LE OPERAZIONI INTERFORZE E MULTINAZIONALI NELLA STORIA MILITARE ACTA II PARTE PRIMA

Sotto l’Alto Patronato del Presidente della Repubblica

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Commissione Italiana Storia Militare

Stato Maggiore DifeSa

CIHM

Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare

Ministero

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difesa

Torino 1 - 6 settembre 2013

le operazioni interforze e multinazionali nella storia militare

Joint and combined operations in the history of warfare Les opérations muLtinationaLes et interarmées dans L’histoire miLitaire

ACTA II T omo

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INDICE GENERALE TOMO II - parte prima relazioni - segue dal i tomo The Conceptof “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without

External Assistance” and Japan-United States Joint Operation ................................................ pag. Yasuaki Chijiwa “PEACE for Galilee” – Naval Operations ............................................................................................................. “ Ze’ev Almog “Together is not enough: Argentine Jointness during the Malvinas War 1982” ............. “ Alejandro Amendolara La Force Interafricaine (Fia) de l’organisation de L’unite africaine (Oua) au Tchad en 1981 ............................................................................................................................................................................... “ 666Mactar Diop - Birama Thioune The Retaking of the Falklands in 1982: Successful Joint Operations Against the Odds .. “ John Peaty L’Operazione “United Shield” e il 26° Gruppo Navale Italiano ............................................................ “ Francesco Loriga (Gulf War / Desert Storm Operation)

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Joint Operations UAE Armed Forces Participation in Kuwait’s Liberation War Mohamed Salah Dahmani Le Contingent Marocain en Somalie (Décembre 1992 à Avril 1994): Une opération humanitaire réussie ? .............................................................................................................................. “ Omar El Ouadoudi The Participation of the Danish Navy in Operation Maritime Monitor / Sharp Guard 1993-1996 .......................................................................................................... “ Søren Nørby UNITAF and UNOSOM II: The Failure of Multinational Operations in Somalia 1992-1994 ...................................................................................................................................... “ Richard W. Stewart Strategic Integration - Mission and Practices of NATO Special Operations Forces ........... “ Nancy Collins Le missioni di pace della Polizia di Stato .................................................................................................................... “ Raffaele Camposano

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La Task Force “GRIFO” in Afghanistan ................................................................................................................ “ Francesco lamberti Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Approaching ISAF operations in Afghanistan within Galula’s frame of counterinsurgency ....................................................................................................... “ David Vestenskov “Joint and combined operations in the history of warfare” ................................................................ “ Antonio Coppola Il potere aerospaziale durante l’operazione “Unified P otector” .......................................................... “ Settimo Caputo - Giancarlo Maragucci Coalitions militaires entre la guerre et l’humanitaire ...................................................................................... “ Issa Babana El Alaoui Synthetic historical review of the technical and political evolution of the Italian intelligence Services since the beginning of the Kingdom of Italy to the last reforms in 2007 and 2012 ................................................................................................................................................. “ Maria Gabriella Pasqualini NATO’s deployable forces: The history of the Allied Mobile Force and the UK Mobile Force as historical blueprints for the NATO Response Force today ..................... “ Bernd Lemke Guerre di coalizione e operazioni combinate ........................................................................................................... “ Virgilio Ilari Time-out for Jointness – Time for the Comprehensive Approach ........................................................ “ Joerg Hillmann To think war differently: from AirLand Battle to Effects-Based Operations ............................. “ Ma Uzh Daniel Fuhrer

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PROPRIETÀ LETTERARIA Tutti i diritti riservati: Vietata la riproduzione anche parziale senza autorizzazione © 2013 • Ministero della Difesa CISM – Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare Salita S. Nicola da Tolentino, 1/B – Roma quinto.segrstorico@smd.difesa.it A cura di: Prof. Piero Crociani Dott.ssa Annalisa Bifolchi Comitato di Redazione Direttore Colonnello EI Matteo PAESANO Coordinatore generale Tenente Colonnello EI Gianluca FICANO Collaboratori Sottotenente EI Paolo FORMICONI Maresciallo Ordinario G. di F. Mauro SALTALAMACCHIA Brigadiere CC Giuseppe MARINARO Sergente Maggiore EI Fabrizio FERRARI Cod ISBN: 9788898185078 Copia esclusa dalla vendita Stampa: Litos Roma

Relazioni - segue -

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The Concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” and Japan-United States Joint Operation Yasuaki CHIJIWA Introduction uring the Cold War, Japan had adopted the concept of so-called “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” (gentei shōkibo shinryaku dokuryoku taisho) in its national security policy. This concept first appeared in the “National Defense Program Outline” which was formulated in October, 1976 (“the NDPO (or bōei taikō) 1976”). The NDPO 1976 mentioned that: “Should direct aggression occur, Japan will repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage by taking immediate responsive action and trying to conduct an integrated, systematic operation of its defense capability. Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance. In cases where the unassisted repelling of aggression is not feasible, due to scale, type or other factors of such aggression, Japan will continue an unyielding resistance by mobilizing all available forces until such time as cooperation from the United States is introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression.”1 That concept was also followed in the “Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation” which was some kind of a basis for joint operation planning in these bilateral relations and formulated in November, 1978 (“the Guidelines 1978”). The Guidelines said: “In principle, Japan by itself will repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Japan will repel it with the cooperation of the United States.” 2 The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” had been maintained until the new “NDPO 1995” (formulated in November, 1995) and the new “Guidelines 1997” (formulated in July, 1997) abandoned it in the aftermath of the Cold War. What did the concept mean to Japan’s national security policy? Why was that abandoned after the end of the Cold War? There is a trend in Japan today for people to understand its national security policy through a paradigm of conflict between “Autonomous Defense (or jishu bōei) line” and the “Japan-U.S. Alliance line.” According to one point of view, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was a product of the “Autonomous Defense line.” This valued Japan’s autonomy from the U.S. because it had the intention “to repel without external assistance” in spite of the U.S. duty based

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1 The National Defense Program Outline 1976 (October 29, 1976). 2 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (November 27, 1978).

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on Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, which prescribes that the U.S. should defend Japan when it was attacked3. However, according to the other point of view, the concept would enhance Japan’s security relationship with the U.S. because Japan could not help relying on the U.S. assistance to repel greater aggression than “limited and small scale.”4 But, is it true that we can understand what the concept meant through the paradigm of “Autonomous Defense vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance”? The purpose of my presentation today is to reconsider what the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” meant, from the view point of “Defense Force Building” and “Operation.” The ndpo 1976 and the concept of “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” After World War II, Japan’s defense force was re-built in accordance with successive four five-year plans. However, in the 1970’s, it became difficult to accomplish the goal for defense force building due to the recession. Furthermore in Japan after World War II, many were allergic to defense issues and some groups that regarded the Self-Defense Force as an unconstitutional entity were powerful. Therefore, the policy to build defense force against the Soviet Union threat as in the past, in spite of détente, had been facing growing criticisms. Since defense force building by a five-year plan as in the past became deadlocked, the NDPO 1976 was formulated based on a way of thinking to build the “minimum necessary” defense force. The NDPO is now the official document that sets forth the basic policies for Japan’s national security, as well as basic guidelines for Japan’s defense force in the future, including the significance and the role of Japan’s defense force, the specific organization of the SDF and the target levels of major defense equipment to be developed. Unlike previous five-year plans, the NDPO 1976 lasted for 19 years. Then there were a question which asked “what was the ‘minimum necessary’ defense force?” The NDPO 1976 answered that it meant defense force that “could repel to limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance.” Concretely speaking, it meant Japan’s defenses included 180,000 personnel in the Ground SDF, 4 flotillas in the Maritime SDF, 430 combat aircrafts in the Air SDF. Then, would Japan actually repel without the U.S. assistance when limited and smallscale aggression occurred? In reality it was not. Noboru Hōshuyama, who was deeply committed to the formulation of the NDPO 1976 as a staff in Division of Defense in Bureau of Defense in Defense Agency, said in his oral history that: 3 Akihiro Sadō, Sengo Nihon no Bōei to Seiji [defense and politics in the postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbun Kan, 2005), pp. 274-278. See also Yū Takeda, “Nihon no Bōei Seisaku ni okeru ‘Jishu’ no Ronri: ‘Bōei Keikaku no Taikō’ wo Chūshin ni,” [logic of ‘autonomy’ in Japan’s defense policy: featuring formulation of ‘National Defense Program Outline’] Kokusai Seiji Keizai Gaku Kenkyū [study of international politics and economy] 17 (March 2006). 4 Norman D. Levin, Japan’s Changing Defense Posture (RAND: California, 1988), pp. 13-14. See also Shingo Yoshida, Nichi Bei Dōmei no Seidoka: Hatten to Shinka no Rekishi Katei [institutionalization of JapanU.S. alliance: historical process of its development and deepening] (Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppan Kai, 2012), pp. 272-275.

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“[If the U.S. helps us at a pinch] many would be always talking about ‘Japan’s defense force is not matter. SDF can buy their choice within the limit of budget. There is no problem to exercise by such equipment.’ This is not the ideal philosophy for defense force building in an independent state. [Therefore, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was needed.]”5 Moreover Akira Shiota, who was former defense councilor at the time of formulating the Guidelines 1978, told in his oral history as the following: “The NDPO 1976 said ‘Japan will repel limited and small-scale aggression, in principle, without external assistance.’ But actually SDF would not repel limited and smallscale aggression without external assistance. It was not an actual operation plan. It was just a defense force building plan. So it only wanted to build defense force that would be comparable strength to repel limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance.”6 As described above, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was not an operational concept but something constructed to clarify the meaning of the “minimum necessary” for defense force building. The guidelines 1978 and the concept of “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” After the Vietnam War, misgivings had arisen in Japan whether American commitment in Asia would decrease or not. In response to such concerns, the Guidelines, set forth the basis for wide-range exchanging opinions between Japan and the U.S., were formulated to operating of joint research and training, mutual exchanging in the areas of equipment and technology, cooperating of host nation support for the U.S. force in Japan, and the basis for joint operation plan. In the Guidelines 1978, also, the description of “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” was incorporated. Why the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” that meant the concept for defense force building was incorporated into the Guideline that meant operational plan? Still, was the concept operational one? The answer is no. Last year I interviewed with a person who was deeply committed to formulate the Guidelines 1978 as a staff in Joint Staff Office. In this interview, about the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance,” he said: “The Guidelines described similar words [about “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” with the NDPO], but there are no relation in substance between them.” “So the theory of ‘the NDPO 1976’ was never substantially introduced to the Guidelines. We did not consult with the U.S. side about the concept.”7 5 Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku eds., Hōshuyama Noboru Ōraru Hisutorī [oral history of Noboru Hōshuyama] I (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyū Daigakuin Daigaku, 2005), pp. 67-68. 6 Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyū Kai eds., Shiota Akira Ōraru Hisutorī [oral history of Akira Shiota] (Tokyo: Kindai Nihon Shiryō Kenkyū Kai, 2006), p. 118. 7 Author’s interview with person involved in the Secretariat of Joint Staff Council (November 8, 2012, Tokyo).

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The reason why the first Guidelines referred to “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” nevertheless was that, in the negotiation, Japanese side recognized “if we did not indicate the description of it to the U.S. at the very least, Japan might repel all scale aggression without external assistance. Then support from the U.S. would be limited only to make up for deficiencies. That is terrible.”8 In other words, this description in the Guidelines stressed to clarify that Japan could not repel aggression more than limited and small-scale one without American assistance. Progress of defense force building and Japan-U.s. Defense cooperation After that, through 1980’s, defense force that the NDPO 1976 targeted gradually became to build. P-3C antisubmarine aircrafts and F-15 fighters were introduced. Then, there were increasing interest in operations that was difficult to consider in the era when defense force was not built enough. And by formulation of the Guidelines, joint exercises between the SDF and the U.S. Force boosted. In November, 1978, the Air SDF had first Japan-U.S. joint exercise. In February, 1980, the Maritime SDF first joined the Rim of the Pacific Exercise. In November, 1982, the first Japan-U.S. joint field training exercise that assumed the aggression against Japan was conducted. In October, 1986, the first Japan-U.S bilateral joint exercise was also conducted. Through these exercises and exchanges, role-sharing between Japan and the U.S. gradually became clear so it became possible to consider operation concretely. The end of the cold war and abandonment of the concept of “repelling limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance” After the end of the Cold War, the NDPO 1976 and the Guidelines 1978 that were formulated in the Cold War era were naturally revised. The newly formulated NDPO 1995 said “Should direct aggression occur, take immediate responsive action by conducting an integrated and systematic operation of its defense capabilities, in appropriate cooperation with the United States, in order to repel such aggression at the earliest possible stage”9 and the Guidelines 1997 also said “Japan will have primary responsibility immediately to take action and to repel an armed attack against Japan as soon as possible. The United States will provide appropriate support to Japan. Such bilateral cooperation may vary according to the scale, type, phase, and other factors of the armed attack. This cooperation may include preparations for and execution of coordinated bilateral operations, steps to prevent further deterioration of the situation, surveillance, and intelligence sharing.”10 In other words, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was abandoned. Regarding that development, Masahiro Akiyama, who was Director of Defense Bureau at that time and initiated to formulate the NDPO 1995, wrote in his memories that: 8 Ibid. 9 The National Defense Program Outline 1995 (November 28, 1995). 10 The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997).

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“Speaking in the extreme, apart from whether the U.S. military would battle on the frontline actually, considering there are great U.S. military presence in Japan, when military attack against Japan would occur, based on Japan-U.S. military alliance, it would be inevitable that Japan and the U.S. actually cooperate to repel any scale aggressions from the very beginning. ‘In one case, Japan would repel it without the U.S. assistance because the attack is limited and small-scale.’ ‘In the other case, Japan and the U.S. cooperate because scale of the attack is greater.’ It is nonsense. I thought that it should not be indicated any concept that differed so much from actual operations.”11 The concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” was gradually considered to be unsuitable with any actual operation. Conclusion According to verbal evidences by related persons in Defense Agency and the SDF, it seems that formation and abandonment of the concept of “Repelling Limited and SmallScale Aggression without External Assistance” did not have much to do with the paradigm of “Autonomous Defense vs. the Japan-U.S. Alliance” that scholars on Japan’s security policy often use. In the 1970’s, the concept was constructed to build the “minimum necessary” defense force after defense force building by counter-threat five-year plan was deadlocked and indicated in the NDPO 1976. The Guideline that was a basis for joint operation plan between Japan and the U.S. also did not regard it as operational concept. However, through 1980’s, as Japan’s defense force building progressed and joint exercises and exchanges boosted between Japan and the U.S., there were increasing interest in operation. And in the 1990’s, after the end of the Cold War, the concept was abandoned by operational request. In short, the concept of “Repelling Limited and Small-Scale Aggression without External Assistance” played a role to form a bridge between defense force building and operation in Japan’s security policy from the Cold War era to the post-Cold War era.

11 Masahiro Akiyama, Nichi Bei no Senryaku Taiwa ga Hajimatta: Anpo Sai Teigi no Butai Ura [strategic dialogues between Japan and the U.S. have started: behind-the-scenes of redefining Japan-U.S. security partnership] (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2002), p. 104.

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“PEACE for Galilee” – Naval Operations Ze’ev Almog

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n June 5, 1982, the Israeli Navy has launched, in collaboration with other branches of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), operation “PEACE for Galilee”. The operation was set out in order to stop unprovoked terrorist attacks from Lebanon on civilian population in northern Israel. The IDF’s goal was to destroy the terrorists’ infrastructure in Lebanon in order to eradicate future terrorist activities. The tasks of the Navy were to support the ground forces and to prevent interference of the IDF operation by the Syrian Navy. The specific missions of the Israeli Navy were as follows: a) To land the 96th Operational Area Paratrooper Division and to transfer their armored vehicles, equipment and troops onto the coastal shores of Lebanon. b) To support advancing troops along the coast of Lebanon with accurate fire while targeting enemy objects on ground. c) To impose a sea blockade on all Lebanese ports in order to prevent the transfer of terrorist troops and weapons through the sea. The idea and execution of landing forces from the sea was based on accumulated experience in amphibious operations in prior years:

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During the War of Attrition, on September 8, 1969, a relative small landing operation took place in the Gulf of Suez by only three 36-meter-landing crafts, executed in one short cycle. Between 1972 – 1973 several landing operations were planned and trained for in the South-western shore of the Suez Gulf (operation “Green Light”). Even though the operation did not take place eventually, the Navy has gained valuable experience in the area of integrated sea and land operation, command and control procedures, division and delegation of power to the different field commanders, the safeguarding of the theater of action, the planning of maritime routes and the methods of capturing and securing beachheads. Since the beginning of 1979 and until 1982, all amphibious forces and their auxiliary components were evacuated from the Sinai Peninsula - in accordance with the peace agreement with Egypt. They were concentrated in the Mediterranean southern base of Ashdod, which is situated close to relevant ground forces. All the naval units were put under one command, the commander of this base; who trained all members of the amphibious forces and was later assigned to commanding the whole operation from the board of a missile boat. Operation “Ohr Yarok” Planed and prepared for the Yom Kippur War (1973)

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XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM The Naval Prticipants in the Operation Peace for Galilee

Between 1979 – 1982, while executing various organizational, instructional and command moves towards a possible amphibious operation, a series of operative activities have taken place along the shores of Lebanon. As a side effect, such activities contributed to the elimination of terrorist attempts to penetrate Israel from the sea. Considering this experience, it is not surprising that the naval operation of “Peace for Galilee” was very successful and ended without a single casualty or damage to vessels. The Israeli naval forces were comprised of 22 missile boats providing support fire to ground forces, plus isolating and securing the area of operation from possible Syrian intervention. 2 submarines for detecting enemy targets on shore and for directing the missile boats’ fire against such targets. This is in addition to giving early warning against sea bound enemy forces. Directing Missileboats’ Fire 15 fast patrol boats for direct support to the landing troops. 3 landing crafts which could land 41 – 49 armored vehicles and 604 troops. An auxiliary ship that carried 50 Naval Commando troops to capture the beachhead. 34 zodiac boats that were dedicated to delivering the paratroopers to shore. 2 tugboats for vessel salvage operation.

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Two additional squad teams of Naval commando fighters were deployed north of the town of Sidon in order to prevent reinforcement of enemy forces from reaching the beachhead from the north and to intercept fleeing terrorists from the south. Shortly before the first landing, the commando troops on the beachhead eliminated two groups of terrorists that approached the site, thereby creating a secured gateway for the landing troops. The Naval activities in sea and on shore have eliminated the need for any air support. In spite of continuous shooting and shelling at Naval forces, no troops were injured. During the first 10 days of the operation, the Navy has delivered and landed 388 vehicles and about 1000 troops. In the following three months the Navy delivered 1087 vehicles to and from Lebanon.

Catching the Beachhead by Naval Commandos in Operation Peace for Galilee (1982)

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“Together is not enough: Argentine Jointness during the Malvinas War 1982” Alejandro AMENDOLARA Introduction ike most militaries, the Argentine Armed Forces prepared military plans for those scenarios that they felt were the most compelling for their country. National-level war planning, however, was not a joint activity before the war in 1982 -except in times of internal crisis, and even then, joint cooperation tended to be accomplished by ad hoc committees-. For routine planning, each service prepared its own plans, with the Argentine Navy naturally focused on the South Atlantic, constantly updating theorical plans for the repossesion of the Malvinas Islands.

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In Beaumont’s words: “Trying to reduce jointness and opposition to it to rational, measurable terms matches the dilemma of the biologist who must kill to dissect, since the separate roots of this conflict rise from the common ground of intense human emotions”.1 1. Initial planning: In January 1982, the Argentine Navy Chief of Naval Operations Vice Admiral José Lombardo, was ordered to prepare a plan to take back the Malvinas without necessarily defending them. Each service appointed a representative to work in a small and secret working group. With diplomatic negotiations between Argentina and Britain scheduled to resume in February 1982, the joint planning group believed it had a few months to finalize planning should negotiations fail. A military operation, if it were to occur, was likely to happen between July and October 1982. However, events were to escalate during the second-half of March 1982, and took the Working Group by surprise. This fact and its evolution promoted to speed up the strategic planning, and the Joint General Staff was forced to suspend the elaboration of the documents committed by the Military Committee (“COMIL”) on March 16, 1982, to devote to combine and complete the documents made by the Working Group. On March 23 the documents were completed in haste, being approved by the Military Committee on the same day. The Campaign Plan implemented was expected to move with the occupation of the islands exclusively, creating the Theatre of Operations Malvinas (“TOM”), in charge of an Army officer, Brigadier-General Osvaldo García, and a first Military Directive was issued containing general guidelines with guidance for the effective defence of the islands if the British were to react, that is, the assumptions and structure that will frame the future South Atlantic Theatre of Operations. 1 Beaumont, Roger A.; “Joint Operations – A Short Story”; Greenwood Press; Westport, CT, USA; 1993, p.186.

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2. First setback: Until the Argentine landings on the Malvinas on April 2nd, all had gone according to plan for the Military Junta. Both the Malvinas and South Georgia were repossesed with a minimal loss of life to themselves, and what was believed to be politically more important, no loss of life to the British. Here, the military clock was supposed to have stopped running, and the Argentine troops involved were to return to mainland. But, as Clausewitz wrote in his “Principles of War”, “The conduct of war resembles the workings of an intrincate machine with tremendous friction, so that combination which are easily planned on paper can be executed only with great effort”. 2 The British government dispatched a Naval Task Force on April 5th, to recapture the islands, so the Argentine plans had to be changed. “As soon as the Military Junta had been warned of the British decision to break diplomatic relations and send a naval task force to retake the islands, troop evacuation was ordered halted and units were made ready to return to the theatre of operations. The decision, which was at odds with the original plans, denoted a change in the initial strategic objective, which had been “Occupy in order to negotiate” to “reinforce in order to deter Great Britain from retaking the islands by force, and then negotiate”. 3 “It could be supposed that since the initiative in retaking the islands had been Argentina’s, its armed forces must have had sufficient warning for the approaching campaign. It was not so. Contingency planning for use of the military option had been cloaked in such secrecy that even Argentina’s intelligence service had been kept in the dark until the last few hours prior to the landings in the islands”. 4 3. One commander, several commands: “Once the strategic decision had been made to reinforce the Malvinas garrison, the Military Junta decided to establish various operational commands in order to beef up the defense of both the islands and the mainland. The Theatre of Operations Malvinas was deactivated, and was established the Theater of Operations South Atlantic (“TOAS”) command. It had the heaviest responsibility, for under it was the Malvinas military garrison, whose task it was to consolidate positions and keep the islands from falling back into British hands”. 5 On April 7th, General Galtieri signed Decree Nbr 700 establishing the TOAS and designating Vice-admiral Lombardo as its commander, with authority to exercise all functions except military governorship. Since then onwards, he had now to prepare the military defense for the Malvinas. “At the same time, the Strategic Air Command (“Comando Aéreo Estratégico”“CAE”) was established. Its mission was conceived as being more defensive in nature, since Great Britain’s military reaction had yet to be recognized in all of its might. Major2 Von Clausewitz, Carl; “Principles of War”, Dover Publications Inc., New York, 2003, p.61. 3 Moro, Rubén O.; “The History of the South Atlantic Conflict – The War for the Malvinas”, Praeger, New York, 1989, p.74. 4 Moro, O.; p.68. 5 Moro, O.; p.78.

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Brigadier Conrado Weber, who had been air operations commander, was appointed to head the CAE. In turn, CAE established the Air Force South (“Fuerza Aérea Sur” “FAS”), which would be entrusted with the implementation of tactical missions, using the Air Force’s available inventory of attack aircraft, which would be provided to FAS on an as-needed basis”. 6 “Air defense of the mainland would be the responsibility of Air Command Defense Zone South. TOAS would have both Malvinas Military Garrison and the high seas fleet under its command, as well as the submarine force. The garrison would be commanded by Brig. Gen. Mario Benjamín Menéndez, who established a joint command that included the three main components, one of each service, of which the most significant would be the land forces, which would have three infantry brigades assigned to it”. 7 “The FAS established its command post in the City of Comodoro Rivadavia and assigned its attack aircraft, parceling them out among the main airstrips and bases throughout Patagonia”. 8 The newly appointed commander Lombardo recalls: “The means from the Argentine Air Force on the continent would not be subordinated to me. Any necessary mission requested, should be coordinated with them. Also, the National Strategic Reserve would not be under my command. If necessary, I should ask for its deployment. Logistics would be the responsibility of each of the Armed Forces”. 9 On April 12th, Lombardo’s headquarters issued Plan Esquemático Nbr 1/82 “S” –a South Atlantic Theater of Operations Schematic (Operations) Plan with annexes that outlined a general scheme for defense and provided tasks for component commanders. Nevertheless, as the political level differences between the services tended to be unresolved, communications further down to the chain of command reflected independent operations that spawned miscommunication, arguments, and confusion at the Operational Level. It soon became a reality that each commander in chief in the Military Junta ordered independently to his Armed Force, respectively. Just a few examples of that, were the decision from the Army’s Commander in Chief, General Galtieri, ordering two Infantry Brigades to cross from the mainland to the islands without prior knowledge of the COMIL; the Navy’s Commander in Chief, Admiral Anaya, ordering the Fleet to withdraw to coastal waters after the sinking of the cruiser Belgrano, once again, without consulting the COMIL; and the Air Force Commander in Chief, Brigadier Lami Dozo, with his planes not assembled or operated under a single command, launching air attacks or deciding withdrawals from the Islands, without knowledge of the others. After the conflict, Lombardo expressed in his report: “How often in those days, I recalled reading the history of the Pacific War during the Second World War, when U.S. admirals complained about Mac Arthur and the Air Force”. 10 6 Moro, O.; p.78-79. 7 Moro, O.; p.79. 8 Moro, O.; p.79. 9 Lombardo, Juan José; “Malvinas: Errores, Anécdotas y Reflexiones”; unpublished edition, p.9. 10 Lombardo, Juan José; ob.cit., p.30.

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4. An un-chained command: Undoubtedly, this lack of coordination at the top of the chain of command was to affect the course of tactical actions on the Islands and the logistics, vital for a garrison under the British naval blockade. Since the beginning of the British naval bombardments, air support was incessantly demanded to attack ships, because of the lack of coastal defence artillery with sufficient range. It was a constant flow of dispatches, messages at times with intemperate tone which did not receive the proper attention due the poor information provided or if the mission was ordered, it was ineffective as there was no targets in the reported position. Added to that was the inability of Lombardo to dispose directly the air assets, under the orders of a parallel command to his, which ordered missions by itself without confirmation or subordination. General Menendez decided to raise the issue to his commander, Admiral Lombardo, as the lack of reaction on ships bombarding shore positions, began to affect the soldier’s morale, who felt increasingly powerless, Admiral Lombardo understood him and said he was going to bring the matter to the core of the Military Committee. But, the answer to Menéndez came instead through the chief of the air component in the Malvinas, Brigadier Castellanos, who in turn had been reported from the mainland by Brigadier Crespo, the FAS Commander, who had told Castellanos that the issue had been discussed at the Military Committee and had arrived at the conclusion that what Crespo had being doing was right, that the air combat power was to be preserved for the decisive moment, which would be the British landings, and would only be used by exception in the event of very profitable targets. Facing this circumstance, Menendez wrote a message to Admiral Lombardo pointing out that he had had an indirect and verbal response. He added that “if this was true, as commander in the Malvinas, I understand that there are some things to clarify”. 11 On May 16th, 1982, Menéndez informed the Commander in Chief of the Army, about the critical situation of the forces and staff under his command. “Two days after this radio to Lombardo, I decided to make a full report for a better knowledge of the Commander in Chief of the Army”. 12 “All these facts let to reflect the actual climate which began to be felt in the Argentine High Command, diminished in its work by the lack of joint action, due the institutional pride which stopped being subordinated to each other, and arose the deficiencies on the defensive system of the Malvinas Islands “.13 These circumstances had to be solved in anticipation of the British invasion, which seemed imminent by mid-May. Lombardo recalls: “Disharmony had already done its damage, and the vacated space was occupied instead by suspicion and mistrust. Any aircraft failure at the last moment; delays in warm up times; errors in dispatches reporting 11 Túrolo, Carlos M.; “Malvinas – Testimonio de su Gobernador”, Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 1983, p.163. 12 Túrolo, p.164. 13 Mayorga, Horacio A.; “No Vencidos –Relato de las Operaciones Navales en el conflicto del Atlántico Sur”; Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1988, p.347.

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results or looking for information; lack of coordination in the use of the tanker aircraft, etc., caused a flood of requests for information that didn’t help the war effort”. 14 But, on the other hand, “Jointness existed at the tactical level within the Argentine forces during the conflict. In virtually every case it was the product of initiatives by midlevel officers who put aside service parochialism to confront a common enemy”. 15 “An incipient jointness was improving logistics services, the Air Defense, and the Combat Information and Operations Centers. Also, in the air bases where Naval and Air Force squadrons operated together, “air units provided weapons and advised attack methods to each other, and exchanged information. All was theirs, there was no difference”. 16 Unfortunately, such ad hoc efforts were too few and too late. 5. The ceopecon is created: While the Argentine media in Buenos Aires trumpeted the successes of the air attacks on British warships, the Junta met to assess the on-going military situation and the need for better operational-level decision making. Building upon its decisions a week prior, the Military Committee decided to place General Osvaldo García, who had commanded the initial invasion forces, back in charge on May 23rd, with unified command below him (at first), both for combat operations and logistics. Information and requests from subordinate commands would come through the Centro de Operaciones Conjuntas [Joint Operations Center] (CEOPECON) to General García, ensuring that the Military Committee was kept informed. Military Committee approval of decisions wasn’t required, but they would become involved in requests for additional resources and resolution of major issues. Guidance had been given to brigadier-general Menendez to maintain personal contact with the operational commanders at the CEOPECON to ensure more fluid cooperation among the services in defending the islands. Additionally, the Commander of the South Atlantic Theater of Operations Command moved from Puerto Belgrano to Comodoro Rivadavia to preclude delays executing a defensive strategy. Moreover, it was determined that General García, the most senior among the operational commanders, would have the decisive voice in making operational-level decisions. This Centre did not plan or conduct operations, but support for operational and logistical activities. Anyway, its members interpreted in different ways their faculties with respect to the TOAS. In fact, the creation of the CEOPECON involved the TOAS dissolution, what was not fully and ultimately shared by all the members from COMIL and CEOPECON. In May 26th, under internal pressure by the home news showing the heroism of the pilots of the Air Force in their attacks on British warships, and the sacrifice of the Navy with the victims of the General Belgrano, the commander of the Fifth Army Corps, asked Gen. Menéndez -without knowledge of the other members of CEOPECON- the 14 Mayorga, Horacio; p.342. 15 Scheina, Robert L.; “Argentine Jointness and the Malvinas”, JFQ, Summer 1994, p.95. 16 Mayorga, Horacio; p.342.

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planning of a major offensive action on the British beachhead in San Carlos.17 Menéndez plan, made up with the participation and suggestions from the three services components under his command, was finally rejected by the CEOPECON. Anyway, with the British troops landed on the islands and next to Puerto Argentino, the fate of the Argentine success was almost decided. Finally, with the last ring of defenses around Puerto Argentino already fallen, on the morning of June 14th, General Menendez sought contact the CEOPECON before making his final determination. There was little interest to answer his call, so he finally ended up talking with General Galtieri, who seemed oblivious to what was happening on the battlefield. If Menendez had been on his own in the defense of the islands, for the decision to surrender the garrison, he would be even more alone. 6. Aftermath: Just two weeks after the Argentine surrender on the islands, the Commander of the FAS, submitted a report to the Commander of the Air Force, with the lessons learned related to his command in the conflict. Brigadier Crespo says in his report that “the actions of the three armed forces can set the conclusion that there are three completely different forces, in terms of conception and strategies related to the joint efforts” and that “the inability of the Air Force to generate a joint action, motivated every effort to be ultimately sterile and the heavy losses in lives and material generated by his action, wasted”.18 On December 2nd, 1982, the new Military Junta in charge ordered the creation of an inquire commission19 on the political and military strategic liabilities over the commanding officers during the planning and the conflict evolution.20 The commission’s final report, plus its documentary and the witnesses’ testimonies, known as the Rattenbach Report, due to the general’s name presiding said commission, was opened in February 2012, by decision of the National Executive Power. 21 It should be noted that, in relation to joint doctrine, the commission said that “the deficiencies observed on the jointness conduct, have resulted in a significant level and demand for an urgent solution. The first joint action of the [Argentine] armed forces occurred in this war with Britain. There are no previous records, of training operations or major joint exercises. This has been a serious responsibility of the conducting officers of this conflict”. 22 17 “The Army seems to have only an attitude of static defence which, should it continue indefinitely, will make the men wilt in their own positions even before being able to engage in combat with the mass of enemy troops … in your hands and in your future decisions rest the honour of the Argentine Army”. 18 Cardoso, O; Kirschbaum, R; and Van der Kooy, E.; “Malvinas - La Trama Secreta”; Editorial Sudamericana, Buenos Aires, 2012. 19 Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades del Conflicto del Atlántico Sur (“CAERCAS”). 20 Minutes of the Military Junta; December 2nd, 1982. 21 Decree Nbr. 200/2012. 22 Rattenbach Report, 870.

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The report continues: “In modern warfare, only the joint integration of the Armed Forces allows the achievement of proposed military objectives. Therefore, this requires, a harmonious, balanced and rational development adapted to the needs of modern combat of the three Armed Forces. It matters little that any service acquires a potential or capacity determined, if not accompanied by a similar development in the other services”.23 “To solve this problem, it should become a primary responsibility of the highest authorities of each service. It will be necessary, first, to mend fences, to define operational areas, to develop joint doctrine, to conduct theoretical and practical exercises, to implement courses for the general staff and, crucially, to understand each and every one of the members from an operational command, the mission and the fate of that command are above all considerations of institutional order. Wars are won or lost by the Armed Forces of a nation, not by this or that service. Modern warfare does not admit the possibility of the victory exclusively by a single service. Instead, the certainty of defeat is there, if they act in watertight compartments”. 24 Finally, the Commission concludes that “The Joint General Staff is the key organization to operate this transformation. This will require to prestige, enhance and giving to it the most capable men each service can devote to it, according to their joint vocation, officially accredited and qualified. A unique system of planning, and a joint war college, plus demanding more careful observation and selection in this sense, should be the first steps”. 25 The Rattenbach Report, was the basis for the prosecution to the proceedings before the Armed Forces High Court, to establish the responsibilities of the main Argentine commanders.26 The final judgment on May 15th, 1986, condemned the members of the Military Junta, but noted out that “in their capacity as members of the Military Committee, they had and exercised the responsibility of conducting the military strategic level, and affected the operational strategy, creating situations that proved insuperable for strategic operational and tactical levels”. 27 The sentence continues: “The charge of lack of unity of command revealed, since the beginning, on the occasion of the Working Group members being appointed and instructed separately, and to have exposed their work and conclusions to each his Commander in Chief separately. It was also true that each commander in chief ordered his force independently. In the operational aspect, we conclude that the facts referred harmed military operations, because undoubtedly involved efforts dispersion and losses, with consequent operational disorder “. 23 24 25 26

Rattenbach Report, 871. Rattenbach Report, 872. Rattenbach Report, 873. “Judging provisions of Decree No. 2971/83 dated November 11, 1983, of the alleged offenses under the Code of Military Justice, and events mentioned in the report produced by the Commission for Analysis and Evaluation of political and strategic responsibilities military Conflict in the South Atlantic War “. May 15th, 1986. 27 Judgement, Paragraph 39th.

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7. The road to jointness: Despite all the efforts to work together, thoughout the fighting, the Argentine armed forces rarely had a jointness vision of the conflict. In truth, the Argentine lack of “jointness” was the rule among armed services in most of the world and not the exception. “Jointness” was especially difficult for the Argentina armed forces, for they had found themselves in opposite sides in the occasional inter-services feuds that arose following World War II. Therefore, each Argentine armed force fought its own war against a more unified British military machine, which also experimented similar problems, but had the convenient speed to react and reach victory. Then, the Argentines were fully aware of the price that was paid for this lack of jointness. It was the task of the following constitutional governments to complete a radical change in the organization and structure of the Armed Forces, and their jointness, drawing the lessons from the Malvinas conflict. “In joint operations, the officers who grew up together, sharing a particular culture, are found to have different manners, shapes, language and procedures of other cultures that are unfamiliar, but rather difficult to understand. These cultural features on ground, naval and air units are so tagged, that it is often easier to cross national borders with their foreign colleagues, rather than between services of the same country”. 28 “For truly effective jointness, new institutional perspectives must evolve, and commitment or it must work against the forces of history and tradition”. 29 So, in 1988 began a process to establish the functions for the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces, with special competence in: a) The formulation of joint military doctrine b) Development of joint military planning c) The management of the joint military training d) Control of strategic planning and operational effectiveness of joint military action. 30 Anyway, it was not until 2006 that the law was regulated by a series of decrees and ministerial decisions, which led to the creation of the Joint War College of the Armed Forces, as the military academic institution for the higher education for Senior Officers. Its mission is to train the officers in conducting at the Operational Strategic level and the development of the duties of general staff in the Strategic Operational and Strategic levels, within the framework of military joint and joint-combined action, to optimize the use of the Nation’s military arm, and professionals interested in perfecting national defense through the development of graduate opportunities, research and extension activities. Let me conclude with words of Maurice de Saxe, “Very few men occupy themselves with the higher problems of war. They pass their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the only branch of the military act. When they arrive at the command of armies they are totally ignorant and, in default of knowing what should be done, they do only what they know. One of the branches of the art of war, that is to say drill and the method of fighting, is methodical; the other is intellectual. For the conduct of the latter it is essential that ordinary men should not be chosen”. 31 28 Cushman, John H.; “Comando y Control de las Fuerzas en el Teatro de Operaciones”; Instituto de Publicaciones Navales; Buenos Aires, 1985; p.99 29 Scheina, p.101. 30 Article 17, Law Nbr. 23.554. 31 Maurice de Saxe; “Reveries on the Art of War”; Dover Publications, Inc, Mineola, New York, 2007 edition; p.119.

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La Force Interafricaine (Fia) de l’organisation de L’unite africaine (Oua) au Tchad en 1981 Mactar DIOP Birama THIOUNE

L’

Afrique a conduit des opérations de paix, avec un relatif succès, en particulier dans le cadre de la CEDEAO, au Libéria (en 1990 et 1994), en Sierra Leone (1997), en Côte d’Ivoire (2003), en Guinée-Bissau (1999 et 2012) et au Mali (2013). Aujourd’hui, des mécanismes de forces en attente existent dans les organisations sous-régionales africaines. Cependant, beaucoup d’erreurs ont été commises avant d’atteindre ce résultat. L’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA) a été crée à Addis-Abeba (Ethiopie) en 1963 par les 32 Etats africaine. Elle a fonctionné jusqu’en 2002, date à laquelle elle a fut remplacé par l’Union Africaine (UA). La Force Interafricaine (FIA) déployée par l’Organisation de l’Unité Africaine (OUA) au Tchad en 1981 pour faire cesser un conflit à la fois interne, internationale et idéologique, quoique n’ayant pas été un modèle de réussite, représente une étape décisive dans la marche vers la sécurité collective. Nous examinerons d’abord la situation politico-militaire au Tchad en 1979 (I), ensuite les circonstances dans lesquelles la Force a été constituée et engagée (II) et enfin nous en dresserons le bilan aux plans militaire, politico-diplomatique et des opérations de paix (III). I- La situation politico-militaire du Tchad en 1979 En 1979, le Tchad apparaît comme un pays déchiré par un conflit aux origines anciennes, que plusieurs tentatives diplomatiques de règlement n’ont pas pu faire cesser. II- Une situation de conflit permanent depuis l’indépendance a) - Présentation du Tchad Situé au centre de l’Afrique, le Tchad est un vaste pays continental qui s’étend sur une superficie de 1 284 000 km2. Avant la colonisation française, l’actuel territoire du Tchad était occupé au Nord par les empires de Kanem-Bornou, de Baguirmi et du Ouaddaï. Ces empires s’adonnaient à des activités de pillage, de razzia et d’esclavage sur les populations du Sud. Le Tchad se caractérise par une diversité ethnique, religieuse et économique. Au Nord, les territoires du Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti sont habités par le groupe ethnique Toubou constitué de musulmans éleveurs nomades. Au centre, cohabitent plusieurs ethnies, musulmans et chrétiens, arabes et noires, pasteurs et agriculteurs, sans véritables unité sociologique. Au Sud, il existe également une kyrielle d’ethnies dépourvues d’unité culturelle, avec cependant une prédominance chrétienne et une majorité du groupe

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des Sara auquel appartient le Président François TOMBALBAYE, premier Président du Tchad indépendant. Il est cependant admis par la majorité des tchadiens qu’ « avant la guerre civile de 1979, il n’y avait pas de problème particulier de cohabitation entre eux, qu’ils soient originaires de telle ou telle région et qu’ils pratiquent telle ou telle religion »1. b) - les origines sociopolitiques de la crise Durant la période coloniale, l’administration française s’est davantage reposée sur les populations du Sud plus scolarisées et mieux représentées dans l’administration et les forces de sécurité. La fronde du Tibesti La remise en cause de l’autorité coloniale française est partie Le Tchad du Tibesti dont les populations étaient mécontentes des mauvais traitements de l’administration et de l’armée2. La fronde s’étendra progressivement au Borkou et à l’Ennedi. A l’indépendance du Tchad, le 11 août 1960, les nouveaux gouvernants font face à d’énormes difficultés pour unifier le pays. Confronté aux oppositions Nord-Sud et à la naissance d’organisations politiques, le Président TOMBOLBAYE verse dans une répression aveugle. La rébellion du Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad (FROLINAT) L’Union Nationale Tchadienne (UNT), créée en 1958 au moment du référendum sur l’intégration dans la Communauté française, est interdit par le Président Tombolbaye en janvier 1962. Ses leaders s’exilent au Ghana et en Algérie. Né en avril 1965, le Front 1 Mohamed Tétémadi BANGOURA, Violence politique et conflits en Afrique : le cas du Tchad, l’Harmattan 2005, P 75. 2 Goukouni WEDDEYEEI, Témoignages pour l’histoire du Tchad, Entretien avec Laurent CORREAU, Radio France Internationale, 18 août 2008, PP 6-7 consultable sur http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/104/article_70216.asp

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National de la Libération du Tchad (FLT) s’installe au Soudan et déclenche des opérations militaires à la fin de 1965. L’UNT s’allie avec le FLT pour créer au Soudan, le 22 juin 1966, le FROLINAT3. Parallèlement, la rupture sociale s’accentue entre le pouvoir et le Nord avec, en 1965, l’exil en Lybie du Derdé, chef de la communauté Toubou. En février 1968, le FROLINAT déclenche progressivement une guérilla à partir de la Lybie. Ayant renversé le roi Idriss le 1er septembre 1969, Khadafi accorde son soutien au FROLINAT. A partir de 1971 une dissidence, menée au sein du FROLINAT par Goukouni WEDDEYE et Hissène HABRE, aboutit à la création du Conseil de commandement des Forces Armées du Nord (CCFAN). Hissène HABRE prend de plus en plus de l’importance et s’illustre notamment par l’enlèvement, le 21 avril 1974, de l’ethnologue française Françoise CLAUSTRE. Le 13 avril 1975, le général Félix MALLOUM prend le pouvoir par un coup d’Etat au cours duquel le Président TOMBALBAYE est tué. A partir de 1975, une scission a lieu au sein du CCFAN. Les causes de la rupture entre ces deux leaders nordistes sont à trouver dans le désaccord sur le traitement de l’affaire CLAUSTRE et davantage sur les relations avec la Lybie, HABRE se montrant intransigeant sur la souveraineté tchadienne sur la bande d’Aouzou. A l’issue des accords de Khartoum, le 16 septembre 1977, Hissène HABRE rejoint le pouvoir de MALLOUM où il occupe, le 29 août 1977, le poste de Premier Ministre d’un gouvernement de transition. Le 29 janvier 1978, la faction du CCFAN dirigée par Goukouni WEDDEYE, avec le soutien de la Lybie, lance un offensive qui aboutit à la conquête de Faya Largeau et à la création des Forces Armées Populaires (FAP). La première bataille de Ndjamena (1979) Le gouvernement de MALLOUM se caractérise par des antagonismes régionalistes et des conflits de préséance entre le Président et le Premier Ministre. Ce dernier refuse de désarmer ses FAN que des combats opposent, dès le 12 février 1979, aux Forces Armées Tchadiennes. En mars 1979, dans le cadre des pourparlers entre la rébellion du Nord et HABRE d’une part et entre la rébellion et les troupes françaises d’autre part, une trêve est observée dans les combats. Les FAP de Goukouni en profitent pour franchir le dispositif défensif français et s’engager dans la bataille de Ndjamena aux côtés d’Hissène HABRE, sous le prétexte de protéger les populations nordistes. La situation militaire s’embrase à Ndjamena où s’affrontent les différentes tendances du FROLINAT réunies et les FAT conduites par le Colonel KAMOUGUE. Défaites, celles-ci se replient à LOUMIA à 80 km au Sud de NDJAMENA. Cette première bataille de Ndjamena marque la perte du pouvoir politique par le Sud.

3 Robert BUIJTENHUIJS, Le FROLINAT et les révoltes populaire du Tchad, 1965-1976, Mouton, 1978.

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Les interventions de la France depuis les années 70 La France s’est engagée de 1969 à 1972 d’abord dans le Tibesti, à l’appel du Président TOMBALBAYE, avec des opérations de maintien de l’ordre contre le FROLINAT, puis de restauration de l’ordre dans le BET. Entre 1972 et 1977, la France ne conduit pas d’opérations. Outre les nécessités d’avoir une présence stratégique en Afrique Centrale avec la base de Fort Lamy, l’intervention militaire française s’explique aussi par le souhait de « maintenir au pouvoir les sudistes francophones et présumés francophiles… »4. La seconde intervention se fera dans le cadre de l’ « Opération TACAUD » déclenchée en mars 1978 à l’appel du Président Félix MALLOUM contre l’offensive du FROLINAT vers Ndjamena avec le soutien de la Lybie. La France établit un dispositif défensif sur une ligne NDJAMENA-MOUSSORO-ABECHE avec un corps expéditionnaire d’un millier d’hommes. Parallèlement, Paris s’attèle à aider Hissène HABRE à reconstituer ses FAN réfugiées au Soudan. Les conférences de Kano et de Lagos Face aux combats incessants qui menacent la souveraineté et l’intégrité du Tchad, l’intervention de puissances étrangères, et la situation humanitaire catastrophique à Ndjamena, mais surtout face aux risques de déstabilisation de la sous-région, l’OUA joue la carte diplomatique. Les conférences de Kano 1 et 2 La conférence de Kano a été débutée le 11 mars 1979, suite au cessez-le feu signé à l’issue des négociations conduites par le Soudan qui propose l’organisation d’une conférence dans un pays neutre. Le Président OBASANJO s’offre pour l’abriter à Kano, avec la participation du Président MALLOUM, de son Premier Ministre HABRE, de Goukouni WEDDEYE et du Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Tchad (MPLT), faction soutenu par le Nigéria. Le 16 mars, les parties s’accordent sur un cessez-le-feu général et la démilitarisation de Ndjamena, l’amnistie pour tous les prisonniers politiques, la dissolution des factions armées et la formation d’une armée nationale, le retrait des troupes françaises et la supervision du cessez-le-feu par le Nigéria. Le 23 mars, l’accord devient effectif avec la démission du Président MALLOUM et du Premier Ministre HABRE. Goukouni WEDDEYE prend la direction d’un Conseil d’Etat. L’accord prévoit également la création d’un Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition (GUNT) chargé de gouverner le Tchad jusqu’aux prochaines élections et auquel HABRE et MALLOUM ne devaient pas participer. Pour remplacer les forces françaises, il est prévu la mise sur pied d’une Force neutre qui sera fournie par le Nigéria.

4 Mohamed Tétémadi BANGOURA, op.cit. P 278.

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WEDDEYE et MALLOUM

WEDDEYE après sa désignation à la tête du GUNT

Cependant, ces accords de KANO 1 n’avaient pas intégré les principales factions prolibyennes. Les négociations reprennent et débouchent, le 11 avril 1979, sur les accords de KANO 2 signés par les factions représentants le FROLINAT originel et quelques tendances pro-libyennes. Devant les questions de représentativité entre le Nord et le Sud, la situation se bloque, contraignant le Nigéria à convoquer de nouvelles assises à Lagos. L’accord de Lagos Il a été signé le 21 août 1979 sous l’égide de l’OUA et du Nigéria, mais aussi de la France et de la Lybie. Les onze factions tchadiennes représentées décident de former un GUNT pour une période de dix-huit mois, la mise sur pied d’une Armée Nationale Intégrée et la constitution d’une Force Neutre composée de pays n’ayant pas de frontières avec le Tchad. Goukouni WEDDEYE est placé à la tête du GUNT, le Président KAMOUGUE est nommé vice-président et Hissène HABRE ministre de la défense. Après la défection du Bénin et de la Guinée, la Force panafricaine ne comptera finalement que 550 soldats envoyés par le Congo le 19 janvier 1980 avec l’aide de l’Algérie. Le GUNT souffre d’un grave déficit de confiance entre les principaux leaders. Goukouni WEDDEYE se réconcilie discrètement avec Khadafi. Le territoire tchadien est encore divisé entre les différentes factions qui exercent, chacune, son pouvoir sur sa zone d’influence. Les Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) de Goukouni contrôlent le BET, le Sud reste sous la coupe des Forces Armées Tchadiennes (FAT) du général KAMOUGUE, et toutes les factions disposaient de troupes armées à Ndjamena qui est quadrillé en différentes zones d’influence. La force panafricaine n’a jamais disposé des moyens de sa mission consistant à protéger les populations civiles, désarmer les factions belligérantes et aider à la reconstruction d’une armée nationale intégrée. Ndjamena ne tarde pas à s’embraser en mars 1980 avec l’attaque lancée par les FAN, ce qui devait sonner le glas du GUNT. A la demande de ses autorités nationales, le contingent congolais est évacué précipitamment le 03 avril.

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13- La guerre civile de mars-décembre 1980 Il s’agit d’une guerre entre les partisans de la coalition du GUNT et les opposants au GUNT»5. Bousculé par les FAN, Goukouni WEDDEYE signe au nom du Tchad un « traité d’amitié et de paix » avec la Lybie qui permet alors à Kadhafi d’intervenir à N’Djamena et dans les provinces du Nord qui tombent sous le contrôle de Goukouni. Le 15 décembre 1980, les FAN quittent la capitale et se replient sur la frontière avec le Soudan. L’OUA décide de déployer une Force de maintien de la paix. II- L’intervention de la Force Interafricaine 21 La création de la FIA par l’OUA Au cours de son XVIIIème sommet à Nairobi au Kenya, du 24 au 27 juin 1981, l’OUA prend la résolution 102 qui pose le principe de la création d’une FIA qui doit cependant être soumise à l’approbation du GUNT. Le 20 octobre 1981, le Président Mitterrand lance l’appel de Cancun demandant à l’OUA de tout mettre en œuvre pour déployer une force militaire afin de préserver l’indépendance du Tchad. Le 29 octobre, un conseil des ministres est convoqué et demande le retrait de la Lybie pour le 31 décembre. Le 03 novembre, la Lybie entame un retrait du territoire tchadien, à l’exception de la bande d’Aouzou. En décembre 1981 à Paris, le Secrétaire général de l’OUA signe avec le Président du GUNT l’accord sur la création de la FIA. Cet accord prévoit un comité permanent des chefs d’Etat de l’O.U.A., placé sous la responsabilité du secrétaire général de l’O.U.A., chargé d’exercer les fonctions d’« organe suprême chargé de s’assurer de là bonne conduite des opérations de maintien de la paix ». Valable pour une période de six mois, l’accord est renouvelable par tacite reconduction et prend fin à la demande de l’un des deux signataires (le Tchad et l’O.U.A.). Enfin, l’accord précise que le Commandant de la Force sera nommé par le secrétaire général de l’O.U.A., « en accord avec le chef de l’Etat tchadien ». Dès lors, le déploiement de la FIA pouvait commencer. Cependant, elle n’empêchera pas la marche victorieuse des FAN sur Ndjamena depuis la frontière avec le Soudan. En début mai, le Nigéria entame le retrait de la moitié de son contingent. Il est suivi du Sénégal le 07 juin. Le retrait de la FIA devient officiel avec l’annonce faite par le Président en exercice de l’OUA le 11 juin. Ainsi, mis en place en novembre 1981, la FIA est retirée en juin 1982, sans avoir tiré un seul coup de feu. Il convient dès lors de s’interroger sur les raisons de son échec. 22-Mission et organisation La volonté de l’OUA était de doter le Tchad d’un mécanisme de transition politique vers la reconstruction institutionnelle du pays. Mission de la FIA La mission de la FIA, qui découle de son mandat, comportait deux aspects contro5 Goukouni WEDDEYE, interview RFI, op.cit.

