Issuu

Sotto l’Alto Patronato del Presidente della Repubblica

Commissione Italiana Storia Militare

Stato Maggiore DifeSa

CIHM

Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare

Ministero

della

difesa

Torino 1 - 6 settembre 2013

le operazioni interforze e multinazionali nella storia militare

Joint and combined operations in the history of warfare Les opérations muLtinationaLes et interarmées dans L’histoire miLitaire

ACTA I T

omo - PARTE SECONDA

ActA

INDICE GENERALE I TOMO - parte seconda relazioni

MissionImpossible?Soviet’sMajor offensive at the End of the Winter War in 1940 .. pag. Laaksonen Lasse The Emergence of Joint and Combined Approaches in Finnish Operations during the Continuation War (1942 and 1944) ...................................................................................................... “ Pasi Tuunainen “Wishful Thinking?” Air Integration, Dieppe, 19 August 1942 ........................................................... “ William A March Truppe di élite, operazioni combinate e dinamiche multinazionali nella seconda guerra mondiale: i paracadutisti italiani, l’Asse e la sfida di Malta ................................................... “ Marco Di Giovanni La participation des Polonais dans l’operation Overlord en 1944 .............................................. “ Tadeusz Panecki The Bombing of Monte Cassino in 1944: Was it Reasonable? Was it Lawful? ........................ “ Fred L. Borch Offensive Operation in Belorussia (Operation “Bagration”), June 23 – August 29, 1944 ..... “ Victor Gavrilov Romania’s Switch in Alliance (August 23-31, 1944) an Unprecedented Combined Military Operation .............................................................................................. “ Mihail E. Ionescu - Carmen Rijnoveanu Paths and memories of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in Italy ................................... “ Marcelo de Mello Ribeiro - Edgley Pereira de Paula L’esercito e l’aeronautica nella resistenza contro Hitler ............................................................................... “ Winfried Heinemann

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Il Comando Contro Guerriglia (Co.Gu.) della Repubblica Sociale Italiana 1944-45 .......... “ Federico Ciavattone “Hour Zero” as Combined Operation The Allied Planning for the surrender of Germany ...... “ Philipp Fraund In mano americana (1943-1946): i soldati dell’Asse e la memoria ........................................................ “ Francesca Somenzari Combined operation of People’s Liberation Army of China A historical reflection: 1949-1991 ........................................................................................................................................ “ Qu Aiguo The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Korean War 1950-1953. A case study on worldwide ambitions, and international as well as national prestige ......................................... “ Anselm Van Der Peet Il contributo del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa Italiana nelle operazioni militari dal xx al xxi secolo ........................................................................................................ “ Ettore Calzolari Formosa MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group): Army Building in a Cold War Hotspot .......................................................................................................................... “ Eric Setzekorn The coalition warfare within the United Nations framework, the case of UN Command in Korean War ..................................................................................................................“ Enrico Magnani Learning to project power in an era of declining access: joint forces, expeditionary operations and the Royal Navy, 1956-1982 ..................................................................... pag. Ian Speller Green Mountain’s War 1957-1959 .................................................................................................................................... “ Saif al Bedwawi Mandala Operation: the encourage factor of West Irian dispute accomplishment in 1962 ..... “ I Wayan Agus Apriana Les operations multinationales croisees au Congo. Le cas du Katanga (Shaba), 1960-1964 ... “ Mor Ndao Operation “Mar Verde” .............................................................................................................................................................. “ Aniceto Afonso - David Martelo The South African Navy and the war in Namibia and in Angola, 1966-1989: an example of limited but nevertheless important joint operations .................................................. “ André Wessels A Study on the Combined and Joint Operation of the ROK Armed Forces through in the Vietnam War ................................................................................................................................................... “ Hong-Guk Oh Warsaw Pact multilateral military intelligence estimates on NATO’s war plans and military exercises ......................................................................................................................................... “ Jordan Baev Operations “Escort & Raviv” ............................................................................................................................................... “ Benny Michelson

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PROPRIETÀ LETTERARIA Tutti i diritti riservati: Vietata la riproduzione anche parziale senza autorizzazione © 2013 • Ministero della Difesa CISM – Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare Salita S. Nicola da Tolentino, 1/B – Roma quinto.segrstorico@smd.difesa.it A cura di: Prof. Piero Crociani Dott.ssa Annalisa Bifolchi Comitato di Redazione Direttore Colonnello EI Matteo PAESANO Coordinatore generale Tenente Colonnello EI Gianluca FICANO Collaboratori Sottotenente EI Paolo FORMICONI Maresciallo Ordinario G. di F. Mauro SALTALAMACCHIA Brigadiere CC Giuseppe MARINARO Sergente Maggiore EI Fabrizio FERRARI

Cod ISBN: 9788898185078 Copia esclusa dalla vendita Stampa: Litos Roma

Nota Il tema del Congresso “Le operazioni interforze e multinazionali nella storia militare”, è stato suddiviso in vari sottotemi, ai quali i relatori si sono riferiti nella stesura delle loro presentazioni. Tutti i sottotemi proposti hanno trovato adeguata trattazione e si è cercato da parte del Comitato Scientifico di predisporre un programma consequenziale, attinente alle tematiche che erano state indicate. Tuttavia negli Atti, per favorire una visione più sistematica dei lavori si è preferito raggruppare le relazioni in maniera più strettamente tematica e cronologica. In questi Atti sono state incluse anche le relazioni non presentate nel corso del Congresso per sopravvenuta indisponibilità dei relatori e quelle italiane non pubblicate negli Atti del XXXVII Congresso di Rio de Janeiro, Brasile e del XXXVIII Congresso di Sofia, Bulgaria. The Theme of the Congress “Joint and combined operations in the history of warfare”, has been divided into various items, to which the speakers have referred in their presentations. All proposed items found adequate treatment and where listed by the Scientific Committee to prepare a consequential program, relating to issues that were mentioned . However, in the Acts, to promote a more systematic work has been preferred to set papers in a more strictly chronological and thematic progression. In these Acts are also included papers not submitted to the audience during the Congress, for occurring unavailability of lecturers and the Italian papers, not published in the Proceedings of the XXXVII Congress of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and of the XXXVIII Congress in Sofia, Bulgaria. Le Thème du Congrès “Les opérations interarmées et multinationales dans l’histoire militaire”, a été divise en différents sous thèmes, que les orateurs ont évoqué dans leurs présentations. Toutes les propositions des sous thèmes ont trouvé le développement approprié et le Comité Scientifique a elaboré un programme cohérent, relatives aux questions mentionnés. Toutefois, dans les Actes, à fin de promouvoir un travail plus systématique, on a préféré réunir les relations dans un plan plus strictement chronologique et thématique. Dans ces Actes ont été egalement inclus les présentations qui n’ont pas été préséntées, en séance par indisponibilité des présentateurs et les presentations italienne, qui n’ont pas été publiée dans les Actes du XXXVII Congrés de Rio de Janeiro, Brésil et du XXXVIII Congrés de Sofia, Bulgarie.

Comitato CIHM Presidenti Onorari / Honorary Presidents / Présidents d’Honneur André CORVISIER Professeur (emeritus) de la Université de Paris Sorbonne (France) Dr. Cornelis M. SCHULTEN Oud-directeur Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Amsterdam (Nederland) Prof. Dr. Luc de VOS Professeur ordinaire d’Ecole Royale Militaire et Professeur extraordinaire à la Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Belgique) Tesoriere Onorario / Honorary Treasurer / Trésorier d’Honneur Colonel Hervé de WECK Professeur au Lycée cantonal, Suisse Presidente / President / Président Dr. Piet H. KAMPHUIS Director Netherlands Institute of Military History, Den Haag (Nederland) Vicepresidente / Vice-President / Vice-président Dr. Joseph P. HARAHAN Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Virginia (U.S.A.) ICHM Newsletter Editor Vicepresidente / Vice-President / Vice-président Professor Massimo de LEONARDIS Ordinario di Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali Direttore del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Milano (Italia) Segretario Generale / Secretary-General / Secrétaire général Dr. Erwin A. SCHMIDL National Defence Academy Vienna Institute for Strategy & Security Policy Head of the Contemporary History Unit (Austria) Tesoriere / Treasurer / Trésorier Brigadier-General Fritz STOECKLI Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse

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Membri / Members / Membres Prof. Dr. Esat ARSLAN (senior Colonel (R)) ÇAĞ University, Faculty of Eco. & Adm. Sciences Chairman, International Relations Department, Mersin (Turkey) Prof. Jean D. AVENEL Professeur des universités (Suisse) Dr. Abdessalem BEN H’MIDA (Tunisie) Captain (N) (R) Josè M. BLANCO NÚÑEZ Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), Madrid (Spain) Dr. L. Ericson WOLKE National Defence College, Stockholm (Sweden) Prof. Dr. Reiner POMMERIN, Colonel (Res.) (Deutschland) Major General (rd) Professor Lekoa Solly MOLLO Director-General Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (PALAMA), Pretoria (South Africa) Colonel Prof. Dr. Hab. Tadeusz PANECKI Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej, Warsaw (Polska) Prof. Dr. Hisashi TAKAHASHI Department of International Relations Faculty of Foreign Studies Sophia University, Tokio (Japan)

XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM

Comitato di Bibliografia CIHM Presidenti Onorari / Honorary Presidents / Présidents d’Honneur Brigadier J. LANGENBERGER Major D. QUELOZ Presidente e Caporedattore / President and Editor-in-Chief / Président et Rédacteur en chef Dr. Mauro MANTOVANI Head, Chair Strategic Studies Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport VBS Departementsbereich Verteidigung Höhere Kaderausbildung der Armee Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich (MILAK) Kaserne, CH-8903 Birmensdorf (Switzerland) Segretario Generale e Redattore scientifico / Secretary General and Scientific Editor Secrétaire général et Rédacteur scientifique Dr. Marco WYSS Senior Researcher Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich (Switzerland) Membri / Members / Membres Brg (Res) Dr. Dani ASHER IDF CSC , Kfar Saba (Israel) Prof. Pierre-Emmanuel BARRAL (France) Eric BASTIN Responsable du service des archives Bibliothèque Universitaire de la Défense Service des archives de l’Ecole Royale Militaire, Bruxelles (Belgium) Dottor Serge BERNIER Associate Member Centre interuniversitaire de recherche sur la science et la technologie (CIRST) Bureau N-8420 Université du Québec à Montréal (Canada) Dottor Zisis FOTAKIS Lecturer of the Hellenic Naval Academy Member of the HCMH, Athens (Greece)

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Professor Guilherme de A. FROTA (Brazil) Oberst i.G. Dr. Winfried HEINEMANN Bundeswehr Center of Military History and Social Sciences, Potsdam (Deutschland) Dr. Ricardo A. HERRERA Assistant Professor of Military History School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Kansas (U.S.A.) Gso. Ma. Jarl E. KRONLUND (Finland) Col. David Manuel de MATOS MARTELO (Portugal) Captain (N) (R) J.M BLANCO NÚÑEZ Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional (CESEDEN), Madrid (Spain) Dr. Ciro PAOLETTI Direttore Associazione Studi Storici e Militari, Greve in Chianti (Italia) Prof. Dr. Dumitru PREDA Directeur de la direction des Archives Diplomatiques Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Bucuresti (Romania) Dr. Claudia REICHL-HAM Deputy Head, Research and of Publications Department, Austrian Army Museum, Wien (Austria) Drs. Erwin van LOO Nederlands Institute of Military History, Den Haag (Nederland)

XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM

Comitato Archivi Militari CIHM Presidente / President / Président Dr. Hans PAWLISCH Chief Joint Operational History Branch, Joint History Office Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC (U.S.A.) Segretario Generale / Secretary-General / Secrétaire général Tenente Colonnello Flavio Carbone Comando Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri Ufficio Storico, Roma (Italia) Segretari verbalizzanti / Recording Secretaries / Secrétaires de sèance Warren Sinclair Robin HIGHAM

Comitato dell’Educazione CIHM Presidente / President / Président Professor Dr. Rudolf JAUN Universität Zürich Historisches Seminar (Switzerland) Segretario Generale / Secretary-General / Secrétaire général Professor Dr. Michael EPKENHANS Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt der Bundeswehr, Potsdam (Deutschland)

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Comitato d‘Onore del XXXIX Congresso Presidente del Senato della Repubblica Senatore Pietro GRASSO Presidente della Camera dei Deputati Onorevole Laura BOLDRINI Presidente della Corte Costituzionale Professor Avvocato Franco GALLO Ministro della Difesa Senatore Professor Mario MAURO Ministro dell’Istruzione dell’Università della Ricerca Professoressa Maria Chiara CARROZZA Presidente della Regione Piemonte Onorevole Roberto COTA Sindaco di Torino Onorevole Piero FASSINO Presidente della Provincia di Torino Dottor Antonio SAITTA Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa Ammiraglio Luigi BINELLI MANTELLI Capo di Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito Generale di Corpo d’Armata Claudio GRAZIANO Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina Ammiraglio di Squadra Giuseppe DE GIORGI Capo di Stato Maggiore dell’Aeronautica Generale di Squadra Aerea Pasquale PREZIOSA Comandante Generale dell’Arma dei Carabinieri Generale di Corpo d’Armata Leonardo GALLITELLI

XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM

Segretario Generale della Difesa/DNA Generale di Corpo d’Armata Enzo STEFANINI Comandante Generale della Guardia di Finanza Generale di Corpo d’Armata Saverio CAPOLUPO Comandante del Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze Generale di Corpo d’Armata Marco BERTOLINI Presidente della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare (CIHM) Dottor Piet H. KAMPHUIS Magnifico Rettore dell’Università degli Studi di Torino Professor Ezio PELIZZETTI Magnifico Rettore dell’Università degli Studi del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” Professor Cesare EMANUEL Magnifico Rettore dell’Università degli Studi “Sapienza” Professor Luigi FRATI Magnifico Rettore dell’Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Professor Franco ANELLI Magnifico Rettore dell’Università degli Studi “Federico II” Professor Massimo MARELLI

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Comitato Scientifico del XXXIX Congresso Presidente / President / Président Colonnello Matteo PAESANO Capo Ufficio Storico del V Reparto dello SM della Difesa Presidente della Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare Membri / Members / Membres Professor Alessandro BARBERO Ordinario di Storia Medievale Università del Piemonte Orientale “Amedeo Avogadro” Professor Antonello Folco BIAGINI Pro Rettore per la Cooperazione e i Rapporti Internazionali Università “Sapienza” Professor Massimo de LEONARDIS Ordinario di Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali e Direttore del Dipartimento di Scienze Politiche, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Vice Presidente della International Commission of Military History Professor Vincenzo FERRONE Docente di Storia Facoltà di Scienze Politiche Università di Torino Professor Mariano GABRIELE già Docente dell’Università “Sapienza” Presidente Onorario della Società Italiana di Storia Militare Professor Nicola LABANCA Professore associato di Storia contemporanea Dipartimento di Scienze storiche e dei beni culturali Università degli studi di Siena Presidente del Centro Interuniversitario di Studi e Ricerche Storico-Militari Professor Matteo PIZZIGALLO Ordinario di Storia delle Relazioni Internazionali Università di Napoli “Federico II” Ammiraglio di Squadra (aus) Ferdinando SANFELICE di MONTEFORTE Professore di Storia delle Istituzioni Militari Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM

Gruppo di Lavoro del XXXIX Congresso Colonnello E.I. Matteo PAESANO Capo Ufficio Storico del V Reparto dello SM della Difesa Presidente della Commissione Italiana di Storia Militare Capo Gruppo di Lavoro Colonnello E.I. Marco CENNI Project Officer Tenente Colonnello E.I. Gianluca FICANO Responsabile Logistica e Trasporti Tenente Colonnello CC. Pier Vittorio ROMANO Ufficio Pubblica Informazione SMD Tenente Colonnello A.M. Fabrizio FABRIANI Responsabile Comunicazione Maggiore dei Carabinieri Loris DITTA Responsabile Sicurezza e Scorte Sottotenente E.I. Paolo FORMICONI Responsabile Rapporti con il Comitato Scientifico 1° Maresciallo M.M. Antonio MORLUPI Ufficio Pubblica Informazione SMD 1° Maresciallo A.M. Cristiano Maria di CARLO Segreteria Gruppo di Lavoro Maresciallo Capo E.I. Giovanni BOMBA Segreteria Gruppo di Lavoro Maresciallo Capo CC. Sebastiano RUSSO Ufficio Pubblica Informazione SMD Maresciallo Ordinario G. di F. Mauro SALTALAMACCHIA Addetto al Sito WEB Sergente Maggiore E.I. Fabrizio FERRARI Segreteria Gruppo di Lavoro Brigadiere dei Carabinieri Giuseppe MARINARO Segreteria Gruppo di Lavoro Dottoressa Ada Maria FICHERA Responsabile Rapporti con la Stampa Dottoressa Annalisa BIFOLCHI Responsabile Rapporti con i Dottorandi

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Mission Impossible? Soviet’s Major offensive at the End of the Winter War in 1940 Laaksonen LASSE

he heaviest battles of the Winter War were fought at the Karelian Isthmus, also known as the Gate of Finland, during the two last weeks before the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty on March 13th 1940. The Russians attempted to widen the Karelian Isthmus Front by launching a massive crossing offensive over the frozen Bay of Vyborg at the beginning of March. The aim of the attack was to advance deep into the mainland. The Bay of Vyborg -operation was also an important part of the effort to conquer the biggest city in the Karelian Isthmus − Vyborg.1 The intention of the Russians was to capture the city with a double envelopment manoeuvre, also called the pincer movement, when direct attempts to advance proved unsuccessful.2 The massive offensive on a wide front carried out by the Russians on the Bay of Vyborg came as a surprise to the Finns. Exceptional conditions, i.e. a winter far colder than the average, provided the attacker with an opportunity to drive their heavy vehicles, such as tanks, on ice, a circumstance that the Finns were not prepared for.3 The Russians aimed to utilise their overwhelming superiority in all areas on an open battlefield. A crossing attack, however, was a rash undertaking. Large enough forces had to advance quickly on the coast. Spring was on its way and the thawing of ices would have led to a

1 Lasse Laaksonen, Todellisuus ja Harhat - Kannaksen taistelut ja suomalaisten joukkojen tila talvisodan lopussa 1940 (Reality and Illusions: The Battles in the Karelian Isthmus and the Condition of the Finnish Troops at the End of the Winter War in 1940) (Helsinki 1999), passim. See also English summary; Olisiko taisteluja pystytty jatkamaan? Suomalaisten tilanne Kannaksella talvisodan lopussa 1940 (Could the fight have been continued? The Finn’s situation on the Karelian Isthmus at the End of the Winter War in 1940). In the Journal of Military History 19. (Jyväskylä 2000), 128-174. See also English summary. 2 Ohto Manninen, Neuvostoliiton operatiiviset suunnitelmat 1939-1941 Suomen suunnalla. Journal of Military History 11, (Jyväskylä 1993). See also English summary. 3 Osasto 5/Merivoimien esikunta 19. 1. 40 n:o 273/Ase l.sal. Merivoimien esikunta operatiivinen osasto v. 1940. Rannikkosotatsto (Op. 2.). Rannikkovoimien talvitoiminta. National Archives. T 16320. Ilmari Karhu, Suomen sotilasmaantieto. Valtioneuvoston kirjapaino (Helsinki 1932), 14, 69-70 and 93. Air Force types, see Lasse Laaksonen, Taivaan vartiat - Ilmasotakoulun historia 1918-2008 (the History of the Air Force Academy of Finland) (Jyväskylä 2008), passim.

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disaster consisting of innumerable casualties and immense losses.4 The defence of the Bay of Vyborg had been neglected as the direction was not considered to be of operational importance during the winter months. There were few troops, mostly from costal artillery, in the area and the necessary fortifications and communication arrangements were unfinished. Once the exact ramifications of the development dawned on the defenders, troops were transferred and deployed on the Bay of Vyborg from wherever conceivable, even the Northeast part of Finland the Lapland Front.5 The result was a mishmash of troops from varying branches of service: singular battalions of navy, artillery and infantry. Only the infantry had experience in battling armoured forces. Panic arose within other branches of service, and the front quickly fell back at some places. The troops of the Bay of Vyborg were organised under the Coastal Group and Major General Kurt Martti Wallenius was appointed its commander. After a mere three days, however, he was dishonourably discharged due to his heavy use of alcohol. According to Wallenius, the mission appointed to him was impossible.6 In his letter to Marshal Mannerheim, the Supreme Commander, the obstinate Wallenius stated that he knew of no commander that was a teetotaller. He was replaced by the Chief of General Staff, Lieutenant General Karl Lennart Oesch.7 The fact that the most 4 Vladimir Vasiljevitsh Kirpitshnikov, Lyhyitä sotahistoriallisia muistelmia, vaikutelmia, ja johtopäätöksiä sodasta Suomea vastaan talvella 1939 - 40 ja kesällä 1941, etupäässä silmällä pitäen 43.D:n toimintaa (Short of war historical reminiscences, impressions, and conclusions of the Winter War). National Archives. Sotatieteellisen neuvottelukunnan luettelot. Vladimir Vasiljevitsh Kirpitshnikov was born in Ulyanovsk region in 1903. He had been in the Red Army in the 1920s, since the first half. In the Winter War Kirpitshnikov work was the 43 sniper division commander and his military rank at the time was Colonel. He was ousted in this task at the beginning of March in 1940, when 43.D not been able to move forward quickly enough to the Bay of Vyborg over to the north shore. Kirpitshnikov was further rank of major general in the war worthy of the Finns captured. He wrote a report on prison during the Winter War battles. Kirpitshnikov returned after the war, the Soviet Union, where he was executed, probably in 1946; Yrjö Järvinen 1937, Panssarijoukot ja venäläinen panssaritaktiikka. (Helsinki 1937), passim. 5 KS 0037. = Päämaja n:o 550/Op.1. sal. 19. 2. 1940. National Archives. T 2865/7; KS 1230. = PM n:o 612/Op. 1 25. 2. 1940. National Archives. T 2865/6; KS 2350 = PM n:o 626/Op. 1. 25. 2. 1940. National Archives. T 2865/6.; Viipurin lohkon toimintakertomus (war diary). National Archives. Spk 3229; Marshal Mannerheim, Muistelmat II osa (Memories, Part II), (Helsinki 1952), 209. 6 Lasse Laaksonen, Eripuraa ja arvovaltaa - Mannerheimin henkilösuhteet ja johtaminen (Discord and Authority – The Personal Relationships of Mannerheim and his Generals and their Effect on Leadership) (Jyväskylä 2004), passim; Viipurin lohkon toimintakertomus (war diary). National Archives. Spk 3229; Marshal Mannerheim, Muistelmat II osa (Memories Part II). (Helsinki 1952), 209. Lasse Laaksonen, Eripuraa ja arvovaltaa Mannerheimin henkilösuhteet ja johtaminen Discord and Authority – The Personal Relationships of Mannerheim and his Generals and their Effect on Leadership). See also English summary. (Jyväskylä 2004), passim. Wallenius military career and background Where the War Generals come from? The Road to the Mannerheim’s Command 1918-1939 (Keuruu 2011) for example 200215 223-229 7 ”Herra sotamarsalkka”, Wallenius letter to Mannerheim 15.9.1941. Mappi 7. K.M. Walleniuksen arkisto. National Archives. Yksityisarkistot 602:344; PÄÄMAJA 3.10.1941 ”Kenraalimajuri K..M. Wallenius” (Mannerheim’s letter to Wallenius. Upseerien siirtoja, rangaistuksia, kuolemantapauksia ym. koskevia asiakirjoja. PM - Pv.PE, Komento-osasto, Kom I. National Archives. T 22316/5; W.E. Tuompo. Muiden lausuntoja Mannerheimista. Mannerheim -teoksen II osan käskirjoitusta. Kenraali Heinrichsin kokoelma. National Archives. Pk 1172/65.

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important subordinate of the Supreme commander was assigned to command on the Bay of Vyborg Front underlines just how desperate the situation was. A great number of new staffs were created in the final two weeks of the war and all of them were not capable of functioning efficiently. The chain of command became heavy and controversial. The foremost units were not always aware of their attached troops. On some places on the islands and the mainland, isolated campaigns were conducted, where the units were unaware of the locations of the neighbouring units or the overall development of the front.8 The fundamental causes as to why the defender failed in the organisation of his defensive and the conduct of battle on the Bay of Vyborg, both in the archipelago and on the coast, include especially inadequately organised command structures and communications, which are firmly interrelated as explanatory factors.9 The Russians managed to create a strong bridgehead on the mainland in the last week of the war and to cut off Helsinki-Vyborg main highway. The Russians were unable to breach the Finnish resistance decisively at the Bay of Vyborg front before peace came into effect on March 13th. However, the defender was at the very limits of his endurance and no reserves with high combat efficiency could be transferred to the area.10 8 Esim. Liite (numeroimaton) JR 11:n kirj. n:o 270/III/62. National Archives. P 4158:6; Liite n:o 5 I/JR 11:n rannikkotaistelukertomukseen. SArk. P 4158:6; Lentolaivue 12:n sotapäiväkirja (war diary) 12.3.1940. Lentolaivue 12:n sotapäiväkirja (war diary) 16. 1. - 7.4.1940. National Archives. Spk 2319. 9 Liiteet n:o 1 ja 6 JR 11:n kirj. n:o 270/III/63. National Archives. P 4158:6; Liite n:o 5 I/JR 11:n rannikkotaistelukertomukseen (war diary). National Archives. P 4158:6; Os. Jussilan taistelukertomus (war diary)18. 2.-13.3.1940. National Archives. P 4158:6; Todellisuus ja Harhat - Kannaksen taistelut ja suomalaisten joukkojen tila talvisodan lopussa 1940 (Reality and Illusions: The Battles in the Karelian Isthmus and the Condition of the Finnish Troops at the End of the Winter War in 1940) See also English summary. Helsinki 1999, passim.; Olisiko taisteluja pystytty jatkamaan? Suomalaisten tilanne Kannaksella talvisodan lopussa 1940 (Could the fight have been continued? The Finn’s situation on the Karelian Isthmus at the End of the Winter War in 1940) See also English summary. Journal of Military History 19 (Jyväskylä 2000), 128-174 10 Todellisuus ja Harhat - Kannaksen taistelut ja suomalaisten joukkojen tila talvisodan lopussa 1940 (Reality and Illusions: The Battles in the Karelian Isthmus and the Condition of the Finnish Troops at the End of the Winter War in 1940) See also English summary (Helsinki 1999), passim.

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The Bay of Vyborg Front was strategically the most important. It is evident that a swift breakthrough in the Coastal Group sectors would have had the most direct consequences to the defender. The basic setting to protect southern Finland would have been demolished. The Karelian Isthmus Army still defending would have been outflanked. In this respect the perseverance of the Coastal Group was a true question of life and death to the Finnish Army. On the basis of the analysis on the situation at the front in this sector, the delaying of the attacker on the Bay of Vyborg at the end of the war was not possible until the expected relief by thaw would have rendered roads impassable.

Vyborg Bay Front at the end of the Winter War, 13th March 1940.

The Russians tactics to capture the Islands at the Bay of Viborg by Infantry, Artillery and Tanks.

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The Emergence of Joint and Combined Approaches in Finnish Operations during the Continuation War (1942 and 1944) Pasi Tuunainen Introduction fter the Winter War (1939–1940) Finland was caught between Germany and the Soviet Union. In 1941 the Finnish Army joined Operation Barbarossa in an attempt to reclaim land annexed by the Soviet Union. During what is known as the Continuation War (1941–1944) the Finns conducted many operations in co-operation with the Germans, particularly in the northern part of their country where one Finnish Army corps was attached to the German Mountain Army. In and around the southern half of Finland, the Finnish military leadership was in complete charge of operations.1 In World War II the Finnish military almost never took a joint approach. Representatives of the different services often deemed that co-ordination was secured through negotiations and pre-agreements between higher echelons of command. There was no tradition of integrating the various services into a single unified command.2 Nevertheless, this paper will examine the planning and execution of operations comparable to joint and combined activities in the areas near Leningrad (the Karelian Isthmus and the adjacent bodies of water). With awareness of the dangers of anachronism, three cases from 1942 and 1944 will be examined, tracing various features of Finnish military history in World War II that have later been characteristic for joint and combined operations. The research is based on official military archival sources (such as planning documents, orders, various reports, correspondence, and war-time diaries) deposited at the Finnish National Archives, Kansallisarkisto (hereafter cited as KA), memoirs, other participant accounts, interviews, and scholarship.

Case 1: The “Semi- Joint” Suursaari (Hogland) Operation in March 1942 The island of Suursaari was of strategic importance since it is situated in the middle of the Gulf of Finland, at its widest point. The island changed owners several times. The Finns lost it in 1939, but reclaimed it in March 1942, thus restricting the Soviet Fleet to the eastern area of the Gulf and enabling the Finns to protect their vital sea lanes.3 1 Olli Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War: Between Germany and Russia (Chippenham: Palgrave, 2002), chapter 6; Pasi Tuunainen, “The Finnish Army at War: Operations and Soldiers, 1939–45”. In: Finland in World War II: History, Memory, Interpretations, eds. Tiina Kinnunen & Ville Kivimäki (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 153–159. 2 Jukka Mälkki, ”Tulevaisuus on ’joint’”. Kylkirauta n:o 4/2010, 11. 3 Niilo Lappalainen, Suursaari toisessa maailmansodassa (Juva: WSOY, 1987), 7–8. For the planning documents pertaining to the Suursaari operation 1942 see Itä-Suomenlahden Rannikkoprikaatin Esikunnan arkisto, T 19574/24, KA.

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The operation to re-capture Suursaari in March 1942 was not a fully joint operation, but it resembles one. This successful operation was meticulously planned. Units from different services participated under a single commander, Major General Aaro Pajari. Even though the operation was initially planned at the Navy HQ, it later became an Army operation. This was logical since the troops did not need any vessels and they were moving on the ice cover of the Gulf of Finland.4 The initial idea for the operation had come from the Germans who had promised the Finns that they would conduct simultaneous operations and give air support. The planning process was timed according to the wishes of the Germans. Even though their promises were not kept the Finns decided to proceed with the operation as planned. Pajari’s final plan drew upon the planning work that had been done at the HQ of Coastal Brigade. The operation received abundant resources. The Red Army only had one battalion there, but the Finns sent in a 3500-strong Detachment P(ajari), equal to a reinforced regiment. It consisted of units from both the field army and the coastal forces, and it was placed directly under the Finnish High Command (hereafter FHC). Detachment Pajari had the support of two Air Force Regiments. The Air Forces, except for one squadron, were not led by Pajari, but accomplished their mission independently.5 Case 2: Multinational Combined Joint Naval Action on Lake Ladoga in the Autumn of 1942 The Germans wanted to end the siege of Leningrad. The only life line to the besieged city was through Lake Ladoga, so the Germans started to prepare naval action directed to the southern parts of the lake. Even though the Finns, their co-belligerents, had taken their major offensive action by December 1941 and had refused to take part in the siege actively, they had harassed the Soviet lines of communication by mining the waters. In the autumn of 1942 a small multinational Finnish-German-Italian naval task unit under Finnish command was engaged in a minor joint effort against the Soviet supply routes

Mikko Karjalainen, Ajatuksista operaatioiksi: Suomen armeijan hyökkäysoperaatioiden suunnittelu jatkosodassa (Helsinki: MPKK, 2009), 201–212, 215; Marko Palokangas & Ville Vänskä, ”Näkökulmia yhteisoperaatioon – tahtoa, operaatiotaitoa ja johtamista”. Sotilasaikakauslehti n:o 3/2011, 57; Juho Talvitie, Viipurinlahden taistelu 1944 Joint-operaatioiden näkökulmasta tarkasteltuna. Treatise, National Defence University 2011, 19. 5 The initial plan for the Suursaari operation, 5 January 1942, The commander’s order to the Coastal Brigade of the Eastern Gulf of Finland, 1 February 1942 and the Navy HQ’s comments (including an alternative plan) on the operations plan, 13 February 1942. Sekalaisia asiakirjoja 1942, Itä-Suomenlahden Rannikkoprikaatin Esikunnan arkisto, T 19574/24, KA; Lieutenant Colonel T. V. Viljanen’s diary entries, 19 March and 2 April 1942. Kenraaliluutnantti T. V. Viljasen kokoelma, PK 1240/96, KA; Palokangas & Vänskä 2011, 57; Karjalainen 2009, 215, 217–218; Uolevi Tirronen, KotRPsto: Kotkan Rannikkopatteristo 1918–1993 (Jyväskylä: Rannikkotykistön Upseeriyhdistys, 1994), 92; T. Reponen, ”Rannikkojoukot sodissa”. In: Suomen rannikkotykistö 1918–1958 (Helsinki: Rannikkotykistön Upseeriyhdistys, 1959), 265; Jatkosodan historia 6 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1994), 86–87.

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on Lake Ladoga.6 The German contingent consisted mainly of Siebel ferries (auxiliary gunboats), landing craft assault, fast minelayers and some support vessels. They were accompanied by four Italian MAS motor torpedo boats (MTBs). No Finnish boats were involved in the operations. All these vessels were tactically attached to the Finnish Navy, under the name naval task unit Kijanen, and they were ready for action in July 1942 (only the command arrangement of the naval units was confirmed in writing!). Finnish Colonel E. I. Järvinen led the naval detachment operations only. For other matters the German ferries were responsible to Luftlotte 1. On the Finnish side, the FHC and the HQs of the Air Force, Navy and Ladoga Coastal Brigade were involved in the planning work.7 In August 1944 the Germans revealed to the Finns that the mission of their boats had been changed to tightening the ring around Leningrad. From then on the German boats conducted several attacks. In late October they failed in their raid against a lighthouse island. The Italian motor torpedo boats protected the ferries and were not allowed to conduct independent missions. The strength of the multinational naval detachment was inadequate. The Germans suffered heavy casualties for minor results. Operations were complicated further by difficult conditions (especially the shallowness of the waters) and technical problems. The naval detachment was then abolished and the boats were transferred to other duties.8 Case 3: Joint and Combined Approaches on the Karelian Isthmus during the Summer of 1944 In the summer of 1944 the Finnish Army was faced with the Red Army’s fourth strategic offensive to push Finland out of the war. Finnish defensive operations were aimed at blocking the main Soviet thrusts and centred on the Karelian Isthmus. These operations came closest to a joint (and combined) approach. The battles in one main operational area were co-ordinated and synchronised under a single commander.9 6 Operation orders of the Naval Detachment K(ijanen), May–October 1942. Salainen kirjeenvaihto 1942, Laatokan Rannikkoprikaatin arkisto, T 8491/4, KA; Karjalainen 2009, 219, 226–227; Jatkosodan historia 6, 1994, 78–80. For a general overview of the operations of the Finnish-German-Italian flotilla see K. Kijanen’s treatise “Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla v. 1942” (1947). Historiateoksen esitöitä ym tutkielmia, Sotahistoriallisen toimiston arkisto, T 20773/11d, KA. 7 E. I. Järvinen’s diary entries, 17 May–30 October 1942. E. I. Järvisen kokoelma, PK 2405/2, KA; After-action reports of the Naval Detachment K(ijanen) May–October 1942. Laivasto-osasto K:n käskyjä ja kertomuksia 1942, Laatokan Rannikkoprikaatin arkisto, T 8491/4, KA. See also the situation reports by units operating on Lake Ladoga to the operations branch of the Finnish Navy HQ during the summer and autumn 1942. Joukkoosastojen tilannetiedotuksia 1942, Merivoimien Esikunnan operatiivisen osaston arkisto, T 15758/1194, KA; Jatkosodan historia 6, 1994, 79; Karjalainen 2009, 219, 226–233, 239–240. 8 K. Kijanen’s treatise “Laivastotoiminta Laatokalla v. 1942” (1947). Historiateoksen esitöitä ym tutkielmia, Sotahistoriallisen toimiston arkisto, T 20773/11d, KA, 4–17; T. V. Viljanen’s diary entries, 23–24 October 1942. Kenraaliluutnantti T. V. Viljasen kokoelma, PK 1240/96, KA; Karjalainen 2009, 222–225, 234–239. 9 Interview with Professor Pasi Kesseli, 5 March 2013; Ville Vänskä, ”Yhteisoperaation johtaminen”. Kylkirauta n:o 1/2013, 11.

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On 15 June 1944, Lieutenant General Karl Lennart Oesch received a short directive from Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim giving him instructions to stabilize the situation, which was becoming critical. Oesch had all the Army units under his command, and strategic support. The unity of command was not compromised by the intrusions of politicians. General Oesch was aided by a joint headquarters under which the functions of all services (except the Navy) were placed in the same echelon. Oesch did not have a total control over his troops since the Corps answered directly to the FHC in personnel and supply matters. However, since Mannerheim kept some strategic reserves under Oesch’s command, he was also able to influence these.10 The establishment of a new command echelon eased the burden of the FHC. The decision-making process was speeded up by centralizing command in one pair of hands, giving the new front HQs more leeway and role in operational planning. In a highly fluid situation, Oesch did not interfere in the activities of lower level leaders. He had to focus on the operation as a whole and he trusted his subordinate commanders, so he chose to employ mission-type orders. Mannerheim urged Oesch to take back lost defensive positions but he insisted on further withdrawal to the last prepared line of defence. Oesch, who knew the situation well, was able to change his mission according to his own operational approach and intent.11 Time was pressing, and Oesch did not have enough time to develop a sound plan of operations. He assumed command when the battles had already started. Initially Oesch did not possess a sufficiently accurate view of the situation until the air force liaison officer was included in Oesch’s HQ. This was also the channel through which ground forces made requests for air support, and through which Oesch and his staff received intelligence on the enemy’s ground and air forces. Furthermore, the arrival of the German dive-bomber Squadron Kuhlmey gave Oesch both air-to-ground capability and a significant addition to close air support for the ground units, but only in the most dangerous directions. The Air Forces were preoccupied with supporting the ground troops in the decisive battle of Tali–Ihantala further north. Bombing sorties and artillery barrages

10 Marshal C. G. E. Mannerheim’s instructions to Lieutenant General K. L. Oesch, 15 June 1944 and General Erik Heinrichs’s (the Head of the Finnish General Staff) letter to all higher commanders about new chains of command, 14 and 16 June 1944. Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan (hereafter cited as KaJoKe) operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5, KA; Secret correspondence between Oesch’s HQ’s operations branch and the FHC, summer 1944. Ibid. T 5761/4–6, KA; Lasse Laaksonen, Eripuraa ja arvovaltaa: Mannerheimin ja kenraalien henkilösuhteet ja johtaminen (Jyväskylä: Ajatus Kirjat, 2004), 275–281; Talvitie 2011, 49–50; Karjalainen 2009, 262–264. 11 Karjalainen 2009, 262–264; Tuomas Markkinen, Ilmatoiminnan johtaminen Karjalan Kannaksen torjuntataisteluissa kesällä 1944. Treatise, National Defence University 2011, 36.

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were used effectively in order to support the impact and achieve synergy.12 It is not easy to examine Finnish operations on the Karelian Isthmus from a joint viewpoint because they were fought simultaneously in three separate directions. Oesch was not able to show flexibility or use his forces optimally, and, in the face of a formidable foe, he was forced to resort to a standard method of defence. Finnish manuals instructed that the main defensive position, that was the last line of defence, had to be in the hands of the defenders after the battle.13 After its breakthrough the Red Army took the city of Vyborg and Finnish resistance intensified on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet troops attempted to open a new front by advancing along the Viipurinlahti/Bay of Vyborg (as they had done during the Winter War), and advance to the right flank and rear of the Finnish main forces, threatening their supply lines.14 In the Bay of Vyborg, all services were fighting together in a small area. Yet the general features of a joint operation are not apparent in this case. The operation did not have a clear beginning and end; it was a continuation of earlier delaying tactics. The troops were not under a unified command. The area of operations had been divided between Oesch’s troops under the V Army Corps and the Navy, each led by their own HQs. The V Army Corps had a traditional infantry corps HQ, not a joint staff in the real sense of the word. The liaison arrangements between the Navy and ground forces were insufficient. There was a Navy liaison officer at the V Army Corps HQ, but the co-operation between the Navy and Air Forces was even worse, with no similar arrangement made. The Bay of Vyborg operation was more a quest for synergy and joint fire than proper synchronization.15 Co-operation was conducted mainly at the high HQ and corps levels. In the Bay area, these negotiations and agreements were not enough. At the tactical level it practically meant just conveying messages. The HQs were far away from the fighting troops; the Navy HQ was 200 kilometres away. This meant that requests from lower echelons and the execution of orders could be critically delayed. The operation was not carefully planned and the use of forces was not co-ordinated.16

12 The orders issued by the HQ of the Finnish Air Forces in late June 1944. Operatiivisia käskyjä 1944, Ilmavoimien Esikunnan operatiivisen ja koulutustoimiston arkisto (Ye. 3), T 19283/110a, KA; K. L. Oesch, Suomen kohtalon ratkaisu Kannaksella v. 1944 (Helsinki: Otava, 1957), 95; Palokangas & Vänskä 2011, 56; Juha Mälkki, “Kävimme verisiä saaristotaisteluja – Joint-operaatio Viipurinlahdella 4.–5.7.1944”. Suomen Sotilas n:o 1/2007, 64; Mälkki 2010, 11; Markkinen 2011, 37; Pasi Kesseli, ”Ilmapuolustuksen johtamisjärjestelmä jatkosodassa.” In: Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen, eds. Antti Juutilainen & Jari Leskinen (Porvoo: WSOY, 2006), 911; Markku Lamppu, IV Armeijakunnan ilmatorjunnan järjestelyt vetäytymisvaiheen taisteluissa 1944. Treatise, National Defence University 2007, 46–47. 13 Markkinen 2011, 52–53. 14 Matti Koskimaa, Torjuntavoitto Viipurinlahdella kesällä 1944 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1996), 68. 15 Niilo Lappalainen, Veren kostuttamat saaret (Saarijärvi: Kustannuspiste, 1983), 19–20; Niilo Lappalainen, Viipurinlahti kesällä 1944 (Juva: WSOY, 1988), 280–284; Koskimaa 1996, 70; Mälkki 2010, 11, Mälkki 2007, 64; Vänskä 2010, 31; Talvitie 2011, 23, 35, 44, 50, 63–64, 69. 16 Mälkki 2010, 12; Talvitie 2011, 47, 51, 64.

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The chains of command were complicated, and there were several commanders. The troops fighting in the northern section of the Bay were from the Cavalry Brigade under the V Army Corps. The southern part of the coastline and the islands, where the enemy had placed its centre of gravity, were defended by coastal forces under the Navy. Yet they were fighting like infantrymen. Their co-operation was hindered by a lack of both signal equipment and experience.17 The Navy HQ had a hierarchical command culture, and it often interfered in tactical matters even concerning individual companies. Local commanders had to receive approval from the top. Co-ordination was limited to the ground forces’ support requests to the Navy and Air Force. The Light Naval Detachment did not have a functioning connection to its own HQ let alone to the ground forces. Unlike the ground forces, the coastal forces did not have air force liaison officers. This meant that the ground forces managed to pass their requests swiftly, whereas the coastal forces use the proper channels all the way to the Commander of the Navy. The Navy HQ’s decision-making and planning process was cumbersome and slow. Thus it was no surprise that the Light Naval Detachment tried to contain the arrival of the Red Army forces to the area by sea and support the ground forces in defending the archipelago. This independent action under the Navy HQ failed as it was not co-ordinated to support the overall operational aims because the coastal forces had no connection to the troops fighting ashore. The detachment did not have air cover either, and since the Soviets enjoyed almost total air control of the area, the mission was doomed. The forces scattered on the islands were not used economically as they were ordered to counter-attack to take back all positions lost. Due to the Commander of the Navy’s obstinate demands to hold on to the islands, the 22nd Coastal Artillery Regiment suffered particularly high casualties. They had neither proper equipment nor experience and the rocky islands were difficult to fortify.18 Therefore it should come as no surprise that in early July after several days of fierce fighting the Finns lost the key islands situated in the middle of the Bay of Vyborg. In the aftermath, the Finnish troops were reorganized and regrouped on the Western shore of the Bay. The remains of the 22nd Coastal Artillery Regiment was attached to the V Army Corps. Yet the dropping of one echelon clarified the command. The V Army Corps HQ was closer with better signal and liaison connections than the Navy HQ, and therefore, a much better view of the situation.19 The new command arrangement simplified the defence. Operations conducted on the 17 FHC’s order concerning the areas of responsibility in the Bay of Vyborg, 17 June 1944. KaJoKen operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5, KA; Jatkosodan historia 5 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1992), 224–225, 232; Mälkki 2007, 62–64; Talvitie 2011, 49. 18 Lappalainen 1983, 21, 214–215; Koskimaa 1996, 110–113; Mälkki 2007, 62–66; Talvitie 2011, 35–37, 41, 51, 54–58, 62, 65–70; Eino Pukkila, Taisteluhälytys – Suomen laivasto jatkosodassa (Porvoo: WSOY, 1961), 244–249; Per-Olof Ekman, Meririntama – Merisotatapahtumat Itämeren pohjoisosassa 1941–44 (Juva: WSOY, 1983), 269–271; A. E. Lyytinen, ”RTR 22:n taistelut Viipurinlahdella”. In: Koivisto ja Viipurinlahti 1939–1944 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1958), 261–290. 19 Commander of the Navy’s order to reorganize the coastal forces, 14 July 1944. KaJoKen operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5, KA; Koskimaa 1996, 116–120; Talvitie 2011, 32, 60, 64; Jatkosodan historia 5, 1992, 237–238.

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Karelian Isthmus, particularly in the Bay of Vyborg area, had a combined element, since the Finns received some support from Germany and Estonia. In addition to Squadron Kuhlmey, the German 122nd “Greif” Division replaced the Finnish Cavalry Brigade that was in reserve together with 200th Infantry Regiment of Estonian volunteers. At the same time, the attachment of the Estonians to the German division was discontinued. The German division had heavier weapons that were suitable for deterring landing operations.20 Conclusion All in all, we can say that it is difficult to detect joint and combined approaches from Finnish operations during World War II. None of the above mentioned three cases is a fully fledged joint or combined operation in the contemporary understanding. Yet we can identify features of co-operation in each case. In the Second World War the Finns did not properly coordinate their operations, and they often failed to integrate various services under unified commands. The end result was that these different services practically “fought their own wars”.

20 FHC’s order concerning the German 122nd Division, 24 June 1944 and Lieutenant General Oesch’s orders (3) to the corps commanders concerning the German troops and Estonian volunteers, 25–26 June and 1 July 1944. KaJoKen operatiivisen osaston kirjeenvaihtoa 1944, Kannaksen Joukkojen Komentajan Esikunnan arkisto, T 5761/5, KA; Jorma Multanen, Jalkaväkirykmentti 200: virolaisten vapaaehtoisten historiikki Suomessa ja kotimaassa toisen maailmansodan aikana (Joensuu: Lions Club Luumäki, 1991), 63–64; Arto Mustajärvi, Jalkaväkirykmentti 200: Pelinappula Saksan, Suomen ja Viron pelissä. Treatise, University of Joensuu 1994, 69–76; Koskimaa 1996, 116–120; Talvitie 2011, 32, 60, 64; Jatkosodan historia 5, 1992, 237–238.

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“Wishful Thinking?” Air Integration, Dieppe, 19 August 1942 William A March

n Wednesday, 19 August 1942, approximately 6000 soldiers, the majority of them Canadian, supported by a large naval force and almost 1000 aircraft launched Operation JUBILEE; a combined “raid in force”, against the German occupied French port of Dieppe.1 The goal was to take and hold the port for a specified period of time, destroy facilities, gather information and intelligence, including a naval Enigma machine, and withdraw. Overhead, the Royal Air Force (RAF) was tasked to provide an aerial umbrella that would protect the assault force, provide close air support and, finally, bring the German Air Force, the Luftwaffe, into open combat where it could be destroyed. It was a combined operation on a grand scale and was to last, from start to finish, mere hours.2 It was a failure. Over sixty percent of the ground forces involved in the attack were killed, wounded or captured. The Royal Navy lost another 550 personnel and took a severe pounding as they provided invaluable support to the troops involved. Virtually none of the objectives of the raid were achieved. At the time, the only bright spot was deemed to be the performance of the Air Force. They had provided an almost perfect air shield over the invasion force and decisively defeated the Luftwaffe. Or had they? Many post-war authors and historians have noted that the Luftwaffe actually lost far few aircraft that the Royal Air Force (48 to 106) and there has grown a sense that the Air Force could have done much more to support the ground forces. So let us examine Operation Jubilee from an Air Force perspective.3 There were very good reasons for a raid on this scale to be mounted. The first half of 1942 had not been good for the Allies with reverses in the Far East, the Middle East and the Atlantic. German successes in Russia were of particular concern. There was tremendous pressure to mount some sort of “second front” to bolster morale and relieve some of the pressure on Russia. A major invasion was out of the question, but a large raid, for the reasons already noted was feasible.4 There were many precedents for this type of action, the most recent of which had been the raid on the St. Nazaire, Operation CHARIOT, in March 1942, which had resulted in the destruction of a valuable dry dock; 1 In World War II, a “combined” operation involved forces from two or more of the military services (army, navy and air force), while a “joint” operation involved forces from the military services of two or more countries. 2 For a good overview of the operation see C.P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume 1, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1955), 310-412. 3 Given the rich historiography associated with Operation JUBILEE, it is interested that there is only one book that deals with the air battle: Norman Franks, The Greatest Air Battle: Dieppe, 19 August 1942 (London: Grub Street, 1992). The text is narrative in nature and provides only limited analysis. 4 For a general discussion highlighting reasons for the raid see Denis Whitaker et al, 23-35, or Jacques Mordal, Dieppe: The Dawn of Decision (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1962), 72-87.

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albeit with heavy casualties to the attacking force.5 Why Dieppe? Certainly there was a belief at that time that an invasion of occupied Europe would require the Allies to obtain harbour facilities, so in a way it made sense to attack a port. However, the size of a port required to supply several armies dwarfed the facilities of town the size of Dieppe. Dieppe was the right size to potentially yield valuable intelligence and to provoke a response by the Germans if attacked and held. Furthermore, it was within range of RAF fighters, an important consideration as the Air Force was a strong supporter of the raid.6 The RAF was cognizant of its role in support of combined operations. However, it tempered its responsibilities in this area with the need to ensure that the autonomy of the Air Force was never in doubt. From the perspective of senior RAF commanders, the primary goal in a combined operation was to establish and maintain air superiority. With this accomplish, the Air Force would be free to undertake its secondary, but extremely important role, of providing direct support to ground forces be it through what we call today Close Air Support or Battlefield Interdiction. To maintain Air Force integrity, the air forces assigned these tasks would be commanded by a senior air officer. This approach was reflected in the 1938 Manual of Combined Operations.7 In the months leading up to the Dieppe raid, the Royal Air Force had responded to demands by Combined Operations Headquarters, headed since October 1941 by Lord Louis Mountbatten, for the provision of air staff to assist in integrating air elements into combined operations training and the planning of actual missions. Although the training was just commencing in earnest by the summer of 1942, it focused primarily on medium day bomber and fighter-bomber units which would provide close air support. Fighter units, whose focus would be on air superiority, were deemed not to require as much formal training in combined operations.8 Doctrinally, air support for combined operations would be “fighter heavy” which fit in well with the Royal Air Force’s desire to bring the Luftwaffe to battle and diminish the enemy forces through attrition. This supported the aggressive policy that the RAF had been pursuing in the West via fighter sweeps and escorted day bomber raids.9 The 5 For more information about the raid see Jon Cooksey, Operation Chariot: The Raid on St. Nazaire (Barnsley, United Kingdom: Pen and Sword, 2004). 6 Terry Copp, “The Air Over Dieppe: Army, Part 9” in Legion Magazine, 1 June 1996. Available online at http://legionmagazine.com/en/index.php/1996/06/the-air-over-dieppe/, accessed 14 October 2013. 7 United Kingdom, National Archives (hereafter UKNA), AIR 10/1437, Manual of Combined Operations (1938). 8 For an excellent overview of the training engaged upon, see Ross Wayne Mahoney, “The Royal Air Force, Combined Operations Doctrine and the Raid on Dieppe, 19 August 1942”, and unpublished Master of Arts thesis, University of Birmingham, August 2009. It is available online at http://etheses.bham.ac.uk/445/1/ Mahoney09MPhil.pdf, accessed 14 October 2013. 9 The different RAF offensive fighter operations were given specific codenames. A “Rodeo” was a fighter sweep from squadron to wing strength, a “Ramrod” was an attack by bombers on a specific target with fighters along for protection, and a “Circus” involved a bomber formation as “bait” will the accompanying fighters dealt with enemy aircraft. For additional detail see Hugh Halliday, The Tumbling Sky (Stittsville, Ontario: Canada’s Wings, 1978), 10-11. In very many ways, Operation JUBILEE could be considered a Circus.

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aim was to bring the Luftwaffe into the air to fight and, subsequently, destroyed. Although Luftwaffe resources in the West were extremely limited, most of their aircraft were heavily engaged on the Eastern Front, the RAF’s plan of action meant that the enemy could chose when, or if, to fight.10 In April 1942 planning began for Operation RUTTER, an attack on Dieppe that was to have taken place during the first week of July. The original plan called for a landing force to seize and hold Dieppe for a pre-determined period of time and then withdraw in good order. Royal Air Force support, although still predominantly fighter oriented, included the provision of heavy bombers to attack designated targets the evening prior to the invasion, smoke-laying aircraft to blind the defenders, direct attack on gun positions and hard points, reconnaissance of inland approaches to the port and airborne landings to seize flanking gun batteries.11 Almost from the beginning the use of heavy bombers was a contentious point. Combined operations doctrine called for the use of heavy bombers only if they were readily available, there were clear targets and their use did not remove the element of surprise. As well, there was reluctance on the part of Prime Minister Churchill to rescind earlier directives that limited bombing which could result in French civilian casualties.12 When this was combined with the need to hit targets around near the sea shore without causing extensive damage to the town, a level of precision beyond what the bombers were capable of in 1942, their use was removed from the plan. As it turned out, less than stellar rehearsals and bad weather led to the cancellation of RUTTER.13 Primarily for political and strategic reasons already mentioned, the attack on Dieppe was resurrected in July as Operation JUBILEE. The plan was virtually unchanged except for the substitution of sea-borne commandos in place of airborne forces and the addition of a diversionary attack by United States Army Air Corps bombers on the German airfield at St. Abbeville-Drucat.14 Overall command of the Air Forces engaged at Dieppe would be Air Marshal Tafford Leigh-Mallory, the Officer Commanding 11 Group, part of Fighter Command. Under his command he would have 50 squadrons of day fighters and six squadrons for close support, two squadrons of day bombers, two squadrons of Hurricane fighter-bombers, four Army Cooperation squadrons for tactical reconnaissance and three squadrons to lay smoke. He would exercise command from the bunker at Royal Air Force Station Uxbridge, while his eyes and ears forward would be Air Commodore Adrian Trever Cole onboard His Majesty’s Ship (HMS) CALPE, a Royal Navy destroyer that also housed the Major-General Roberts who commanded the land force and Captain J. Hughes Hal10 Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defea : The Luftwaffe 1933-1945 (Montgomery, Alabama : Air University Press, 1983). Approximately 180 German aircraft were within range of Dieppe at the time of the raid. 11 Canada, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History and Heritage (hereafter DHH), Report No. 100, Historical Officer Canadian Military Headquarters, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part I: The Preliminaries of the Operation”, 8. 12 Ibid., 9. 13 Stacey, 338-340. 14 Ibid., 340-348.

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lett, who led the naval force.15 In rough terms, air support for Jubilee was provided in three layers. High squadrons, primarily concerned with air superiority controlled from Uxbridge; low level squadrons tasked to protect the ships controlled from the destroyer HMS Berkely, and close air support controlled from the Calpe. Orders and requests were issued by, or through, the senior air staff present. Air intelligence estimated that the Luftwaffe had approximately 250 aircraft, primarily fighters, with which to oppose the assault. Bombers were available, but it would take time for them to move to the attack from their normal operating bases.16 Air reconnaissance was provided by Mustang aircraft from the fledgling Army Cooperation Command. They primary task was to keep a look out for approaching German reinforcements to Dieppe which would then be attacked by day bombers. As they roamed far beyond Allied fighter cover they suffered disproportionate losses. Once they completed their sorties, they were to check in with Calpe on the way back to England. Upon landing, the information they gathered was relayed to Uxbridge via land line. Close air support was provided by Hurricane and select Spitfire squadrons, plus light bombers from No. 2 Group. The bombers were directed to attack specific guns positions, as well as lay smoke, while the Hurricanes were directed to attack strong points on the waterfront using bombs and cannon. Their attacks were heaviest during the initial landing and withdrawal, deemed to be the two most dangerous times for the operation, and these were launched at pre-determined times. They returned periodically throughout the operation as requested by the Force Commander on Calpe and were to check in with the controller on board for employment. The close air support had mixed results. The smoke was effective in blinding German gunners, but had the unexpected result of making it more difficult for the commanders to see what was happening ashore. Attacks were delivered with great bravery, but accuracy was lacking and the weight of ordnance insufficient to silence German positions. There was no way for the ground forces on the beach to communicate with the attacking aircraft, nor were there trained Air Force personnel (as there was for Naval gunfire) with the troops to assist in calling down air strikes. Requests for support were relayed via the Calpe and could take up to an hour to action.17 These aircraft suffered primarily from enemy, and friendly, anti-aircraft fire. A post operation report diplomatically pointed out that Naval air recognition needed to be improved.18 On average, there were between three and six fighter squadrons over the beach at any time with the highest numbers present for the landing and withdrawal. They were di15 It had been decided that the operation would be “Jointly” commanded by these three senior officers with no one in overall control. DHH, Historical Report No. 100, 8. 16 For a complete overview of the RAF’s organization for Dieppe, including the command and control arrangements see UKNA, AIR 25/204, “Report by the Air Force Commander on the Combined Operation Against Dieppe – 19 August 1942.” 17 DHH, Historical Report No. 108, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42. Part II: The Execution of the Operation,” 17 Dec 43, 61. The delay in message traffic would range from a few minutes to over an hour. See also DHH File 594.013(D1), “The Dieppe Raid (Combined Report),” October 1942, Appendix B to Annex 7, “Detailed Chronological Air Narrative.” 18 UKNA, AIR 16/784, “Dieppe Report: Covering Letter by Air Force Commander”, 5 September 1942, 3.

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vided into “low squadrons” that operated between two and five thousand feet to protect the ships and beaches attacked any enemy aircraft that made it past the Spitfire squadrons above. High squadrons operated primarily about 10000 feet and were to engage the enemy aircraft as they approached. Except for the occasional hit and run attack by a German aircraft, the RAF fighters achieved and maintained air superiority. However, despite the number of squadrons involved, the Germans could, and did, have the initiative and at times outnumbered the defending fighters. Had more enemy aircraft been available, or if their intelligence had been better in identifying times at which the fighter cover was the weakest, they could have overwhelmed the defenders. As it was, the number of Allied aircraft lost exceeded those of the Luftwaffe by more than two to one, but this was unknown at the time. Only one major vessel was sunk during the Dieppe raid, the Berkeley, and German attacks had been successfully broken up or deflected. At that time, the RAF’s performance was lauded as the one success during the raid. Estimates of enemy aircraft destroyed or damaged, even though they turned out to be incorrect, seemed to point to a great victory for Fighter Command. And disparity in losses aside, the RAF deserved the praise as it had done its job in accordance with its doctrine and to the best of its ability.19 Much as been written about the lessons that can be derived from Dieppe and many, including some of the primary commanders, have stated that information and experience gained during JUBILEE were instrument in the success of the Normandy landings in June 1944.20 It may be argued that landings in the Pacific, or North Africa, or Sicily and Italy, offered the same, if not better lessons, however, an in depth analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, here are a few observations on the RAF’s performance at Dieppe. Sometimes an Air Force actually reads, and applies, its own doctrine. This is what the RAF did at Dieppe, however, a case could be made that this doctrine, developed during a prolonged period of peace without adequate testing, was flawed; especially with respect to command and control. Unfortunately, the perceived success of the Air Force at Dieppe meant there was little incentive to change existing doctrine and may have complicated the establishment of the successful tactical air force programme for Nor-

19 Within the British War Cabinet, the Foreign Secretary remarked on the “…notable achievement of the Royal Air Force.” UKNA, CAB/65/31/18, War Ministry (42), 115th Conclusions, Minute 1, Confidential Annex (20th August, 1942 – 6.0 p.m.), 2. 20 For example Captain Hughes-Hallett, who commanded the naval forces at Dieppe, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan Brooke, and no less a personage than Churchill himself, have stated at various times that the Dieppe raid was essential to the success of a full-scale invasion of France, DHH, Historical Report No. 159, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe 19 Aug 14, Additional Information on Planning”, 5 October 1946. For detailed examinations of potential lessons garnered from Dieppe see DHH, History Report No. 128, “The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42 – Some New Information,” 20 November 1944; Stacey, 387-412; and Nigel Jones, “What We Learned…from the Dieppe Raid,” Military History, Volume 26, No. 5, January 2010, 17.

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mandy.21 Indeed, Leigh-Mallory in his final report on the operation wrote that Dieppe …proved conclusively that the existing Fighter ground control organization, although primarily designed for defensive purposes, provides all the facilities required for the direction of offensive operations within normal fighter range. To summarize – the system of control from the Group, though Sectors, and through the Headquarters Ships [sic], adequately met all requirements. The excellent communications and flexible control facilities of the normal Fighter organization at home proved most efficient for such combined operations.22

Be as wary of success as you are of failure. Given the scope of the disaster, there was a need to focus on a “win”. The perceived victory of the RAF over the Luftwaffe contributed to the acceptance of unrealistic claims on the amount of damage the enemy had sustained. If the numbers had been correct, almost two thirds of the Luftwaffe’s strength in Western Europe had been damaged or destroyed, yet they managed to mount a series of attacks in the days following Dieppe and subsequent Allied fighter sweeps did not report a lessening of German activity.23 The inconsistencies were explained away rather than being a cause for re-examining the outcome of the raid. Bravery and skill are not always a substitute for lack of training. Dieppe was mounted before changes to combined operations training could be fully implemented, but there had still be a somewhat lax approach to close air support training undertaken by the Royal Air Force. Within the fighter community, this type of training had been virtually non existent, as the doctrinal approach indicated that it would be business as usual for this force.24 In fact, many of the squadrons only learned of the raid, and their role in it, the night prior to their first sortie. Command and control procedures that serve an institutional purpose, especially in peacetime, are not always the best for wartime. The rather fractured command process implemented at Dieppe where control was divided between two ships and Uxbridge, with a pre-determined support schedule, may have kept the unity of Air Force command intact, but it was extremely inflexible and time consuming. Hence when the Force Commander wanted to withdraw his forces from the beaches at 1030 hours, he was advised to wait an extra half hour to permit the support aircraft to fly to their home bases, re-arm 21 Again and again the extent of the RAF’s “victory” over the Luftwaffe became the “official” view of the Dieppe raid and no one was more vigorous in trumpeting this point of view than Churchill who stated in Parliament that “This raid, apart from the information and reconnaissance value, brought about an extremely satisfactory air battle in the west, which the Fighter Command [sic] wished they could repeat every week.” Reported in DHH, Historical Report No. 109, “Operation ‘JUBILEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, Part III: Some Special Aspects,” 17 December 1943, 14. 22 DHH File 75/283, “The Dieppe Raid – Report by the Air Force Commander,” 4. 23 Indeed, by the day after the attack (20 August), the Luftwaffe had replaced or repaired the majority of it lost and damaged aircraft. DHH SCR II 322, Luftflotte 3 Headquarters, “British Large-scale Landing Operation at Dieppe – Second Appreciation,” 28 August 1942. 24 For an overview of the training provided see Mahoney, 80-88.

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and return because the Air Force had planned for an 1100 hour withdrawal.25 Given the level of combined operations doctrinal develop, and the relative lack of formal practice between combined operations forces and the RAF, and especially Fighter Command, air integration at Dieppe was much more than “wishful thinking.” To a very great extent the policies and procedures put in place represented the best that could be expected for inter-service cooperation in 1942, albeit from a United Kingdom – Western Front point of view. The RAF had succeeded in supporting a major landing and, according to the pundits of the day, had won an outstanding victory. Still, it was fortunate that the D-Day invasion would not be attempted for almost another two years permitting the continued weakening of a determined enemy and the inculcation of experience gained in other theatres of war. Following the path that led to “victory” in the skies over Dieppe might have led to a much more difficult experience for the soldiers and sailors that assaulted the Normandy beaches in 1944.

25 DHH, Historical Report No. 101, “Operation ‘JUBILLEE’: The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 1942. Part II: The Execution of the Operation. Section 1: General Outline and Flank Attacks,” 11 August 1943, 56.

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Truppe di élite, operazioni combinate e dinamiche multinazionali nella seconda guerra mondiale: i paracadutisti italiani, l’Asse e la sfida di Malta Marco DI GIOVANNI

l nostro tema pone al centro il nesso tra lo sviluppo, in Italia, di una specialità dalle peculiari caratteristiche qualitative ed operative come i paracadutisti e dinamiche interforze, verificandone la crescita in rapporto a specifiche ipotesi strategiche e allo sviluppo di una diretta cooperazione tra alleati dell’Asse sino alla crisi bellica del 1942-43. Lo sviluppo delle unità paracadutiste nella seconda guerra mondiale corrisponde alla crescita di complesse dinamiche operative interforze. Nel caso della truppe aviotrasportate erano fondamentalmente specificità terrestri e componenti aeree a doversi combinare e, nei diversi contesti nazionali, ne sarebbero scaturiti anche peculiari profili di dipendenza istituzionale. Inoltre, lo sviluppo di unità paracadutiste si integrava a prospettive strategiche ed operative di carattere offensivo che determinavano anche il livello di priorità con cui la specialità veniva sviluppata dalle diverse potenze. Il contesto tedesco offre allora un’esemplare combinazione di prospettive strategiche, ancorate all’idea di una guerra rapida condotta attraverso colpi sorprendenti ed operazioni decisive, e dinamiche istituzionali. L’Aeronautica avrebbe infatti assunto il controllo della specialità, incorporandone il ruolo nel dinamismo che caratterizzava l’identità bellica del mezzo aereo1. Il caso tedesco segnala peraltro il peculiare carattere dell’autonomia dell’arma di Goering, il cui sviluppo di fondo era comunque nutrito dal prevalere di una visione terrestre e continentale e, pertanto, dalla necessità concreta di integrare il proprio ruolo alla spinta della armata di terra. In ogni contesto nazionale la specialità si poneva al centro dei rapporti interforze, rimodulando su basi moderne la tradizione delle fanterie d’assalto e vincolandola, per formazione, addestramento e impiego all’Aeronautica ed alla pianificazione aerea di ciascun paese. Si tratta dunque di una collocazione esemplare e rivelatrice dei caratteri, dei limiti e dell’evoluzione, della dinamica interforze anche in contesto italiano, in una 1 Per il complesso di questi aspetti cfr F.O. Mikshe, Paratroupes. L’historie, l’organization et l’emploi tactique des forces aeroportées, Paris, Payot, 1946 e anche Marco Di Giovanni, I paracadutisti italiani. Volontari, miti e memoria della seconda guerra mondiale, Gorizia, LEG, 1991 pp. 23 ss. La specialità tedesca, avviata nel 1937, si consolidò in vista dell’offensiva ad occidente nella primavera del 1940, in cui vennero impiegate, in varie fasi, unità del primo reggimento. La costituzione di una intera divisione, su due reggimenti, si compì nei mesi successivi e si integrò allo sviluppo di una dottrina di impiego che vedeva la collaborazione di reparti aviolanciati, divisioni di fanteria aviotrasportate e speciali unità d’assalto trasportate con alianti. Un quadro complesso, che prevedeva l’allestimento di speciali armamenti ed attrezzature ed un intenso addestramento anche degli equipaggi dei vettori, oltre che una formazione d’assalto anche per le ordinarie unità di fanteria. L’impiego integrato di tali unità venne sperimentato, con successo ma altissimi costi, nell’operazione Merkur, la conquista di Creta, nel maggio del 1941. Su tale esperienza, anche come fonte per la costituzione di reparti britannici, si veda una relazione inglese del giugno 1941 in AUSSME, Fondo SME, Racc. 3, cart. 4

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fase che vede tutte le maggiori potenze chiamate, di fronte alla complessità delle operazioni che la nuova guerra imponeva, a sviluppare effettivamente capacità “joint”2. Il caso della pianificazione dell’operazione di attacco a Malta, per quanto concerne le unità paracadutiste, rende inoltre evidente il tipo di rapporto istituitosi nella guerra di coalizione dell’Asse ed illumina ancora una volta la sostanziale dipendenza delle scelte italiane da quelle dell’alleato. In questo caso, alla disparità di obiettivi tra i due alleati si affiancava la dipendenza tecnologico - operativa italiana nel rendere sostanzialmente impossibili autonome assunzioni d’iniziativa nel teatro di operazioni prescelto e decisivo per l’Italia Il caso italiano conferma in fondo il tessuto delle tensioni strategico-operative da cui germina la formazione della nuova specialità, connotandolo con le contraddizioni ed incertezze strategiche e con i limiti di programmazione peculiari dell’Italia di fronte alla nuova guerra. Non è un caso che le prime unità paracadutiste venissero formate in Libia e per volontà del Governatore Italo Balbo, ex ministro dell’Aeronautica e propugnatore, in contesto africano, di una sia pur velleitaria pianificazione offensiva della guerra futura. Ne sarebbe scaturita una operazione di modesto respiro, da cui nacquero un paio di battaglioni (in realtà unità del peso complessivo di circa 200 uomini, destinati a dilatarsi solo a guerra incipiente) il cui sviluppo, dopo un pretenzioso esordio in esercitazione, nel 1938, non sedimentò frutti ed esperienze utili, sul piano della collaborazione interforze, della dottrina di impiego, dello sviluppo dei materiali e dei mezzi di volo, per quanto sarebbe stato realizzato successivamente in patria3. In territorio metropolitano, lo Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito aveva previsto la creazione di un battaglione paracadutisti nel 1936. La relativa indefinitezza di obiettivi (limitati ad azioni di guastatori dietro le linee) e mezzi di impiego ne avevano però congelato la nascita sino allo scoppio della guerra4. Solo dal 1939 l’Esercito avviò la effettiva costituzione della specialità che fu sostanzialmente slegata dalle esperienze condotte in Libia. Una faticosa gestazione che risentiva anche del peso di un generale conservatorismo di impostazione e di restrizioni di bilancio che minavano spinte innovative dalle prospettive incerte. La chiusura corporativa di ciascuna arma si palesava inoltre proprio di fronte al problema di alimentare esperienze che chiamassero in causa una effettiva collaborazione e pianificazione comune. L’arma aerea, cui spettava la costituzione e la gestione logistica ed organizzativa della Scuola paracadutisti, rivelò un notevole disinteresse per la specialità, relegandola ad una sede poco attrezzata, il piccolo aeroporto di Tarquinia, senza impegnarsi in spese di allestimento delle strutture di base per i reparti