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versés. En vertu de la résolution qui procède à sa création, sa mission est d’ « assurer la défense et la sécurité du pays en attendant l’intégration des forces gouvernementales ». Pour sa part, le statut de la force dispose que celle-ci « a pour rôle de prévenir, de contenir et de tempérer les hostilités au Tchad ou d’y mettre fin, ainsi que d’assurer la sauvegarde de l’Etat du Tchad grâce à l’utilisation des forces multinationales. Elle contribuera en outre à aider le gouvernement tchadien à la formation de l’armée nationale intégrée ». Pour le Président GOUKOUNI, la Force doit participer aux combats pour sauvegarder les institutions légitimes, en l’occurrence le GUNT. Pour le Secrétaire Général de l’OUA par contre, le rôle la FIA se limite à permettre une stabilisation nécessaire à une sortie de crise avant le 30 juin 1982. Organisation de la FIA La FIA fut placée sous la responsabilité du Secrétaire Général de l’OUA et d’un Comité politique. Les Etats participants à la Force furent au nombre de trois : Nigéria, Sénégal, Zaïre. D’un effectif de 5000 hommes avec 600 sénégalais, 2000 Zaïrois, 2000 Nigérians et 56 observateurs militaires en provenance du Kenya, de l’Algérie, de la Guinée-Bissau et de la Zambie. Elle est placée sous le commandement du général nigérian Geoffroy EJIGA.

Contingent sénégalais-Décembre 1981/Juillet 1982

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III- Bilan de la FIA La FIA a présenté des lacunes sur le plan militaire et a révélé l’incapacité de l’OUA à déployer une OMP. 31-Insuffisances dans la planification Les phases politiques et militaires ont souffert d’une absence de coordination. Les contingents ont été déployés de façon prématurée sans mise en condition opérationnelle. Sans aucune coordination sur le terrain, les troupes seront réparties selon le dispositif ci-après : le contingent sénégalais au centre, encadré par les Zaïrois au Nord et les Nigérians au Sud. Du fait cette faiblesse de la fonction commandement de la Force, les contingents n’ont pas pu disposer de règles d’engagement. En ce qui concerne la constitution des approvisionnements, c’est également le son de la discorde entre les partisans d’un financement autonome et l’aide étrangère. La solution sera finalement trouvée dans la coopération bilatérale. Le Sénégal et le Zaïre reçoivent le soutien de la France, le Nigéria se fait équiper par les USA, l’Allemagne Fédérale et la Grande Bretagne. Cette disparité laisse imaginer toutes les difficultés induites en termes d’interopérabilité. Enfin, la neutralité de la Force a été mise en doute, les contingents sénégalais et Zaïrois étant fortement soupçonnés de sympathie, voire de complicité ou de duplicité à l’endroit des FAN. 32-Echec du règlement politique de l’OUA La prise du pouvoir par les FAN renvoie à l’échec du règlement politique de l’OUA : HABRE était au pouvoir, la réconciliation n’était pas faite et les institutions n’avaient pas été reconstruites. Dès le 09 août 1983, la France déclenchait l’Opération « MANTA » pour arrêter l’offensive du GUNT amené par Goukouni avec le soutien de la Lybie qui occupe toujours la bande d’Aouzou. 33-L’incapacité à remplir des missions de sécurité collective Si lors du sommet de Khartoum en 1978, l’OUA avait estimé que « la défense, la sécurité et la paix sont la responsabilité des seuls Africains », la FIA au Tchad a montré qu’elle n’en avait pas encore ni le cadre organisationnel, ni les moyens. Conclusion La FIA de l’OUA au Tchad apparaît aujourd’hui comme une expérience inédite. Conduite par une Organisation internationale dépourvue de mécanismes de sécurité collective et traversée par de fortes divergences politiques entre ses membres, dans un pays qui avait sur son sol des armées étrangères et où la violence politique était chronique, la FIA pouvait difficilement remplir la mission qui lui avait été fixée. Cependant, les erreurs qui ont été commises ont permis à l’Afrique de faire des avancées décisives sur le chemin de l’édification de mécanismes de sécurité collectives et des opérations de paix.

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Bibliographie - Pierre François GONIDEC, L’OUA, trente ans après, Karthala 1993. - Mohamed Tétémadi BANGOURA, Violence Politique et conflits en Afrique : le cas du Tchad, l’Harmattan, septembre 2012. - Hassatou BALDE, Le bilan de l’OUA dans le domaine du maintien de la paix et de la sécurité en Afrique, Groupe d’étude des questions de Paix et de Sécurité internationales, Février 2003. - Volker GERDESMEIER, Conflits violents au Tchad : Causes, acteurs et pistes d’actions, Groupe de Travail Paix et Développement (FriEnt), Mars 2008. - Sam G. AMOO, Frustrations of Regional Peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 19771982, The Carter Center of Emory University, September 2010. - Charles NACH MBACK, La Force Interafricaine de maintien de la paix au Tchad : un essai non concluant, in Dominique Bangoura (éd.), La recherche de la paix en Afrique, Paris, OPSA, 1998. - ean-Pierre MAGNANT, La guerre tchadienne, une mise au point, Politique Africaine n° 33, - Robert Buijtenhuijs , Le FROLINAT et les révoltes populaires du Tchad, 1965-1976, Mouton, 1978 - Robert Buijtenhuijs, Le FROLINAT et les guerres civiles du Tchad (1977-1984), Karthala-ASC 1987. Crédits photos et cartes - Pages 7: Raymond DEPARDON : consultables sur http://www.magnumphotos.com - Pages 3: Goukouni WEDDEYEEI, Témoignages pour l’histoire du Tchad, Entretien avec Laurent CORREAU, Radio France Internationale, 18 août 2008, PP 6-7 consultable sur http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/104/article_70216.asp - Pages 10: Musée des Forces Armées du Sénégal.

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The Retaking of the Falklands in 1982: Successful Joint Operations Against the Odds John Peaty Summary oint and Combined Operations are by their nature very challenging operations of war. During the latter years of the Second World War and subsequently, the British Armed Forces have excelled at Joint and Combined Operations. The Falklands conflict of 1982 saw the British Armed Forces successfully mount Joint Operations – after many years of exercising but little experience - to retake the Falklands Islands from Argentina. These operations were mounted over great distances and without a base in the region. Because of the Cold War focus on Europe, Operation CORPORATE was unforeseen, planning had to be done in a hurry and equipment was inadequate. Victory was achieved because of the superior skill, training, morale, robustness, professionalism, leadership and intelligence of the British Armed Forces. The paper will look in particular at how one type of intelligence - Geographic Intelligence (GEOINT) - was provided in high quality and at short notice by Ministry of Defence (MOD) civilians in the UK to the three services: the Royal Navy (in particular the Royal Marines), the Army and the Royal Air Force. GEOINT provided the British Armed Forces with excellent situational awareness (far superior to that of the opponent) and enabled the land, sea and air forces of Britain to co-ordinate their efforts to a remarkable degree. The demands made by CORPORATE were unexpected, the difficulties great, the fortunes mixed and improvisation was the order of the day. Yet despite the rough terrain, the harsh climate and the opponent (numerically superior on land and in the air), Britain’s Armed Forces co-ordinated to achieve a victory that few inside and even fewer outside Britain thought possible. The paper will conclude that a first-class challenge can only be met by first-class forces, that Joint Operations are inherently complex and difficult, and that success is only likely if they are properly planned, rehearsed, equipped and led. These are enduring lessons of military history, lessons which the British Armed Forces successfully put into practice in Southern Italy seventy years ago and relearned the hard way in the South Atlantic in 1982.

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Introduction April 1st is a risky day for the gullible in Britain, where hoaxes are a national sport. In 1977 thousands were fooled when the “Guardian” newspaper announced the existence of Sans Serriffe, a pair of islands in the Indian Ocean, shaped like a semi colon and named Caissa Superiore and Caissa Inferiore. The normally sober MOD has been known to join in, with a proposal to reduce costs by replacing Regimental goats with rabbits.

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Even Military Survey succumbed one year with a tasking for Exercise Nifty Ski that involved digitising all the contours on Swiss mapping to an impossibly tight time frame. Hence, when the Military Survey duty officer received a call in the early hours of 1 April1982 to say that Britain was going to send a Task Force to evict the Argentinean scrap metal dealers that had landed illegally on South Georgia, his first reaction was one of scepticism. Fortunately he investigated, for the attack by Argentinean amphibious forces on 2 April confirmed that this was no joke and Military Survey was thrown into a period of sustained geographic support. This paper describes the products that were available at the time of the invasion and then details the products that were provided to support the Task Force and its reclamation of the islands. The author is indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel John Himbury and Mrs Liz Manterfield in particular for their published accounts and memories of the time. Background Responsibility for providing Geographic Intelligence, including land maps and aeronautical charts, to the Forces in 1982 was vested in the MOD’s Directorate of Military Survey. The headquarters was based at Feltham, alongside the production capability, the Mapping and Charting Establishment, Royal Engineers (MCE (RE)). The Map Library, a worldwide collection of maps and charts, was 11 miles away at Tolworth whilst 8 Map and Chart Depot RE at Guildford stored bulk stocks of mapping. The uniformed element of Military Survey, 42 Survey Regiment RE (which included the War Reserve Map Depot), was based at Barton Stacey and was able to provide additional production and printing resources, as well as survey and map supply detachments. Although not strictly correct, unless it is important to distinguish which part of the organisation had a key role, for the sake of simplicity this paper refers to all the elements as ‘Military Survey’. Products in existence at the start of Operation CORPORATE Military Survey had not planned for an invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentina. During the Cold War it was a low priority area in terms of requirements and allocation of survey and map production resources had been minimal. There were no contingency plans stating the coverage and scales of maps required for the area, no maps in the War Reserve Depot, and no medium or large scale military maps. Even the Library, usually regarded as MOD’s insurance policy for mapping, had a limited collection of maps of South America and the Falkland Islands and was considering relocating them to an offsite store so that the space could be utilised for mapping of higher priority areas. During the Second World War there had been a Garrison on the Islands which had included Royal Engineers and, for a short time, a Topographic Section from 14 Field Survey Company RE. They established the Sapper Hill 1943 datum and produced some maps at 1:25,000 scale. At the start of any crisis, the first request is for a general map of the country to establish its location and principal points. All that was available for the Falkland Islands was the Operational Navigation Chart at a scale of 1:1 million produced by the Americans in

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1965. At this scale the Islands covered less than 2% of the sheet and showed little detail. The Directorate of Overseas Surveys (DOS) had produced a larger scale product at 1:643 000, DOS 906 in 1966 which was a more manageable size and showed more detail. At the planning scale, Military Survey had produced a 1:250,000 Joint Operations Graphic (JOG) as part of a joint production programme with America. Field Marshal Viscount Slim famously said that in his experience every battle took place at the junction of map sheets. Well, the Falklands, despite their small size, were at the junction of 4 sheets and to complicate matters further - 2 grid zones! The islands fell across longitude 60° W which was the junction of two zones of the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) grid referencing system. The significance of the grid junction is that a single location could have two different grid references depending on the grid zone being used. DOS had also produced a two sheet series at 1:250,000 in 1964-65 and revised in 1977 but the 1971 JOG with its standard specification and grid was preferred for military use. There were two series of civil maps at larger scales. The 1:50,000 DOS 453 maps had been produced by the DOS as part of their responsibility to the Ministry of Overseas Development. This series was in 29 sheets and produced in 1961-2, based on 1956 aerial photography. Most sheets were ¼ degree by ½ degree in size though 7 were larger and would not fit onto NATO size printing presses. Although the information on the maps was 20 years old, there had been little development on the islands so they were still reasonably accurate. In 1979 a second edition of sheets 14 and 15 had been produced, the latter to show Stanley airfield. The series had been constructed on the Transverse Mercator projection but did not have gridlines, only grid ticks in the neatlines of the map. DOS had extended the grid zone right across the islands to avoid the inconvenience of the grid junction mentioned earlier. This created the nightmare scenario of using two map series -1:50,000 and JOGs - across the same area with different grid zones and therefore different grid references. The other large scale series consisted of two sheets at 1:2,500 over Stanley, also produced by DOS in 1966. It lacked contours and only covered a small area. Nautical charts were of course required and these were provided by the Royal Navy’s Hydrographic Office. Nautical charts suffered similar problems to air charts and land maps with some of the bathymetry on the smaller scale charts dating back to Fitzroy’s survey 150 years earlier. Fortunately Brigadier Julian Thompson’s HQ possessed detailed knowledge of the coastline of the Falklands in the person of Major Ewen Southby-Tailyour, who was specially attached. A keen single-handed yachtsman and artist, he had served in the Falklands for a year spending a lot of his time doing detailed beach and coastal surveys and charting creeks, inlets and bays in the Falklands (of which there are 10,000). He had written a manuscript which in December 1981 he had sent to various publishing houses. Sadly, as there were no yachts or inshore fishing boats in the area, there appeared to be no market for the book and it had been returned with regrets. Fourteen weeks later because of the crisis the MOD impounded the manuscript and classified it “Top Secret”! Southby-Tailyour’s manuscript and memory proved important planning tools for the retaking of the Islands.

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The Crisis The crisis occurred in a “normal” week for Military Survey. 3 out of the 5 officers in headquarters were in Brussels for a NATO meeting, with another international meeting scheduled for the following week. The majority of production managers in both MCE and 42 Regiment were at a meeting with Ordnance Survey in Southampton and many other staff were on holiday. There used to be an old joke that if you wanted to invade Britain, do it on a Bank Holiday because everywhere was shut; and it was particularly unfortunate that Easter 1982 coincided with the end of the MOD leave year, which meant that staff were using up their leave. Initial requests for mapping were satisfied with existing stock of the JOGs and civil mapping. Fortunately, in 1981 Military Survey had reprinted the DOS 1:50,000 series as a routine stock topping exercise so there were enough copies to meet the initial demand, but these were rapidly exhausted. However the grid junction mentioned earlier along longitude 60° W was a problem with the 1:50,000 series. The grid lines, on both axes, were not parallel across the zone boundary. The bulk of the Falklands falls to the east of 60° W (in Zone 21) but about one-third falls to the west (Zone 20). To overcome the inconvenience of the grid junction, DOS had constructed all 29 sheets of the series with Zone 21 grid ticks, which provided incorrect references on the 10 western sheets (for example, on sheet 23 Malacara Valley was located at grid ref TC 5327 on Zone 21 but PH 6431 on Zone 20). Military Survey decided to reproduce the 1: 50,000 series as a military product, H791, with the grid shown in full. Urgent talks were held about the grid problem with HQ Commando Forces at Plymouth. It was agreed to show both grids on the western sheets using different colours. A prominent warning note would direct users to give references using the red numbers for Zone 20 and the purple for Zone 21. The two grids seriously impaired the legibility of the western sheets and later reports indicated that the forces did not use the dual gridded sheets because they were too cluttered. Luckily, most of the operations took place on East Falkland. This series was the most used in combat and it has been reported that the Royal Marine’s “yomp” from San Carlos to Stanley could be traced by the piles of maps discarded as the advance progressed. In view of the strong winds that sweep the island this may be apocryphal. On 7 April DOS notified Military Survey of an error on sheet 25. Some of the islands in the north west were misplaced by 6mm (about 300m on the ground). DOS had corrected their reproduction material but the set that Mil Svy held had not been changed. Reprinting the 1:50,000 sheets had perpetuated the error and some work was necessary to correct the position on this sheet and the 1:250,000 scale mapping that had been derived from it. It is lucky that Bird Island did not feature in the operations as four years after the conflict the island was discovered to be 700 metres from where it was supposed to be! Since it was clear that Stanley would become the focus of attention, Military Survey overprinted the DOS 1:2,500 sheets with more recent information and a UTM grid to create series GSGS 5451. Since it was clear that maps of Stanley airport would be required, various plans, engineering drawings and diagrams were obtained from the Civil Aviation Authority and by the 6 April four sheets had been printed at 1:500 to 1:50,000 to supplement the meagre information held previously.

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The Map Library Requests were coming in for a wide variety of geographic products. One unforeseen difficulty was that the collection over this area was in a small number of map presses in the Library, and if somebody was using a drawer, those above and below could not be opened. A major refilling exercise had to be undertaken so that more than one person at a time could get access to the mapping. Much of the material needed didn’t exist even as library copies and a major collection effort started. Staff were asked to contact universities and commercial companies who might have useful material and then despatched to collect it, an exercise not always without risk. Military Survey’s library was on the opposite side of a busy road to the DOS offices and during this period staff frequently risked life and limb running between the two offices. The risk was not only from the traffic. The Antarctic collection in DOS was managed by a formidable lady of the old school, who had several members of Military Survey quaking in their boots. On one occasion a young girl required to carry a particularly large and fragile sheet across the busy ‘A’ road was told: “Be careful! I don’t care about you but don’t lose the map!” Rationalisation of Products Towards the end of April it became necessary to rationalise the variety of products over Stanley and to ensure that a suitable map for planning the final assault was available. DOS was requested to compile a 1:12,500 map of Stanley to a standard specification, using plots provided by the Hydrographic Office and aerial photos taken between 1976 and 1982 by the helicopter of HMS Endurance. Initially two sheets over Stanley were produced and then four more sheets further west were completed in May. The hydro plots did not cover the whole area required and some of the 1:50,000 series was enlarged to fill in the gap. This led to a very apparent join of the two sources. This product reached units in time for the final assault and proved invaluable for subsequent explosive ordnance disposal. Trying to operate off four JOG sheets was very difficult so the sheets were joined to produce a single sheet over the Islands (GSGS 5455). This made for an impressively big map, beloved of senior officers. As Major Chris Keeble (acting CO of 2 Para) recalled: “Brig Wilson arrived in my HQ carrying the biggest map I had ever seen, covered in large Chinagraph arrows. He outlined a plan…!” The map served as the base for creating an updated topographic map on which roads, tracks, bridges and installations identified from the air photos taken by HMS Endurance could be printed in magenta. A second version was also produced with terrain assessments for cross country movement, based on information from the Royal Marines and Falkland Islanders. This became known as the RE Briefing Map and was one of the most useful and sought after products provided. The need for scales larger than 1:50,000 was identified early on. Defence Intelligence wanted a 1:25,000 product for assessing the Argentinean deployment around Stanley. A new survey was impossible, so the 1:50,000 mapping was enlarged and reproduced on new sheet lines over the required areas and overprinted with updated information. CINCFLEET also liked the product and on the 27 April requested sheets over Fox Bay, Port Howard, Port San Carlos, Darwin/Goose Green - two days later Pebble Island was

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requested. This sheet had a dynamic history. A first edition was produced by enlarging the 1:50,000, then it was overprinted to include new information to produce edition 2. However, it was discovered that a peat cutting had been mistaken on the air photography as an airstrip. Users were warned by signal and edition 3 was produced to correct it. By this time, further new information was available which was incorporated into Edition 4 issued on the 6 May. Fortunately this rapid succession of editions was unusual. By the end of CORPORATE, this series had been extended to cover most of East Falkland between San Carlos, Darwin and Stanley. It is not standard cartographic practice to enlarge 1:50,000 to 1:25,000 but in this case the original had been produced at the larger scale. A requirement for a 1:100,000 scale product was also identified. The 29 sheets of H791 were found to take up too much room in Operations Rooms, were difficult to join together and were not suitable for detailed planning. The JOG was too small for plotting in detail and did not carry a full 1km grid so 6-figure grid references could not be identified immediately. The JOG was enlarged to make a five sheet 1:100,000 series, GSGS 5460, omitting the hill shading to save time, adding a warning note to alert users to the possible lack of accuracy and overprinting it with updated information. The resulting product was not pretty but met the requirement exactly. For the first time in war, computer graphics were used to assist in topographic assessments. They were needed to support radar location and radio wave propagation studies. Digital Terrain Elevation Data was created based on the 1:250,000 contours and was used in the Vulcan cockpit during Operation BLACK BUCK, the long-range bombing of Stanley airfield. In addition the terrain model around Stanley was later refined using the new contours from the 1:12,500 maps. Computer Terrain Views were also produced showing the ground shape as seen from any selected viewpoint. A rendezvous point was required for regrouping and replenishing the first wave of the Task Force. Ascension Island was selected as having adequate anchorages and communication facilities. DOS had published a 1:25,000 map of the island which had been adopted for military use. A Warrant Officer was recalled from his honeymoon and despatched to Ascension to manage the withdrawal of superseded maps from stock and replace them with the latest editions. Other Products On 7 April it was confirmed that artillery units would be included in the Task Force, so trig lists for Falklands and South Georgia were produced. A 1:100,000 series was also produced over South Georgia. In order to keep commands, formations and units up to date on the availability of geographic products a special CORPORATE geo catalogue was compiled on the 23 April. Without Military Survey staff in the Task Force it was essential to disseminate information on the status of geographic products as widely as possible. The succession of new editions and the introduction of new products necessitated regular amendments to the catalogue and a second edition had to be produced in May.

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There was also an urgent requirement for gazetteers of the Falklands and Argentina. In 1943 a Naming Committee had been established by the Governor to assist the Royal Engineers in their systematic survey of the Islands. At the time of the Argentine invasion a gazetteer of almost 3,000 place names compiled from DOS 453 maps and published by British Antarctic Survey in 1972 was in use. In the week following the invasion Military Survey hurriedly produced an updated gazetteer (GSGS 5442) with over 3,000 entries for the Falklands (including variants) and 830 for South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Sources used were the 453 series maps (including second editions of sheets 14 and 15 from 1979), hydro charts, manuscript additions on the series 453 sheets made in the 60s and 70s by administrators in the Islands and Argentine 1:500,000 sheets from 1968 and 1974. Given the hurry with which it was produced, not surprisingly the gazetteer contained several deficiencies. A second edition, revised and expanded, was produced three weeks later on 28 April. Unnecessary duplications were removed and coverage of the Dependencies expanded to over 1,000 entries. The gazetteer contained variant names (mostly those found in Argentine sources) and these were cross-referenced to the main entries. This was crucial because the Argentineans had different names for over 200 major geographical features of the Islands and frequently these were not simple translations of the English name that could be easily deduced. For example, when the Argentines reported on 1 May that a Mirage had hit a destroyer near Puerta Enriqueta, the gazetteer told you that this was the Argentine version of Port Harriet. During the conflict the Argentines employed five different names for Stanley, settling on Puerto Argentina only on the 21 April. In early June the Plaza of the English in Buenos Aires was renamed the Plaza of the Air Force! The Other Side of the Hill: The Argentines DOS maps of the Falklands were on public sale and carried a note “Agents for the sale of this map are Edward Stanford 12/14 Longacre London”, advice that the Argentineans followed, as they spent £2,000 buying up stocks of these maps from Stanfords prior to the invasion: apparently without anyone in Britain attaching any significance to the fact. They also captured DOS maps during the invasion and reprinted them in Argentina. On his surrender, the Argentine commander General Menendez had a DOS 1:50,000 map with him – ungridded. Clearly, the Argentineans did not use a ruler and a pencil to join up the grid ticks - which is precisely what the Commandos under Thompson did in the early days before the gridded versions reached them. Not only was mapping inferior on the Argentine side it was also scarce. One conscript afterwards lamented: “I hadn’t the slightest idea…where I was…As soon as they had landed they had had an idea of where they were, they knew which hill was which. I, on the other hand, had no idea…We didn’t even have basic geography….You want to see a map, at least to find out where you are”. Conclusion The feedback on the mapping was that it was well received. However, the 50ft contour on the larger scale maps gave an over generalised impression of the ground - a 30ft cliff could be a serious hazard in the dark. Also the conventional sign for rock outcrops

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was not really well suited for depicting stone runs, which are major geological features peculiar to the Islands and which proved important tactical features and obstructions to movement. CORPORATE was very much a UK Defence operation. By its conclusion 410 different geo products had been made available over an area stretching from the Antarctic across the South American mainland and back 3,300 miles to Ascension in case the operation should expand. Military Survey had supplied material to a range of customers from the Special Forces through to the BBC for reporting progress of the war. Throughout the operation the deadline seemed to be “NOW”. In this paper just a selection has been provided. The Falklands crisis highlighted areas in need of improvement, for example the physical separation of activities could cause delays and communication. It also reinforced the need for ready access to source material worldwide. It also demonstrated that Military Survey was capable of producing what was needed in an emergency. Enthusiasm, skill and diligence were matched by initiative, ingenuity and loyalty among all those involved. Staff cheerfully gave up their Easter leave, weekends and even night’s sleep to get the work done on time and the local fish and chip shop did a roaring trade as runners were sent to bring in lunch and supper for staff!

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L’Operazione “United Shield” e il 26° Gruppo Navale Italiano Francesco LORIGA

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rima di descrivere il contributo che l’Italia diede in supporto all’operazione multinazionale denominata United Shield, condotta nel 1995 in Somalia sotto l’egida dell’O.N.U. e che presenta tutte le caratteristiche peculiari del “joint” e del “combined”, tema specifico del Congresso, qualche breve cenno alla presenza italiana in Somalia, una terra che ne è stata per lungo tempo testimone. La prima presenza militare italiana in Somalia data l’aprile-maggio 1885, quando la Regia Nave Barbarigo, un piccolo avviso di circa 800 tonnellate, nel quadro della politica coloniale del Regno d’Italia dell’epoca fu incaricata di esplorare la foce del Giuba e di visitare le coste dipendenti dal Sultano di Zanzibar. Stabiliti i primi contatti con le popolazioni indigene furono stipulati accordi commerciali, che consentirono via via una penetrazione sempre più consistente nel territorio. Di pari passo anche la presenza militare si rafforzò, costituita prevalentemente da truppe autoctone sotto comando italiano. Fu costituita anche una Capitaneria di Porto a Mogadiscio, città che divenne la base di una flottiglia di “sambuchi” (delle piccole barche a vela) in organico alla Marina. La presenza italiana in Somalia si consolidò dopo la 1^ Guerra Mondiale e, dopo la conquista dell’Etiopia nel 1935-36, assieme a quest’ultima ed all’Eritrea, costituì la cosiddetta Africa Orientale Italiana, in pratica l’intero territorio del Corno d’Africa, con le significative eccezioni della Somalia francese (la zona di Gibuti, prospiciente lo Stretto di Bab-el-Mandeb) e del Somaliland inglese (la zona di Berbera prospiciente il Golfo di Aden). Durante la 2^ Guerra Mondiale, dopo un’effimera conquista Somaliland, la controffensiva britannica portò alla resa dell’intera Africa Orientale Italiana nell’aprile 1941. L’Italia tornò però in Somalia poco dopo la fine della guerra su mandato O.N.U. con un corpo di spedizione denominato C.S.S. (Corpo di Sicurezza per la Somalia), inviato per assicurare l’ordine interno e addestrare le forze armate locali nella delicata fase transizione verso l’indipendenza. La presenza militare nell’ex-colonia durò dieci anni, dal 2 aprile 1950 al 1° luglio 1960, data in cui la Somalia divenne uno Stato indipendente. Tale presenza vide la partecipazione a vario titolo di personale dell’Esercito (per la maggior parte, con compiti di sicurezza e addestramento), della Marina (nel settore delle telecomunicazioni), dell’Aeronautica (nel settore dei collegamenti logistici), dei Carabinieri e della Guardia di Finanza (con compiti di sicurezza e addestramento), secondo un modello che sarà ripreso in seguito sempre più insistentemente nelle operazioni di peace keeping e che si rivelerà vincente. Dopo il conseguimento dell’indipendenza la Somalia, il cui tessuto sociale è rimasto sostanzialmente di tipo tribale, entrò nel giro delle influenze della Guerra Fredda, vedendo dapprima una presenza sovietica, sostituita nel 1976 da quella occidentale.

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Il ritorno in forze dei militari italiani in Somalia si verificò nel 1992, a seguito della Risoluzione n. 794 dell’O.N.U. che autorizzò l’operazione multinazionale Restore Hope per portare rimedio alla crisi alimentare che, complice la guerra civile ed il conseguente caos, aveva colpito il Paese, portandone la popolazione sull’orlo del genocidio. Era questo il primo intervento di “ingerenza umanitaria armata” in uno Stato intrapreso senza l’assenso del medesimo, vista peraltro l’impossibilità di identificare all’epoca un’autorità nazionale somala nel senso comune del termine. L’Operazione Restore Hope, sia pure rimodulata nelle varie fasi, durò per l’Italia circa 18 mesi, dal dicembre 1992 all’aprile 1994, e vi presero parte militari di tutte le Forze Armate. Per la Marina italiana essa fu contraddistinta dall’impiego di due distinti Gruppi Navali: il 24°, per il trasporto, il dispiegamento e la protezione dal mare del contingente nazionale da schierare sul terreno, attivato dall’11 dicembre 1992 al 14 aprile 1993, ed il 25°, per il reimbarco, con relativa protezione dal mare, ed il trasporto sempre del contingente nazionale verso la madrepatria, attivato dal 16 febbraio al 6 aprile 1994. Terminato nel 1994 l’impegno in Somalia dei contingenti militari occidentali, quello dell’O.N.U. continuò, ma la situazione non migliorò affatto. Nel corso dei seguenti dieci mesi il peggioramento fu costante e in dicembre fu chiaro che non restava altro da fare alle Nazioni Unite che abbandonare ogni speranza di pacificazione e disporre l’evacuazione dei circa 8.000 Caschi Blu, che vi si trovavano, con oltre 550 mezzi tra corazzati, cingolati, ruotati ed elicotteri e 336 containers di materiali. La decisione di procedere al ritiro dell’intero contingente O.N.U. fu assunta dal Segretario Generale dell’epoca, Boutros Boutros Ghali e, a seguito della constatazione che le Nazioni presenti con i propri uomini a terra non avrebbero potuto provvedere autonomamente ed in sicurezza al ritiro del proprio personale, fu ritenuto necessario costituire una forza multinazionale cui affidare tale delicato compito. La decisione di adottare tale linea di comportamento scaturì anche dall’esigenza di dimostrare, nei fatti e non solo con le parole, la volontà dell’O.N.U. di ritirare e proteggere le proprie forze evitando, nel contempo, di alimentare nella popolazione locale il convincimento che fosse in atto un tentativo di invasione, come invece propagandato a gran voce dai capi delle diverse fazioni somale. L’operazione, affidata al Generale U.S.A. dei Marines Anthony Zinni, fu denominata United Shield. Di nuovo si dovette ricorrere all’Italia, specie per facilitare lo sganciamento del dispositivo a prevalenza pachistana rimasto in Somalia, e di nuovo toccò alla

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Marina, con la significativa partecipazione dell’Esercito. Dopo aver approntato una base dell’O.N.U. a Brindisi, fu costituito il 26° Gruppo Navale, formato dall’incrociatore portaeromobili Giuseppe Garibaldi, dalle navi anfibie San Giorgio e San Marco, dalla fregata Libeccio e dalla nave logistica Stromboli. In comando del Gruppo fu affidato al contrammiraglio Elio Bolongaro. La situazione era caratterizzata da uno stato di generale incertezza, aggravato dal contemporaneo incremento delle capacità belliche delle fazioni in lotta. Con tali presupposti il livello di rischio associato all’operazione fu valutato superiore a quello della precedente – il ritiro del contingente italiano avvenuto dieci mesi prima – quantunque il profilo di missione si configurasse sostanzialmente analogo. Per tale motivo il dispositivo imbarcato assunse delle caratteristiche di stampo prettamente offensivo, ritenendosi necessario assicurare la disponibilità di: - una consistente componente di volo per le esigenze di supporto di fuoco, scorta in volo, evacuazione sanitaria, ricerca e soccorso – comprensiva del cosiddetto “COMBAT/SAR” – e di elitrasporto; - una consistente forza da sbarco, imperniata su una componente organica della Marina integrata da una consistente aliquota di reparti dell’Esercito, per le esigenze di acquisizione e protezione di una spiaggia e di pronto intervento eliportato. Il Nucleo Sanitario e il Nucleo Tecnico-Logistico, invece, furono configurati in analogia alle precedenti operazioni, essendosene valutata l’adeguatezza anche per questa operazione.

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Fu così che sull’incrociatore Giuseppe Garibaldi la componente di volo imbarcata fu configurata su 3 aerei Harrier AV 8B Plus e dieci elicotteri: 2 SH 3D, 4 AB 212 in versione ottimizzata per la lotta anfibia (NLA) e 4 A 129 “Mangusta” dell’Esercito. La componente di volo del Gruppo era integrata da altri 6 elicotteri SH 3D imbarcati sulle navi anfibie, 3 sul San Giorgio e 3 sul San Marco, e 2 AB 212 in versione utility sulla fregata Libeccio. In totale, quindi, il 26° Gruppo Navale poteva contare su un dispositivo aereo di 21 macchine. Per quanto riguarda il contingente da dispiegare a terra per la protezione del reimbarco delle truppe O.N.U., esso era stato composto da un totale di 573 uomini della Marina e dell’Esercito: 331 uomini del “Battaglione San Marco” e 30 incursori del Gruppo Operativo Incursori di COMSUBIN per la Marina e 101 paracadutisti del 183° Reggimento Paracadutisti “Nembo”, 24 paracadutisti incursori del 9° Reggimento “Col Moschin”, un plotone di 29 uomini del 19° Reggimento Cavalleggeri “Guide” e una squadra di 4 uomini dell’11° Reggimento Trasmissioni “Leonessa” per l’Esercito. Il 26° Gruppo Navale partì da Brindisi il 20 gennaio e l’8 febbraio arrivò davanti a Mogadiscio, stazionandovi davanti insieme ad altre 13 navi tra statunitensi, francesi, britanniche, malesi e pachistane. A terra la situazione era minacciosa: i miliziani somali delle varie fazioni, e prevalentemente quelli del generale Aidid, avevano organizzato manifestazioni di protesta contro quella che definivano “la nuova invasione americana”. La città era priva di ogni forma di controllo e in preda a una miriade di gruppi e sottogruppi armati, più o meno autonomi e comunque pronti a depredare tutto ciò che avrebbero potuto trovare durante e dopo la partenza delle truppe dell’O.N.U.. I disordini crescevano e le uccisioni erano all’ordine del giorno, coinvolgendo anche gli stranieri, tra cui un operatore della RAI, che fu la quindicesima vittima italiana dall’inizio delle operazioni in Somalia. Il piano d’evacuazione venne dunque studiato nei minimi dettagli, prevedendo necessariamente, anche la

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possibilità di non poter usare le strutture del Porto Nuovo di Mogadiscio. I Caschi Blu erano in quel momento in una grossa base, comprendente il porto e l’aeroporto di Mogadiscio, protetta da una cintura di filo spinato e da un cordone di soldati malesi e pachistani e stavano imbarcando i materiali e i mezzi ruotati e cingolati sui mercantili, che li avrebbero trasportati a Brindisi. Alla fine dell’imbarco dei mezzi sarebbe toccato agli uomini, protetti a loro volta da Italiani e Statunitensi, che si sarebbero reimbarcati per ultimi. Il 5 febbraio le unità italiane e statunitensi condussero un’esercitazione elicotteristica congiunta nella baia di Unguama per verificare il grado d’interoperabilità delle rispettive componenti elicotteristiche, che fu giudicato buono. Poi, già dall’8 febbraio, vennero effettuate ricognizioni della spiaggia e del terreno, per fornire al comando i dettagli topografici e di situazione per pianificare il reimbarco dei Caschi Blu e l’eventuale intervento delle forze di protezione da sbarco eliportate. Dal 27 febbraio, le truppe statunitensi e italiane – Subacquei Incursori, San Marco e Paracadutisti – nella notte presero terra sulla spiaggia di fronte alla pista dell’aeroporto di Mogadiscio, mentre il porto vedeva lo sbarco dei soli Marines americani. Gli Italiani impiegarono un contingente misto San Marco-Paracadutisti, attestandolo sulle colline a sud-est della pista dell’aeroporto di Mogadiscio per garantire un’adeguata cornice di sicurezza al ripiegamento e all’evacuazione della retroguardia delle truppe O.N.U., nonché aeromobili AV 8B Plus, AB-212 NLA e A-129, in turno con analoghe forze americane, per l’eventuale supporto di fuoco alle forze sul terreno. Dal 28 febbraio mattina al 1° marzo si svolse senza incidenti la partenza degli ultimi 2.000 Caschi Blu, sotto la protezione degli Italo-Americani, mentre le fazioni somale si limitavano a qualche sparatoria senza conseguenze. Per tutta la durata della permanenza davanti a Mogadiscio: - gli AV-8B Plus assicurarono, sia in volo che pronti in 60’, capacità di pronto intervento per supporto di fuoco ravvicinato nelle ore diurne; - gli elicotteri garantirono la disponibilità per missioni di ricerca e soccorso ed eva-

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cuazione sanitaria, svolsero regolarmente missioni di scorta armata, ricognizione armata, trasporto truppe e utility, assicurando sia in volo che pronti in 60’ la capacità di pronto intervento per supporto di fuoco ravvicinato. Il 2 marzo i due contingenti di protezione si reimbarcarono sulle rispettive squadre e il 22 marzo 1995 il 26° Gruppo Navale terminò in Patria la propria missione, avendola assolta compiutamente e con pieno successo. I fattori che hanno consentito tale successo sono stati fondamentalmente i seguenti: - la completa integrazione di tutte le diverse componenti operative che costituivano il Gruppo, alcune delle quali impiegate per la prima volta in ambiente reale (AV 8B Plus, AB 212 NLA e Nucleo di ricerca e soccorso). E’ da evidenziare, in particolare, la buona complementarietà conseguita tra i reparti della Marina e dell’Esercito nelle operazioni elicotteristiche ed il confortante livello di amalgama raggiunto in quelle terrestri, specialmente tra il Battaglione San Marco della Marina ed i Paracadutisti dell’Esercito, che ha ottimizzato, di fatto, le capacità delle rispettive componenti; - la completa integrazione del 26° Gruppo Navale nella Task Force Combinata grazie al livello di addestramento raggiunto, alle capacità dimostrate ed al conseguimento della piena interoperabilità, sia dal punto di vista tattico-operativo che procedurale, con le forze aeree, terrestri e navali U.S.A.. Requisito indispensabile è stato l’impiego di comuni dottrine/normative N.A.T.O. (applicate da tempo nelle esercitazioni congiunte in Mediterraneo) e la compatibilità delle apparecchiature di telecomunicazioni e di comando e controllo in dotazione; - l’elevata professionalità messa in campo da parte di tutti i partecipanti; - la validità delle linee guida che hanno caratterizzato l’addestramento di base ed avanzato dei reparti nazionali che costituivano il 26° Gruppo Navale, in particolare per le componenti anfibie ed aeree;

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- la flessibilità di impiego dei mezzi aerei imbarcati e dei ponti di volo delle unità navali. In particolare l’incrociatore Giuseppe Garibaldi ha permesso di impiegare contemporaneamente, senza soluzione di continuità e con elevate prestazioni, 4 diverse linee di volo, cosa mai effettuata nella Marina italiana in precedenza. In sintesi l’Operazione United Shield ha dimostrato come l’integrazione interforze sia da considerarsi un fattore essenziale per costituire contingenti bilanciati in grado di sfruttare sinergicamente le specificità delle singole componenti. A conclusione, infine, si ritiene opportuno evidenziare l’aspetto maggiormente significativo dell’intera operazione, ovvero quello che ne ha determinato il pieno successo: l’unitarietà della catena di comando, sia a livello nazionale che multinazionale, realizzata con la precisa definizione di compiti e responsabilità. Esso è stato senza dubbio l’elemento indispensabile per far sì che l’azione potesse essere indirizzata con la dovuta incisività, ottimizzando l’impiego delle forze a disposizione e, soprattutto, evitando un inutile dispendio di energie. Valorizzando gli insegnamenti delle precedenti missioni O.N.U. in Somalia, infatti, dove si verificarono problemi di coordinamento derivanti dal sovrapporsi di differenti interessi nazionali da parte delle forze coinvolte, già in fase di pianificazione iniziale fu posta la massima attenzione per eliminare possibili dicotomie ed individuare una chiara catena di comando che accentrasse in un solo Ufficiale la responsabilità di tutta l’operazione assegnandogli, attraverso la forma più blanda di dipendenza, il controllo tattico, la direzione di tutte le forze disponibili. Dello staff del Comandante della Task Force, composto da circa 150 Ufficiali, facevano parte elementi delle quattro forze armate USA ed Ufficiali di collegamento di tutti i paesi costituenti la coalizione, conseguendo così quella connotazione di “Joint” e di “Combined” nell’ambito del comando della forza indispensabile per assolvere il tipo di missione. Elemento fondamentale, infine, è stata la sinergia di intenti e conseguenti attività che si è realizzata tra la componente militare (il Comando della Task Force), la componente politica (rappresentata dall’Ambasciatore USA in Somalia che, nei momen-

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ti critici dell’operazione, è stato continuamente presente mantenendo frequenti contatti con i capi clan somali a terra) e la componente di intelligence (sia strategica che tattica).

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Joint Operations UAE Armed Forces Participation in Kuwait’s Liberation War (Gulf War / Desert Storm Operation) Saeed Hamad Al Kalbany Introduction he United Arab Emirates was founded on December 2nd 1971, and it joined the Arab League on December 6th following creation of the Federation. It also joined the United Nations on December 9th 1971 to become State No. 132, joining the international organizations as part of its commitment to the UN charter and international conventions. The United Arab Emirates honors international charters and agreements, and it is a peace and security loving nation. Its founder, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (May God Rest His Soul in Peace), once said that “We are a nation that seeks peace, respects neighboring countries and cares for friendly nations, but our need to build a strong army defending our nation does exist and continues to exist, and we are not building an army to invade or fight other nations but to defend ourselves”.

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UAE Armed Forces Role in Kuwait’s Liberation War As part of the international coalition forces, UAE Armed Forces participated in the Gulf war following the Iraqi Republic’s annexation of the sovereign state of Kuwait on August 2nd 1990, and the international coalition managed to liberate Kuwait on February 27th 1991. This paper will discuss the stance of the United Arab Emirates from the aggression through humanitarian and field operations and how the UAE Armed Forces joined and participated with the international coalition forces in the joint operations, leading to Kuwait’s liberation in February 1991. This paper will also discuss how to achieve victory with minimal casualties and provide conclusions on the causes leading to the success of Operation Desert Storm. Stance of the United Arab Emirates from the Aggression The stance of the United Arab Emirates toward Kuwait’s occupation is summarized in the following three points: 1. Complete rejection of Iraq’s annexation of the State of Kuwait. 2. Attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully through the immediate and unconditional exit of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait, and reinstatement of the legitimate ruler; Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Subah (May God Rest his Soul in Peace) 3. Full support and provision of all means of political, popular and military support to

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the brotherly State of Kuwait. Each of the above three points will be explained in detail as follows: Complete Rejection of Iraqi Occupation of the State of Kuwait The role of the United Arab Emirates was clearly evident from the reactions of late Sheikh Zayed; he cut short his overseas visit, returned home immediately and stopped at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where he met the king of Saudi Arabia Fahd Abdulaziz Al Sud (My God Rest his Soul in Peace) and also he met former Egyptian President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, and supported the call for an immediate Arab League meeting. On September 3rd 1990 His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Rashed Al Maktoum, the then Minister of Defense, made it clear that the United Arab Emirates stood against all forms of occupation and stressed the UAE’s rejection of the occupation of the brotherly State of Kuwait by the Iraqi Forces whatever the reasons and justifications of the occupation are, and hoped that the occupation would stop immediately and peacefully. Attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully through immediate and unconditional exit of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait, and reinstatement of the legitimate ruler; Emir of Kuwait Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed Al Subah (May God Rest his Soul in Peace) On August 10th 1990, the Arab League summit was convened in Cairo and twelve Arab nations out of 22 members endorsed the sending of Arab forces to Kuwait. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan considered Kuwait’s liberation a fateful cause for the community and said “the State of Kuwait will once again become free as it used to be before the occupation, because Kuwait’s liberation is a fateful cause for the international community, a confirmation of the principle requiring deprivation of the aggressor from benefiting from his aggression, and restoration of regional stability and international legitimacy”. Full support and provision of all means of political, popular and military support to the sisterly State of Kuwait. Once all peaceful solutions and efforts bore no fruits, the UAE Army joined an international coalition of (37) states in the battle, and the UAE founder said that “We cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world, honor our agreements, cooperate with dignity and help without self-admiration or pride and we stand by the principles of equality and justice”. Government and Popular Support The United Arab Emirates exerted all efforts to ensure comfort and assurance for its Kuwaiti sons, whose numbers exceeded 66000 persons and who lived in the UAE until their country was liberated. Sheikh Zayed (May God Rest his Soul in Peace) ordered raising the Kuwaiti flag beside the UAE flag in all schools across the United Arab Emirates. Furthermore, he ordered saluting the two flags each morning of every school day. In addition, the generous UAE People played an important role in standing by the Kuwaiti brothers and sisters and this popular and government support was evident through:

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1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Providing all means of transportation such as buses and cargo planes. Receiving of Kuwaiti families by Emirati families. Opening guesthouses for Kuwaiti families travelling by land to the UAE, including Al Kindi School Centre, Gulf Exhibitions Centre, Ajandin Centre, Al Jazeera Sports Club Centre, Al Muhiriy Centre – Al Ain, Mussafah Centre. Accommodating Kuwaiti families in fully furnished apartments and houses. Exempting Kuwaiti brothers and sisters from all costs of medical treatment, water, electricity…etc. Establishing specialized centers for holding voluntary courses in all subjects. Allowing Kuwaiti students to join UAE schools and providing uniform and stationery to them at all schools grades. Granting tickets to Kuwaitis wishing to travel anywhere in the world whether for medical treatment or to join their families abroad. Distributing food supplies and basic needs to Kuwaiti families. Organizing cultural and entertainment programs for Kuwaiti children, and arranging visits and events in coordination with UAE relevant centers. Synergy between the UAE and Kuwaiti Peoples in holding mass peaceful demonstrations condemning Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and urging the international community to take action to liberate Kuwait.

Volunteering At the time of the crisis, thousands of UAE citizens of all ages including school and university students and employees, as well as UAE women volunteered to provide first aid to Kuwaitis. Also, Kuwaitis living in the UAE had undergone training within the UAE. Across the UAE, training centers received significant numbers of Kuwaitis for military training programs, and the legitimate Kuwaiti government, represented by the Kuwaiti Minister of Defense, attended the graduation ceremonies. This shows the honorable role played by the UAE People in this initiative, and the founding leader was proud of his volunteering sons. Sheikh Zayed delivered a speech, which was engraved in the hearts of volunteers, urging these volunteers to exert all efforts to preserve the dignity of the nation and saying that decent life without a home was without use. Military Involvement From the first day of the crisis, the UAE sent a battlegroup, which was reinforced by a UAE infantry company previously deployed as part of Al Jazeera Shield Forces in Hafr Al Baten. Thus, the UAE participated with a battalion (+) which was attached with GCC forces to the 10th Saudi Mechanized Brigade in the Eastern Sector under the command of the joint forces. In the first days, this brigade managed to occupy the front line in the land war.

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UAE forces were the first to arrive at the Flag Public Square in Kuwait City; the first company of the UAE Task Force arrived there at 6:00 A.M and joined Kuwaiti resistance elements and Kuwaiti sons camped there. Then, the remaining forces arrived at 10:00 A.M, and scenes of jubilation overwhelmed the city celebrating liberation and victory banners mixed through raising the Kuwaiti and UAE flags. Our Armed Forces engaged effectively in the Kuwait Liberation War as part of the international coalition forces and GCC forces. The operation consisted of three phases as follows: Phase (1) - Desert Shield Phase, which began after the invasion and ended on February 23rd 1991. - Participant Force Structure: Infantry Battalion+. - Deployment Area: Hafr Al Baten, Saudi Arabi. Reasons of Desert Shield Operation From the very beginning of the crisis and few days after the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the GCC forces were defending the Northern borders of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia against Iraqi threats. Thus, solidarity was achieved among GCC states in that critical stage of their history. The forces took their positions in the Eastern and Northern areas under the command of the Joint Commander Lieutenant General Khaled bin Sultan. The operational theatre was as follows:

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1. In the Northern Area (Hafr Al Baten) GCC Forces took their positions respectively in Hafr Al Baten area in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an assembly area for training, coordination and preparation. Commands were formed and awaited orders in preparation to liberate Kuwait. 2. In the Eastern Area (Coastal Axis) The remaining GCC Forces were positioned in the coastal axis of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and formed command groups to coordinate their operations. Though most of these units were derived from infantry forces, they managed to delay the attack by the Iraqi Forces in cooperation with the air forces. 3. Joint Role of GCC Air Forces During the initial stages of Operation Desert Shield, GCC countries mustered most of their fighter jets and advanced training aircrafts and prepared for ground attack at Al Dahran Air Base, to secure themselves from the direction of greatest threat. The remaining air forces were gathered at several military bases, including air bases of Tabouk, Taef, Al Gubiel, Ras Mosheab and others, in preparation for involvement. In cooperation with the Allied Air Forces, this was aimed at securing the operational theatre, deploying forces and engaging Iraqi Forces in case of any offensive actions against the Saudi soil. At the same time, the Saudi fighter jets in cooperation with the GCC and Allied fighter jets established a daily 24-hour air umbrella to secure deployment and positioning activity as well as protecting critical sites especially in the Saudi Eastern and Northern areas. 4. Navy GCC Navy Forces participated in imposing the economic and trade embargo on Iraq, and the GCC naval reconnaissance aircraft contributed to reconnaissance and surveillance missions over the Arabian Gulf. Also, the GCC Navy Forces participated in the naval interdiction force to observe Iraqi commercial ships. 5. Combat Support Measures by GCC Countries to Secure the Operational Theatre From the beginning of the Kuwaiti crisis untill completion of operations, GCC countries adopted several combat support measures collectively which contributed to the maintenance of forces and securing of the operational theatre through the combat support maintenance. Water, Food and Fuel: GCC Countries provided all required water, food and fuel for the forces throughout the operational theatre. Uniforms and Supplies: GCC Countries participated in making available all required uniforms and supplies for the forces across the operational theatre. Transport of Needs: GCC Countries provided all possible means for movement of supplies at the ports to the combat support stores at the operational theatre and then to user units.

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Transport of Heavy Weapons and Equipment: GCC Countries provided the largest portion of cargo trucks for movement of heavy weapons and equipment from the shipping ports to the positioning areas. Theatre Medical Preparation: GCC Countries participated in providing medical preparations for the theatre of operations through makeshift hospitals and treatment facilities. Troop Accommodation: In cooperation with Japan, the GCC Countries were able to conduct a number of projects to construct accommodations for the allied forces. It is clearly evident from the previous paragraphs that the GCC Countries led concerted and joint efforts to provide combat support for the theatre of operations. These efforts were among the most difficult missions faced by GCC Forces due to the lack of most resources in the operational theatre and the large numbers of forces. This shows the effectiveness of previous training undergone by the logistics units during peace time in preparation for any contingent circumstances, which facilitated their missions during operations. Phase (2): This phase was divided into several steps as follows: Al Khafji Operation This battle was characterized by a spirit of cooperation between the international coalition forces in general and GCC Countries in particular, as it was the first step toward repelling the Iraqi Forces which occupied Al Khafji, and defeating and causing damage to the occupation forces. It also raised the morale of the GCC Forces. Role of Air Forces The GCC Air Forces participated in the air campaign under the command of the US Air Forces. Also, the GCC Air Forces destroyed the Iraqi defensive targets and command posts within and to the north of Kuwait. They focused their attacks on the Republican Guard, command and control posts and ammunition depots, as well as attacking some airports, defense positions and air defenses. UAE Air Forces From the beginning of the military operations, the Air Forces and Air Defense Forces participated effectively in the battle as part of the international coalition forces and also as part of the GCC air forces. The air forces conducted (173) air sorties without casualties; the first sortie was on February 16th 1991 and the last one was on February 27th 1991. Local pilots of all ranks participated in these sorties. Land Battle Progress In order to outline the role of the GCC Countries and their solidarity during the offensive action which started on February 24th 1991 and ended on February 28th 1991, a short explanation will be given to demonstrate this role and success during the progress of the offensive action in the operational theatre. On February 24th 1991, at 4:00 A.M, the Joint Command issued its orders to launch an attack on the coastal axis through the Eastern Forces area, which includes GCC Forces.