2 Interessanti considerazioni coeve erano mosse da una relazione del SIM diretta al Capo di stato maggiore generale avente per oggetto “Organizzazione, addestramento e impiego dei paracadutisti negli eserciti tedesco, francese e sovietico” datata 6 giugno 1940, in NAW, Italian military records, roll. 130. 3 Sul complesso di questa vicenda rinvio a M. Di Giovanni, I paracadutisti …, op. cit., pp. 31- 36 4 Significativo ma privo di seguito un certo interesse dell’Aeronautica per l’impiego tattico della nuova specialità, segnalato da una articolo del maggiore pilota Gianni Bordini, Sbarchi aerei in “Rivista aeronautica”, 1937, n. 4, pp. 15-24

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da costituire, delle quali, alla fine, si fece carico l’Esercito5. Di qui, anche, l’assenza di qualsiasi studio preliminare in merito al materiale tecnico necessario, primi tra tutti naturalmente i paracadute, e di adeguati approfondimenti in tema di mezzi di trasporto aereo. Per parte sua l’Esercito, cui competevano formazione e addestramento dei reparti, si curò della specialità solo a guerra iniziata6. Nel 1940 la Scuola di Tarquinia divenne effettivamente l’ente preposto alla creazione della specialità: addestramento, studio dei materiali necessari, formazione del personale di volo adibito al lancio. Una collaborazione con l’alleato tedesco fu attivata già alla fine del 1940, quando una Commissione del Reparto studi della Scuola si recò in Germania per studiare ed acquisire il paracadute tedesco che, modificato a Tarquinia, venne adottato dai reparti italiani a partire dal marzo 1941, mese in cui fu possibile effettivamente brevettare il primo battaglione nazionale7. Secondo i ritmi sussultori di una guerra che pretendeva ancora di svilupparsi “parallela” a quella dell’alleato, i reparti furono interessati da progetti di impiego che esulavano largamente dal loro grado di preparazione. Nell’autunno del 1940, per diretta volontà di Mussolini, si era avventuristicamente ipotizzata la presa di Corfù. Analogamente, nel febbraio-marzo del 1941, lo SME fu chiamato a studiare il lancio di un reparto paracadutisti sul canale di Corinto, in vista degli esiti dell’offensiva prevista sul fronte albanese. L’esigenza 2P, secondo la denominazione in codice, mise subito alla prova dei fatti gli esiti delle dinamiche interforze di lungo periodo. Lo studio dello SME poneva in evidenza la sostanziale assenza di mezzi aerei adatti al lancio di guerra. I pochi utilizzabili, gli S. 82, erano destinati ad altri ed usuranti impieghi né la produzione nazionale offriva prospettive realistiche e rapide di soluzione del problema8. Una carenza che si rifletteva su aspetti sostanziali della fungibilità operativa dei reparti : l’addestramento avveniva su vecchi Ca 133, lenti e poco capienti, e ciò rendeva inappropriata anche la formazione dei direttori di lancio e degli osservatori, chiamati a misurarsi con velocità di approccio all’obiettivo e di aviolancio lontane dalle condizioni di combattimento. Ne scaturiva, sin da allora, la consapevolezza che l’impiego operativo della specialità sarebbe dipeso da un sostanzioso e determinante contributo dell’alleato tedesco, almeno in termini di mezzi aerei. Il comando supremo tedesco aveva accolto le richieste dell’alleato ed a marzo si ipotizzava il lancio di due battaglioni italiani grazie all’intervento di 30 JU 52 con relativi equipaggi e personale tecnico. Se teniamo conto che il progetto prevedeva anche il lancio di un piccolo reparto del battaglione di fanteria di Marina San Marco, apposita5 Cfr M. Di Giovanni, I paracadutisti …, op. cit., pp. 28-31. Anche la costituzione della Scuola di Castel Benito, in Libia, era avvenuta senza la ratifica dell’Aeronautica, che aveva inteso scaricare le spese di impianto sull’amministrazione coloniale 6 Del resto l’iniziativa balbiana, sul finire del 1939, aveva fatto emergere l’ipotesi di accorpare in Libia lo sviluppo della specialità, evidentemente non ancora pienamente accolto in seno all’Esercito e con piena soddisfazione dell’Aeronautica 7 Su questa fase di vita della Scuola, con tutte le sue difficoltà, è di grande interesse la relazione del Capo della sezione addestramento, maggiore Giovanni Verando in MSBPF, Relazione Verando, dattiloscritto 1941 8 Sul complesso di questa vicenda rinvio a M. Di Giovanni, I paracadutisti …, op. cit., …, pp. 89-94 con la documentazione dello SME da NAW, .. roll, 127

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mente addestrato a Tarquinia, ed il concorso di forze navali, ci troviamo di fronte ad una dinamica operativa complessa, che anticipava elementi di integrazione interforze e tra alleati che avrebbero fortemente segnato la pianificazione dell’attacco a Malta. L’esito della 2P, abbandonata anche per il mancato sfondamento italiano del fronte, fu però diverso e in qualche modo rivelatore e certo fu alla base, un anno dopo, delle perplessità tedesche sulla effettiva determinazione italiana a portare a fondo un’azione ancora più impegnativa come quella su Malta. Il mancato sfondamento sul fronte albanese e la prospettiva di un imminente diretto intervento tedesco fecero cadere le prospettive italiane di concretizzare l’operazione. Furono così i tedeschi a carpirne il senso ed il lustro, conducendo con successo la presa del canale di Corinto il 26 aprile. In vista della grande azione aviotrasportata su Creta essi si sentirono di richiedere all’Italia solo una collaborazione navale9. L’unico aviolancio militare italiano si ebbe il 30 aprile sull’isola di Cefalonia, in un contesto ormai pacificato con la resa greca. Il lancio confermò i limiti segnalati: per carenza di trasporti fu possibile impiegare solo la metà degli uomini previsti (una settantina); i soli tre S 82 disponibili si persero in volo e l’inesperienza degli equipaggi contribuì ad accentuare la conseguente dispersione di uomini e materiali con errori di lancio. La pronta resa della gendarmeria locale evitò comunque esiti infausti. Il confronto con l’operazione Merkur su Creta era destinato e diventare un filo conduttore della costituzione italiana di una intera divisione della specialità ed anche dei potenziali impieghi operativi di questa, intrecciandosi come detto sin dalle origini, per necessità, ad una stretta collaborazione con l’alleato tedesco Tra la primavera del 1941 e l’estate del 1942 si ebbe pertanto una rapida dilatazione della specialità e dei compiti della Scuola. La costituzione di una grande unità su tre reggimenti (ed uno di artiglieria, secondo il quadro organico della primavera del 1942), definita proprio in questa fase, il precisarsi dei concetti di impiego, l’affinarsi delle procedure addestrative ed una buona selezione del personale, rientrano in un più ampio processo di recupero qualitativo dell’esercito italiano in quella fase10. Per iniziativa di vertice ma anche sulla base dell’esperienza diretta (si pensi al teatro africano ed alla partecipazione italiana ad una moderna guerra motocorazzata) si puntò a riqualificare i combattenti italiani, almeno recuperando parte delle carenza addestrative che la prima fase della guerra aveva pesantemente palesato. La specialità paracadutisti tese a qualificarsi come espressione di élite per intensità di addestramento e qualità di quadri ed ufficiali. Preparazione individuale e di reparto approfondita e relativamente anomala nel quadro della tradizione italiana (oltre che alla selezione fisica si valorizzava l’iniziativa individuale e a livello di nuclei minori, con attenzione al ruolo dei quadri e degli ufficiali inferiori e la preparazione alle armi, sotto la guida di attenti ufficiali di stato maggiore). 9 Per il quadro della partecipazione italiana cfr A. Santoni- F. Mattesini, La partecipazione tedesca alla guerra aeronavale nel Mediterraneo (1940-1945), Roma, Edizioni dell’Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1980, pp. 80-95. 10 La cornice di riferimento è quella che emerge a partire dagli studi di Lucio Ceva, sul Comando Supremo (La condotta italiana della guerra. Cavallero e il Comando supremo 1941-1942, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1975) e sulle operazioni in Africa settentrionale (Africa settentrionale 1940-1943 : negli studi e nella letteratura, Roma, Bonacci, 1980)

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Un quadro di competenze articolato e qualificante tale da conferire ai reparti qualità di truppe di élite (i reparti destinati a Malta avrebbero maturato un periodo di formazione qualificata oscillante tra i 12 e i 22 mesi, sostanzialmente in linea con i parametri delle unità scelte dell’esercito britannico). La stessa Scuola di Applicazione di Fanteria vide lo sviluppo di studi sull’impiego tattico delle unità, in formazioni assai ampie ed in collaborazione con reparti aviotrasportati destinati, con armamento pesante, al supporto dell’azione avviata dai lanci11. In vista dell’azione su Malta, ai reparti divisionali si affiancarono quelli di altre armi, la Marina e l’Aeronautica, con la costituzione di unità incursori che consolidavano una prospettiva operativa interforze12. A fronte di ciò, l’Aeronautica italiana rimase con continuità “un passo indietro”, limitando l’impegno per uno sviluppo adeguato della Scuola e quello per l’adeguamento dei mezzi aerei e la formazione del personale addetto ai lanci. Autorevoli ufficiali della costituenda divisione giunsero a prospettare, sull’esempio tedesco, la necessità che la specialità venisse posta per intero sotto la dipendenza, e quindi la responsabilità, dell’Aeronautica. Proprio scrivendo al Capo di gabinetto del Ministero, era il colonnello Alberto Bechi Luserna, autentica anima della costituenda divisione, a prospettare questa necessità: “I paracadutisti, posti come sono alle dipendenze del’Esercito, non “vanno”. Incomprensioni, interferenze, ritardi di ogni genere ne minano seriamente l’efficienza. Già da tempo me ne ero convinto. Ora ho l’autorevole appoggio del gen. Ramke e degli altri ufficiali germanici qui giunti per uno scambio d’idee. Il generale, Ramke, che già aveva espresso nella sua conferenza innanzi al Duce la necessità di trasferirci all’Aeronautica, mi ha assicurato che sarebbe tornato alla carica. Ritiene che, altrimenti, ogni futura nostra impresa sarebbe destinata al fallimento od a sterili risultati. Il parere è pienamente condiviso da tutti noi ufficiali paracadutisti”. 13 Le ipotesi operative interforze e la pianificazione “tripartita” del’attacco a Malta Un impiego di paracadutisti in una eventuale operazione volta alla conquista di Malta appariva in uno studio del giugno del 1940 dello Stato Maggiore della Marina, attento, anche negli aggiornamenti successivi, alla dimensione aerea di un’operazione del genere14. Quando la stasi operativa seguita alla sospensione dell’operazione Seelöwe aprì una finestra nella pianificazione strategica tedesca, l’ammiraglio Raeder avviò studi che prevedevano un intervento tedesco nel Mediterraneo. A fianco dell’invio del DAK in Libia, 11 Cfr M. Di Giovanni, I paracadutisti.., op. cit., pp. 125 ss. 12 La Marina diede sviluppo al nucleo di paracadutisti / marinai predisposto in vista dell’azione su Corinto, dando vita ad un battaglione di nuotatori paracadutisti con funzione di sabotatori incursori. L’Aeronautica costituì un piccolo reggimento su due battaglioni di incursori e riattatori per campi di aviazione 13 La lettera, non datata ma recante il timbro ministeriale del 6 maggio 1942 è in ACS, Min. Aeronautica, Gabinetto, 1942, b. 7, fasc. 11, s.fasc. 3 14 Per la vicenda generale della pianificazione rinvio naturalmente a M. Gabriele, , Operazione C/3 : Malta, Roma, USMM, 1965 (2. ed. 1990). In particolare per gli esordi dell’attenzione della Marina cfr pp. 42-44. Le forti responsabilità da attribuire all’Aeronautica, in termini di neutralizzazione da bombardamento, copertura aerea e certo anche collaborazione diretta alle operazioni principali, erano comunque sempre al centro degli aggiornamenti della questione

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trovò spazio allora sia la collocazione di supporto nell’area del X CAT, sia la messa a fuoco della questione di Malta. Investita dall’azione aerea delle forze di Kesselring, l’isola fu oggetto di un progetto di conquista elaborato tra il febbraio e il marzo 1941 come operazione essenzialmente aerea e condotta da sole unità tedesche: una divisione paracadutisti (laVII) ed una aviotrasportata, le stesse che sarebbero poi state impiegate su Corinto e su Creta15. A partire da questa fase, la questione della presa di Malta si pose all’attenzione del Comando Supremo e dell’Esercito e, sul finire del 1941, divenne oggetto di un intento condiviso con i comandi tedeschi di settore. Lo sviluppo italiano della specialità paracadutisti assunse una funzione più chiara e fu così posta al centro di una complessa pianificazione, interforze e interalleata. All’inizio del ‘42 era stato istituito un comitato italiano interforze di studio, che definì il quadro delle unità destinate all’operazione e della “Forza navale speciale” che doveva condurne la fondamentale componente di sbarco. La divisione paracadutisti Folgore e la divisione aviotrasportabile La Spezia dovevano essere sottoposte a speciale addestramento. Per queste unità, come del resto per il quadro aereo complessivo dell’operazione, risultava da subito evidente ed urgentissimo un indispensabile contributo dell’alleato in termini di materiali, armamenti speciali e di esperienza. E’ in questa fase della pianificazione che si intreccia una fitta rete di consulenze e relazioni con esperti tedeschi (in particolare paracadutisti, ma anche della Marina per la scottante questione delle unità da sbarco) e giapponesi. La delegazione nipponica guidata dall’ammiraglio Abe fu chiamata anzi a stilare un piano di invasione destinato ad essere posto a confronto e discusso con quelli sviluppati dalle singole armi e dallo Stato maggiore generale.16 Già l’8 e il 9 febbraio in una riunione di vertice tra Cavallero e Kesselring, prendeva corpo l’esigenza di affiancare ai paracadutisti italiani analoghe unità tedesche. Ciò superando le perplessità e resistenze dell’OKW dopo la dura esperienza di Creta ed alla luce delle difficoltà ancora maggiori che l’azione su Malta, ormai munitissima e certamente preparata ad un assalto dal cielo, presentava17. Il piano sviluppato dal Comando supremo prevedeva l’impiego iniziale di due divisioni paracadutisti e due aviotrasportate. Dunque un ruolo di primissimo piano per l’aggiramento verticale, volto ad accelerare i tempi di un’azione che poteva contare solo su una stretta finestra temporale di superiorità navale negli sbarchi. Un aspetto che, in questa fase, accentuava le incertezze hitleriane, anche alla luce della costosa esperienza di Creta. Eppure, erano proprio i comandi locali tedeschi ad enfatizzare il ruolo potenziale dell’attacco dal cielo, ponendolo al centro della esecuzione eventuale di un “colpo di mano” in caso di evidente cedimento delle difese dell’isola sotto la pressione

15 Cfr ibidem, pp. 64-65 16 Cfr ibidem, pp. 103-107 e 115 ss. 17 Cfr ibidem, p. 99

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dell’attacco aereo e dell’assedio in corso18. Un’azione risolutiva sostenuta anche dalla consapevolezza che i mezzi resisi al momento disponibili per la pressione sull’isola erano soggetti, sul piano strategico, ad un prevedibile ritiro, vista la sostanziale priorità attribuita al fronte orientale che imponeva nel Mediterraneo una politica tedesca delle “mezze misure”19. Una proposta tedesca in tal senso veniva avanzata da Kesselring il 17 marzo ma Cavallero doveva ribadire che un impegno italiano in tale eventualità dipendeva esclusivamente dalla certa ed immediata disponibilità tedesca a fornire anche proprie unità aviolanciabili e gli indispensabili vettori aerei per i paracadutisti italiani (8 battaglioni) in corso di addestramento con la supervisione del generale Ramke. L’11 aprile, tornando sull’ipotesi di colpo di mano, Cavallero doveva confermare che per il mese di maggio i paracadutisti italiani non sarebbero stati ancora pronti20. Prendeva corpo dunque la richiesta di una significativa compartecipazione tedesca e sembrava in fondo riproporsi uno schema visto nella primavera precedente, quando le carenze e le incertezze italiane avevano lasciato ai tedeschi l’onere di agire. I colloqui al vertice di Klessheim (29-30 aprile) fissarono l’ipotesi di successione operativa tra una limitata offensiva in Africa, per evitare iniziative britanniche da Tobruk, e l’attacco a Malta e dettero la certezza della disponibilità di importanti reparti tedeschi (divisione paracadutisti e aviotrasportata), di alianti da trasporto e JU 52 per il lancio. Se il quadro dell’azione prendeva dunque corpo proprio in virtù del contributo tedesco, già nel mese di maggio parte cospicua del II CAT veniva ritirata dal settore in vista dell’offensiva sul fronte orientale, confermando i limiti della propensione hitleriana a dare respiro agli sviluppi mediterranei. Da parte italiana la preparazione era stata accelerata, coprendo però con difficoltà l’ampio ventaglio di esigenze che l’operazione presentava. La pianificazione italiana era stata avviata nell’ottobre 1941 e prevedeva un apposito allestimento della Forza navale speciale, affidata al comando dell’ammiraglio Tur21. L’aspetto navale, sempre del massimo rilievo, comportava un impegnativo allestimento di materiali e mezzi speciali per i quali, ancora una volta, l’apporto tedesco risultava decisivo (in aggiunta alle richieste di forniture extra di carburanti e materie prime appunto finalizzate alla preparazione e conduzione dell’operazione). Il problema dei mezzi da sbarco sarebbe rimasto a lungo carico di incognite (anche per i mezzi di attracco), ma comportava ad esempio richieste 18 Le pubblicazioni sulla vicenda difensiva di Malta, di parte britannica, sono numerosissime e testimoniano il peso di quel’esperienza nel quadro della memoria inglese della guerra nel Mediterraneo. Per il contributo italiano, assai modesto, all’assedio, a fasi alterne, dell’aviazione tedesca, rinviamo, oltre che a G. Santoro, L’aeronautica italiana nella seconda guerra mondiale, 2 v., Roma, Esse, 1957, anche alla rapida cronaca di Nicola Malizia, Inferno su Malta: la più lunga battaglia aeronavale della seconda guerra mondiale, Milano, Mursia, 1976. 19 Cfr K. Assmann, Anni fatali per la Germania, Roma, Garzanti, 1953, p. 265 20 Cfr M. Gabriele, Operazione.., op. cit. p. 129 21 Una valutazione generale del livello di preparazione dell’operazione, con una polemica difesa della determinazione del Comando della Marina a condurre l’operazione, in V. Tur, Plancia ammiraglio, 3 vol., Roma : Edizioni moderne [poi Canesi.] , 1959 – 1963, vol. 3, pp. 417 ss.. Per un quadro strategico generale dell’operazione C3 cfr Giorgio Giorgerini, Da Matapan al Golfo Persico. La Marina militare italiana dal fascismo alla Repubblica, Milano,m Mondadori, 1989

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di mezzi speciali agli alleati man mano che la pianificazione assumeva forma. Già l’8 e il 9 febbraio1942, ad esempio, in una riunione di vertice tra Cavallero, Kesselring e l’ammiraglio Riccardi, era evidente la necessità di ricevere dai tedeschi una ingente quantità di motozattere Siebelfahre, oltre ai motori per quelle di costruzione italiana22. L’azione navale poteva così essere ipotizzata solo per la seconda metà di luglio allineandosi, non senza incognite, ai tempi previsti dalle scelte strategiche operate al convegno di Klessheim. La oscillante disponibilità di Hitler e dell’OKW non si nutriva solo delle incertezze italiane ma anche delle difficoltà di successo dello sbarco ed in particolare dell’aggiramento verticale. Uno degli elementi critici dell’assetto difensivo maltese, con la fitta rete di fortificazioni interne che proteggevano quelle costiere, era la distribuzione “naturale” di muretti a secco che, nati per uso agricolo, erano stati incrementati in vista di possibili attacchi dei paracadutisti, La difficoltà di atterraggio, ed in particolare di approdo per gli alianti, come a Creta, era un elemento critico in azioni che dovevano portare a rapidi successi per liberare il campo, almeno in parte, ai movimenti degli sbarchi dal mare. I tempi presunti del dominio aeronavale nell’area, contenuti in 48 ore, imponevano rapide iniziali azioni di rottura, anche particolarmente arrischiate ma necessarie ad accelerare i tempi dell’azione sul terreno nelle fasi in cui era possibile ipotizzarne alimentazione e copertura. Il lancio dei paracadutisti era pertanto inizialmente previsto di notte, con una assunzione molto alta di rischi. L’operazione, complessa e articolata, imponeva pertanto anche un decisivo sforzo anfibio capace di supplire all’incertezza del successo degli aviosbarchi Nella pianificazione finale gli aviolanci per la costruzione di una testa di sbarco nel sud dell’isola vennero infine collocati alla luce del giorno, in 3 ondate seguite dagli sbarchi di alianti come azione di fiancheggiamento Le unità dovevano portare al seguito tutte le dotazioni ed i rifornimenti necessari per un tempo minimo (5 giornate). L’arduo compito era di soluzione tutta tedesca e prevedeva l’impiego di alianti armati e migliorati rispetto all’esperienza di Creta, e centinaia di aerei trasporto Gothas 242 nonché di alcuni Giganten da 24 tonnellate. Il comando del corpo d’armata d’aviosbarco era assegnato ad un veterano come il generale Student23. Nel complesso di un’operazione integrata assai complessa, all’Italia competeva il comando ed il ruolo assolutamente principale nelle operazioni navali ed il comando del corpo di spedizione a terra24. Se dunque gli elementi di punta dell’aggiramento verticale rientravano nel controllo e nelle prerogative tedesche, l’operazione contro Malta avrebbe avuto, se realizzata, una significativa impronta italiana. Non fu comunque per questo che essa non si realizzò, anche se la relativa lentezza di preparazione e i limiti italiani in termini di autonoma 22 Cfr M. Gabriele, Operazione.., op. cit , in particolare pp. 99 ss. 23 Per il quadro tedesco dell’operazione cfr F. Schneider, Les Troupes Aéroportées Allemandes en 1939-1945. L’opération « Hercule » (Malte) et son abandon, in « Revue de Défense Nationale », 1952 24 Uno stato maggiore misto per l’esigenza C3 era stato costituito il 12 aprile. Il comando dell’azione a terra sarebbe stato attribuito al generale Vecchiarelli.

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disponibilità di mezzi per un’azione aerotrasportata non resero praticabili le ipotesi di un rapido colpo di mano svincolato dalle oscillazioni dei vertici germanici. Di fatto, le condizioni per cui tale modalità di azione potesse realizzarsi non si concretizzarono mai. Nella dinamica delle scelte strategiche tedesche, dopo lo sforzo ed i costi di Creta nel 1941, non c’era spazio per correre l’alea di una operazione incerta ed ancora più complessa come quella di Malta in uno scacchiere periferico che poteva poggiare le sue sorti sulle momentaneamente più concrete e promettenti prospettive di successo nell’affondo terrestre verso il Delta. Ancorchè rimasta sulla carta, l’azione su Malta rivestì panni indiscutibilmente moderni. Anche prescindendo dalla componente navale, certamente decisiva, le unità di punta italiane che erano chiamate ad aprirla dovevano operare in maniera congiunta con gli alleati, appaiando l’apporto italiano ai livelli qualitativi delle truppe tedesche di élite. In fondo, anche il comune destino che legò parte cospicua della Divisione Folgore e la brigata Ramke, inviate entrambe in Africa settentrionale per tamponare le falle del fronte ma con la riserva di un eventuale impiego nell’azione decisiva sul Delta , vincola ancora strettamente quello sviluppo di specialità ad una prospettiva operativa non solo interforze ma interalleata, conferendole una posizione particolare nella parabola della guerra dell’Asse.

Fonti archivistiche Archivio centrale dello stato (ACS), fondi: Ministero Aeronautica, Ministero dell’Interno A5/g, Seconda guerra mondiale, AAGGRR; Segreteria particolare del Duce, carteggi ordinario e riservato 1922-1943 National Archives, Washington (NAW), Collection of Italian military records Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio storico Fondo SME Diari storici Museo Brigata paracadutisti Folgore, Livorno Carteggi e diari

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La participation des Polonais dans l’operation Overlord en 1944 Tadeusz PANECKI

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opération « Overlord » durant du 6 juin jusqu’au 31 août 1944 a été la plus grande opération navale de débarquement dans l’histoire du monde. Le but de cette opération consistait à briser les défenses côtières allemandes du mur de l’Atlantique et à prendre des têtes de pont sur le continent européen, et à commencer la libération de l’Europe de l’Ouest. L’opération a débuté la nuit du 5 au 6 juin par le débarquement des 82e et 101e divisions américaines aéroportées et de la 6e division britannique aéroportée ; le débarquement après lequel les forces américano-britanno-canadiennes ont débarqué sur les plages de Normandie. Les forces d’invasion, ayant pris des têtes de pont, menaient leurs opérations de guerre au nord-ouest du territoire français. Au mois d’août, pendant la bataille de Falaise, qui était le point culminant, la plupart des troupes allemandes ont été encerclées et détruites ce qui a permis aux alliés de traverser la Seine et de libérer Paris. L’opération « Overlord » a duré 3 mois et a pris fin le 31 août, lorsque la poursuite opérationnelle de l’armée allemande reculant, effectuée par les alliés, a commencé. Au même temps l’opération « Overlord » a ouvert le II front en Europe, après le front est et les opérations sur la péninsule italique. A partir de ce moment le sort du III Reich a été incontournable, et la défaite de l’Allemagne n’était qu’une question des mois les plus proches. Au sens militaire, lors de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, l’opération « Overlord » a été la plus grande opération combinée : navalo-aéro-terrestre aussi bien en ce qui concerne l’engagement de forces et de moyens que l’envergure du résultat obtenu. Dans l’opération « Overlord » ont aussi participé les unités des Forces armées polonaises sous l’allégeance du Gouvernement polonais en exil. En parlant de l’engagement polonais dans cette opération il faut toujours garder en mémoire que cela concerne le pays occupé dès 1939 par les Allemands, et dont la représentation politique a trouvé l’hospitalité tout d’abord en France, et ensuite en Grande Bretagne. Il s’agit d’une armée organisée à l’étranger avec toutes les conséquences concernant son ampleur, son potentiel et ses possibilités militaires. Vu l’engagement des grandes puissances, tels les EtatsUnis, telle la Grande Bretagne, envisageons la présence polonaise, toutes proportions gardées. Cette présence s’est fait marquer dans deux phases : - la première phase (le débarquement des alliés sur les plages de Normandie) : la participation des unités des Forces aériennes polonaises et de la Marine de guerre polonaise ; - la deuxième phase (les opérations terrestres après la prise de têtes de pont) : la participation de la 1ère Division blindée polonaise. Quand à l’aube, le 6 juin 1944 les alliés commençaient le débarquement naval et aérien sur le continent européen, les navires de la Marine de guerre polonaise opéra-

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tionnellement attachés à la Royal Navy ont été directement engagés dans les opérations de guerre ; de même, les avions des Forces aériennes polonaises combattant dans la Royal Air Force. En ce moment, la 1ère Division blindée polonaise commandée par le général Stanisław Maczek se trouvait toujours en Angleterre finissant les préparatifs au déplacement sur le continent. Dès le premier jour du débarquement des alliés en Normandie, cinq navires polonais supportaient les armées alliés : croiseur NRP (Navire de République de Pologne) « Dragon », et distroyeurs : NRP « Błyskawica », « Krakowiak », « Piorun », « Ślązak ». En plus, 8 paquebots de la Marine commerciale polonaise qui ont pris part dans le débarquement (« Modlin », « Kmicic », « Kordecki », « Chorzów », « Narocz », « Wilno », « Katowice » et « Poznań ») ravitaillaient les forces américaines dans le secteur ouest du terrain du débarquement. NRP « Dragon » (le commandant : le capitaine de vaisseau Stanisław Dzienisiewicz) – l’un des plus petits navires dans sa classe parmi les navires dans l’équipe du contre-amiral W. R. Patterson - supportait les forces britanniques sur extrème l’aile gauche du terrain du débarquement. Cette équipe contenant 2 cuirassés, 1 monitor et 5 croiseurs légers combattaient les batteries côtières de l’ennemi agitant en faveur de la section « Sword » située au nord de Caen. Le 6 juin, les canons 152 mm du croiseur polonais dirigés par radio depuis sol sont entrés en lutte avec la batterie allemande 105 mm, et l’ayant détruite ils ont pilonné la batterie lourde 150 mm, et ensuite les positions de l’infanterie allemande, près de Caen. Le 6 juin, de l’aube, les distroyers d’escorte polonais : « Ślązak » (le commandant - le capitaine de vaisseau Romuald Tymiński) et « Krakowiak » (le commandant - le capitaine de frégate W. Maracewicz) se trouvaient dans la section « Sword ». Leur rôle était de protéger de l’est l’équipe du contre-amiral Patterson attaquée par les distroyers allemands. Pendant le refoulement d’une des attaques, NRP « Krakowiak » et les navires britanniques ont fait ensemble couler les deux unités auxiliaires de la Kriegsmarine. NRP « Ślązak » avec les navires de son groupe a pilonné les batteries côtières allemandes. Après leur élimination de la bataille, l’infanterie britannique a débarqué sur la plage et s’est apprêtée à l’attaque. La nuit, du 8 au 9 juin, les deux navires polonais ont pris part dans la bataille navale aux bord de l’îlot Ushant. Dans cette bataille ont aussi participé les navires suivants : NRP « Piorun » (le commandant – le capitaine de frégate Tadeusz Gorazdowski) et NRP « Błyskawica » (le commandant – le capitaine de vaisseau Konrad Namieśniowski) ; ce dernier a joué un rôle très important dans le naufrage du distroyer allemand. Deux jours après la bataille, les destroyers polonais « Krakowiak » et « Piorun » sont entrés en bataille avec des chasseurs et des dragueurs de mines allemands. Ensuite les navires polonais supportaient les forces sur les têtes de pont déjà prises et couvraient les paquebots transportant le ravitaillement de guerre. Le croiseur « Dragon » supportait avec le feu de ses canons les armées de terre sur la tête de pont dans la zone de Caen. La nuit du 7 au 8 juillet, il a été torpillé par une torpille humaine allemande type « Neger », et après cela, il servait à renforcer le brise-lames du port factice « Mulberry ». Dès le premier jour de l’opération « Overlord » 11 groupes d’aviation polonaise dont 8 chasseurs et 3 bombardiers participaient dans les opérations de guerre. La plupart des groupes d’aviation de chasse faisaient partie du 131e aile polonaise de chasse qui

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a été sous les ordres du commandant aviateur Julian Kowalski (groupe d’aviation 302 commandé par le capitaine aviateur Wacław Król, groupe d’aviation 308 commandé par le capitaine aviateur Witold Retinger, groupe d’aviation 317 commandé par le capitaine aviateur Włodzimierz Miksa) et la 133e aile polonaise de chasse commandée par le commandant aviateur Stanisław Skalski (groupe d’aviation 306 commandé par le capitaine aviateur Stanisław Łapka, groupe d’aviation 315 commandé par le capitaine aviateur Eugeniusz Horbaczewski, groupe d’aviation britannique 129 commandé par le commandant aviateur C. Haw). Le 6 juin les chasseurs polonais ont décollé quatre fois. Ils couvraient le débarquement de forces armées sur les plages de la zone de Cherbourg. Le 7 juin les groupes d’aviation de la 133e aile possédant les avions « Mustang III » ont descendu 16 « Messerschmitts ». Le 9 juillet la 133e aile a été retirée de la France pour aller sous les ordres de la Défense aérienne de la Grande Bretagne. Cependant la 131e aile munie d’avions « Spitfire Tx » prenait toujours part dans les opérations militaires aériennes sur la France. Pendant la bataille de Falaise, les avions polonais attaquaient les colonnes allemandes tentant de se dégager de l’encerclement. A part les groupes de chasse polonais organisés dans les deux escadres supportant les forces d’invasions, de même, combattaient les groupes de chasse polonais appartenant à la Défense aérienne de la Grande Bretagne : le 303e commandé par le capitaine aviateur Tadeusz Koc, le 316e (le commandant - le commandant aviateur Paweł Niemiec), et le 307e (le commandant - le commandant aviateur Gerard Ranoszek). Les pilotes polonais réalisaient des opérations de routine dans l’air, et en plus, ils luttaient contre les bombes volantes allemandes V-1, lesquelles, à partir du 13 juin étaient envoyées des rampes de lancement situées sur les côtes de la France et de la Belgique visant l’Angleterre et nottament Londres. Pendant les 3 mois de combat dans le cadre de l’opération « Overlord », les trois groupes de bombardement polonais prenaient aussi part dans les opérations aériennes : le 300e (le commandant - le commandant aviateur Teofil Pożyczka), le 304e (le commandant - le capitaine aviateur Czesław Korbut) et le 305e (le commandant - le commandant aviateur Kazimierz Konopasek). En juin, les bombardiers polonais attaquaient les cibles à l’arrière du front en France, ils détruisaient les rampes de lancement de bombes volantes V-1, et ensuite ils ont été incorporés à bombarder les objectifs sur le territoire du Reich. Une part très importante dans la bataille contre V-1 – arme allemande extêmement dangeureuse – revient aussi au groupe polonais de renseignements sous les ordres du capitaine Władysław Ważny (« Tigre »). Le groupe travaillait dans le nord de la France dans le cadre de l’organisation polonaise de services secrets : Organisation Polonaise de Combat pour l’Indépendance – POWN – (« Monika »). Le réseau du « Tigre » a localisé 173 rampes de lancement V-1, et par radio, il a transmis à Londres la localisations d’objectifs, après quoi les rampes ont été détruites par l’aviation des alliés. Le capitaine Ważny a été découvert par les Allemands, arrêté et exécuté. Tel a été l’engagement polonais dans la première phase de l’opération « Overlord » dans l’air et en mer. Dans la deuxième phase de l’opération la plus grande unité blindée des Forces armées polonaises c’est-à-dire la 1ère Division blindée polonaise a pris part.

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Cette unité avait débarqué sur la plage de Normandie le 29 juillet 1944. Il vaut bien de mentionner que c’était une unité particulière de l’Armée polonaise. En prenant en considération les changements d’organisation on peut dire que cette division a été une seule grande unité polonaise combattant dans les trois campagnes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale : dans la campagne polonaise de 1939, dans la campagne française de 1940 et dans les opérations d’invasion de 1944. Elle a changé deux fois de nom et de structure d’organisation. Tout de même, pendant toute la guerre la brigade restait héritière et continuatrice de la 10e Brigade de cavalerie d’avant guerre. Elle combattait dans toutes les campagnes sous les ordres du même commandant : le colonnel, et puis le général de la brigade Stanisław Maczek. Son histoire a commencé en 1937, quand la 10e Brigade de cavalerie a été muée en brigade blindée. Des chars, des voitures, des motos ont remplacés des chevaux ; les cavaliers depuis blindés se sont laissé une épaulette noire comme « deuil de cheval » (les Polonais sont très attachés à la tradition de cavalerie). Dans les luttes de septembre 1939, la brigade ne s’est pas laissé vaincre par les Allemands. Après la campagne perdue, la brigade armée et avec les drapeaux a franchi la frontière avec la Hongrie où elle a été internée. Bientôt, presque tous les soldats sont parvenus à aller en France où le général Władysław Sikorski était en train de former l’Armée polonaise. La 10e Brigade blindée reconstruite sur le sol français se battait dans la campagne de juin 1940. Après la capitulation de la France, les blindés du général Maczek se sont rassemblés en Ecosse où, avec le temps, on a créé la 1ère Division blindée. C’était la fierté et l’orgueil des forces polonaises, la plus grande et la plus forte unité dans notre histoire militaire. Il suffit de dire que cette division disposait de tant de chars que toute l’Armée polonaise en avait en 1939 ! La division comptait plus de 16 mille soldats et elle était munie de 380 chars, 470 canons, 4000 véhicules. Entre le 29 juillet et le 4 août, les détachements de la division polonaise ont débarqué sur les plages de Normandie, près d’Arromanches (la section « Gold »). La division a fait partie du 2e Corps canadien de la 1ère Armée (le commandant – le général H. Crerar) opérant dans la direction de Caen et de Falaise. L’attaque des Canadiens a commencé la nuit du 7 au 8 août. Le 2e Corps, comprenant deux divisions blindées : la 4e canadienne et la 1ère polonaise, a frontallement attaqué la 5e Armée blindée du général Sepp Dietrich. Sur la ligne d’attaque de la division polonaise on a constaté la présence de la 12e Division blindée SS et des 89e et 279e divisions d’infanterie de la Wehrmacht. Quand les détachements canadiens et polonais sont allés à l’attaque, à peu près 1000 bombardiers B-17 américains ont survolés et, par erreur, ont lancé une partie de bombes sur leurs propres positions. Dans la 1ère Division blindée 8 soldats ont trouvé la mort, et 20 soldats ont été blessés. Avant de tirer à l’ennemi, les blessés polonais ont subi des pertes à cause d’une erreur des alliés. Tout de même, cet incident n’a pas retenu l’attaque polonaise. Lors de la bataille de quelques jours les Polonais et les Canadiens n’arrivaient pas à fermer la poche de Falaise. Les Allemands étaient très bien armés et leurs canons antichars efficacement détruisaient les chars « Sherman » de la division. Le 18 août la division a reçu de nouveaux ordres de la part du chef du 2e Corps canadien, c’est-à-dire du général Guy G. Simonds lequel a ordonné aux Polonais de prendre Chambois et de couper ainsi aux Allemands la retraite et la possibilité de traverser la

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Seine. Après de violents combats Chambois a été pris le 19 août, et depuis, les opérations de guerre avaient le caractère d’une tenace défense encerclant d’importants points de terrain sur le trajet de déroute des forces allemandes tenant à se dégager de l’encerclement. Le 20 août pendant des luttes acharnées les Polonais ont capturé le général Otto Elfeldt - le commandant du 84e Corps et mille soldats allemands près. Se battant dans l’encerclement et subissant des pertes importantes d’hommes et de matériel, les Polonais ont gardé les positions prises jusqu’à la clôture et la liquidation complète de la poche de Falaise, c’est-à-dire, jusqu’à l’après-midi du 21 août. Ce jour-là la 4e Division blindée est survenue du nord-est et elle a établi une liaison directe avec les troupes polonaises. En même temps, les unités de front de la 2e Armée britannique sont venues de l’ouest, de la zone de Chambois. Pour les Polonais ce moment a signifié la fin de la lutte dans l’encerclement. On a pu commencer l’évacuation de blessés et de captifs. Les mots prononcés par le maréchal B. Montgomery (le commandant du 21e Groupe d’armées) témoignent du rôle très important joué par la 1ère Division blindée dans la lutte près de Falaise – Chambois : « Les Allemands étaient comme si on les avaient embouteillés, et la division polonaise était comme un bouchon servant à les refermer dans cette bouteille. » La victoire de Falaise a bien coûté la division : 446 blindés sont morts, 1500 ont été blessés. Après une semaine de repos et ayant complété les pertes d’hommes et de matériel, la 1ère Division blindée est partie aux suivantes opérations de guerre dans le cadre de la poursuite opérationnelle : le 3 septembre les Polonais ont pris Abbeville, et le 6 septembre ils ont franchi la frontière belge. Ensuite le chemin de bataille mène la division par la Belgique, par la Hollande jusqu’à l’Allemagne où il finira le 5 mai 1945 avec la conclusion de la capitulation de Wilhelmshaven – port allemand. En résumant, il faut souligner que l’opération « Overlord » a ouvert la voie à la liberté aux nations d’Europe étant sous l’occupation. A côté des fronts est et italien, le nouveau front ouest a été créé. Depuis, l’écroulement du III Reich a été inévitable. Dès le premier jour de l’opération normande, les marins et les pilotes polonais prenaient part dans les luttes, et fin juillet, la 1ère Division blindée s’est trouvée parmi les forces alliées. Cette division qui a marqué un très beau chemin de bataille, plein de gloire, depuis Falaise à Wilhelmshaven. Au mois de septembre, la 1ère Brigade indépendante de parachutistes polonais – unité élitaire des Forces armées polonaises, commandée par le général S. Sosabowski, a été jointe aux opérations de guerre. Elle a participé dans l’opération « Market – Garden » en Hollande. L’engagement polonais dans l’opération « Overlord » réflétait les possibilités des autorités polonaises agitant en exil, et contribuait à vaincre définitivement le III Reich et finir la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

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Bibliographie S. Ambrose, D-day 6 czerwca 1944. Warszawa 1999. W. Biegański (red.), Walki formacji polskich na Zachodzie 1939 – 1945. Warszawa 1981. R. Dequesnes, Normandie 1944 – le débarquement et la bataille de Normandie. Paris 2009. S. Maczek, Od podwody do czołga. Edynburg 1961. T. Panecki, Overlord – Polskie Siły Zbrojne w ramach drugiego frontu w Europie Zachodniej. Warszawa 1994. 1 Dywizja Pancerna. Zarys historii wojennej. Londyn 1964. O. Wieviorka, Histoire du débarquement en Normandie. Des origines à la libération. Paris 2007.

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The Bombing of Monte Cassino in 1944: Was it Reasonable? Was it Lawful? Fred L. BORCH Introduction he sixth century Abbey of Monte Cassino was the cradle of the Benedictine monastic order. In February 1944, the fortified town below the Abbey was a critical part of the German Gustav line, and consequently was holding up American Lieutenant General Mark Clark’s 5th Army from advancing to Rome. Indian troops under the command of New Zealand Lieutenant General Bernard Freyberg were directed to attack the town of Cassino. Afraid that German troops were watching from the Abbey, and would direct artillery fire upon them, Freyberg requested that the Abbey be bombed. General Clark resisted the bombing. He argued that it was not reasonable to attack the building because military necessity did not require it. Clark argued that the monastery should not be bombed because: (1) of the Abbey’s importance as a cultural and religious monument; (2) there was no credible evidence it was being used for military purposes by the enemy, and; (3) if reduced to rubble in an attack, the ruins would be occupied by the Germans, who could construct almost impregnable defensive positions. Clark’s hand was forced, however, by Freyberg, who was supported by British General Harold Alexander, Clark’s superior officer in the combined command arrangement. The Abbey, occupied only by monks and civilians (who had taken refuge there to escape the fighting), was demolished in a series of air raids. Not a single German soldier was killed---as none were near the abbey. The Vatican called the bombing “a piece of gross stupidity.” Professor (and USCMH member) Allan R. Millett called it “one of the most inexcusable bombings of the war.” This paper will discuss the principle of “military necessity” in the attack on Monte Cassino. Was the bombing of this historic religious site justified by military necessity? What about its importance as the cradle of the Benedictine monastic order? To what extent does a structure’s cultural significance preclude its destruction in combat? Did Freyberg’s belief that the abbey was an enemy position, or might become an enemy position, mean the attack on Monte Cassino was reasonable? Or did Clark’s reasons for declining to attack the cultural icon make it unreasonable to bomb it? Finally, what does the Law of Armed Conflict say about the attack on the Abbey?

Background By the beginning of 1944, the Allied 15th Army Group under Field Marshall Sir Harold Alexander was stalled at the “Gustav Line,” the name given to the German defensive positions in the mountains south of Rome. To break this stalemate, Alexander planned a frontal assault on the Gustav Line, which would be supported by an Allied amphibi-

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ous invasion at Anzio. Since Anzio was only thirty miles south of Rome---and behind German lines---the idea was that the 50,000 British and American troops comprising the U.S. VI Corps would wade ashore there, move inland, and outflank the Gustav Line. They would then link-up with Alexander’s forces, and drive on to Rome. It did not work out as planned, however, and Anzio became yet another stalemate. The Allies now decided to re-double their efforts on the Gustav Line around Cassino, and General Alexander chose the newly arrived 2nd New Zealand, 4th Indian, and 8th British Divisions, under the command of New Zealand Lieutenant General Sir Bernard Freyberg, to lead the upcoming assault. Freyberg, who had been awarded the Victoria Cross in World War I, studied the maps and terrain of the area, and decided that the Allies must take Monte Cassino if they were to advance on Rome. How should this mountain peak be captured? Major General F. I. S. Tuker, in command of the Indian Division, decided that the monastery located on the peak of Monte Cassino must be destroyed as part of the capture of Monte Cassino. He made this decision after driving into Naples, going into a bookshop, and finding a book published in 1879 that described the Abbey’s construction, dimensions, and thickness of its walls. In Tuker’s view, it was “unreasonable to ask his men to move against a position that was crowned by an enormous, intact fortress.”1 Tuker did not care whether the Germans were in the monastery or not, as he was convinced that the enemy would move into the abbey once the battle started and, once in the Abbey, would only with great difficulty---and at the cost of many lives---be dislodged. Tuker convinced Freyberg that the Abbey must be destroyed and, when Freyberg asked Major General John Cannon, the commander of the U.S. Twelfth Air Force, if the monastery could be destroyed from the air, Cannon replied: “If you let me use the whole of our bomber force against Cassino we will whip it out like a dead tooth.”2 Cannon’s statement (which seems rather foolish) reflected the prevailing view of American (and British) airmen that victory could be achieved through airpower: they would destroy Monte Cassino with blockbuster bombs, and then the infantry would simply move in. General Clark and other ground commanders, however, were not convinced. They were strongly opposed to the bombing for two reasons. First, the Hague and Geneva Conventions required that religious and cultural buildings be spared from the ravages of combat. In fact, the Combined Chiefs had recently advised General Dwight D. Eisenhower that churches and “all religious institutions shall be respected and all efforts made to preserve the local archives, historical and classical monuments, and objects of art.”3 But--and Clark and opponents of the bombing knew this---a religious or cultural icon could be attacked and destroyed if this were required by “military necessity.” Consequently, their second reason for opposing the bombing was that there was, in fact, no sound military reason for bombing the Abbey. Not only was there no compelling evidence that the Germans were using the monastery for any military purpose but, if the religious site were bombed, then the Germans definitely would move into the rubble that remained and set 1 Robert Wallace, The Italian Campaign (Alexandria, Va.: Time-Life, 1978), 141. 2 Id. 3 Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007), 432.

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up defensive positions. The Allies had learned in Sicily that a ruined town or destroyed structure will provide better protection for the enemy than one that is intact. It follows, argued Clark and others, that even if military necessity justified the destruction of the Abbey, the rubble that remained would only enhance the enemy’s defenses. Freyburg and those who supported bombing the Abbey---especially the airmen who believed that airpower would deliver victory---insisted that the Germans were in the monastery, and were using it for military purposes. American General Ira C. Eaker, commander of the allied air forces in the Mediterranean, and General Jacob Dever, the Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander, flew over the monastery at 1500 feet in a small observation airplane. They insisted when they returned that they had seen “Germans in the courtyard and also their antennas” along with a machine-gun emplacement less than 50 meters away.4 While Clark (and others) continued to protest that the bombing of the monastery was unnecessary and unreasonable, Freyburg convinced Alexander that the attack go forward. The result: on February 15, 1944, attacking in waves over several hours, American B-17s, B-25s, and B-26s dropped 600 tons of high explosives on the Abbey. Between these aerial attacks, ground-based artillery unleashed round after round on the target. Monks and civilian refugees---probably about 300 total---were killed in the raid. Not a single German lost his life---because the Germans were not using the Abbey for any purpose.5 As General Clark had predicted, the Germans quickly moved into the rubble of the monastery and set up mortar and machine gun positions. Although the soldiers of the 4th Indian Division did manage to fight their way to within 200 meters of the monastery, they could never capture it. Freyberg’s tactical incompetence was never rewarded; the Allies were able to occupy the Abbey only after the Germans withdrew of their own accord three months later.6 Who was correct? Could the monastery---despite its obvious cultural and religious value---be bombed because “military necessity” required it? This question can only be answered if one examines what is meant by the principle of military necessity in warfare. What is “military necessity?” It might come as some surprise that “military necessity”---one of the bedrock principles of war, since “no more force or greater violence should be used to carry out a military operation than is necessary”7---is not defined in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 or in Additional Protocol I of 1977. So what is it? According to the United States, “military necessity,” as understood in modern war, is the principle that “justifies those measures not forbidden by international law and which are indispensable for securing the com4 Id., at 433. 5 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), at 261 (“The Nazis had promised the Vatican that they would not use the Abbey, and they did not.”) 6 Wallace, note 1, at 145; Atkinson, note 3, at 437. 7 Frederic de Mulinen, Handbook of the Law of War for Armed Forces (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 1987), para. 352.

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plete submission of the enemy as soon as possible.”8 In the context of property, military necessity allows an Army (or Navy or Air Force or Marine Corps) to kill and destroy property, but only if this destruction is imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. There must be some reasonable connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy forces. It is lawful to destroy railways, lines of communication, or any other property that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and churches may even be destroyed if necessary for military operations.9 (emphasis supplied) But perhaps the best definition comes from Napoleon, who reportedly said: “My greatest maxim has always been, in politics and war alike, that every injury done to the enemy, even though permitted by the rules, is excusable only so far as it is absolutely necessary; everything beyond that is criminal.”10 Military necessity cannot be completely understood unless one considers two close related “core” principles of the law of armed conflict: unnecessary suffering and proportionality. This is because, even if military necessity lawfully permits an attack, a commander may still be restrained if the results of that attack cause unnecessary suffering. Hague Convention IV (1907), which was applicable to hostilities during World War II, states that “it is especially forbidden … to employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.”11 In this regard, unnecessary suffering is the obverse or “flip-side” of military necessity: while the former permits the infliction of suffering on the enemy, only that amount of suffering necessary to bring about the submission of that enemy is allowed. “Proportionality” is the other principle that limits military necessity. The concept was a part of Hague Convention IV---and consequently applicable to the decision-makers at Monte Cassino. Article 22 says: “The rights of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.”12 In other words, a commander may not make war without regard to civilians and their objects.13 As Additional Protocol I of 1977 explains in Article 51.5(b), it is a violation of the principle of proportionality if an attack damaging civilian property “would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”14 Article 57.2(b) of that same Protocol provides additional insight into the principle, since it requires that an attack “be cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a military one or … that the attack may be expected to cause … damage to civilian objects … which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”15 8 Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), para. 3.a, at 4. 9 Solis, note 5, at 259, quoting United States v. Wilhelm List, et al (“The Hostage Case”) (1948), XI TWC 125354. 10 Id., at 258. 11 Hague Convention IV, 1907, art. 23. 12 Hague Convention IV, 1907, art. 22. 13 Solis, note 5, at 273. 14 Additional Protocol I (1977), art. 51.5(b), http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750065 15 Additional Protocol I (1977), art. 57.2(b), http://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/470-750073

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Analysis Applying the principle of military necessity (and unnecessary suffering and proportionality) to Freyberg’s insistence that Monte Cassino be bombed, what evidence can be marshaled to support each position, and what conclusions may be drawn? For Freyberg: First, the Abbey was in enemy territory, and was on a key piece of terrain blocking the Allied advance on Rome. Second, Freyberg’s intent was to destroy an enemy target and, even if he believed that the Germans were not in the monastery, it was not unreasonable for him to conclude that they might occupy it once the battle commenced. Third, and finally, Freyberg was concerned about the risk to his own soldiers. As Freyberg put it to Clark when insisting that the Abbey must be bombed, Clark would “have to take the responsibility” for the dead New Zealanders, Indians and British that would result if the Germans in fact were in the Abbey.16 For Clark: First, the monastery was a world famous cultural and religious object and should be protected. Second, the Germans were not using it for military purpose – which would have been a violation of the law of war and deprived the Abbey of any protected status. While Generals Eaker and Devers insisted that they had seen enemy activity in or around the Abbey, others had not. Major General Geoffrey Keyes, for example, had taken his plane up and flown over the monastery; he reported that he had seen no signs of enemy activity.17 Third and finally, if the Abbey were destroyed, the Germans would now use the rubble to defend the position from attack. Said Clark: “If the Germans are not in the monastery now, they certainly will be in the rubble after the bombing ends.”18 Conclusion Freyberg’s intent was to destroy an enemy position, rather than a religious site. Alexander, who conceded that Clark’s points were valid, ultimately decided against him for one reason: “Bricks and mortar, no matter how venerable, cannot be allowed to weigh against human lives.” Freyberg was “a very important cog in the commonwealth effort. I would be most reluctant to take responsibility for his failing and for his telling his people: ‘I lost five thousand New Zealanders because they wouldn’t let me use the air as I wanted.’”19 Clark finally acquiesced---but not before he wrote that it was “too bad unnecessarily to destroy one of the art treasures of the world.” Of course, Clark was correct: Freyberg’s tactical incompetence in insisting that the Abbey be destroyed “brought no military advantage of any kind,” wrote the author of the official British history of the event.20 Post-war investigations also revealed that the Germans in fact had been scrupulous about avoiding any military use of the monastery. Lieutenant General Fridolin von Senger und Etterlin, the Wehrmacht commander in charge of the Cassino front, even avoided look16 Atkinson, note 3, at 434. 17 Ibid., 433. 18 Ibid., 434. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid., at 440.

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ing out of the windows of the Abbey when he visited the abbot for dinner---because he might inadvertently see Allied positions below.21 Of course, Freyberg and Alexander did not know this at the time they decided to attack the Abbey, so these facts cannot be part of the calculus in weighing the reasonableness of their decision. The destruction of the Monte Cassino monastery is a good example of what military necessity meant in a war of attrition---as the fighting in Italy had become by February 1944. The British military strategist J.F.C. Fuller called it “sheer tactical stupidity”22 and, while this means that Freyberg’s decision was foolish, it was not unreasonable when evaluated using the principle of “military necessity.” This is because Freyberg’s intent (supported by General Alexander) was to destroy an enemy position (and not a religious building), and there was a reasonable basis for Freyberg (and Alexander) to believe that the destruction of this enemy position was necessary under the circumstances. What lessons may be drawn from the destruction of Monte Cassino in examining and evaluating other decisions to attack targets? (1) Determining what constitutes military necessity is a duty of the battlefield commander; (2) The law presumes good faith on the part of the commander; it presumes that given the information available to him at the time he made his decision, military necessity reasonably required that he take the action he did. As for evaluating the decision after it has been made, the test is whether a reasonably prudent commander, knowing what the commander who ordered the attack knew, would have acted similarly in similar circumstances. The definition of military necessity, and how it is evaluated by commanders, is unlikely to change. This only underscores what the German strategist Carl von Clausewitz said about war: that it is “fog” and “friction.” In sum, the claim that the bombing of Monte Cassino was a piece of gross stupidity may well be true. But, when the decision to attack the monastery is evaluated in light of the principle of military necessity, it was not unreasonable and not illegal under the law. Sources: Atkinson, Rick. The Day of Battle (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2007) Barnett, Correlli (ed.) Hitler’s Generals (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989) Field Manual 27-10, The Law of War (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1940) Hapgood, David & David Richardson, Monte Cassino (New York: Congdon & Weed, 1984). Murray, Williamson & Allan R. Millett, A War to be Won (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000) Rogers, A.V.P. Law on the Battlefield, 2d ed. (Manchester, UK: Juris, 2004) Solis, Gary D. The Law of Armed Conflict. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010). 21 Ibid., at 436. 22 Ibid, at 441.

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Offensive Operation in Belorussia (Operation “Bagration”), June 23 – August 29, 1944 Victor Gavrilov

s a result of the war operations in winter and spring 1944 on the central part of the Soviet-German front there appeared so called Belorussian Protrusion (“Belorussian Balcony”) that was of critical operational and strategic importance for the Wehrmacht Command. The German Army Group “Center” very well defended the directions to Eastern Prussia and Warsaw, threatened the flank of the Soviet troops in the Ukraine and provided the stable positions of the Army Group “North” in the Baltic region. The German troops in Belorussia had built a deliberately fortified system of defensive lines and areas that were echeloned to the depth of 250-270 km. The primary effort was focused on holding the tactical zone of defense, 12 – 18 km deep. At tank passable terrain there were built pillboxes, antitank and antipersonnel obstacles. Garrisons were stationed at all built-up areas that were specially prepared for defense. To break through the German defense the Soviet Command planned one of the most outstanding joint operations of the Second World War that involved the troops of four Fronts (1st Baltic, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts), long range aviation, the Dnieper River Flotilla and Belorussian partisan formations. The operation was given code name “Bagration” after one of the famous Russian generals during the Napoleon wars. Table 1. The ratio between Soviet and German strength Divisions Tank @ Mechanized Corps Cavalry Corps Artillery and mortar pieces Tanks @ self-propelled guns Aircraft Personnel

Soviet strength 160 12 4 More than 36,000 5,200 5,300 2,4 mln

German strength 63 3+2 – 9,600 More than 900 1,400 1,4 mln

The primary idea of the plan was to simultaneously attack the enemy at six separate sectors located rather far from each other, encircle and destroy the strongest German flank groupings in the areas of Vitebsk and Bobruisk. After that it was planned to use a massive strength of the three Belorussian Fronts to attack in the direction of the town of Minsk, encircle the main force of the Army Group “Center” and shortly after that destroy it. Then it was planned to continue offensive and reach the western border of the USSR. The Operation “Bagration” may be divided in two stages. The first one was from June 23 till July 4, 1944 and included the breaching of the enemy defense in the zones of

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action of the four Fronts, liberation of the Belorussian capital – town of Minsk and making the conditions for further advance on the Baltic and Warsaw directions. These objects were achieved during a number of offensive operations: Vitebsk – Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruisk, Polotsk and Minsk operations. The first one to start was Vitebsk – Orsha operation that involved the 1st Baltic and rd 3 Belorussian Fronts. It started on June 23. The first day the Soviet troops breached the enemy tactical defense at many sectors. By the end of the second day the 1st Baltic Front reached the Western Dvina river, rushed to force the crossing and captured a number of beach-heads. Same day the 3rd Belarusian Front put into action a cavalry-mechanized task force. By June 25 the troops of the 1st Baltic Front and 3rd Belorussian Front encircled the German Vitebsk force made of five divisions and cut it into two parts. At the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were moved to the gap in the enemy defense and rushed to the rear of the German Orsha force. The German Command had to issue order to retreat. June 28 the 3rd Belorussian Front advanced 150 km and reached the Berezina River. By that time Soviet troops had already completely destroyed the enemy force encircled at Vitebsk. The result of the Vitebsk – Orsha operation was the rout of the main forces of the German 3rd Tank Army at the left flank of the Army Group “Center”. The object was achieved within 5 days. At the same time Soviet troops deeply enveloped German 4th Army from the North. The Bobruisk operation was conducted June 24-29 by the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front. Army General Konstantin Rokosovsky who was in command of that Front had made two shock forces, which were to attack on converging directions to Bobruisk, encircle and destroy the Bobruisk enemy force. When that plan was discussed in Kremlin, Stalin twice asked Rokosovsky to leave his room and think over again whether it was possible or not to simultaneously deliver two main blows, but every time Rokosovsky came back and confirmed his plan. The plan was a success. The right shock force passed to the offensive and by the end of the third day crushed the enemy defense in the width of 155 km and advanced from 10 to 35 km to the depth. Even more effective was the left shock force. June 26 its 1st Guards Tank Corps reached the area 6-8 km south-west of Bobruisk and enveloped the town. It was a catastrophe for German troops stationed there: five infantry divisions of the German 35th Army Corps found themselves under the threat of a complete encirclement. The next day the Soviet 9th Tank Corps reached Bobruisk from the North and completed the encirclement of the 40 thousand germansof the enemy force. By the end of June 28 the Front main forces advanced to 100-110 km. The next day the enemy force in Bobruisk and south-west of it was completely destroyed. The result of the operation was that main forces of the German 9th Army were crushed and thus there were created conditions for a fast advance to Minsk and Baranovichi. At the same time the 2nd Belorussian Front conducted Mogilev operation. During June 23-28 Soviet troops forced six crossings including Dnieper river, liberated the town of Mogilev and advanced to 90 km.

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As a whole during 6 days offensive the 1st Baltic, 3rd, 2nd and the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Fronts encircled and destroyed 13 German divisions in the area of Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev and Bobruisk. Besides they seriously crippled two infantry and three tank divisions moved to Belorussia from the other sectors. Soviet troops had advanced 90-150 km to the west. The 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts from north and south deeply enveloped the enemy troops stationed on the Minsk direction. June 28 Soviet HQ specified the objectives. The further plan was as follows. 1st Belorussian Front right wing in cooperation with the 3rd Belarusian Front left wing and the main forces of the 2nd Belorussian Front were to attack the enemy on the directions converging to the town of Minsk, encircle and crush the main forcers of the German 4th Army and liberate Minsk. One of the conditions of success in that operation was to disrupt the cooperation between the Army Group “Center” and Army Group “North”. The 1st Baltic Front effectively fulfilled that task. During June 29 – July 4 it conducted Polotsk offensive operation. As a result Army Group “Center” was cut from the north and deprived of any reserves inflow from the other sectors and that contributed to the success of the Minsk operation. During that operation the cavalry and mechanized troops of the 1st and 3rd Belorussian Fronts delivered blows on converging directions and cut off the railroads outgoing from Minsk. July 3 the 5th Guards Tank Army rushed into the town. As a result there was encircled the enemy force of 105 thousand men to the east of Minsk. The same day Minsk was completely liberated. The result of the first stage of the Belorussian Offensive Operation actually was the rout of the Army Group “Center”. The enemy defense was breached in the zone of 400 km wide. After 12 days offensive Soviet troops advanced to the distance of 225-280 km and liberated more than half the territory of Belorussia including its capital – Minsk. The second stage of the Operation “Bagration” was from July 5 till August 29. At that stage Soviet troops completed the rout of the German force encircled in the area of Minsk, and conducted Siauliai, Vilnius – Kaunas, Bialystok and Lublin – Brest offensive operations. The 2nd Belorussian Front in the period of July 5-13 completed the rout of the encircled enemy force. German losses totaled more than 70 thousand killed and about 36 thousand captured including three Corps Commanders and six Division Commanders. The 1st Baltic Front conducted the Siauliai operation, liberated a part of Lithuania and advanced to the territory of Latvia and radically worsened the situation of the German forces stationed in the Baltic area. Nevertheless they were still sufficiently strong. German Command delivered a number of severe counter-blows, made the Soviet troops retreat and restored the land communications of the Army Group “North”. However the 1st Baltic Front managed to hold advantage ground for further offensive on Riga and Memel (Klaipeda) directions. The 3rd Belorussian Front conducted Vilnius – Kaunas operation and by the end of July advanced to 180-300 km, liberated Vilnius and Kaunas and made good conditions for further offensive to the border of Eastern Prussia.

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The 2nd Belorussian Front conducted Bialystok operation, advanced to more than 300 km, approached the area near the Eastern Prussia border and provided good conditions for further offensive on the Warsaw direction. In July – August the 1st Belarusian Front liberated a number of Belorussian towns (Baranovichi, Pinsk, Brest) and in the course of Lublin-Brest operation crushed the stubborn resistance of the enemy, crossed the Polish border, reached the Vistula River in the zone of 120 km wide and captured four beach-heads on its western bank. Concluding remarks. The Operation “Bagration” lasted for 68 days. The scale of the offensive was 1100 km in width and 600 km in depth. During the operation the whole Belorussia was finally liberated, the German troops were driven out of a substantial part of Lithuanian territory, some areas of Latvia and Ukraine. The Soviet troops defeated one of the strongest German army groupings – Army Group “Center”, and reached Vistula River and Eastern Prussia border. 17 enemy divisions and 3 brigades were completely destroyed and 50 divisions lost more than 50 % of their strength. According to a very rough calculation the German losses were about 500 thousand men. To reinforce and stabilize the situation the Wehrmacht Command had to redeploy 46 divisions and 4 brigades from other directions, that substantially weakened the German forces deployed against Allied troops in France. In comparative view the Operation “Bagration” to a very significant extent was a mirror image of the German “Barbarossa” Plan both from the operational and strategic point and the point of terms. The Soviet Command took well planned disinformation measures to make Germans believe that the main effort would be in the south where there was allegedly concentrated massive tank force. However the main strike was delivered in the direction of Minsk where a massive German grouping was finally encircled and destroyed or took captive. It was a kind of Stalin’s revenge for June 1941 Hitler sudden strike that was delivered also in the direction of Minsk where a big grouping of the Soviet Army was also encircled and destroyed or captured. The Operation “Bagration” is a very good example of swift breaching the enemy tactical defense and then achieving operational success by means of skillful using tank formations that advanced at a high speed deep into the enemy rear. Strong blows delivered on six sectors in a wide zone cut the enemy defense into pieces, and denied the capability of the German Command to reinforce its troops at every threatened sector and thus dispersed its reserves. Soviet Command had gained the experience of preparing and conducting operations aimed at quick encirclement of big enemy forces both in tactical and operational depth. The terms of time of final destruction of the encircled enemy forces reduced greatly compared to the previous war periods. It took just a few days to rout the enemy: at Vitebsk – 2 days, at Bobruisk – 3 days, Minsk – 6 days, at Vilnius and Brest – 2 days. The important feature was that Soviet troops did not stop and continued their advance. That also denied the ability of German Command to organize cooperation between the encircled and the main forces, and greatly impeded the ability of the encircled troops to break through the encirclement. Another important feature was combined use of armor mechanized troops at all the

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stages of the operation. They were especially effective as maneuver task forces in the operational depth. That contributed greatly to increasing the scale of the Army and Front offensive operations and achieving decisive success. At the same time during that Operation all the Fronts suffered great difficulties in logistics and maintenance. Not only maneuver task forces but also regular infantry troops moved so fast that maintenance teams could not restore the destroyed railroads on time. That greatly impeded the flow of necessary expendables to the frontline. The Operation “Bagration” was not a pleasant walking-tour. The overall Soviet losses were about 765,815 men, including 178,507 KIA and MIA. Among the four Fronts the 1st Belorussian Front sustained the biggest losses – 281,394 men or 37 % of the total losses. However, unlike the German losses that were mostly unrecoverable because of multiple encirclements, Soviet soldiers wounded in action (about 600,000 men) in many cases recovered after proper treatment and took part in the fights again. On the whole, the successful Soviet offensive in summer 1944 radically changed the situation on the entire Soviet-German front, and sufficiently reduced the Wehrmacht battle capacity. The defeat of the Army Group “Center” made it possible for the Soviet Command to conduct further successive offensive operations that finally crushed first the defense of the German Army Group “South” and then Army Group “North”. Elimination of the Belorussian Protrusion also denied the threat of German flank strikes from the north on the armies of the 1st Ukrainian Front advancing to Lvov. The beach-heads captured on the western bank of Vistula in the area of Pulava and Magnushev were very important for further operations aimed at the final liberation of Poland and defeat of Nazi Germany. Key words: Belorussian Protrusion, Operation “Bagration”, encirclement, breachhead, Army Group “Center”, “Barbarossa” Plan. Bibliography 1. Nash D. Hell’s Gate. The Battle of the Cherkassy Pocket January-February 1944. RZM Imports, 2002. 2. Великая Отечественная война 1941-1945. Военно-исторические очерки. В 4 кн. М., 1999. Кн. 3. Освобождение. (Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. Essays on Military History. In 4 vols. Moscow, 1999. Vol. 3. Liberation). 3. История Великой войны 1941-1945. В 2 т. М., 2010. Т. 1. (History of a Great War 1941-1945. In 2 vols. Moscow, 2010. Vol. 1). 4. История Второй мировой войны 1939-1945. В 12 т. М., 1978. Т. 9. (History of the Second World War 1939-1945. In 12 vols. Moscow, 1978. Vol. 9). 5. Кривошеев Г.Ф. и др. Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века. Книга потерь. М., 2010. С. 320-323. (Krivosheev G.F. et al. Russia and USSR in the Wars of the 20th Century. The Book of Losses. Moscow, 2010. P. 320-323).

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6. Мировые войны ХХ века. В 4 кн. М., 2005. Изд. 2-е. Вторая мировая война: исторический очерк. (World Wars of the 20th Century. In 4 vols. Moscow, 2005. 2nd edition. WWII: a Historical Essay). 7. Русский архив. Великая Отечественная война. Ставка ВГК. Документы и материалы 1941-1945. М., 1999. Т. 16 (5-4). (Russian Archive. Great Patriotic War. Supreme Command Headquarters. Documents and Materials 1941-1945. Moscow, 1999. Vol. 16 (5-4).