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Given the success of the Eastern Forces in assaulting the Iraqi defenses at the coastal axis, instructions were issued by the Joint Command to attack Hafr Al Baten axis through Northern Forces area. On February 25th 1991, the GCC Forces succeeded in penetrating the Iraqi defenses in depth and accomplished their missions before the specified time and with minimal damages due to joint cooperation, good training and preparation and high morale of these forces. On February 26th 1991, the forces penetrated the frontline to a depth of 20 kilometers, and at the end of the day the forces took positions enabling them to pave their way toward Kuwait City. At the beginning of February 27th, the Gulf and Arab forces moved from the south and west toward their assigned targets inside the city, and by 2:30 PM they liberated the city and eliminated the resistance pockets of Iraqi Forces. Therefore, it can be said that the GCC Forces through their alliance and cooperation achieved more than their expected targets. Also, due to the solidarity of the GCC peoples, victory was achieved and precious Arab land was liberated; i.e the Land of Free Kuwait. UAE Armed Forces Axis - On February 24th, at 4:00 A.M, the UAE Force took advanced positions on the SaudiKuwaiti borders in preparation for attack as part of the 10th Brigade of the GCC Forces and it was part of the brigade front ready for attack. Furthermore, our field engineering platoon participated with the Saudi Saif Allah Battlegroup in opening breaches through the opposite force obstacles. - On February 24th, by 6:00 P.M, the UAE Battlegroup completed its advance inside the Kuwaiti soil for a distance of 23 kilometers. - On February 25th, the UAE Battlegroup continued its attack toward enemy positions close to Abdullah Port and occupied enemy positions. - On February 26th, the UAE Force continued its advance toward Abdullah Al Salem Al Subah Air Base. - On February 27th, the UAE Force continued its advance toward the oil wells area at Al Ahmadi, and the infantry company departed at night toward Kuwait City. Participant forces in the Desert Storm Operation (Phase 2) returned home on March 2nd 1991. - Desert Storm Phase, which started on February 24th 1991 and ended on February 27th 1991.

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- The participating battlegroup structure in Operation Desert Storm: consisted of an infantry battalion+. - Deployment Area: Ras Meshab, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and advanced by stages untill entering the City of Kuwait. Casualties: - This battle caused eight dead and twenty one wounded. Prisoners of War - The UAE Battlegroup captured 1203 officers and personnel from the enemy forces. Post-Liberation - Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan (May God Rest his Soul in Peace) was the first president to visit Kuwait after liberation. Phase (3) - “Operation Desert Farewell” phase from March 3rd 1991 to June 1992. - Participant force structure: Three battalions participated rotationally. - Deployment Area: the UAE Forces (Phase 3) were first deployed at Sabhan Area in the Air Defense Camp of the Kuwaiti Forces and then moved toward Al Salmi area on the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border. The participant military force accomplished a series of missions and tasks including: - Removing mines and unexploded bombs from residential areas. - Protecting the UAE Embassy to the State of Kuwait. - Distributing food and services, and providing assistance to the Kuwaiti People.

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- Removing war debris, and repairing and restoring services. - Collecting materiel from the battle field. - Organizing the return of some Kuwaiti families from the UAE to Kuwait aboard the Air Forces Aircraft. - Establishing checkpoints and maintaining security. - Securing, observing and defending the Kuwaiti-Iraqi border along a front of 45 kilometers. The United Arab Emirates also took the following steps: - Sending all types of humanitarian relief. - Sending equipped ambulances for urgent surgical cases. - Sending an administrative and medical team to Kuwait to assess the situation firsthand and supervising distribution of rations and food relief to Kuwaiti families in coordination with the Red Crescent and Ministry of Health. Summary The Iraqi aggression towards Kuwait led to different points of view among the Arab countries but it reinforced, at the same time, synergy among the Gulf countries on the popular and governmental level, and thus it emerged that concerted international efforts were required to expel Iraqi Forces from Kuwait. The Military Operations were divided into three phases: 1. Operation Desert Shield: it was the operation of political and military preparedness based on UN resolutions.

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2. Operation Desert Storm: it was the main effort of the attack, whether by air strikes or missiles, followed by the ground attacks to liberate Kuwait. 3. Following liberation of Kuwait, another phase started to remove mines and extinguish burning oil fields, and then for gradual troop withdrawal and return back to their home countries. The UAE Armed Forces were effective throughout all stages and from the first phase. Lessons Learnt From Kuwait Liberation War include the following: 1. Importance of cooperation and integration among the GCC Forces in terms of their weapon systems and training. 2. Improvement of the GCC Forces and laying down common policies to confront any potential threat. 3. Importance of laying down a security strategy for the Arabian Gulf Region. 4. There is a need to pay attention to the security of the region, because it reflects on the Arabian Gulf security as a whole. 5. There is a need to improve relationships among the GCC Countries in particular, and Arab and friendly nations in general. 6. There is a need to resolve conflicts among the region’s countries and to respect existing political and geographical boundaries. 7. There is a need to maintain joint military exercises among the GCC Forces, with emphasis on joint logistics. References: 1. Khaled bin Sultan Abdelaziz: “Fighter in the Desert”, Al Saki Publishing House, Beirut, 2nd Edition, 1995. 2. Nasser Fahd Al Dowaila, Redat Al Forsan “Cavaliers Reaction”, Dar Al Watan, Kuwait, 2007. 3. Nasser Al Dahery, “UAE Armed Forces Honor Record and Achievements”, 2011, Abu Dhabi. 4. Stewart, Richard (2010) “War in the Persian Gulf: Operation Desert Shield & Desert Storm: August 1990-March 1992”, Washington D.C. Periodicals 1. Al Khaleej Newspaper, 18, 19/08/1990. 2. Al Fateh Ali Ibrahim: Nation Shield Newsletter, Edition 230, September, 1990. 3. Taleb Abu Abdallah: Nation Shield Newsletter, Edition 231, October, 1990. 4. Juma Nassar: Nation Shield Newsletter, Edition 232, December, 1990. 5. Interview with Staff Major General (Eng.) Hilal Zaid Al Al Shehi, by the Verbal History Team.

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Le Contingent Marocain en Somalie (Décembre 1992 à Avril 1994): Une opération humanitaire réussie ? Omar EL OUADOUDI

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a Somalie a vécu (ou survécu) de crise en crise depuis l’écroulement du régime de Siad Barré en Avril 1991. Sa défaite va entraîner le pays dans la tourmente de la guerre civile et les factions armées vont s’entre-déchirer faisant de la capitale Mogadiscio un immense mouroir et du reste du Pays une population entamée par la famine, la pire famine que l’Afrique ait connu depuis celle de l’Ethiopie en 1985. Le drame somalien avait atteint une intensité telle que ses effets chaotiques soustendent jusqu’à aujourd’hui les risques de retour en arrière: 2 décennies de chaos, La plus longue guerre civile en Afrique. Rétrospectivement, la famine s’est déclenchée en début 1992 dans un contexte d’anarchie dans un pays de sécurité alimentaire fragile aggravée par la sécheresse. Lorsque 6 mois plutard, les Nations Unies, les pays donateurs et les médias alertés par les ONG s’étaient intéressés aux affamés, les morts se comptaient déjà par milliers. Pire encore, Au moment où se décide la mission onusienne de l’aide, il ressurgit le clan des vaincus en Avril 1991, pour tenter de reprendre Mogadiscio par les armes après la chute du régime et dont les miliciens ruminant leur vengeance ravagent les provinces du Raxanweyn abritant le potentiel agricole le plus significatif de la Somalie. Plus que l’insuffisance de la pluviométrie, ce sont surtout ces destructions qui vont générer la famine générale s’abattant sur la région de la mi 1992 à 1993 et forçant la sympathie internationale pour la mise en place d’une aide alimentaire urgente mais tardivement parvenue. Après le « vœu pieu » de l’opération Onusienne ONUSOMI à base de 23 millions de dollars et de 50 observateurs et dont l’échec s’est répercuté sur le plan humanitaire, c’est la résolution 794 du 3 décembre 1992 qui va infléchir le destin de la Somalie en autorisant le recours à la force par le biais d’une opération militaire ponctuelle sous commandement américain UNITAF plus connue sous l’appellation « Restore Hope » et qui sera relayée ultérieurement par « Continue Hope » (UNOSOM II) à partir de Mai 1993. Les opérations militaro-humanitaires de l’ONU en Somalie ont généré de nombreuses analyses de la part des spécialistes et des écrivains lesquels ont majoritairement souligné que leur militarisation à outrance excluant totalement la dimension politique et sociale de la crise n’a fait que fragiliser la situation davantage. En effet, au bilan, si l’opération « Restore Hope » avait réalisé ses objectifs dans la lutte contre la famine et amélioré relativement le contexte humanitaire en Somalie, celles qui l’avaient relayées jusqu’à mars 1995, n’avaient pas pour autant achevé leurs missions et de ce fait, n’avaient constitué qu’une simple parenthèse dans la guerre civile, car elles n’avaient pas été accompagnées d’un véritable processus de stabilisation et de

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reconstruction du pays. Suite au drame de la bataille de Mogadiscio, les USA avaient fait le choix de rapatrier hâtivement leurs troupes engagées en Somalie, à sa suite l’ONU avait validé cette orientation abandonnant le pays à son sort avec juste la famine en moins et on parlera pour la première fois dans l’histoire de pays « failli » (failed state). Dans ces 20 minutes, il convient d’abord d’analyser les facteurs qui militent en faveur d’une approche inappropriée du contexte Somalien de l’époque puis d’aborder ensuite la dimension humanitaire des interventions onusiennes en mettant en exergue la singularité de la participation marocaine, résolument orientée dès le départ vers l’action humanitaire pure à travers le déploiement d’un hôpital de campagne à Mogadiscio. I- L’approche internationale du contexte somalien : La fragilité de la démarche onusienne avant et après Décembre 1992 tient du fait que seule la dimension de la famine avait été prise en compte dans le champ d’analyse, excluant toute appréciation approfondie de la crise politique et de ses implications militaires. La nécessité du désarmement des factions n’a pas été perçue comme impératif préalable aux premières tractations avec les chefs de guerre. Les répercussions d’une telle carence n’avaient pas tardé à devenir perceptibles, dès que les armes commençaient à être recyclées dans la protection des ONG et la sécurisation de l’acheminement des vivres. Et faute d’avoir déployé assez tôt un dispositif sécuritaire dissuasif ; toutes les actions humanitaires seront menées au départ sous la protection de miliciens payés en numéraire et renflouant leurs petites fortunes grâce au détournement de l’aide qu’ils convoient. On parlera avec le recul d’incohérences, de passivité, de lenteur d’improvisation, et même « d’erreurs comportementales vis-à-vis de la Somalie ». Nous en citerons les plus essentielles : 1. Washington avait défendu fermement au départ le scénario du traitement purement humanitaire de la crise somalienne excluant tout rapprochement avec la situation de la Bosnie pour laquelle les Américains avaient insisté sur la nécessité d’une aide humanitaire escortée. Nous nous rappelons tous du tollé suscité à l’époque chez les Africains soutenus par la France et l’Autriche au sujet des deux poids deux mesures. Le changement d’attitude américaine interviendra un peu plus tard en conjoncture électorale serrée. 2. New York avant de saisir « l’offre » américaine, nourrissait la conviction controversée que, d’une certaine manière, les nationalismes y compris somalien étaient condamnés à disparaitre avec la fin de la guerre froide pour céder la place à la gouvernance mondiale. Dans les faits, cette vision globalisante s’avérera encore prématurée pour le cas somalien. 3. Les succès remportés dans la guerre du Koweït, sur laquelle l’attention internationale restait rivée à l’époque, ont animé aussi bien à Washington qu’à New York le sentiment que s’il on est aisément venu à bout de la puissante Armée irakienne, régler militairement dans le temps le petit cas somalien relevait d’une promenade de santé, sans compter que la crise du Golfe avait éclipsé sur les ondes du monde entier la

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question de la Somalie qui venait d’éclater comme une grenade. 4. Quand la situation s’est dégradée, le mandat onusien « imposer la paix » est devenu un leurre et d’aucuns parleront en langage désabusé de « croisade humanitaire » qui tout au moins n’est pas réellement, « la poursuite de la politique par d’autres moyens» au regard du surdimensionnement de la force, et des choix tactiques opérés. En conséquence, la mise en œuvre des solutions se révélera inappropriée quand progressivement va s’imposer la difficulté du théâtre. Pourtant la connaissance de la question somalienne et de sa complexité exigeait la prise en considération d’autres facteurs déterminants surtout qu’on allait pour la première fois dans l’histoire faire valoir le droit d’ingérence humanitaire dans un pays en crise. Seule l’analyse historique de cette nation nomade est en mesure d’éclairer sur les origines de la conflictualité, son passage de la pauvreté traditionnelle à la misère moderne, et de comprendre le déséquilibre instable entre son passé non maîtrisé et son futur non maîtrisable. • Faut-il remonter la crise somalienne à l’époque des relations entre Rome et Mogadiscio et explorer la décennie 1950-1960 durant laquelle l’administration protectrice avait introduit un nouveau système de l’Etat, un état de conception wébérienne incompatible avec l’organisation traditionnelle de l’autorité basée sur les statuts hérités en harmonie avec la réalité clanique comme vecteur de construction politique ? • Faut-il la remonter à 1941 date de la reconquête du Somali land par les britanniques annexé en Août 1940 par l’Italie et devenu indépendant en juin 1960, fusionnant avec la Somalie italienne, pour former la République de Somalie mais proclamant unilatéralement son indépendance après l’effondrement du pouvoir Somalien en 1991 ? Et corrélativement trouver les origines dans le morcellement de cette Corne de l’Afrique dont l’interprétation des contours géographiques varie selon que l’on est français ou anglo-saxon ? • Faut-il trouver l’explication de la crise dans le fait que la Somalie s’est construite en bénéficiant de la rente diplomatique et économique de la guerre froide et quand tout cela s’est achevé le pays est devenu difficile à soutenir. N’oublions pas que les pays de la Corne d’Afrique constituaient un enjeu de la rivalité entre superpuissances dans les années soixante-dix et que la Somalie avait été parrainée par l’URSS jusqu’à 1977, et quant commencera la guerre civile, les USA sur lesquels s’est tourné Siad Barré ont bien vu que le pays a perdu de son importance, il n’y a plus d’URSS, il n’ ya pas de pétrole. • Faut-il trouver encore les explications dans les relations de la Somalie avec ses voisins et leur position au lendemain des indépendances face au défi de l’irrédentisme Somalien, car l’enjeu était de garder un certain équilibre régional au moment où le pays inscrivait dans sa première constitution un objectif de réunion des populations Somalies en accordant automatiquement la citoyenneté aux somaliens vivant sur les territoires ne faisant pas encore partie de la République. Même le coup d’Etat du nationaliste Siad Barré, va cristalliser les revendications autour du concept de la Grande Somalie. C’est donc, l’occultation de ces facteurs au profit d’une lecture sélective du passé,

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privilégiant le « pallier au plus urgent » qui a caractérisé l’approche internationale de la crise Somalienne menée par l’ONU et qui l’a encore enfoncée davantage dans l’impasse. D’autres facteurs endogènes sont à considérer dans cette étude mais faute de temps nous préférons les situer dans le débat qui sera autorisé par Mr le Président en fin de séance. II- LA DIMENSION HUMANITAIRE : Limitons nous dans l’étude du volet humanitaire, à l’analyse du soutien sanitaire que la communauté internationale devait apporter progressivement à une population en détresse ravagée par la famine et les atrocités de la guerre civile. Voici brièvement le tableau: • Sur les 70 hôpitaux existant à travers la Somalie en 1988, 15 seulement sont restés partiellement fonctionnels. La plupart d’entre ces 15 ne disposent plus de l’équipement médical de base. • Les 3 hôpitaux de Mogadiscio tous situés à proximité du centre ville étaient soit bloqués en zone de combat soit pillés jusqu’à l’état de ruines. • Une seule clinique agissant pour l’organisation autrichienne « SOS » village d’enfants, dirigé par un italien, pouvait fonctionner en antenne chirurgicale en transformant les salles de classe d’un orphelinat. • MSF s’installe la première à Mogadiscio et sera longtemps la seule à apporter des secours et des médicaments et la première à sortir des murs de la capitale mais surtout à témoigner et à diffuser la détresse à l’étranger en pleine guerre du Golfe. • Le CICR avait imposé la mise sur pied d’un hôpital dans une prison, au lendemain de la signature du cessez le feu, mais très vite il va être conquis et pillé et il n’y sera autorisé qu’une petite clinique d’enfants de l’ONG « Save the children » soignés sous tentes au moment où il est recensé plus de 40% d’enfants souffrant de malnutrition grave. • L’UNICEF s’est investi dans le soutien pédiatrique et la nutrition thérapeutique et l’OMS a mis des cadres de santé dans le pays. Quand l’espace humanitaire a commencé à se confondre avec l’espace militaire, les ONG travaillant jusqu’alors en autonome apparaissent comme contributrices, à l’économie politique du conflit même s’il est reconnu de toute évidence qu’elles ont été prises entre le dilemme de témoigner et celui de sauver des vies tout en préservant la sécurité de leurs personnels. Ce qui n’enlevait rien à leur dévouement mais la stratégie de l’acceptation cherchant à obtenir le consentement politique pour accéder aux populations vulnérables a trouvé ses limites, d’autant plus que les tentations de leur instrumentalisation par les parties en conflit ont rendu difficile la mise en œuvre de cette stratégie. Le déploiement militaire devait permettre aux ONG de se débarrasser de leurs gardes somaliens. La compromission des ONG auprès des miliciens devient inéluctable. Si bien qu’au plan sécuritaire, cette transition est devenue une véritable épreuve à risque pour les ONG. C’est pourquoi au moment où se met en place l’ONUSOM II, plusieurs ONG en profitent pour se replier discrètement pour s’implanter dans le Sud-Soudan, dénonçant l’amalgame entre actions militaire et humanitaire « l’armée du salut humanitaire s’est transformée en force d’occupation en pesante tutelle » dira Stephen Smith de MSF.

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C’est dans ce contexte que fût déployé l’hôpital marocain au sein de la force internationale de maintien de la Paix. III - LE BILAN DES ACTIVITES DE L’HÔPITAL : Le Contingent Marocain en Somalie était constitué d’un groupement d’intervention et de protection et d’un hôpital de campagne, qui avait reçu pour mission principale le soutien sanitaire, social et moral de la population somalienne en détresse. Cet hôpital a été déployé à Mogadiscio, avec une structure intégrée, couvrant la plupart des spécialités de la médecine et de la chirurgie. Il était l’unique hôpital sur l’ensemble du territoire somalien de cette importance ouvert totalement à la population civile. Il disposait également d’une composante opérationnelle « action sociale » pilotée par des Assistantes sociales militaires rompues à leurs tâches. Il a poursuivi ses activités du mois de Janvier 93 à Avril 94 au sein de l’UNITAF (Restore Hope) et au sein de l’ONUSOM II aux côtés de 2 hôpitaux : Le premier américain, pour les troupes américaines et le second suédois pour les troupes de la coalition avec des soins épisodiques fournis à la population. Conçu comme une antenne chirurgicale avancée, il disposait d’une capacité hospitalière de 60 lits avec 2 blocs opératoires et d’une autonomie initiale de 2 mois, le complément de la dotation de base et le remplacement du matériel usé étant livré à partir du Maroc soit par avion soit par bateau en particulier pour les bouteilles d’oxygène. Son fonctionnement en horaire continu de 8 heures à 16 heures, 6 jours sur 7 pour les consultations et en tour de garde de 24 sur 24 heures, 7 jours sur 7 pour les urgences toutes spécialités disponibles, lui a permis de faire face à un flux moyen de 428 patients par jour avec une fluidité tolérable. En 16 mois, 750 médecins marocains se sont relayés dans cet hôpital à raison d’une rotation tous les deux mois, 198 infirmiers et 67 auxiliaires, et pour sa composante « Action Sociale » : …… Officiers Assistantes Sociales et ……. auxiliaires. En 16 mois d’activité, 201.414 personnes ont bénéficié de ses prestations médicales et chirurgicales. Les pathologies médicales, de type tropicale, aggravées par la famine ont représenté 22,5% de ses activités, tandis que la chirurgie d’urgence a intéressé 44% des consultations.16,25% en faveur de la population infantile bénéficiaires des soins des pédiatres complétés par la distribution de nourriture et de médicaments. Le reste est représenté dans les interventions à caractère social menées par les équipes d’assistance sociale et qui ont assuré au profit des enfants : 1/- des programmes de vaccination en collaboration avec l’UNICEF à raison 30 à 60 enfants par jour à l’hôpital. Les vaccins et le matériel de la chaîne de froid étant fournis par l’UNICEF. 2/- des campagnes mensuelles de vaccination mobiles pour couvrir toutes les régions comprises dans un rayon de 100 km intéressant 4942 enfants. 3/- Un programme d’éducation sanitaire au profit de 13.174 mères de famille en collaboration avec les experts de l’O.M.S. et ceux de l’UNICEF, notamment pour ce qui est de l’hygiène générale et de la prévention contre les maladies à transmission hydrique

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et du péril fécal, les maladies à transmission vectorielle et les maladies sexuellement transmissibles. 4/- La circoncision selon la tradition islamique de 40 enfants par semaine (journée du vendredi) avec distribution d’effets vestimentaires provenant du Maroc. 5/- Des séances d’animation récréative au profit des enfants à l’occasion des fêtes. Dans les environs immédiats de l’hôpital une école primaire et un orphelinat pour 1000 enfants ont été pris en charge sur le plan médico-social et éducatif. Parallèlement, l’hôpital devait aussi assurer le soutien médico-chirurgical des Contingents de la force onusienne ainsi que les militaires du Contingent Marocain. Conclusion : J’ai essayé dans ce bref exposé de replacer ce « little Morocco » dans le contexte de son engagement au service d’une population en détresse, dans un théâtre qui lui a fourni un bon paradigme pour s’interroger sur l’ambiguïté des relations entre la logique militaire et la logique humanitaire aux règles d’interaction mal définies à l’époque, dans un pays où il était devenu quasiment impossible de contrôler l’usage des armes, conséquence négative de la fragilité des démarches onusiennes pour constituer un droit d’ingérence humanitaire tout neuf et atteindre par delà la complexité, une recomposition du champ politique et social de la Somalie. A travers les bilans qu’il a réalisés, cet hôpital a bel et bien rempli sa mission et audelà des témoignages de reconnaissance multipliés par la population et des propos du convenu tenus par les représentants internationaux, il est loisible de reconnaître qu’il a réussi là où d’autres acteurs politiques et militaires se sont éprouvés : l’acceptation par la population. Un exemple illustre bien cet état d’esprit : Dans les conditions extrêmes le Groupement d’Intervention du Contingent Marocain menant des opérations de ratissage dans son secteur s’était opposé à des groupes armés et qui se sont soldées par des pertes humaines et des blessés de part et d’autre : « Le little marocain » n’a pas hésité à prendre en charge et à soigner côte à côte les blessés des 2 bords. Il avait pour mission de réussir une opération humanitaire sans faute. Sources bibliographiques - Marc Frontier, « Etat démantelé 1991 – 1995 – annales de Somalie », Bilbliothèque Harmattan. - Muhyidin Ahmed Abdi, Michele Lanna, Giovanna Palermo « Somalie : de la démocratie pastorale aux conflits entre les clans », Harmattan Italia. - D.Morin, « le parcours solitaire de la Somalie ». - Stephen Smith « la guerre perdue de l’humanitaire », éd. Calmann Lévy. - Anne Claire de Gayeffier – Bonnevile, « l’intervention en Somalie 1992-1993 ». - Publications Center of Military History (USA). - Revue de Défense Nationale - France. - Revue des Forces Armées Royales – Maroc.

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The Participation of the Danish Navy in Operation Maritime Monitor / Sharp Guard 1993-1996 Søren Nørby When Danish corvette Olfert Fischer joined the UN operation against Iraq in 19901991, it was seen as the most significant sign of the changing security situation which Denmark and the Navy were facing following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Danish corvette F354 Niels Juel. SHARP GUARD 1995. Warsaw Pact. Boarding team boards an unidentified civilian ship. Much has been much written about Olfert Fischer and its participation in the first Gulf War, causing the following and in many ways larger operation - the Navy’s participation in the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro from 1993 to 1996 - to slip into the background. This is not fair as the Navy’s participation in that conflict was an important step on the road from territorial defense of the Baltic Approaches to the contemporary international - global - profile of the Danish Navy. To date, historians have been focusing on the land war in the former Yugoslavia and not much has been written about the maritime part of the UN involvement. The operation was, however, quite interesting as it is portrayed as a modern example of Combined and Joint Operations in the History of Warfare, and this paper will attempted to describe it in details.

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n the summer of 1991, the process that would eventually lead to the disintegration of the communist republic of Yugoslavia started to erupt. It all began in June 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence. Serbia, the leading country in the Yugoslav republic, refused to recognize their independence and that quickly resulted in what was to become the bloodiest war in Europe since 1945.1 The conflict placed the rest of the world in a dilemma. The war was characterized by several instances of ethnic cleansing and massacres and it soon became difficult for both the neighboring countries and the rest of the world to stand idly by while this was happening. But at the same time, no one wanted to interfere in a war where the peacemaking effort would require a lot of resources and probably loss of own troops. The dilemma

1 The civil war in the former Yugoslavia was a highly complex conflict; here, I will “only” focus on those aspects of the conflict that are relevant to Operations MARITIME MONITOR / SHARP GUARD.

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was formulated very precisely by the then U.S. Secretary of State James Baker when he said that “We do not have a dog in that fight” by which he meant that Americans had nothing to gain by interfering.2 The many TV images of dead, wounded or displaced people, however, caused the people of the United States and Europe to demand that their respective governments “did something”. This so-called “CNN effect” was instrumental in the process which on September 25, 1991, resulted in the UN adopting the first resolution on the war in Yugoslavia. This resolution, number 713, imposed an arms embargo against what was by then known as the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The outbreak of the civil war in Yugoslavia was overshadowed by Iraq’s occupation of neighboring Kuwait. It was not until the U.S. led operation to liberate Kuwait was over in the spring of 1991 that the civil war in Yugoslavia moved to the front of the world’s newspapers. When the Yugoslav civil war broke out, the Danish corvette Olfert Fischer was in the Persian Gulf participating in the multinational force enforcing the UN embargo against Iraq. Much of the know-how that the officers and crews of Olfert Fischer had gathered during their time in the Persian Gulf was employed when the three corvettes later joined the embargo against Yugoslavia. Here Olfert Fischer returns to Naval Station Holmen on September 15, 1991. However, Resolution 713 was not supported by military force and did not to stop the fighting. On May 30, 1992, the UN adopted a new resolution on the war in Yugoslavia (before the civil war was over, the UN would adopt more than 100 resolutions on the war). This new resolution, number 757, imposed a total embargo on the FRY (which by then consisted of the two countries Serbia and Montenegro) and prohibited the import and export of all goods except humanitarian aid. On paper this was a significant strengthening of the UN’s attempt to force the warring parties to stop fighting and instead seek a solution at the negotiation table. But it had little or no effect as the embargo still was not being actively enforced and until July 16, 1992, the UN had to be passive bystanders while the embargo was being broken in at least 53 cases. The pressure on the UN to do more to stop the war increased and on June 15, 1992, the world organization took the unprecedented step of asking NATO for assistance. This 2 Maddow 2012, p. 178.

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led to a situation where NATO - for the first time in their history - joined an operation that probably would result in actual combat missions. The following day, i.e. June 16, 1992, the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) arrived in the Adriatic Sea and began an operation named MARITIME MONITOR.3 As the name implied, the mission was to monitor the Yugoslav coastline and ensure that UN resolutions nos. 713 and 757 were observed. Alongside Maritime Monitor, a similar operation named SHARP VIGILANCE was launched by the Western European Union (WEU). At this point in time, France was not part of the military partnership in NATO and was attempting to make the WEU a European counterpart to NATO - which is why the WEU ought to be present in the Adriatic Sea alongside NATO.

The Danish corvette Niels Juel in the Adriatic Sea with Operation Sharp Guard in the summer of 1995. The threat against NATO units during SHARP GUARD came from a mix of older Warsaw Pact equipment and - to a lesser extent - more modern Western equipment. The Yugoslav navy had a number of small surface vessels, coastal submarines, land-based missiles and sea mines, the Yugoslav air force had a small number of aircraft and the Yugoslav army had placed a number of artillery batteries near the coast. Add to this the fact that the area was characterized by heavy civilian sea and air traffic, so there was a lot to keep an eye on4. The task was to prevent the warring parties from receiving weapons, fuel and other things needed for the war effort by sea. Only merchant vessels carrying food and/or medication were allowed to pass. However, the warships participating in MARITIME MONITOR were only allowed to monitor traffic and not to board suspicious vessels in order to inspect the cargo to name an example. Following their arrival in the Adriatic Sea, the merchant ships were queried about their cargo and destination, and subsequently monitored by the warships to check whether they proceeded to the claimed destination. On the other hand, the warships did not have the mandate to intervene where a merchant deviated from the indicated destination, for example Venice, and instead headed for Dubrovnik or another place. In such cases, all the warships could do was to report it to 3 It was STANAVFORMED’s first operation since its establishment on April 30, 1992. 4 CNS OPORDER 1/93. Operation “Sharp Guard”. NATO Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe Naples, Italy. 1993.

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the UN which would then submit a formal protest to the relevant Serbian, Bosnian or Croatian authorities. In September 1992, the STANAVFORMED force was relieved by NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) for three weeks and since Danish corvette Niels Juel was part of this force at the time , it naturally became part of the MARITIME MONITOR operation. Map of Operation MARITIME MONITOR / SHARP GUARD, summer 1993. The coastline to be monitored covered the area from the Albanian port of Vlore in the south to Dubrovnik in the north and was divided into a number of patrol areas.

On 16 November 1992, the UN Security Council adopted a new resolution on the civil war in Yugoslavia. This Resolution - No. 787 - remedied some of the problems with the inability of the deployed forces to enforce the previous resolution and the Maritime Monitor units now had authorization to stop and inspect any vessel they thought might be in the process of violating Resolution No. 713 or No. 757. Consequently, MARITIME MONITOR became a genuine embargo operation and on the 22 November, the name was changed to MARITIME GUARD. The WEU mission was also renamed and became SHARP FENCE. On 12 April 1993, the NATO mission was extended when the organization was tasked to enforce the UN’s new no-fly zone over the former Yugoslavia. The NATO operation was named DENY FLIGHT and aircrafts from alliance immediately began patrolling the airspace over Yugoslavia. DENY FLIGHT did not directly impact the daily enforcement of the embargo in the Adriatic Sea, but the task of keeping an eye on the area was lessened when the SHARP GUARD units were given access to the air situation above the Adriatic Sea produced by NATO AWACS planes. DENY FLIGHT came to demonstrate NATO’s readiness to use force when six Serbian aircraft violated the no-flight ban on 28 February 1994. NATO - engaging in their first combat mission in history - shot down four of the six Serbian aircraft. The Serbian

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Air Force did not test the no-flight ban again. On 17 April 1993, the embargo was further tightened with the passing of UN Security Council Resolution No. 820 which gave the MARITIME GUARD units the right to operate in Yugoslavian territorial waters should it become necessary in order to enforce the embargo. At the same time, an agreement was made with the Albanian government allowing NATO units to operate in Albanian waters. Following the adoption of Resolution No. 820, on 8 June 1993 NATO and the WEU decided to merge operations MARITIME GUARD and SHARP FENCE into one joint operation under the name SHARP GUARD. This operation was launched on 15 June 1993 where an impressive naval force consisting of 21 STANAVFORMED units, seven STANAVFORLANT units and six WEU units sailed into the Adriatic Sea together. NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) handed over the day-to-day operational control of SHARP GUARD to Italian Admiral Mario Angeli, the then Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH) and as such head of NATO Task Force 440. During Operation SHARP GUARD, a number of officers from the WEU were assigned to the admiral’s staff which was headquartered in Naples. The SHARP GUARD units were split into three so-called Combined Task Groups (CTGs): a northern group, CTG 440.01, usually consisting of four ships, a southern group in the Otranto Strait, CTG 440.02, usually consisting of three ships, and CTG 440.03 which was a “harbor” group consisting of ships that were not on patrol but in Italian ports for R & R (Rest and Recreation) or at sea for exercise activities, naval visits or similar. The units normally rotated, with approx. ten patrol days at sea in groups one and two and then up to a week in group three engaging in the exercises necessary to keep the equipment working and the crew well-trained. While the first two Task Groups were under the command of the STANAVFORLANT Commander and the STANAVFORMED Commander respectively, TG 440.03 came under the operational control of the WEU CONTINGENCY MARITIME FORCE (COMWEUCONMARFOR)5. Last, but not least, Admiral Angeli had at his disposal a number Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) based on Sicily and several Tornado type fighter bombers from the Italian air force base at Gioia del Colle. It was also necessary to block access to the former Yugoslavian republics via the Danube river to complete the blockade and in order to reach this goal, the U.S. government among others allocated $1.45 million to strengthening border control activities towards Serbia and acquired five small patrol boats for Romania and Bulgaria. The WEU also contributed an unknown amount to that end but it was insufficient to completely seal off the Danube and large amounts of oil reached the Serbs exploiting this gap in the embargo. 5 For Denmark, joining the WEU mission was at first a problem in that on 2 June 1992, the Danish voters had voted No to the EC Maastricht Treaty and its provision stating that the WEU was to be the military arm of the EU. Thus, Danish warships under WEU control could be seen as going against the voters’ decision. The problem was, solved, however, by placing the WEU forces under NATO command.

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CG-61USS MONTEREY of the TICONDEROGA class joined SHARP GUARD in the summer of 1995. In addition to the 1 or 2 US warships that participated in SHARP GUARD, parts of the US Sixth Fleet also operated in the area ande US aircraft participated in Operation DENY FLIGHT. A Ticonderoga class cruiser was deployed to the SHARP GUARD mission virtually during the whole 1993-1996 period. These units were very important as their advanced electronic equipment gave the SHARP GURAD forces direct access to the air situation above the Adriatic Sea which US aircraft and ships provided on an ongoing basis. A number of submarines also participated in SHARP GUARD but the large nuclear US submarines proved to be of limited value as their size meant that they could not operate too close to the coast. During the 3-year long SHARP GUARD operation, 14 of NATO’s then 16 member states contributed ships to the force - the two countries not contributing were Luxemburg and Iceland, but both had a legitimate excuse: no naval ships!. The Danish Participation in Operations MARITIME MONITOR and SHARP GUARD As previously mentioned, the Danish corvette Niels Juel had, briefly participated in the embargo as part of its participation in STANAVFORLANT 1992. On 1 June 1993, Danish Defense Minister Haekkerup presented a “proposal for a parliamentary resolution on Danish participation in the international maritime embargo on the former Yugoslavia” (B 99) to the Danish parliament. The duration of the Danish contribution - a corvette - was supposed to be until the end of September 19936. The proposal was adopted with 118 votes in favor and none against. B 99 made ​​it clear that the corvette risked being faced with a situation where it would be necessary to use force to defend the ship, other task force units or to stop a blockade runner. Parliament gave the needed consent for this. Once again, the first Danish corvette to join the operation after the adoption of B 99 was Niels Juel which participated from 14 June to 1 August, with Commander Henrik 6 At this time, Denmark had made both a Niels Juel class corvette and a Tumleren class submarine ​​available to NATO but there is nothing suggesting that it was considered deploying a submarine to the Adriatic Sea.

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Muusfeldt as commanding officer. He had been the commanding officer of Olfert Fischer when it participated in the (first) Gulf War, meaning that he had personal experience from such multinational operations. The following three years, the three Niels Juel class corvettes partook in the joined SHARP GUARD mission seven times, each tour lasting three months7. A Danish boarding team boards an unknown civilian ship. Preferably, boardings were carried out during the day but all the participating Danish units were faced with situations where night boardings were necessary. The Danish corvettes were too small to have an onboard helicopter and this proved to be a problem, especially during boardings. Without a helicopter, the boarding teams had to use a rubber dinghy. This meant that the Danes could only do so-called “compliant boardings” where the captain of the civilian ship had to give the boarding team permission to come on board in advance. Furthermore, the lack of a helicopter meant that the Danish corvette could not do boardings when the sea was too rough. A boarding could last several hours and was strenuous work. The 8 or 10 man high boarding team was headed by an officer and was split into three groups: a bridge team, a guard team and a search team. The bridge team was to secure the ship’s bridge while the guarding team guarded the ship’s crew who were assembled on the deck while the search team examined the ship’s papers and cargo. Normally, two search teams would be dispatched to larger ships which would increase the team to ten men. During the transfer of the boarding team from the corvette to the ship to be inspected, it was important that the corvette was positioned in such a way that its weapons systems - primarily the 20mm guns and machine guns – would cover the dinghy. The task of monitoring ship traffic in the Adriatic Sea did not differ significantly from the maritime surveillance which the Danish Navy exercised in Danish, Faroese and Greenlandic waters. However, in the Adriatic Sea the threat level was of course somewhat higher than at home after the Cold War had ended. Also, the SHARP GUARD operation did not differ from the NATO exercises which the Danish Navy had participated in since the 1960’s. By 1993, a small navy like the Danish Navy had many years of experience with multinational cooperation, and even though SHARP GUARD was “the 7 Niels Juel: from 14 June to 1 August 1993. Peter Tordenskiold: from 2 August to 27 September 1993 and from 19 April to 7 July 1994. Olfert Fischer: from 28 July to 9 October 1994, from 7 April to 4 June 1995. Niels Juel: from 23 August to 7 October 1995 and from 25 April to 11 May 1996.

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real deal” and not an exercise, the day-to-day work did not differ much. The Danish corvettes were - as usual - the smallest units in the task force and also the units with the shortest possible sea time. On the other hand, the corvettes were fully capable of executing the required tasks to everyone’s satisfaction. For most of the crew, the daily routines aboard the ships were almost the same as they would have been had the corvettes been operating anywhere else in the world. But officers, the combat information specialists in the Operations Room and the boarding teams came to experience firsthand that they were part of a major international operation far from home. For the majority of the crew, the highlights were port visits in Italian cities such as Bari, Brindisi and Venice. The Sharp Guard units were ordered to concentrate only on larger vessels violating the blockade of Yugoslavia and as such to turn the blind eye to the many speed boats and small vessels that almost in regular service were smuggling refugees or goods between the Albanian and Italian coasts; stopping this traffic was a job for the Italian coastguard.

Statistics Corvette Peter Tordenskiold’s participation in Operation SHARP GUARD from 26 July to 9 October 1993 Duration of deployment: 75 days Days at sea: 51 days (71 %) Patrolling: 26 days (35 %) Deployment (incl. from/to Danmark): 27 days (36 %) Days in harbor: 22 days (29 %) Number of ships challenged: 136 Number of ships boarded: 11 Number of ships rerouted: 1 Total distance: 15,000 nm Oil consumption: 850 m3 Meals served: 22,000 Number of received signals: 12,000 Number of signals sent: 1,000 Crew complement: 95: 18 officers, 11 NCOs and 66 privates and conscripts.

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The Lido II-incident On 1 May 1994, the SHARP GUARD units became involved in the most serious attempt to circumvent the embargo when a Maltese tanker tried to violate the embargo. At 06:00 hours, the 45,000 ton tanker Lido II and its primarily Russian crew entered the Adriatic Sea and stated that it was on its way to Durres in Albania. However, the SHARP GUARD headquarters soon established that on 28 – 29 April the ship had reported that it was on the way to Rijeka in Croatia. This meant that the ship’s actual destination was unclear. At 06:15 hours, the authorities in Durres informed the SHARP GUARD headquarters that they were not expecting the Lido II. Consequently, the ship was reclassified to “suspect vessel” and US cruiser Philippine Sea set a course for the ship’s position. At 06:24 hours, the Lido II sent out a mayday signal and claimed that water was entering its engine room. The captain of the Lido II announced that his intention was to beach the ship on the Albanian coast as soon as possible to avoid an environmental disaster. The ship did not, however, head for the Albanian coast but instead steered directly for Montenegro and increased its speed to 14-15 knots. At the same time, two Yugoslavian surface battle groups were operating in the area: to the north, a Koni class frigate and a Koncar class missile boat, and to the south, a Kotor class frigate and two other missile boats. When the Lido II started sending out mayday signals, the southern group headed towards the tanker, going approx. 25-30 knots. They soon moved out of Yugoslavian territorial waters which was unprecedented. At the same time, the SHARP GUARD units could hear the radio communication between the Lido II and the Yugoslavian warships. British frigate Chatham and Dutch frigate Van Kinsbergen were ordered to intercept the Lido II as soon as possible and the tanker was repeatedly ordered to turn away and slow down. The captain of the Lido refused, claiming that any changes to course or speed would increase the risk of the ship sinking. While US cruiser Philippine Sea headed towards the Maltese tanker, the US ship asked for permission to use “disabling fire” against the Lido II if it did not follow the order to stop. The request was granted. Immediately afterwards, the captain of the US cruiser passed the job on to Dutch frigate Van Kinsberger which was closer to the Lido II. The problem was then, however, that in the US Navy, “disabling fire” means firing at the engine room while in the Dutch navy it means firing at the ship’s bridge – where the risk of killing and wounding crewmembers is considerably higher. Luckily, it did not become necessary to open fire on the Lido II, but the incident showed the lack of – and need for - common NATO force guidelines. At 07:15 hours, a helicopter from Van Kinsbergen transferred a Dutch boarding team to the Lido II, and five minutes later the boarding team had the tanker under control and changed its heading to southwest. Shortly after, a damage control team was transferred from the Chatham and the flooding was quickly stopped. It turned out that the flooding problem primarily was the result of the tanker’s crew having configured a pump to pump water into the engine room.

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The Lido II, seen here a few years later, when it was renamed Amanda Miller.

At 08:09 hours, the Yugoslavian frigate and two missile boats arrived in the area with the now stopped tanker. The nearby SHARP GUARD units noticed that a missile port was open on one of the missile boats, meaning that it was ready for immediate action. The situation became even more tense when the two missile boats placed themselves between the Van Kinsbergen and the Lido II and the Chatham and the Lido II, respectively, while the Yugoslavian frigate took position approx. 5 miles out. The Van Kinsbergen was repeatedly illuminated by the frigate’s fire control radar and the ships guns were directed towards the Dutch frigate. At around 09:05 hours, one of the missile boats made a risky maneuver in front of the Chatham in that it tried to force the British frigate away. This maneuver almost resulted in a collision but the Chatham - which was following the rules of navigation - did not turn away and subsequently, the missile boat gave up. At the same time, Italian fighter jets arrived at the scene to support the SHARP GUARD units which caused the Yugoslavian naval units to retreat back to Yugoslavian territorial waters. The incident petered out and the Lido II was later towed to Brindisi. The Lido II incident was the first real attempt to break the embargo and it was the first time the Yugoslavian Navy participated in a coordinated action, and even outside Yugoslavian territorial waters. The general feeling in the SHARP GUARD force was that anything could happen now, and perhaps at very short notice. The general perception was that the Lido II incident had only been the first act and now the second act could happen anytime and anywhere. The incident, however, turned out to be a one-off and not the start of a new and more confrontational policy on the part of the Yugoslavian Navy. Enforcement of the embargo soon fell back into the previous routines with the occasional boarding, exercises and port visits as the only highlights in an almost boring everyday life. The Dayton Peace Agreement The western press had a very black & white approach to the civil war in the FRY and most newspaper articles portrayed the Serbs as the aggressor while the Bosnian and Croatian forces were described as if they just defended themselves against Serb attacks. This was one of the reasons behind the US government decision of 11 November 1994 to stop enforcing the arms embargo against Bosnia. This gave rise to a strange situation where the participating US ships did not inspect ships bound for Bosnia but also did not interfere when other SHARP GUARD-units inspected them. In reality, the new US policy did not influence the day-to-day handling of the embargo very much as Americans continued to participate in the part of the embargo that was directed against Serbia

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and Montenegro - and ships bound for Bosnia could be inspected by other Sharp Guard units. On 21 November 1995, a peace agreement was finally reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. The peace agreement came into force on 14 December 1995 and after a period where everybody waited to see if the agreement held, the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia was partially lifted on 13 March 1996. The SHARP GUARD units remained in place, ready to resume enforcement of the embargo if needed. This did not become necessary, however, and the embargo was finally lifted on 18 June. The next day, Operation SHARP GUARD was suspended. On 1 October 1996, the UN lifted all sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, meaning that Operation SHARP GUARD was officially over. Â

The participation of the Danish corvettes in Operation Sharp Guard got wide attention from the politicians and Secretary of Defense Haekkerup visited the ships several times. In this photo, he is on board the Niels Juel in 1995, watching the boarding team practicing their pistol shooting skills on the aft deck.

When Operation SHARP GUARD was cancelled on 19 June 1996, the participating naval units had challenged 74,192 ships of which 5951 were boarded - and 1,480 of these rerouted to a nearby Italian port for further inspection. The SHARP GUARD force captured 11 blockade-violators: seven carrying oil for Serbia and four with weapons for the Croatian forces. This rather meager result hides the important conclusion that the embargo worked as the mere presence of the SHARP GUARD force caused the warring factions to desist from trying to smuggle contraband by sea - they found other and easier ways.

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References Unknown author ”OLFERT FISCHER. SHARP GUARD Adriaterhavet 7. april - 13. juni 1995.” Forsvarets Bibliotek, not dated. Andreasen, E. ”Togtbog. Med korvetten ”Niels Juel” på ”Operation Sharp Guard” og togt til Caribien 15 APR - 24 JUN 1996.” Forsvarets Bibliotek, not dated. Boorda, J. M. “Loyal Partner - NATO\’s Forces in support of the UN.” NATO’s sixteen nations, # 1 / 1994. Christensen, H. B. Unpublished manuscript for presentation about NIELS JUEL in Sharp Guard 1993. Cortes, P. ”Korvetten Peter Tordenskiold’s deltagelse i embargoen mod Serbien og Montenegro.” Lecture manuscript, dated 23 February 1994. Elleman, B. A. ed. ”Naval coalition warfare from the Napoleonic War to Operation Iraqi Freedom.” London 2008. Hiscock, F. “Operation Sharp Guard,” The Naval Review, July 1994. Hækkerup, H. “På Skansen. Dansk forsvarspolitik fra Murens fald til Kosovo.” København 2002. Leurdijk, D. A. ”TheUnited Nations and NATO in Former Yugoslavia, 1991-1996. Limits to Diplomacy and Force.” Den Haag 1996. Lussow, H. “The German Navy in deeper water.” NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace, 3/2001 Maddow, R. ”Drift. The Unmooring of American Military Power.” New York 2012. Muusfeldt, H. ”En ny æra - søværnets korvetter i ny rolle.” Værnskontakt, # 1/1993 Muusfeldt, H. ”Korvetter i STANAVFORLANT”. Tidsskrift for Søvæsen, # 5/1993. NATO CNS OPORDER 1/93. Operation “Sharp Guard”. NATO Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe Naples, Italy. 1993. NATO F A C T - S H E E T. NATO-WEU OPERATION SHARP GUARD http://www.nic.funet.fi/index/doc/world/AWEU/General/sharp-guard- facts NATO ”STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC: 1995-1996: A Year at Sea with the Sailors and Ships of The STANDING NAVAL FORCE ATLANTIC, for the first Time under the Command of a Portuguese Commander.” No location. 1996. Jørgensen, T. S. ”Søværnets deltagelse i internationale operationer.” Lecture manuscript, dated 1994. Nielsen, H. ” Togtbog for ”Operation Sharp Guard” med korvetten Niels Juel 14 AUG - 17 OKT 1995.” Forsvarets Bibliotek, not dated. Sharpe, R. (ed.) ”Jane’s Fighting Ships 1990-91”. Surrey 1990. Plus the ”Søværnsorientering” magazine . May be downloaded at www.marinehist.dk The mentioned UN resolutions can be found on the UN website at www.un.org All photographs and illustrations are from the Defence Library‘s Online Photo Archive www.foto.fak.dk

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UNITAF and UNOSOM II: The Failure of Multinational Operations in Somalia 1992-1994 Richard W. STEWART

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t is impossible to discuss the failed mission in Somalia in the early 1990s, twenty years ago now, in terms of one operation or one decision or even one reason for failure. It was a highly complex military and political operation which, in the course of three years took a number of dramatic twists and turns worthy of a soap opera, albeit one with deadly consequences for hundreds.1 The story of the failure to assist in saving Somalia from itself is a complicated one. It is made more difficult given the fact that the political and military conditions in Somalia changed so often that in the space of less than five years in the early 90s one can make out no fewer than eight distinct operational phases or sub-phases to the various United Nations and multi-national operations that tried to deal with the deteriorating situation. These phases were, in fact, so different as to almost constitute distinct and separate military actions. These operations, listed here were: Operation UNOSOM I (United Nations Operations in Somalia) from Apr. to Aug. 1992; U.S. Operation PROVIDE RELIEF (a humanitarian airlift operation with some special operations support run solely by the U.S.) from Aug.-Dec. 1992; UNITAF or Unified Task Force ( U.S. Operation RESTORE HOPE) involving the deployment of a U.S.-led multinational force supported by a UN from Dec. 1992 to May 1993; a renewed United Nations mission in Somalia called Operation UNOSOM II starting in May 1993 lasting until March 1995; (the U.S. sub-operation called CONTINUE HOPE until Mar 1994); GOTHIC SERPENT, a concurrent sub-operation of U.S. Task Force Ranger from Aug. to Oct. 1993 culminating in the “Blackhawk Down� raid of 3-4 October 1993; the U.S. military reinforcement, under strict rules of engagement in support of UNOSOM II operations from Oct. 1993 to March 1994 called JTF Somalia; and UNITED SHIELD, the U.S. name of the operation that assisted in the final withdrawal of all U.N. personnel from Somalia over the next year ending in March 1995. Each of these operations or phases constitute a distinct, although related, story with different actors, shifting political alliances, varied UN and U.S. interests and resolutions, and very different outcomes. For the purposes of this paper, and in consonance with the theme of this Congress of joint and multinational operations, I propose to focus on the middle, and in my mind most critical, period in the story of the multinational engagement in Somalia from late 1992 to early 1994. The greatest chance of success in the mission of ending famine in Somalia and crafting some form of political settlement was in this middle period. One of the critical facts in understanding the situation in Somalia in the 1990s, is

1 This paper reflects only my own opinion and does not represent the views of the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Army or the U.S. government.

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that the famine was only partly due to the drought in the region. The major factor in the unfolding humanitarian disaster was the political chaos and fighting between the various clans and sub-clans in that troubled region. The main chance to change that particular equation and resolve both issues—famine and anarchy—was during the UNITAF multinational intervention starting under UN auspices in December 1992 where a U.S.-led coalition of 38 nations held the dominant position in the country. And it was the flawed transition to UNOSOM II and the reduction of that military force, complicated by the expansion of the mission to include efforts to capture one of the key warlords, Mohammed Farah Aideed, which ultimately doomed the effort. The result was the failure of all western efforts to rescue Somalia from political chaos: efforts which were complicated by the widely divergent capabilities of national forces, the inability of the UN to establish a credible command and control structure, and the shift in mission starting in May 1993 from one of humanitarian relief to an aggressive form of nation-building that would have changed the political balance in the country. As a consequence of this failure, Somalia’s downward spiral for the last two decades into the status of “failed nation” continues to this day. The political and economic situation in Somalia in 1992 and the reasons behind the western intervention into the affairs of Somalia are well known. The political chaos resulting from the collapse of the regime of Somali strongman Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991 led to the descent of the region into sectarian and ethnic warfare with the creation of numerous regional warlords.2 With the collapse of political order came a collapse of the various western aid organizations’ relief networks. Those networks were already stressed by the endemic poverty of the region and this was compounded by a severe drought in the southern region of the country. With the failure of political order came attacks on food warehouses, raids on relief convoys, and starvation on a vast scale. UN and early U.S. attempts at improving the distribution networks were only small band-aids placed on gaping wounds, resulting in UN Resolution 751 on 24 April 1992 which authorized UNOSOM I, U.S. airlift operations beginning in August, and finally a U.S. led multinational force intervention in December 1992--UNITAF. The Unified Task Force or UNITAF, (called by the U.S. Operation Restore Hope) was almost immediately successful. UN Security Council Resolution 794 endorsed the intervention on 3 December and U.S. and multinational forces were on the ground on 9 December. The operation was joined by large components of troops from France, Italy, Belgium, Morocco, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Canada for a total of 20 nations. The operation was organized so that each nation had a major and sometimes independent role to play, but as part of an operation coordinated by the U.S. and backed us logistics and firepower.3 2 Richard W. Stewart, The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, Washington, D.C.: U. S. Army Center of Military History, 2002, p. 2. 3 Robert F. Baumann and Lawrence A. Yates with Versalle F. Washington, “My Clan Against the World”, US and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, pp. 30-31. The UNITAF organizational chart is from page 31.