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Romania’s Switch in Alliance (August 23-31, 1944) an Unprecedented Combined Military Operation Mihail E. IONESCU 1 Carmen RIJNOVEANU

his history of the Second World War takes note that, on August 23, 1944, Romania parted with Nazi Germany and joined the Coalition of the United Nations, alongside whom it has fought until the end of the hostilities. The event had numerous consequences over Romania’s internal and international status and over the unfolding of the Second World War. It continues to be amply debated in Romanian historiography, especially for its political dimension, given that the communist regime transformed it into Romania’s national day for four decades (1949-1989). But, beyond these controversies, one can find a relative consensus over the military aspects. The switch in alliance, which unfolded on August 23-31, 1944, took place in an ample combined operation which encompassed the entire Romanian army, as well as forces of the United Nations. Romania’s military situation on August 23, 1944 At the beginning of the third week of August 1944, Romania’s military situation worsened considerably because of the new Soviet offensive, launched on August 20, named “Iaşi – Chişinău”. The Soviet forces comprised the 2nd and the 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, under the command of General Rodion Malinovsky and, respectively, Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin, with 90 divisions, six mechanized and tank corps, two air armies and a total manpower of 1.1 million. On the other side, in the East, on the line Târgu-Neamţ – north Iaşi – north Chişinău – lower Dniester, the defense comprised, in early April 1944, the Army Group South Ukraine, under the command of General Johannes Friessner, consisting in two German armies (6th and 8th) and two Romanian armies (3rd and 4th). The German forces on the front totaled 427 121 soldiers, there were 128 682 in the intermediary areas, 70 832 in the interior, out of which the majority were deployed in the region Ploieşti-Bucureşti2. The effective of the two Romanian armies, deployed alongside the large German units, totaled 394 148 officers and soldiers. However, the Romanian military potential was significantly larger, totaling 843 312 men under arms. The Romanian armed forces comprised land forces, aeronautics formations (air forces and air defense) and naval forces3 (Annex no. 1). The command and the structure of the defensive disposition in the East were meant to offer the German partner the total control over the situation. The Army Group 1 Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Ministry of National Defense 2 Romanian Military Archives (A.M.R.), fund 948, section no. 3, file no. 2906, p. 53. 3 România în războiul antihitlerist, 23 august 1944-9 mai 1945, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1966, p.600-620.

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South Ukraine consisted of two subgroups, one led by General Petre Dumitrescu, the commander of the Romanian 3rd Army, the other by General Otto Wöhler, the commander of the German 8th Army, the large Romanian and German units being intertwined4. During the period of relative calm of May-August 1944, under Hitler’s direct order, the Supreme High Command of the German Army (OKH) pulled out from the front eleven divisions (five armored divisions and six infantry divisions), thus weakening the defensive capabilities in Moldova. The fighting broke out on August 19, but the Soviet general offensive launched, as previously mentioned, the next day. The German-Romanian defensive disposition was penetrated in the first day, the large soviet units focusing their offensive to the south and east in the attempt of encircling the German 6th Army, the main group of forces, from two directions. The advancing Soviet units could not be stopped, so that, in the evening of August 23, they were at 50-60 kilometers from the fortified line of FocşaniNămoloasa-Brăila (F.N.B), which was meant to block their access inside Romania5. Under these circumstances, King Michaeli I, the head of the Romanian state and the supreme commander of the armed forces, supported by the main political forces, grouped in the National Democratic Bloc (National Peasants’ Party, National Liberal Party, Social Democrat Party, Communist Party of Romania), which was constituted on June 20, 1944, and also by a number of high ranking officers, decided to break the alliance with Germany and to join the Coalition of the United Nations. Marshal Ion Antonescu, the “conducător” (“the leader”) of the Romanian state, and his close collaborators were arrested at the royal palace, the king appointing a new government during the same evening, headed by General Constantin Sănătescu, until then Marshal of the Royal Palace6. The decision was communicated to the local and international audience through the Royal Proclamation broadcasted on radio in the evening of August 23, 1944, at 10:25 PM, and printed in large numbers in order to be distributed on the entire national territory. The royal document stated that: “in the most difficult moment of our history, I concluded, in complete agreement with my people, that there is only one way to save our country from a total catastrophe: to break the alliance with the powers of the Axis and to immediately end the war with the United Nations”. Romanians were also informed about the creation of a new government of national unity, which had the task “to bring to fruition the country’s firm decision to make peace 4 Klaus Schönherr, Luptele Werchmactului în România 1944, translated by Elena Matei, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 2004, p.60-73. For example, in order to keep the 17 Romanian divisions under control, general Wöhler constituted groups of army corps led by German generals. 5 The fortified line of of Focşani-Nămoloasa-Brăila (F.N.B) barred the area between the elbow of the Romanian Carpathians and the Danube, extending over a distance of 160 km and comprising 1600 concrete pillboxes (10 for each kilometer of the front). On the most important directions, over 60 km of antitank trenches over built, the system being completed with 1800 machine gun nests made of concrete and wood. By August 23, 1944, the line was not ready for defense, the forces deployed here comprising about 15 000 soldiers (the fortification detachments 106, 115 and 121 with 9 battalions). 6 Details in Jurnalul generalului Sănătescu, foreward by Simona Ghiţescu, second edition, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006.

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with the United Nations. Romania accepted the armistice offered by the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States of America. From this moment, the fighting or any act of hostility against the Soviet Union comes to an end, as well as the state of war with Great Britain and the United States. Receive the soldiers of these armies with trust. The United Nations guaranteed the independence of our country and the non-interference in our internal affairs. They also recognized the injustice of the Vienna Diktat, by which Transylvania was taken away from us”. King Michael went further, stating that “Those who might oppose our decision, taken freely and not infringing anyone’s rights, are the enemies of our people. I order the army and I call the people to fight with any means and at any cost against them. All the citizens should gather around the throne and government to save our fatherland”7. The next day, the declaration of the new government was published, which announced that the first foreign policy measure adopted was to accept the armistice with the United Nations. “Our exit from the war waged alongside the powers of the Tripartite Act and the cessation of hostilities against Soviet Union are decisions meant to avoid a certain and unavoidable national catastrophe. From now on, Romania considers the United Nations as friendly nations”8. The declaration of the government reiterated the firm decision to fight against those who would try to keep the country at war with the United Nations, thus prolonging its suffering9. In conclusion, both documents established the new political orientation of the Romanian state, the cessation of hostilities against the Soviet army, of the state of war with the United States and Great Britain, as well as the commitment to fight with all its forces to annul the Vienna Diktat and to liberate Romania’s north-west. In the newly created situation, the Romanian army was given the decisive role, as it represented the instrument meant to materialize the political decision. However, its problems and missions were highly complex, given that the switch in alliance was a unilateral move by the Romanian state, which was not preceded by an armistice with the United Nations and especially with the Soviet Union, whose troops operated in Romania10. Therefore, the Romanian army found itself in an unique situation, almost unprecedented in the history of warfare, being in conflict with both the former and the new ally, the latter officially recognizing the cessation of the state of war only after the signing of the Armistice Convention in the night of September 12/13, 1944. The concept of the operation In accordance with the political decision, the Romanian army had to accomplish extremely difficult missions in order to achieve an efficient change of fronts. Thus, it 7 8 9 10

23 August 1944.Documente 1944, vol. II, Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, Bucureşti, 1984, p.415-416. Ibidem, p. 417. Ibidem. During the preparations for the switch in alliance, the decision was taken to send a general on the front, in the person of Victor Dombrovschi, later on replaced by Aurel Aldea, in order to inform the Soviets about the decision to replace Antonescu’s regime and to negotiate a potential ceasefire. The mission of General Aldea was provisioned to begin on August 17, 1944, before the start of the Soviet offensive. Details in Traian Udrea, 23 August 1944.Controverse istorico-politice.Studiu istoriografic, Editura Alex Alex, Bucureşti, 2004, p.273278.

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was imperative to move the large Romanian units from the east, to regroup them to the south of Carpathians, to settle the rapports with the former ally and to establish relations with the command of the Soviet forces, now in full offensive. Under extremely fluid and tensioned conditions, the Romanian General Staff, headed by General Gheorghe Mihail, appointed by decree by King Michael I11 in the evening of August 23, was given the task to establish the strategic concept and to coordinate the large Romanian units in the area under the jurisdiction of the Romanian state, which, at that time, totaled over 150 000 square kilometers. It is worth mentioning that, after the political changes of August 23, 1944, and until September 7 same year, when the Romanian 1st and 4th armies were subordinated to the Ukrainian 2nd Front, the General Staff had all the command prerogatives over the large units. It was the only period during the entire course of the Second World War (1941-1945) when the Romanian armed forces found themselves under national command. The concept of the operation of “turning the weapons” (against the former ally), established between August 23 and August 31, 1944, materialized in the operative directives issued by the General Staff. The first such directive was issued in the afternoon of August 23, 1944 (General Staff Order no. 678 563). It ordered the cessation of hostilities against the Soviet army and ended the subordination of Romanian units to German command. At the same time, it instructed Romanian troops to oppose any German attempt to disarm them or to occupy public institutions. In this first stage, the new Romanian government wanted to settle the rapports with the former ally amiably. For instance, both King Michael I and Constantin Sănătescu, the new prime minister, held talks with German representatives in Romania, asking them to take note of the new political orientation of the Romanian state and to avoid direct confrontations. There are documents that imply that the new authorities were willing to offer a 15 day respite for the German troops to leave Romanian territory. After a few hours, the General Staff issued the second operative directive, which established the strategic concept and the missions of the large units. According to the document, the political goal of the operation was the cessation of “the fighting alongside German troops, in order to make peace with the United Nations and to fight alongside its troops in order to liberate Northern Transylvania”12. The directive also stipulated that, from that moment, “all Romanian land, air and naval forces are no longer under German authority and are placed under the command of King Michael I, whose orders will be issued through the General Staff”13. The general operative concept had four major missions: a) to immediately cease the hostilities against the troops of the United Nations (against Soviet troops); b) to regroup the large Romanian units from Bessarabia and Moldova in order to subsequently use them in the operations against the Vienna Diktat; c) to liberate the national territory from 11 Documente din Istoria Militară a Poporului Român (DIMPR), vol. I, 23-31 august 1944, eds. Ilie Petre, colonel dr. Al.Gh. Savu, colonel Leonida Loghin, captain Mihail E. Ionescu, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, 1977, p.13. 12 Ibidem, p. 14. 13 Ibidem

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the German troops; d) to prepare the offensive to recapture Northern Transylvania. The first three missions required immediate actions, while for the fourth new orders were to be expected. The two Romanian armies from the front, the 3rd and the 4th, were to regroup initially in the area Focşani-Galaţi and later on in the area Ploieşti-Bucureşti in order to facilitate the offensive to the north of Carpathians. The troops inside the country received clear missions in accordance to their area of deployment. Therefore, the 1st Army, deployed in the north of Carpathians in the west of the country, was tasked to secure Romania’s western border and the Romanian-Hungarian demarcation line in the Transylvanian plateau and to eliminate German presence from its area of responsibility. In Oltenia, the 1st Army Corps received the same missions, while Muntenia was divided into two areas: the northern part became the area of responsibility of the Territorial 5th Corps, while the southern part of the Territorial 2nd Corps. Their missions were to eliminate German troops and to deter the arrival of German and Bulgarian reinforcements from the other side of the Danube. Bucharest and its surroundings were the area of responsibility of the Military Command of the Capital, which received reinforcements from the Territorial 2nd Corps, while Dobruja – the area between Danube and the Black Sea – was the area of responsibility of the 2nd Army Corps. The directive also provisioned specific missions for the air forces and air defense and also for the naval forces. The latter received the mission to deter German and Bulgarian infiltrations in Danube’s delta and to safeguard maritime Danube: at their turn, the river flotillas safeguarded the Danube between Brăila şi Silistra, especially the passes from Brăila, Hîrşova, Cernavodă and Călăraşi. Besides the specific missions they were entrusted, the Romanian troops were tasked to maintain the order, to stop any act of sabotage against railroads, communication lines, oil refineries, factories, etc.; to break German communications of any kind in order to paralyze the chain of command. The directive stipulated that “the military action must be swift, in order to take advantage of the initial surprise”14. On August 30, 1944, the Romanian General Staff issued the third operative directive (no. 51), at a time when the combined operation was practically completed15. It was addressed to the 1st and 4th Army, which received new orders in order to cover the line of demarcation in the north of Southern Carpathians and the western border and to prepare the offensive in order to liberate the territory that was ceded through the Vienna Diktat. These operative directives were constantly supplemented by a series of orders and provisions, which added explanatory notes and nuances, in accordance with the events on the ground, but without significantly altering the strategic framework established by the document issued in the evening of August 23. The unfolding of the combined operation One of the most urgent missions was to settle the rapports with the former ally, namely the German army. As previously mentioned, the Romanian authorities wanted the German troops to withdraw without confrontation, but the decisions taken in Berlin 14 Ibidem, p. 16. 15 Ibidem, vol.IV. p.72-74.

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led to a different course of events. The events from Bucharest constituted a surprise for Hitler and his entourage, who were convinced that Marshal Ion Antonescu controlled the situation. They maintained this conviction until the very last moment, although the political and military preparations were widely discussed in the Bucharest parlors. It was a serious error of judgment and the subsequent reaction precipitated the Romanian-German conflict. On August 23, 1944, Hitler had to face a serious dilemma. If he had tried to make Romania a second Italy, then this new front would have swallowed some of the German divisions that were indispensable to the war effort. They risked being destroyed by the Soviets and Tito’s armies. If he had allowed the events to take their course, he would have lost the oil, facilitate Bulgaria’s exit from the alliance and potentially face some unpleasant surprises from Hungary. Listening to the erroneous assessment by A. Gerstenberg, according to which “the coup” was the product of a small clique of politicians and officers, in agreement with the king, but without the support of the population, Hitler ordered the suppression of the Bucharest “putsch”, the reinstatement of Antonescu or, in case this was not possible, the appointment of a new government led by a philo-German general. This is how the chance offered by the new Romanian authorities in the evening of August 23, meant to avoid a conflict between the two former allies, was squandered. Therefore, the initiative of attacking the former comrades belonged to the German army, whose air forces attacked Bucharest. The state of belligerence subsequently extended in many areas where the Germans had a significant presence. The confrontations between Romanian and German troops lasted until the end of August 1944, the Romanian army emerging victorious. The clashes had some unique traits, as there was no continuous front, in a classical sense, the German troops being deployed to various points, especially around economic, political and strategic objectives. Therefore, the German “pockets” and convoys were isolated, divided and liquidated, by fighting or by their surrender. The extreme fluidity of the events required from the Romanian commanders and troops great mobility, rapid decisions, the creation of ad-hoc fighting structures, the use of tactics and procedures that were not previously employed (ambushes, pursuits, etc.). In the reports submitted after the end of the operation, many Romanian commanders recognized the atypical character of the confrontations they took part in. Thus, the commander of the Artillery Training Center stated in his report from September 7, 1944, that it was the first time when “the pupils of the School of Artillery and recruits from the garrison were engaged in guerrilla warfare, in subunits that were created ad-hoc and with improvised means of transportation”16. Recent investigations show that there were cases when the Romanian-German camaraderie continued even after the emergence of the state of war between the two countries, some Romanian commanders refusing confrontation and allowing German convoys, units and subunits to leave the national territory. Such cases took place in the Buzău Valley, in Banat, on the Black Sea, where the German fleet left the port of 16 DIMR, Vol. IV (23/31 august 1944),… p. 345.

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Constanţa without any incident, with the consent of counter admiral Horia Măcelariu, the commander of the Romanian fleet17. One of the most difficult missions was the regrouping inside the country of the large Romanian units from the front in Moldova. The situation was aggravated by the fact that the Soviets had not been informed about the move and there had been no prior agreement. In fact, as recent researches demonstrated, the authorities in Moscow ordered the large Soviet units not to deviate and to accomplish their missions. In addition, the Royal Proclamation from the evening of August 23, which instructed the Romanian troops to cease the fight against the Red Army, increased the confusion. In our opinion, it would have been preferable if the Operative Directive no. 1 had been issued first and then the Proclamation. Many unpleasant situations that the Romanian troops had to face would have been avoided. On the front in Moldova, the Romanian troops had the huge surprise to see that the Red Army continued to treat them as enemy. After August 23, for three to four weeks (until September 20-25), around 145 000-160 000 Romanian troops (officers and soldiers) were taken prisoners by the Red Army, forces that could have been used against the common enemy. The delay in the signing of the armistice was premeditated by the Soviets in order to capture effectives and equipment, considering the Romanian territory where the Soviet troops had entered as occupied territory. In the postwar period, this represented a political and historiographic contentious issue between Romania and USSR. But, as it happened with the Germans, there were also cases when the state of belligerence was left behind, some Romanian units taking the initiative to collaborate with the Soviet part, who accepted their support. Such was the case of the 7th Regiment of Artillery, 1st Armored Division, 103 and 104 Mountain Brigades, who collaborated with the large Soviet units in order to penetrate the Trotuş gorge from Eastern Carpathians. Despite these difficulties, the Romanian 3rd and 4th Army managed to accomplish their mission, regrouping most of their forces, until the end of August 1944, in the counties indicated by the General Staff. In early September 1944, the large units of the Romanian army were reorganized and sent to battle against German-Hungarian forces in the north of Southern Carpathians. An important component of the operation was the securing of the “line of demarcation” from the Transylvanian plateau and of the land and river borders of south-western Romania, with a length of 1400 kilometers. The deployment took place in record time (48 hours), the eastern part being heavily reinforced, as it blocked the path to Bucharest and Prahova Valley, where Romania’s most important oil fields were located. The deployed forces comprised one army command (1st Army), three army corps commands, 11 divisions (most of them training divisions, meant to prepare the soldiers who later joined the active divisions), 64 battalions, 16 squadrons and 17 batteries. The troops had a double mission: to stop German reinforcements from arriving in the perimeter of the operation and to destroy or capture them. Until August 31, they fulfilled 17 Marian Mosneagu, Dictionarul marinarilor romani (Romanian sailors dictionary), Editura Militara, Bucuresti, 2008, p. 283-290

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their missions, managing to secure the area of operation. At the same time, the strategic consequences were significant, creating in the north of Southern Carpathians a bridgehead of about 50.000 square kilometers, something that facilitated the concentration of Romanian and Soviet forces for the ample operation with the code name “Debrecen”, which included the liberation of the territory ceded to Hungary through the Vienna Diktat (August 30, 1940). The operation initiated by the Romanian army on August 23, 1944, had also a western component (American and British). On August 24, 1944, at 7:30 in the morning, a LARES aircraft took off to Ankara, carrying colonel Ştefan Niculescu and colonel Georges de Chastelain, member of the group “Autonomus”18. The two informed the diplomats on the changes in Bucharest and pleaded for the support of the British-American aviation. On this basis, on August 26, 1944, a large American air formation, comprising 240 aircraft, bombed the area Băneasa-Otopeni, occupied by German troops. After this action, but also under the attacks by the Romanian forces, the German troops gave up the attempts of occupying Bucharest, withdrawing in the north. The convoy was intercepted southeast of Ploieşti by the Romanian 4th Army, which was regrouping from Moldova. The second episode in the Romanian-western cooperation consisted in the flight by the famous aviator Constantin (Bâzu) Cantacuzino, with a Me 109G aircraft, to the air base in Foggia (Italy). In the cabin of the aircraft there was the American colonel Gunn, who, once he arrived at the destination, informed the authorities on the good condition of over 1 000 American and British prisoners in Romania. They were evacuated by air in early September 194419. Geopolitical and geostrategic consequences The combined operation that was launched on August 23, 1944, virtually came to an end by the end of the month, when the entire territory under the jurisdiction of the government in Bucharest was under the control of the Romanian military forces. On August 30 and 31, 1944, the Soviet troops entered Bucharest, Romania’s capital, a city which, since August 26, was under the control of the Romanian military command. The participating Romanian forces and the results of the operation unfolded in late August 1944 are presented in annexes no. 2, 3, 4, 5. The success obtained by the Romanian army had significant political, economic and strategic consequences on the situation in Romania, but also on the unfolding of the Second World War, in general. However, the constraints in terms of space and time do not allow us to detail them. That is why we shall limit ourselves to highlighting the most important aspects from a military and strategic point of view. The success of the combined operation led to the collapse of the entire German disposition in the Balkans, which included Army Group “F”, deployed in Yugoslavia, and Army Group “E”, in Greece. Thanks to the actions of the Romanian forces, the Soviet 18 Detalii în Ivor Porter, Operaţiunea “Autonomus”, traducere de George G. Potra şi Delia Razdolescu, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1991. 19 Aeronautica Militară Românească (The Romanian Military Aeronautics) Editura Curtea Veche, Bucureşti, p. 225.

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army was able to exploit what the British analyst and historian B.H. Lidell Hart called “the largest flank ever known in modern warfare”. In practice, the Soviet army executed a strategic march through the territory controlled by Romanian troops, closing in to the borders of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. It resumed the fighting with the German troops at a distance of 650-750 km west to the point they were located on August 23, 1944. The chief of staff of the Ukrainian 2nd Front, General M.V. Zakharov, wrote that the large units under his command were advancing over 50 kilometers a day (armored vehicles) and 30-35 kilometers (infantry), a pace significantly higher than average. Consequently, on September 3, the Soviet army entered Bulgarian territory and, on September 6, the Yugoslav territory, something that led to important political and military mutations in both countries. By late September, the large Soviet units reached Greece, which will later be embroiled in a civil war. One of the most important consequences was the creation of a bridgehead in the north and west of Carpathians, covering an area of about 50 000 square kilometers. Consequently, the German command was prevented from creating a defensive line on this mountain range, something that allowed Romanian and Soviet forces to concentrate in the region in order to resume the offensive in the direction of middle Danube, towards Budapest, Vienna and Bratislava. Understanding the importance of this mountain barrier20, the German command organized in the first half of September 1944 two counterstrikes in order to take hold of the Carpathian arch, but they were repelled by the large Romanian units, with Soviet support towards the end. Equally important was the fact that, because of the success of the combined operation, Germany was deprived of Romanian oil, which was essential for carrying on the fighting. The shortage of oil worsened after the failure of the Wehrmacht in the campaign of 1942, which made Romania’s oil reserves of outmost importance. While there were a number of oil fields in Galicia, Austria and Hungary, the extracted quantities were significantly smaller21. For instance, in 1943 alone, Romania exported to Germany 1 776 800 tons of oil products and, until August 23, 1944, some further 763 800 tons, in addition to the 35 900 tons to the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia22. During the Romanian-German confrontations of August 23-31, 1944, the German command stressed that Ploieşti area must remain under German control “at any cost”23. It must also be said that regaining the control over Romanian oil deeply preoccupied Hitler. The final goal of the last German offensive during the Second World War, which was launched at Balaton on March 6, 1945, were the oil fields from Ploieşti, whose 20 General Johannes Friessner, the commander of the Army Group South Ukraine, stressed in his memoirs that the goal of the offensive was “to conquer the passes from Southern Carpathians and to block them… as mountains were our best allies. The enemy could have been stopped here with special forces, relatively few in number, much easier that in the area situated in the north of these passes”. (Cf. Hans Friessner, Verratene Schlachten.Die Tragődie der deutschen Wehrmacht in Rumanien un Ungarn, Holstei Verlag, Hamburg, 1956, p. 47) 21 In 1942, the quantities extracted from Galicia stood at 340 000 tons and from Hungary at 150 000 tons. 22 Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, Regele Carol şi Mareşalul Antonescu. Relaţiile germano-române 1938-1944, ed. Stelian Neagoe, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 1993, p. 290-291. 23 Hans Kissel, Die Katastrophe in Roumanien, Darmstadt, 1964, p. 144.

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retaking would have represented a gift for Führer’s birthday (April 20).24. What also must be taken into account is the Romanian military potential, which was made available to the Coalition of the United Nations after August 23, 1944. Until the end of hostilities, Romania sent on the front 538 536 men (308 003 – infantry, 73 667 – aeronautics, 9 468 – naval forces), 175 000 of them being in constant contact with the enemy. The losses stood at 169 822, among which 21 035 killed, 90 344 wounded and 58 443 missing. It is worth mentioning that the expeditionary corps was exclusively supported from internal resources, in addition to the fulfillment of the provisions of the armistice convention signed in Moscow during the night of September 12/13, 194425. The importance of Romania’s act of August 23, 1944, and of the military contribution that followed received a symbolic recognition through the decoration of King Michael I, the head of the Romanian state between 1940 and 1947, by the major actors of the Coalition of the United Nations. In 1945, he received from the Soviet Union the highest military decoration, the Order of Victory, given to very few foreign personalities. The document stated that the order was bestowed “for the brave act of turning Romania’s policy towards the break with Nazi Germany, allying with the United Nations, in a moment when the German defeat was all but certain”. On March 20, 1946, President Harry Truman awarded King Michael I with Chief Commander of the Legion of Merit, the highest military decoration that a head of state can receive from the government of the United States of America. He also received Knight Grand Cross of the Royal Victorian Order from Great Britain and the Grand Cross of the Légion d’Honneur from France. Conclusions The political decision of August 23, 1944, taken by the constitutional factors and by the main Romanian political parties, to break the alliance with Germany and to join the Coalition of the United Nations, was followed by an ample combined operation, achieved by the Romanian military forces under the command of the General Staff, which was given complete freedom of action. The circumstances in which it unfolded were highly complex, comprising both favorable aspects (such as the Soviet offensive launched on August 20, 1944, which immobilized the main German forces) and unfavorable factors, among which the lack of communication with the allies, especially with the Soviets, before the switch in alliance. Through the operation executed by the Romanian armed forces, who responded in their entirety to the orders issued by the supreme commander, King Michael I, without hesitation or cracks in the chain of command, Romania managed to avoid unconditional surrender, reiterated at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. In it true, however, that the Soviets, by not recognizing the change that had taken place in Romania, tried 24 Inside the Third Reich. Memoirs by Albert Speer, translated from German by Richard and Clara Winston, The MacMillan Company, p. 434, 474; see also Henrik Eberle, Mathias Uhl, Dosarul Hitler (Hitler Dossier), Editura Meditatii, Bucuresti, 2007, p. 301-304. 25 Gheorghe Romanescu, Nicolae Ciobanu, Alesandru Duţu, L’Armée Roumaine dans la campagne de l’ouest 1944-1945, Editiona Militaires, Bucarest, 1991, p.253-290.

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to apply this formula, taking prisoner some of the Romanian forces that had ceased the hostilities. But the operative needs and the conduct of the large Romanian units, which managed, partially, to thwart Soviet intentions, eventually led to cooperation at command level before the signing of the Armistice Convention. The operation unfolded in a large area, basically on the entire territory under the authority of the Romanian government. The concept established by the General Staff under dramatic circumstances was adequate to the situation created by the political decision, demonstrating strategic flexibility and vision, the missions being established according to priorities. The operation comprised complex actions, given the deployment of Romanian and German forces, in which all the components of the Romanian military body were involved â€“ land forces, naval forces (river and maritime), air forces and air defense forces. Its main characteristics were: the absence of a continuous front; fighting in â€œhotbedsâ€?, for certain targets; high maneuverability; large freedom of action for the bottom chain of command; the use of tactics and methods specific to urban warfare, etc26. The military actions in the period August 23-31, 1944, by their features, area, forces involved and consequences over the unfolding of the conflagration, represented the largest combined operation of the Romanian army during the Second World War.

26 A.M.R, fund 948, file no.856, p. 23-25.

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Annex no. 1 SITUATION OF ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES ON AUGUST 23, 1944

Service branches

Land forces

20 divisions + 5 30 divisions* + brigades 57 battalions**

Air forces

30 squadrons*

28 squadrons**

14 batteries*

168 batteries** 14 searchlight batteries

2 Air defense

Within national borders

On the front

Naval forces

Aeronautics

No.

37 ships + 17 artillery 34 ships + 11 batteries + coastal batteries 4 infantry battalions

Commands

Observations

* - 21 training divisions ** - 5 detachments, 37 military schools and 5 23*** training centers *** - 3 army and 20 army corps or similar * - 249 aircraft ** - 259 aircraft 2 air corps*** *** - 1.131 training aircraft in bases, centers and schools * - 96 artillery guns ** - 1268 artillery guns 4 brigades*** and 168 searchlights *** - 10 anti-aircraft regiments * - Maritime Naval Forces Command - River and Maritime 3* Littoral Command - River Flotilla Command

Annex no. 2 ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES THAT TOOK PART IN THE FIGHTING ON AUGUST 23-31, 1944 No. 1 2 3

Service branch Land forces Aeronautics (air forces and air defense) Naval forces Total

Effectives 382 222 73 667 9 468 465 357

Losses 7 905 661 20 8 586

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Annex no. 3 ROMANIAN LAND FORCES THAT TOOK PART IN THE OPERATION (AUGUST 23-31, 1944) No.

Title

Number

Effectives

General Staff

2 882

Armies

582

3 4

Army corps Divisions*

15 38

28 350 241 321

Separate ties*

109 087

382 222

enti-

Total

Losses

Observations Commanding officers, communication units, military engineers, etc. The effectives of command, units and rearguard formations

7 905

* 14 training divisions and one detachment the size of a division * Regiments, detachments, officersâ€™ schools, regional fixed battalions, gendarmerie legions, military warehouses.

Annex no. 4 LOSSES INFLICTED BY THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES TO THE ENEMY DURING THE OPERATION (AUGUST 23-31, 1944)

No. 1 2

Losses Prisoners Killed Total

Effectives 56 455* 5 048* 61 503

Observations * - subsequently received by Soviet commands * - only those identified by the Romanian part

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Annex no. 5 RESULTS OBTAINED BY THE PARTICIPATING FORCES TO THE COMBINED OPERATION (AUGUST 23-31, 1944)

No.

Region

Date

Prisoners

Captured generals

Bucharest and surroundings

August 23-28

Around 7 000

Valea Prahovei

August 23-31

Around 8 600

Dobruja

August 23-26

Around 12 000

- von Tschammer und Osten

CălăraşiOlteniţaGiurgiu-Roşiori

August 29-30

Around 9 000

- Burckhardt

Turnu SeverinGura Văii

August 25-31

Around 1 600

- E. Hansen - A. Gerstenberg - Busch - Lilienthal - R. Stahel - K. Spalcke - Raess - Tillessen - Kuderna - Hoffmayer - Teschner - Appel

Participating Romanian units - Bucharest Military Command (with its available forces) - Fourth Army (at Gherghiţa-Prahova) - armed popular forces

- Territorial Fifth Corps - Fourth Army (regrouped forces on August 28-31) - armed popular forces - Second Army Corps - Second Frontier Force Regiment - forces from the Third Army - armed popular forces - Territorial Second Corps - armed popular forces - 19th Infantry Division (2 regiments) - 5th Cavalry Division - armed popular forces

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Region

Date

Oltenia (including ArgeĹ&#x; county)

August 24-28

Around 2 400

Teleorman (Alexandria, Zimnicea, etc.)

August 26

Around 1 200

South Transylvania

August 23-31

Around 1 700

Banat

August 23-31

Around 3 000

10 The whole

August 23-31

Around 10 000

Around 56 500

territory

Total 150 000 square km

Prisoners

Captured generals

No.

Participating Romanian units - Territorial First Corps - Territorial Third Corps - armed popular forces - Territorial Third Corps - Territorial Fourth Corps - armed popular forces - First Army - Territorial Sixth Corps - Mountain Corps - armed popular forces - Territorial Seventh Corps - armed popular forces - Gendarmerie formations supported by armed popular forces

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Paths and memories of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) in Italy Marcelo de Mello Ribeiro Edgley Pereira de Paula 1. Introduction n fact, we live in “interesting times”1, if on one hand the globalization process, points to a world without borders, massified and somewhat superficial, we check in response to this “state of matters” the emergence of cultural resistance, either through organized social groups or even government al institutions, sometimes showing the past and tradition of the nation state that insists on not disappearing, sometimes defending the memory of people who realize in their common past a value, a cultural asset that distinguishes and identifies them. It is inserted in this paradox and historical context the revisiting to a recent past, in this case, the Brazilian participation in World War 2. As the great background this revisiting it is the disappearance of the last generations that actually lived in the time of war both on the Brazilian side, immortalized in the figure of the “pracinhas”2, as on the Italian side in the figure of almost mythological partigiani3. In Italy and Brazil, it increases considerably the number of people and institutions dedicated to research about the topic. In addition to the worship of these soldiers deeds that had always occurred among the military group, lately reaching even the national film industry, as the symbolic case of the film “Heroes” which tells the unusual case of three Brazilian soldiers killed in combat and subsequently buried by the Germans under the words “DREI BRASILIANISCHEN HELDEN” which translated would be “Three Brazilian Heroes.” On the other hand, in Italy, the city halls (known as communes) in the Tuscany region, including Montese, Gaggio Montano, Fornovo di Taro and Collecchio are organizing themselves as in an interesting cultural heritage project called “ Gothic Line Project.”. This coast defense line was formed by dams between the cities of La Spezia and Massa, towards the Apuan Alps, the Garfagnana, the Modena Apennines, in the Bolognese Apennines, also supported in the upper valley of the Arno River area, on the Tiber valley up to the heights of Via Emilia, to close on the coast of the Adriatic Sea with other field fortifications between Pesaro and Rimini.

1 HOBSBAWM, Eric J. Tempos Interessantes. Uma virada no século XX. Companhia das Letras, 2007. 2 Name as it became popularly known members of FEB, it appears as a peculiar way to call military lowest ranks in the military hierarchy, eg. Soldiers, Corporals and Sergeants. 3 Name given to the participants of the Italian resistance to the nazifascist domain. It is based on an adaptation of Partisans or members of the Party, in the original case the Communist Party (PC)idea.

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This project intends to identify “places of memory”4 or “symbolic sites of belonging”5 referring to the expulsion of the Nazi-fascist forces and the victory of the Allied Armies in the region. Certainly, these two theoretical concepts of “places of memory” and “symbolic sites of belonging” help to better understand the routing or cultural itinerary Project. For the French historian Pierre Nora “places of memory” would be spaces where the idea of heritage and physical space (material) and also would serve as a support and vehicle for the formation and preservation of a collective memory (immaterial), while for Zaoal, these “places” or “spaces” can also be thought from the perspective of a social group identity, to the extent that what is material, a monument, a fort or a castle, for example, generates feelings of belonging and emotional attachment to a collectivity. The Army Historic and Cultural Heritage Directory (DPHCEx) attended the launch of the “Gothic Line Project” covering much of the historical and cultural future itinerary and also inaugurating a Center for Studies among researchers of the two countries, essential step in the preservation and dissemination of Brazilian participation in the liberation of that friendly nation. Different places of extreme symbolic value for Brazil and for the project itself were visited, for being the “stage” of the major battles in the area, such as the trenches of Castle Hill, the Bombiana church, the Museum of Montese, the Votive Brazilian Soldier Monument in the Cemetery Pistoia, among other “places”. Thus, the routing of FEB paths is inserted in this aforementioned present paradox where we seek references in our common past to get to know each other and identify ourselves with something. Within this context, the University of Bologna has also supported the communes involved in “Gothic Line Project “, through a scientific support. In this sense, all professionals who deal with “cultural object”, in all its nuances and capabilities, should not lose sight of that acceptance or rejection of these proposed symbols, being them monuments, historic sites or same routes, because they may reveal existing “roots “ in the popular imagination, being incumbent to verify the ability to work on these symbols and redo this imaginary according to the new values of this society that is ever changing and in movement. As Baczko6, another theorist of the social imaginary, would say war, revolutions, the so-called “hot times” “ is a strongly marked period to sedimentary imaginary that are perpetuated in society, taking these images and understandings beyond political and economic time , being closer to the time of mentalities, slower, difficult to remove, no wonder what the Tuscany region tries to systematize. Notably, many Italian and Brazilian tourists already do it, empirically, when run through the same routes where the old ‘pracinhas’ and partigiani fought seeing rivers and elevations of the region, contemplating the monuments that remain from the period, visiting and redefining a story that does not die, but live forever. 4 NORA, Pierre.Entre memória e história: a problemática dos lugares. Projeto História. São Paulo: PUC-SP. n° 10. 1993. 5 ZAOUAL, Hassan. Globalização e Diversidade Cultural. São Paulo, Cortez, 2003. 6 BACZKO, Bronislaw. “A imaginação social” In: Leach, Edmund et Alii. Anthropos-Homem.Lisboa,Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1985.