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Because of this powerful force, the Somalis acquiesced quickly to the intervention. The various Somali warlords, including rivals Mohammed Farah Aideed of the Habr Gidr sub-clan and Ali Mahdi Mohamed of the Abgal sub-clan, were awed by the overwhelming force of the western allies, and agreed to move their heavy weapons and gunjeeps into monitored cantonment areas. The situation as described in the U.S. Army’s After Action Report for the operation was one of “respectful coexistence” with the clan militias keeping their weapons but also their distance from coalition forces. Thus during the first 60 days of UNITAF’s existence, militia attacks fell sharply and massive starvation was dramatically reduced.4 This relatively benign environment allowed multinational troops to establish protected warehouses and feeding locations, begin convoys of relief supplies into the interior of the country, and create a more secure environment at a number of refugee camps. The multinational forces of UNITAF moved out from Mogadishu into the countryside and set up eight Humanitarian Relief Sectors (HRS). The U.S. Army forces focused on operations in four sectors—HRS Baidoa (shared with the Australians), Balli Doggle, Merca, and Kismaayo—with the U.S. Marines operating primarily in Bardera. Other coalition forces maintained various levels of presence in Mogadishu and some elements in the U.S. sectors, but some nations were given areas of control of their own. Canadian forces focused heavily on Belen Uen, Italian forces on Gialalassi, and the French on Oddur. The boundaries of these sectors remained relatively constant but the shift of units and national forces into and out of these sectors varied greatly.)5 By the end of Operation UNITAF on 4 May 1993, it seemed as if the crisis was all but over. The country was quiet. Starvation was reduced. Food supplies flowed freely. The presence of 39,000 coalition forces strong, nearly 29,000 of which were U.S. troops, was enough to establish a measure of peace. That overwhelming force was able to halt the violence and distribute hundreds of thousands of tons of food and relief supplies throughout the southern half of the country.6 This was all to change. The first warning signs of what became a textbook case of “mission creep” occurred as early as 11 December, just as the UNITAF forces were moving into Somalia. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Gali called U.S. President George H.W. Bush and insisted that the only way the operation would be successful was for the coalition troops to completely disarm the various Somali factions, not simply move their heavy weapons into Somali-controlled cantonments. President Bush strongly disagreed and considered that any such move against the still-powerful and well-armed warlords would instantly lead to open warfare.7 The mission, in his mind, was to remain focused on doing what 4 Somalia Working Group, United States, Somalia After Action Report and Historical Overview: The United States Army in Somalia, 1992-1994, Washington, D.C: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 2003, p. 26. (Hereafter referred to as the Somalia AAR.) 5 Stewart, p. 8. 6 Somalia AAR, p. 26. 7 Baumann and Yates, pp. 35-36. The phrase “’Selective disarming’ as necessary” was apparently coined by Central Command Commander, marine General Joseph Hoar.

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was necessary to stop the starvation. It was not to force political change on a war-torn nation. The mission directive provided to U.S. commanders was specific: “selectively disarm” any forces that were deemed hostile and remove heavy weapons and the ubiquitous “technicals” or gun vehicles, but not to undertake wholesale weapons seizures. While mass starvation as decreasing, there were some additional warning signs on the horizon. UN diplomats did not cease to press for a more active role for the military in Somalia to force a political settlement. However, UNITAF was a limited, peacekeeping operation under Chapter VI of the UN charter and much of its success was due to its limited, humanitarian goals. But while there was an uneasy truce in Somalia, there was no peace. Unosom Ii: Operation Continue Hope While U.S. and allied forces under UNITAF maintained an uneasy calm in Somalia, a new American administration took office in January 1993. The new Clinton administration, either out of a concern to limit the U.S. role in Somalia in a misunderstanding of actual UN capabilities, was helping to push the United Nations into taking over the mission. This would help the United States to reduce the size of its committed forces and handle only limited aspects of security and logistics. And on 26 March 1993, the United Nations passed resolution 814 which considerably broadened its mandate to intervene in another country’s affairs. The UN was now intervening militarily in a peacemaking role under Chapter VII of its charter. The apparent goal was to make the peace by more aggressive actions on the ground, even while undercutting the size and military effectiveness of the forces that were to be employed.8 Turkish Lt. Gen. Cevik Bir was appointed commander of the new UNOSOM II force, with a U.S. Army Maj. Gen. as his deputy. U.S. General Thomas Montgomery also retained his position as commander of U.S. Forces in Somalia (USFORSOM) so that the U.S. forces retained their own national chain of command while still placing themselves under the UN structure.9 The force envisioned by the new command was to consist of nearly 30,000 soldiers from over 30 of nations with the largest force contingents coming from India (5,000), Pakistan (4,500), Italy (2,500) and the U.S. (4,200). But when the transition occurred on 4 May, only 18,000 of those peacekeepers and a partially filled headquarters were on hand to face a vastly expanded mission and an increasingly hostile Somalia.10 The slow passage of Security Council Resolution 814 left all parties with little time to plan for an orderly transition. It took time to fill the UN positions for the new force and, by all accounts, the handover of the mission was poorly done with only 30 percent of the UN staff in place on the date of transfer.11 However, despite the challenges of 8 R.D. Hooker, Jr., “Hard Day’s Night: A Retrospective on the American Intervention in Somalia”, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 54, 3rd Quarter 2009: 130. See section on Change of Mission. 9 Somalia AAR, pp. 63-64 and 71. 10 Baumann and Yates, pp. 101-103 and Somalia AAR, p. 77. 11 See Somalia AAR, 71-77 for transition concerns.

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transition, General Bir assumed command of forces in Somalia on 4 May 1993 as UNOSOM II assumed the mission. In support of UNOSOM II, the United States provided a substantial logistics structure (consisting of about 2,600 troops) and a small special operations element. The U.S. military also provided a 1,100-soldier ground-based quick reaction force (QRF) for UNOSOM II, consisting of a brigade-level headquar- ters from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, under General Montgomery’s tactical control but under the operational control of US Central Command in Florida.12 Jonathan Howe, a retired U.S. admiral, was appointed the new UN envoy to Somalia, the personal representative of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, with wide-ranging powers. It quickly became apparent that at least one of the warlords, Mohammed Farah Aideed, had little respect for the new military organization, the UN, or Admiral Howe. Here are just a few of the key attacks that took place almost immediately after the transition. The worst of these was on 5 June when Aideed’s Somali National Alliance forces ambushed and killed 24 Pakistani soldiers and wounded another 44 in an ambush at a feeding site. 13 The following day, the United Nations Security Council approved Resolution 837 adopting a more aggressive military stance toward Aideed and asking member states for more troops and equipment. In Mogadishu, Pakistani and Italian forces conducted heavy armored patrols throughout the city, concentrating on the areas near the ambush site. Also in early June the U.S. sent four Air Force AC‑130 gunships, special C-130 cargo planes (see photo) modified for direct ground support, to carry out air strikes against the Somalis. The gunships conducted 32 missions in six weeks in support of the UN including attacks on Aideed’s weapons cantonments and cripple Radio Mogadishu, his propaganda station. 14 On 17 June Admiral Howe issued a warrant for Aideed’s arrest and authorized a $25,000 reward. This only served to harden the already strained political lines in Mogadishu.15 Skirmishing between UN and U.S. elements and Aideed’s Habr Gidr subclan continued and on 12 July in a direct challenge to Aideed’s leadership, the American QRF attacked a major Aideed compound with helicopter gunships. After the raid, a hostile crowd near the compound killed four western journalists covering the action, displaying their bodies for the world to see. This was followed by more attacks, including the use of land mines on UN travelled roads starting in early August. Immediately, UNOSOM II Command focused its intelligence and operational capability on locating, capturing, and arresting Aideed and any of his supporters whom it 12 13 14 15

Ibid., p. 105. Ibid, p. 127. Ibid. p. 130. Ibid. p. 150.

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deemed responsible for the attacks on June and July but he proved an elusive target. Nor did the UNOSOM structure have a robust intelligence gathering capability. It simply could not handle such a complex operation. Finally, in exasperation, the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asked the U.S. to assist him directly in capturing Aideed. On 22 August 1993, the new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, directed the deployment of a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by Aideed supporters upon American and UNOSOM forces and installations. The JSOTF, named Task Force Ranger, arrived in Somalia on 28-29 AUG with the not-very secret mission of capturing Aideed and his key lieutenants and turning them over to UNOSOM II forces. The task would prove extraordinarily difficult, for Aideed had gone underground after the AC‑130 air raids and ground assaults on his strongholds in June and July.16 Reporting directly to national authorities and not to UNOSOM II elements, TF Ranger began operations in early September. The different chains of command contributed to some early missteps, but coordination improved rapidly with the exchange of liaison officers between the two U.S. headquarters elements. During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into Mogadishu, all of which were tactical successes, with one on 21 September capturing Osman Atto, one of Aideed’s closest advisers and his chief financial aide.17 The situation in Mogadishu worsened even as the raids continued. In one of the most violent and costly incidents, on 8 September U.S. and Pakistani soldiers were clearing roadblocks near a site known as the Cigarette Factory when they were attacked by Somali militia using 106-mm. recoilless rifles, RPGs and small arms. Later that same day, near an abandoned allied checkpoint, the same clearing element was again attacked by militiamen, this time joined by a mob of approximately 1000 Somali civilians. Six UNOSOM II soldiers were injured. On 16 and 21 September two roadblock clearing teams were attacked on 21 October Road. The Pakistanis an armored personnel carrier and suffered nine casualties, including two killed. On 25 September a U.S. Black Hawk helicopter was shot down and three soldiers killed. Early in October, TR Ranger elements conducted their boldest and most costly strike against members of Aideed’s faction in the heart of his sector of Mogadishu. The 3 October TF Ranger raid was the most deadly and famous, so I don’t need to go into many details. Suffice it to say that two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot down in the middle of Aideed’s stronghold and three others were hit by rocket propelled grenades. U.S. forces were cut off, taking heavy casualties, until the following morning when they were rescued by an armored convoy of Malaysian Armored Personnel Carriers and Pakistani tanks along with two companies of the U.S. QRF from the 10th Mountain Division.18 Casualties included 18 soldiers killed, another 79 wounded, and one captured. The Malaysian coalition partners had 2 killed and 7 wounded and the Pakistanis suffered 2 16 Ibid., p. 136. 17 Stewart, p.14. 18 Hooker, “Hard Day’s Night”, JFQ: 134.

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wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties between 500 and 1,500. The battles of 3-4 October were a watershed in U.S. involvement in Somalia. The already complex mission and difficult environment took a dramatic turn with those events. The U.S. military presence in Somalia increased significantly and a new U.S. Joint Task Force Somalia was created. Coalition troop strength quickly increased to nearly 30,000 soldiers but it was too late: the political situation was beyond repair. The Clinton administration was focused on using those forces to facilitate the withdrawal of U.S. troops rather than use them to punish Aideed.19 In a national security policy review session held in the White House on 6 October, the president directed the acting chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral David G. Jeremiah, to stop all actions by U.S. forces against Aideed except those required in self-defense. He also reappointed Ambassador Robert Oakley as a special envoy to Somalia in an attempt to broker a peace settlement and then announced that. The President addressed the nation on 7 October announcing his intent that all U.S. forces would withdraw from Somalia no later than 31 March 1994. It was apparent that the U.S. had had enough.20 The situation in Somalia continued to slide downhill as more and more western troops departed: the French on 12 Dec., the Belgians soon afterwards, followed by the Turks, the Germans and the Italians and finally the U.S. by 25 Mar. Peace talks in Addis Ababa failed to deliver a settlement and although UN personnel would remain in Somalia for about another year, all attempts at obtaining a political settlement were stymied by Aideed’s intransigence and the coalition’s collapse of will. The mission in Somalia was a failure. Conclusions: The multinational coalition entered Somalia in December 1992 to stop the imminent starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. Although it succeeded in this mission, the chaotic political situation of that unhappy land prevented the creation of a permanent settlement. This problem was only exacerbated by the devolution of the mission onto an ill-prepared, poorly resourced UN follow on mission: UNOSOM II. UNITAF had succeeded as well as it did because of several key reasons. The mission was clear, the rules of engagement robust, the chain of command clean (to the extent any multinational mission can be given each nation’s ability to say NO at any time), and there was enough force on the ground to cow the splintered Somali opposition. But when UNITAF left and transitioned to UNOSOM II, all of these strengths went away and the Somali factions, especially those led by Aideed, saw both weakness in the new headquarters and a new mission which was an existential threat to their power. And why did UNOSOM II fail to retain these strengths? First, because the U.S. tried to shake off the responsibility for the mission and minimize its exposure while at the same time helping hand the UN a widely expanded and dangerous mission: disarm the 19 Somalia AAR, pp. 140-141 20 Ibid., p. 139.

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factions. So the mission grew and it was not sufficiently backed by a strong force or fully functioning, well-led staff. The Somalis sensed this weakness immediately and Aideed’s forces first tested the new organization, then bloodied it, and finally neutralized it. Each of the coalition partners quickly decided that the game was not worth the candle. The military and diplomatic effort to bring together all the clans and political entities into a peace settlement was a failure. Multinational coalition military power had initially established the conditions for a possible peace in the midst of a famine and civil war, but, unlike later in Bosnia, the Somali factions were not yet exhausted from the fighting and were not yet willing to stop killing each other and anyone caught in the middle. There was no peace to keep or build upon.

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Strategic Integration - Mission and Practices of NATO Special Operations Forces NANCY COLLINS Part I Objective his presentation analyzes the emergence of NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the twenty-first century, at present, and its near-term challenges.

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Method Its focus is the case study of Afghanistan, the only conflict in which NATO SOF has had universal participation. This presentation analyzes the duration of the conflict, from autumn 2001 to the present, as a site of strategic integration of NATO’s SOF.

Relevance It provides an essential model for understanding twenty-first century warfare, both its critical factors and its current limitations. To date, this SOF integration effort is the most significant undertaking toward a globally networked interoperable force. The fault lines in Afghanistan are immediately applicable in current battlegrounds—including Mali, Libya, and Syria—and potentially significant to policy decisions regarding a number of areas of concern, including the South China Sea, North Korea, and Egypt. Part II Definitions SOF are defined as highly trained units that perform selected military activities, frequently high-risk missions, often for the purposes of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency.

Growth Since 9/11, Special Operations Forces have surged in their strategic utility. SOF now resides in a new and unfamiliar place, a result of the exceptional growth in its role and resources, the effects of the long war on its culture, and the global operational environment that questions the use of large, heavy, and costly conventional military formations.

Utility SOF hasn’t always been in such demand. Far from it. It was the rise of international terrorist activity, especially in the late ‘70s and ‘80s, that brought SOF to the fore in a number of NATO nations. September 11th brought about its major transformation, to its current position of prominence in the twenty-first century, bringing together multi-

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national SOF to Afghanistan. Now these forces are no longer relied on for rare and episodic use. They have increasingly been groomed for, and budgeted as, a continuous presence as well as a surgical strike force. Part III Case Study: Afghanistan In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the United States deployed SOF to Afghanistan to target AQ and the Taliban-led government. NATO invoked Article V, the treaty’s mutual defense clause, for the first time in its history, providing the basis for NATO members to support the United States. In the early days, SOF from Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Poland, and Turkey rapidly deployed to Afghanistan.

Multi-National Commands In Afghanistan since 2001, a range of NATO members countries took responsibilities for varying territories and tasks as well as non-NATO members. While multi-national activities were sometimes coordinated, SOF was decidedly not integrated across national units. Such separation of forces limited SOF’s ability to have strategic impact across that country, strained limited aviation and intelligence platforms, and fragmented training missions with Afghan units, thereby slowing down efforts to increase domestic stability and return military authority to local leaders. Challenges To Synchronization There were a number of obstacles to SOF synchronization, most notably that most NATO members consider their national Special Operations Forces to be: 1) a scarce resource; 2) of exceptionally high value; 3) often with unique capabilities. To combine such forces, for the purposes of the war in Afghanistan, would then reduce the availability of these forces for individual national need, as well as expose certain national techniques and skills, and increase risk to their forces by turning over control and command to a non-national leader in a major battleground. Increased Need In Afghanistan, SOF was in great demand due largely to its counterterrorism capabilities, that are generally more honed than national conventional forces. What began as a force of about 500 grew to a force of 2,200 special operators, and led in 2007 to an overarching SOF element called the International Security and Assistance Forces Special Operations (ISAF SOF). NATO established a SOF Coordination Center to offer training, tactics, and capability development, and by 2010, NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) provided new infrastructure for joint training and planning, an effort that continues to grow today.

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Unified Command in Afghanistan In 2012-2013, in Afghanistan, all national special operations forces (SOF) have been united under one command. This represented a major shift, and culmination, in the strategy and operations of NATO Special Operations Forces. Indeed, it is unprecedented. It is further standing up and training Afghanistan Special Operations Forces who are expected to take the lead in future years as NATO SOF withdraws. Part IV Emerging Challenges However, SOF’s growth and rise in prominence has also had effects that raise concern, notably: • Astronomical Expectations With a track record of military operational success, and under an intense spotlight, it seems difficult to imagine how SOF can sustain this pace in other potential conflicts and at the same time avoid its overuse or misemployment. Furthermore, some political and military leaders have become so enamored of this capability that they are relying on SOF even when other tools would be a better fit. • Intense Demand This force, more than others, requires extensive training for readiness. It cannot be grown quickly, and needs years to mature, and probably cannot be stretched much further. NATO SOF is experiencing its longest continuous combat, now entering its twelfth year. For some of these units, which were designed and trained for the occasional hostage rescue or airport take-down, perpetual warfare has fundamentally transformed the life of the operator. In the words of one operator, this is the result of “catastrophic success,” as SOF’s effectiveness has led to greater scale and operational tempo. • Inattention to Security Challenges Beyond Counterterrorism Given the dramatically increased scale in counterterrorist strike activities, long-term operations for other security challenges have not been accorded the attention and care they require. SOF’s strike missions receive intense focus and substantial resourcing, but NATO SOF will be the first to state that this method is unlikely to create enduring stability. • Narrow Focus Despite all of the success and attention, or perhaps because direct action missions draw nearly all of it, few people have an understanding of the full spectrum of NATO SOF and its missions. This is not just a problem among the public at large; it is also a limitation of some individuals whose policy decisions directly affect the use of special operations, as the mission set has become more narrow, focused largely on strikes, and other SOF skills have atrophied.

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Part V Five Strategic Shifts: At present, there are 5 strategic shifts that shape the environment for NATO SOF and its strategic integration:

1) NATO’s Geographic Range NATO, at the policy level, has undertaken a major shift in its area of responsibility. It has redefined its geographic range, moving away from its defensive posture on the continent of Europe, to a more proactive global structure, stating that threats to Europe must be confronted at their origination, regardless of continent.

2) NATO’s Military Scope In close relation to this change, NATO’s core mission, to protect the nearly 1 billion citizens of NATO countries, is now said to require a different sort of approach to new threats, which are likely to be asymmetric and international in form, rather than conventional military action across land. This awareness has led NATO to adjust its military scope, and even its purpose. 3) Afghanistan as Shared Framework NATO SOF service in Afghanistan has become its common framework and its shared experience. Each and every nation of NATO has contributed SOF forces. It is the only conflict that has drawn universal participation. These forces, now highly integrated, with exceptional capabilities, are beginning to disperse, as the Afghanistan war draws to a close, and all NATO nations have withdrawn, or are withdrawing. However, their current ties remain very close.

4) Redeployments The near-term is highly certain. In the post-2014 environment, will there be a significant role for NATO SOF? Current conflicts in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Egypt each present a potential role for NATO SOF. Or, if NATO policymakers choose not to deploy these forces to these areas, will NATO SOF largely reverse to disaggregated national forces, largely ending the process of strategic integration, and even undoing its efforts over the last decade? 5) Preventive Interventions Will NATO SOF develop a new role? It is considering deeper efforts in preventive intervention, to reduce the sway of violent ideologies. NATO SOF is currently considering changes to its mission set, to consider much greater attention to Phase 0 and Phase 1 activities. This objective would, of course, require significant new options and approaches that beyond kinetic activity, and in a time of diminished resources, may not be politically viable. VI. Conclusion: Ambiguity Between Peace and War These five shifts, and the corollary questions, will determine whether strategic integration continues, or reverses. Either direction is equally possible at present; staying in

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place is not. Retrenchment, particularly driven by financial and budgetary concerns, is the conventional wisdom. However, it may not be the wise course. Further engagement could lead SOF to play a greater role in long-term global presence, and therefore expand beyond episodic deployments, and beyond a concentrated focus on Afghanistan. If that course is taken, SOF could then turn to diffusing conflicts before they reach crisis levels, in ambiguous and sensitive locations. This could increase its work with so-called bad actors, in the blurry area between peace and war, where effects could be achieved during low-intensity conflicts, in the hopes of reducing the likelihood of large-scale incursions in the years to come. While this may be the more difficult path, it is likely the most strategic utility of force in the twenty-first century.

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Le missioni di pace della Polizia di Stato Raffaele CAMPOSANO Introduzione a partecipazione della Polizia di Stato alle missioni civili promosse in ambito internazionale, in particolare dall’ONU e dall’UE, è abbastanza recente. Pur tuttavia, l’impiego dei poliziotti in missioni “fuori area” si può far risalire alla prima metà del secolo scorso, sebbene le motivazioni e le finalità che ne sono alla base appaiono ben diverse da quelle delle attuali missioni di pace. Indubbiamente parlare di polizia in ambito coloniale o di polizia al fronte risulta essere ben altra cosa rispetto ai nuovi e più impegnativi scenari geopolitici che si sono aperti al termine della “Guerra fredda” e con l’avvento della globalizzazione, soprattutto economico finanziaria, ma farne un accenno è, comunque, utile per evidenziare alcune similitudini che si possono riscontrare sia in riferimento alle aree interessate dalle operazioni di “pacificazione”, sia per alcune delle problematiche emerse durante la loro effettuazione, non soltanto di natura logistico/organizzativa quali la gestione dell’ordine pubblico, la salvaguardia dei diritti delle persone, il rapporto con le autorità locali e con le altre forze militari e di polizia partecipanti alla missione, i problemi di ambientazione; la diffidenza, se non addirittura ostilità, da parte di fazioni o gruppi locali per motivazioni di ordine politico, razziale, culturale o religioso.

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Polizia in territorio coloniale La Polizia Coloniale fu istituita nel 1936. Tre anni dopo assunse la denominazione di Polizia dell’Africa Italiana. Il nuovo Corpo, posto alle dipendenze del Ministero dell’Africa italiana, organizzato militarmente e dotato di un proprio Comando Generale, entrò a far parte delle FF.AA. dello Stato, concorrendo con esse alle operazioni militari di polizia e successivamente di guerra. La P.A.I. era dislocata nelle Questure africane, dalle quali dipendevano pure i servizi di specialità di Polizia (foto 1). Tutte le sue unità erano a composizione mista tra nazionali e autocnoni, con una netta prevalenza di questi ultimi: gli Ascari organizzati anche in “bande”, furono addetti soprattutto al pattugliamento dei confini (foto 2). Il Corpo dimostrò assoluto valore nelle operazioni belliche sul fronte africano, meritando numerosi riconoscimenti al Valor Militare. Nel delicato passaggio di poteri alle Autorità militari inglesi, la PAI ebbe, seppure per brevi periodi, la responsabilità di assicurare l’ordine pubblico nei maggiori centri abitati. Al termine del ciclo di operazioni in terra africana, la PAI si distinse nelle operazioni militari del 1943, partecipando alla difesa di Roma. All’atto dell’occupazione dell’Eritrea da parte delle Forze Armate britanniche (1^

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Aprile 1941) nessuna variazione fu apportata al servizio di polizia che continuò ad essere svolto dalla PAI dell’Eritrea sotto il controllo di qualche ufficiale inglese. Il 25 luglio 1941 fu istituita l’Eritrea Police Force (Corpo di Polizia dell’Eritrea) alle dipendenze di un Commissioner of Police (Questore) e di altri ufficiali in sottordine, denominati Superintendenti di Polizia ed Assistenti Superintendenti nonché di sottufficiali qualificati come Ispettori. (foto 3) Per costituire la E.P.F. (Corpo di Polizia dell’Eritrea) venne impiegato il seguente personale: Ufficiali britannici; Ispettori britannici; Constables (poliziotti) italiani, greci, ebrei, egiziani, maltesi reclutati fra i civili residenti ad Asmara, o provenienti da altre località; Constables nativi eritrei, reclutati prevalentemente fra gli ex Ascari PAI e Zaptiè; I PAI dell’Eritrea che, pur facendo parte dell’E.P.F., rimase alle dipendenze dei rispettivi superiori, coi propri regolamenti interni e la propria uniforme. Successivamente anche i CC.RR., man mano che la situazione si andava normalizzando, si presentavano per essere assunti in servizio . In un primo tempo essi vennero assunti in forza nella PAI ed inviati di rinforzo alla varie stazioni.1 L’incremento di organico così ottenuto fu valutato come eccessivo dall’Autorità britannica che pensò bene di ridurne gli effettivi, internandone circa 100, quali prigionieri di guerra. Verso la fine del 1941 la posizione della polizia italiana (PAI e CC.RR.) fu regolarizzata mediante un “affidavit”, concretato tra le Autorità italiane e britanniche, col quale ogni membro della Polizia italiana s’impegnava volontariamente a prestare servizio alle dipendenza della Autorità occupante. Nel febbraio 1942 vennero internati come prigionieri di guerra il Questore di Asmara e molti altri ufficiali e sottufficiali della PAI. Pertanto, tutta la parte direttiva del servizio fu effettivamente assunta dagli ufficiali britannici. I pochissimi ufficiali della PAI rimasti vennero impiegati per la disciplina del reparto e per alcune limitate funzioni di polizia giudiziaria e amministrativa. Anche nelle stazioni di polizia venne posto un Ispettore britannico con l’incarico di dirigente del servizio ma in sostanza non aveva altro compito che di coordinare l’impiego della Polizia italiana e i constables nativi. Sopraggiunto l’armistizio, la cobelligeranza e la pace, le attribuzioni della Polizia italiana rimasero non solo immutate ma l’organico della PAI e dei CC.RR. gradatamente venne diminuito. I militi della PAI, rimasti in servizio in Eritrea, dopo lo scioglimento del Corpo (15 febbraio 1945), vennero riorganizzati in un Gruppo Autonomo Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza dell’Eritrea. (foto 4) A partire dalla seconda metà del 1947 alcune stazioni di polizia vennero affidate esclusivamente ai nativi sotto il comando di ispettori sempre del posto. Nell’aprile del 1948 l’organico complessivo della E.P.F. ammontava a circa 2.469 1 In seguito i CC.RR. ottennero di essere disimpegnati dalla PAI e poterono costituire una propria Compagnia dell’Eritrea;

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unità così suddivisi: nr. 56 britannici; nr. 115 Gruppo Guardie di P.S.; nr. 108 Compagnia Carabinieri Eritrea; nr. 37 Constables italiani; Constables eritrei nr. 2.153. Il Gruppo Autonomo Guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza dell’Eritrea, che si distinse particolarmente nell’opera antibrigantaggio condotta nei confronti degli sciftà e nell’attività di ordine pubblico nelle maggiori città eritree, a protezione dell’incolumità e dei beni non solo dei nostri connazionali ma anche dei nativi, continuò a svolgere i suoi compiti fino al 1952, anno dell’annessione dell’Eritrea all’Etiopia . (foto 5) Polizia al fronte a) Il Corpo Armato di Polizia per l’Albania fu istituito col Decreto Luogotenenziale il 31 agosto del 1939 n. 72, su ispirazione dell’Ispettore Generale di P.S. Giuseppe Gueli, nominato “Consigliere Permanente di Polizia” presso la Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri albanese. Inizialmente detto Corpo fu concepito per essere inquadrato nel Corpo di Polizia italiano ma in pratica, a causa dell’avversione delle Autorità albanesi, la sua costituzione rimase prevalentemente affidata a personale reclutato localmente. Teoricamente la sua organizzazione avrebbe dovuto prevedere una Direzione Generale di P.S. presso la Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, un Ufficio Provinciale di P.S. presso ogni sede di Prefettura, con uffici distaccati presso le Sottoprefetture ed Uffici di P.S. di frontiera. Inizialmente l’azione del Corpo fu concentrata nell’ambito della polizia politica, risultando scarso l’apporto dato nell’attività di ordine pubblico. Il suo contributo al conflitto fu molto limitato. Nel 1942 il Corpo Armato di Polizia fu regolamentato nell’interesse esclusivo degli albanesi senza più alcuna menzione all’inquadramento nella Polizia italiana. Da parte italiana, per coprire gli organici fu previsto che funzionari ed impiegati di altre amministrazioni, così come gli ex ufficiali, potessero essere trasferiti in Polizia con decreto luogotenenziale, su proposta del Ministro degli Interni, ed essere mantenuti, in esperimento, per un anno, e che anche sottufficiali e guardie potessero avere la medesima provenienza o essere tratti dalla vita civile, previa la frequenza di un corso accelerato. Ai funzionari italiani di P.S. era riservato l’incarico di “Consigliere Tecnico” presso la Direzione Generale e presso le Questure, in funzione subalterna rispetto ai superiori albanesi. Questo tipo di collaborazione forzata fece scaturire non poche richieste di rimpatrio che indebolirono alquanto la tenuta del Corpo. In seguito, l’arruolamento massiccio e poco oculato di poliziotti albanesi finì col compromettere del tutto la tenuta operativa dell’intera organizzazione. Un ulteriore fattore di indebolimento fu rappresentato dalla frequenti diserzioni e dagli attacchi sanguinosi dei partigiani. Dopo l’8 settembre 1943, con l’assunzione dei pieni poteri da parte della germania, l’attività del Corpo Armato di Polizia per l’Albania perse di efficacia e validità.

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b) Battaglione mobilitato Guardie di P.S. Fiume (1943). Allo scopo di concorrere alle operazioni di controguerriglia in svolgimento lungo i confini orientali dell’Italia, il 10 giugno 1943 fu mobilitato un Battaglione di Polizia composto da 6 ufficiali, 15 sottufficiali e 524 guardie di Pubblica Sicurezza (foto 6). L’intendimento del Ministro dell’Interno nella costituzione del Battaglione era quello di continuare la brillante tradizione già aperta dal Reparto Guardie motociclisti mobilitato in Albania, quale segno di concorso dei militari della Polizia italiana allo sforzo delle valorose unità combattenti del Regio Esercito. Per la sua organizzazione esso fu concentrato presso la Scuola Allievi Guardie di Caserta e messo agli ordini del Capitano Ermanno Di Loreto. Tenuto conto del tipo di impiego cui era destinato, il Battaglione fu dotato di armamento specifico: due mitragliatrici pesanti per il fuoco di appoggio, mitra Beretta, moschetti Mod. ’91 e pistole automatiche Beretta In un primo tempo, la base logistica fu San Martino di Susak (Croazia), nei pressi di Fiume, da cui poi prese il nome. Dal punto di vista operativo il Battaglione venne posto agli ordini del Prefetto di Fiume che l’impiegò in delicati servizi di ordine pubblico, in special modo nei giorni che seguirono il 25 luglio 1943. In seguito, su disposizione del Comando della 2a Armata, il Battaglione fu inviato di rinforzo al 27° Settore Guardia alla Frontiera (G.A.F). La prima azione di guerra fu compiuta da una compagnia del citato Battaglione nella notte del 18 agosto 1943 nel paesino di Ponikve. Fino al 6 settembre 1943, giorno in cui il Ministero dell’Interno dispose il suo rapido trasferimento nella Capitale, il Battaglione mobilitato subì gravi perdite in azioni di contrasto dei partigiani. L’unica squadra rimasta nella zona di Buccari per l’espletamento delle pratiche burocratiche fu massacrata nei tragici giorni successivi all’8 settembre, allorquando, di iniziativa, i restanti reparti presenti nella Capitale si batterono a Porta San Paolo a fianco di soldati e civili contro l’occupante tedesco. Per le azioni svolte alle dipendenza della 2° Armata e per i fatti di Roma del settembre 1943, fu concessa alla Bandiera della Polizia la Medaglia di Bronzo al Valor Militare. La partecipazione della Polizia di Stato alle missioni internazionali Le missioni civili che l’Unione Europea organizza nell’ambito della Politica Europea di Sicurezza e Difesa (PESD), divenuta Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune (PSDC) con il Trattato di Lisbona, costituiscono ormai da alcuni anni una delle forme di intervento tra le più originali a favore della stabilità e della pace internazionali. Intervenendo a sostegno delle funzioni essenziali dello Stato in situazioni di crisi e di grave disordine post-conflitto, esse svolgono un ruolo importantissimo nell’assicurare la sostenibilità nel tempo degli altri interventi internazionali, che di solito le hanno precedute, soprattutto di quelli armati. La PESD assume tanto più rilievo politico e valore aggiunto operativo, quanto più le missioni di gestione di crisi intraprese nel suo contesto si articolano con le vari

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azioni che l’Unione è in grado di dispiegare nei campi dell’assistenza umanitaria, della cooperazione allo sviluppo e del consolidamento delle istituzioni. L’Italia, tradizionalmente sensibile al richiamo della solidarietà internazionale ed impegnata nel peacekeeping, vi partecipa in misura considerevole, rappresentando ormai in termini di uomini e di risorse uno dei maggiori Paesi contributori in assoluto. All’interno di ciascun Paese, e dell’Italia tra gli altri, la partecipazione di tutte le istituzioni interessate alla gestione civile di crisi, in stretta relazione con il Ministero degli Affari Esteri (MAE), è fondamentale per fornire un contributo nazionale, quantitativamente rilevante e qualitativamente adeguato, alle esigenze della cooperazione multinazionale in aree di crisi.2 I Ministeri dell’Interno, della Difesa, della Giustizia, dell’Economia e delle Finanze ed il Dipartimento della Funzione Pubblica della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri sono attori chiave in questo contesto. Fondamentale fattore per la riuscita delle missioni in ambito della PESD civile è la capacità di rispondere ad esigenze sempre più avvertite sul terreno, specialmente nelle fasi di stabilizzazione post-conflitto e di prevenzione dei conflitti, in presenza di forti tensioni politiche e fragili strutture statali. Tali circostanze richiedono il dispiegamento, spesso in tempi rapidi, di personale altamente qualificato ed adeguatamente addestrato con compiti quali l’assistenza alle strutture locali nel consolidamento dello stato di diritto e l’osservazione del rispetto di specifici accordi in contesti instabili. Tra gli altri compiti attribuiti alle missioni civili PESD, la riforma del settore di sicurezza, ovvero il rafforzamento degli organi di governo, supervisione, gestione amministrativa e comando delle forze di pubblica sicurezza e delle forze armate in Paesi terzi, è progressivamente emersa quale area di azione prioritaria. L’invio di personale in Missione di Polizia Internazionale da parte della Polizia di Stato ha avuto inizio nell’agosto 1999, col dislocamento in Kosovo di un primo contingente nell’ambito della Missione UNMIK dell’ONU. Col passare degli anni, il mutare continuo degli scenari internazionali e gli sforzi profusi dal Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza hanno, via via, ampliato tale presenza cosicché, ad oggi, la Polizia di Stato partecipa, con aliquote di proprio personale contingentato, anche alle seguenti Missioni di gestione civile delle crisi dell’Unione Europea. UNMIK (United Nations Mission in Kosovo) La Missione Internazionale di Polizia Civile O.N.U. CIVPOL, denominata UNMIK è stata dispiegata in Kosovo con la Risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite nr. 1244 del 10 giugno 1999, che ha previsto per la Polizia dell’UNMIK due specifici obiettivi: • garantire l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica in Kosovo e assicurare il rispetto della legge; 2 Per gli aspetti normativi e finanziari della partecipazione dell’Italia alle missioni civili Pesd in Quaderni IAI nr. 35 L’Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE. Criticità e prospettive a cura di Nicoletta Pirozzi febbraio 2010, a pag. 71;

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• reclutare ed addestrare un Polizia locale altamente professionale, imparziale ed autonoma, denominata KPS – Kosovo Police Service In oltre 10 anni, i risultati operativi e la dedizione agli incarichi assegnati hanno rafforzato la già grande considerazione dei direttivi O.N.U. circa la professionalità del personale della Polizia di Stato (foto 7). Oltre a contribuire ad accrescere la positiva immagine internazionale dell’Italia, la presenza di personale della Polizia di Stato all’interno delle strutture investigative e dell’intelligence delle Nazioni Unite ha avuto, inoltre, una funzione di monitoraggio e di contrasto delle attività criminali di matrice balcanica dirette verso il nostro Paese, ottenendo risultati efficaci (foto 8). Nel corso della Missione UNMIK la Polizia di Stato ha avuto come caduto l’Agente scelto Marco Gavino, morto il 12 novembre del 1999 in un incidente aereo mentre tornava da una licenza in Italia. Medaglia ONU – UNMIK alla Bandiera della Polizia di Stato (2002) Il 23 febbraio 2002, in Pristina (Kosovo), nel corso di una suggestiva cerimonia tenutasi presso il Quartier Generale della Missione delle Nazioni Unite, alla presenza del Rappresentante del Segretariato Generale, con la partecipazione del Direttore Centrale per gli Affari Generali della Polizia di Stato del Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza Pref. Pietro Longo, in rappresentanza del Capo della Polizia, la gloriosa Bandiera della Polizia di Stato è stata insignita della Medaglia dell’ONU.3 per i particolari risultati ottenuti nel corso del periodo reso in missione dal personale dipendente (iniziati nell’agosto 1999) E’ stata la prima volta in cui le N.U. hanno concesso tale prestigioso riconoscimento ad una Bandiera di una Forza di Polizia o di un Reparto di Forza Armata nazionale Per la Polizia id Stato si è trattato del primo riconoscimento internazionale e nel contempo della prima decorazione ottenuta per operazioni rese al di fuori del territorio nazionale dopo il 1943 allorquando fu concessa la Medaglia di Bronzo al Valor Militare al Battaglione Mobilitato Guardie di P.S. “Fiume” per le operazioni sul fronte croato dal mese di giugno all’11 settembre 1943. (foto 9 e 10) E.U.P.M. (European Union Police Mission) - Bosnia gennaio 2003 – giugno 2012 Può considerarsi la prima operazione di polizia nell’ambito della Politica Europea di Sicurezza e Difesa (PESD), subentrata alla preesistente Forza di Polizia Internazionale delle Nazioni Unite (United Nations Mission in Bosnia - Herzegovina - International Police Task Force – UNMIBH IPTF). Istituita nell’ambito della Politica Estera e di Sicurezza Comune (PESC), con caratteristiche tipicamente di “monitoraggio”, è stata finalizzata alla gestione delle crisi e dei conflitti attraverso il supporto di strumenti sia civili che militari (foto 11). La missione ha avuto la funzione di contribuire a stabilire, in accordo con le Autorità bosniache, un Corpo di polizia professionale e multietnico, in grado di garantire livelli 3 Per la Missione della N.U. CIVPOL UNMIK in Kosovo, l’istituzione della Medaglia è stata decisa dal Segretario Generale dell’ONU nel mese di settembre 1999.

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di efficienza nella gestione della sicurezza e dell’ordine pubblico e il rispetto delle leggi, secondo i riconosciuti parametri europei. Il personale della Polizia di Stato, che si è avvicendato più volte fino al termine della missione, avvenuta nel mese di giugno 2012, ha dato dimostrazione di capacità professionale, occupando posizioni strategiche e di interesse operativo. In particolare, alcuni operatori della Polizia di Stato hanno avuto modo di operare efficacemente all’interno della State Border Service (Polizia di Frontiera bosniaca), riuscendone a monitorare tutte le attività, dai confini con la Croazia e la Serbia fino all’aeroporto di Sarajevo, ottenendo in tal modo preziose informazioni sul traffico di esseri umani e l’immigrazione clandestina. Altri dipendenti hanno raggiunto posizioni di prestigio in uffici investigativi e di intelligence, dando contributi notevoli alla lotta contro il terrorismo. Nel corso di detta missione, il 20/11/2003 è venuto a mancare il Vice Sovrintendente della Polizia di Stato Francesco NIUTTA a seguito di un incidente stradale sulla strada per Sarajevo. Niutta era un poliziotto esperto di missioni all’estero in quanto aveva già prestato servizio nelle Ambasciate italiane di Nigeria e di Algeria. EUPOL PROXIMA E’ stata la seconda Missione Internazionale di Polizia Civile, organizzata dell’U.E. in FYROM – Macedonia. Scopo della missione, che ha avuto inizio alla metà di dicembre 2003 e si è conclusa a metà dicembre del 2005, è stato quello di assistere la Polizia macedone nella lotta al crimine organizzato, promuovendo anche l’attività di formazione dei Funzionari di polizia e sostenendo l’opera di modernizzazione delle strutture di polizia già avviata dal Ministero dell’Interno macedone. La squadra di cinque Poliziotti che ha operato in EUPOL PROXIMA è stata affidata alla responsabilità di un Funzionario direttivo della Polizia di Stato, “co-locator” presso il Ministero dell’Interno macedone, con l’incarico di Assistente del Capo della Polizia. EULEX (European Union Rule of Law Mission) Nel dicembre 2008 è iniziata ufficialmente la più importante missione civile dell’Unione Europea con circa 1.400 membri del personale internazionale e circa 500 membri del personale locale. Trattasi di una missione tecnica con limitati poteri esecutivi a carattere integrato, in quanto include: la polizia, la giustizia e, per la prima volta nel contesto della Pesd civile, i servizi doganali. Ha sostituito progressivamente la missione delle Nazioni Unite nell’aiutare le Autorità dello Stato del Kosovo (autoproclamatosi Stato indipendente il 17 febbraio 2008) a creare un ambiente democratico e multi-etnico, rispettoso dello stato di diritto, idoneo ad uno sviluppo economico sostenibile e con istituzioni in linea con le “best practices” europee e internazionali. La componente della Polizia di Stato inserita nella missione, a seconda dei vari gradi

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di responsabilità che gli vengono attribuiti (es.: Special Adviser, Police Investigator ecc.), assiste il KPS (Kosovo Police Service) per organizzare un Corpo di polizia multietnico e libero da interferenze politiche, al servizio del popolo Kosovaro. Il personale di polizia opera all’interno di tre Dipartimenti: Strengthening Department (Dipartimento di rafforzamento/consolidamento), Executive Police Department (Dipartimento esecutivo di Polizia), Special Police Department (Corpi Speciali). Molto apprezzato è stato, finora, il contributo offerto nei seguenti ambiti: contrasto alla criminalità organizzata collegata anche al terrorismo internazionale (Organized Crime Investigative Unit); Polizia di Frontiera (Border Police); indagini sui crimini di guerra (War Crimes) alle dirette dipendenze della Corte Suprema dell’Aja; cooperazione e collegamento INTERPOL ed EUROPOL; Protezioni testimoni (Witness Security Unit), e Intelligence. Il quartiere ufficiale si trova a Pristina. La missione terminerà quando le Autorità kosovare avranno accumulato sufficiente esperienza per garantire lo stato di diritto. Eulex Kosovo ha una catena di comando unificata in linea con altre operazioni di gestione delle crisi dell’Unione.4 .Nella missione sono attualmente impegnati un funzionario direttivo e 26 poliziotti. EUPOL COPPS (Co-ordinating for Palestinian Support) La missione dal 2006 supporta la Polizia Civile Palestinese nell’individuazione delle sue necessità e provvede ad indirizzare le risorse per la realizzazione di infrastrutture e acquisto di materiali necessari allo sviluppo ed al funzionamento della citata polizia (foto 12). Tale missione, che inizialmente aveva mandato per tutti i territori palestinesi (Cisgiordania e Striscia di Gaza), a seguito delle vicende politiche dell’estate 2007 ha un mandato ridotto alla sola Cisgiordania. Molti sono gli obiettivi realizzati, finora, dalla Polizia di Stato in favore della Polizia civile palestinese: fornitura di auto, moto, equipaggiamenti e materiali per i servizi di polizia stradale, corsi di formazione sull’infortunistica stradale, sul rintraccio di auto rubate e sul trasporto di merci pericolose, tenuti anche da esperti del l Centro addestramento della Polizia Stradale di Cesena (Caps), conferenze congiunte tra le polizie stradali palestinesi ed israeliane sul traffico di auto rubate. Sempre nell’ambito della citata missione, il personale della Polizia di Stato ha concepito uno studio originale sulla Polizia Stradale Palestinese, denominato “Traffic Police Assessment”. Grazie all’apporto del Consolato d’Italia a Gerusalemme, si è riusciti poi a realizzare un progetto tendente allo sviluppo della Polizia Stradale e Turistica Palestinese con corsi di addestramento fra cui molto interesse ha suscitato il corso di lingua italiana organizzato in collaborazione con l’Università di Torino cui ha partecipato personale della Polizia Turistica e di Tutela delle Antichità. 4 Approfondimenti sulla missione civile Eulex in Kosovo in Documenti IAI 12/04 L’Unione Europea e la politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune: elementi a cura di F. Di Camillo e V. Miranda – aprile 2012 pag. 61;

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Missioni OSCE, “Bilaterali”, monitoraggio elezioni Il personale delle Polizia ha svolto sovente anche Missioni per conto di Organizzazioni Internazionali nell’ambito delle quali opera singolarmente e non in reparti contingentati. Trattasi di missioni di durata variabile che nascono da precise richieste degli Organismi Internazionali che pervengono al Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza, attraverso il MAE, e vedono l’impiego di dipendenti in attività di “monitoraggio, di verifica oppure in qualità di consulenti e/o consiglieri giuridici”. Si ricorda l’impiego di personale della Polizia di Stato nella Missione denominata MAPE (Multinational Advisory Police Element), dislocata sotto l’egida dell’Unione Europea Occidentale UEO in Albania nel 1998; nel 1999 in occasione della crisi umanitaria del Kosovo col dislocamento temporaneo delle strutture della “Missione Arcobaleno”; in missioni cd. di monitoraggio dell’Organizzazione per la Sicurezza e la Cooperazione in Europa (OSCE) soprattutto in occasione di consultazioni elettorali ovvero di iniziative di monitoraggio di Forze di Polizia di Stati sovrani, generalmente dell’Est Europeo. E ancora, in missioni fuori area, in Sudan nel 2002 in occasione della Missione Multinazionale di osservazione denominata JMM (Joint Monitoring Mission) per il controllo del rispetto delle tregua tra le fazioni armate combattenti nella regione dei Monti Nuba. Personale della Polizia di Stato è stato interessato, infine, a partire dal mese di settembre del 2004, al programma di addestramento delle Forze di polizia libiche per il pattugliamento dei confini terresti e delle coste di quel Paese fino al deposizione cruenta del Col. Gheddafi. EUBAM – LIBYA La continua pressione migratoria dal Nord Africa, oltre alle preoccupazioni per la proliferazione delle armi e la minaccia del terrorismo, hanno portato l’U.E., tramite l’EEAS - European External Action Service, a identificare la Libia quale area di intervento immediato all’esterno dei suoi confini, maggiormente strategica per la sua sicurezza. A seguito di negoziazione con l’U.E, avviata lo scorso anno, le Autorità Libiche hanno invitato una Missione europea , denominata EUBAM – European Union Border Assistant Mission, di esperti qualificati nel settore delle frontiere dell’immigrazione, dogane, asilo e diritti umani, che è ufficialmente iniziata il 22 maggio 2013. La Polizia di Stato, vi partecipa attivamente con un suo Funzionario dell’Ufficio Coordinamento e Pianificazione Forze di Polizia, in qualità di Border Guard Adviser, che aveva già avuto simili esperienze nei Balcani. (foto 13) La Missione ha come proprio “core business” il supporto alla Autorità Libiche nella gestione delle frontiere attraverso la predisposizione di diversi moduli di training e di piani di azione e cooperazione per lo sviluppo di una strategia coordinata di controllo del territorio e messa in sicurezza della immensa linea di confine libica, che si estende per migliaia di chilometri, per lo più in aree desertiche, gestite da diverse tribù, spesso

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difficili da raggiungere e pattugliare (foto 14). A rendere più articolato il lavoro della Missione è la eterogenea strutturazione delle Forze di Polizia Libiche: la Polizia di Frontiera, corpo civile e dipendente dal M.I. cui è affidato il controllo dei valichi di frontiera; il Board Guards, corpo militare, alla dipendenze dirette del Ministero della Difesa al quale spetta il pattugliamento terrestre, cui si aggiungono gli appartenenti alla Milizie, che hanno condotto la rivoluzione anti Gheddafi, per i quali è prevista la graduale reintegrazione negli apparati regolari delle Forze di Polizia. La sede della missione EUBAM LIBYA è ubicata a Tripoli ma, a breve, non si esclude la dislocazione di un proprio Ufficio a Ghadames, ubicata nel c.d. “triangolo rosso”, ai tre confini tra Libia, Algeria e Tunisia oggi area di smistamento per i traffici illeciti, compreso quello degli esseri umani. La Missione è considerata di vitale importanza per l’U.E., in quanto molti dei traffici illegali che si registrano attualmente proprio attraverso i confini libici hanno riflesso immediato sul tutto il Nord- Africa e sullo spazio Schengen. L’Italia, in virtù del rapporto fiduciario instaurato in passato con la Libia, ha avviato numerosi progetti bilaterali e di partenariato tra le Forze di polizia italiane e quelle libiche. Reclutamento e Formazione Vista la delicatezza dell’attività da svolgere, per operare in terra straniera a strettissimo contatto con personale di altre polizie (portatore non solo di esperienze umane diverse, ma anche e soprattutto di metodologie lavorative spesso opposte alle nostre) sono necessari requisiti di eccellenza. Le missioni sono promosse da organismi internazionali (ONU ed UE) che effettuano quelle che in gergo tecnico vengono definite “call” (chiamate). La particolarità è che queste “call” non riguardano interi contingenti inquadrati, bensì posizioni specifiche da ricoprire. Nell’assegnazione degli incarichi si applica il principio “no rank”, ossia non tanto valgono i gradi acquisiti nell’amministrazione di appartenenza quanto le capacità evidenziate nel corso della missione.5 Il personale della Polizia di Stato è selezionato su tutto il territorio nazionale a cura delle Direzioni Centrali della Polizia di Stato interessate e/o dall’Organismo internazionale richiedente e successivamente, superato un corso di formazione propedeutico all’invio,

5 Sull’importanza e la qualità della formazione del personale impiegano nelle missioni civili Pesd vedasi Quaderno IAI nr. 35 L’Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE. Criticità e prospettive a cura di Nicoletta Pirozzi febbraio 2010, da pag. 39;

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è distaccato presso il 1° Reparto Mobile di Polizia con sede a Roma.6 Alla Direzione Centrale per gli Affari Generali della Polizia di Stato è affidata la responsabilità decisionale dei contingenti della Polizia di Stato avvalendosi delle Direzioni Centrali competenti, mentre sono conferite al Dirigente del 1° Reparto Mobile le incombenze di carattere gestionale affidate all’”Ufficio Coordinamento Missioni Estero”. Conclusioni In un mondo dove minacce vecchie e nuove si moltiplicano e la richiesta di interventi di gestione di crisi continua a crescere la Pesd costituisce una componente chiave della politica estera dell’Unione Europea determinante anche per la sua credibilità. Il suo successo dipende, a sua volta, dall’impulso politico proveniente dai Paesi membri e dalla loro volontà di mettere a disposizione le risorse necessarie. C’è da augurarsi che nel prossimo futuro le non poche problematiche emerse nel corso dell’esperienza operativa della Pesd civile portino finalmente alla tanta auspicata adozione di una strategia nazionale per la gestione civile delle crisi da cui attendersi linee guida per futuri sviluppi nei settori della formazione e del reclutamento, del lessons learned process e in quello normativo/giuridico e finanziario. Se ciò avverrà sarà per costruire concretamente “a sicure Europe in a better word!”7

6 In base alle peculiarità della missione, con apposito decreto il Capo della Polizia individua: • La Direzione Centrale per gli Affari Generali della Polizia di Stato cui viene normalmente affidata la responsabilità di accentrare e di snellire l’attività informativa, propositiva e decisionale relativa al personale delle varie missioni avvalendosi delle Direzioni Centrali interessate (Direzione Centrale per la polizia Stradale, Ferroviaria, delle Comunicazioni e per i Reparti Speciali, la Direzione Centrale per i Servizi Tecnico Logistici e della Gestione Patrimoniale ecc..) • La Direzione Centrale per le Risorse Umane (e/o D.C. AA.GG.) provvede a diramare specifica circolare per la raccolta delle aspirazioni alla partecipazione a missioni di pace all’estero del personale della Polizia di Stato e trasmissione agli organismi internazionali interessati. Inoltre provvede al movimento del personale dall’ufficio di appartenenza al 1° Reparto mobile per il successivo invio all’estero. • La Direzione Centrale per gli Istituti di Istruzione provvede all’istituzione di specifici corsi cui parteciperanno i candidati, • La Direzione Centrale di Sanità provvede alle incombenze di carattere Sanitario di idoneità e di controllo periodico del personale. • Al Primo Reparto Mobile spettano le incombenze di carattere addestrativo amministrativo, e logistico oltre a monitorare le condizioni riferendo alla D.C.AA.GG. Per quanto riguarda, invece, le selezioni del personale da inviare nelle missioni EU vengono effettuate direttamente dall’Organismo internazionale sulla scorta delle candidature inviate loro dal Dipartimento della P.S. tramite il MAE. 7 “A Secure Europe in A Better World” (meglio noto come documento Solana: The European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 Dicembre 2003) è stato il primo tentativo di conferire una dottrina strategica alla PESD sulla scia della National Security Strategy americana, di cui riprende taluni concetti sul nuovo ordine mondiale. Il concetto di sicurezza a cui l’Unione europea si ispira, delineato nella Strategia di sicurezza, è inclusivo e comprende oltre alla dimensione puramente militare quella politica, socio-economica, energetica ed ambientale. Essa prevede, inoltre, una intensa cooperazione con altre Istituzioni multilaterali per rendere più efficace e legittima la propria azione.