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Hereafter, some temporal cutouts of FEB participation will be portrayed. After a stabilization period on the Italian front, caused by winter, the spring allowed the offensive moviment of the Allied armies in the theater of operations (TO) of the Italian territory. This offensive is defined by the OPERATIONS Campaign Manual C100-5 of the General Staff of the Brazilian Army as a combined operation, as it relates strategic military, strategic or operational tactics actions, where ponderable elements of more than one armed force under one command take part. In this case, the XV Allied Army Group was the major Allied command of both Allied Armies, the V American, and the VIII British, that would operate in two distinct axes: the foothills of the Apennines (Genghis Khan line) and the Po river Valley, respectively. 2. Development 2.1 First Phase (15 Sep to 30 Oct 44) in the valley of the river Serchio The Allied Army, composed of the U.S. Fifth Army and English Eighth Army, worked from Sicily, southern Italy, pushed the German Army to the North. The 1st Expeditionary Infantry Division (EID) was part of the IV Army Corp, on the western flank of the Fifth Army and its mission in this offensive operation would be advanced to positions of winter and move against Montese - which was characterized as the bloodiest battle of history of FEB and it would highlight the allied offensive, to have unbalanced the German defensive mechanism in the area. FEB mission was to occupy the land dominated by elevations occupied by the enemy (German 114th Light Division), which was located next to the main axis of troop movement and the starting line (LP) of the attack. Thus, to reach Bologna, it was necessary to break the Gothic Line a line of fortifications in the Apennines about 280 km long, from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea, as already mentioned above. If they could break through the Gothic Line, the Allies could use a road known as Route 64. The strategic objective was to release, before the arrival of winter, the northern Italy, making up the junction with the troops operating in France. However, the offensive is held, for they are taken by the V U.S. Army, VI Corps (3 Infantry Divisions) and the French Expeditionary Corps (7 divisions) to be employed in the French front, which was thus substantially strengthened after the allied landing in Normandy. There already were three months that American and British afflicted unsuccessfully Bologna â€“ main accident of German defensive. Bologna resisted, and in fierce counterattacks, German troops inflicted the most severe losses, the Fifth Army of the United States (U.S.) and the Eighth English Army. As a result of the German resistance in the region, it was created the myth of the impregnability of the Gothic Line. Our Detachment arrived in this critical phase of the war and was incorporated into the IV Army Corps, under the command of Gen Willis Crittenberger, subordinate to the shorn V Army, under the command of Gen. Mark Clark. 2.2. Second Stage (15 Sep to 30 Oct 44) in the valley of the river Reno At this stage of the operations FEB clenched on the foothills of the Belvedere bastions, Monte Castello and Castelnuovo. There was the dominance of the quota of Monte

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Castello won by Brazilian forces, it would be difficult for the forces of IV Corps continue towards Bologna. Thus, on 24 Nov 44, the task was given in order to conquer the heights of Monte Belvedere - Monte Castello,up to Task Force 45 of the U.S. Army, which received a Battalion of the 6th Infantry regiment, the Mechanized Recognition Squadron and the support of Artillery. The enemy in his defensive position, repelled this attack. Other trial is held the next day, 25 Nov 44, with partial success, because only Mount Belvedere was won by the Americans. The third attack was planned for 29 Nov 44 - just four days after the first failure. A Grouping composed of 3 Brazilian battalions was organized (I / 1 RI, III/11 RI and III / 6 RI), with the support of three Artillery groups (two Brazilians and one American) under the command of Gen Zenรณbio Costa. On 28 Nov 44, something unexpected happened: 232nd German Infantry Division counterattacks vigorously and dislodges Task Force 45 from Monte Belvedere. However, it is given the order for the attack to happen. The weather conditions on 29 Nov 44, were the worst: it rained not allowing the use of the Air Force and Combat Cars. Thus, 12 Dec 44, two battalions of the 1st and 2nd battalions of the RI 11 supported by three groups Artillery invested the assault. However, once again the rain leads to FEB failure. Snowfall started and there is stability across the front. The plan of releasing Bologna before winter and snow never happened. However, the IV Corps was finally convinced that only with flank protection and strong fire support, the 1st DIE, they could succeed. Thus, approximately 70 days had passed since the failure of the fourth Monte Castello attack. Spring blossomed and warfare operations move back to Italian TO. The 10th U.S. Mountain Division received the mission to conquer Mount Belvedere and Mazzancana and the 1st DIE to conquer Monte Castello -Torre Di Nerone - Castelnuovo. On 19 Feb 45, the 10th Mountain Divi-

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sion offensive begins that on the following day, conquer Monte Belvedere, Gorgolesco and Mazzancana and prepares for continued on 21 Feb 45, over Monte Della Torracia along with the Brazilian attack. Finally, the western flank of the FEB was clear. At 17h 30 min, 21 Feb 45, the I and III / 1 RI reached the top of Monte Castello. After 12 hours of fighting and 3 months of efforts that claimed the lives of 263 Brazilian soldiers and thousands of other injured men. The victory against the German troops meant the maximum moment of the FEB in Italian lands. After the consolidation of Monte Castello, Della Torracia and La Sierra, at noon on 5 Mar 45, the 6th RI, seconded by 11th RI, launches attack, conquering on the same day the elevations of Nerone and Castelnuovo. It was broken the continuity of the Gothic Line. The 10th Mountain and 1st DIE IV Corps could finally use the highway 64 to enforce the fatal blow on the city of Bologna. 2.3 Third phase in the valley of the River Panaro After the conquests of Monte Castello, La Sierra, Torre di Nerone and Castelnuovo, they would go further north, in order to operate in the cutting of the river Panaro. On 14 and 15 Apr 45, the American Fifth Army and Eighth English Army converged their elite troops over Bologna strategic objective of the XV Army Group, which came to fall, finally on 21 Apr 45. On 14 Apr 45, our Division receives the mission to attack the heights north of Monte Castello among which Montese, Quota 888 and Montello. The Germans endeavored to keep possession of those heights, which were of vital importance. The first Brazilian patrols were launched at just the moment when the 10th Mountain Division began the attack. The enemy responded with violence, bombing the entire region, but the platoons FEB men advanced, though. The attack itself began at 13 h and 30 min, preceded by intense artillery preparation and with the support of a CC Cia and the American Chemical Mrt Cia. At one point, Ten Iporan, commander of the Brazilian squads, announced by the the radio to suspend firing of artillery, as his platoon was inside that “eagles nest”, at 1,200 meters high, the village of Montese. Before dark, Montese was in the hands of FEB. It had been a hard journey, the Brazilians faced the treacherous mines and most violent bombardment of the entire campaign, behold Montese received more grenades Artillery enemy than all the rest of the front of the IV Corps. We captured 107 prisoners and Gen Crittenberger thus ruled on the Brazilian victory: “In the journey of yesterday, only Brazilians deserve my unrestricted congratulations, with the brilliance of their achievement and their offensive spirit, the Brazilian Division is able to teach others how to conquer a city.” 2.4 Fourth phase pursuit operations south of the river Po With the enemy already beaten and headlong flight, the south of the river Po persecution took place, developed in the direction Vignola-Alexandria. On 27 Apr 45, the 1st DIE ran into enemy resistance in Collecchio - Fornovo - Respicio, and in double envelopment, it started encircling German troops. They fought up throughout the night

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of 27 and 28 Apr 45. On 29 Apr 45, the Commander of the 6th RI entrusted the Vicar of Neviano dei Rossi to take a “ultimatum” of unconditional surrender to the Germans. One hour after the German response came with no definition. Then the Commander of the Regiment decided to attack, with a detachment of troops composed of three RI of the 1st DIE, which was done throughout the afternoon and early part of the evening of 9 Apr 45, with support from the Artillery Division. At 22:00, the German EM/148º DI Chief appeared with an escort. It was surrender. Dawn on 30 Apr 45, when most of Division appeared as well as the remnants of the 90th Panzer Grenadieren Division and Bersaglieri Italia Divisin, under the command of Gen Otto Fetter Pico, accompanied by 31 officers of his staff. The Commander, escorted by Gen Falconiere da Cunha, was sent to the V U.S. Army HQ. At that moment surrender in combat happened: 14,779 men, 4,000 animals, 2,500 vehicles, and a large amount of weaponry and equipment. But FEB continued its advance. Persecution and cleaning the Po River valley were accelerated. On 30 Apr 45, the region of Alessandria was occupied and there was the junction with the 92nd Army Division. On 1 May 45, after surpassing the city of Turin, another joint is performed with French troops in Susa. The mission was practically ended and well accomplished. It was ended with honor and glory, one of the most brilliant pages in our military history. FEB lost 451 soldiers in combat; 1,577 men were wounded, 1,145 injured, 58 misguided and 35 taken prisoners in 239 days of day and night commitment The performance of the FEB meant the renewal of customs and a new way of seeing the country. But the main one was that Brazil conquered many military powered representants in the politics field: a President, a Vice President, a President of the Senate, four governors, thirteen Ministers of State and other prominent politicians, public figures. 3. Conclusion In Pistoia, hundreds of crosses, marked in the Old Continent, the presence of Brazilian heroes. However, in 1960, these heroes returned home and are buried in Brazilian lands, “ad perpetuate rei memoriam” at the Monument to the dead of World War II, in Rio de Janeiro. The burial chamber that houses 468 graves monument, engraved with the name, grade or rank, unit, date of birth and death of those brave. 15 graves have no identification data, as they relate to missing and dead unrecognized. There is written: “Here lies a hero FEB - God knows the name.” The “Project Gothic Line” retakes “places of memory” in order to revive the project routing Soldiers FEB. Result of this project the University of Bologna has sought to give a technical-scientific support to the communes in order to stimulate research and visitation of this precious cultural itinerary. Ultimately, go through the same routes where the old ‘pracinhas’ and partigiani fought, see rivers and quotas in the region, seeking to contemplate the monuments that remain from the period, redefining the ways of FEB in Italy is one more way to honour and keep alive the everlasting memory of our “pracinhas” that so bravely honored the Brazilian people.

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Bibliography: BACZKO, Bronislaw. “A imaginação social” In: Leach, Edmund et Alii. AnthroposHomem. Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional/Casa da Moeda, 1985. HOBSBAWM, Eric J. Tempos Interessantes. Uma virada no século XX. Companhia das Letras, 2007. NORA, Pierre. Entre memória e história: a problemática dos lugares. Projeto História. São Paulo: PUC-SP. n° 10. 1993. ZAOUAL, Hassan. Globalização e Diversidade Cultural. São Paulo, Cortez, 2003. MORAIS, João Batista Mascarenhas de. A FEB pelo seu Comandante e Memórias. Rio de Janeiro:Editora, Biblioteca do Exército, 1947. BRANCO, Manuel Thomaz Castello. O Brasil na Segunda Grande Guerra. Rio de Janeiro:Editora, Biblioteca do Exército, 1960. CRITTENBERGER, Willis D. Campanha ao Noroeste da Itália. Comp. Ed. Americana, 1952. PAES, General Walter de Menezes. Lenda Azul – Atuação do 3º Batalhão do Regimento Sampaio na Campanha da Itália. Rio de Janeiro: Editora, Biblioteca do Exército, 1991. ESTADO-MAIOR DO EXÉRCITO. C 100 - 5: Operações. BRASÍLIA: EGGCF, 1997. EXÉRCITO BRASILEIRO. Página oficial – Brasília, 2003. Disponível em,< htttp:// www.exercito.gov.br/>. Acesso em: 06 jun 2013. LINHA GÓTICA. Página oficial –Bologna – Itália, 2013. Disponível em, < http://www. lineagotica.eu >. Acesso em 05 jul 2013.

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L’esercito e l’aeronautica nella resistenza contro Hitler Winfried HEINEMANN 1. La resistenza come espressione di conflitti nel sistema policratico del nazionalsocialismo uando i geologi studiano la crosta terrestre, analizzano il propagarsi delle scosse generate dai terremoti. In modo simile, si può partire dagli sconvolgimenti provocati su un sistema politico da atti di resistenza, più o meno riusciti, per comprendere meglio l’essenza del sistema stesso. In questo senso, l’analisi della resistenza militare contro il regime nazionalsocialista può condurre a conoscenze più approfondite del regime stesso. È sbagliato concepire il regime nazista come “hitlerismo”, come “stato del Führer” o come una dittatura monolitica. A partire dagli anni Sessanta del secolo scorso questo equivoco, prima ampiamente diffuso, è stato sostituito nella ricerca dal modello delle “strutture policratiche” secondo il quale Hitler e il movimento da lui guidato riuscirono a far presa su ampie porzioni della società tedesca evitando di prendere posizioni univoche, sia negli indirizzi programmatici che nelle strutture. Tutti i soggetti coinvolti si affannavano a “lavorare in funzione del Führer” e la politica del “sia ... sia”, seguita con coerenza da Hitler, permetteva di sfruttare questa concorrenza tra i diversi gruppi e istituzioni per garantirsi il potere.1 Questo valeva anche per l’ambito militare. La Reichswehr era segnata dal conflitto tra coloro che, come il Comandante in Capo dell’Esercito Colonnello Generale Hans Seeckt, concepivano un piccolo “esercito di comandanti”, il cosiddetto “Führerheer”, altamente tecnicizzato, mobile e apolitico e tra coloro che vedevano in un “esercito di massa” altamente politicizzato , quale strumento nazionale di indottrinamento, la giusta risposta alle esperienze della Prima guerra mondiale. Nel 1934 Hitler appoggiò i vertici della Reichswehr facendo assassinare Röhm, che aveva voluto trasformare le sue SA, le truppe d’assalto, in un “esercito popolare”. Allo stesso tempo, però, Hitler fece crescere le Waffen-SS che si concepivano come “esercito d’élite” e che puntavano a sostituirsi alla Wehrmacht in tale funzione.

1 Mommsen, Hans: Die Realisierung des Utopischen. Die “Endlösung der Judenfrage” im “Dritten Reich” in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 9 (1983), pp. 381-420, p. 387; Kershaw, Ian: “Working towards the Führer”. Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler dictatorship, in: Contemporary European History 2 (1993), 2, pp. 103118; Nolzen, Armin: Von der geistigen Assimilation zur institutionellen Kooperation. Das Verhältnis zwischen NSDAP und Wehrmacht, 1943-1945, in: Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland, hg. von Jörg Hillmann und John Zimmermann, München 2002 (=Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte, 55), pp. 69-96; Heinemann, Winfried: Der Wert funktionalistischer Erklärungen bei der Erforschung des militärischen Widerstands, in: Interessen, Strukturen und Entscheidungsprozesse! Für eine politische Kontextualisierung des Nationalsozialismus, hg. von Manfred Grieger, Christian Jansen und Irmtrud Wojak, Essen 2010, pp. 165-178; Der prekäre Staat. Herrschen und Verwalten im Nationalsozialismus, hg. von Sven Reichardt und Wolfgang Seibe, Frankfurt 2011. Einleitung der Herausgeber, p. 18.

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2. Esercito e aeronautica, Ufficio Comando e Operazioni della Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtführungsamt) e Comando Supremo della Wehrmacht Già negli anni Venti del secolo scorso si era discusso se le forze aeree dovessero avere un’organizzazione indipendente e condurre principalmente una guerra aerea strategica contro centri abitati e industriali, o se dovessero invece fornire un supporto tattico all’esercito ed essere all’uopo inquadrate in quest’ultimo a livello organizzativo.2 Anche in questo caso Hitler prese una decisione ambigua mettendo l’intera aviazione alle dipendenze del suo principale collaboratore: Hermann Göring, pilota da caccia insignito delle più alte decorazioni che rese l’aviazione militare un elemento indipendente della Wehrmacht accanto all’Esercito. Allo stesso tempo, però, dalla metà degli anni Trenta Göring smise di equipaggiare le forze aeree per una guerra aerea strategica limitandosi al supporto aereo all’Esercito.3 Una caratteristica peculiare del Terzo Reich fu l’accentramento dell’aviazione civile e militare alle dipendenze di Göring che era sia Ministro dell’Aviazione del Reich che Comandante in Capo dell’Aeronautica militare, la Luftwaffe. In generale l’aereo, mezzo veloce e moderno, divenne un importante emblema del “movimento”: Hitler amava mostrarsi mentre viaggiava in aereo, al contrario di Stalin che invece non amava viaggiare e non salì mai su un velivolo del Duce Mussolini che nella tradizione dei Cesari si faceva fotografare a cavallo. Le forze aeree, dunque, erano entrate in scena nel Terzo Reich, accanto all’Esercito e alla Marina Militare, come elemento più giovane della Wehrmacht, ma non certamente come il meno rilevante. Il loro Comandante in Capo era, del resto, allo stesso tempo Ministro dell’Aviazione, Presidente dei Ministri di Prussia e primo Generale Feldmaresciallo del nuovo Reich. Ciò pose la questione di una nuova struttura organizzativa di vertice: accanto allo Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, acquisiva sempre più rilievo il Comando Supremo della Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), che operava trasversalmente sotto la guida di Keitel. Il Generale dell’Artiglieria Ludwig Beck, fino al 1938 Capo di Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, non si dimise perché rifiutava sostanzialmente una politica che portava alla guerra, bensì perché riteneva che dietro le pressioni di Hitler affinché s’iniziasse presto la guerra, ci fosse il Comando Supremo della Wehrmacht che lo aveva mal consigliato. Beck voleva inoltre protestare contro il declassamento dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito che fin dai tempi di Moltke aveva assolto la funzione di primo consigliere militare del sovrano.4 Il rapporto tra il Comando Supremo della Wehrmacht e il Comando Supremo dell’Esercito (Oberkommando des Heeres) è un classico esempio di strutture parallele policratiche durante la Seconda guerra mondiale: fu motivo di continue dispute di compe2 Völker, Karl-Heinz: Die deutsche Luftwaffe 1933-1939. Aufbau, Führung und Rüstung der Luftwaffe sowie die Entstehung der deutschen Luftkriegstheorie, Stuttgart 1967 (=Beiträge zur Militär- und Kriegsgeschichte, 8), pp. 28-44; Boog, Horst: Das Problem der Selbständigkeit der Luftstreitkräfte in Deutschland 1908-1945, in: Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 43 (1988), pp. 31-60. 3 Boog, Horst: The Strategic Air War in Europe and Air Defence of the Reich, 1943-1944, in: Germany and the Second World War, vol VII: The strategic air war in Europe and the war in the west and East Asia 19431944/5, Oxford 2006, pp. 7-458. 4 Müller, Klaus-Jürgen: Generaloberst Ludwig Beck. Eine Biographie, Paderborn 2008, pp. 334-364.

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tenze e allo stesso tempo un punto di critica sostanziale mosso da ufficiali dello Stato Maggiore critici e che manifestarono poi, in un secondo momento, idee di opposizione. Un giovane maggiore in servizio presso il Comando Supremo dell’Esercito era solito iniziare le sue presentazioni sull’organizzazione di vertice di guerra con la seguente considerazione: “La struttura di vertice di guerra della Wehrmacht tedesca è ancora più stupida di quanto non potrebbero inventare i più capaci ufficiali di Stato Maggiore se ricevessero l’incarico di mettere a punto la struttura di vertice più assurda”.5 Il nome del maggiore era Claus Schenk Conte di Stauffenberg. 3. Concorrenza di risorse: le divisioni campali della Luftwaffe Un particolare elemento di critica era costituito dalle unità terrestri della Luftwaffe, che durante la guerra diventavano sempre più numerose e, accanto ad esse, dal fatto che ci si aspettava anche da ufficiali dell’aeronautica, come ad esempio il Generale Feldmaresciallo Albert Kesselring in qualità di Comandante in Capo di un teatro di guerra, che questi potessero assumere la responsabilità operativa di guidare formazioni dell’esercito. “Mettere sullo stesso piano un corpo di comandanti militari formatosi in anni di addestramento specifico con un corpo estraneo di comandanti molto meno qualificati, in parte addirittura senza alcuna qualifica [...] è un peso difficilmente accettabile”,6 dichiarò più tardi alla Gestapo uno dei cospiratori. Le formazioni terrestri della Luftwaffe divennero in breve tempo un autentico “terzo esercito” (accanto all’Esercito vero e proprio e alle Waffen-SS) che assorbiva ingenti risorse di personale e materiali senza garantire una corrispondente potenza di combattimento. Si trattava di elementi dovuti a motivi puramente ideologici. Göring era tradizionalmente maldisposto verso l’Esercito che gli appariva troppo conservatore, troppo poco deciso e troppo poco nazionalsocialista. Molte delle unità terrestri della Luftwaffe erano state create con personale che, a causa delle perdite di velivoli al fronte, non era più necessario per l’organizzazione al suolo della guerra aerea. Sotto quest’aspetto, quindi, il semplice aumento del numero di tali unità era indice del fallimento della Luftwaffe di Göring. Ma restituire all’Esercito questo personale di cui non c’era più bisogno per le attività di volo vere e proprie era per Göring, per l’appunto, fuori discussione.7 Non stupisce quindi che già il primo ordine dei cospiratori il pomeriggio del 20 luglio 1944 avesse l’obiettivo di rimediare a questa frammentazione. Esso recitava, infatti, che il Generale Feldmaresciallo Erwin von Witzleben era stato nominato “Comandante Supremo della Wehrmacht” al quale erano subordinate tutte le componenti della Weh5 Hoffmann, Peter: Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg und seine Brüder. Das Geheime Deutschland, Stuttgart 1992, p. 239. 6 Nota durante una riunione presso il Comando Supremo dell’Esercito il 25 giugno 1942, citata in Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung. Die Opposition gegen Hitler und der Staatsstreich vom 20. Juli 1944. Geheime Dokumente aus dem ehemaligen Reichssicherheitshauptamt, hg. von Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 2 Bände, Stuttgart 1984, vol. 1, p. 528 (15/12/1944). 7 Stumpf, Reinhard: Die Luftwaffe als drittes Heer. Die Luftwaffen-Erdkampfverbände und das Problem der Sonderheere 1933 bis 1945, in: Soziale Bewegung und politische Verfassung. Beiträge zur Geschichte der modernen Welt, hg. von Ulrich Engelhardt u.a., Stuttgart 1976 (=Industrielle Welt, Sonderband), pp. 857-894.

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rmacht (e le Waffen-SS).8 Si trattò, ad un’analisi spassionata, dell’unico tentativo intrapreso durante la Seconda guerra mondiale di creare i presupposti organizzativi per una guerra totale attraverso una struttura di vertice unitaria. A Berlino la Luftwaffe disponeva di un numero di effettivi non più quantificabile con certezza. In particolare, presso la Caserma General Göring all’aeroporto militare di Berlino-Tegel si trovavano le unità di riserva della Divisione corazzata “Hermann Göring”.9 Né queste né le truppe SS a Berlino-Lichterfelde intervennero il 20 luglio 1944: il tentativo di colpo di stato fu fermato dagli ufficiali dell’Esercito nel Bendlerblock e, molto più tardi, dal Battaglione della Guardia appartenente all’Esercito. 4. Resistenza nella Luftwaffe: il gruppo “Orchestra rossa” La Luftwaffe era considerata “bruna”, dunque particolarmente esposta agli influssi nazionalsocialisti; per questo si ritiene che non ci sia stata una resistenza al suo interno. Se nell’analisi della resistenza militare ci si limita agli elementi nazional-conservatori, il cui operato culminò nel tentativo di colpo di stato del 20 luglio 1944, non si noterà certamente che già prima all’interno dell’Aeronautica militare tedesca c’erano state altre forme di resistenza. Nell’agosto e settembre del 1942 la Gestapo arrestò a Berlino e altrove gli appartenenti a un gruppo a cui aveva dato l’appellativo “Orchestra rossa” e che considerava soprattutto un’organizzazione di spionaggio sovietica. In realtà, il lavoro di intelligence a favore dell’Unione Sovietica costituiva solo una parte molto esigua delle attività del gruppo che si dedicava altrimenti alla discussione di posizioni politiche di sinistra per la Germania del dopoguerra. Ma cospiratori di primo piano come i tenenti Harro SchulzeBoysen e Herbert Gollnow erano membri della Luftwaffe; dal Comando Supremo della Luftwaffe Schulze-Boysen aveva avuto accesso alle informazioni sull’attacco all’Unione Sovietica che aveva passato all’ambasciata sovietica a Berlino. Il processo contro il gruppo guidato da Harro Schulze-Boysen e dal pedagogo Arvid Harnack si tenne di fronte al Tribunale Supremo Militare del Reich, il Reichskriegsgericht, che era l’istanza competente anche in virtù della situazione giuridica.10 Una competenza che esso mantenne anche quando, come in questo caso, nei fatti incriminati erano coinvolti civili che vennero anch’essi processati in un unico procedimento. Göring, al quale premeva non lasciarsi compromettere troppo dal coinvolgimento di membri del suo ministero, decise che il procedimento penale si sarebbe dovuto tenere di fronte al

8 Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung, p. 24 e seg. 9 Kurowski, Franz: Von der Polizeigruppe z.b.V. “Wecke” zum Fallschirmpanzerkorps “Hermann Göring”. Die Entstehung, Entwicklung und das Endschicksal der Luftwaffeneinheiten mit dem weißen Spiegel “Hermann Göring”, Osnabrück 1994, p. 388 e seg. 10 Si confronti qui e in seguito Messerschmidt, Manfred: Vier Soldaten der “Weißen Rose” vom Volksgerichtshof verurteilt, in “Wider die Kriegsmaschinerie”. Kriegserfahrungen und Motive des Widerstandes der “Weissen Rose”, hg. von Detlef Bald, Essen 2005, pp. 166-174, p. 166 e seg.

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Tribunale Supremo Militare.11 La situazione invece era diversa per il processo contro gli studenti del gruppo della “Rosa Bianca” di Monaco, che fu celebrato quasi contemporaneamente. Anche in questo caso erano coinvolti dei militari, ma questa volta dell’Esercito: Hans Scholl, Alexander Schmorell, Willi Graf e Christoph Probst appartenevano ad una compagnia militare studentesca ed erano in licenza esclusivamente per motivi di studio. Eppure, in pochissimo tempo, furono tratti di fronte alla Corte di Giustizia Popolare (Volksgerichtshof), condannati e giustiziati.12 Un’importante differenza riguardò il diverso grado di visibilità dato ai due eventi. Le udienze di fronte al Tribunale Supremo Militare si tennero a porte chiuse, mentre per quelle di fronte alla Corte di Giustizia Popolare era stata volutamente scelta una dimensione pubblica.13 Di fronte alle azioni di grande impatto pubblico portate avanti dagli studenti di Monaco, una condanna e un’esecuzione capitale altrettanto pubbliche potevano apparire “opportune” a scopi preventivi generali, mentre per l’affare “Orchestra Rossa”, che oltre ad una dimensione politica aveva anche implicazioni attinenti ai servizi d’informazione, era raccomandabile un processo non pubblico. In ogni caso, quest’approccio produsse anche l’effetto, certamente gradito e considerato dal regime una sorta di successo collaterale, di tenere il ruolo svolto dalla Luftwaffe al di fuori della discussione pubblica. Lo smascheramento del gruppo di Schulze-Boysen avvenne infatti in un momento tutt’altro che felice per Göring. Gli anni 1942/1943 videro una forte intensificazione dei bombardamenti alleati: nel marzo 1942 venne distrutta la città di Lubecca, il 30 maggio 1942 Colonia fu colpita dal primo attacco dell’Operazione Millennium14 e nell’inverno 1942/1943 fallì il promesso rifornimento dall’aria alle truppe tedesche assediate nella sacca di Stalingrado. La stella di Göring cominciava a tramontare. Si diceva che prima della guerra il “Maresciallo del Reich” si vantasse scherzando che si sarebbe chiamato “Meier”15 se mai un aereo alleato fosse apparso al cielo di una città tedesca. Oramai 11 Nelson, Anne: Die Rote Kapelle. Die Geschichte der legendären Widerstandsgruppe, München 2010, p. 365. Höhne, Heinz: Kennwort: Direktor. Die Geschichte der Roten Kapelle, Frankfurt 1970, p. 205 e seg., si basa sulle dichiarazioni rilasciate dopo la guerra dal rappresentante dell’accusa Manfred Roeder quando fu a sua volta chiamato a rispondere della propria attività davanti a un tribunale. Secondo tali dichiarazioni, Göring dovette essere prima convinto della scelta del Tribunale Supremo Militare come foro competente. Höhne non tiene tuttavia in sufficiente considerazione il carattere giustificativo delle dichiarazioni rese allora da Roeder. 12 Messerschmidt, Vier Soldaten. 13 Sösemann, Bernd: Verräter vor dem Volksgericht. Die denkwürdige Geschichte eines Filmprojekts, in: Der Umgang des Dritten Reiches mit den Feinden des Regimes. XXII. Königswinterer Tagung (Februar 2009), hg. von Manuel Becker und Christoph Studt, Berlin 2010 (=Schriftenreihe der Forschungsgemeinschaft 20. Juli 1944 e.V., 13), pp. 147-163. 14 Boog, Horst: The Anglo-American Strategic Air War over Europe and German Air Defence, in: Germany and the Second World War, vol VI: The global war. Widening of the conflict into a World War and the shift of the initiative , Oxford 2000, pp. 469-628, pp. 566-568; Süß, Dietmar: Tod aus der Luft. Kriegsgesellschaft und Luftkrieg in Deutschland und England, München 2011. 15 Kube, Alfred: Pour le mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich, München 1986 (=Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte, 24), p. 341; Overy, Richard J.: Hermann Göring. Machtgier und Eitelkeit, München 1986, p. 373 e seg.

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invece le barzellette raccontate di nascosto alle spalle di Göring erano all’ordine del giorno. Era pertanto d’interesse vitale per Göring che il proprio impero civile-militare non venisse collegato anche a massicci atti di resistenza o di tradimento.16 5. I cospiratori del 20 luglio 1944 e l’aviazione La competenza di Göring, che si estendeva sia all’aviazione civile sia a quella militare, faceva sì che il Ministero dell’Aria del Reich e il Comando Supremo della Luftwaffe avessero entrambi sede nello stesso edificio nella Wilhelmstraße e che anche a livello di personale non ci fosse una separazione netta tra i due organi. Anche se non è sbagliato affermare che la Luftwaffe del Reich, fatta eccezione per il Tenente Colonnello della Riserva Cäsar von Hofacker, non era coinvolta nella resistenza nazional-conservatrice, si tratta comunque solo di una mezza verità. Quest’affermazione, infatti, non tiene in considerazione la misura in cui alcuni membri dell’aviazione civile fossero coinvolti nei piani per rovesciare il regime. Se si pensa alle strutture del Terzo Reich, che erano più che altro orientate ad personam e non più nettamente distinte dal punto di vista amministrativo, è del tutto legittimo considerare entrambi gli elementi insieme come l’ “impero” di Göring. I piani sovversivi portati avanti dal servizio d’informazione del Comando Supremo della Wehrmacht, l’Ufficio Informazioni Estere/Difesa (in tedesco Amt Ausland/ Abwehr) fino all’inizio dell’estate del 1943 si appoggiavano in gran parte ai membri del Ministero dell’Aria e della Lufthansa, per lo più legati tra loro da vincoli di parentela. Sono noti i contatti con l’estero del teologo Dietrich Bonhoeffer, attivo nel servizio d’informazioni militare, il cui fratello Klaus era consulente legale e Capo dell’Ufficio Legale della Lufthansa. Questo legame facilitava i viaggi all’estero di Dietrich Bonhoeffer e anche Klaus Bonhoeffer sfruttava le possibilità offertegli dalla sua attività per intrattenere contatti con diversi gruppi di resistenza. Una sorella dei Bonhoeffer, Christine, era sposata con Hans von Dohnanyi, che nell’ambito del controspionaggio raccoglieva documenti sui crimini commessi dai nazisti.17 Un altro consulente legale della Lufthansa era Otto John che rappresentava l’impresa nella neutrale Madrid. Suo fratello Hans era assistente presso l’Istituto per il Diritto Ae16 Boog, The Strategic Air War in Europe, pp. 257-260. 17 Per maggiori dettagli su questi contatti si veda soprattutto Gerrens, Uwe: Rüdiger Schleicher. Leben zwischen Staatsdienst und Verschwörung, Gütersloh 2009. Su Vollmer, Antje, und Lars-Broder Keil: Stauffenbergs Gefährten. Das Schicksal der unbekannten Verschwörer, München 2013; Limbach, Jutta, et al.: Erinnerung an Hans von Dohnanyi, Berlin 2003 (=Beiträge zum Widerstand 1933-1945); Chowaniec, Elisabeth: Der “Fall Dohnanyi”. 1943-1945. Widerstand, Militärjustiz, SS-Willkür, München 1991 (=Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 62). La letteratura su Otto John si concentra prevalentemente sul suo ruolo di presidente dell’Ufficio Federale per la Protezione della Costituzione (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) e sul suo passaggio a Berlino Est nel 1945; si confrontino invece in merito Stöver, Bernd: Otto John (1909-1997). Ein Widerstandskämpfer als Verfassungsschutzchef, in: Konspiration als Beruf. Deutsche Geheimdienstchefs im Kalten Krieg, hg. von Dieter Krüger und Armin Wagner, Berlin 2003, pp. 160-178, e Heinemann, Winfried: Military Resistance Activities and the War, in: Germany and the Second World War, vol. IX/I: German Wartime Society 1939-1945. Politicization, Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival, Oxford 2008, pp. 771-925,p p. 890-892.