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Bibliografia Polizia in territorio coloniale • Archivio Ufficio Storico della Polizia di Stato (USPS) fondo PAI – Eritrea 1941 -1957 –; • Piero CROCIANI La polizia dell’Africa Italiana (1937-1945) su progetto dell’USPS Ed. Laurus Robuffo Roma,2009. Corpo Armato di Polizia per l’Albania • Archivio Ufficio Storico della Polizia di Stato (USPS) fondo Albania; • Piero CROCIANI Gli Albanesi nelle Forze Armate italiane (1939 -1943) Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito - Ufficio Storico Roma, 2001. Battaglione mobilitato Guardie di P.S. “Fiume” • Archivio Ufficio Storico della Polizia di Stato (USPS) fondo Battaglione Speciale Mobilitato “Fiume” – Relazione storica del Capitano Ermanno Di Loreto. La partecipazione della Polizia di Stato alle missioni internazionali • Manuale interforze perle operazioni di pace Stato Maggiore delle Difesa - III Reparto Piani e Operazioni – Ufficio Addestramento e Regolamenti - Edizione 1994; • Manuale per le operazioni di mantenimento della pace e per interventi umanitari (n. 903 della serie dottrinale) Allegati – Vol. II 1995 - Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito III Reparto – Ufficio Regolamenti; • Esercito Italiano. Le nuove frontiere del peacekeeping a cura di A. Nativi – Ed. Mondadori Milano 2004; • Missioni di Polizia internazionale di P. Cestra e G. Butini - Ed. Laurus Robuffo Roma 2005; • Working Paper 19/205 Le relazioni tra civili e militari nelle operazioni di supporto della pace. L’esperienza italiana, il CIMIC e le sue prospettive a cura di S. Aprile, e M. Soledad Marco con la collaborazione di G. Ruffini CeSPI (Centro Studi Politica Internazionale), Agosto 2005; • Dossier n. 7/AP I temi della PESC e della PESD all’interno del trattato di Lisbona Senato della Repubblica Servizio affari internazionali Ufficio per i rapporti con le Istituzioni dell’Unione Europea XVI Legislatura -18 giugno 2008; • Panorama 2010 su Scenari Internazionali e di Crisi a cura di N. Pedde, K. Mezran, V. Cassar – G.N.A. S.r.l. Roma 2009; • Rapporto di Ricerca CEMISS 2009 Nuove minacce ed esigenze di protezione per uomini e mezzi: L’approccio italiano alle PSO e l’elaborazione di una futura strategia nazionale di counter insurgency . Direttore di ricerca F. Coticchia – Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa 2009; • Documenti IAI Manuale di documentazione del Corso. L’Unione Europea come attore globale: le politiche di sicurezza, difesa e aiuto allo sviluppo a cura di G. Bonvicini, M. Comelli, N. Pirozzi, N. Tocci, C. Zagari, 2009; • Quaderni IAI nr. 35 L’Italia nelle missioni civili dell’UE. Criticità e prospettive a

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cura di Nicoletta Pirozzi – Febbraio 2010; • Documenti IAI 10/27 L’Unione Europea e la gestione delle crisi: istituzioni e capacità a cura di E. Greco, N. Pirozzi S. Silvestri - dicembre 2010; • Documenti IAI 12/03 L’Italia e la trasformazione dello scenario internazionale Rapporto introduttivo dell’Edizione 2012 dell’annuario “La politica estera dell’Italia” di A. Colombo e E. Greco – aprile 2012; • Documenti IAI 12/04 L’Unione Europea e la politica di sicurezza e di difesa comune: elementi a cura di F. Di Camillo e V. Miranda – aprile 2012; • Quaderni IAI Verso un’eurozona della difesa . Sviluppo delle flessibilità istituzionali nelle politiche europee di sicurezza e difesa di G. Daviddi Ed. Nuova Cultura 2012; • Documentazione messa a disposizione dal 1° Reparto Mobile della Polizia di Stato di Roma - Ufficio Coordinamento Missioni Estero. Lista delle abbreviazioni CC.RR. CIVIPOL EEAS EUBAM – LIBYA EULEX Kosovo EUPOL COPPS EUPOL PROXIMA EUPM Bosnia/Herzegovina E.P.F. FF.AA. FYROM G.A.F. JMM. KPS MAE MAPE OSCE P.A.I. PESC PESD UNMIBH IPTF UNMIK

Carabinieri Reali CIViliam POLice European External Action Service European Union Border Assistant Mission European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo Eurepean Union Police Coordinating for Palestinian Support. European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia European Union Police Mission in Bosnia/Herzegovina Eritrea Police Force (Corpo di Polizia dell’Eritrea) Forze Armate Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ettore Guardia alla Frontiera Joint Monitoring Mission Kosovo Police Service Ministero degli Affari Esteri Multinational Advisory Police Element Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Polizia dell’Africa Italiana Politica estera e di sicurezza comune Politica europea di sicurezza e difesa United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina-International Police Task Force United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

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Foto 1 - Questore della P.A.I. di Asmara decora una guardia

Foto 2 - Ascari di Polizia in combattimento al confine tra Sudan ed Eritrea

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Foto 3 - Ufficiali ed impiegati della Polizia Britannica dell’Eritrea

Foto 4 - Adunata del Gruppo Guardie di P.S. “Eritrea” - Reparto di Asmara – Rivista armata del Questore Col Britannico FITZPATRIC – Gennaio 1949

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Foto 5 - Operazioni anti scifta nel bassopiano orientale eritreo. Reparto di Polizia cammellato - Otumo 8 ottobre 1950

Foto 6 - Plotone motociclisti guida una colonna della Divisione Marche in un’operazione di polizia in territorio croato

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Foto 7 - 8 - Missione UNMIK Foto 9 - Il Pref. Pietro Longo, Direttore Centrale per gli Affari Generali della Polizia di Stato alla cerimonia di consegna della Medaglia ONU – UNMIK alla Bandiera della Polizia di Stato

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Foto 11 Missione E.U.P.M.

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Foto 13 - Missione EUBAM – Libya

Foto 14 - Missione EUBAM - Libya

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La Task Force “GRIFO” in Afghanistan Francesco LAMBERTI 1. Premessa l Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ha approvato, in data 20 dicembre 2001, la Risoluzione n. 1386 con la quale ha autorizzato il dispiegamento, nella città di Kabul e nelle aree limitrofe, di una Forza multinazionale denominata International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). A decorrere dal mese di agosto 2003, la guida della missione è stata assunta dalla NATO. Il Governo italiano partecipa alla missione ISAF, sin dalla sua costituzione, con un contingente militare nazionale posto sotto il comando operativo del Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa. In questo quadro internazionale, nel gennaio 2006, il Comando Operativo di Vertice Interforze (COI) dello Stato Maggiore Difesa ha chiesto la collaborazione della Guardia di Finanza alle attività della missione Afghanistan, con specifico riferimento alla possibilità di inviare un team di specialisti doganali con compiti di addestramento nei confronti degli organismi locali. A seguito di apposite missioni esplorative condotte in teatro, è stato deciso l’invio ad Herat, di un contingente del Corpo, cui affidare compiti esclusivamente addestrativi nei confronti della polizia di frontiera afgana (Afghan Border Police – ABP), forza di polizia che svolge compiti di vigilanza alle frontiere per il contrasto e la repressione del contrabbando e dei traffici illeciti.

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2. Situazione In data 22 novembre 2006 è stato completato il rischieramento, presso la Forward Support Base (FSB) di Herat, della Task Force “GRIFO”. Il contingente del Corpo ha visto nel tempo aumentare il numero di componenti, da 10 unità fino a 20 nel 2011, di pari passo con il costante incremento degli impegni addestrativi richiesti sul campo. La Task Force “Grifo” è un assetto nazionale e si avvale del supporto logistico (vitto, alloggio, carbolubrificanti, ecc.) assicurato dall’Italian National Contingent Commander (IT NCC) che garantisce, altresì, la force protection. In ragione dell’avvio del processo di riconfigurazione (cd. thin-out) della missione NATO ISAF, che terminerà il proprio mandato entro il 2014, a partire dal gennaio 2013 la forza organica della Task Force “Grifo” è rimodulata in 10 unità, di cui un Tenente Colonnello/Maggiore ed un Capitano. La missione è terminata in data 12 giugno 2013 con il rientro definitivo del contingente. 3. Attività addestrativa L’obiettivo iniziale è stato l’addestramento del personale del 4° Regional Command (ex 6^ Brigata) dell’Afghan Border Police, allo scopo di migliorarne le tecniche operative

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e, in particolare, le capacità di controllo doganale. L’attività addestrativa è stata poi estesa ai funzionari delle Dogane afghane (CUSTOMS) e agli agenti della Polizia doganale (CUSTOMS POLICE), al fine di affinarne le tecniche di contrasto all’evasione dei tributi doganali. Parallelamente, a seguito di specifiche richieste avanzate dalle Autorità afgane, sono stati avviati corsi nei confronti di: - operatori aeroportuali dell’ABP presso l’aeroporto di Herat, finalizzati a fornire un training specialistico volto a migliorare gli standard di sicurezza doganale e di polizia della citata struttura aeroportuale; - funzionari pubblici del Governatorato di Herat, nel settore della lotta alla corruzione e delle assegnazioni di appalti pubblici.

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Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan Approaching ISAF operations in Afghanistan within Galula’s frame of counterinsurgency David VESTENSKOV Introduction hen the Danish parliament chose to join the US led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was highly motivated by the principle of standing side by side with an alliance partner who had suffered an attack (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States which relied on a classic Clausewitzian center of gravity1 approach. This resulted in large-scale military operation against the enemy’s (the Taleban’s) strongholds – primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the Al Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11 and secondarily to prevent future terrorist networks from forming and working on Afghan soil. The primary objective was accomplished within a few months while the secondary objective was much more complicated than initially anticipated due to the fact that it could be addressed from several angles, for example the democracy project that characterized the period from 2003 to 2008. Despite the fact that NATO this is not a guiding principle in the alliance, it was nonetheless what decision-makers from the member countries claimed. Furthermore, the NATO ISAF forces carried out offensive operations in compliance with the center of gravity model which is corroborated by analyses of the Danish and British military activities in the Helmand Province from 2003 to 2008. And though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgency groups remained a core element in the strategy. In December 2006, the US military attempted to implement a strategy change in Afghanistan, going from an enemy-centric focus to a population-centric focus. The Counterinsurgency Doctrine was described in a US military field manual2 where work performed by a French officer four decades earlier suddenly appeared in several references. This marked the beginning of a revelation for David Galula and his thoughts on the strategy of counterinsurgency (COIN). This article will focus on the insurgency vs. the counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 2007-2013 based on the laws and principles of Galula’s theory as they appear in Coun-

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1 Allen, Ralph L., ‘Piercing the Veil of Operational Art’, PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, 1995 (2013), 111–119; Carl von Clausewitz, Von Clausewitz, on war (London: Routledge, 2004). 2 United States and others, Counterinsurgency Field Manual [2006] (New York: Cosimo Reports, 2010).

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terinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice.3 COIN Principles and Laws The main principles of Galula’s COIN theory focus on the population and its division into three main groups: 1) the friendly minority, 2) the neutral majority, and 3) the hostile minority. According to the theory, both minority groups will seek to gain the support of the neutral majority in that this group is the decisive factor for victory or defeat. From a COIN point of view, keeping groups two and three apart is a key ingredient in the recipe for victory, and the opposite is true for the insurgency. Furthermore, as civilian casualties should be avoided, the COIN forces will have to accept the limitations of conventional warfare and the fact that they cannot adapt the strategy of the insurgency as its aims to create disorder where the COIN forces will be measured on their ability to provide security and maintain order.4 According to Galula, the guiding principle should be that COIN approaches are based on four laws that are that are centered on the previously described support of the neutral majority of a population. Firstly, the support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgency as it is for the insurgency. Controlling an area and preventing the development of political insurgency cells requires the support and active participation of the population. Secondly, support is gained through the active minority. All conflicts have a minority that supports the cause which the COIN forces need to localize and organize in order to mobilizing the neutral majority. Thirdly, it is important to emphasize that the support of the population is conditional.5 Finally, intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential. Consequently, the focus of the COIN force should rather be local and intense than national and fragile. During the implementation of the laws, it is very important to show the population that the situation is better for the COIN forces and their cause is better - than for the insurgency. This is as another key principle.6 Using Galula’s Theories in a Contemporary Conflict Galula’s COIN Doctrine was rediscovered by the US Army in December 2006 and was attempted implemented by means of a Field Manual. A very important question is of course whether Galula’s theory can be used in a contemporary conflict almost four decades after it was conceived. The fact that Galula’s theory was written for a COIN force fighting to stay is the opposite of Afghanistan where the foreign COIN force (ISAF) is fighting to leave following 3 David Galula and John A Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006). 4 David Galula and John A Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), pp. 49–52. 5 Galula makes four deductions in this law: a) effective use and show of force, politically as well as militarily, b) political and economic reforms are useless if offered in areas where the insurgency still operates, c) an early and convincing demonstration of will, means and ability to win, d) joining negotiations from a position of strength only. Galula and Nagl, pp. 54-55 6 Galula and Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, pp. 52–55.

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the proclamation of the exit date,7 which leads to another problem, namely the timeframe. Galula points out that a COIN force needs to “stay to the very end” which is difficult when the war is optional and depends on domestic political support. According to the COIN principles, the population needs to be convinced that the COIN forces will succeed. When the exit date was proclaimed, the mission focus changed from an objective for progress to an objective for time which undermines the basics of the COIN theory. Also, unification of the Afghan society has proven to be highly complex and finding a single political cause is probably not possible which is not unique to a country in a state of war. However, the Afghan history of the last four decades is filled with different wars that terrorized the civilian population and created extreme conditions in terms of both security and political stability.8 The nature of the propaganda aspect, and hence the possibility of controlling information, has also been completely changed by the evolution of the internet and the cell phone, making unification far more complex. Finally, there is the issue of safe havens. In Algeria, the French dealt with this by effectively sealing the border to Tunis9 which eliminated the threat from safe havens and prevented arms smuggling to the insurgency. However, due to geography, it is not possible to seal the Afghan-Pakistani border completely. With these caveats in mind, the theory still has a variety of elements with relevance to the contemporary conflict in Afghanistan and the mentioning of a COIN Doctrine in the American Field Manual provides an opportunity to view the operational framework through the “Galula perspective.” The following analysis has two parts: focusing on the ISAF operation in the Helmand Province in Afghanistan and further illuminating the fact that while a COIN approach was found to be relevant and pursued implemented, the actual events proved that the ideas of Galula were not tested as a strategy in Afghanistan. Operational Framework: The Eight Steps In the description of the step framework,10 it says that it should be conducted sequentially and that analyses on each steps should not be conducted until the step has been completed successfully. Looking at the ISAF operation through the perspective of Galula could give you an impression of how the implementation of the COIN theory at the strategic level influenced the actual operations. 7 With ISAF being very dependent on the American contribution, Obama’s proclamation of the American exit-strategy was decisive for ISAF’s strategy. Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan | The White House’, 2009 <http://www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> [accessed 9 September 2013]. 8 Further reading e.g.: Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan, a Modern History, Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy?, the Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition, New ed. (London: IBTauris, 2005); Artemy Kalinovsky and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-insurgency and Nation-building in Afghanistan ([Washington, D.C.]: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010); Mohammad Yousaf, The Bear Trap, Afghanistan’s Untold Story, 1st ed (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992). 9 David Galula, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006), pp. 61–64. 10 All eight steps are described sequentially by Galula and in the following analysis; Galula´s chapter on operations will be the point of reference. Galula and Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, pp. 75–94.

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The first step is the destruction or expulsion of the forces of the insurgency. This objective is achieved when static units are able to garrison the area. In some areas of the Helmand Province, this was accomplished by the expansion of the ISAF force in 2006. It is important to notice, however, that the insurgents were merely pushed into rural areas and Pakistan and not eradicated altogether11. Furthermore, different insurgent groups remained in control of the rural areas of the Helmand Province which means that the successes may be attributed to the fact that some major cities/towns were controlled by ISAF. The second step is the deployment of a static unit to establish a protected area with a view to allowing political and economic development. The establishment of the British Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gar and the Danish development programs in Gereshk indicates that such areas have been established.12 The third step is contact with and control13 of the population. Here, it is vital that COIN authority is established and that the insurgency is isolated from the population. In the 2006-2010 period especially, this was attempted by means of patrolling and deploying forward operating bases. Ironically, this process was rolled back at the same time as the COIN operational framework was presented as the strategic path for Afghanistan14 due to the number of casualties and the fact that too few troops had been deployed. By 2013, both contact and control were limited to the cities of Lashkar Gah and Gereshk, with no permanent military presence in Gereshk - only daytime patrols. The fourth step deals with the destruction of the political organization of the insurgents by expelling their political sympathizers which has proven to be a difficult task in Afghanistan as the Taliban does not seem to have a common political vision. Furthermore, Taliban’s scattered structure with local branches each pursuing their own agendas impedes the use of a single political counter strategy.15 The absence of a military presence in local and remote areas of the Helmand Province is also affecting the ability to counter the political opposition. The fifth step deals with local elections and the installation of local leaders in positions of responsibility and power. In this phase, it is vital that COIN forces prove their ability to maintain security in order to gaining the trust and support of the population. In 11 Theo Farrell, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33 (2010), 567–594 (pp. 573–582) <doi:10.1080/01402390.201 0.489712>. 12 Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Dansk institut for internationale studier, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005); Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), The Danish Helmand Plan 2011-2012, and Report on the Danish Engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). 13 Control should be linked to ability to protect 14 The strategy of COIN was defined both by the then ISAF Commander General McChrystal and NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan : the Liberal Disconnect (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 58–65. 15 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: a Localised Insurgency with a Local Objective’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21 (2010), 259–276 (pp. 262–265).

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the Helmand Province, the success of the elections is highly questionable as fraud, corruption and low voting percentages all caused problems in both national and provincial elections. Generally speaking, the ISAF forces and forces from the Afghan National Security Forces have been able to maintain an acceptable level of security in the largest cities16 but have failed to ensuring representation in the democratic institutions for the rural population. The sixth step tests the local leaders, although this of course requires that step five the holding of elections - was successful. With regards to autonomy and own initiatives concerning the upholding of security and developing the local area, the elected leaders have not been tested sufficiently. The testing has proven to be a difficult task as Afghan autonomy must be respected and there were an insufficient number of alternative qualified candidates.17 The seventh step involves organizing a political party based on national consensus on at least a number of points in terms of how political visions and problems should be addressed. In this context, unifying the local leaders in one party or several parties is essential to sustaining the peace. In the Helmand Province (and in all of Afghanistan), this turned out to be impossible due to Afghan legislation. And the Afghan president Hamid Karzai’s centralization of the power in the presidential office and the constant feuds between the parliament and the presidency have also obstructed progress in this area.18 The final step is defined by winning over or suppressing the last insurgents and should be accompanied by an offer of amnesty to the remaining insurgents. This step has partly been a part of the 2006-2013 strategy and still is an important part of the offensive ISAF operation.19 These measures are successful in relation to the levels of operation and tactics and have put a lot of pressure on the Taliban command structure. However, on the level of strategy, this approach has failed in terms of steps 3 & 4 and the negative consequences include further radicalization and alienation of the COIN force from the majority of the population. Neglecting the Basic COIN Principles In general, you have two operation types; short-term operations and long-term operations. Naturally, short-term operations have short-term objectives and in Afghanistan these varied in the period from 2006 to 2013. The element of search and destroy, however, always played an important role, for example when the ISAF forces launched an offensive and established a series of Forward Operating Bases in some of the remote 16 Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), The Danish Helmand Plan 2011-2012, and Report on the Danish Engagement in Afghanistan in 2010. 17 Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘Security Sector Stabilisation in Counterinsurgency Operations: The Case of Afghanistan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22 (2011), 619–643 (pp. 527–632). 18 International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Parties in Transition., 2013, pp. 1–5 <http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b141-afghanistans-parties-in-transition.pdf> [accessed 13 September 2013]. 19 CH DANCON, ‘Interview with CH DANCON (Chief Danish Contingent)’, 2013, Private archive.

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areas of the Helmand Province. In the frame of reference of COIN, this was a logical step in order to gain the support of the neutral majority. However, the focus was on the hostile minority and not on controlling the population.20 Furthermore, the decision to set an exit date did little in terms of convincing the population that COIN would be in control in the future. Also noteworthy in this context is the Danish duty term rotation system – 6-month terms – which according to the COIN laws and principles is very questionable in relation to interacting with the population. The long-term operation was defined by the collaboration between the military and the civilian effort. From 2010 and onwards, these operations were placed in a COIN frame with ISAF leadership. The frame had a clear- hold-build-transfer strategy,21 with the hold element being vital in the COIN frame of reference. However, a major problem was the absence of a single commander in chief orchestrating (or dictating) the overall rebuilding efforts. Dividing Afghanistan between different nations each responsible for different provinces caused difficulties for the overall rebuilding strategy as the different ISAF nations focused on different aspects22. In addition, the fixing of an exit date limited the hold element and had little effect in terms of persuading the population to choose to cooperate and side with the COIN forces. Conclusion The COIN approach in the Helmand Province could have been successful had it been more decisive and determined. Even though some elements have been implemented, it is open for discussion whether the COIN approach was anything but an articulated vision determining the ISAF strategy in Afghanistan. As shown in this analysis, Galula’s theory was identified and pursued implemented on the level of strategy but on the operational level, the step-by-step counterinsurgency framework was not sufficiently followed due to some very identifiable problems. Firstly - and most important - the core focus on the hostile minority and the friendly minority made it difficult for the neutral majority to choose side. Secondly, the conventional approach with huge military bases with manpower-demanding high tech equipment alienated the majority of the population, which in turn led to the third problem: insufficient deployment of forces, causing lack of visibility of COIN forces in relation to the population. When a population cannot see the forces that are supposed to protect them, they simply do not feel protected. The formation of national and regional political parties is the fourth issue which was not only neglected by ISAF/NATO but also thwarted by the friendly minority (with Karzai at point) by means of strict regulations in relation to the establishment and organization of political parties. The fifth problem is the decision to set an exit date which comes 20 Rynning, pp. 161–164. 21 Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), Den danske indsats i Helmand 2010, Helmand-planen 2010 (Udenrigsministeriet, 2010), pp. 5–13. 22 Robertus Johannes Maria Beeres, Jan van der Meulen and J Soeters, Mission Uruzgan: Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2012), pp. 147–161.

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with a build-in “come what may” aspect and increases the dilemma of the population, or even shifts their sympathy to favor the insurgency. Finally, the current strategy of targeting key insurgency leaders focuses on step 8 of the framework without steps 3-7 having been successfully completed. And although this definitely puts a lot of pressure on the Taliban Movement and the other insurgency groups, it does little in terms of persuading the majority of the population to side with the COIN forces. References

Allen, Ralph L., ‘Piercing the Veil of Operational Art’, PARAMETERS, US Army War College Quarterly, 1995 (2013), 111–119 Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan | The White House’, 2009 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan> [accessed 9 September 2013] Beeres, Robertus Johannes Maria, Jan van der Meulen, and J Soeters, Mission Uruzgan: Collaborating in Multiple Coalitions for Afghanistan (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2012) CH DANCON, ‘Interview with CH DANCON(Chief Danish Contingent)’, 2013, Private archive Clausewitz, Carl von, Von Clausewitz, on war (London: Routledge, 2004) Farrell, Theo, ‘Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, 2006–2009’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33 (2010), 567–594 <doi:10.1080/0 1402390.2010.489712> Galula, David, Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp., 2006) Galula, David, and John A Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006) ---, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006) International Crisis Group, Afghanistan’s Parties in Transition., 2013 <http://www.crisisgroup. org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/b141-afghanistans-parties-in-transition.pdf> [accessed 13 September 2013] Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, and Dansk institut for internationale studier, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2005) Kalinovsky, Artemy, and Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, The Blind Leading the Blind: Soviet Advisors, Counter-insurgency and Nation-building in Afghanistan ([Washington, D.C.]: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010) Rasanayagam, Angelo, Afghanistan, a Modern History, Monarchy, Despotism or Democracy?, the Problems of Governance in the Muslim Tradition, New ed. (London: IBTauris, 2005) Rynning, Sten, NATO in Afghanistan : the Liberal Disconnect (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012) Thruelsen, Peter Dahl, ‘Security Sector Stabilisation in Counterinsurgency Operations: The Case of Afghanistan’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 22 (2011), 619–643

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---, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: a Localised Insurgency with a Local Objective’, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 21 (2010), 259–276 Udenrigsministeriet (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark), Den danske indsats i Helmand 2010, Helmand-planen 2010 (Udenrigsministeriet, 2010) ---, The Danish Helmand Plan 2011-2012, and Report on the Danish Engagement in Afghanistan in 2010 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011) United States, Department of the Army, United States, and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual [2006] (New York: Cosimo Reports, 2010) Yousaf, Mohammad, The Bear Trap, Afghanistan’s Untold Story, 1st ed (Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992)

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Joint and combined operations in the history of warfare Antonio COPPOLA

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uongiorno, sono il Colonnello Antonio COPPOLA, Direttore del Centro Operativo del Comando di vertice Interforze, in Roma. Con questo breve intervento mi ripropongo di sintetizzare quello che è stato l’impegno italiano in Afghanistan nell’ambito dell’International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Eviterò di declinare freddi dati numerici. Piuttosto, proverò a condividere con voi il processo attraverso il quale si è sviluppato, maturando, l’apporto dell’Italia alla ISAF. Dal punto di vista concettuale, l’impiego della forza militare è conseguente a una situazione manifesta di rischio per la sicurezza, o di grave minaccia per gli interessi vitali di un Paese. Ebbene, dopo i sanguinosi attacchi suicidi alle torri gemelle, fatti che sono stati intrisi di una efferatezza inimmaginabile nei tempi moderni, l’intera comunità internazionale, profondamente turbata dagli eventi, prescindendo da qualsiasi precedente posizione di parte ritenne di non potersi esimere dal pronunciare il proprio sdegno e manifestare solidarietà verso il popolo americano. Fu aperto un intenso dibattito sul cosa fare e avviate le conseguenti iniziative di politica internazionale. Dal punto di vista militare, quando il Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite ratificò la risoluzione n.1386, con la quale veniva autorizzato il dispiegamento nella città di KABUL e nelle aree limitrofe di una forza multinazionale denominata “International Security Assistance Force” (ISAF), era il 20 dicembre 2001, e le forze armate statunitensi, affiancate da una cospicua componente britannica, avevano già lanciato la loro controffensiva al terrorismo con l’operazione “enduring freedom”. L’Italia, come tanti altri paesi contributori, fornì la propria disponibilità senza tentennamenti, con il chiaro intento di collaborare alla neutralizzazione del network terroristico e alla liberazione dell’Afghanistan dall’oppressivo regime talebano. Da quel momento, il Tricolore verde, bianco e rosso ha sventolato in tutte le fasi della missione, assolvendo un ruolo rilevantissimo, in particolare per la stabilizzazione del paese e per la transizione della responsabilità alle forze di sicurezza afghane, che con un pizzico di orgoglio, devo dire, non hanno mai mancato di riconoscere la professionalità, la disponibilità e la vicinanza del soldato italiano. Questo mi consta personalmente, non tanto per l’incarico che oggi ricopro, quanto piuttosto per essere stato per un lungo periodo il consigliere del Comandante del 207° C.A. Afghano e, in un secondo momento, anche il consigliere del generale coordinatore delle forze di sicurezza afghane schierate nella regione ovest. Dopo questo antefatto, un brevissimo inciso di carattere storico sociale può essere

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utile per connotare meglio la situazione interna all’Afghanistan: uno stato dalla storia turbolenta, che negli anni novanta si presentava frastornato da un lungo periodo di instabilità, sfibrato dalla disomogeneità delle etnie e dalla geografia del territorio, stremato dalla guerra contro i sovietici.

La milizia fondamentalista islamica dei Talebani, su quel tessuto politico e sociale, non aveva faticato molto ad imporsi, applicando la Sharia nella sua forma più rigida, propagandando una bellicosa avversità alla cultura occidentale e alimentando le organizzazioni terroristiche di matrice islamica, tra le quali la rete di Al-Qaida, guidata da Osama bin Laden, comprovato artefice, tra gli altri, del malvagio attentato dell’11 settembre. Al-Qaida aveva infatti impiantato in Afghanistan numerosi campi per l’addestramento di quelle milizie con le quali, negli stessi anni novanta, aveva già colpito gli Stati Uniti con gli attentati alle ambasciate di Kenia e Tanzania. In sintesi, era giunto il momento di interrompere la deriva autoritaria del regime talebano, prima che in Afghanistan il senso comune di nazione e di popolo potesse essere drasticamente compromesso, a vantaggio dell’impero del male. E’ questa la situazione in cui si materializza l’intervento americano lanciato il 7 ottobre 2001 con l’inizio dei bombardamenti, seguiti già il 20 di ottobre dall’aviolancio delle prime forze paracadutiste, con le quali si provvide all’allontanamento dei talebani dai centri di gestione della vita pubblica e all’affermazione di Karzai (22 dic. 2011) come capo del governo provvisorio. Era il mese in cui, con riferimento agli accordi di Bonn (5 dic. 2011), la cosiddetta Amministrazione ad interim dell’Afghanistan e l’International Security Assistance Force convenivano di collaborare nel rispetto della risoluzione 1386 del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite. In particolare, l’Amministrazione ad interim si proponeva di cooperare con la comunità internazionale per combattere il terrorismo, la droga e il crimine organizzato, garantendo nel paese il rispetto delle leggi internazionali e relazioni pacifiche con le nazioni confinanti e con il resto della comunità internazionale. L’ISAF avrebbe da parte sua assistito l’Amministrazione ad interim nello sviluppo delle strutture organizzative di sicurezza; nella ricostruzione; nella identificazione degli obiettivi addestrativi e nell’assistenza all’assolvimento dei compiti delle costituende forze di sicurezza, garantendo il rispetto delle sensibilità religiose, etniche e culturali locali. Qui entra in gioco la coalizione: le prime forze ISAF sono state dispiegate il 04 gennaio 2002, con un contingente internazionale a guida britannica. Dagli obiettivi cui abbiamo appena fatto cenno, emerge chiaramente che le forze ISAF non sarebbero andate a sostituire la Task Force Counter Terrorism (Operazione Enduring Freedom – OEF) a guida statunitense, che rimaneva contemporaneamente schierata. L’Italia, determinata nella condanna dei crudeli attacchi terroristici, nel marzo 2003 immise in OEF un proprio contingente (Task Force “NIBBIO”), con mandato di 6 mesi, per sostenere il grande sforzo iniziale, assolvendo compiti di controllo del territorio nella provincia orientale di PAKTIA, al confine con il PAKISTAN (FOB “Salerno”), e

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di supporto logistico presso la base di BAGRAM, sede del Comando della Coalizione in AFGHANISTAN. In agosto dello stesso anno, con l’assunzione della responsabilità dell’operazione ISAF da parte del Comandante NATO del “Joint Force Command” di BRUNSUM, iniziò una rotazione di 6 mesi, che dal 04 agosto 2005 al 04 maggio 2006 portò l’Italia a schierare il “NATO Rapid Deployable Corps Italy”, esprimendo anche il Comandante di ISAF VIII (Gen. C.A. Mauro DEL VECCHIO). Vale la pena ricordare che il controllo delle operazioni è passato ufficialmente da Enduring Freedom alla missione ISAF, a guida NATO, solo il 5 ottobre 2006. Da allora in poi, Enduring Freedom ha continuato ad operare parallelamente ad ISAF sul territorio afghano.

Vediamo ora la missione di ISAF più nel dettaglio, attraverso le sue cinque fasi: – 1^ fase: Analisi e preparazione; – 2^ fase: Espansione, a sua volta secondo 4 stage; • 1° stage: Area Nord; • 2° stage: Area Ovest; • 3° stage: Area Sud; • 4° stage: Area Est; – 3^ fase: Stabilizzazione; – 4^ fase: Transizione; – 5^ fase: Rientro Qual è stato il contributo dell’Italia? Le Forze italiane in AFGHANISTAN sono state dislocate nell’ambito del Regional Command Capital (RC-C) e del Regional Command West (RC-W). Nel Regional Command Capital, inizialmente un “Battle Group” per contribuire al controllo di KABUL e delle aree circostanti, esercitando anche il ruolo di leader del Comando Regionale per un semestre (06 dicembre 2007 - 5 agosto 2008). Ma la partecipazione più significativa, in termini di dispositivo, si è configurata con l’assunzione del ruolo di “lead Nation” del Regional Command West (RC-W) nel qual ruolo l’Italia ha proseguito il processo di espansione già in atto (conclusosi nell’ottobre del 2006) e condotto la fase 3, ovvero di stabilizzazione. Il dispositivo, era composto da unità di manovra, di supporto, di reazione rapida e, in particolare, dei PRT (HERAT, a guida italiana – FARAH, a guida USA – CHAGHCHARAN, a guida lituana - QAL’E NOW, a guida spagnola), ai quali era (ed è) assegnato il delicato compito di supportare e coordinare tutte le attività di ricostruzione condotte dalle organizzazioni che operano nelle rispettive aree d’intervento. Senza timore di smentita, sento di poter affermare che proprio sull’attività e sulle interazioni dei PRT si è fondato lo sviluppo socio economico delle province, grazie alle tante iniziative di carattere sociale e le opere pubbliche realizzate, volte a migliorare le condizioni di vita degli abitanti e, contemporaneamente, a consolidare il potere delle istituzioni. Considerata l’entità dell’impegno, dal 2008 vi è stata una progressiva riduzione della presenza italiana nel Regional Command Capital, dove sono state comunque mantenute

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qualificate posizioni organizzative nell’ambito del Comando ISAF e negli altri comandi multinazionali che insistono su KABUL. Contemporaneamente, è stata dedicata maggiore energia al regional Command West. Il Comando di RC-W, ancora oggi, si fonda su una struttura di Brigata multinazionale, operante in un’area di responsabilità suddivisa in quattro settori, ognuno coincidente con una provincia, sebbene non rispondente ai reali confini amministrativi, nei quali sono state schierate le necessarie forze di manovra, al fine di garantire la libertà di movimento, e i 4 PRT a supporto della ricostruzione e dello sviluppo. All’avvio della fase di stabilizzazione, l’incessante impegno delle forze di manovra e dei PRT aveva già mietuto più che favorevoli riscontri. Ma non era un punto d’arrivo. Era piuttosto un punto di partenza, con l’obiettivo di rendere autonome le locali forze di sicurezza. In tal senso, dal luglio 2006 hanno cominciato ad operare 7 team di addestramento e collegamento (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams – OMLT) che, dall’interno del 207° Corpo d’Armata Afghano, schierato appunto nell’area ovest, modulavano i rapporti con RC-W, svolgevano azione di indirizzo negli ambiti della pianificazione/organizzazione/condotta e promuovevano/svolgevano l’addestramento opportuno per far conseguire la necessaria prontezza operativa. Altrettanto è stato fatto per le forze di polizia (Afghan National Police - Afghan Natinal Civil Order Police - Afghan National Border Police), attraverso l’impiego di task forces dell’Arma dei Carabinieri e della Guardia di Finanza. Tra gli obiettivi addestrativi di maggior pregio conseguiti con il programma di sviluppo delle Forze di Sicurezza Afghane vi sono: • sensibilizzazione e capacità CIED; • impiego del fuoco indiretto • integrazione dell’attività informativa; • pianificazione e programmazione logistica; • conoscenza del diritto penale e applicazione della legge; • formazione della leadership; • alfabetizzazione dei soldati; • nozioni e tecniche di pronto soccorso; • informatica e comunicazioni, oltre tutte le altre istruzioni di carattere tecnico tattico. Finché, a partire dalla prima metà del 2011 ha avuto inizio la fase di Transizione, 4^ fase della campagna ISAF, suddivisa a sua volta in 5 tranches, in ognuna delle quali una definita quantità di Distretti, selezionati dal Joint AFGHAN NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB), designati dal presidente Karzai, hanno assunto/stanno assumendo la responsabilità diretta della sicurezza. Si tratta di un processo politico-militare che prende in considerazione tre pilastri fondamentali: sicurezza, governance e sviluppo, laddove il conseguimento della sicurezza è la condizione necessaria per garantire la governante e lo sviluppo, come peraltro affermato nel vertice NATO svolto a CHICAGO nel maggio del 2012. Nel corso della transizione, come facilmente intuibile, diminuisce il fabbisogno di

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forze di manovra, ma non per questo lo sforzo si riduce. Al contrario, a una riduzione quantitativa si sta contrapponendo un incremento qualitativo del personale, chiamato a ricoprire ruoli più delicati, necessari di un elevato livello di cultura militare e generale. E’ il caso di accennare ai team di consiglieri (advisor) che indirizzano nel lavoro quotidiano i Comandi e le unità dell’Esercito e delle Forze di Polizia ancora abbisognevoli di supporto. In questi giorni si comincia a pianificare la quinta fase, ovvero quella del ritiro. Bene! Per parlarne, aspettiamo che diventi storia. Ringrazio dell’attenzione e auguro un buon proseguimento dei lavori.

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Il potere aerospaziale durante l’operazione “Unified Protector” Settimo CAPUTO Giancarlo MARAGUCCI

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l potere aereo è stato da sempre considerato una capacità militare autonoma ed in grado di sfruttare e controllare la terza dimensione al fine di acquisire il vantaggio militare in termini di tempo, distanza e prontezza all’azione e alla reazione. Le capacità aeree delle forze armate a livello mondiale sono nel tempo mutate proprio per sfruttare, sempre più, lo spazio sovrastante i mari e le nazioni e riuscire a dominare le operazioni militari che si svolgevano in superficie. Con lo sviluppo tecnologico, inoltre, ci si è spinti sempre più verso i limiti dell’atmosfera, riuscendo ad adattare le capacità dei vettori spaziali alle esigenze dei velivoli tradizionali. Ed ecco allora che il potere aereo si tramuta in potere aerospaziale, in quanto le operazioni militari moderne non possono prescindere dal “supporto” spaziale, nei vari campi applicativi. L’operazione Unified Protector a guida NATO è stata la riprova del successo tecnologico in campo militare e nella fattispecie in campo aerospaziale. Nel 2011, a seguito della risoluzione ONU n. 1973, la NATO predisponeva lo strumento aereo per riuscire a: · Proteggere i civili sul territorio libico; · Istituire una no-fly-zone sul territorio per prevenire qualsiasi spostamento aereo da parte delle truppe pro Gheddafi. Non erano previste, in questa operazione, truppe a terra, ovvero militari della coalizione sul territorio libico, in grado di gestire la battaglia a contatto con le truppe di Gheddafi. La coalizione era composta da Nazioni della NATO e nello specifico Belgio, Canada, Danimarca, Spagna, Francia, Regno Unito, Grecia, Italia, Olanda, Norvegia, Turchia e Stati Uniti d’America e da Paesi non NATO quali Giordania, Qatar, Svezia ed Emirati Arabi Uniti. Gli assetti aerei a disposizione consistevano in: · Velivoli per il comando e controllo delle operazioni; · Velivoli di Intelligence, sorveglianza e ricognizione, che a loro volta erano suddivisi in: - Velivoli con equipaggio, - Velivoli a pilotaggio remoto, - Velivoli da ricognizione tattica. · Velivoli rifornitori; · Velivoli di guerra elettronica e di soppressione dei sistemi di difesa aerea; · Velivoli da attacco al suolo; · Velivoli per eventuale soccorso a personale a terra; · Elicotteri d’attacco.

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Il dispositivo aereo era quindi articolato e complesso, dislocato a terra su circa 20 basi aeree europee e a bordo delle navi della coalizione nel Mediterraneo. Tutto lo spazio aereo tra l’Italia meridionale, la Grecia, la Libia ed il Mediterraneo che li collega era sostanzialmente controllato e gestito dalla coalizione, che aveva il Comando presso le strutture NATO di Bagnoli ed utilizzava Enti ed infrastrutture delle singole Nazioni per il supporto logistico e tecnico. Dal mese di marzo al 31 ottobre gli alleati hanno svolto quasi 26.000 sortite, di giorno e di notte, per una media giornaliera di 120. La componente satellitare ha ovviamente rappresentato un elemento chiave per il successo delle operazioni aeree, nei vari ambiti: · Global Positioning System GPS: la costellazione dei satelliti americani garantisce, agli utenti militari, elevata precisione di localizzazione e quindi navigazione, e viene utilizzata da: o Velivoli: il ricevitore GPS a bordo dei moderni velivoli militari permette di navigare con assoluta certezza e nei tempi previsti; o Armamento: il ricevitore GPS sui sistemi di guida dell’armamento a caduta garantisce precisione di ingaggio e quindi riduce in modo considerevole la possibilità di danni collaterali a cose o persone non coinvolte direttamente nell’operazione (esempio: JDAM Joint Direct Attack Ammunition). · Meteorologia: i satelliti meteorologici sono di ausilio sia nella fase di pianificazione che in quella di esecuzione delle operazioni aeree. Grazie alle informazioni ricevute dallo spazio, infatti, si riesce ad effettuare previsioni attendibili e quindi si è in grado di pianificare le missioni aeree senza il rischio di incorrere in condizioni meteorologiche sfavorevoli; · Satelliti per il controllo degli Aeromobili a Pilotaggio Remoto A.P.R.: i cosiddetti velivoli senza pilota (U.A.V. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) hanno invece una complessa architettura organizzativa che include un equipaggio a terra e un’infostruttura articolata. Il controllo del velivolo a distanze oltre l’orizzonte (BLOS Beyond Line Of Sight) avviene attraverso un satellite che rilancia da e per il velivolo i segnali generati dalla stazione di controllo a terra; · Satelliti per immagini: le informazioni relative al “campo di battaglia” possono essere raccolte e diffuse anche attraverso satelliti dedicati che a loro volta si distinguono in: o Satelliti con sensore ottico: in questo caso il sensore è ottico e riceve le informazioni da terra nelle varie frequenze, fino ad arrivare a quelle infrarosso; o Satelliti con sensore radar: tali satelliti hanno un sensore attivo che sfrutta le onde elettromagnetiche generate dal radar di bordo per riuscire a generare le cosiddette immagini radar. · Scambio dati: un’architettura di comando e controllo moderna è fortemente dipendente dalla capacità di centralizzare il comando e decentralizzare gli assetti operativi e tattici. I tempi di azione e reazione attuali impongono una rete di collegamento tra tutti i partecipanti e lo scambio dati avviene, preminentemente, grazie all’ausilio di appositi vettori satellitari.

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Questi sono solo alcuni esempi di applicazione della tecnologia spaziale alle operazioni aeree del 2011 sulla Libia, ma rendono chiaro il concetto che oggi il potere aereo non può prescindere dalla tecnologia spaziale. Possiamo sintetizzare dicendo che la tecnologia aerospaziale si applica a: · Sensori di bordo; · Satelliti; · Velivoli; · Armamento; · Comunicazioni e scambio dati. Il vantaggio operativo che ne scaturisce si sintetizza in: · Intelligence accurata: le informazioni sono sempre più puntuali e chiare; · Comando e controllo: le forze impegnate possono risiedere anche ad elevate distanze senza penalizzare le capacità di comando e controllo e lo scambio dati in tempo reale; · Precisione di ingaggio: l’armamento utilizzato è in grado di colpire il bersaglio con precisione centimetrica, evitando in questo modo i danni collaterali; Quindi la tecnologia applicata all’ambiente aerospaziale permette anche una riduzione del numero di assetti coinvolti nelle operazioni aeree. Poco più di 300 aeroplani hanno svolto tutte le sortite sui cieli della Libia, risultato di assoluta rilevanza, se confrontato, ad esempio, con il numero di assetti coinvolti nell’operazione Desert Storm in Iraq vent’anni prima, che superava abbondantemente il migliaio. È opportuno a questo punto effettuare una comparazione tra l’Operazione Unified Protector e altre due operazioni aeree condotte nell’ultimo ventennio, e cioè l’operazione Desert Storm del 1991 e l’operazione Allied Force sui cieli del Kossovo del 1999. In particolare mi soffermerò solo su 4 aspetti che ritengo rilevanti nel contesto in cui ci troviamo. Il prospetto che segue riassume quanto sto per descrivere.

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Capacità stealth: nel 1991 fecero per la prima volta apparizione i velivoli americani F-117, cosiddetti aerei invisibili in quanto grazie ad una forma della fusoliera particolare e a nuovi materiali utilizzati riuscivano ad eludere i radar di avvistamento del sistema di difesa irachena. Tale capacità, specialmente in uno scenario complesso, risulta particolarmente vantaggiosa in quanto permette di sorvolare lo spazio aereo dell’area di operazioni con bassissimo rischio di essere avvistato e quindi ingaggiato con i sistemi di difesa attiva (missili e/o aerei). Fino ad oggi solo gli americani sono stati in grado di gestire la cosiddetta tecnologia stealth, includendo l’Operazione Unified Protector, in cui nella primissima fase gli Stati Uniti hanno utilizzato velivoli B-2 e F-22. Ma il futuro vedrà lo scenario cambiare, in quanto il velivolo F-35 JSF (Joint Strike Fighter) è attualmente in fase di sviluppo e verrà sviluppato e acquistato da numerosi Paesi occidentali. Ecco quindi che la capacità stealth non sarà più solo appannaggio degli americani. Bombe di precisione: le bombe tradizionali a caduta libera sono state nel tempo sostituite da quelle a guida laser e/o GPS. In effetti la tecnologia ha migliorato il sistema di guida fino ad arrivare a precisioni centimetriche, riducendo quindi la possibilità di danni collaterali. Nell’Operazione Unified Protector sono state utilizzate unicamente bombe di precisione, anche se in effetti nella maggior parte dei casi i corpi bomba sono gli stessi utilizzati in passato. Ora gli sforzi si stanno quindi concentrando sul potere distruttivo dell’armamento, cercando di essere sempre più chirurgici negli ingaggi al suolo. Un esempio concreto sono le Small Diameter Bombs (SDB) che saranno implementate sul JSF. APR: i sistemi a pilotaggio remoto sono stati, nel tempo, un assetto sempre più importante ed efficace. Innanzitutto eliminano completamente i rischi che i piloti tradizionali vivono nel compiere le missioni reali, ma soprattutto hanno vantaggi in termini di: · persistenza in area di operazioni: un APR può volare fino a 24 ore senza la necessità di rifornimento in volo: · valenza strategica: le informazioni di un APR possono essere utilizzate, in tempo reale, a livello tattico ma anche a livello strategico, dando un notevole vantaggio al processo decisionale; · capacità di ingaggio puntale: i moderni APR sono piattaforme di ricognizione e di raccolta di informazioni ma hanno anche la capacità di ingaggio diretta di un bersaglio, senza quindi la necessità di far intervenire altri assetti aerei. In OUP sono stati usati alcuni assetti APR ma le esigenze sono sempre crescenti. In futuro sicuramente sempre più Paesi si doteranno di questa capacità. Intelligence fusion: nel 1991 la difficoltà nelle operazioni militari ed in particolare in quella aerea era principalmente collegata con le capacità dei sistemi a disposizione di raccolta e collezione delle informazioni riguardanti il “nemico”. Oggi invece la tecnologia in campo aerospaziale permette di poter collezionare un immenso volume di informazioni ed il problema riguarda invece la capacità di gestione delle stesse, ossia la capacità di estrapolare le informazioni utili ed utilizzabili a livello strategico e tattico.

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I sensori sono molto “performanti” ed è necessario effettuare la cosiddetta Intelligence fusion, in cui le informazioni vengono correlate e confrontate per estrapolare le informazioni giuste. In questo caso non si parla solo di tecnologia ma anche di infrastrutture, personale, processi di lavoro necessari ad esprimere tale capacità. Questo concetto è stato adottato anche dalla NATO che si sta organizzando con velivoli (forse RQ-4), infrastrutture (base aerea Sigonella, in Sicilia) e personale che si integreranno perfettamente con i vettori satellitari e con i velivoli aerotattici (ad esempio JSF) per esplicitare tale capacità. Questo programma è chiamato A.G.S., Alliance Ground Surveillance, link http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48892.htm. Per concludere l’Operazione Unified Protector del 2011 a guida NATO è stato un evento operativo complesso e articolato, in cui il potere aerospaziale ha dato riprova di efficacia e puntualità. La tecnologia aiuta e aiuterà ad ottenere risultati sempre migliori in termini di precisione, limitazione dei danni collaterali e riduzione degli assetti coinvolti.

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Coalitions militaires entre la guerre et l’humanitaire Issa Babana El Alaoui

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ucun des termes « alliance »1 et « coalition »2 militaires, n’acquiert, dans leurs définitions, l’unanimité des spécialistes, bien qu’ils soient presque synonymes3. Mais nous pouvons qualifier la « coalition militaire » d’« alliance temporaire » en se référant à certaines analyses théoriques. Ce qui signifie que « l’alliance militaire est plus durable et souvent plus formalisée que la coalition, s’étendant à la diplomatie et au temps de paix »4. Nous déduisons en synthèse que les ententes militaires5 résident aussi bien dans des alliances politico-militaires durables que dans des coalitions de guerre6, de paix et d’actions humanitaires7 conjoncturelles. 1 D’aucuns considèrent l’« alliance militaire » comme « la forme embryonnaire de la sécurité collective ». Un système au sein duquel « des Etats se rassemblent pour mettre en commun leur sécurité et défendre leurs intérêts communs ». Toutefois, la définition la plus souple de l’« alliance militaire» est celle de Charles Calvo qui la perçoit comme « l’union de deux ou plusieurs nations pour la poursuite d’un but politique commun ». Cette approche semble plus utile et réaliste, pour comprendre l’élargissement du concept et du rôle de l’« alliance militaire » qui s’opère depuis la fin de la guerre froide. Une nouvelle forme d’alliance qui ne se limite plus à un pacte militaire d’assistance mutuelle (bilatérale ou multilatérale). 2 La «coalition militaire » se distingue de l’«alliance militaire ». Elle correspond à « un groupement d’Etats formé à l’occasion d’un conflit pour bénéficier de moyens militaires et diplomatiques plus importants ». 3 Dans le langage courant (non académique) on utilise les mots « alliance » et « coalition » comme deux synonymes, en parlant de plusieurs pays associés dans une déclaration de guerre contre un adversaire commun ou bien pour la réalisation d’une OMP ou des actions humanitaires à travers leurs forces armées. Outre le lexique politique, cette équivalence sémantique figure également dans la définition du mot « coalition » selon le dictionnaire Larousse. 4 Ainsi, on peut considérer comme « coalition » : le regroupement des 32 pays autour des Etats-Unis pour empêcher l’annexion du Koweït par l’Irak (1990-1991) autant que la « coalition of the Willing » formée autour des Etats-Unis dans le cadre de l’intervention militaire en Irak de mars 2003. Et l’on peut désigner comme « alliance » le regroupement des 28 pays au sein de l’OTAN. Appelée également NATO (en anglais) l’OTAN (Organisation du Traité de l’Atlantique Nord) s’est nettement développée. Depuis 1949, le nombre de pays membres de l’Alliance est passé de 12 à 28, en six vagues d’élargissement. 5 Par exemple, on a donné à la « coalition militaire en Irak » une définition assez large et riche dans le temps et l’espace. Parce qu’elle désigne non seulement « la force armée multinationale conduite par les États-Unis pour attaquer l’Irak en 2003 » mais aussi « le commandement des contingents et des troupes stationnés en Irak après la chute du régime de Saddam Hussein pour former et soutenir les nouvelles forces de sécurité (…) jusqu’au remplacement de ce commandement, le 1er janvier 2010, par United States Forces – Iraq (USF-I), regroupant les forces américaines. Des forces qui ne quitteront l’Irak qu’à partir du 31 décembre 2011. 6 Bien que l’alliance de guerre de plusieurs armées d’Etat soit la forme la plus ancienne, elle s’est beaucoup développée au fil des siècles, tant par les stratégies de combat adoptées collectivement par ses membres (dans l’harmonisation et l’ordre) que par les moyens guerriers et logistiques modernes employés. 7 Et puisque « l’union fait la force », le rassemblement coordonné des forces armées sert mieux les desseins ciblés que l’action propre d’un seul Etat.. Que les objectifs visés soient constructifs ou destructifs pour les sociétés.

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Le recours aux trois types de coalitions s’est développé dans l’évolution des relations internationales. Mais il tire son essence dans la notion contemporaine de « défense nationale »8 qui, dépassant le domaine des combats, intègre des missions de solidarité entre les nations, transcendant les drapeaux et les frontières. S’agissant d’abord des alliances de guerre, leurs inconvénients cohabitent avec leurs avantages. Car si « l’union fait la force », elle n’apporte pas forcément le succès à une coalition fragile devant un pays puissant9. D’ailleurs - ironie du sort - la première défaite dans ce sens, est affligée par la France à la première coalition militaire contemporaine qui se constitue contre elle, entre 1792 et 1796. Ce cas de figure demeure possible aujourd’hui10. Une coalition de guerre n’a pas toujours le monopole de la victoire, et l’ampleur des pertes humaines et matérielles ne dépend pas toujours de la loi du nombre11. Une menace gravissime à la « sécurité collective » entraîne parfois une opération militaire multinationale. On l’a vu, depuis le 11 septembre 2001, devant le « terrorisme international »12. Néanmoins, le recours à des «opérations musclées » coalisées peut comporter des risques d’enlisement de conflits. Par ailleurs, les Etats ne s’entendent pas seulement pour attaquer ou contre-attaquer un ennemi commun. La défense préventive justifie également les pactes militaires. C’est

8 L’élément fondamental de cette notion signifie que « le premier rôle d’un État est de protéger ses citoyens et son territoire. Cela peut passer par le recours à la force, dissuasive ou défensive. Séparément ou par alliance d’Etats. La notion globale de « défense nationale » concorde avec les deux concepts conventionnels du mot « coalition ». Le premier, qui signifie « alliance militaire et politique d’Etats contre un adversaire commun », se rapporte à la guerre. Le second, qui signifie « entente circonstancielle entre puissance pour une action commune » s’applique aux initiatives non guerrières dont les Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP) et les Actions Humanitaires. Des actions qui résident essentiellement dans l’«assistance sociale » et « les actes médicaux ». 9 L’Histoire militaire nous enseigne que les alliances n’ont pas toujours raison des armées qui se battent seules. Le registre des célèbres combats qui se sont déroulés - depuis notamment le 6ème siècle - entre des alliances d’Etats et certains pays se bataillant hors alliance, nous confirme cette réalité. 10 Une coalition de plusieurs pays, fourmillante de soldats, dotée d’armes conventionnelles désuètes aurait peu de chance de vaincre un Etat solitaire, mais nettement supérieur en armements terrestres modernes et en force de frappe aérienne. Surtout s’il s’agit d’un pays nucléaire. La loi du nombre peut jouer un mauvais tour quand on y croit aveuglement. Tout dépend de l’efficacité des arsenaux et des stratégies. Voilà un piège dont il faut se méfier en cas d’alliance. Et même quand la victoire est souvent acquise par les forces de la coalition, cellesci n’en sortent pas sans pertes - parfois considérables - aux plans humain et matériel. 11 Les Première et Deuxième Guerres mondiales autant que les interventions militaires en Afghanistan et en Irak ont causé énormément de victimes civiles chez les belligérants en général, outre les grands nombres de morts et de blessés chez les soldats des pays alliés. Les bilans sont extrêmement atroces. Environ 9 millions de morts et 8 millions d’invalides pour la Première Guerre, et plus de 55 millions de morts avec plus de victimes civiles et militaires pour la Deuxième Guerre. Ce conflit fut le plus coûteux en vies humaines de toute l’histoire de l’humanité. Enfin, le plus récent des bilans contemporains signale, qu’après sept ans d’opérations militaires, les pertes de la coalition dans l’intervention en Irak s’élèvent à 4792 morts (dont 4475 soldats américains) et plus de 36000 blessés (dont 30718 américains) 12 Qu’il s’agisse de « terrorisme d’Etat » ou d’actions terroristes perpétrées par des organisations rebelles ou insurrectionnelles.

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Bismarck qui a inventé les « alliances militaires en temps de paix »13. De la Duplice14 à la Triple entente15 en passant par la Triple Alliance 16 (soit de 1872 à 1907), le changement de bloc s’opère par le jeu secret d’intérêts, partagés entre les gouvernements17. Toutefois, si les « alliances » et les « coalitions » militaires constituent « des instruments d’équilibre des puissances » (balance of power) parmi d’autres mécanismes, force est de constater qu’ils peuvent rendre le système international instable, « puisque toute alliance entraîne - généralement - une contre-alliance ». Limitons-nous à un seul exemple parmi tant d’autres18 : la création de l’« OTAN » en 1949 a, par effet de symétrie, entraîné la création du « Pacte de Varsovie », en 1955. Il en résulte une bipolarisation et une escalade militaire qui ont un effet déstabilisateur sur la « sécurité collective ». Pourtant, une « alliance militaire » est censée être « la forme embryonnaire de la sécurité collective » comme disait Sur Serge. Voilà le « dilemme de sécurité de l’alliance », porteur de paradoxes et d’inquiétudes. Car non seulement chaque groupement se sent menacé par l’autre, mais aussi les Etats qui doivent assurer leur sécurité hors-alliance (self-help) se sentent eux aussi menacés. En somme, les coalitions constituent des systèmes de défense et de dissuasion à double tranchant, même contre leurs propres membres quelquefois. Pouvant créer des malheurs ou des chances pour les peuples. En voici deux exemples classiques : a) - Il est responsable de la Première Guerre mondiale (1914-1918) en générant un conflit localisé mineur, qui débouche sur un embrasement généralisé. b) - Il façonne positivement la carte géopolitique du monde après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale (1939-1945), par la victoire des Alliés. Car sans lui, le Nazisme et le Fascisme auraient produit plus de calamités et duré plus longtemps19. Aussi, quels que soient leurs objectifs, les coalitions de guerre présentent d’autres problématiques, à travers la variabilité de leurs structures et l’inconstance plausible de leurs membres. En voici quelques réalités démonstratives : 1 - Le jeu des alliances ne sert pas toujours tous les membres. Il peut même s’avérer préjudiciable à certains Etats. On le constate durant l’été 1914, dans le conflit aus13 En effet, depuis sa défaite contre la Prusse, la France est isolée diplomatiquement. Bismarck réussit à se garantir contre toute revanche française en faisant de l’Allemagne le centre de la diplomatie européenne, entre 1871 et 1890. Après cette période, le « système bismarckien » cédera progressivement la place à deux blocs d’alliances qui diviseront l’Europe en deux grands systèmes antagonistes. 14 Bismarck signe la Duplice avec l’Autriche-Hongrie, en 1879, pour s’appuyer sur elle stratégiquement. 15 La France, la Grande-Bretagne et la Russie forment la Triple Entente en 1907. 16 En 1882, la Duplice devient Triple Alliance (Triplice) avec l’entrée de l’Italie dans l’alliance : l’Italie est très anti-française depuis la signature du traité du Bardo en 1881, instaurant un protectorat français sur la Tunisie, région que l’Italie considérait comme son domaine réservé 17 Un scénario ressemblant à un déplacement de pions dans un échiquier où les profits antagonistes des Etats constituent les vrais joueurs. 18 L’alliance défensive entre l’URSS et la Chine (Pacte sino-soviétique », conclu en 1950, a suivi l’alliance militaire totale entre Paris et Londres en 1947 (traité de Dunkerque) et celle signée entre la France, le Royaume uni et le Benelux en 1948 (traité de Bruxelles). 19 Cependant, les désastres des deux Grandes Guerres sont tels que les peuples décident, en 1945, de mieux cohabiter dans le cadre de l’ONU que sous l’édifice d’une Société Des Nations (SDN) déficiente.

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tro-serbe puis austro-russe : ni la France ni l’Allemagne n’ont d’intérêt direct dans l’affaire, mais elles se trouvent entraînées dans le conflit à cause des accords qui les attachent à leurs alliés. 2 - Les intérêts dictent naturellement la création ou l’achèvement d’une alliance de guerre20. Les stratégies peuvent évoluer ensuite de l’humanitaire vers l’usage de la force21, et de l’opposition catégorique contre une intervention militaire vers une participation logistique ou de génie militaire22 à cette intervention. Elles peuvent changer, enfin, fondamentalement, en peu de temps. Les exemples ne manquent pas23. 3 - La frontière entre les coalitions de guerre opposées est parfois si mince qu’elle permet aux gouvernements de passer facilement d’un camp à l’autre par basculement. Un Etat peut même se retourner contre ses alliés de départ, pour se coaliser avec ses ennemis d’hier24. C’est le cas de l’Espagne quand elle quitte la coalition de 1792 contre la France révolutionnaire pour se ranger du côté de celle-ci, le 18 août 1796. 4 - Tous les membres d’une alliance de guerre ne sont pas obligés d’y rester jusqu’à l’accomplissement total des objectifs fixés. Certains décident de se retirer avant l’achèvement du conflit. La décision de l’Espagne en 2004 - dans l’intervention militaire en Irak - est éloquente25. Chaque membre d’une coalition peut se donner

20 Les alliances se nouent et se dénouent, se gonflent et se dégonflent, se resserrent et se desserrent, par augmentation ou réduction d’effectifs, ou bien par retrait ou départ définitif. Dans l’intervention militaire en Irak, près d’une cinquantaine de pays de quatre continents participe initialement à cette coalition au titre de la période 2003-2004. À son niveau le plus haut, la coalition compte 330 000 soldats originaires de 38 pays, dont 250 000 Américains et 40 000 Britanniques. Quatre ans plus tard, le nombre d’Etats participants tombe presque de moitié : 22 États seulement étaient présents en juillet 2008. Le mandat de l’ONU expire d’ailleurs le 31 décembre 2008. Le gouvernement irakien ne demande pas son renouvellement. 21 En effet, il arrive que des Etats s’associent au commencement des attaques coalisées - même par soutien logistique - en donnant d’abord un caractère humanitaire à leur participation militaire sans pour autant exclure l’option armée. Par exemple, en 2011, la Pologne avait notifié sa décision de « détacher une partie de ses forces armées et ses moyens pour l’aide humanitaire (…) excluant sa participation à une force de frappe en Libye après le feu vert de l’ONU ». Pourtant, son gouvernement se montra prêt à offrir ses avions de transport. (Déclaration du Ministre polonais des Affaires Etrangères, Bogdan Klich). 22 Bien qu’opposée à l’intervention militaire en Irak en 2003, la Nouvelle-Zélande envoie un contingent de génie militaire et de logistique composé de 61 membres « pour la reconstruction », et ce dans le cadre de la résolution 1483 du conseil de sécurité. 23 Après s’être opposée à l’intervention militaire coalisée en Irak le 20 mars 2003, la France soutient la frappe armée contre la Libye huit ans plus tard. Pourtant, les deux interventions sont justifiées par des motifs de « sécurité collective » (malgré la différence des formules employées) et visent essentiellement des dirigeants désignés comme « dictateurs ». D’autres Etats agissent inversement face aux deux interventions. Ils s’abstiennent de participer à la frappe militaire décrétée contre la Libye après avoir participé à celle engagée contre l’Irak. Qu’ils soient membres de l’Union européenne et de l’OTAN ou seulement de l’OTAN sans faire partie de l’Union européenne. Qu’ils soient membres de l’OCI ou du Conseil de coopération du Golfe ou en dehors de ces organisations non occidentales. 24 Sortant d’une alliance faible pour rejoindre le camp adverse, même si ce dernier constitue un seul pays. 25 Alors que le Premier ministre espagnol José Maria Aznar (parti populaire, droite espagnol) avait engagé au départ l’Espagne dans le conflit, José Luis Zapatero (qui le remplaça après sa victoire aux élections législatives de mars 2004) prit la décision de retirer les troupes espagnoles d’Irak.

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raison en usant de sa souveraineté26. 5 - Il n’y a pas de cloison hermétique entre les coalitions de guerre et celles de paix ou d’actions humanitaires. Car les mêmes Etats qui s’allient militairement pour frapper un pays, peuvent se coaliser également pour panser les blessures de ses habitants27. 6 - La ligne de démarcation s’efface parfois entre les concepts de « coalition défensive », « coalition offensive » et « coalition de bonne volonté ». Finalement, l’interférence des conflits armés28 liés à la guerre froide29 avec d’autres types de belligérances30, sous le jeu des alliances occidentales précitées, vont générer une nouvelle vision des relations internationales au sein des Nations unies, en vue de « renforcer les dispositifs de la paix » et assurer la « sécurité collective »31 autrement. D’où « le redéploiement des forces » pour « le maintien des cessez-le-feu » dans des régions enflammées. C’est dans cette perspective que des contingents militaires d’Etats membres de l’ONU vont accomplir des Opérations de Maintien de la Paix (OMP)32 ainsi que des Actions Humanitaires, chaque fois que des évènements l’exigent33. L’action de maintien de la paix sera confiée alors à des coalitions d’États, entre autres structures

26 L’alternative humanitaire sous l’optique sécuritaire paraît moins périlleuse que l’intervention militaire. Comportant moins de risques par rapport aux combats armés et moins de conséquences politiques incertaines pour les gouvernements coalisés. Par ailleurs, si les membres des Nations Unies divergent de temps en temps sur l’opportunité des interventions militaires coalisées, ils s’accordent cependant, presque toujours, sur l’utilité salvatrice des OMP, en coalition ou hors alliance. 27 Ou bien pour empêcher la réédition d’hostilités, au nom de la « sécurité collective ». 28 Il s’agit d’hostilités d’ordres géopolitique et géostratégique, interétatiques ou interethniques. 29 On peut citer certains conflits parmi les plus importants, faisant de nombreuses victimes civiles et militaires, comme la guerre de Corée (1950-1953), la guerre d’Indochine (1946-1954), la guerre du Viêt Nam (1964-1975) et la guerre d’Afghanistan (1979-1989), ont traduit l’opposition indirecte entre les Soviétiques et les Américains, par l’intermédiaire de leurs alliés respectifs. 30 Telles que les guerres d’indépendance, les guerres civiles à caractère purement ethnique, le guerres de frontières, les guerres de sécession et les guerres pour le pouvoir. 31 On relève des désaccords sur la définition de l’expression « sécurité collective ». Selon certains juristes elle « évoque tout système de mise en commun des responsabilités en matière de sécurité au sein d’une communauté donnée, la sécurité de tous assurée par tous. En relations internationales, il met en jeu des Etats, et a pour but de les protéger contre tout péril menaçant leur survie et leur intégrité, voire, dans une perspective plus large, leur prospérité et leur développement ». On impute les discordances de vues sur la notion de « sécurité collective » à l’«ambiguïté intrinsèque de sa construction ». (Voir réseau de recherche sur les opérations de paix, université de Montréal) 32 Ces opérations ont exécutées par la « Force de maintien de la paix de l’Organisation des Nations unies » (couramment appelée les Casques bleus). Elle a pour rôle le « maintien ou [le] rétablissement de la paix et de la sécurité internationale », sur ordre du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies. Signalons que « cette Force ne constitue pas une armée des Nations Unies », les casques bleus étant principalement des militaires prêtés par des pays membres de l’ONU. 33 Ainsi, des hommes d’épée s’unissent pour la paix. L’entreprise généreuse des soldats s’accorde bien avec leur capacité humanitaire, sans négliger leur métier de guerre. Et c’est à cette mission militaire première que les « coalitions de guerre » doivent naturellement leur ancienneté par rapport aux OMP et aux actions militaires humanitaires en période de guerre ou post-guerre.

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internationales34. En effet, onze ans après sa création, l’ONU se trouve confrontée à son premier grand défi à la paix internationale lors de la crise du canal de Suez, en 1956. Pour y répondre, elle réalise sa première intervention armée dans la même année, en vertu de la Résolution « union pour le maintien de la paix »35. C’est la première coalition de quelques forces armées36 sous l’égide de l’ONU, en Afrique. Quatre ans plus tard, un autre défi à la paix se déclenche au Congo, avec un mouvement de séparatisme dans la région du Katanga. L’ONU engage la deuxième OMP (en 1960) dans le jeune Continent, baptisée ONUC, pour « préserver l’intégrité territoriale du jeune Etat congolais ».37. C’est la première coalition militaire de 32 pays d’Asie, d’Afrique, d’Europe et d’Amérique constituant « une force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies »38. Le Maroc y prend part avec 3200 soldats (portant des Casques bleus), 48 mois après la création de son armée, se plaçant aux premières loges des opérations de paix onusiennes39. L’ONU devrait peut-être continuer plus fermement dans cette voie, en utilisant les OMP pour maintenir l’intégrité territoriale des Etats membres, contre tout mouvement séparatiste. En somme, depuis 1956 à ce jour, les alliances militaires évoluent dans une direction presque invariable, allant de la guerre vers la paix40. Les guerres de coalitions génèrent des alliances d’OMP dans l’attente de nouvelles ententes militaires de guerre. Lesquelles ententes engendrent à leur tour d’autres alliances de paix quand les armes se

34 En effet, l’action militaire de maintien ou de soutien à la paix peut être confiée également à une organisation internationale reconnue par l’ONU ou non affiliée au système des Nations unies. Par exemple, à plusieurs reprises, le Conseil de sécurité a donné mandat à l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique Nord (OTAN) ou à la Communauté économique des États de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEDEAO) pour assurer des OMP sur des territoires connaissant des tensions particulièrement menaçantes à la paix et à la sécurité internationales. Ou encore des opérations de maintien de la paix confiées à l’Union Africaine telle que la « Mission de l’Union Africaine en Somalie », depuis 2001. 35 Projet de résolution présenté initialement à l’Assemblée Générale par le ministre canadien des Affaires étrangères, Lester Bowles Pearson. Cette résolution (377-V) fut baptisée « résolution Acheson ». 36 Il est vrai que la première « force de maintien de la paix de l’ONU » fut envoyée en 1948, avec pour mission de surveiller la trêve de la guerre arabo-israélienne. Mais cette force n’était pas armée. Elle avait le statut d’observateur seulement. 37 L’ONUC constitue par ailleurs « la première mission a avoir posé le problème du recours à la force puisqu’elle n’est pas chargée de séparer les combattants, mais plutôt d’intervenir militairement comme une force coercitive » L’Opération des Nations unies au Congo (ONUC) est une mission de l’Organisation des Nations unies (ONU) en activité du 14 juillet 1960 au 30 juin 1964, durant la crise congolaise, dont l’objectif fut d’« aider le gouvernement congolais (Congo-Kinshasa alors appelé Congo-Léopoldville) à rétablir et à maintenir l’indépendance et l’intégrité territoriale, à maintenir l’ordre et la loi, et à mettre en place un large programme d’assistance technique ». Aussi, la particularité de cette mission onusienne réside dans le fait qu’elle fut « la seule mission dite de première génération, complexe, aux implications internes et avec un mandat assez ambigu » (caractéristiques associées aux missions de deuxième génération) 38 L’ONUC comptait 20.000 militaires et civils. 39 Depuis lors, les Forces Armées Royales marocaines participent quasi-régulièrement à des OMP et des actions humanitaires importantes dans plusieurs pays, sous l’égide de l’ONU. 40 Même si des pactes militaires en période de paix suscitent parfois des facteurs de conflits armés.

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taisent. Et ainsi de suite41. Alors, comme des braves surveillants de prévention d’incendies, les OMP 42 interviennent entre propagation d’étincelles et extinction de flammes43. Par exemple, l’intervention militaire des forces de la coalition44 contre l’Irak, en janvier 1991, après l’invasion du Koweït, est suivie de la mise sur pied, en avril 1991, d’une OMP dénommée « MONUIK45 ». Mieux encore, une alliance militaire peut arrêter une guerre qu’elle n’a pas déclenchée ou un génocide contre l’humanité. C’est le cas de l’OTAN qui, suite à son intervention contre les forces serbes en 1995, a mis fin à « la guerre en Bosnie », permettant la négociation des accords de paix de Dayton, signés à Paris le 14 décembre 1995. C’est aussi grâce à l’intervention de l’OTAN contre les forces serbes que la guerre au Kosovo prend fin, en 1999, par des accords de paix. Signalons à ce propos que le Maroc est le seul pays arabe et africain à avoir participé à ces opérations de l’OTAN dans les deux pays du Balkan46. Cependant, les membres de l’ONU ne tombent pas toujours d’accord sur l’opportunité d’une « intervention militaire », en donnant toujours feu vert à l’OTAN ou à une autre alliance. Certains gouvernements deviennent de moins en moins enclins à des

41 Pourtant, autant que dans les alliances de guerre, les troupes d’une coalition chargée d’une OMP peuvent être acculées à des batailles et s’exposer à la mort, malgré le caractère pacifique de leur mission . La 1ère OMP de l’ONU en Afrique a connu ce genre de risques avec 235 soldats décédés. En effet, l’opération ONUC a été marquée par plusieurs combats et par de nombreuses opérations civilo-militaires : 126 soldats des Nations Unies ont été tués, et 109 sont morts par suite d’accidents ou pour des raisons naturelles.. 42 Pourtant, malgré certains éléments intrinsèques qui les rassemblent en termes d’actions sociales durant leurs missions, les alliances de guerre et de paix comprennent des ressources humaines de mêmes spécialités et compétences, mais non totalement similaires dans leurs statuts. Par exemple, une coalition de guerre se constitue exclusivement de militaires (y compris ses médecins, ses infirmiers et ses assistants sociaux). Mais une coalition d’OMP peut regrouper des militaires et des civils, travaillant ensemble. On l’appelle alors une « OMP à composantes multiples ». L’ONU en a connu plusieurs depuis sa création. La GANUPT (Groupe d’assistance des Nations Unies pour la période de transition en Namibie) constituait la première OMP en la matière. La GANUPT se composait de 4.500 militaires, 1.500 policiers et 2.000 civils. Par ailleurs, la particularité de la GANUPT était le fait d’appartenir à la première génération des OMP si on considère sa date de création, elle relèvait de la deuxième génération par ses caractéristiques d’opération complexe. C’est enfin la première OMP à avoir apporté un appui au processus de démocratisation d’un nouvel État. 43 La réparation des dégâts sociaux intervient par Actions humanitaires durant les combats ou après le cessezle-feu. 44 Une coalition dirigée - opérationnellement et matériellement - par les Etats-Unis, au premier rang. 45 MONUIK (Mission d’observation des Nations unies pour l’Irak et le Koweït). Son rôle est de contrôler la zone démilitarisée le long de la frontière entre l’Irak et le Koweït, après la libération de ce dernier. 46 Les Forces Armées Royales marocaines ont pris activement part aux opérations de l’OTAN dans le Kosovo et de l’UE en Bosnie-Herzégovine. Sa contribution en Bosnie-Herzégovine aux côtés des autres Nations, avec un contingent de 135 militaires, s’est achevée le 28 octobre 2007.

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alliances de frappes armées, même quand les supports juridiques ne manquent pas47. Par exemple, la première coalition militaire internationale concernant la Deuxième guerre du Golfe comprend 32 Etats48. La deuxième coalition (qui la suit douze ans plus tard) pour la troisième guerre du Golfe réunit 48 Etats. Mais la troisième coalition internationale qui opère l’intervention militaire en Libye n’a pu réunir que 19 Etats49. L’hésitation onusienne sur l’idée d’une intervention militaire en Syrie est significative. Cette mutation positive rattrape bien la croissance des OMP. Car la prévention d’une récidive de guerre par une OMP vaut mieux qu’une intervention coercitive après belligérance. Dans ce contexte salvateur, le Maroc répond de plus en plus aux appels de l’ONU, par une déconcentration géographique internationale de ses contributions. Cette vérité est étayée par des statistiques que nous présentons ici, en bas de page50. On en conclut que la durée moyenne des participations du Maroc aux OMP et aux actions humanitaires combinées s’élève à 5 ans par pays bénéficiaire. Soit 40 ans de durée glo-

47 Généralement, les résolutions des Nations Unies prévalent en dernier ressort dans les interventions militaires qu’elles avalisent. Mais l’unanimité n’intervient pas toujours sur des conflits gravement stratégiques. Le veto du « Conseil de Sécurité » ou l’abstention d’un de ses membres est suffisant pour bloquer l’adoption d’une résolution. On le sait. Le cas de la Syrie en est aujourd’hui la meilleure démonstration. D’autant qu’une alliance militaire extra-onusienne pourrait aggraver les retombées d’un conflit, plus que le compliqueraient des différences d’interprétation. L’intervention militaire en Irak, dès 2003, le confirme. Pourtant, la Charte onusienne ne manque pas d’outils juridiques pour soutenir des interventions armées. Le Chapitre VII de la Charte en est l’armature. Mais les réalités du terrain et les rapports de force des protagonistes ont parfois raison des principes onusiens. 48 C’était la première alliance militaire de guerre qui suivit celle des « alliés » de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Elle s’était formée en 1990 après l’invasion du Kuweit par l’armée irakienne de Saddam Hussein. Baptisée « 2èmeguerre du Golfe », la « guerre du Koweït » se déroula sur une période de deux ans : 1990-1991. 49 Cette évolution quantitative triangulaire pyramidale, s’expliquerait essentiellement par deux facteurs fondamentaux : a) Le résultat positif de la deuxième guerre du Golfe qui entraîna la libération du Koweït. Conséquence qui aurait suscité le maximum d’adhésions d’Etats à la deuxième coalition militaire internationale dans la 3ème guerre du Golfe, relevant le nombre des participants de 32 à 48 pays. b) La situation dramatique que connaît encore l’Irak, aux plans sécuritaire, politique et socio-économique depuis une décennie, malgré l’élimination de Saddam Hussein et son régime. Conséquence qui aurait découragé l’adhésion à la troisième alliance militaire contre la Libye, en abaissant la courbe de 48 à 19 Etats. Pourtant, mieux que la deuxième alliance militaire de 48 pays qui déclencha une guerre juridiquement controversée, les première et deuxième coalitions reposaient clairement sur des résolutions onusiennes. 50 Au titre des opérations achevées dans le cadre de l’ONU, le Maroc a participé 7 fois entre 1960 au Congo (ONUC) et 2006 en Haïti (MINUSTAH), sur trois continents (Afrique, Asie, Amérique). Au titre des opérations achevées sous le commandement de l’OTAN dans les Balkans, il a réalisé 2 participations consécutives entre décembre 1995 et décembre 2004, en Bosnie Herzégovine, soit dans le continent européen. Au niveau des opérations en cours (onusiennes et sous l’OTAN), il continue sa participation sur deux continents, simultanément, en Europe (au Kosovo) et en Afrique (au Congo et en Côte d’Ivoire), et ce depuis 1999. A la lumière de ce qui précède, nous relevons que la période globale passée par des contingents militaires marocains dans l’ensemble des OMP s’étend sur un quart de siècle. Elle dépasse aujourd’hui 14 ans consécutifs pour les OMP en cours.

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bale pour 8 pays51. Ces résultats ne sont pas négligeables52. Nul mieux que le Secrétaire général adjoint de l’ONU aux OMP, M. Alain Le Roy, ne saurait exprimer avec force l’hommage à l’action des Forces Armées Royales marocaines : « Nous sommes, a-t-il dit, reconnaissants au Maroc pour sa contribution en troupes et son soutien au département de maintien de la paix à différents niveaux (…) à l’heure où la demande d’opérations de maintien de la paix est de plus en plus pressante »53. On comprendra mieux le sens de cette déclaration si l’on sait, que dans bien des cas, les nombres de personnes tuées dans des combats sont presque égaux aux nombres de blessés soignés, grâce à des actions médicales et sociales accomplies par des troupes militaires54. Sur ce chapitre, le Maroc réalise encore des records, parallèlement à ses participations aux OMP dont nous venons de fournir des chiffres parlants. Ses hôpitaux établis aux frontières tuniso-libyennes55 (après l’intervention militaire coalisée en Libye en 2011) ainsi qu’en Jordanie (pour apaiser le drame des réfugiés syriens à Tel zaetar en 2012), sont autant d’apports concrets.56 Le Royaume du Maroc adhère ainsi à des actions avant-gardistes57 de la « sécurité collective », privilégiant l’alliance de fraternité devant la souffrance d’autrui, à la brutalité de l’hostilité qui détruit. Des actions traduisant une vision perspicace de la paix, dont la sauvegarde ne peut être assurée que grâce à des mesures de prévoyance et de solidarité sociale : la sécurité de chacun contre

51 Dont certains ont bénéficié de 2 OMP consécutives, comme la Somalie, l’Angola et la Bosnie-Herzégovine. 52 Comparés à des participations militaires réalisées par d’autres Etats dans les opérations de maintien de la paix et les actions sociales. Comme si les Forces Armées Royales Marocaines faisaient de leur présence humanitaire sur des fronts de guerre leur vocation, et de la préservation de la paix dans le monde leur prédilection. 53 Source : l’Agence marocaine d’informations Maghreb Arabe Presse (MAP). 54 En additionnant les nombres de personnes ayant profité de ces actions humanitaires au sein de chaque contingent militaire dans les pays concernés, on trouve des dizaines de milliers de bénéficiaires. 55 Dans le cadre de leur action humanitaire, les FAR ont mis en place dans un camp de réfugiés dans la région de Ras Jdir, aux frontières tuniso-libyennes, un hôpital militaire multidisciplinaire. Encadrée par 42 médecins et 44 cadres médicaux, cette structure a effectué près de 28.000 actes médicaux au profit de plus de 18.000 réfugiés de différentes nationalités ayant fui les troubles en Libye. 56 Les actions humanitaires accomplies par les Forces Armées Royales, résident généralement dans des prestations et des actes médicaux de tous genres, la fourniture de nourriture de base, la mise en place de moyens matériels vitaux (tentes, couvertures …etc), l’assistance sociale et psychologique aux victimes des combats sans distinction de nationalité, de race ou de religion. Dans ce contexte humanitaire général légitimé par l’ONU, le Maroc franchit parfois les espaces géographiques de ses voisins, de sa région, de son Continent, de la nation arabe et de la communauté musulmane, en se portant volontaires dans des conflits lointains. 57 A ce niveau d’adhésion très avancé, le Maroc est déjà animé par les principes classiques de la sécuritaire collective, à savoir : la « souveraineté nationale », l’« auto-protection », l’« auto-interprétation de ses obligations » et la « responsabilité d’assurer le respect de ses droits ». Et loin de s’enliser dans une polémique sur des théories juridico-politiques discutables, le Royaume chérifien s’en tient essentiellement au fondement consensuel de la notion de « sécurité collective » dans les textes et le contexte de l’ONU.

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tous »58. Soit « la sécurité de tous, assurée par tous ». Là où « la responsabilité de protéger » assumée par plusieurs Etats (appréciation communautaire légitime) se substitue au « droit d’ingérence » exercé par un Etat (appréciation subjective unilatérale)59. En définitive, une alliance d’armées n’opère pas seulement des frappes militaires. Les soldats peuvent y soutenir la paix, tout en réalisant des missions sociales pour les populations civiles. Ces formes d’actions associées constituent les moyens modernes de la « sécurité collective », conformément à la Charte de l’ONU. C’est dans ces conditions que se forment, se prolongent ou disparaissent les coalitions militaires, entre la guerre et l’humanitaire à travers le pont de la paix. Sources bibliographiques et references - Zorgbibe Charles, « Les alliances dans le système mondial », PUF, Paris, 1983 - Sur Serge, « La sécurité collective : une problématique », publication du Sénat français sur les travaux du colloque au Sénat, Paris, 6 juin 2005 (Bibliothèque du Sénat). - Parmentier Guillaume, « Les Etats-Unis et l’OTAN : de l’alliance à la coalition », Annuaire français de relations internationales, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005. - Zorgbibe Charles, « Alliances et sécurité collective », colloque : l’OTAN dans le système international de sécurité, Académie de la paix, Monaco, 13-15 mars 1997. - Boutros Boutros-Ghali, « contribution à une théorie générale des alliances », A. Padone, Paris, 1963. - Alexandra de Hoop Sheffer, « Le multilatéralisme. Evolutions et tendances », La Découverte, Paris, 2007. - Divers ouvrages (classiques et récents) et plusieurs publications scientifiques portant sur les alliances et les coalitions militaires, sur les interventions armées multinationales du XXe et début du XXe siècle ainsi que sur les guerres de coalitions de l’après guerre froide. Parmi les auteurs : Raymond Cartier et Yves Durand (sur l’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale) - Divers documents universitaires et articles de revues spécialisées portant sur l’Histoire militaire contemporaine. 58 Dans cette optique, la paix est vue comme bien plus qu’un simple état d’absence de guerre, mais comme « une valeur à protéger et à promouvoir, voire comme un droit à assurer ». Que sa concrétisation se fasse par opération humanitaire en mouvement solitaire ou par maintien de la paix en alliance militaire. La première panse les blessures de batailles dans l’action et le second sauvegarde la réconciliation après les batailles. Mais c’est aussi dans cette logique de paix que le Maroc adhère aux implications contemporaines de la « sécurité collective » conformément à la légalité internationale. La participation du Maroc aux OMP se réalise conformément à trois principes fondamentaux : les missions autorisées de l’ONU, le respect de l’intégrité territoriale des Etats et leur souveraineté, et le consentement des pays concernés. 59 C’est en privilégiant le premier concept (appréciation communautaire légitime) que le Maroc favorise « l’alliance pour la mise en œuvre, la stabilisation ou le maintien de la paix avec l’action humanitaire » par rapport à la participation armée directe à une « coalition de frappe militaire ». La prévention de futurs conflits armés par des OMP après des guerres achevées, vaudrait peut-être mieux que des interventions militaires enclenchant ou aggravant des combats armés. Ces notions constituent les principes fondamentaux de la « sécurité collective » sur lesquels toute forme de coalition ou d’alliance militaire devrait se former La plupart des juristes, politologues et sociologues s’accordent sur ces principes fondamentaux, en dépit des flottements et des dissensions que l’on remarque sur la définition de la « sécurité collective ».

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Synthetic historical review of the technical and political evolution of the Italian intelligence Services since the beginning of the Kingdom of Italy to the last reforms in 2007 and 2012 Maria Gabriella PASQUALINI

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he history of ‘spying’ – a simplistic and misleading term -, both the military one and the domestic one with the aim to maintain the stability of Institutions, doesn’t consist only in particularly brilliant undercover operations. It is also this, but it is above all a daily work, almost ad horas, of collecting, coordinating and analyzing information; a continuous and constant commitment, which cannot accept Sundays or holidays’ interruptions, which must be timely and updated with the use of every source, open or classified: even simple news published in a newspaper or by other means of communication can be a piece, or the missing piece. Not for nothing even in the more ‘sensitive’ conflicts, it is often planned the presence of embedded journalists, recognizing the right to information, but with a necessary attention to what can be published, which could indicate and has indicated, especially in the past, enemies’ intentions and positions. In a synthetic historical review it has to be remembered that, well before the constitution of the Kingdom of Italy, there were many ‘secret services’ in the preunification States, when the word intelligence had not yet entered into use, and above all, that from immemorial time information has been an integral part of every clan or state structure. You cannot ever forget Sun Tzu who in 500 B. C. in his Art of War wrote … there are secret agents of five kinds: local agents, agents, agents of counterintelligence, killing agents and security agents… to arrive at nearer times recalling the Tudors, with their efficient very branched informational services, as well as Louis XIV who had very articulated bodies for the ‘large-scale spying’ and ‘micro observation’ on the ground. The Sun King created the Police of Paris, a domestic service, which availed itself of agents, trustees and… even the very first ‘collaborators of justice’. Napoleon was not less so: he organized a widespread military information service and a domestic one, having in this way six distinct institutions for this purpose. An historical curiosity for Italy: when did the common expression ‘secret service’ begin to be used in an institutional way in Italian unitarian and pre-unitarian legal orders? In April 1855 the Royal Command of the General Staff of the Sardinian Army issued, publishing it on the official Military Newspaper,1 a Short Instruction about the Service of the Officials of the Royal Command of the General Staff in wartime edited by the 1 Instruction no. 21 of April 1855, in Military Newspaper, i.e. Official Collection of laws, regulations and land and sea regulations, [GM] published by the Ministry of War, year 1855, Volume One, Turin, Giuseppe Fodratti’s Typography and Lithographic Laboratory, p.775 -793.

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Royal Command of the General Staff and approved by the Ministry of War, widely known as ‘La Marmora Instruction’: this Instruction will produce its effects for many years to come, at least until the First World War. The Instruction divided the War Service into five parts and the Sixth one was the secret service: probably from here it comes the official use to call the military information activity… ‘secret service’. All things considered, everybody really liked the aura of ‘secrecy’ as it gave a sense of prominence both in saying and whispering even not particularly sensible military information. Little, however, remained definitely ‘secret’ ... The service for special missions and the secret service, in accordance with the above mentioned Instruction, were those services starting, in a more organized way than in the past, the collection of military information in the Sardinian Army, just during the Eastern Campaign organization, i.e. the Crimean war, first official presence of the Piedmont army in an international field. Since this war, an Office responsible for military information was always present in the Royal Command of the General Staff, even if it was never officially added to the organization charts or in service orders until August 23, 1906, when the Office came out definitively from clandestinity. 2 The Sixth Chapter about the Secret Service of the ‘La Marmora Instruction’, perhaps the most interesting for our synthetic historical path, indicated among other things: the secret missions; the exits [i.e. , inspections]; the spies’ service to explore the enemy’s means and strength, and the political condition of foreign provinces; the rules for preliminary negotiations, armistices, conventions with the enemy; the examination of prisoners and enemy deserters, and the exchange of prisoners ... a true vade-mecum of the military information and the ‘spies’ service that had to be channeled and provided with a series of ‘rules’ to reach effective results. These ones, although revised and updated according to time needs, were at the basis of informative collection until the end of the Second World War. In the new organization of the Italian Army (not yet Royal Army),3 no Information Office was put into as such in an official chart, nevertheless it existed and took inspiration from the ‘La Marmora Instruction’: this is precisely clear reading the numerous documents from the 1866 archives regarding the organization of military information in that period. As regards the domestic security, with the advent of the Kingdom of Italy, Cavour, whose father had been the chief of the Piedmont police, knew very well the art of collecting intelligence, in the dual sense of collecting news or persuading, by means of evident or less evident special envoys (among them the famous glamorous Countess of Castiglione, Virginia Oldoini), foreign politicians (like Napoleon III) to side with the Kingdom of Piedmont. Count Cavour was a member of the High Statistics Commission (word that repeatedly occurs in the informative military structure before and between the two world wars, to conceal centers of counter-intelligence: Sections or Centers of 2 AUSSME, L3, b.301, Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army, Agenda of August, 23, 1906. 3 See Note no. 76, May 4, 1861, signed by Manfredo Fanti, Minister of War.

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Statistics), established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Turin, on March 28, 1836. In the Kingdom of Italy, after unity, the statesman treasured his experience.4 In 1861 the Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom had an Office of High Political Surveillance and a Directorate-General of Public Security, which became in 1879 Direction of the Public Security Services. In 1887 the Public Security Direction was however reconstituted with a Prefect as its Chief. In the last two decades of the Nineteenth Century, the Kingdom of Italy gained solidity and institutional infrastructures: even so the intelligence Services began an evolution that in the more modern sense, for the military ones will be effective only in 1925, as well as for the civilian ones, especially inclined to maintaining the Fascist regime security and stability. The majority of published studies indicates the year 1900 as the one when Italian military intelligence officially started but it is not so. The Information Office of the Army, as formally established Office, already existed in 1897, when Colonel de Chaurand de Saint Eustache was called to manage it, but you cannot say that the military intelligence did not exist prior to that date: the Section or Information Office existed well before 1897, it received reports directly or in copy and after reading them, used to put its round green inked stamp on the document testifying its actual existence. There is an historical explanation to this anomaly in the organization charts: the Service Rules had to be public and communicated to friendly states asking for them and then ‘fatally’ friends and enemies knew the real duties of the various officers assigned to the Command of the Royal Army: this particular detailed piece of information could have been harmful for those going on a mission abroad…. responsible for informative missions or simply to attend ceremonies or maneuvers to which the Royal Command had been invited. Not mentioning their particular assignment, High Commands believed that these tasks could escape to a tight control by foreign military organizations … This was the documented reason of the disappearance from 1870 to 1906 of the Office ‘I’ instead existing, working hard and slowly organizing itself. The Office finally came out from clandestinity with the Agenda no. 37 of August 23, 1906, staffed only with a superior officer, a lieutenant and a clerk. Few employees and limited financial resources. As regards the metropolitan territory, it is interesting to remember that the counterintelligence was not only played by the Royal Carabinieri but also by the Finance Police, sending the collected information to the General Staff of the Army, and by the Commissari (Police Inspectors) of Public Security, especially those on duty at the border crossings or in the territories near by. At that time it had not yet been established a directive body for military information, because the Office was always considered a Section or even an Office but always as a part of an upper structure and not a sector with its own orientation and management autonomy. 4 The term ‘Commission of Statistics’ was later also used in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies in 1851. Efficient and ‘watchful’ Services, those of the Bourbons, but not of a great usefulness to the dynasty, because they were interested ‘blindly’ in the safeguard of the Crown not understanding the political evolution of the kingdom face to the new nationalistic spirit blowing all over the Italian Peninsula.

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Simultaneously during the period 1900-1906 also the Royal Navy began to give greater emphasis to its informative activity5 organizing an Information Office that in 19066 which became a Department, the first one of the Office of the General Staff, headed by a Captain. It started to be very active, particularly in Dardanelles and supplied the Information Office of the Command of the General Staff in a cooperative atmosphere with interesting maps. In 1907 the Office of the General Staff of the Navy was enlarged and modified7 and the Information Department was given greater importance becoming the 4th Department of the General Staff of the Navy, with a very articulated structure, in five Sections and a Secretariat: very interesting, the Fifth one that, in addition to coordinating the military Police in the various military harbours and arsenals, gathered and communicated in due form the military information coming from the affected areas; it corresponded with and managed informers keeping in order also the Archive of Secret Information. In comparison with the already well structured organizations such as the British Military Operations (MO3, precursor of MI6), the Austrian Evidenz Bureau, the German Nachrichtendienst Abteilung III B, and the French Deuxième Bureau, considering only Europe, in that period the Italian military information system was almost at the very beginning; especially it seemed to lack good analytical skills, essential for a true ‘intelligence’, i.e. understanding of gathered news, in a global way. On the eve of the First World War, the intelligence organization improved. In April 1915 it was sought a more rational division of work, within the framework of the Supreme Command with a complete re-organization of the Office ‘I’ that on May 24, 1915, became Information Office of the Supreme Command, headed by the Deputy Chief and Chief of General Staff. During the war necessary services of censorship were instituted, broad-spectrum, another great source for counter-intelligence. The general organization of the informative activity branched out throughout the Army but it did not manage to avoid the defeat at Caporetto, despite a series internal bureaucratic re-shaping in the Service seeking a better performance. In the same period, the Ministry of Interior had a Reserved Office (then Political and Reserved Affairs Office), within the Directorate-General of the Public Security, which was also involved in the general informative activity, certainly not considered a priority, with skills mainly related to domestic security. For the collaboration with the Information Office of the Supreme Command, on September 12, 1913 it was established the Central Bureau of Investigation (in Italian Ufficio Centrale d’Investigazione – UCI) subordinated to the P.S. Directorate-General. During the conflict UCI became the Special Office of Criminal Investigation (in Italian Ufficio Speciale d’Investigazioni – USI) ) which survived until 1921 to be then reabsorbed in Section I of the General and Reserved Affairs Division, which was responsible for public order (Criminal Political Central Records Office included), while the Second one controlled the foreigners. On February 20, 1920 the Director General of the Public 5 R.D. 3.4.1900, no. 76. 6 R.D. 7.15.1906, no. 402. 7 D.M. 2.10.1907 and D.M. 4.5.1907.

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Security informed the President of the Council of Ministers, that it had been established at his Directorate-General an Information Office aiming at the collection of information relating to the order and the public way of thinking and it had direct dealings with the P.S. Director General; the new Office had its own archive and protocol. In 1923 a Special Reserved Office (in Italian Ufficio Speciale Riservato USR) was established with limited powers having a very difficult life as it did not manage to do much also because of the very reduced funds allotted. In the period of the WW I post-war reconstruction, discussions intensified about the organization abroad and the relevant projects of domestic reorganization of the informative sector, which led inevitably also to reconsider that kind of activity within the country, remembering that in addition to the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency of the Council also had an efficient intelligence service. Many proposals were put forward, especially as regards the activities abroad: among them some tried, without success, to steal even the collection of military intelligence to the High Commands of the Armed Forces. The idea that an intelligence coordination was strictly necessary for a proper evaluation and analysis was implemented and integrated in the jurisdiction of the new Service established in 1925, the Military Information Service (in Italian Servizio Informazioni Militare – SIM) but this aim was not reached even due to the lack of clarity in the constitutive decrees. SIM actually remained in force until the outbreak of WW II, as the only informative corps of the Army. Many were the historical reasons for the failure of the new Service as coordinator of the military intelligence not least the strong reluctance of the Informative Service of the Italian Navy (in Italian Servizio Informazioni Segreto - SIS) and Aviation (in Italian Servizio Informazioni Aeronautica - SIA, which was established after the foundation of “The Blue Army”, as in Italy the Royal Air Force was sometimes called) to be coordinated by a body always considered only just a part of the Army. During the conflict SIM managed to coordinate only the counterintelligence and even so with much difficulty. The synthesis requested in this historical note does not allow to analyze all the long and complex regulating path of SIM from the its constitution to the its dissolution as a result of the armistice (September 8, 1943) and the re-establishment of it a few days later, in Brindisi, by the legitimate Badoglio’s Government; interesting path also for the ability of its members who collaborated, together with the other Services, with the Anglo Americans, who had to acknowledge their professional ability after an initial period of strong distrust towards the Italians. In the same year of SIM establishment (1925) it was also reorganized the sector of Public Security with a law on the matter. Fascism strengthened during that period its other secret services: OVRA, the most known, but it was not the only one. In 1927 there were major changes in the Directorate-General of Public Security, reorganized in various Divisions the most important of which was the Political Police Division, known as the dangerous Polpol; the General and Reserved Affairs Division was articulated in three sections. The Special Reserved Office had in fact no more reason to exist, as Arturo Bocchini thought, when he became the Police Chief in 1926.

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The idea of creating a Police Force was increasing in power and as a consequence it was instituted in 1927: a special Police Inspectorate, with the main purpose of fighting the communist activity and not only. In December 1930 this office was given the name of OVRA (or Special Inspectorate of Public Security), equipped with almost unlimited funds and surely over staffed. Always in the same period, to demonstrate a general revision of the whole informative apparatus in the various bodies of the State, with a Royal Decree-law of January 10, 1929, no. 27, 8 the Stenographic Service of the Presidency of the Council of Ministers was abolished and it was set up a ‘special reserved Service’, the institutional tasks of which, however were not clearly defined in the decree. It was however dissolved in 1946, June 28. It has not to be forgotten that in 1933 also the Presidency of the Council had reorganized its informative Service, present since 1861, officially constituting a Press Office directed by Galeazzo Ciano. The Press Office expanded its activities up to become in 1937 the Ministry of Popular Culture.9 One more interesting note: within the Ministry of Interior, in 1936, a DirectorateGeneral of Statistical Services was established, a true Information Service concerning national and international issues, such as the so-called ‘Statistical Sections’ of SIM located in many cities of Italy. In 1944, in the territory no longer under the fascist yoke, the Office of the Political Police was abolished and the General and Reserved Affairs Division was split up in two: the Reserved Affairs became the Special Information Service (SIS – not to be mislead with the Information Service of the Navy). After April 25, 1945, the reconstruction of the Italian State began; Italy made the ‘Atlantic choice’ and in 1949 it finally succeeded in launching the creation of a true joint Service, SIFAR(Servizio Informazioni Forze Armate); after it became Defense Information Service (in Italian Servizio Informazioni Difesa, SID). The Ministry of Interior re-established in 1946 the Directorate-General of Public Security and, two years after, it restored the General and Reserved Affairs Division that in 1965 became part of the Security Police Directorate-General. In the following years many changes were implemented as a result of the historical internal changes and event of the Republic. The turmoil in the Italian society, more than twenty years after the end of the war, imposed to the Government to review the organization of this particular sector still suffering from an obsolete post-war mentality. In fact, the two separate structures, military and civilian ones, had different dependencies; their powers had not been sufficiently delineated giving rise to many overlaps of aims and operational activities. There was no institution responsible for the coordination with a clear waste of human and financial resources for a sector requiring instead an optimization, in order to obtain those results necessary to maintain stability and security of a young but well firm democracy. 8 Converted on 24 June in L. no. 1165 published in O.J. July 19, 1929, no. 167. As a matter of fact , the Stenographic Service was a service of the Ministry of Interior depending ever since 1925 on the Presidency of the Council, i.e. the Head of the Government. 9 The Press Office, then Under-secretariat under the direct responsibility of the President of the Council was raised to the ministerial dignity with the Royal Decree no. 1009 of June, 24 1935; the R. D. no. 752 of May 27, 1937 ordered the new name.

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The VII legislature was able to enact with a large political consensus, and only one “reading” and discussion in the two branches of Parliament, the first reform in the modern sense of the Information Services for Security, the Law no.801 of October 24, 1977, thirty years later followed by the Law no.124 of 2007, with new principles derived from the experience of the previous one, and the more recent Law 133 of August 7, 2012, considered only as an ‘important maintenance work’. Which were the main important changes in 1977? For the first time in the Italian history of intelligence the entire responsibility of the sector was given to the President of the Council of Ministers who had to outline the policy directives for intelligence; the Ministers of Defense and Interior had to implement them on Prime Minister’s instructions. A Ministers Committee was set up to help in the implementation, but above all the novelty was a Parliament Committee (Chamber of Deputies and Senate), composed by ten representatives of the governing political parties and the opposition ones, for a strict control (mainly financial) of Intelligence Services: a new transparency both financial always (…in theory) and operative when possible. In 2007 the most important change is that the Prime Minister is given full responsibility of the sector, direction and implementation, not dividing it with other Ministers, not even Defense or Interior. Financial Ministers and Foreign Affairs one became permanent members of the Ministers’ Committee which can have other not permanent members if interested in the questions at stake. The Parliament Committee is given more power to control the Services and the Prime Minister has to report to this Committee and to Parliament what has been done and is to be, every six months. It must be said that since 2007 the Reports to the Parliament are very well organized and very interesting above all concerning which has been the intelligence policy of the State and the way it has been implemented.10 Italian Armed Forces now have some intelligence sectors (as all the other NATO Forces have) within the General Chief of Staff High Command and in the Army, Navy, Aviation, Carabinieri and Guardia di Finanza, mainly concerned with operational intelligence above all for peace-keeping missions abroad. Intelligence is now ‘global’, not only military as it was considered in the past: it does not concern only the military information or the obsolete though useful intelligence about ‘opinions and morals of the people’ but also and above the effects of the economic crisis and social unrest, the faults in banking and financial circuits, the financing of terrorism, the cybernetic threats and of course it has to produce the analysis of the geostrategic regions nearer Italy, which means the southern shore of the Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, the current upheavals in that area. Intelligence has had a deep conceptual, methodological and operational evolution and its structure is absolutely necessary, with the due transparency, precisely in order to safeguard the stability of the democratic institutions of the State, under the control of Parliament, expression of the ‘citizens’ sovereign will. 10 See for example the interesting and explanatory last Report to the Parliament concerning the information policy for Security 2012, in www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it.