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ronautico della Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität di Berlino, guidato dal Professor Dottor Rüdiger Schleicher. Schleicher, che era a sua volta sposato con Ursula, un’altra sorella dei Bonhoeffer, era stato Direttore dell’Ufficio Legale del Ministero dell’Aria dal 1935 al 1939, ma era poi stato sostituito per il suo impegno in favore del rispetto del diritto internazionale anche in tempi di guerra. Tra le persone che erano in contatto con Klaus Bonhoeffer c’era Ernst von Harnack che si può annoverare in senso più lato tra i membri della resistenza operaia. L’ex Presidente del Governo Distrettuale di Merseburg, esponente del Partito Socialdemocratico SPD, era allo stesso tempo cugino di uno dei membri dell’ “Orchestra Rossa”, Arvid Harnack; un altro membro della famiglia, Falk Harnack, sopravvisse nonostante fosse stato arrestato per i suoi legami con la “Rosa Bianca”. Da considerare separatamente è il caso del Colonnello dell’Aeronautica Wilhelm Staehle che durante la Prima guerra mondiale e la Repubblica di Weimar aveva ricoperto incarichi nei servizi d’informazione. Staehle era in stretto contatto sia con la resistenza all’interno del servizio d’informazione militare, la “Abwehr”, che con Carl Goerdeler, anche se, in quanto comandante della Invalidenhaus di Berlino, non operava negli ambiti di attività veri e propri della sua Forza Armata.18 È interessante dare anche qui uno sguardo al modo in cui queste personalità vennero perseguite dopo l’attentato del 20 luglio 1944. Come già detto in precedenza, c’era uno stretto legame tra i membri di questo gruppo, imparentati tra loro, e le forze di opposizione all’interno del servizio d’informazioni militare “Abwehr”. Proprio in virtù di tale legame, contro un gran numero di questi cospiratori non si tenne mai un processo vero e proprio e la maggior parte di essi poté rimanere in vita fino quasi alla fine della guerra. Ernst von Harnack morì il 5 marzo 1945 sul patibolo a Plötzensee, Dietrich Bonhoeffer e Hans von Dohnanyi furono impiccati il 9 aprile 1945 a Flossenbürg; Wilhelm Staehle, Rüdiger Schleicher, Klaus Bonhoeffer e Hans John vennero assassinati alle spalle il 23 aprile 1945 nella Invalidenstraße a Berlino all’avvicinarsi delle truppe sovietiche. Un motivo era evidentemente dovuto al coinvolgimento dei servizi d’informazione: a quanto pare, Himmler s’illudeva ancora di riuscire a ritagliare per sé un ruolo dopo la fine della guerra tramite contatti utili dei detenuti. Ma anche questo modus operandi fece sì che le azioni penali contro gli atti di resistenza partiti dagli ambiti sotto il comando di Göring non divenissero mai di dominio pubblico durante il Terzo Reich. Cäsar von Hofacker, l’unico ufficiale dell’aviazione e uno dei congiurati principali, fu condannato a morte il 30 agosto 1944 insieme con altri tre imputati, ma a differenza di questi ultimi fu impiccato solo nel dicembre dello stesso anno.19 In ogni caso, gli ufficiali dell’Esercito furono perseguiti e giustiziati più velocemente e con maggiore fermezza rispetto agli altri imputati. Il coinvolgimento di cospiratori provenienti dall’ambito dell’aviazione ha avuto im18 Roon, Ger van: Wilhelm Staehle. Ein Leben auf der Grenze 1877-1945, München 1969 (Reprint Neuenhaus 1984). 19 Wagner, Walter: Der Volksgerichtshof im nationalsozialistischen Staat. Mit einem Forschungsbericht für die Jahre 1975 bis 2010 von Jürgen Zarusky, München 2011 (=Die deutsche Justiz und der Nationalsozialismus, Teil 3, =Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 16, 3), p. 691.

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portanza vitale per i piani di colpo di stato che culminarono nell’attentato del 20 luglio 1944 da almeno un punto di vista. Otto John, infatti, era l’uomo di collegamento più stretto di Stauffenberg con gli alleati occidentali: tramite lui e i suoi contatti con gli inglesi a Madrid, i vertici della congiura militare ottenevano informazioni circa gli spazi d’azione in politica estera che un governo sovversivo avrebbe potuto aspettarsi decisamente più chiare e realistiche rispetto a quelle fornite dal sempre eccessivamente ottimista Goerdeler attraverso il suo uomo di contatto con i servizi segreti americani, il problematico Hans-Bernd Gisevius.20 Il coinvolgimento del gruppo che ruotava intorno ai Bonhoeffer e ai Dohnanyi non si era affatto fermato con la messa fuori gioco dell’ “Abwehr” quale centrale della resistenza nel 1943. Al contrario, i congiurati rimasti in libertà parteciparono anche ai piani che partivano dall’Ufficio Affari Generali dell’Esercito (Allgemeines Heeresamt) e dal Quartier generale del Comandante dell’Esercito di riserva. Per quel che riguarda un’ulteriore dimensione si possono solo fare supposizioni. In seno al Gruppo d’Armate “Centro” nel 1943 venne costituita un’unità di cavalleria che fungeva per lo più da Reggimento di Cavalleria “Centro”, ma che nel luglio 1944 era già divenuta 3ª Brigata di Cavalleria.21 Da quest’unità dovevano essere presi circa 1200 uomini agli ordini del Maggiore Philipp von Boeselager (fratello del comandante, Tenente Colonnello Georg von Boeselager), in supporto del colpo di stato, questi militari si sarebbero dovuti spostare nell’area metropolitana di Varsavia in un tour de force a cavallo e da là fatti arrivare in aereo a Berlino. Ci furono però a lungo dubbi su come realizzare effettivamente il trasporto aereo di così tanti soldati con l’equipaggiamento (naturalmente senza cavalli) nell’estate di guerra del 1944. Questi uomini, comunque, non avrebbero potuto cominciare ad operare a Berlino prima di 24 ore dall’inizio del colpo di stato. Evidentemente, i cospiratori si aspettavano conflitti armati prolungati nella capitale. Non è possibile dire con certezza se si sarebbe potuto contare sul supporto logistico della “bruna” Luftwaffe22 al rovesciamento del regime. Anche se si possono solo avanzare ipotesi, è probabile che i contatti dell’opposizione con l’aviazione civile avrebbero potuto offrire possibilità alternative. 6. Procedimenti giuridici a confronto: “Orchestra Rossa”, “Rosa Bianca”, Ehrenhof Per completezza si cita un altro aspetto del sostegno alla resistenza fornito dalle fila della Luftwaffe, in questo caso dopo il 20 luglio: si tratta della cognata di Claus e Berthold von Stauffenberg, l’aviatrice Contessa Melitta von Stauffenberg. Insieme a Hanna Reitsch e Beate Uhse, Melitta von Stauffenberg, laureata in ingegneria, era una delle più 20 Heinemann, Winfried: Außenpolitische Illusionen des nationalkonservativen Widerstands in den Monaten vor dem Attentat, in: Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, hg. von Jürgen Schmädeke und Peter Steinbach, München 1985, pp. 1061-1070. 21 Qui e in seguito: Reuther, Thomas: Soldaten für den Staatsstreich. Die Heeresgruppe Mitte und der 20. Juli 1944, in: Militärgeschichte 2004, 2, pp. 4-7. 22 Reuther, Soldaten für den Staatsstreich, p. 6, parla di 77 velivoli da trasporto pronti presso la 6ª Flotta aerea schierata a supporto del Gruppo d’Armate “Centro”, senza però esaminare se questi sarebbero poi stati effettivamente pronti all’impiego in supporto alla causa dei cospiratori.

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eminenti pioniere dell’aviazione, tanto che Göring era riuscito ad ottenere da Hitler che la donna, che era mezza ebrea, fosse “parificata agli ariani” e che potesse rimanere in servizio nella Luftwaffe. Ed era anche stato Göring stesso ad averle conferito la Croce di Ferro. Come gli altri membri della famiglia, anche lei fu arrestata in virtù della “responsabilità penale familiare” (Sippenhaft) ma venne ben presto rilasciata. Il suo biografo suppone che la Luftwaffe non solo continuasse ad avere bisogno di lei, ma anche che non avesse alcun interesse che il ruolo personale svolto da Göring divenisse di dominio pubblico.23 Melitta von Stauffenberg volava da un campo di concentramento all’altro o da una prigione all’altra tenendo unita la famiglia Stauffenberg fino a quando, l’8 aprile 1945, venne abbattuta da un caccia americano nella Bassa Baviera e ferita mortalmente. Il 20 luglio 1944 può essere interpretato come il momento culminante di un conflitto di lunga data tra le vecchie élite nazional-conservatrici, soprattutto tra le fila dell’Esercito, e le tendenze socio-rivoluzionarie del nazionalsocialismo24 che erano in aumento verso la fine della guerra in seguito ad un processo di “radicalizzazione cumulativa”. Sotto quest’aspetto è comprensibile come la persecuzione penale non andasse mai a colpire solo i responsabili individuali, bensì venisse usata dal regime per una sorta di resa dei conti generale con l’Esercito.25 È in linea con ciò il fatto che delle tre forze armate della Wehrmacht, solo l’Esercito fu costretto a concorrere all’espulsione degli “autori” dalla comunità militare per mezzo di una commissione militare speciale denominata “Ehrenhof” (corte d’onore). Ad uscire vincitore dal fallito tentativo di colpo di stato fu, anche se fu una vittoria di breve durata, Himmler che con l’Esercito di riserva ottenne accesso anche alle risorse di personale e materiali dell’Esercito. Göring invece non riuscì a trarre vantaggi personali dagli avvenimenti: la sua immagine, un tempo favorito del Führer e ora tossicodipendente, era ormai troppo danneggiata. Dire allora che dalle fila della Luftwaffe non fu opposta alcuna resistenza contro il regime nazista è troppo riduttivo, perché così facendo non si tiene conto dello stretto legame tra l’aviazione civile e quella militare, e del fatto che anche all’interno di quest’ultima ci fu una notevole partecipazione agli episodi del 20 luglio 1944. È inoltre un’affermazione semplicemente falsa se si considerano anche le azioni intraprese al di fuori di questo contesto, come ad esempio quelle portate avanti dal gruppo di Harnack e Schulze-Boysen. Il fatto che questa idea venga diffusa, per lo più senza essere contraddetta, è da considerare anche come un effetto che continua tuttora degli sforzi del sistema volti a non danneggiare ancora di più pubblicamente il “paladino del Führer” Göring e la sua sfera di potere nel variopinto apparato nazista. 23 Medicus, Thomas: Melitta von Stauffenberg. Ein deutsches Leben, Berlin 2012, p. 294. 24 Mommsen, Hans: Der Nationalsozialismus. Kumulative Radikalisierung und Selbstzerstörung des Regimes, in: Meyers Ezyklopädisches Lexikon, Band 16, Mannheim 1976, pp. 785-790, p. 785, p. 789. 25 Si veda qui e in seguito Heinemann, Winfried: Selbstreinigung der Wehrmacht? Der Ehrenhof des Heeres und seine Tätigkeit, in: Der Umgang des Dritten Reiches mit den Feinden des Regimes. XXII. Königswinterer Tagung (Februar 2009), hg. von Manuel Becker und Christoph Studt, Berlin 2010 (=Schriftenreihe der Forschungsgemeinschaft 20. Juli 1944 e.V., 13), pp. 117-129, p. 126 e seg.

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Il Comando Contro Guerriglia (Co.Gu.) della Repubblica Sociale Italiana 1944-45 Federico CIAVATTONE 1. La controguerriglia dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano opo la firma dell’armistizio con gli Alleati – reso pubblico l’8 settembre 1943 - l’Italia si ritrovò divisa in due: nel centro-nord c’erano i tedeschi occupanti; a sud, le truppe alleate che lentamente risalivano la penisola. A fianco dei tedeschi, Mussolini – una volta liberato – il 23 settembre 1943 costituì la Repubblica Sociale Italiana, un nuovo stato fascista. Nell’Italia meridionale fu creato il Regno vedeva come punti di riferimento Vittorio Emanuele III e Pietro Badoglio. Nel nord Italia, infine, nacque un movimento di resistenza armato di opposizione all’occupazione tedesca e al neonato governo fascista. Pertanto, tra il 1943 e il 1945, in Italia, oltre la guerra tra eserciti regolari (germanico e Alleato), si combatté anche una guerra civile che, come è stata definita Claudio Pavone, fu “civile”, di “liberazione” e “patriottica”1. Quantunque la Repubblica Sociale sia esistita per un periodo limitato – spesso la si definisce “Repubblica dei 600 giorni” –, essa riuscì a costituire ed a destinare al combattimento un significativo numero di reparti e unità militari, più o meno importanti. Naturalmente, per “combattimento” si intendeva quello contro gli Alleati e non la controguerriglia. La realtà, però, fu ben diversa perché il fronte rimase, per la maggioranza, un miraggio: 2/3 dei militari, infatti, vennero impegnati nella repressione del fenomeno partigiano. Senza ombra di dubbio, lo sforzo maggiore per costituire reparti combattenti venne fatto dallo Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano. Uno sforzo che deve essere distinto in più fasi che si conclusero nell’aprile del 1945. Si tratta di cinque momenti distinti, durante i quali cambiarono le tecniche e le modalità di approcciarsi dell’E.N.R. al problema del ribellismo.

Prima fase: settembre 1943-marzo 19442. In questo primo periodo, la repressione del fenomeno partigiano era ancora considerata una prerogativa delle unità di polizia. L’attività antipartigiana veniva, quindi, svolta dai reparti della Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana e dai Carabinieri. I reparti dell’Esercito – pochi in realtà – che parteciparono a operazioni di controguerriglia eseguirono, principalmente, attività di contenimento.

1 C. Pavone, Una guerra civile. Saggio storico sulla moralità della resistenza, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1991. 2 Archivio Centrale dello Stato (da ora in poi A.C.S.), Fondo Repubblica Sociale Italiana (da ora in poi R.S.I.), Segreteria Particolare del Duce (da ora in poi S.P.D.), Carteggio Riservato (da ora in poi C.R.), Busta 70, fasc. 642/R «Ministero della Difesa nazionale», sottofasc. 17, «Varie».

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Seconda fase: aprile-giugno 1944. È il momento in cui i vertici militari dell’E.N.R. prendono atto che le forze di polizia non sono in grado di debellare il movimento ribellistico. Viene, quindi, decisa una maggiore – se non totale – partecipazione dei reparti dell’Esercito alla repressione. In tal modo, il “problema” partigiano non è più considerato soltanto una questione di ordine pubblico, ma diventa un tema militare con ripercussioni tattico-strategiche anche sull’andamento della guerra in Italia. «Il fronte dei nemici interni della repubblica sociale, veniva da allora giudicato direttamente e intimamente connesso con il fronte dei nemici esterni della Germania operanti sul territorio italiano. E questo giudizio permaneva fino al crollo della repubblica sociale»3. Il periodo compreso tra l’aprile e il giugno, si caratterizzò come un momento di potenziamento, sia per la dottrina che per i reparti, in modo da arrivare così all’estate ed essere in grado di eseguire azioni a largo raggio. Terza fase: luglio-settembre 1944. È la fase della reazione a fondo, delle operazioni su vasta scala, dell’inizio della guerra contro la “Vandea” partigiana4. Le grandi operazioni, svolte soprattutto in Liguria e in Piemonte, avevano lo scopo di garantire un certo margine di sicurezza in tutto il settore alpino-tirrenico occidentale, all’indomani degli sbarchi Alleati in Francia. Quell’area, infatti, era ormai considerata il retrofronte del settore francese e pertanto andava resa sicura. Quarta fase: ottobre-dicembre 1944. Il periodo ottobre-dicembre vede in parte attenuarsi le operazioni di controguerriglia. In alcune regioni, però, proseguono importanti rastrellamenti a largo raggio: in Piemonte, ad esempio, sono svolte azioni nella Val d’Ossola e nelle Langhe che portano all’eliminazione delle “libere” Repubbliche partigiane dell’Ossola e di Alba5. Dai dati dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano risulta che, in questa fase, le forze della controguerriglia provocarono ai partigiani, sull’intero territorio della R.S.I., 23.876 morti6. Quinta fase: Gennaio-aprile 1945. Si tratta della fase finale della controguerriglia. Purtroppo i dati a disposizione sono complessivi e, quindi, non è possibile risalire all’effettiva entità della partecipazione dell’E.N.R. alle operazioni di rastrellamento. Dai documenti dell’Ufficio Storico dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito risulta che le FF.AA. della R.S.I., dal gennaio al marzo 3 A.C.S., Carte Graziani, Busta 71, «La marcia della repubblica sociale contro la Vandea», p. 10. 4 Vengono eseguite importanti operazioni in Liguria, in Piemonte e in Veneto. Complessivamente, i reparti dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano impegnati, in quel periodo, nella controguerriglia provocarono 12.911 vittime tra le file dei partigiani. Una cifra, molto probabilmente, gonfiata per mostrare che l’Esercito non stava con le “mani in mano”. Archivio Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore Esercito (da ora in poi A.U.S.S.M.E.), Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 54, Relazione «Perdite inflitte ai partigiani secondo la G.n.r. e l’E.n.r». 5 Importanti operazioni furono svolte anche in Lombardia, in Veneto e in Emilia. 6 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 54, cit., Relazione «Perdite inflitte ai partigiani secondo la G.n.r. e l’E.n.r.», cit.

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1945, provocarono 13.695 morti tra le file dei partigiani7. Ancora una volta, i dati confermano che il settore dove la resistenza risultò essere più attiva era quello occidentale: tra il gennaio e il marzo del 1945, infatti, furono uccisi, in seguito ad azioni di controguerriglia, rispettivamente 3.817 partigiani in Piemonte e 2.017 in Liguria. Nel febbraio del 1945, i documenti affiancano a queste due aree anche la Toscana con 2.338 vittime8. Il numero dei morti di quest’ultima fase sono una chiara dimostrazione della volontà della R.S.I. e dei tedeschi di rendere sicure le immediate retrovie del fronte ed evitare, così, che nel momento del tracollo generale, i reparti italo-tedeschi si trovassero accerchiati anche alle spalle. II. Nasce il Comando Contro Guerriglia (Co.Gu.) L’oggetto di questa relazione è la repressione del movimento resistenziale da parte della Repubblica Sociale Italiana, attraverso le vicende del Comando Contro Guerriglia (Co.Gu.), un ente interforze creato dal fascismo repubblicano. Durante la ricostituzione delle Forze Armate e delle forze di Polizia, il principale problema fu il movimento resistenziale. Proprio il fenomeno partigiano assorbì un numero sempre maggiore di risorse, sia in uomini che in mezzi. Se, infatti, in origine la lotta al ribellismo fu una prerogativa della Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana, successivamente, il principale protagonista divenne l’Esercito, poi affiancato dai Battaglioni di Fanteria di Marina della Decima MAS, dai Battaglioni di terra dell’Aeronautica Repubblicana, dalle Brigate Nere e dalle varie formazioni di Polizia della R.S.I.. Naturalmente, le operazioni dei reparti italiani avvennero sempre in stretta cooperazione con i comandi e le unità germaniche. Il maggiore impiego di risorse militari nella controguerriglia provocò un’escalation di violenza che raggiunse il culmine nell’estate-autunno 1944: la Repubblica Sociale Italiana, infatti, voleva risolvere definitivamente il problema della resistenza con l’utilizzo di qualsiasi strumento. È in questo contesto di guerra civile e di guerra antipartigiana che deve essere inserita la storia del Comando Contro Guerriglia. Il Comando Co.Gu. fu ufficialmente costituito e mobilitato, su ordine dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, il 22 luglio 1944. In seguito ad accordi intercorsi con la parte germanica e ad autorizzazione del Ministero delle Forze Armate, si dispone sotto la data del 25 luglio 1944 la costituzione e la mobilitazione del COMANDO CONTRO GUERRIGLIA (CO.GU.)9. La sua zona di responsabilità, nella repressione del ribellismo, fu il Piemonte anche se, per brevi e differenti periodi, reparti da esso dipendenti operarono in Valle d’Aosta 7 Ibidem. 8 P. Battistelli, A. Molinari, Le forze armate della R.s.i. Uomini e imprese dell’ultimo esercito di Mussolini, Varese, Hobby & Work, 2007, p. 141. 9 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, Diario Storico militare del Comando Co.Gu. (da ora in poi D.S. Co.Gu.), 22 luglio 1944, p.1.

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e in Lombardia. Il 25 luglio 1944, sempre lo S.M.E. indicò gli Ufficiali che avrebbero dovuto ricoprire i ruoli di maggiore responsabilità: - Comandante: Generale di Corpo d’Armata, Archimede Mischi; - Capo di Stato Maggiore: Tenente Colonnello, Romolo Ferrari; - Sottocapo di Stato Maggiore: Maggiore, Giovanni Andrizzo; - Capo Sezione “I”: Tenente i.g.s., Antonio Federico Balestra10; Strutturalmente, il Comando Co.Gu. era composto da un Comandante (Generale di Corpo d’Armata), due Ufficiali addetti, un Capo di Stato Maggiore, un Ufficio Operazioni e Servizi e un Quartier Generale. Complessivamente 16 ufficiali (tra Superiori e Inferiori), 4 sottufficiali e 35 uomini di truppa11. Comandante Ufficiali addetti Capo di Stato Maggiore Ufficio operazioni e informazioni Quartier generale

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1 2 1

Tabella 1. Armamento a disposizione del Comando Co.Gu.

Per lo svolgimento dell’attività quotidiana, i vertici militari misero a disposizione del Comando Contro Guerriglia cinque autovetture, tre autocarri, sei motociclette e due biciclette13. La creazione del Comando Co.Gu. trovava origine dalla necessità di costituire un centro operativo per la condotta delle operazioni di repressione dell’attività partigiana e del “risanamento” delle zone già “epurate”. Il Comando, quindi, non doveva addestrare Reparti alla controguerriglia, ma coordinarli durante le operazioni in modo da conseguire maggiori risultati. Anche se apparentemente, le operazioni erano sotto giurisdizione italiana, le direttive generali erano quelle emesse dal Generale Wolff: i reparti italiani non dovevano intraprendere nessun tipo di operazione senza preventiva autorizzazione del Generale delle SS, tranne in caso di estrema necessità. Per avere un maggiore controllo sul Comando Co.Gu., Wolff vi distaccò il Dr. Kuhlias con il compito di svolgere funzione di collegamento e di supervisione sulle operazioni. Il carattere innovativo del Comando Contro Guerriglia consisteva nel fatto che, anche se i vertici appartenevano allo Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, al suo funzionamento partecipavano tutte le componenti delle FF.AA della R.S.I. e della Polizia. Pertanto, possiamo affermare che il Comando Co.Gu. funzionò come un ente interforze con un solo e preciso obiettivo: risolvere definitivamente il problema partigiano. Il Co.Gu. doveva [essere] alle dipendenze dello stato maggiore dell’esercito, [dove10 11 12 13

Ivi, Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Costituzione del Comando Co.Gu.», 25 luglio 1944. Ivi, «Riepilogo del CO.GU.», 22 luglio 1944, p. 4. Ibidem. A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu., 22 luglio 1944, cit.

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va] essere il centro direttivo della controguerriglia secondo dei piani organici elaborati in base ai dati a disposizione della sezione situazione dell’ufficio operazioni e servizi dello stato maggiore, periodicamente comunicati dai comandi militari regionali, e, molto verosimilmente, dal comando generale della Guardia Repubblicana14. La popolazione italiana e il movimento partigiano avrebbero dovuto apprendere della costituzione di questo nuovo ente con una grande operazione che si sarebbe dovuta svolgere nel luglio 1944, prima su Torino e, successivamente, nel resto del Piemonte. Il piano denominato «Operazione T», prevedeva una dimostrazione di forza (11.700 uomini tra italiani e tedeschi) nel capoluogo piemontese, affiancata al rastrellamento di alcuni quartieri15. Le forze italiane di nuova formazione insieme a quelle in corso di formazione, sotto il comando del Generale Mischi, cominceranno la lotta contro gruppi di bande in zone del Piemonte, da determinare, con una marcia dimostrativa di tutte le unità già pronte per la città di Torino16. Terminata la dimostrazione per le vie di Torino, questi militari sarebbero stati spostati nel resto della regione per iniziare i grandi cicli di rastrellamento: - Val d’Aosta: Decima Mas; - Val Susa e Val Chisone: truppe dipendenti dai comandi tedeschi; - Area compresa tra Cuneo, Alba, Bra, Acqui: “Cacciatori degli Appennini” e Brigate Nere17. L’«Operazione T», però, venne attuata solo nella sua seconda fase: quella dei grandi rastrellamenti. Il 29 luglio 1944, giorno stabilito per l’inizio delle azioni, Mischi inviò a tutti i Reparti dipendenti una circolare che costituiva il “guanto di sfida” al movimento partigiano e che lasciava presagire con quale animo i fascisti si stavano preparando alla “resa dei conti” con la resistenza. Si trattava di un vero e proprio “scontro di civiltà” tra due sistemi che non potevano convivere insieme. A TUTTI I REPARTI DI CONTROGUERRIGLIA È scoccata l’ora di debellare il banditismo. Questa torva masnada di spioni e di sicari al soldo del nemico, che ai gravi lutti e disastri della Patria ha aggiunto massacri, saccheggi e rovine; questi supertraditori che trucidano alle spalle l’alleato, il fascista e il militare colpevoli di voler salvare l’Italia ad ogni costo; tutti questi banditi devono alfine rendere i conti dei loro misfatti. E li renderanno a Voi, mie valorose truppe, che rappresentate la spada inesorabile della legge e della giustizia impugnata per la tutela degli elementari diritti della vita dei cittadini e per il trionfo dell’ordine sociale, che sono le basi della risurrezione della Patria. La lotta potrà avere dure asprezze ma voi tutto supererete perché come i combattitori di buona razza portate nel vostro zaino il mordente che non falla: fede viva, disciplina 14 A.C.S., Carte Graziani, cit., Busta 71, Relazione «Il CoGu.», s.d., p. 1. 15 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 27, Raggruppamento alpini “Cacciatori degli Appennini”, Circolare «Operazione T», 20 luglio 1944. 16 Ivi, p. 1. 17 Ibidem.

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ferrea e volontà decisa. Debellare il banditismo! – Risanare l’Italia da tale immonda piaga. – Ripulire le retrovie del fronte da ogni insidia. – Dare calma e sicurezza alle nostre città e ai nostri villaggi. – Restituire la libertà e la vita alle nostre campagne! Questa è la consegna che il DUCE in nome della Nazione ci affida. Ognuno sia pari al compito e degno della fiducia che la Patria in lui ripone. A Noi! 18 Di fatto, l’attività del Comando Co.Gu. divenne sempre maggiore, sia attraverso un largo dispiegamento di uomini, sia creando una nuova organizzazione militare territoriale. Vennero, infatti, “disegnate” tre Zone Operative per il Piemonte: Zona Nord (Canavese, Cigliano Vercellese, Santhià, San Germano Vercellese), Zona Centrale (Torino e dintorni per un raggio di 20-25 chilometri), Zona Sud (Monferrato, Langhe, Cuneense)19. L’attività del Comando Co.Gu. proseguì sino al maggio 1945 quando, insieme alla colonna fascista in uscita da Torino, raggiunse la zona franca di Ivrea dove si arrese agli Alleati. Terminava, così, l’esperienza di un coordinamento interforze della R.S.I. per la repressione partigiana. III. I reparti alle dipendenze L’originalità del Comando Contro Guerriglia fu il suo carattere interforze e di coordinamento nella lotta antipartigiana in Piemonte. L’aspetto interforze riguardava, oltre che gli organismi coinvolti, anche i reparti alle dipendenze (sia italiani che tedeschi). Essendo i quadri di comando dell’Esercito, il contributo maggiore sotto il piano operativo fu dato dall’E.N.R. attraverso i Comandi Provinciali (Torino, Cuneo, Vercelli, Asti) e due Reparti operativi non indivisionati: i “Cacciatori degli Appennini” e il Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani (R.A.P.)20. Proprio il R.A.P. costituì la “spina dorsale” del Co.Gu. Si trattava di un’unità, nata nell’estate del 1944, finalizzata alla lotta del fenomeno ribellistico. Personale militare che, almeno in teoria, doveva essere addestrato, formato ed equipaggiato per la lotta alla guerriglia raggiungendo, così, una preparazione superiore rispetto allo standard delle FF.AA. Repubblicane. Nei limiti delle sue possibilità – soprattutto materiali e umane –, la R.S.I. perseguì questo progetto. Il Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani operò alle dipendenze del Comando Co.Gu. sino alla fine della guerra21. La struttura era quella di una brigata leggera che traeva origine dalle esperienze di “pacificazione” italiane nei Balcani e in Africa Orientale. Il comando del R.A.P. venne 18 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu., Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Ordine del giorno n°1», 29 luglio 1944, a firma del Generale Mischi. 19 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944», 20 ottobre 1944, a firma del Generale Mischi. 20 Rimando a F. Ciavattone, «Banditi e ribelli, ecco la vostra fine!». Dottrine e tecniche di controguerriglia dell’Esercito Nazionale Repubblicano, Tesi di Dottorato, Università di Pisa, A.A. 2010/2011. 21 Per ulteriori approfondimenti rimando a: A. Pietra, Guerriglia e controguerriglia. Un bilancio militare della resistenza 1943-45, Vicenza, Gino Rossato Editore, 1997; C. Cucut, Le forze armate della RSI 1943-1945. Forze di terra, Trento, Edizioni Gruppo Modellistico Trentino di studio e ricerca storica, 2005; P. P. Battistelli, A. Molinari, Le forze armate della RSI, cit.

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assegnato al Colonnello Alessandro Ruta. Al 22 febbraio 1945, il Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani risultava essere così costituito: • Comando; • Squadra “X”; • 1ª Compagnia Mista Genio; • 1ª Compagnia Carri Leggeri; • I Reparto Autonomo di Cavalleria; • I Reparto Arditi Ufficiali; • II Reparto Arditi ufficiali; • X Gruppo Artiglieria (su 4 batterie); • II Battaglione Arditi; • III Battaglione Arditi; • IV Battaglione Arditi22. Ancora più significativo, però, fu il contributo che il Comando Co.Gu. ricevette, in termini di interforza, dalle altre componenti delle Forze Armate Repubblicane e dai Reparti germanici. Al comando del Generale Mischi, infatti, per periodi e fasi differenti, si alternarono le seguenti unità: - Decima MAS: Battaglioni “Sagittario”, “Lupo”, “Fulmine”, “Barbarigo”, “Tarigo”, Gruppo “Colleoni”, una Compagnia del Battaglione “Freccia”; - Brigate Nere: 1ª Brigata Nera Mobile, Brigate Nere Territoriali di Vercelli, Cuneo, Torino; - Reparti tedeschi: I Battaglione del 15° Reggimento Polizia SS, un Battaglione ucraino della Wehrmacht, Reparti delle SS italiane; - Guardia Nazionale Repubblicana: aliquote della Guarda Nazionale Confinaria, 115° Battaglione “M”, Gruppo Corazzato “Leonessa”; - Unità di Polizia: Compagnie della Legione Autonoma Mobile “Ettore Muti”; Corpo Ausiliario di Pubblica Sicurezza; - Unità non combattenti: Vigili del Fuoco di Torino23. IV. Le azioni Nella sua storia operativa il Comando Contro Guerriglia coordinò ed eseguì, tra grandi e medie operazioni, non meno di 113 azioni antipartigiane.

22 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu, Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Grafico della ripartizione dei reparti autonomi dell’esercito repubblicano, dislocati in Italia, secondo la dipendenza, reparti speciali», 22 febbraio 1945, senza firma, p. 2. 23 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti», relazioni dal 20 ottobre 1944 al 28 marzo 1945, a firma del Generale Mischi.

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Acta Settore Operativo 1. 2. 3. 4.

Zona Nord Zona Centrale Zona Sud Azioni fuori dal Piemonte

Numero di grandi e medie operazioni (luglio 1944 - marzo 1945) 1 13 55 38 7

Tabella 2. Operazioni a medio e grande raggio svolte dal Comando Co.Gu.

In questa sede non è possibile analizzare ogni singola operazione. È necessario, però, prendere atto che l’impegno del Comando Contro Guerriglia si concentrò in più fasi, su differenti settori: tra luglio e novembre 1944, ad esempio, furono rastrellate le Valli dell’Orco, le Langhe24 e riconquistata la cittadina di Alba25. Le operazioni proseguirono, sino al sopraggiungere della primavera 1945: il Comando Co.Gu., infatti, era cosciente di aver disorganizzato fortemente le bande partigiane, ma di non averle annientate. Pertanto, la campagna di controguerriglia proseguì a oltranza, sino alla ripresa dell’offensiva alleata nel 1945. Per il concetto di interoperatività e di comando interforze risulta significativo il ciclo di attività antipartigiana iniziata il 29 luglio e terminata il 30 settembre 1944. Le zone di operazioni coinvolte furono: la valle dell’Orco ed i suoi affluenti e le valli di Lanzo (Settore Nord); Torino e dintorni (Settore Centrale); il Monferrato e le Langhe (Settore Sud). «Le zone nord e sud sono state definite in accordo con il comandante in capo le SS e polizia germanica in Italia; in zona centrale è stata fissata dallo scrivente [Archimede Mischi] per far fronte ad una situazione sempre peggiorante in Torino e dintorni»26. Per tutti gli scacchieri operativi, gli obiettivi generali erano i medesimi: rastrellamento e “distruzione” delle bande partigiane. I singoli Settori, però, avevano obiettivi specifici: • Zona nord: In valle Orco: impossessarsi delle alture dominati lo sbocco della valle dell’Orco e procedere al rastrellamento totale della stessa sbarrando le provenienze della Val Soana. Successivamente presidiare la valle Orco e rastrellare la val Soana. Nelle valli di Lanzo: impossessarsi delle posizioni organizzate a difesa a nord di Lanzo, sbarrare le provenienze della valle di Viù, i valichi montani con la valle dell’Orco e rastrellare, contemporaneamente, le valli di Stura, di Vallegrande e di Ala. Successivamente agire da nord, est e sud in Valle Viù. • Zona centrale: mantenere il controllo in città e dintorni con frequenti ardite pattuglie diurne e notturne. Condurre rapide decise azioni, a più largo raggio, sui nuclei delle bande segnalati di 24 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I., Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu. Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944», 20 ottobre 1944, a firma del Generale Mischi. 25 Ivi, Busta 78, Proposte di ricompense a militari appartenenti alla R.S.I., «Relazione sull’operazione svolta nei giorni 31/10-1-2-3 novembre 1944/XXIII per la liberazione di Alba già occupata da bande di fuorilegge», 12 novembre 1944, a firma del Colonnello Ruta. 26 Ivi, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu, Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944», cit., p. 1.

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mano in mano, intorno a Torino27. • Zona sud: rastrellare, in un primo tempo, la zona delle Langhe fra Tanaro e Belbo sino al parallelo di Ceva ed in secondo tempo il Monferrato28. Si trattò di un ciclo operativo ampio e complesso che vide scendere in campo importanti forze, sia da parte tedesca che italiana. Al Settore Nord venne destinato il Raggruppamento “Borghese” della Decima Flottiglia MAS29 e il Gruppo da Combattimento tedesco “Reinke30, per un totale di 97 ufficiali e 1.636 uomini tra sottufficiali e truppa. Questi militari ricevettero in appoggio quattro mortai da 81, undici mortai da 45, nove pezzi anticarro e tre carri armati31. A fine agosto 1944, i reparti furono ulteriormente rinforzati con il battaglione di Fanteria di Marina “Barbarigo”. Pertanto, gli uomini schierati in quel Settore raggiunsero il numero di 112 Ufficiali e 1.881 militari tra Sottufficiali e truppa32. La Zona Nord vide sopraggiungere continui rinforzi sino al 30 settembre 1944, tanto che, al termine delle operazioni, le forze antipartigiane contavano 241 Ufficiali e 3.974 uomini tra Sottufficiali e truppa. A questa data, però, i reparti del Settore Nord erano totalmente italiani33. Reparti Battaglione “Barbarigo” Battaglione “Fulmine” Battaglione “Sagittario” Gruppo “Freccia” Gruppo Artiglieria “Colleoni” Battaglione “Lupo” Battaglione “Tarigo” Battaglione “N.P.” Iª Brigata Nera Mobile I Battaglione Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani Comando e una Sezione della Xª Batteria Artiglieria Speciale del R.A.P.