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NATO’s deployable forces: The history of the Allied Mobile Force and the UK Mobile Force as historical blueprints for the NATO Response Force today Bernd Lemke

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he solidarity between all members of NATO constitutes a core principle which significantly contributed to the end of the Cold War and was and still is essential for the existence of the Alliance: the common standing of all the allies for the purpose of deterrence and defense against manifest dangers and threats. This refers not only to joint operations by their armed forces, but especially to joint action and the show of strength in matters of policy, military policy, planning and organization in the broadest sense. The following text will focus on this solidarity as manifested by deployable forces in the Cold War. The main objects will be the Allied Mobile Force AMF which existed between 1961 and 2003 and a temporary sister of that body, the UK Mobile Force UKMF, which existed between 1968 and 1976. First there will a short look on the general history of the AMF and the UKMF in the Cold War from its beginning. Then the role of the AMF in the main exercises of NATO for war preparation, the WINTEX and HILEX-series, will be scrutinized. In this course, the controversies in the Alliance after the Americans tried to include the Arabian region into war planning will be looked on. Finally, the article concentrates the only live mission of the AMF in southern Turkey in 1991 from a German Perspective and the last years of the unit until the creation of its successor. The importance of Alliance solidarity as a means of defense – and not only military defense – is as old as NATO itself. From the very beginning, NATO’s means and ends were never merely confined to military build-up, preparations and planning for emergencies. Cohesion between all the partners was the essential basis for deterrence, the decisive instrument of the Alliance for preventing a war and containing Communist aggression in Europe and ultimately around the world. To illustrate the core principles, its realization and its problems, the focus of the following pages will be on one of its most visible manifestations: the Allied Mobile Force. The AMF, one of NATO’s longest-standing units, is a very good example to demonstrate how coherence within the Alliance and its capability to respond to aggression have developed from 1960 until today. The Allied Mobile Force (AMF) was designed and set up in response to the general strategic development in the late 1950s. Its beginnings can be traced back to the major strategic transition before 1990, the change from Massive Retaliation to Flexible Response. This was based on the growing realization that the Alliance could not respond to local provocations or attempts by the Eastern bloc with purely nuclear means as there was always the danger of nuclear escalation. The Russians were catching up with the US

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in the nuclear arms race. As an almost logical consequence, NATO focused increasingly on conventional defense and, subsequently, the situation on the flanks. The situation there had been precarious for political and military reasons right from the beginning of the Cold War. In the north, this was especially true for Norway and Denmark, which on the one hand were able to raise only a limited number of forces and on the other did not want to be bound too much by NATO militarily. The most dangerous areas of this flank were Northern Norway and Zealand in the BALTAP-area. The situation in the south or southeast was even more threatening since the two main allies in this region, Turkey and Greece, were relatively weak in military terms and had trouble with each other. The strategic trouble spots in this region were the northern border in Thrace with the extremely important Bosphorus at its back, Turkey’s southern border and Eastern Anatolia. Finally, there were concerns regarding the northeastern border of Italy (near Istria), which would have been under threat if a conflict had arisen over Yugoslavia. NATO headquarters did not merely see the direct military aspects as the main danger, but rather the risk of a weakening of Alliance solidarity, which had not always been stable due to the continued conflicts of political and military interests in general. The deterrence of the enemy and the Alliance’s efforts to strengthen itself were two sides of the same coin. As the major tool for defence the NATO Military Committee considered influencing the enemy rationally and psychologically by an effective crisis management in an emergency. It was to be made clear to the Warsaw Pact that the risks of aggression of any kind would by far outweigh the benefits. The AMF was considered as one of the most important tools for precisely these purposes. Its main mission was to act as a front-line deterrence, i.e. the units assigned to the AMF, mostly elite units, had to be able to move to their position on one of the regions of the flank quickly, to act ostentatious and communicate with the public. It was especially important that the whole world realized that the force was multinational and made up of units from powerful allies that counted not to the flank states (in particular the USA, the UK and the Federal Republic of Germany). Their core mission was, so to say, “showing the flag”. Albeit in peacetime, the AMF was loudly and clearly conveyed to the public as a flexible elite force. It was made clear to the Eastern bloc that if the AMF was deployed, it was a kind of last warning. The AMF was to a certain degree the most distinct military manifestation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. A direct military attack on one of its battalions would have been considered an attack against NATO and each of its single members. The AMF consisted of a total of six battalions, which were assigned and equipped according to the preparedness of the member states. The headquarter of the Allied Mobile Force Land (AMF (L) was located initially in Seckenheim/Palatinate and later collocated with the headquarters of the 7th US Army in Heidelberg. The air support forces consisted of 6 squadrons of fighter bombers, but these did not have any permanent

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headquarters. In the event of an emergency, the squadrons would not have been assigned to the AMF, but to the respective Allied Tactical Air Force (ATAF). This organizational rationale was in accordance with the tactical and organizational principles of the NATO air forces. Three battalions and three squadrons were assigned to each flank (north or south). The forces available were therefore rather limited. Nevertheless, the amount of effort for transport and logistic support proved to be so immense that sophisticated flight plans had to be set up. In the event of an emergency, large volumes of equipment and soldiers had to be delivered. Planners had projected a dynamic and precise schedule of continuous slots of different nations via different multiple air routes. Organizing and executing the whole enterprise proved to be very expensive and extremely complicated. It provides a good blueprint for the global operations of today. NATO defined the AMF as a pioneer and elite force in the Flexible Response set-up. The Force hat not only to act as the foremost manifestation of deterrence in the event of an emergency, but also serve as a spearhead for the new strategy. Initially, it had even been seen as providing a guideline for the development of all the Alliance’s forces. The objective was to achieve extensive flexibility among as many NATO combat units as possible, using the AMF as a model. Along these lines, additional deployment forces were built up nationally. One good example is the UK Mobile Force. The UK Mobile Force was created in 1968 to give SACEUR an instrument to react in endangered areas in Europe and, if possible, to have a strategic reserve. Its basic principles were developed quite according to the mission profile of the AMF. Airportable troops should be ready at short notice and deployed to crisis regions. The UK Mobile Force consisted mainly of the 3rd Division, contained 3 brigades and was supported by the Royal Air Force’s 38 Group. Included was a Parachute Brigade. Different to the AMF was the fact that the UK Mobile Force was not only earmarked to the flanks, but also to reinforce the Central Front in case of necessity. The mission plans consisted of three Priorities: Zealand in Denmark, the Central Front and North East Italy, the so-called Gorizia-Gap. Interestingly, the UK Mobile Force has a pre-history. Its main body, the 3rd Division, possesses a very distinctive tradition with a long combat history all over the world since the beginning of the 19th century, including colonial wars. After 1945, the Division carried out global missions and was then redefinded as national strategic reserve. Its task was to be a kind of global “Fire Brigade” acting from Britain all over the world when necessary. The creation of the UK Mobile Force of 1968 brought a new readjustment. According to the military retreat from the regions East of Aden global missions were more or less ruled out for the 3rd Division. Instead deployment in Europe as part of NATO defence became Priority 1. Actually, however, a lot of units of the UKMF were afterwards sent to Northern Ireland when the situation exploded there in 1969. But planning and training for Europe went on. Britain moved even closer to Europe when the next round of financial axes was

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applied in 1975. The UKMF was disbanded afterwards and 3rd Division, again, got a new role. It became a tank division in Germany as part of the BAOR. After 1990 one more readjustment was executed. The Division was redesigned as a deployable force and conducted missions in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. In a way, the UKMF was an indicator of British defence priorities. For NATO, the UK Mobile Force – as the AMF - are excellent historical examples for NATO’s deployable forces. Moreover, they form a diachronic link from the Cold War over the turn from 1990 until now, thereby being direct forerunners of the NATO Response Force. The position of the Allied Mobile Force in the overall structure of NATO’s strategy in the Cold War and their importance in the historical context become particularly clear when we look at the Wintex and HILEX exercises. In addition to the live plans in the GDPs, these command post exercises were the most important instruments of the Alliance for preparing for possible crises and wars. They also provide a good overview of the Alliance’s perception of the enemy and are excellent historical landmarks. Beginning with Wintex 71, the Wintex exercises were the continuation of the FALLEX series of the 1960s. Their main purpose was to try out military chains of command and coordination procedures. The planners worked on the assumption that, in a direct confrontation, the Warsaw Pact would try to achieve supremacy by exerting economic, political and military pressure. Then the enemy would start deploying massive forces in rapid succession on all the fronts and, maybe, commencing direct aggression. In order to prevent such a scenario from getting out of hand in an emergency, NATO established a whole range of deterrence and stabilization tools. Crisis management procedures were to be applied to calm down the situation right from the start and minimize tension. The AMF was an extremely important tool for the lower escalation scenarios. For this purpose, NATO developed special Rules of Engagement so that appropriate action could be taken in each situation. Its deployment in the real trouble spots, northern Norway, Denmark, Istria, northern Greece or the southern and eastern borders of Turkey, was meant to be a kind of clear warning. The focus remained on preserving the territorial integrity and political and military coherence of NATO in Europe even under extreme pressure. This scenario underwent noticeable extensions during the very first Wintex exercise, an option that later became a new priority and was to create considerable potential for conflict within the Alliance. Primarily on the initiative of the United States, the decisive trigger for simulated confrontation in Wintex 71 was not based on an aggravation of the situation in Europe, but on a crisis in the Middle East. The background for this strategic extension was the result of the events the Six-Days War of 1967. One of the consequences was that the Soviet Union apparently saw this as an opportunity to start massive political and military commitment. At the same time, the Americans recognized the weakness of NATO’s whole southern flank. A conflict in Palestine, causing destabilization in the entire region, would have threatened Turkey

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and Greece and thus NATO as a whole. Syria and Iraq also figured highly as possible aggressors. Despite all these American fears the NATO partners in the Central Region didn’t really appreciate this idea of a crisis scenario. What followed, were hard discussions. Not least German planners believed that possible aggressions on the part of the Warsaw Pact in Europe were already enough to deal with and that the focus should be on them. They were, however, not able to assert their views at the time, for the NATO Military Committee approved the Middle East scenario in June 1969. But the discussions went on. This new development did not have positive connotations for the strategic position of the AMF since its importance declined as a consequence of such extensions and discussions. Although there many hopes in connection with the AMF, it played a quite limited role in Wintex 71. The AMF acquired more importance in NATO’s second series of major exercises – the HILEX series which started in 1968, deliberately designed to contrast with the Wintex series. The main focus was to single out the most flexible adaptation to crisis situations, in particular at political levels, thereby involving the appropriate civilian decision-makers in a prominent way. The exercise plans concentrated, to a much greater degree than the Wintex exercises, on achieving political de-escalation without the use of nuclear weapons. The practical procedures for crisis management were then exercised in the 1970s. In the respective scenarios the AMF came into play as a crucial element, thereby ultimately highlighting its raison d’être. On this basis, the planning and the exercises went on. The UK Mobile Force became integrated as well, here especially in connection with a massive employment in the BALTAP area, including the use of Landing Ships Logistic. The main practical business of the AMF were the field exercises, especially the so-called Express series. Until 1990 about 100 Exercises in all contingency areas were helt. Like it or not – the Oriental region still kept on going and influencing NATO as well. This led to quite unforeseen and somewhat grave events. HILEX 9 in 1980 became, and this is not yet really appreciated today, a kind of watershed in the strategic development of NATO and the history of its exercises. The exercise coincided almost exactly with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and was therefore cancelled as a precautionary step to avoid escalation. There were considerable fears within NATO that the Soviet Union might be provoked if it became known to the public that the Alliance was holding a highlevel crisis exercise while Soviet units were invading Afghanistan. The major strategic background here was that the United States were more and more drawn into the conflicts in this region. Washington saw the events at the Hindu Kush and the events in the US embassy in Tehran at the end of 1979 as a massive threat to its interests in the Gulf and beyond. The most important manifestation in this respect was the Carter doctrine, which demanded unconditional resistance against any aggression by the Eastern bloc in the Gulf. As a consequence, the Americans insisted that this region was included also in the NATO plans in one way or another. The main document for NATO was the “South West Asia Impact Study” which was published to all NATO

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partners in June 1980. With these documents the strategic perspectives of the Alliance had expanded once and for all – despite the criticism of the Central Europeans. All this was fully implemented in HILEX 10 of 1982. The exercise concept was almost identical with HILEX 9, but at the crucial points included a new key element; the deployment of the Rapid Defense Force (RDF), which later became the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), the predecessor of today’s US Central Command. This led to further discussions. The Europeans assumed, not without good reason, that the primary interests and sensibilities of the Americans had shifted at least in part to the Gulf region and were afraid the US reinforcements for Europe would be affected. Especially the fact that the deployment of the RDF demanded a considerable share of the US airlift capacities came on agenda. Airlift resources were -and still are!- scarce and expensive. It was hardly possible to support two major global theatres at the same time with maximum effort. Furthermore, the RDF units comprised highly mobile and highly specialized elite units (marines, mechanized and airborne units). The question of the major RDF units and the problems of the Persian Gulf and the Middle East continued to be controversial until the end of the Cold War. Fortunately, despite the War between Iran and Iraq until 1988, the situation in the Middle East remained more or less stable, so that the strategic plans weren’t put to the test. Even during the great changes of 1989/90, there was still considerable tension with regard to these two elements, i.e. the Eurocentric perspective and the expanded outlook of the Americans with a view to the Middle East and even global scenarios. The issue got a new thrust by the 2nd Gulf War 1991, which almost coincided with German reunification. The AMF acquired a prominent role there. It is one of the last paradoxes of the Cold War era that the first “live” operation of the AMF took place in 1991, that is to say, after the end of the East-West conflict. When the situation in the Gulf region got increasingly difficult after the occupation of Kuwait, Turkey felt threatened by Iraq and called for NATO solidarity. The following mission presents a very good example for the conditions and problems which multilateral task forces, in particular those of NATO, have to face when deployed. In December 1990, Turkey submitted an urgent request via the NATO chain of command, i.e. via AFSOUTH. The supreme decision-making body for these questions, the Defence Planning Committee, started to discuss and decide on the request. As in many previous cases, there was no agreement or consensus at first. National interests and prerogatives had to be weighed up and reconciled with the interests of the Alliance. In this case, the position of Germany in particular was at the center of the controversies. Turkey had hoped to immediately receive a positive response, and maybe even invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. In the course of events, Ankara gave some information to the press and thereby caused considerable irritation in Bonn. Chancellor Kohl was extremely angered because he hadn’t been informed beforehand by the Turkish government about their plans for requesting the AMF. Accordingly, there was little harmony in the debate within the DPC. To the disappointment of the Turks, the German representative strictly refused to make final

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decisions without further consultations. This left Bonn increasingly isolated. Especially the Americans and the British, who were just deploying huge numbers of troops to the Gulf region, wanted to get all the NATO partners someway on board at least nominally. The British representative therefore also accused Germany of being obstructive. Basically, subsequent debates focused on the specific mission that would be assigned to the AMF. As in similar cases in the previous decades, there was a tough struggle over wordings. The Turks, British and Americans worked towards defining the mission of the AMF as generously as possible. Washington and London probably secretly expected that the direct involvement of NATO would divert some of Baghdad’s attention to the north. Maybe there were even some hopes that NATO would intervene militarily. Anyway, none of these hopes were able to be fulfilled since Germany’s restrictive position left absolutely no margin for interpretation of the AMF-mission. It was clear from the very beginning that only the air component of the AMF would be deployed. The three ground battalions remained at their home bases. In addition, Bonn also insisted on the wording for the rules of engagement being clear and exactly limited. The squadrons had to carry out a purely demonstrative mission and were explicitly not included in the active air defense of the 6th ATAF. Training flights had to take place exclusively north of a 40 km zone along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Furthermore, the AMF units were fundamentally given permission to fire only in self-defense. The British had hoped to leave a loophole for mutual assistance to be provided between Turkish combat aircraft and the AMF squadrons for self-defence in case of attack by the Iraqi Air Force. The Germans prevented this as well. After some time, other NATO partners started to support Bonn. The Germans acted primarily for political reasons. It must not be forgotten that German reunification had only just been achieved and that the concerns of the Eastern European states had to be taken into consideration. And the Soviet Army was still in Germany until 1994. A real taste of danger was supplied on 13th January 1991 when the Russian Army attacked civilian protesters in Lithuania with Infantry and even tanks. The result of this Bloody Sunday in Vilnius were hundreds of injured and dead. Furthermore, the historical burdens were still too much at the fore. Despite Germany’s caution in all these questions domestic turmoil was not long in coming. As the Gulf War drew nearer, the number of conscientious objecters soared, and there were even some in the task forces earmarked in southern Turkey. More than 50 members of the Anti-Air Missile Wing 36 refused to do military service under the German conscription law. The AMF Air was less affected by this, but was still automatically in the focus. Pilots of the German AMF contingent spoke very pensively about the operation in public. The Spiegel magazine wrote repeatedly and with relish that “fear” was the prevalent feeling among the German personnel - and in German living rooms. The damage not least at the international area was enormous. In other countries, above all in the UK, a flow of commentators appeared in the public and accused the Germans of collective cowardice. The foreign policy of Hans-Dietrich Genscher fuelled this criticism even more. Genscher had refused to provide forces or at least military

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equipment to the Israelis, offering financial resources instead. This policy, which has gone down in history as “check book diplomacy”, came under special fire. Various camps claimed that the Germans had become a nation of shop-keepers who were only interested in profit and in an emergency would let the others do the real dangerous jobs. Of course, these and other accusations were purposely aggressive and did not do justice to the complexity of the situation. After the Defence Planning Committee finally had achieved the necessary compromises in the wording, SACEUR issued the activation order and the deployment began. Since the British and Americans had already stationed massive forces in the Gulf region, other allies stepped in. The following units were deployed: 1 Alpha Jet squadron (2 Squadron / 43rd Fighter Bomber Wing, Oldenburg) 1 F-104 squadron (Italy) 1 Mirage 5 squadron (Belgium) The German squadron arrived at Erhac on 8 January 1991, where it began deterrence operations. The mission was basically successful, although substantial discussions and differences of opinion about the character of the mission continued. Meanwhile, considerable practical difficulties arose. The weather was so adverse at times that sorties had to be cancelled. Furthermore, “Showing the Flag”, for very technical reasons, proved to be difficult. Here, the very limited performance of the Iraqi Air Defense played the major role. NATO aircraft could hardly be detected north of the 40 km air defense identification zone. When the NATO aircraft only slightly turned further to the north, they disappeared from the Iraqi screens. Here we see one of the basic problems of the AMF since its creation. On the one hand, politicians and diplomats in particular feared that the situation would escalate and that the consequences were unforeseeable – dangers which continue to exist to this day, albeit in a different form – see Syria. On the other, you cannot deter if you do not make your presence felt. If you like, all remained a balancing act between deterring the enemy and being afraid of what reaction might follow. The specific conditions under which the soldiers had to execute their mission were rather difficult at first. The logistical structures had to be set up step by step; the considerable distances repeatedly hindered progress in this. The forces notably complained about a lack of support from the Host Nation. Much had to be provided via the long transportation routes from Germany. The commander of the German force, a lieutenant colonel, also almost a full-time job with receiving members of the public. In addition to the Turkish president, Özal, the force was visited by the SACEUR, General Galvin, the German Minister of Defense, Gerhard Stoltenberg, the German Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, Alfred Biehle, and many other dignitaries. The press did not remain idle either and caused a number of considerable problems. A TV team from the Saarländischer Rundfunk broadcasting station entered the quarters without permission and conducted interviews. The team was only allowed to continue after they commited themselves formally to abstain from actions like these. The crisis was short-lived since the Iraqi combat units were soon defeated by the

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coalition forces in the Gulf. The AMF started to withdraw in March. Summing up, it could be said that in the end, the first “live” operation of German combat units was a successful, albeit rather rugged premiere. After these events, NATO’s strategy and the image of war began to change considerably. At first, the AMF wasn’t too much affected by the new perspectives. In the mid1990s, however, the final stage of its history began. The general setting was the development of NATO’s strategy after 1990 in connection with the fundamental changes in the Alliance’s command structure. The strategy papers of 1991, 1999 and 2006 as well as the deployment of NATO forces in Operation “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia are distinct milestones on the road to a considerable extension of the strategic outlook. The East-West conflict lost more and more of its importance and was replaced by a more global perspective. In the late 1990s the AMF in its actual complexion had become obsolete. This was in part due to increasing lack of tactical capabilities and of composition and in part lagging behind the new innovations in the field of information technology. NATO therefore decided to make a completely fresh start. It proved to be considerably less expensive to establish an entirely new force which was fully integrated into the new overall concept of NATO from the outset. In August 2002, the Defense Planning Committee adopted a formal decision to disband the AMF L and replace it with the NATO Response Force (NRF). From a historical perspective, the Allied Mobile Force, the UKMF and the Rapid Defense Joint Task Force a kind of special acid test for the flexibility of NATO’s strategy both in the Cold War and in the post-1990 period. In the Cold War, the AMF was a limited attempt by NATO to overcome its military shortcomings on its flanks in Europe. The importance of the AMF had always remained limited, not least because the Alliance had focused on the main battle forces in the Central Region of Europe and the question of nuclear first use. But, and this aspect is very important, the discussions about a use of US-forces that were assigned to NATO in the Middle East brought a complete new element on the agenda. What role NATO will play in a global context today and in future is not clear. In the meantime, the mobile response forces will constitute a major focal point of the Alliance. Today, however, nothing gets stuck in theory, plans or exercises. Whether NATO will become a global alliance with regional problems or persists as a regional alliance with global problems remains to be seen. This text is based on the following articles: - Bernd Lemke, Crisis Management in Turkey and the Problem of Escalation, The Allied Mobile Force 1961 – 2003 and the Future of NATO’s South-Eastern Flank, in: Atlantic Voices, Vol. 3 – Issue 9, September 2013, download: http://www.ata-sec.org/ publications/atlantic-voices.

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- Bernd Lemke, „Abschreckung, Provokation oder Nonvaleur?“ Die Allied Mobile Force (AMF) in den Wintex- und Hilex-Übungen 1970 – 1985, in Wege zur Wiedervereinigung, Die beiden deutschen Staaten in ihren Bündnissen, ed Oliver Bange und Bernd Lemke (Munich: Oldenbourg 2013), 311 – 334. (Deterrence, provocation of bluff? The Allied Mobile Force in the WINTEX- and HILEX-exercise 1970 -1985) - Bernd Lemke, Die deutsche Luftwaffe und die Allied Mobile Force 1961 - 1991, in: Gneisenau Blätter 11(2012), „Sicherheitspolitik und Luftwaffe seit 1956“, S. 49 - 56, download: http://www.gneisenau-gesellschaft.de/downloads/gneisenau_band_11.pdf (The German Air Force and the Allied Mobile Force 1961 – 1991). - Sean Maloney, “Fire Brigade or Tocsin?” NATO’s ACE Mobile Force, Flexible Response and the Cold War, in: The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.27, No.4, December 2004, 585 – 613, download, URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/136236904 2000314529. - Götz Steinle, Allied Mobile Force, in: Truppenpraxis 2/1991, S. 121 – 125. - Bernd Lemke, „Abschreckung oder Provokation? Die Allied Mobile Force (AMF) und ihre Übungen 1960 – 1989“, in Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee, Nr. 2/2010, S. 49 – 63. (Deterrence or provocation? The Allied Mobile Force and its exercises 1960 – 1989) - Bernd Lemke, „Globale Probleme einer regionalen Allianz: die NATO und die Frage militärischen Engagements außerhalb der Bündnisgrenzen bis 1989“ in Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F), 27.Jg. 2009, H.1, S. 24 – 30. (Global problems of a regional alliance: NATO and the question of military engagement out of area until 1989). - Soon to come: Bernd Lemke, Strategische Mobilität im Kalten Krieg 1956 – 1990, Die Allied Mobile Force, die UK Mobile Force und die Rapid Defence Joint Task Force im Vergleich (Strategic Mobility in the Cold War 1956 – 1990, The Allied Mobile Force, the UK Mobile Force and the Rapid Defence Joint Task Force in Comparison), in: Sonderfall Bundeswehr? Hrsg. von Rudolf Schlaffer und Heiner Möllers (Conference Volume 53rd International Conference for Military History, Potsdam) It is planned to publish a book on the Allied Mobile Force 1961 – 2003 in German and, later on, in English.

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Guerre di coalizione e operazioni combinate Virgilio ILARI Un problema poco studiato alla guerra di Troia alle Crociate fino alla guerra del Golfo la maggior parte dei conflitti armati internazionali è stata caratterizzata dall’intervento di coalizioni di Stati contro un determinato avversario e talora dallo scontro fra coalizioni contrapposte. Senza contare i conflitti, soprattutto guerre civili, in cui, pur senza intervento diretto né comandi integrati, le missioni militari straniere hanno comunque assunto di fatto la direzione strategica e operativa delle forze assistite, come fecero, in questo secolo, i consiglieri sovietici in Spagna e nell’Ogaden e quelli statunitensi in Laos, Cambogia e Centroamerica. Malgrado ciò, “guerra di coalizione” e “operazioni combinate” condotte da “forze multinazionali” sono argomenti alquanto trascurati dalla letteratura militare. Il lettore che non abbia familiarità con questa particolare letteratura, può facilmente constatarlo consultando le relative voci dell’International Military and Defense Encyclopaedia (curata dal colonnello Trevor N. Dupuy e pubblicata dalla Brassey’s US nel 1993), redatte entrambe dal tenente colonnello Albert D. McJoint (“Coalition Warfare” e “Combined Operations”, II, pp. 533-7 e 579-89). Entrambe hanno infatti un carattere quasi pionieristico, confermato dalla obbligata genericità dei rinvii bibliografici. Altri autori assumono il problema dei comandi multinazionali nel contesto tecnico della “guerra di teatro” (cfr. Thomas Gardner, Command Structure for Theater Warfare, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1984). Naturalmente gli studi analitici e propositivi riguardano essenzialmente l’esperienza della NATO e delle forze di pace dell’ONU, mentre la storiografia ha svolto una funzione ancillare occupandosi principalmente delle esperienze che hanno preceduto e direttamente influenzato l’organizzazione nordatlantica, cioè la cooperazione e l’integrazione militare anglo-americana durante le due guerre mondiali. Non mancano però contributi più recenti su altre vicende storiche, ad esempio la cooperazione e l’integrazione fra le Potenze dell’Asse. Anzi l’analisi del nuovo assetto militare italo-tedesco stabilito nel 1941 a seguito dell’intervento tedesco nei Balcani e nel Mediterraneo è servita a comprendere e periodizzare la guerra italiana del 1940-43, definendo più chiaramente il mutamento strategico e organizzativo che differenziò la fase della “guerra parallela” dalla fase della “guerra dell’Asse”. Per quale ragione lo studio delle coalizioni e delle operazioni combinate è stato così a lungo trascurato? Anzitutto, a differenza delle alleanze permanenti - come il Sacro Romano Impero, il Patto di Famiglia, la Santa Alleanza, la Confederazione Germanica, il Commonwealth, l’ONU, la NATO, l’UEO, il Patto di Varsavia, la CSI - le coalizioni militari sono forme di cooperazione internazionale per obiettivi limitati e contingenti. Per questa ragione la documentazione relativa è quasi esclusivamente nazionale.

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Manca infatti una burocrazia analoga a quella delle organizzazioni permanenti, preposte come vestali al culto dello spirito fondatore e degli scopi comuni. Per quanto siano formate da rappresentanti nazionali, queste burocrazie vigilano anche sulla tutela degli interessi comuni ed esprimono un punto di vista autonomo e diverso. Invece, come osserva anche McJoint, le coalizioni temporanee non producono un “patriottismo” multinazionale: piuttosto rinfocolano i pregiudizi nazionali. Nel loro caso la cooperazione è incentrata sulla condotta effettiva della guerra e consiste in un continuo, laborioso e precario bilanciamento di interessi continuamente influenzati dalle vicende belliche, e che perciò modifica l’originario equilibrio interalleato a favore di alcuni Stati e a danno di altri. Conclusa la guerra e cessato l’effetto della propaganda interna a favore dei partner, riemergono tutti i rancori e le polemiche accumulate, amplificate dall’interesse ad appropriarsi dei meriti e scaricare le colpe, sia in caso di vittoria che di sconfitta. Ciò si riflette sulle storiografie nazionali. Le storie diplomatiche enfatizzano i contrasti, quelle militari minimizzano il contributo alleato e le decisioni comuni, come avviene anche per le operazioni combinate condotte da più forze armate di una stessa nazione (esercito o marina? regolari o partigiani?). Patriottismo nazionale e spirito di corpo ostacolano non solo una corretta valutazione delle operazioni combinate a carattere multinazionale o semplicemente interforze, ma anche la capitalizzazione tecnica delle esperienze, rendendo più difficile analizzare e correggere difetti ed errori. Del resto, per quanto insufficiente, l’approccio nazionale al problema delle coalizioni non tradisce la realtà. Poche guerre di coalizione hanno assunto, e soltanto temporaneamente, uno spiccato carattere multinazionale. Sotto questo aspetto la guerra del Golfo e lo stesso intervento delle Nazioni Unite in Somalia sono meno interessanti della “battaglia delle Nazioni” (Lipsia, 1813), degli interventi della Santa Alleanza, della guerra dei Boxer, della spedizione di Suez e della guerra di Corea. Molte guerre di coalizione sono state condotte anche mediante mere “cobelligeranze” o guerre “parallele”, talora rimaste del tutto indipendenti non soltanto sotto il profilo militare, ma anche sotto l’aspetto giuridico. Ad esempio guerre formalmente “bilaterali” come le aggressioni sovietiche a Polonia e Finlandia e le cobelligeranze italiana e romena contro la Germania sono rimaste giuridicamente distinte dalla seconda guerra mondiale combattuta tra le Nazioni Unite e le Potenze dell’Asse, la quale ha invece riassorbito, almeno nell’ultima fase, il precedente conflitto cino-giapponese. Per analoghe ragioni formali la stessa storia militare non ha finora studiato in modo unitario quella che fu probabilmente la più vasta coalizione della storia, e cioè quella del 1780-83 che vide l’Inghilterra sola contro tutti, non soltanto in guerra con le Tredici Colonie ribelli e con la Francia, la Spagna e l’Olanda, ma aggredita anche dall’ostile neutralità armata della Lega Nordica promossa da Caterina di Russia. Le osservazioni di Clausewitz (VIII, ix, D) Dato che l’unico vero libro sull’essenza della guerra è il Vom Kriege, non deve sorprendere che sia Clausewitz l’unico autore classico ad aver esaminato, sia pure in modo incidentale ed ellittico, la questione dell’alto comando nelle guerre di coalizione,

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tema che ovviamente è del tutto ignorato dal suo protodetrattore Jomini, benchè nel Précis de l’art de la guerre (ed. 1855, ristampa anastatica 1973) compaia uno specifico capitolo sull’alto comando (pp. 121 ss.). In quest’opera il tema è sfiorato appena a proposito delle guerre che Jomini definisce “guerre di intervento” (pp. 49 ss.), limitandosi a due osservazioni abbastanza triviali. Una è che conviene disporre di alleati (p. 48). L’altra che la maggior parte delle coalizioni fallì per aver dimenticato tre precauzioni: scegliere un comandante in capo al tempo stesso politico e militare; accordarsi bene con gli alleati sui rispettivi ruoli; determinare un obiettivo in armonia con gli interessi comuni” (p. 54). Anche l’autore del Vom Kriege intendeva dedicare all’alto comando uno specifico capitolo, che annunziò nel suo testo incompiuto ma che la sorte avversa gli impedì di scrivere. Con ogni probabilità in questo capitolo avrebbe analizzato anche la questione del comando congiunto di forze coalizzate, dal momento che alcune brevi annotazioni in proposito si trovano nell’ultimo capitolo (il ix del libro Ottavo, dedicato al “piano di guerra mirante all’atterramento dell’avversario”), in particolare nel paragrafo “D) ripartizione dei compiti”. Per inciso, queste brevissime osservazioni sono probabilmente il miglior commento finora mai scritto sulla struttura militare delle sette Coalizioni antifrancesi del 1792-1815. In rigorosa concatenazione logica con la sua fondamentale distinzione tra “obiettivo” (Ziel) militare e “scopo” (Zweck) politico della guerra, Clausewitz scrive che la differenza tra le Armate coalizzate e quelle ausiliarie sta nel fatto che le prime hanno tra loro scopi politici (Zwecken) “indipendenti”. Un corollario implicito è che nel caso delle Armate ausiliarie lo scopo politico non è “indipendente”, bensì subordinato a quello della potenza egemone. Altro corollario implicito è che l’indipendenza degli scopi perseguiti dai singoli coalizzati costituisce la particolare vulnerabilità delle coalizioni, come dimostra l’esperienza di quelle antifrancesi, cinque delle quali vennero infrante dall’efficace strategia rivoluzionaria e poi dalle magistrali campagne di Napoleone. Clausewitz ne trae la conseguenza che la struttura ottimale delle Armate coalizzate consiste nello spingere l’integrazione multinazionale delle forze al minor livello tecnicamente possibile, perchè ciò “rende molto più difficile ai governi l’isolare i rispettivi interessi”. L’integrazione militare ha dunque soprattutto un obiettivo politico: è un collaudato meccanismo “antidefezione”. Clausewitz aggiunge però che assai di rado si verifica una tale “intimità e comunanza di interessi” da consentire la soluzione ottimale. Probabilmente questa è una delle affermazioni ellittiche e fuorvianti che l’autore intendeva modificare nella progettata revisione del manoscritto incompiuto. Infatti è facile ribattere che tanto più gli interessi sono realmente “comuni”, tanto meno vulnerabile è la coalizione e dunque tanto meno necessaria è l’integrazione multinazionale. Ne consegue che i fattori determinanti dell’integrazione non sono la mera “intimità e comunanza di interessi”. Quale altro, allora? L’unico esempio concreto di integrazione multinazionale citato da Clausewitz è quello della Sesta Coalizione (1813-14), quando i Corpi d’armata nazionali vennero riuniti in Armate multinazionali. In quell’occasione il fattore determinante fu, secondo

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Clausewitz, “il pericolo” che “spinse tutti” verso tale soluzione. L’autore non specifica la natura del “pericolo”. Certamente era Napoleone. Ma per andare oltre la mera cobelligeranza non era sufficiente il metus hostilis che aveva animato le precedenti coalizioni antifrancesi: occorreva anche una comune percezione delle catastrofiche conseguenze di un ennesimo scollamento. Ma una comune percezione del pericolo è in fondo un caso particolare di riconosciuta “comunanza di interessi”. E se davvero “tutti” i coalizzati si rendevano conto nella stessa misura del “pericolo”, perchè avrebbero dovuto assicurarsi reciprocamente con un meccanismo antidefezione? Lo stesso Clausewitz, poche righe più avanti, suggerisce implicitamente che la realtà fosse differente. Elogia infatti lo Zar, il quale, pur vantando il contingente più numeroso e il maggior merito nell’aver determinato la situazione propizia alla definitiva sconfitta di Napoleone, accettò di passare le proprie truppe al comando di generali austriaci e prussiani, “rinunziando all’ambizione di entrare in guerra con un’Armata russa autonoma”. Solo lo Zar poteva farlo, proprio perchè era più forte degli altri due sovrani suoi alleati. Inoltre l’invasione subita nel 1812 rendeva più acuta la sua percezione del “pericolo”. L’apparente eccezione del 1813 conferma dunque la regola delle coalizioni precedenti: l’integrazione militare non si verificò perchè gli interessi, le percezioni e gli scopi dei singoli coalizzati si fossero interamente identificati con quelli “comuni”; piuttosto perchè restavano abbastanza differenti da consentire deleghe di sovranità non pienamente reciproche o paritarie. Comunque sul sistema “ottimale” Clausewitz non si dilunga, proprio perchè ha constatato che si tratta di un’eccezione. Quel che gli preme è invece individuare il criterio generale. La storia militare gli dimostra infatti che “la peggiore delle combinazioni è sempre quella in cui due generali in capo indipendenti, agenti a nome di potenze distinte, si trovano in un solo teatro di guerra, come si verificò spesso nella guerra dei Sette anni con i Russi, gli Austriaci e l’esercito dei Circoli” (formato dai contingenti tedeschi del Sacro Romano Impero). La ragione è che la stretta cooperazione tra due forze non saldamente integrate al livello decisionale attenua la reattività di entrambe. Ciascuna tende inevitabilmente a scaricare sull’altra “il peso di quanto gli incombe”. Viene dunque a mancare lo “stimolo all’azione” esercitato “dalla forza degli avvenimenti”. Inoltre “la cattiva volontà dell’uno paralizza le forze dell’altro”. L’unico modo di evitarlo, è subordinare gerarchicamente una delle due Armate all’altra. I piccoli contingenti ausiliari non possono restare indipendenti, ma debbono essere posti alle dirette dipendenze del sovrano territoriale, tutt’al più assegnando loro “le province ricche ove stiano più volentieri”. Se invece l’Armata ausiliaria è più importante e determinante di quella locale, il sovrano territoriale deve trasferirle il controllo delle proprie truppe, “come fecero gli austriaci alla fine della campagna del 1805 e i prussiani in quella del 1807”. Nel caso delle coalizioni, se non è possibile raggiungere una effettiva integrazione dei comandi operativi, è preferibile adottare una “separazione completa” delle responsabilità. Ciò secondo Clausewitz “non presenta difficoltà ... poichè l’interesse naturale di ciascuna potenza indica già, di solito, una direzione propria delle rispettive forze”.

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Dunque, secondo Clausewitz, il fattore che rende efficace la separazione delle forze su distinti teatri di guerra è che essa riconosce realisticamente l’originaria indipendenza e differenza degli interessi nazionali dei coalizzati e le asseconda per sfruttarle a favore dello sforzo comune, anzichè tentare di forzarla con misure necessariamente controproducenti. Per interpretare correttamente questa affermazione, occorre tener conto che essa è implicitamente riferita al particolare esempio delle Coalizioni antifrancesi del 16701815, le uniche che si potessero ancora prendere in considerazione al tempo del Vom Kriege, prima delle rivoluzioni nazionali, dell’unificazione tedesca, delle coalizioni antitedesche e della guerra fredda. Inoltre il paragrafo successivo, la cui stesura risale al 1828, è dedicato ad un ipotetico “piano di guerra” preventiva contro la Francia, basato su due attacchi autonomi ma convergenti verso Parigi e oltre la Loira, uno a guida prussiana dall’Olanda e uno a guida austriaca dall’Alto Reno, eventualmente integrati da “due imprese accessorie, quella degli austriaci in Italia e quella delle truppe inglesi da sbarco”. Questa è la ragione per cui l’autore non si dilunga sui rischi politici del “combattere divisi per colpire uniti”. Il presupposto implicito è che non sia una scelta deliberata, ma soltanto l’unica realistica alternativa alla desiderabile ma non possibile integrazione delle forze. Non v’è dubbio, infatti che la separazione dei coalizzati, scaricando su ciascuno di loro “tutto il peso di quanto gli incombe esclusivamente”, amplifichi “lo stimolo all’azione” determinato “dalla forza degli avvenimenti”. Nulla però garantisce che proprio la maggior reattività agli avvenimenti non possa volgersi a danno degli altri cobelligeranti. Lasciando a ciascuno il controllo esclusivo delle proprie forze e di un teatro di guerra, la separazione facilita eventuali defezioni o paci separate, ma anche l’insorgere di sospetti e nuove rivalità in rapporto alle differenti visioni sullo scopo della guerra e sul nuovo equilibrio di forze prodotto dall’eventuale vittoria. In ogni caso la coesione della coalizione resta affidata ad accordi di contingenza e in sostanza alla sola determinazione, lealtà e fiducia reciproca dei coalizzati. Elementi che raramente si rafforzano di fronte ad una prova effettiva e prolungata. Le operazioni combinate nella storia militare italiana del Settecento La storia militare, anche italiana, offre innumerevoli esempi dello specifico condizionamento esercitato dalla logica della coalizione nel determinare il piano di guerra e la condotta delle operazioni. Un primo condizionamento è quello di frenare la reattività all’iniziativa altrui. Anche quando gli interessi comuni appaiano facilmente identificabili, raggiungere un accordo concreto sulle modalità della cooperazione e sull’assetto dei comandi è una impresa molto difficile. Il comando delle armate franco-ispane che combatterono in Italia durante le guerre di successione (1700-48) era formalmente integrato, nel senso che i trattati di alleanza offensiva lo attribuivano a un sovrano o a un principe del sangue, fissando al tempo stesso gli scopi politici della campagna, sia pure in forma meno dettagliata delle attuali “regole di ingaggio” (V. Ilari, Giancarlo Boeri e Ciro Paoletti, Tra i Borboni e gli Asburgo; Id., La corona di Lombardia, Nuove Ricerche, Ancona, 1996 e 1997).

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Sia Vittorio Amedeo II di Savoia sia suo figlio Carlo Emanuele III furono scelti quali comandanti in capo delle Armate congiunte nelle due occasioni in cui la dinastia sabauda si schierò dalla parte francese, cioè nel 1701 e nel 1733. Naturalmente era un comando formale, talora rifiutato per protesta, come avvenne nel 1702 e 1735. Ma non si deve dimenticare che il comando ha un’intrinseca natura politica, e garantiva comunque una formale superiorità gerarchica sui comandanti nazionali nonchè il controllo diretto sulla conformità delle operazioni militari agli scopi politici concordati. Molto probabilmente la vera ragione per la quale nel 1742 il maresciallo Montemar non varcò il Panaro per soccorrere il duca di Modena aggredito dagli austro-sardi, era che in quel caso avrebbe dovuto cedergli il comando dell’esercito napolispano, come prevedeva il trattato segreto ispano-modenese. La designazione del sovrano sabaudo non era soltanto un doveroso riguardo nei confronti dell’unica potenza regionale italiana, ma anche il modo più elegante per evitare insolubili quanto inutili questioni di precedenza tra le due corti borboniche. Tanto più velleitaria quanto più debole e insicura, Madrid era ovviamente la più sospettosa e suscettibile, penosamente ossessionata dalle più irrilevanti o secondarie questioni di rango, proprio come la moderna diplomazia italiana. Versailles, essendo egemone, badava alla sostanza e generalmente preferiva cedere ai capricci del subalterno, come fece lo Zar nel 1813 e come abitualmente fanno gli Stati Uniti nei confronti degli alleati europei. Ma, beninteso, ogni pazienza ha un limite. La debolezza del sistema non stava nel fatto che l’effettivo comando militare fosse attribuito ad un rappresentante tecnico della potenza egemone, bensì nel fatto che le Corti di Versailles e Madrid non conferivano plenipotenze ai comandanti delle rispettive Armate. Di conseguenza non bastava che il comandante in capo dell’Armata congiunta arbitrasse i contrasti avvalendosi della propria autorità regale oppure, assai più spesso, convocando continuamente consigli di guerra. Tanto più irresoluto era il comandante in capo tanto più frequenti e assembleari erano i suoi consigli di guerra. Inutile dire che i laboriosi compromessi collegiali erano regolarmente i peggiori possibili e che nulla garantiva che le decisioni, anche unanimi, fossero poi effettivamente eseguite. D’altra parte qualsiasi iniziativa di rilievo provocava la consultazione delle rispettive corti, paralizzando per settimane o mesi le decisioni operative e non di rado sprecando intere campagne in inutili temporeggiamenti. Esaminiamo un caso concreto. Nel 1733 l’armata franco-sarda entrò a Milano quasi senza colpo ferire, e il re di Sardegna si concentrò sull’assedio del Real Castello in cui si era chiusa la simbolica guarnigione austro-lombarda, perchè quel che gli premeva era formalizzare prima possibile l’annessione cingendo la corona di Lombardia promessagli da Versailles ma rivendicata anche da Madrid. Invece il suo comandante aggiunto, l’anziano maresciallo Villars, avvertiva segretamente Luigi XV che il prolungarsi dell’assedio avrebbe potuto provocare la defezione sabauda, come era avvenuto nel 1703. Al contrario, Villars voleva attaccare subito il Serraglio Mantovano dal Modenese, come aveva fatto nel 1702 il suo predecessore Vendome, per impedire al nemico di attaccare alle spalle le forze spagnole che dal ducato di Parma e dalla Toscana si accingevano

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a marciare sul Regno di Napoli per scacciarne il viceré austriaco. Carlo Emanuele III, al contrario, non aveva alcun interesse ad aiutare gli spagnoli né a distruggere l’Armata austriaca. Paradossalmente fu Villars a dover cedere, rassegnando le dimissioni e morendo poco dopo di crepacuore. In quel momento l’interesse francese convergeva infatti con quello del re di Sardegna, perchè conveniva mantenere impegnati in Italia i 60.000 austriaci che altrimenti Vienna avrebbe potuto trasferire sul Reno. Quanto poi alla corona di Lombardia, la faccenda fu archiviata senza rischi l’anno successivo, con un bell’armistizio separato franco-austriaco. A Torino e Madrid non restò che trangugiarlo. Coalizioni per scelta e coalizioni per necessità La cooperazione militare austro-sarda del XVIII secolo anticipa invece il medesimo schema di quella italo-tedesca dal 1866 al 1943. Confrontandola con quella borbonica, incunabolo delle future coalizioni occidentali, emerge già nettamente tutta la radicale differenza tra le coalizioni “per scelta” e le coalizioni “per necessità”. Le coalizioni promosse dalla Francia e dagli Stati Uniti sono modi di competere o subentrare all’Impero britannico sotto una diversa formula giuridica. Riflettono obiettivi geopolitici globali e di lungo periodo e sono caratterizzate dall’inclusione di alleati non contingui e periferici (quelli storici della Francia furono Svezia, Polonia, Turchia, Russia). Le coalizioni antifrancesi, e poi quelle antioccidentali del XX secolo, appartengono piuttosto alla seconda categoria. Reazioni obbligate dall’iniziativa avversaria, il tentativo di una grande potenza, generalmente assediata, di guadagnare tempo e spazio vitale sfondando nelle direzioni ancora libere (e dunque meno redditizie) e circondandosi di precari e riottosi avamposti. Con l’unico risultato di accumulare “palle al piede” che la indeboliscono invece di rafforzarla. Benchè non vitali, gli interessi austriaci in Italia erano più cospicui e diretti di quelli francesi. Ciò rendeva Vienna meno incline alle “architetture di sicurezza” e alle operazioni combinate. Soltanto a fatica, durante la guerra di successione spagnola, il principe Eugenio ottenne le forze necessarie per mantenere aperto il fronte italiano dopo la sconfitta del 1703 e infine liberare il ridotto piemontese assediato per tre anni dai francesi. Nel 1742 Maria Teresa fu costretta dalle circostanze a mettere la difesa avanzata della Lombardia nelle mani dell’Armata sarda, ma non appena la situazione migliorò le forze austriache in Italia ripresero brutalmente la libertà d’azione. Se nel 1745 Versailles mancò l’obiettivo di concludere una pace separata con Torino, non fu certo per effetto della saggezza austriaca, ma piuttosto del costante sabotaggio spagnolo e della dipendenza del Piemonte dal sussidio finanziario inglese, che copriva un quarto delle spese di guerra. Uno dei principali fattori della sconfitta finale del regno di Sardegna nella pur gloriosa guerra delle Alpi (1792-96) fu senza dubbio l’illusione di Vittorio Amedeo III di poter costringere l’Austria a difendere il Piemonte, se non a riconquistare le province transalpine subito occupate e annesse dal nemico. Fu per questa ragione che si rassegnò a cedere il comando in capo della sua Armata a un generale austriaco. Era un fatto senza precedenti nella storia della dinastia, benchè nel 1706 il suo avo Vittorio

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Amedeo II avesse affidato al maresciallo Daun la luogotenenza di Torino assediata proprio per ricordare all’Austria l’impegno assunto nei confronti dell’eroico alleato. Novant’anni dopo, invece, due defatiganti negoziati austro-sardi con mediazione inglese fruttarono un inutile e men che simbolico contingente ausiliario austriaco. E al prezzo di un assetto dell’alto comando talmente macchinoso (“un’idra dalle sette teste”) da suggerire il sospetto che la recondita intenzione austriaca fosse proprio quella di paralizzare qualunque iniziativa anglo-sarda. Vienna traeva infatti un triplice vantaggio dallo stallo sulle Alpi: proteggeva efficacemente la Lombardia scaricando tutto l’onere finanziario sul Piemonte e sull’Inghilterra, distoglieva e logorava consistenti forze francesi e poneva le premesse per una futura spartizione franco-austriaca dei domini sabaudi ed eventualmente anche di quelli genovesi. La stessa integrazione delle forze austro-sarde pose le premesse del disastro. Il fatto che il comandante della Divisione sarda fosse un generale proveniente dal servizio austriaco (un vogherese) non gli impedì di sabotare cavillosamente e sistematicamente gli ordini del comandante in capo austriaco (un belga), comportamento che gli valse poi l’immeritato plauso della storiografia militare sabaudo-italiana, come se il vero problema del Piemonte non fosse resistere alla Francia, bensì mostrare fermezza con l’Austria. Lo sfondamento finale, nell’aprile 1796, avvenne proprio nel settore debolmente presidiato dalle due brigate formate da battaglioni di entrambi gli eserciti, una delle quali, forse per segreti accordi ad alto livello, cedette al primo sparo. I sistemi anticoalizione Il ventiquattrenne Napoleone trasse fama immeritata dall’aver sfondato nel punto di giunzione tra le forze sarde e quelle austriache. Non solo perchè entrambe si erano schierate in quel modo disastroso proprio per avere il pretesto di potersi ritirare in direzioni divergenti, l’una verso Torino e la pace separata, l’altra verso il tradizionale arroccamento fra Mantova e il Trentino. Ma anche perchè quella era notoriamente l’unica direttrice d’attacco possibile, su cui in quattro anni avevano lentamente avanzato tutti i comandanti che avevano preceduto il vanaglorioso enfant-prodige spedito da Barras a scassinargli il forziere italiano. Quella direttrice d’attacco, attraverso la Liguria e le Langhe, era già stata seguita dal maresciallo Maillebois nella campagna del 1745, attentamente studiata da Napoleone. Tuttavia, diversamente dal 1796, nel 1745 gli austro-sardi non aspettarono il colpo mortale divisi e seduti ai piedi delle Alpi Marittime e dell’Appennino Ligure, ma si ritirarono saggiamente nel Basso Monferrato, dove potevano efficacemente coprire entrambe le rispettive capitali. Allora fu il geniale ingegnere-cartografo Pierre de Bourcet a dettare a Maillebois l’attacco strategico nel punto di giunzione delle forze austro-sarde, che si trovava a Bassignana, quasi al confine tra Piemonte e Lombardia. Se Carlo Emanuele III non fosse miracolosamente riuscito a sganciarsi sacrificando mezza cavalleria, quel colpo avrebbe neutralizzato il Piemonte esattamente come accadde nel 1796.

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Il risultato strategico mancò per l’inadeguatezza dello strumento tattico (le fanterie del tempo non erano in grado di manovrare su più colonne indipendenti). Ma il mancato sfruttamento della sorpresa di Bassignana determinò il fallimento dell’intera campagna borbonica, perchè anche l’Armata delle Tre Corone era paralizzata dai divergenti e contrastanti obiettivi geopolitici di Madrid e Versailles e dagli irriducibili contrasti personali tra i comandanti dei contingenti francese e napolispano, solo nominalmente agli ordini dell’Infante Filippo. In realtà l’offensiva napoleonica dell’aprile 1796 combinava la strategia del “carciofo”, fino ad allora efficacemente praticata dai governi rivoluzionari per isolare l’Austria e l’Inghilterra dai loro alleati minori (mediante offensive diplomatiche, propaganda sovversiva, azioni clandestine e attacchi limitati), con il principio tattico della manovra per linee interne. Questo consiste nell’incunearsi tra due forze nemiche, marciando tra di esse o sfondando il punto di giunzione, per batterle separatamente. Ovviamente il valore del risultato dipende dall’entità e dalla qualità delle forze nemiche che in tal modo vengono neutralizzate, ed è massimo quando tali forze appartengono a due diversi Stati, il più debole dei quali può essere facilmente disarmato e neutralizzato. Il ricorso a questo sistema è la costante della strategia come dell’arte militare napoleonica. Napoleone lo usò anche nella campagna dei cento giorni, aiutato dall’erronea decisione di Wellington di arretrare lo schieramento inglese allargando la distanza dall’Armata prussiana. Almeno sul piano tattico il colpo sarebbe riuscito se Bluecher, disperso nello scontro preliminare di Ligny, non si fosse ricongiunto con le sue truppe in tempo per ricondurle al fronte. Durante la sua assenza, infatti, il suo capo di stato maggiore Gneisenau, ingannato dal suo pregiudizio anti-inglese, si era persuaso che Wellington avesse piantato in asso i prussiani e aveva a sua volta ordinato l’autonoma ritirata su Liegi. Del resto lo stesso Bluecher guidò metà delle sue forze verso il cannone di Waterloo più per una questione d’onore che per reale convinzione nelle possibilità di successo. Come si è accennato in merito alla strategia del “carciofo” usata dalla Francia rivoluzionaria per sgretolare la Prima Coalizione, i sistemi anticoalizioni sono essenzialmente tre. Durante la prima guerra mondiale vi fecero ricorso tanto l’Intesa quanto gli Imperi Centrali. Anzitutto l’azione diplomatica sostenuta da operazioni clandestine e di propaganda, mediante la quale l’Intesa ottenne la neutralità e poi l’intervento italiano. Entrambe le coalizioni impiegarono anche un altro sistema, già utilizzato dalla Francia rivoluzionaria contro la Prima Coalizione, e cioè l’attacco, se non prioritario per lo meno massiccio, contro gli elementi più deboli e periferici della coalizione avversaria. Tuttavia i risultati furono nulli. Lo sbarco a Gallipoli, la Strafexpedition e l’offensiva di Caporetto non misero fuori combattimento né la Turchia né l’Italia. Gallipoli, imposta dal protagonismo di Churchill e dell’Ammiragliato, si risolse addirittura in un disastro. Nel caso della Russia non fu l’armata a crollare, ma il fronte interno, anche se la Germania ne ricavò alla fine una precaria pace separata. Secondo Hans Delbrueck lo stato maggiore tedesco non seppe sfruttare il vantaggio della manovra per linee interne che la geografia assegnava in partenza alla Germania. Invece di attaccare l’esercito nemico più forte nel vano tentativo di annientarlo al primo colpo (il piano

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Schlieffen fallito sulla Marna), avrebbe dovuto anzitutto neutralizzare quello più debole, cioè il “rullo compressore” russo, raggiungendo già nel 1914 il risultato fortuito del 1917. Non è il caso di discutere qui i limiti e le evidenti implicazioni ideologiche di questa critica retrospettiva. Il piano Schlieffen fu semmai un esempio del terzo sistema anticoalizione, il brutale attacco “napoleonico” sul punto di giunzione delle armate alleate per disarmare lo Stato più debole e imporgli la pace separata. Ludendorff ci riprovò nella primavera del 1918, sferrando la più colossale offensiva della storia con 3 milioni e mezzo di uomini. Sia pure a carissimo prezzo, gli obiettivi tattici furono in gran parte raggiunti, ma non bastò, come del resto era abbastanza prevedibile, a provocare il collasso dell’enorme esercito francese e il reimbarco degli inglesi. Questo risultato fu raggiunto soltanto dalla guerra lampo del maggio 1940. Con la neutralizzazione della Francia la coalizione anglo-francese venne effettivamente infranta, malgrado la simbolica resistenza di de Gaulle. Furono soltanto la straordinaria determinazione inglese e l’intempestivo e controproducente intervento italiano a impedire ad Hitler di chiudere il fronte occidentale. I fattori dell’integrazione durante l’antico regime Come si è accennato a proposito delle guerre italiane del Settecento, la forma minima e più antica di comando congiunto è quella a carattere collegiale. Tutti conoscono i versi dell’Iliade sui consigli di guerra tenuti dai comandanti greci durante la guerra di Troia e le pagine di Guerra e Pace sul sonno dell’eroe Kutusov durante la brillante esposizione del geniale piano austriaco per la battaglia di Austerlitz. Altrettanto antico è il sistema di eleggere un unico comandante supremo. E’ però caratteristico della struttura confederale, dal dictator latinus testimoniato nel IV secolo a. C. al generale federale svizzero già previsto dal Defensional del 1647, e in qualche modo esprime un certo grado di unità nazionale e precorre l’unione politica delle sovranità confederate. Paradossalmente lo studio delle guerre dell’età moderna (XVI-XVIII secolo) dimostra che l’integrazione multinazionale di forze terrestri o navali era raggiunta più facilmente di quella interforze. Ad esempio, alla battaglia delle Dune avvenuta nel 1658, il maresciallo Turenne comandava sia le truppe francesi che il contingente inglese, ma non aveva autorità sulla flotta inglese cooperante. Durante la campagna di Yorktown, nel 1781, Washington e Rochambeau esercitavano collegialmente il comando congiunto franco-americano, ma la squadra francese era sotto il comando indipendente di de Grasse. Soltanto l’Inghilterra raggiunse un accettabile coordinamento tra guerra navale e guerra terrestre, due mondi che nell’esperienza militare continentale tendevano ad ignorarsi vicendevolmente. Quanto alle operazioni anfibie, le competenze terrestri e navali erano fissate dalla linea del bagnasciuga o dal raggio del cannone. Come osserva McJoint, nell’epoca dell’antico regime la coesione dei comandi congiunti faceva leva sulla “fraternità sociale” e sui frequenti legami di parentela fra i capi militari, aristocratici e cosmopoliti e sulla scarsa incidenza dell’origine nazionale. Alcuni comandanti nazionali vennero designati proprio perchè avevano un grado o un rango nell’esercito o nell’aristocrazia del paese alleato. Senza contare che non pochi ufficiali,

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soprattutto generali, servirono parecchi sovrani nel corso della loro carriera, il che facilitava l’eventuale integrazione dei rispettivi eserciti. Anche Clausewitz fu tenente colonnello del Re di Prussia e colonnello dello Zar, e il suo passaggio al servizio russo, assieme ad un quarto dell’ufficialità prussiana, non fu specificamente autorizzato dal suo sovrano, che si era limitato ad accordargli il congedo. Le spedizioni internazionali in Crimea e in Cina All’epoca della guerra di Crimea cosmopolitismo e fraternità sociale erano già stati soppiantati dal nazionalismo e dalla burocratizzazione delle carriere. Lord Raglan e la serie dei suoi omologhi francesi (il sedicente Saint-Arnaud, poi Canrobert e infine Pellissier) non avevano nulla in comune né sotto l’aspetto sociale e culturale né sotto l’aspetto professionale. Il comandante ottomano, un croato proveniente dai sottufficiali austriaci, fu ben lieto di farsi togliere le castagne dal fuoco mescolando i suoi battaglioni nelle brigate francesi. Ma, pur avendo in linea appena un quarto delle forze francesi, gli inglesi non si rassegnarono a riconoscere la supremazia gerarchica dei marescialli alleati. Proprio per sbloccare i contrasti che paralizzavano le forze alleate più del colera e del coraggio russo, Napoleone III meditò di assumere personalmente il comando. Ma il consiglio di guerra interalleato gli dette un segnale negativo bocciando il piano elaborato dall’Imperatore. E si convinse ad archiviare definitivamente il progetto quando un cavo telegrafico sottomarino steso fra Varna e la Crimea gli consentì di tempestare Canrobert e Pellissier di ordini e raccomandazioni. Fu il primo segnale del netto peggioramento determinato dalla moderna capacità tecnica di controllo a distanza in tempo reale. Anche la fortunata spedizione del famoso contingente sardo (Pier Giusto Jaeger, Le mura di Sebastopoli, Mondadori, 1991) anticipa il modo italiano di mostrare bandiera. Concepito per sostituire truppe francesi nell’Armata di riserva a Costantinopoli, finì invece in Crimea nel settore inglese, per di più alle dipendenze di entrambi i contingenti. Nelle sue memorie Lamarmora racconta di aver chiesto a Cavour, mentre già stava per imbarcarsi: “ma insomma, mi volete dare queste benedette istruzioni?”. La risposta, accompagnata da un abbraccio, sarebbe stata “ingégnati!”. Il biografo del ministro subalpino, Rosario Romeo, ha dimostrato che quel colloquio non potè aver luogo. Ma l’aneddoto “se non è vero, è ben trovato”. In seguito, però, l’esempio negativo della Crimea servì a sostenere l’assoluta necessità dell’unità di comando e di chiare istruzioni. Generalmente questi criteri furono applicati durante le spedizioni internazionali del tardo Ottocento e del primo Novecento. Il comando congiunto delle forze navali fu spesso attribuito col criterio gerarchico, che in genere rifletteva la diversa importanza dei contingenti. Durante l’assedio dei Boxer alle Legazioni di Pechino, il comandante in capo fu invece designato all’unanimità dai rappresentanti delle 13 nazioni (scelsero quello inglese perchè aveva esperienza militare), mentre furono gli ufficiali degli 8 minuscoli contingenti (400 uomini in tutto) ad eleggere il comandante militare (un ufficiale austriaco). La questione del comando della successiva spedizione in Cina fu complicata dalla disparità dei contributi nazionali (73.000 russi, 21.000 giapponesi, 20.000 inglesi,

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12.000 tedeschi, 10.000 francesi, 5.700 americani, 2.000 austriaci e 2.000 italiani) e dai veti incrociati (inglese contro l’Intesa, russo contro l’Inghilterra, russo e tedesco contro il Giappone). Abortita l’iniziativa russo-americana di deferire la scelta ad uno speciale Consiglio di guerra interalleato, fu il Kaiser a troncare la questione nominando comandante in capo congiunto il feldmaresciallo tedesco von Waldersee. Ad eccezione degli Stati Uniti, e tra le deboli proteste della Francia, gli alleati accettarono il fatto compiuto. Solo quando i contingenti raggiunsero la Cina il comando tedesco fu trasformato formalmente in “Quartier Generale interalleato” integrandolo con 2 ufficiali russi, 2 inglesi, 2 giapponesi, 2 italiani e 1 austriaco (Amedeo Tosti, La spedizione italiana in Cina 1900-1901, Ufficio storico del Corpo di S. M., Roma, 1926, pp. 55-56). Le operazioni combinate durante la prima guerra mondiale Già prima del 1914 tanto l’Intesa quanto la Triplice avevano avviato una embrionale cooperazione militare. Ma la cooperazione più stretta ed efficace, benchè molto laboriosa, fu invece quella anglo-francese, improvvisata durante la guerra sotto la spinta della necessità. Un fatto addirittura epocale, tenuto conto del secolare antagonismo fra le due nazioni, rinfocolato dalle perduranti rivalità coloniali. Tuttavia soltanto adesso si sta cominciando a scrivere la “storia della coalizione sul fronte occidentale”, come osserva giustamente William Philpott in una esaustiva rassegna delle future linee di ricerca (“Britain and France go to War: Anglo-French Relations on the Western Front 1914-1918”, War in History, 1995, 2, pp. 43-64). Naturalmente fu l’intervento americano a determinare la vittoria alleata. Tuttavia non vi fu alcuna integrazione operativa, perchè inizialmente il presidente Wilson non accettò di porre la forza di spedizione americana sotto comando interalleato. E quando i primi clamorosi fiaschi gli fecero mutare opinione, fu il comandante in capo, generale Pershing, a pretendere di conservare un autonomo teatro di guerra (David F. Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918, University of Kansas Press, 1993). Malgrado una laboriosa cooperazione con gli alleati (Luca Riccardi, Alleati non amici, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1992), anche l’Italia condusse la guerra in modo sostanzialmente autonomo. Peraltro vi fu uno scambio di contingenti non meramente simbolico e non paritario (2 divisioni italiane in Francia e 1 in Macedonia contro 11 alleate schierate in Italia dopo Caporetto) e alla vigilia dell’offensiva di Vittorio Veneto il comando delle due Armate italiane (10a e 12a) che includevano i contingenti alleati fu assunto rispettivamente da ufficiali britannici e francesi. Alle dipendenze italiane operò anche 1 divisione czeco-slovacca reclutate fra i prigionieri di guerra dell’esercito austroungarico. Il comando interalleato durante la seconda guerra mondiale Durante la seconda guerra mondiale la cooperazione interalleata fu imposta dalla comune dipendenza dagli Stati Uniti, l’”arsenale delle democrazie”. Quella anglo-francese cominciò già nel 1938, ma solo nel 1939 fu istituito un Consiglio supremo di guerra e solo nel 1940 vennero effettuate manovre congiunte. La principale difficoltà era l’ignoranza reciproca circa le forze armate e il potenziale bellico dell’alleato.

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La coalizione anglo-americana sorse nel 1941, già prima dell’entrata in guerra degli Stati Uniti, sulla base delle conferenze al vertice tra il primo ministro e il presidente svoltesi per stabilire una vasta cooperazione militare, che si manifestò con la legge “affitti e prestiti” varata dagli Stato Uniti a favore dell’Inghilterra assediata. Sotto il profilo militare venne costituito il comitato “combinato” dei Capi di Stato Maggiore, detto Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) per distinguerlo dal corrispondente comitato nazionale americano, il Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Il CCS era responsabile della pianificazione strategica dello sforzo bellico e per le operazioni combinate a scala “globale”, ossia mondiale. Gli alleati si ripartirono i due teatri operativi dell’emisfero orientale: Pacifico e Cina agli Stati Uniti, Oceano Indiano e Medio Oriente all’Inghilterra. Furono però costituiti un Consiglio di Guerra Alleato del Pacifico (APWC) e 2 comandi combinati di teatro: Pacifico Sud-occidentale e Asia Sud-orientale (SEACC) responsabile del teatro indo-birmano. Il primo aveva un comandante americano, da cui dipendevano sia forze integrate che forze puramente nazionali. Il secondo aveva comandante inglese e vicecomandante americano. Le operazioni strategiche delle forze aeree nei due teatri era diretto dal CCS, mentre l’organo esecutivo unico era il capo delle forze aeree dell’esercito americano. Un terzo comando di teatro, quello dell’Oceano Pacifico, era invece di esclusiva competenza americana. In Mediterraneo e in Europa le operazioni combinate furono dirette dal Quartier Generale delle Forze Alleate (AFHQ), costituito a Londra nel 1942 per dirigere l’operazione Torch (sbarco in Nordafrica) e subito trasferito nel Mediterraneo, dove fu riorganizzato per assicurare una direzione maggiormente unitaria delle operazioni terrestri, navali ed aeree. Per la campagna d’Italia venne costituito alle dipendenze dell’AFHQ uno specifico Quartier Generale della Forza del Mediterraneo Centrale (CMF), poi ridesignata Armate Alleate in Italia (AAI) ma nota anche come XV Gruppo d’Armate. Inizialmente il comandante era britannico, ma nel 1944 gli subentrò un americano. Per realizzare l’integrazione con le forze francesi, italiane, brasiliane, polacche e di altre nazioni balcaniche, vennero utilizzati quatto differenti sistemi: a) piena integrazione degli stati maggiori operativi (integrated staff); b) aggregazione di speciali sezioni nazionali agli stati maggiori (incremented staff); c) distacco di missioni alleate presso gli organi direttivi di eserciti nazionali minori (come la Military Mission Italian Army, scherzosamente chiamata dagli italiani “mamma MIA”); d) istituzione di sezioni e unità di collegamento (liaison) presso stati maggiori e unità nazionali o combinati (come le British Liaison Units, BLU, distaccate presso i gruppi di combattimento italiani). All’inizio del 1943 il generale americano Eisenhower assunse il comando del Quartier Generale Supremo della Forza di Spedizione Alleata (SHAEF). Aveva alle sue dirette dipendenze un comandante aggiunto (deputy commander) inglese e le missioni militari e gli uffici di collegamento nazionali. Era assistito da uno stato

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maggiore articolato in due branche, una operativa (Informazioni, Operazioni, Pianificazione, Politica Militare e Comunicazioni) e una di supporto (Logistica, Personale e Amministrazione). Da SHAEF dipendevano anche i comandi congiunti dei Gruppi d’Armata e delle forze navali e aerotattiche. Alcuni comandi d’Armata erano nazionali, altri combinati, mentre i Corpi d’Armata erano in genere nazionali. Le forze strategiche americane e inglesi rimasero invece alle dirette dipendenze del CCS, tranne un breve periodo dopo l’invasione del 1944 quando furono assegnate direttamente a SHAEF. Malgrado le tensioni e le rivalità personali fra Eisenhower, Montgomery, Patton e altri famosi generali, impietosamente raccontate da David Irving (La guerra tra i generali all’interno dell’alto comando alleato, Mondadori, Milano, 1981), l’AEF raggiunse un livello di integrazione senza precedenti nella storia militare. La lezione del CCS e dell’AEF è che la migliore integrazione consiste nell’aggiungere ufficiali alleati ad una efficiente struttura di comando nazionale già predisposta. Lo stato maggiore internazionale previsto dalla Carta delle Nazioni Unite avrebbe dovuto perpetuare la struttura interalleata forgiata dagli Stati Uniti durante la seconda guerra mondiale, allargandola a Francia, Cina e Unione Sovietica. La guerra fredda spostò invece l’enfasi su una catena di alleanze regionali a guida americana. L’organizzazione integrata della NATO fu una ricostituzione e un perfezionamento del CCS e dello SHAEF. Le altre alleanze regionali stabilite lungo la “mezzaluna interna” nel quadro della strategia del containment (METO, CENTO, SEATO) furono poi soppiantate dalla costituzione del Central Command (CENTCOM) americano, competente per le aree attualmente critiche, dal Mediterraneo all’Oceano Indiano. La NATO e il CENTCOM hanno costituito l’ossatura portante delle spedizioni internazionali, l’una in Bosnia, l’altro contro l’Iraq e in Somalia e sono le uniche agenzie militari a disposizione delle organizzazioni internazionali di sicurezza (ONU, OSCE, UEO). L’esperienza italiana Malgrado le numerose operazioni combinate condotte dall’Asse, i tedeschi non crearono alcuna stabile struttura di comando integrata, fatta eccezione per alcuni comandi operativi specifici, come l’Armata corazzata italo-tedesca (ACIT) in Africa Settentrionale. Non vi fu dunque alcuna soluzione intermedia tra la completa separazione delle forze (che dipendeva dalle guerre “parallele” e indipendenti condotte dalla Finlandia e inizialmente anche dall’Italia e dagli alleati balcanici) e l’integrazione dei contingenti minori nell’esercito più forte, suscitando continui contrasti con l’Italia. Non soltanto il comandante dell’Africa Korps non fu subordinato al comando italiano in Africa Settentrionale, ma esautorò di fatto i generali italiani. Né miglior fortuna ebbe il tentativo di Mussolini di elevare il livello del contributo italiano alla campagna di Russia. Diversamente dal Corpo di spedizione (CSIR), l’Armata Italiana in Russia (ARMIR) fu smembrata fra i comandi tedeschi, esautorando i comandanti italiani, considerati meri esecutori di ordini impartiti da ufficiali tedeschi che spesso ricoprivano gradi gerarchici e incarichi formalmente inferiori. Ciò non dipese soltanto da arroganza e disprezzo, ma anche dall’enorme differenza tra le capacità operative delle forze tedesche e quelle, nettamente inferiori, dei loro alleati.

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Durante la campagna d’Italia, il massimo livello ordinativo consentito alle forze italiane cobelligeranti (ausiliarie e di combattimento) fu quello divisionale. E’ interessante ricordare che fu il Partito comunista, nel dicembre 1944, a chiedere di riunire i 6 “gruppi di combattimento” (divisioni leggere) in una “Armata italiana di liberazione”, sull’esempio delle Armate romene inquadrate nelle forze sovietiche. La richiesta, debolmente condivisa da qualche generale e del tutto ignorata dagli alleati, ebbe essenzialmente uno scopo polemico e propagandistico, ma indubbiamente mise in risalto il carattere meramente ausiliario e subalterno del concorso nazionale alle operazioni alleate in Italia. Ancor più stretta fu la dipendenza delle forze mussoliniane dai tedeschi. Infatti non soltanto il comando dell’Armata mista italo-tedesca del settore Liguria attribuito al maresciallo Graziani, ma anche i comandi delle 4 divisioni della RSI avevano funzioni meramente amministrative, mentre le forze combattenti vennero aggregate alle divisioni e ai kampfgruppe tedeschi. I sistemi di integrazione militare multinazionale La maggior parte delle coalizioni ha sperimentato forme di coordinamento, assistenza reciproca, cooperazione e integrazione, non soltanto delle attività militari, ma necessariamente anzitutto di quelle civili. Le operazioni combinate rappresentano una particolare forma di integrazione militare, di solito limitata agli aspetti puramente operativi e al massimo logistico-campali, cioè al solo impiego di aliquote delle forze nazionali in un comune teatro di guerra. Lo specifico problema strutturale delle operazioni combinate è costituito dal grado di autonomia attribuito al comando. E’ il medesimo problema che si pone in generale per il comando di forze navali, corpi di spedizione e comandi speciali o periferici. E’ tipico delle guerre coloniali del XVIII-XX secolo, ma si è posto anche durante le guerre mondiali (ricordiamo la dittatura militare di Ludendorff e Hindenburg, i contrasti istituzionali tra Cadorna e Boselli e così via). Ricordiamo che l’importanza del problema non deriva dall’entità delle forze periferiche, bensì dal valore politico della missione loro confidata. Questo può essere decisivo anche in missioni condotte con un solo uomo (l’avvenente attrice ingaggiata dalla CIA per avvelenare il galante Fidel Castro) o con forze assai limitate (la fallita incursione per liberare gli ostaggi nell’ambasciata americana a Teheran o la distruzione del reattore nucleare iraqeno da parte dell’aviazione israeliana). Non va dimenticato che normalmente anche le operazioni clandestine o speciali sono “combinate” a livello interforze e non di rado anche a livello multinazionale. Il fatto che le operazioni siano combinate a livello interforze o addirittura multinazionale non muta la natura del problema, ma ne complica la soluzione perchè moltiplica i centri decisionali in modo esponenziale e dunque sottopone il comando in campo a continue e capillari interferenze. Per questa ragione le moderne comunicazioni in tempo reale, lungi dal semplificare il problema, l’hanno ulteriormente complicato, consentendo a tutti i centri decisonali, inclusa l’opinione pubblica, di interferire direttamente sulle operazioni militari. Per limitare gli inconvenienti occorre dunque limitare le interferenze. Ciò avviene

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in tre modi. Anzitutto integrando i governi nazionali attraverso specifiche conferenze e organizzazioni intergovernative. In secondo luogo limitando e pilotando l’informazione per escludere interferenze estranee non desiderate (come gli Stati Uniti fecero magistralmente durante la guerra del Golfo, nonostante gli allarmismi sui rischi della CNN-politics). Infine accrescendo l’autonomia dei comandi in campo (nazionali e/o congiunti). Il sistema attualmente più affinato per consentire una relativa autonomia è quello di vincolarla a dettagliate “regole di ingaggio” basate su un ragionevole equilibrio fra la libertà di iniziativa necessaria per adattare le operazioni alle situazioni reali. Ma il rendimento di questo sistema è inversamente proporzionale all’ampiezza e alla durata dell’operazione. Le regole di ingaggio funzionano per brevi e limitate operazioni short of war, ma servono a poco in caso di guerra. In caso di guerra l’unico modo possibile di limitare le interferenze è la delega di poteri politici al comandante militare, come accenna di sfuggita anche Jomini. In una certa misura ciò è previsto, ma esclusivamente riguardo all’amministrazione interna dei territori occupati o delle zone di guerra. Assai raramente, invece, i governi nazionali hanno lasciato mano libera ai loro comandanti militari. La dittatura di Ludendorff durante la prima guerra mondiale e il caso del Giappone durante la seconda restano eccezioni. Le analoghe richieste di Cadorna e MacArthur rimasero ad esempio del tutto disattese. Uno dei casi più interessanti è l’iniziativa del generale Norstadt, comandante supremo alleato in Europa (SACEUR). La sua richiesta, disattesa da Kennedy, di trasferire al SACEUR la decisione presidenziale circa l’impiego delle armi nucleari americane in Europa era una risposta “tecnica” al legittimo timore politico degli alleati europei che la nuova dottrina nucleare della NATO (la “risposta flessibile”) indebolisse la garanzia americana in difesa dell’Europa. Alla fine tanto gli Stati Uniti quanto gli alleati europei si accontentarono di un bluff, la famosa Multi-lateral Force, passata alla storia come Multi-lateral farce. La mancata soluzione del problema sollevato da Norstadt non incise sulla nascita del deterrente nucleare francese, che sarebbe avvenuta in ogni caso, ma condizionò la storia dell’alleanza e offerse una finestra di opportunità all’ultima iniziativa sovietica di disgregare la coesione dell’Alleanza con lo spiegamento avanzato di missili a raggio “eurostrategico”. Specializzazione, standardizzazione e interoperabilità delle forze Contrariamente a quanto si è portati a ritenere, il sistema di integrazione delle forze più antico e fondamentale è quello della “specializzazione”, di cui standardizzazione e interoperabilità sono corollari, più che vere e proprie alternative. Infatti, se le capacità militari dei coalizzati sono identiche, diminuisce il vantaggio tecnico dell’integrazione rispetto a quello della separazione. Al contrario, la differente capacità militare non soltanto rende vantaggioso o addirittura indispensabile integrare le forze alleate, ma spesso è addirittura la ragion d’essere della stessa coalizione. Tradizionalmente il concorso inglese alle coalizioni è stato soprattutto finanziario e navale. Federico il Grande biasimò il suo avo per aver venduto all’Inghilterra i propri sudditi come “carne da cannone”, esattamente come i mercanti di Podolia facevano con i maiali. Invece Federico II faceva come gli inglesi, sacrificando in battaglia i mercenari

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stranieri e tenendo di riserva le truppe nazionali. Per quanto maligna, la nota accusa di “combattere fino all’ultimo francese” (o “fino all’ultimo polacco, tedesco, europeo ...) non è certo priva di qualche fondamento. E non è priva di una certa attualità, a giudicare dalla guerra del Vietnam o dal diverso livello delle perdite pakistane e americane durante la missione in Somalia. Ovviamente, la specializzazione è il criterio preferenziale delle coalizioni continentali dominate da un potente e ricco alleato marittimo. Consente a quest’ultimo di risparmiare risorse finanziarie a beneficio delle forze nazionali ad alta intensità di capitale (navali, aeree, nucleari), lasciando agli alleati minori il compito di fornire le fanterie, forse meno costose sotto il profilo finanziario, ma più onerose sotto l’aspetto sociopolitico, anche perchè in caso di guerra subiscono le perdite maggiori. D’altra parte le fanterie sono più difficilmente integrabili per il fatto che è molto più difficile coordinare gli esseri umani che i sistemi d’arma. Inoltre la specializzazione determina una dipendenza asimmetrica, perchè le forze ad alta intensità di capitale sono le uniche che conferiscono una capacità strategica e logistica. Al contrario le modeste fanterie da difesa avanzata non solo sono strutturalmente dipendenti dalle capacità strategiche e logistiche, ma sono anche altamente fungibili. In caso di sconfitta o defezione, la potenza dominante può ricostituirle localmente oppure rimpiazzarle del tutto, sia con le proprie forze mobili di riserva strategica sia con forze di altri paesi limitrofi. Oppure può semplicemente abbandonare la posizione e spostare navi e aerei in un altro paese più sicuro o fedele. La storia della pianificazione difensiva atlantica e occidentale è segnata dalla specializzazione nazionale tra capacità convenzionali e nucleari, strategiche e tattiche, terrestri e aeronavali, di difesa statica e di proiezione a lungo raggio, logistiche e operative, finanziarie e militari. Senza il contributo esclusivamente finanziario dato dalla Germania e dal Giappone la spedizione internazionale contro l’Iraq non avrebbe avuto luogo. Al limite, come nel caso dell’Islanda, il contributo alla comune difesa può consistere esclusivamente nella concessione di basi. Tradizionalmente il fondamentale contributo italiano alle coalizioni consiste nel valore strategico del suo territorio. Il rendimento è massimo quando la Penisola è collocata sull’asse di confronto tra una coalizione occidentale e una centro-orientale. La fondamentale ragione della sua attuale decadenza consiste appunto nel fatto che la fine della guerra fredda ha eroso la sua rendita di posizione. Accadde lo stesso quando la frontiera imperiale romana si spinse fino al vallo di Adriano, cioè fino alle attuali frontiere della NATO. Non a caso Costantino convocò il senato romano nella Nuova Roma costruita al crocevia tra l’Asia e l’Europa. Sotto il profilo militare, malgrado i periodici e disperati tentativi di contrastare la specializzazione dotandosi di repliche a scala lillipuziana delle forze di intervento a largo raggio possedute dalle grandi potenze (lo tentò anche Venezia, dieci anni prima di autodissolversi ingloriosamente), la tendenza fatale dell’Italia è di specializzarsi nel settore logistico a favore delle forze che utilizzano le sue basi. Accadde in Africa Settentrionale, in Russia e nella RSI a favore dei tedeschi, e nell’Italia liberata a favore degli Alleati. Ma è accaduto anche durante l’offensiva aerea della NATO che ha pa-

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cificato la Bosnia e corrisponde all’unica richiesta proveniente dagli alleati. Beninteso una oculata specializzazione nel settore logistico può creare nicchie di vera interdipendenza. Negli ultimi anni della guerra fredda, la Germania federale offerse di assicurare il sostegno logistico tedesco alle forze alleate stanziate sul suo territorio proprio per controllarlo. Per la medesima ragione gli Stati Uniti hanno assicurato il loro determinante sostegno logistico alla Forza di applicazione degli accordi (Implementation Force) e alla successiva Forza di stabilizzazione in Bosnia. Le osservazioni del generale Jean sulle tendenze attuali Il miglior contributo italiano ad una teoria delle coalizioni e dell’integrazione militare nel mondo post-bipolare è finora quello del generale Carlo Jean, in particolare nei due saggi più recenti pubblicati per l’editore Laterza nel 1996 (L’uso della forza, pp. 75 ss.) e 1997 (Guerra, strategia e sicurezza, pp. 256, 262 ss.). A differenza di Clausewitz, e riferendosi alla particolare esperienza del Patto Atlantico, Jean affronta soprattutto la questione della coesione. Il semplice metus hostilis, la “minaccia potenziale”, non è sufficiente, date le differenti “percezioni, interessi e politiche” degli Stati membri, specie se la coalizione è permanente. L’eccezionale vitalità della NATO, sopravvissuta alla fine del suo antagonista, si fonda invece su altri due fattori: “una potenza leader e una serie di meccanismi antidefezione che garantiscano gli Stati membri che, in caso di difficoltà, gli alleati non violino gli accordi sottoscritti”. Sul primo fattore, quello della potenza leader, Jean non si dilunga. Ma in effetti è questo fattore che fa tutta la differenza tra “coalizione” in senso stretto e alleanza egemonica, due forme storicamente assai diverse di cooperazione multinazionale. L’Inghilterra ebbe indubbiamente la leadership di tutte le coalizioni antifrancesi del 16881815. Eppure non ne ebbe mai un controllo politico e strategico paragonabile con quello assunto dagli Stati Uniti nei confronti della seconda coalizione antitedesca e di quella antisovietica. Sopravvissuta alla guerra fredda, e allargata sin quasi all’antico limes danubiano dell’Impero romano, la NATO sta in realtà sempre più assomigliando all’esercito federale romano-italico impiegato nelle Guerre Puniche. La storia dell’Alleanza Nordatlantica offre vari esempi di meccanismi antidefezione. Quello più evidente è la creazione di una organizzazione militare permanente, con comandi e aliquote integrati, fermo però restando il carattere non automatico della difesa collettiva, una clausola imposta dagli Stati Uniti e che dette a de Gaulle un buon pretesto per giustificare l’uscita della Francia dal sistema integrato e lo sviluppo del deterrente nazionale. Proprio per questo i più importanti e decisivi meccanismi antidefezione erano paradossalmente quelli diretti a garantire gli alleati europei contro la defezione della stessa potenza leader in caso di attacco nucleare sovietico limitato al territorio europeo. In fondo l’intera vicenda degli armamenti nucleari dal 1950 al 1989 è incentrata sulla questione del coupling tra la difesa dell’Europa e quella del Nord America, che i sovietici tentarono invano di spezzare. Ma, secondo Jean, ancor più determinante delle armi nucleari fu lo spiegamento avanzato di “consistenti aliquote delle forze aeroterrestri americane”, che “rendeva evi-

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dente e credibile l’impegno di Washington alla difesa europea con l’impiego di tutti i mezzi disponibili”, sull’implicito presupposto che consistenti perdite di vite americane siano il modo più sicuro di scatenare l’auspicato “effetto Pearl Harbour”. Non a caso, nell’ultima decade della guerra fredda, una delle ipotesi considerate dagli analisti occidentali era quella di un attacco sovietico “chirurgico”, in grado di evitare le forze americane. Questo fu uno dei motivi, o almeno dei pretesti, che indusse la NATO a spingere l’integrazione militare sul fronte centrale sino al livello Corpo d’armata. Saddam Hussein fece invece un calcolo opposto, e cioè che un elevato numero di perdite in una secondaria guerra coloniale avrebbe determinato l’”effetto Vietnam”, mobilitando l’opinione pubblica americana contro l’intervento per la liberazione del Kuwait. Secondo Jean le attuali tendenze verso una più stretta integrazione multinazionale in ambito atlantico ed europeo sono in realtà bilanciate e frenate dall’opposta tendenza verso la “rinazionalizzazione della difesa”. Ciò deriva dal fatto che “i conflitti non possono più essere controllati in termini di equilibri globali, ma solo a livello regionale o addirittura subregionale”, dove i differenti interessi nazionali tendono più facilmente a prevalere su quelli comuni. Ma a sua volta anche questa tendenza è naturalmente frenata da vari fattori politici e strutturali. Da un lato le resistenze delle istituzioni multinazionali e degli Stati che per varie ragioni non vogliono o non possono dotarsi di autonome capacità militari e temono che l’indebolimento dei sistemi di difesa collettivi accentui la loro dipendenza strategica dagli Stati Uniti. Dall’altro lato la diminuzione degli stanziamenti per la difesa che ostacola le economie di scala, nonchè la sfida dell’innovazione tecnologica (la cosiddetta “rivoluzione negli affari militari”). Entrambi questi fattori favoriscono una crescente integrazione multinazionale dei complessi militari-industriali di livello inferiore a quello americano, obbligando anche potenze come Germania e Giappone ad accrescere la cooperazione nel campo della difesa. In concreto ne risulta una tendenza intermedia a rendere più flessibili le organizzazioni permanenti, coordinandole secondo i criteri della delega e della sussidiarietà e modificandole col criterio della “specializzazione” nazionale. Lo scopo è di poterle attivare solo in parte e per interventi short of war anche a carattere preventivo, utilizzandole come nucleo di aggregazione di coalizioni di contingenza e “a geometria variabile” (coalitions of the willings) basate su interessi comuni più limitati e specifici. Nel corso del dibattito che ha preceduto la recente riorganizzazione dei comandi regionali della NATO, alcuni “esperti tedeschi” hanno proposto di adottare una “divisione geografica” dei ruoli nazionali, “specializzando” le forze dei paesi del Centro Europa per la difesa ad Est e quelle dei paesi del Sud Europa per la difesa a Sud. Una tesi condivisa dai sostenitori della “geopolitica dei ruoli” o delle “aree di responsabilità”, che ricorda la preferenza “clausewitziana” per la netta ripartizione nazionale dei differenti teatri operativi di una guerra di coalizione, e che ha avuto una recente conferma con l’intervento di pace in Albania, il primo a guida italiana. Secondo Jean il “frazionamento” dell’Alleanza “in insiemi subregionali di spiccata individualità ... collegati unicamente dalla presenza statunitense” trasformerebbe l’Italia

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in “zona cuscinetto a favore del Nord”. Inoltre accentuerebbe l’integrazione delle forze a livello subregionale a scapito di quella complessiva e costringerebbe a diseconomiche ridondanze in alcuni settori (intelligence, sorveglianza, acquisizione degli obiettivi e trasporto strategico). L’autore scarta anche l’alternativa di una “specializzazione funzionale” delle forze nazionali, in vista di una loro completa interdipendenza. Sotto il profilo meramente economico sarebbe “ottimale”, ma è “inaccettabile sotto il profilo politico-strategico” in mancanza di una politica estera e di sicurezza “realmente unica”. In ogni caso renderebbe troppo rigida la risposta ad una aggressione, dal momento che una sola defezione priverebbe il sistema di una componente militare essenziale. Si stanno comunque affermando soluzioni intermedie, come la costituzione di comandi e unità multinazionali terrestri, aerei e navali e di combined joint task forces (CJTF) le quali consentono all’UEO di impiegare “assetti” NATO e dunque di avvalersi delle capacità tecnologiche, operative e logistiche possedute esclusivamente dagli Stati Uniti, dando un minimo di consistenza all’umbratile “identità europea della difesa”. In passato la pianificazione alleata poteva essere integrata perchè il compito della NATO era strettamente difensivo e la minaccia era quantificabile. Ciò non è più possibile, a causa della relativa imprevedibilità dei compiti che potrebbero essere assegnati alle forze alleate nel nuovo contesto internazionale. Tuttavia secondo Jean si potrebbe mantenere una certa “complementarietà” fra le varie pianificazioni nazionali, in modo da conservare l’interoperabilità degli armamenti e dei sistemi logistici e da evitare che nell’insieme delle forze alleate si verifichino carenze in alcuni settori e ridondanze in altri.

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Time-out for Jointness – Time for the Comprehensive Approach Joerg Hillmann

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hen the Italian Minister of Defence Mauro opened the conference he stated, that those countries who are conducting a joint operation and those countries conducting a combined operation commonly are preparing peace. He underlined that military was and is a contributor to a process which is guided by politicians – and we have to consider that the involvement of military is the last step of diplomacy; when diplomacy fails, politicians can use military to pave the ground for a new diplomatic approach in the future. Following that, military engagement as a part of an overall process is clearly earmarked with a beginning and an end point – this underlines that involvement of military is not intended during the overall process. If the job is done, the military should be redeployed to their barracks. Different forms of military engagement could be identified. Within a “classical” conflict between two neighbour countries, jointness for both involved parties is mandatory, as per definition: “Jointness is the integration of the strengths of at least two limbs of the military in a coordinated effort to achieve a common goal.” Even if not neighbour countries are at war, jointness for both involved countries deems mandatory as well – the one due to direct involvement, the other one due to geographic reasons. “By combining the Navy, Army and the Air Force and recently also Special Forces and PsyOps, you are able to reach a concept of jointness. The staffs are consisting of officers from the different services with the special knowledge of their specific service.”1 Looking back in the younger history, the Falklands War between Great Britain and Argentina could be taken as one example for joint operations on both sides. Coordination in planning processes, coordination of all means and activities, as well as a well proven communication are some of the preconditions for the conduct of a joint operation. After Argentina’s occupation of the Falklands, Great Britain dispatched a Joint Task Force to liberate their islands, encompassing ships from the Royal Navy, Royal Fleet Auxiliary and Merchant Navy. These ships transported both Marine Commando Brigades as well as Army Brigades, with air cover being provided by the Fleet Air Arm and with the Air Force providing logistical support. However the deployment of such a Joint Task Force was far from unproblematic, as was proven by the “Bluff Cove Disaster”.2

1 Österberg, V.P.: Military Theory and the Concept of Jointness. A Study of Connection, Copenhagen 2004, p. 12. 2 Bolia, Robert S.: The Falklands War. The Bluff Cove Disaster, in: Military Review, November-December 2004, p. 66-72.

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“Inadequate joint force command structure, poor communications, service parochialism, and a lack of joint exercises – hence joint planning – leading up to the Falklands conflict caused the unsuccessful offloading of the Welsh Guard at Fitzroy. These problems, exacerbated by the lack of A[nti]E[lectronic]W[arfare], led directly to the loss of 56 British lives […]”3. Finally the British military intervention on the Falklands paved the ground for new political activities and establishing a clear political future framework for the Falklands. Colateral damages on the Falklands were restructured by Great Britain within short time. As Great Britain was defending an own territory – far away from the homeland – another example could be used to focus on two different forms of “classical” or “traditional” war: The involvement of another country into a conflict between neighbours by supporting one party or the engagement of another country in their attempts to liberate themselves after being invaded. Due to the geography a joint operation for the third party is mandatory, which leads directly to a combined operation. As example out of the nearer past the operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm could be taken. After the invasion of Kuwait, the US took decision to liberate Kuwait. USCENTCOM took charge of operational command. Gen. Schwarzkopf (USCINCCENT) designated component commanders for Air, Land, Naval and Marine Forces as well as Special Operations. However all operations and forces assigned to the theatre remained under the command authority of USCENTCOM. This streamlining of command and the fact that the deployment at the beginning of Desert Storm was exercised in a coordinated way, which enabled the rapid deployment of more than 500.000 soldiers, 120 warships and 1.600 combat aircraft.4 The Air Force was used to the quick strategic airlift, and later on for theatre airlift, which enabled a rapid build-up of force and command structures on the Arabian peninsula. The Naval forces arrived six days after the launch of the mission and, from that day, kept on providing the further extensive logistical support concerning supply, personnel and vehicles. The US military paved the ground for a renewal of diplomacy in order to ensure peace and freedom for Kuwait. It should be added that the collateral damages of this military interventions had been solved rapidly by Kuwait who were able to do so due to their wealth. These classical, these traditional wars went more and more out of scope of main military advanced and prudent planning during the last years. Nowadays we are expecting the unexpected and planning for scenarios we could not have even thought of a couple of years ago. The fight against terrorism or the fight against asymmetric threats have changed our military thinking and combines again both homeland security and external military activities. Do we have those capabilities needed to address these threats, do the well known large organisations have the power to respond to these threats – what are the capabilities needed? Are we intending to engage a cyber-attack with machine guns in the future? Most probable an answer cannot be found in military means, most probable the military have an even more limited role in managing these kind of conflicts. But does the 3 Bolia, p. 72. 4 Joint Military Operations Historical Collection (=JMOHC), p. V-3.

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general military mentality fit into these considerations? Last year´s conflicts are not classical or traditional war scenarios, but mostly are follow-on developments of inter-state related conflicts in the nearer vicinity or results of a historical development of the past centuries. Somalia is a typical example for that type of conflict the world-community is facing during the last years. Somalia is the prime example of a failed state, located on the Horn of Africa and void of any form of stability in government. Having become a hub for piracy close to one of the most important trade routes and sealines of communication of the world, Somalian piracy has become a major problem for the international community. But the final decision for western involvement – after a first unsuccessful purely military try in the beginning ninetees – was that the ongoing instability has caused for decades major humanitarian problems, which cried for an united engagement. It deemed of utmost importance as a first step to support the Somalian population. Therefore the main task for Operation ATALANTA was and is not to safeguard the sealines of communication, but to ensure safe transfer of the ships of the World Food Programme. However, the reasons for Somalia’s instability are not only within the country, but are also strongly influenced by the regional conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both countries use Somalia as host for a proxy-war, with Ethiopia supporting the central government and Eritrea supporting rebel forces such as the al-Shabaab militia.5 In order to establish good governance in Somalia in a midterm perspective the European Union has started a couple of programmes like building up a new system of justice, police and customs. Education programmes at universities will ensure a better educated population in the future, programmes for better medical support and general health care6 as well as an overall system of security. Building Trust and Confidence inside the population is aiming for better innestate relations to ensure stability. – Military in this comprehensive approach is doing that what they can do best. They are training military personnel with an EU Training Mission and conducting the Operation EU NavFor ATALANTA7. Some Member States support with military means the EU Capacity Building Programme to establish a Coast Guard in the region, EU CAP NESTOR, focusing on advisory and education programmes8. Each of these programmes as stand-alone programme would have no effect. Only the common approach could give a chance for success. In order to achieve all these goals, the EU has appointed a Special Representative for the Horn of Africa to act as coordinator for all EU and Member-States´ efforts within the region.9 The comprehensive approach could be defined as: “The broader understanding of the Comprehensive 5 Duesterhoft, Isabel/ Gerlach, Antonia: The Successes and Failures of the Interventions of the European Union, the African Union and Neighbouring Powers in Somalia. In: S+F, 01/2013, 21-22. 6 Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, p. 18-23. 7 Ehrhardt, Hans-Georg/ Petretto, Kerstin: The EU and Somalia: Counter-Piracy and the Question of a Comprehensive Approach, Hamburg 2012, p. 29. 8 Directorate General for External Policies of the Union, p. 42. 9 Directorate General for External Policies of the Union: The EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa: A Critical Assessment of Impact and Opportunities, 2012, p. 30.

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Approach for the EU is an integrated EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of countries. An integrated approach means that the EU has a set of objectives developed by and agreed to by all relevant EU institutions and it then has policies, “tools”, and activities to implement these objectives.[…]”.10 Concerning Operation EUNavFor ATALANTA the historians have a decisive job to do today by safeguarding all relevant sources produced. This will be of benefit for our successors to allow them a good analysis of the Operation ATALANTA in the future. But we have to consider and acknowledge, that this operation is a part of a larger puzzle – also the other entities have to safeguard their sources as well. In view of the overall activities of the European Union in Somalia the situation in Afghanistan looks totally different due to a remaining violent environment. That hinders those comprehensive approaches necessary for repairing failed state´s structures. But also for the operations conducted in Afghanistan the historians have to ensure that the sources are safeguarded and to ensure that those who were involved deliver their memories. It is not up to us today to analyze the Afghanistan campaigns. This will be also a job which has to be done by our successors. They most probably have to ask the relevant question whether NATO had been the right organization to be in lead of the overall required achievements over the whole period of engagement, in which military played one part. In the following the focus should be on the comprehensive approach. Whereas today the need for such an approach deems necessary in order to address the full spectrum of required achievements for rebuilding, reconstructuring and establishing good governance, a similar approach in the past is difficult to find – this mainly due to the fact that all military activities did not have been conducted and understood as benchmarks or milestones for a military/ civilian overall process. However, it seems to be interesting to ask this question with regard to World War II by focusing on the Operation OVERLORD, most commonly known as the D-Day landing in the Normandy in 1944. The Operation as such has been analysed for several times and is considered as the largest amphibious landing of all time, and one of the largest combined operations ever11. While technically impressive, it should also be noted that a unified command-and-control structure played a decisive role in the operation. After the difficulties encountered during Operation TORCH, the invasion of Northern Africa, General Eisenhower realized the importance of a unified command structure in which one commander is able to exercise OPCON over an entire operation and established clear command-and-control structures. As lessons learned, the Operation OVERLORD combined all ground forces under the command of Field Marshall Montgomery, the entire naval expeditionary force under Admiral Ramsay and the expeditionary air forces under Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory; while he himself retained overall command of the entire operation12. The operation marked a changing point in the further development of World War II and could be interpreted as 10 ‘Comprehensive Approach discussion points’; European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). 11 Seitz, Stephen S.: Operation Overlord and the Principals of War. Norfolk 2002, p. 7. 12 Seitz, p. 13-14, A-7.

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a first step towards rebuilding, reconstructuring and an establishment of new and better governance regarding the times after war â&#x20AC;&#x201C; definitely not been seen as such by those who will directly involved. It was later up to the international Allies to establish new good governance, specifically after the attempt from inside Germany failed latestly in July. Besides all human needs, it was clear that Europe has to be rebuilt, in certainty not with an attempt like 1918/1919. Operation OVERLORD was as military operation finally a starting step towards a larger comprehensive process aiming for peace and stability in the middle of Europe in a long-term perspective. Following such an understanding and interpretation will lead to a couple of new questions and research requirements specifically with regard to the occurring East-West conflict in the late forties and beginning fifties as well as to the intentions of the Soviet Union regarding or disregarding such an approach for East Germany. But new questions in this direction could lead to a different understanding of military activities during missions and operations in general instead of trying to return to the old traditional operational history, by retelling military campaigns isolated from its environment. By understanding military actions always as part of a larger process, military history could contribute more than today to the political and social history and follows the general attempt of interdisciplinarity and a fully integrated approach. A new paper could be named: â&#x20AC;&#x153;Military operations as part of a comprehensive approachâ&#x20AC;?.13

13 Special thanks to my students, Daniel Epkenhans and Florian Weishaupt, for their research contribution.

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To think war differently: from AirLand Battle to Effects-Based Operations Ma Uzh Daniel Fuhrer

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his paper aims at showing the development and change in the perception of the „enemy”, „war” and „warfighting” in the US Army and US Air Force between 1980 and 2000, following, on one hand, the idea of working with military journals and military manuals1 on the other. Theoretical approach and method The main research question in this paper is twofold. First, how is the „enemy“ conceptualized, from which the respective „warfighting“ concept is derived? For example, AirLand Battle was looking at the Warsaw Pact as the „enemy“ in Europe; but the Effects-Based Operations had to be adaptable to every „enemy” and shape of „war”. Second, the use of the language in respect to the verbal meaning of warfare is equally interesting. While AirLand Battle clearly wanted to destroy enemy tanks, infantry and provisions, the „target catalogue“ for the Effects-Based Operations seemed to be wider. Herein also lies the population as a part of the system which has to be influenced, as is the case with its morale. Sources Following Raths and Meier, the study at hand results in a discourse analysis bound to two different text corpora or text „levels“; according to which only texts are worked with. As described already, the key terms and statements in the discourse on „warfighting“ and the „enemy“ shall therefore be shown as an „image of war” discourse. The analysis of the argumentation of critics and supporters is interesting to understand today’s Western view on modern „war“, and thanks to the publication activity in the US armed forces, this examination can draw on extensive documents of interest. Apart from the various publications on military related topics, official military regulations are the second major starting point for this evaluation. AirLand Battle: After the Vietnam War Now let us look at some examples from this analysis. After the Vietnam War, the United States Army seemed to dominate doctrine development2 as general officers such 1 For example „instructions“, „guideline“ or even „guide“ to „war” or „warfighting”. 2 Doctrine is hereby understood to be the institutionalized view in „war” and „warfare”, refer to Headquarters, Department of the Army: Field Manual 3-0, Operations, Washington, DC, 2008, p. D-1: „Army doctrine is a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as an integral part of a joint force. Doctrine focuses on how to think—not what to think. It establishes […] How the Army views the nature of operations.”

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as DePuy and Starry promoted the ultimate land war in the 1980s. The concept title “AirLand Battle Future” seems to be the fitting terminus in two different ways for the first period analyzed until the Gulf War in 1991. The excerpts taken out of the different Field Manual Operations and contemporary articles in the military publications are indicative of the perception of the modern „war”. A gigantic symphony of destruction The „battlefield“ was described as a spacious chaos starting with the manual from 1982, without any clear linear frontlines. The „enemy“, embodied and impersonated as a Soviet „mass“ army, was exaggeratedly thought as gigantic and the Warsaw Pact soldier, compared to the Western one, was imagined as being mentally less free, having less „initiative“, flexibility and decentralized control. Especially Warsaw Pact officers had allegedly a scientific and rigid attitude towards „war“; at the same time the US tried to cope with the enemy „mass“ first using scientifically perfected capabilities, then using technical means. Military thinkers never abandoned the predominance of „firepower“ which they saw as a combined arms warfare. AirLand Battle was conceived to be the gigantic symphony of destruction of the Warsaw Pacts „masses“. Technology played a superior role as it was the means for the defense against a seemingly superior „enemy“, even though factors such as „initiative“ or morale were postulated at the same time. „Mass“ or also „speed“ stood representative for the gigantism which was propagated. The eventual concept of AirLand Battle Future then only described long range „firepower” to be the effective means.3 From „Battlefield“ to „Battlespace“ The term „battlefield“ was translated as the Non-linear Battlefield in the scope of AirLand Battle, then became larger in AirLand Battle Future and was eventually dubbed as Battlespace when discussing the Revolution in Military Affairs. It should then incorporate „space“ and Cyberspace. The multi-dimensional information age as a military concept then as well featured termini such as Full Spectrum Dominance or Information Dominance. The RMA eventually led to the „Transformation“ which, thanks to the new technologies, planned for smaller, more mobile and more lethal units operating in networks. Every soldier should have access to the same situational image simultaneously to outclass potential „enemies“ on the enlarged „battlefield“ in the area of decision-making as well as in regard of the weapons’ „effects“. „Mass“ and „speed“ were still dominating terms in the language of both branches; „speed“ was enforced by the information age, „mass “ was reinterpreted. Effects-Based Operations: „masses“ of „effects“ Especially the Air Force tried to bring forward „masses“ of „effects“ and to distance itself from the solely physical destruction of the „enemy“. Furthermore the Air Force 3 Leonhard, Leonhard, Robert R.: The art of maneuver: Maneuver-warfare theory and AirLand battle, Novato, 1991, p. 235 and 239.

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Fig. 1. Deep Attack. Field Manual 100-5, Operations, 1982, p. 7-14.

liked to look at the „enemy“ as a system or body with a brain, backbone and eyes. The Gulf War in 1991 brought about a hype of possibilities of Precision Guided Munitions and Stealth; moreover, the Army could possibly have beaten its opposing side using fewer troops, which was repeatedly pointed out by the Air Force. On one side this victory strengthened the self-confidence of the military and its political influence; on the other it enlarged the already enormous belief into technology.4 Thanks to its quite decisive effort in Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force seemed to take over the lead in the debate on modern „warfare” in the early 1990s.5 Air Force Officers such as Warden and Deptula were strong proponents of a new American way of war. The New American Way of War was predominantly based on „Airpower“ with its media-hyped main components of Stealth and PGM.6 The American military historian Citino names the Operation Desert Storm the „long road back from Vietnam“, in his eyes it was the most successful military operation in the US military history measured against the limited ends.7 4 Lewis, Adrian R.: The American Culture of War: The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Omaha Beach, New York, 2007, p. 378-383. 5 Again Lewis, The American Culture of War; Linn, Brian M.: Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, Cambridge, 2007 and Mahnken, Thomas G., Technology and the American Way of War since 1945, New York, 2008. 6 Mahnken, Technology, p. 157f. 7 Citino, Robert M.: Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare, Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 2004, p. 288.

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Fig. 2. Five Ring Model. Warden, John A.: The Enemy as a System, Airpower Journal, April 1995.

Paralysis While the „enemy“ was planned to be destroyed by the Air Force using nuclear strikes against cities and troop concentrations in the 1970s, he was to be paralyzed in the 1990s with precise needle stings using Precision Guided Munitions. The goal was to mass as many „effects“ as possible; but the term itself remains blurred. Air Force proponents during the 1990s came to the conviction that thanks to „airpower“, a ground offensive had become unnecessary. This discussion has to be looked at against the backdrop of hot budget debates and quarreling during these years.8 The Systems Approach Proponents of the Systems Approach assume that in order to analyze the „enemy“, the search for the important Centers of Gravity are the most difficult part of the concept. The terminus scalpel brought the „image of war“ to the point: after the Paralysis by the „strategic attack“ the „enemy“ had only to be dissected. The American historian Lewis compares Warden‘s thinking to bypass the enemy military potential with a direct attack on the political leadership, with the theoretical approaches to aerial warfare of the Second World War (Douhet, Mitchell), only deploying new technology.9 Summary In the end, different ways of military thinking as well as corresponding language can be discerned. The Army in the scope of AirLand Battle proposed the image of a boxing match („balance“, „will“, „blow“) against the numerical superior „enemy“ of the Warsaw pact countries. On the other side, the Air Force coined the idea of the surgical 8 After the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1997 the proposition was made to have the Air Force reducing 26‘900 personnel versus 15‘000 in the Army and 18‘000 in the Navy. The F-22 program should be slashed also, as well the B-2 and JSTARS. Confer Tilford Jr., Earl H.: Halt Phase Strategy: New Wine in old Skins. . ., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, 1998, p. 3f. 9 Lewis, The American Culture of War, p. 299f.

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strike and Paralysis of the „enemy“ in the scope of the Effects-based Operations. Hereby a language was discernible which used words such as brain, heart, backbone or nervous system. Despite the „enemy“ being dehumanized alone through the propagated distance from within it was fought and downgraded to a defenseless entity being treated with the scalpel on the dissecting table. Since the Gulf War in 1991 the United States Air Force points out increasingly how airstrikes are more „efficient“ compared to the deployment of ground forces. But at the same time the idea of killing by itself seemed only to have been made more agreeable by the concept of the „effect“ instead of „destruction“ or „annihilation“. Tuck, lecturer at the King’s college, sees the tendency towards a post-heroic American culture of „strategy“ which imagines a „war“ fought through wide distances with minimal casualties.10 Yet, the „wars“ in the Balkans and the intervention in Somalia in 1993 were harbingers of a war reality which did not fit as well to ideas such as Dominant Maneuver or EffectsBased Operations.

10 Tuck, Christopher: Land Warfare, in: Jordan, David; Kiras, James D. et al.: Understanding Modern Warfare, Cambridge, 2008, p. 66-121, p. 114f.