Ufficiali

Sottufficiali e Truppa

241

3.974

Tabella 3. Reparti schierati nel Settore Nord al 30 settembre 1944 27 Ivi, p. 2. 28 Ivi, p. 3. 29 Il Raggruppamento “Borghese” era costituito dai Battaglioni di Fanteria di Marina “Sagittario” e “Fulmine”, dalla Compagnia “Tarigo”, dal Gruppo Artiglieria “Colleoni”, da una Compagnia Genio del Battaglione “Freccia” e dalla 3ª Compagnia della Iª Brigata Nera Mobile. Ivi, «Situazione forza all’inizio delle operazioni 29/7/1944», 20 ottobre 1944. 30 Il Gruppo da Combattimento “Reinke” era composto dal I Battaglione del 15° Reggimento Polizia SS, dal I Plotone della 208ª Compagnia Carristi, da Reparti della Milizia Confinaria, dalla 2ª Compagnia del 115° Battaglione “M”e dal I Plotone Artiglieria Controcarro del Gruppo da Combattimento “Heldmann”. Ibidem. 31 Ibidem. 32 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu., Allegati al D.S., «Situazione della forza alla data del 31 agosto 1944», 20 ottobre 1944. 33 L’armamento individuale, di Squadra e di accompagnamento dei Reparti della Repubblica Sociale nel Settore Nord era costituito da: 450 pistole; 2.413 fucili; 826 Moschetti Automatici; 247 Fucili Mitragliatori; 81 Mitragliatrici; 40 mortai da 45; 14 mortai da 81; 9 pezzi anticarro; 11 pezzi da 75/13; 2 mitragliatrici da 20mm. Ivi, «Situazione della forza alla data del 30 settembre 1944», 20 ottobre 1944.

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A differenza del Settore Nord, la Zona Centrale vide schierare un numero inferiore di unità: al 31 agosto 1944 erano presenti 167 Ufficiali e 697 uomini tra Sottufficiali e truppa. I militari appartenevano al I Reparto Arditi Ufficiali, al Battaglione Fanteria di Marina “Lupo” della Decima MAS, alla 1ª Compagnia del Battaglione “Barbarigo, al I Plotone Universitari del Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani e alla Squadra Granatieri del Quartier Generale del Comando Co.Gu. Per raggiungere maggiori risultati, questo scacchiere operativo ricevette anche sei mortai da 45, sei mortai da 81 e due pezzi anticarro. Al termine delle operazioni – 30 settembre 1944 – le forze del Settore Centrale erano fortemente diminuite (189 Ufficiali e 141 militari tra Sottufficiali e truppa) in quanto alcuni Reparti furono destinati ad altre aree operative. Pertanto, l’intera responsabilità della controguerriglia ricadde sulle spalle del Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani (I e II Reparto Arditi Ufficiali, I Plotone Universitari R.A.P., Squadra da combattimento R.A.P. e una Sezione della Xª Batteria Speciale) e sul Comando Contro Guerriglia (Squadra Granatieri)34. Ben maggiori, invece, furono le Unità combattenti italo-tedesche destinate al Settore Sud. Quando il 29 luglio 1944 iniziarono le operazioni, in quest’area si contavano 268 Ufficiali e 5.198 uomini tra Sottufficiali e truppa35. Reparti Comando Centro Addestramento Reparti Speciali: I/1 Reggimento “Cacciatori degli Appennini”; II/2 Reggimento “Cacciatori degli Appennini”; III/3 Reggimento “Cacciatori degli Appennini”; Gruppo Squadroni Cavalleria Appiedato 1ª Brigata Nera Mobile: Comando; 1ª Compagnia “Novara”; 2ª Compagnia “Cremona”; 4ª Compagnia “Milano” 5ª Compagnia “Mantova”; 6ª Compagnia “Padova”; 7ª Compagnia “ Giovani Fascisti Bir el Gobi”; 8ª Compagnia “Varese-Como”; 9ª Compagnia “Ascoli Piceno” Gruppo Heldmann: I Battaglione del 34° Reggimento; II Battaglione del 34° Reggimento; Gruppo artiglieria delle SS Italiane; 208ª Compagnia Carristi; 2ª Compagnia Legione Mobile “E. Muti”. Totale

Ufficiali

Sottufficiali e truppa

173

1.057

746

49 268

3.395 5.198

Tabella 4. Unità italo-tedesche destinate al Settore Sud al 29 luglio 1944 34 Ivi, «Situazione della forza alla data del 30 settembre 1944», 20 ottobre 1944. 35 Ivi, «Situazione forza all’inizio delle operazioni (29/7/1944)», 20 ottobre 1944.

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A fine agosto, però, questo imponente schieramento di forze fu quasi dimezzato (233 ufficiali e 2.627 militari tra sottufficiali e truppa): i Comandi tedeschi, infatti, ritirarono quasi totalmente le proprie unità, lasciando solo il Gruppo di Artiglieria delle SS italiane36. Al 30 settembre 1944, le forze del Settore Sud erano diminuite ulteriormente, tanto che le intere operazioni antipartigiane gravarono esclusivamente sui reparti fascisti. In questo caso, la responsabilità della lotta alla guerriglia ricadde sui “Cacciatori degli Appennini” che, con i suoi 158 Ufficiali e 1.228 uomini tra Sottufficiali e truppa, tentarono di “debellare” il fenomeno resistenziale37. Nel Settore Nord, le operazioni iniziarono il 29 luglio 1944. Sin dalle prime ore, i Reparti furono disturbati da continue azioni dei partigiani che avevano lo «scopo di mettere in crisi le formazioni italo-germaniche». Il 2 agosto, il Raggruppamento “Borghese” raggiunse Cuorgnè e Pont Canavese. Nonostante le interruzioni stradali, sbarrata la val Soana, le colonne procedono verso la media ed alta valle dell’Orco; un attacco portato, dal versante destro della valle, contro una nostra colonna agente in fondo valle viene rapidamente respinto e gli attaccanti dispersi con perdite. Nei giorni successivi, le operazioni proseguirono a rilento (il 6 agosto venne occupata Noasca) a causa delle pessime condizioni atmosferiche e delle strade «battute dal tiro incrociato di armi automatiche»38 e dei ponti distrutti dai partigiani. Solo l’11 agosto, la macchina bellica italo-tedesca tornò a funzionare a pieno ritmo. Le colonne raggiunsero Ceresole dove ebbe luogo un combattimento contro i partigiani che si risolse alle prime luci dell’alba, quando le truppe fasciste occuparono la località. Mentre le unità del Raggruppamento “Borghese” rastrellavano Ceresole, due colonne leggere vennero inviate verso il colle del Nivolet e della Crocetta. In quest’ultima località, fortemente presidiata dai “banditi”, i reparti fascisti furono travolti e costretti a ripiegare. Nel frattempo azioni di disturbo nel basso Canavese ed informazioni varie confermano che nuclei banditi di variabile forza provenienti dalle valli di Lanzo, per Corio, si stanno raccogliendo nella zona di Forno Canavese allo scopo di tagliare i rifornimenti del raggruppamento Borghese e bloccarlo, a sua volta, in valle Orco39. Proprio in località Forno ebbero luogo due importanti e violenti scontri. «I banditi tra i quali risultano esservi numerosi elementi cecoslovacchi e russi, accettano il combattimento e fanno intervenire anche numerosi mortai pesanti, gli scontri però si risolvono favorevolmente ed i ribelli sono costretti a ritirarsi […] lasciando numerosi morti ed armi sul terreno»40. La situazione creatasi determinò il rinvio del rastrellamento in val Soana. Questa nuova operazione di controguerriglia, infatti, iniziò solo il 4 settembre, quando termi36 Ivi, «Situazione della forza alla data del 31 agosto 1944», 20 ottobre 1944. 37 Ivi, «Situazione forza alla data del 30 settembre 1944», 20 ottobre 1944. 38 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 31 agosto 1944», 14 settembre 1944, a firma del Generale Mischi, p. 4. 39 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944», cit., p. 4. 40 Ibidem.

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narono tutti i movimenti ed i concentramenti delle truppe italo-tedesche. Su richiesta germanica, il comando di questo rastrellamento venne affidato al Tenente Colonnello Buch41. Alle unità già a disposizione dell’Ufficiale, si aggiunsero altri Reparti della Decima MAS e la 1ª Brigata Nera Mobile42. All’alba del 5 settembre, cinque colonne – una italiana e quattro italo-tedesche – iniziarono a muoversi per eliminare le posizioni partigiane all’accesso della valle di Lanzo. Immediatamente si sviluppava la reazione avversaria con fuoco intensissimo di artiglieria e persino con qualche contrattacco che tuttavia non arrestava i movimenti delle colonne che reagivano infliggendo ai banditi gravi perdite43. Solo il 9 settembre, i partigiani, minacciati di accerchiamento da nord e da sud, abbandonarono le posizioni, ripiegando nelle valli di Lanzo, dopo aver tentato di attraversare la valle dell’Orco. Per fuggire dalla “rete” che si stava chiudendo, le bande sferrarono un violento attacco presso il varco a nord di Corio. L’azione condotta di sorpresa e con estrema violenza ha un inizio favorevole per i banditi impegnati da poche forze di sicurezza della 1ª Brigata nera mobile ma l’intervento della riserva (btg. Lupo e reparti di polizia germanica) ristabilisce la situazione e frustra il tentativo dei banditi44. Il 15 settembre le colonne italo-tedesche tornarono a muoversi nella valle Stura di Vallegrande, nella Stura di Ala e lungo la dorsale intermedia. L’intero rastrellamento si concluse tre giorni dopo «senza scontri notevoli ad eccezione di uno all’altezza di Chialamberto in Vallegrande ed uno allo sbarramento della Stura di Vià ove è andato concentrando il grosso dei ribelli»45. L’attività antipartigiana proseguì sino al 30 settembre 1944. Il 20 del mese, i Reparti erano nuovamente in movimento: tra il 21 e il 22 settembre ebbero luogo significativi combattimenti presso il ponte di Barolo. Tre giorni dopo, tedeschi e fascisti arrivarono sulla linea Villaretti-Lemie-Torretta del Prete, raggiungendo – il 26 settembre – la località di Vià. Le operazioni si interruppero sino al 2 ottobre per una serie di trattative intavolate dai tedeschi per scambio prigionieri. I negoziati, però, fallirono e quando i reparti ripresero a muoversi, i “banditi” erano ormai riusciti a fuggire. Di conseguenza, il 5 ottobre 1944, venne dato ordine di interrompere le operazioni. Il Settore Centrale, che comprendeva Torino e provincia, vide impegnati i Reparti del Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani e alcune aliquote del Comando Co.Gu. Principalmente, queste unità operarono in modo indipendente l’una dall’altra, svolgendo sia operazioni di controguerriglia “diretta” (rastrellamenti in ambito urbano ed extraurbano, operazio41 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu, Allegati al D.S., «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 31 agosto al 10 settembre 1944», 17 settembre 1944, a firma del Generale Mischi, p. 3. 42 Durante il concentramento, il convoglio ferroviario, sul quale viaggiavano i militi della 1ª Brigata Nera Mobile, subì un bombardamento da parte di apparecchi Alleati. 43 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu, Allegati al D.S., «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 31 agosto al 10 settembre 1944», cit., p. 4. 44 Ibidem. 45 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu, Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944», cit., p. 5.

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ni di controbanda, raccolta informazioni), sia di controguerriglia “indiretta” (attività di polizia militare, di polizia giudiziaria, di controllo del territorio attraverso presidì e posti di blocco). Questo dinamismo portò cattura di partigiani, sospetti e renitenti e l’aver «immesso nella lotta degli elementi che per la loro mobilità e decisione hanno certamente scompaginato quello senso di sicurezza nel quale si adagiavano gli elementi terroristici agenti in città e nei suoi immediati dintorni»46. Il Settore Sud, costituito dalle Langhe e dal Monferrato, vide inizialmente un importante schieramento di Reparti italo-tedeschi. I risultati più significativi furono conseguiti nelle prime settimane di operazione. Le unità impegnate, infatti, si mossero in modo veloce ed estremamente aggressivo. L’intensa attività di puntate, appostamenti, nonché alcune azioni in forza a più ampio raggio hanno consentito il conseguimento di buoni risultati con la sorpresa di vari accampamenti di banditi, la loro parziale distruzione, la cattura di numerosi banditi e loro capi e di materiale vario. È stato inoltre possibile intercettare e catturare un avio rifornimento47. Le difficoltà ambientali e il successivo ritiro dei Reparti germanici, della 1ª Brigata Nera Mobile e l’invio di un Battaglione “Cacciatori degli Appennini” a protezione delle operazioni di trebbiatura nel Cuneese e delle comunicazioni nel triangolo Torino-Cuneo-Bra, “bloccarono” l’intera Zona Sud. Il numero insufficiente di unità a disposizione, infatti, non permise di avere una visione di insieme dell’intero Settore e non consentì una pianificazione omogenea dell’attività antipartigiana. Le singole operazioni, da quel momento, vennero progettate sulla base delle notizie a disposizione e delle informazioni raccolte. Pertanto avvalendomi di accertamenti diretti e delle notizie fornite da qualche elemento locale o da banditi catturati il seguito delle operazioni è stato basato su di una serie di puntate e di agguati nelle zone dove, di volta in volta, veniva segnalata la presenza partigiana48. Nei primi dieci giorni di settembre, però, i Reparti del Settore Sud scatenarono un’ultima grande azione di rastrellamento nelle Langhe. Con i due Battaglioni “Cacciatori degli Appennini” venne schierato anche un Battaglione di ucraini della Wehrmacht. Nel corso del rastrellamento ebbero luogo significativi scontri e le forze italo-tedesche si ritrovarono anche a subire l’iniziativa partigiana come quando «una cp. ucraina subiva sensibili perdite per effetto di una imboscata». Quest’ultima operazione, però, nonostante la cattura di numerosi renitenti e disertori, non portò a nessun risultato concreto perché il grosso delle bande partigiane era riuscito a fuggire49. 46 Ivi, p. 7. 47 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 21 al 31 agosto 1944», cit., p. 3. 48 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 29 luglio al 31 agosto 1944», cit., p. 5. 49 Ivi, «Riepilogo delle operazioni di controguerriglia svolte dai dipendenti reparti dal 31 agosto al 10 settembre 1944», cit., p. 5.

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Nelle ultime settimane di settembre, i “Cacciatori degli Appennini” poterono eseguire soltanto singole azioni a breve raggio, assumendo di fatto un atteggiamento prettamente difensivo. Al termine di questo grande ciclo di rastrellamenti interforze che vide i reparti della R.S.I. e quelli tedeschi impegnati in tre differenti settori del Piemonte, dal 29 luglio al 30 settembre 1944, secondo le fonti fasciste, i partigiani riportarono 816 morti e 117 feriti. Zone delle operazioni

Morti accertati

Feriti

Zona Nord

638 (di cui sei russi e tre passati per le armi) 3 175 (di cui 23 passati per le armi)

816

117

Zona centrale Zona Sud

Totale

5 96

Prigionieri perché sospetti favoreggiatori 362

Prigionieri perché renitenti di leva

43 402 (di cui uno ucciso in un tentativo di fuga) 807

35 701

824

Tabella 5. Perdite umane causate dal ciclo di rastrellamenti del Comando Co.Gu. (29 luglio-30 settembre 1944)50

V. Le modalità operative Ma quali erano le modalità operative dei reparti dipendenti dal Comando Co.Gu.? In questo caso, si deve parlare di tecniche di controguerriglia “dirette” e “indirette”. Tra le tecniche “dirette”, il principale strumento continuava a essere il rastrellamento, a cui si deve aggiungere la controbanda51 e la raccolta delle informazioni. Nelle tecniche di controguerriglia “indirette”, invece, rientrano tutte le tipologie di controllo del territorio: attività di polizia militare e giudiziaria, presidi, sistemi di presidi, capisaldi, posti di blocco etc. Durante la R.S.I., questa tecnica venne fortemente utilizzata perché, di fronte a una deficienza di uomini, “garantiva” un apparente controllo del territorio o, quanto meno, delle località di maggiore importanza strategica. È doveroso segnalare che il Comando Co.Gu. scelse di utilizzare anche uno strumento già collaudato con “successo” dagli italiani prima dell’8 settembre 1943: il campo di concentramento. Nell’estate del 1944, lo S.M.E. ordinò al Comando Co.Gu., attraverso l’ausilio dei marò del Battaglione “Lupo” della Decima MAS, di costituire un campo di concentramento per civili nel Deposito di munizioni di Lombardore. Il campo avrebbe utilizzato per alloggiamenti le baracche già presenti nel Deposito, le quali avrebbero 50 Ivi, «Specchio delle perdite inflitte ai banditi dal 29/7 al 30/9», 20 ottobre 1944. 51 Durante la Repubblica Sociale Italiana utilizzare la tecnica della controbanda significava combattere i partigiani con le medesime tecniche della guerriglia: agguati, appostamenti, imboscate, etc. I Reparti che utilizzavano la controbanda erano addestrati a eseguire anche azioni di natura “chirurgica” contro obiettivi precisi. Questi militari potevano agire sia in divisa che in borghese. I Reparti Arditi Ufficiali furono, senza ombra di dubbio, le unità dell’Esercito Repubblicano che utilizzarono maggiormente questa tipologia di combattimento.

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ospitato circa 300 detenuti52. VI. Conclusioni L’esperienza interforze del Comando Contro Guerriglia è un esempio che, nel campo della storia e della dottrina militare, non deve essere trascurato. La R.S.I., infatti, attraverso l’istituzione di questo ente cercò di trovare una soluzione definitiva al problema resistenziale, “globalizzando” la guerra antipartigiana: rendendo cioè partecipi tutte le varie componenti delle Forze Armate Repubblicane e di Polizia, sia nella fase di raccolta e rielaborazione informazioni, sia nel corso delle operazioni. Ancora una volta, il ruolo di protagonista fu svolto dall’Esercito. Nello specifico, dai “Cacciatori degli Appennini” e dal Raggruppamento Anti Partigiani, due unità, non indivisionate, dichiaratamente costituite per combattere il fenomeno partigiano, sia attraverso gli strumenti “classici” della controguerriglia, sia attraverso tecniche “innovative”. L’obiettivo finale, per cui era stato creato il Comando Contro Guerriglia, però, non venne raggiunto perché il movimento partigiano non fu debellato. Il Comando conseguì risultati significativi, ma nessuno di essi fu definitivo. I limiti dell’azione del Comando Co.Gu., da una parte, devono essere ricercati nella supervisione dei Comandi germanici e, dall’altra, nei limiti materiali e umani della R.S.I. La sua creazione, però, contribuì ad aumentare il livello della violenza in Italia ed a risucchiare, sia direttamente che indirettamente, tutti i reparti fascisti nel vortice della guerra civile.

52 A.U.S.S.M.E., Fondo R.S.I. I-1, Busta 6, cit., D.S. Co.Gu., Allegati al D.S. Co.Gu., «Costituzione di un campo di concentramento internati civili a Lombardore», 2 settembre 1944, a firma del Colonnello Gentilini.

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“Hour Zero” as Combined Operation The Allied Planning for the surrender of Germany Philipp FRAUND

n May 7, 1945 Germany, represented by German General Alfred Jodl, signed the unconditional surrender of Germany in the headquarters of General Dwight D. Eisenhower in the French city of Reims. Germany’s unconditional surrender symbolized the utter defeat of the German Wehrmacht and with it the unconditional capitulation of the whole Nazi system and state, thus paving the way for a postwar and a post Nazi-regime in Germany. A single, underexposed black and white picture that would become iconic for the surrender of Germany symbolized not only the surrender of Germany, but also the fact that Germany was completely defeated and exhausted. Its dark and depressing atmosphere symbolizes not only the military defeat but also the collapse of the whole Nazi-system and of the Nazi-state. By printing this image in the Allied as well in the few (or again) published German newspapers, the Allies ensured that the German population realized that the war was over. Although the presence of Allied units deployed all over Germany had been acknowledged and mostly welcomed by the German population, the publication of this picture was necessary in order to make it clear to the Germans that the Wehrmacht had surrendered. This photograph would become, in addition to the ruin and rubble that characterized German towns, the most visible sign for the German population that something new was to begin. This transformation of power was later on described as “Hour Zero”. Despite the fact that an Allied commission had been negotiating the terms of the surrender and the wording of the surrender document for almost one and a half year, the signing ceremony was a relatively improvised event. Today, the history of this European Advisory Commission (EAC) is almost forgotten.1 This process of negotiating the terms 1 Although the EAC documents are accessible through the Foreign Relations of the United States series (FRUS) published by the Historical Office of the State Department, very few scholars have worked with these documents, even though they allow a very deep insight into the process of negotiations within EAC. Furthermore they enable historians not only to reconstruct the history of the EAC, they also reveal the aims and plans each Allied nation had regarding the surrender of Germany and the first days after that event. As examples may serve Eschenburg, Theodor. “Deutschland in der Politik der Alliierten.” In Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte; 1945 - 1952. Edited by Josef Foschepoth, 35–49. Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London 16. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985; King, Frank. “Negotiations and Dismemberment of Germany.” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (1981): 585–595; Kowalski, Hans-Günther. “Die “European Advisory Commission” als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945.” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971): 261–293; Mosely, Philip E. “Dismemberment of Germany: The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam.” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 3 (1950): 487–498; Mosely, Philip E. “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn.” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950): 580–604. Mosely was, as assistant to Ambassador Winant, part of the American Delegation to the EAC – insofar both of his articles are a kind of eye-witness account.

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of the surrender of Germany can therefore be seen as a kind of combined operation for planning “Hour Zero”. At this point it is necessary to define the term “Hour Zero.” First, the idea of “Hour Zero” describes one of the oldest desires of mankind – the wish to make a radical cut with an existing situation and to start again from “zero” – building up something new. This wish is linked with the concepts of “cause” and “effect” in the ancient philosophy of nature. Thomas Paine, the American political essayist, describes this yearning for a new beginning and all the emotions involved in his essay “Common Sense”: “We have it in our power to begin the world over again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until now. The birthday of a new world is at hand.”2 Although this desire is the oldest variation of the term “Hour Zero,”3 it had evolved to a truly multidimensional term with relevance in such different disciplines like medicine or the military.4 The most common use of this term originates from the usage of military staffs. Operation “Over- lord,” the Allied amphibious landing on the beaches of Normandy on June 6, 1944 is called in general “D-Day.”5 The term “D-Day” does not actually refer to the landing operations on the beaches of Normandy. Its basic meaning is the day on moves from the stage of planning to execuwhich a certain military operation 6 tion: “D-day is the unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.”7 For the purposes of this article, “Hour Zero” is defined as the time frame between the moment, when Allied divisions first set foot on German soil in September 1944 and the 2 Paine, Thomas. Common sense, Rights of man, and other essential writings of Thomas Paine: With an Introduc- tion by Sidney Hook and a Foreword by Jack Fruchtman Jr. New York: Signet Classic, 2003, p. 59 – 60; see also Ers, Andrus. “Year Zero: The Temporality of Revolution Studied Through the Example of the Khmer Rouge.” In Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation. Edited by Hans Ruin and Andrus Ers, 155–65. Huddinge: Södertörns Högskola, 2011, p.155 – 165, here p. 157 3 See Andrus Ers, “Year Zero: The Temporality of Revolution Studied Through the Example of the Khmer Rouge,” in Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation, ed. Hans Ruin and Andrus Ers (Huddinge: Södertörns Högskola, 2011), 155–65., p. 157 – 158 4 Today in the arts and humanities, the concept of “Hour Zero” is linked with the “end of history” argument of the philosophers Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Alexandre Kojève. See in detail Andrus Ers, “Year Zero: The Temporality of Revolution Studied Through the Example of the Khmer Rouge,” in Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation, ed. Hans Ruin and Andrus Ers (Huddinge: Södertörns Högskola, 2011), 155–65., p. 156; see also Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York, Toronto: Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992 5 For “Overlord” see in detail Vogel, Detlef. “Deutsche und Alliierte Kriegsführung im Westen.” In Das deutsche Reich in der Defensive: Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 19431944/45. Ed- ited by Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs and Detlef Vogel, 419–639. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 7. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001, here p. 502 – 535, see also Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2013, p. 45 – 88 6 For origin and history of the terms “operation” and “operational thinking” see in detail Groß, Gerhard P. Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Die Entwicklung des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger. Zeitalter der Weltkriege 9. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012 7 Joint Chiefs Staff [Eds.]: Joint Publication 3-02. Amphibious Operations, 10. August 2009, p. III-37, see also Joint Chiefs Staff [Eds.]: Joint Publication 5-0. Joint Operation Planning, 11. August 2011, p. II-16

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proclamation of the “Occupation Statute of Germany”8 on April 10, 1949. This very broad time frame is divided into three distinct phases: Firstly, from post-hostilities operations in the first occupied German cities in late 1944 to the installation of the zones of occupation and the transformation of power in late 1945; secondly, from stabilization and the early stages of democratization in the zones of occupation in spring 1946 until the replacement of JCS 1067 by JCS 1779 in July 1947; thirdly, from July 1947 until the proclamation of “Occupation Statute”. This study focuses on Al- lied planning of the first phase. To understand the drastic character of May 8, 1945 and in this context the meaning of the term “Hour Zero”, it is important to take a brief look at what happened in the six years before. The Wehrmacht of the last days of World War II in the European Theater of Operations was only a pale reflection of the forces that had conquered half of Europe in the preceding years: 9 As historian Robert Citino put it: “With their fearsome tank, or Panzer, formations as an apparently irresistible spearhead, and with a powerful air force […] circling overhead, the Wehrmacht ran through, around, and over every defensive position thrown in its path.”10 According to the master narrative, the Wehrmacht was deprived of its deserved victories by Hitler, who was a “stubborn military amateur”11. Although this master narrative was created after the war, not least with the help of many former Wehrmacht Generals, it has influenced the international historiography of World War II for many decades.12 The main argument of the narrative is that the Germans’ fortunes of the war 8 Occupation Statute defining the powers to be retained by the Occupation Authorities; in: FRUS 1949, Vol. III, p. 179 – 183 9 See Kunz, Andreas. “Die Wehrmacht in der Agonie der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944/45: Eine Gedankenskizze.” In Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland. Edited by Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann, 97– 114. München: Oldenbourg, 2002; Detlef Vogel, “Deutsche und Alliierte Kriegsführung im Westen,” in Das deutsche Reich in der Defensive: Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 19431944/45, ed. Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs and Detlef Vogel, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 7 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001), 419–639.; Jung, Hermann. Die Ardennenoffensive 1944/45: Ein Beispiel für die Kriegführung Hitlers. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 12. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971 10 Citino, Robert M. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007, p. 14 11 Gerhard Paul Groß, Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Die Entwicklung des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger, Zeitalter der Weltkriege 9 (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012)., p. 277 12 For the work and the influence of the Operational History (German) Section of the Historical Division of the United States Army see in detail Krug, Esther-Julia. ““Holding down the Fort?”: The War Historical Cooperation of the U.S. Army and Former German Wehrmacht Officers, 1945-1961.” MA-Thesis Emoryhttps://etd.library.emory.edu/file/view/pid/emory:1dpgv/krug_dissertation.pdf; University2009. Wegner, Bernd. “Erschriebene Siege.: Franz Halder, die „Historical Division“ und die Rekonstruktion des Zweiten Weltkrieges im Geiste des deutschen Generalstabes.” In Politischer Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit: Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Deutschlands und Frankreichs: Festschrift für Klaus-Jürgen Müller. Edited by Klaus J. Müller et al., 287–302. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 50. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1995; Burdick, Charles, B. “Vom Schwert zur Feder. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene im Dienst der Vorbereitung der amerikanischen Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung über den zweiten Weltkrieg: Die organisatorische Entwicklung der Operational History (German) Section.” Milittärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 10, no. 2 (1971): 69–80

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turned after Stalingrad13 and that the United States’ en-trance into the war with its full economic and military potential made the war unwinnable. A few numbers serve to illustrate this: In September 1944 the Army-Group B consisted of 12 Divisions with a total of 84 Tanks. The frontline, the Army Group B was responsible for, stretched about 400 km. The Allied unites opposing them had 20 Divisions with 1700 Tanks available.14 When the first GI’s entered Germany, they became eyewitnesses of the somber and grim atmosphere of nearly devastated cities. As the military governor of Hessen described, the GI’s “came into towns and cities that were deathly quiet, that smelled of death and destruction. They came into villages where white flags were draped outside every door, where faces could be felt, not seen, behind barricaded windows.”15 On January 24, 1943 the Casablanca Conference proclaimed the “unconditional surrender” of Germany as an Allied objective. The main purpose of this decision was to For occupying Germany, the Allies prevent another “stab in the back legend”.16 needed a population that had understood why the Allies were doing what they were doing. As the Directive JCS 1067 to the Commander in Chief of the American Forces stated in April 1945: “It should be brought home to the Germans that Germany’s ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed the German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable and that the Germans cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves. Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation. Your aim is not oppression but to occupy Germany for the purpose of realizing certain important Allied objectives. In the conduct of your occupation and administration you should be just but firm and aloof.”17 13 For the Battle of Stalingrad see in detail Wegner, Bernd. “Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942 - 1943.” In Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943. Edited by Horst Boog et al., 761–1102. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6. Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1990, here p. 962 – 1063; Glantz, David M. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War: 1941-1943. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005, p. 25 – 48 14 For details see Jung, Hermann. Die Ardennenoffensive 1944/45: Ein Beispiel für die Kriegführung Hitlers. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 12. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971, p. 33 – 44 15 Quoted after Gimbel, John. The American occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military; 1945 - 1949. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968, p. 6 16 For the history of the “stab in the back legend” see detailed Barth, Boris. Dolchstosslegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933. Schriften des Bundesarchivs 61. Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003 17 Directive JCS 1076 to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation, Regarding the Military Government of Germany; April 1945; in: US Department of State, ed. Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents. Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 21 – 33, here p. 23. JCS 1067 echoed in this case the opinion of President Roosevelt, who told Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, on August 26, 1944, that “[...] the German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization”, quoted in Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 472 – 473, see also McAllister, James. No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2002, p. 50 – 53

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This objective should be reached by continuing the struggle until the Allies had destroyed Nazism. Furthermore, the wording of “unconditional surrender” should provide the Allies with the freedom in planning the war, in order to ensure that the victory was “total and convincing” 18. Simply, this meant the beginning of a total conduct of the war – without rules of engagement defined by policy-makers. This also meant that “victory” went far beyond the defeat of the enemy nation. To a greater degree, a completely new term of international law was created. This “national-political total capitulation” regarded a capitulation not only as consequence of a military defeat, but also demanded a nullification of a political system and some cultural values like militarism. By denying the enemy’s national sovereignty – which also included its sovereignty as defined by international law – it was also no longer accepted as a negotiating party. Consequently, the outcome of this war would not be the result of negotiations, but an imposed treaty. In this sense, the Nazi-regime and the military power of Germany were connected. Without the destruction of one part, the acknowledgement of the defeat was not possible. Besides, it seemed – from the point of view of the Allies – politically preferable not to acknowledge Germany as an internationally recognized sovereign. Reorganizing Europe after the war would be much easier without Germany as internationally recognized entity.19 If Europe was to be reorganized after the end of the war, then it must be assumed that “Hour Zero” is an event that could be planned. If “Hour Zero” can be planned, then one can assume that the Allies had certain concepts for the design of a postwar Europe. However, this was not true. From the outside, the Allies seemed to be a big monolithic block. From the inside they were not in agreement among themselves. It is surely not an exaggerated statement to claim that each ally had internal disagreements what to do with Europe after the war had ended. Many of the political decisions made during the war were not the result of visionary planning; they were just reactions on militarily determined and prejudged events. First, it showed very clear how little was coordinated between the Allies. Secondly this proved how much need for an improvement of the inner Allied communication existed. Following the capitulation of Italy on September 8, 1943 there were grave differences in opinion between the British and the American side. These differences were triggered by the question whether or not the documents of capitulation should be very short and limited to military questions or if the wording should be much more comprehensive. Interestingly enough, the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it also belonged to 18 Boog, Horst. “Die Anti-Hitler Koalition.” In Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943. Edited by Horst Boog et al., 3–94. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990 19 See in detail Horst Boog, “Die Anti-Hitler Koalition,” in Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943, ed. Horst Boog et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), 3–94., p. 82 – 85, likewise Loth, Wilfried. “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems.” In Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges. Edited by Rolf-Dieter Müller, 201–378. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008

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the Alliance, had not been consulted in this question.20 The direct result of this tension of Allied affairs was the creation of a European Advisory Com- mission (EAC) at the Moscow conference of the Allied Ministers of Foreign Affairs (October 19 – 30, 1943).21 The first duty of this newly formed commission was “to study and make recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities.”22 Based in London the European Advisory Commission consisted of Sir William Strang for the United Kingdom, Fedor T. Gusev for the USSR, and John G. Winant for the US. Gusev as well as Winant were ambassadors of their countries in the United Kingdom. Further- more, their assignment to the EAC was only one of several other and competing duties and obligations: “With substantial external respectabilities and small staffs, the three men could barely manage their broad and diffuse EAC assignment.”23 The business done by the EAC may serve as an example for the various approaches and traditions of the involved states. The British side, for example, welcomed the proposal to install the EAC, made by Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov. The American side, however, was very reluctant to accept this proposition.24 The British Foreign Office wanted a mandate as wide as possible, in order to discuss questions concerning not only the enemy states but also the smaller states in Europe. The commission should also be entitled to settle questions regarding ethnic minorities and borders. It would appear that this holistic British approach was on the one hand a product of many years of diplomatic experience and on the other hand a product of the circumstance that forced the Allies to work together if they want to defeat Hitler. From the British point of view, precisely this obligation to succeed, combined with American troops in Europe, enabled them to negotiate these items during the war.25 The American position was different because of its difficult domestic political situ20 See Hans-Günther Kowalski, “Die „European Advisory Commission“ als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., here p. 269; see also Gerhard Schreiber, “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzuges und der Krieg in Italien 1943 - 1945,” in Die Ostfront 1943 / 44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten, ed. Karl-Heinz Frieser et al., Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8 (München: Dt. Verl.-Anst., 2007), 1100–62., here p. 1118 21 The history, organization and tasks of the “European Advisory Commission” are described in Hans-Günther Kowalski, “Die “European Advisory Commission” als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., for the conference of the Allied Foreign Ministers in Moscow see in detail FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 513 – 781 22 Protocol signed at Moscow, November 1, 1942, Annex 2, in: FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 757 23 Eisenberg, Carolyn W. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 - 1949. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. p. 26 24 See in detail Harper, John L. American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 180 – 181 25 For example: The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, London, 4. January 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 1, for further details see Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950)., here p. 581 – 582; Gaddis, John L. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 106 – 107; Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 - 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)., p. 24 – 26

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ation. Secretary of State Cordell Hull wanted to limit the scope for decision-making of the EAC to the preparation of a document of capitulation. The reason for this aim was the fear that the US would limit its own room for maneuver if the authority of the European Advisory Commission was too broad. The other main factor was the fear to get caught in the matters of post-war Europe: “It is vitally necessary to indoctrinate the American people to a recognition of the national responsibility of the country in world affairs. It is essential that the people of America become used to decisions being made in the United States. On every cracker barrel in every country store in the U. S. there is someone sitting who is convinced that we get hornswoggled every time we attend a European conference. European deliberations must be made in the light of the concepts of the new continent because that continent has now, for better or for worse, become a determining factor in the struggles of the older one. What may be lost through not moving to London in the way of better and more accessible records or a greater familiarity with local conditions, will be made up in a readier assumption of responsibility on the part of the U. S. and perhaps in a greater objectivity of decision.”26 Obviously all actors on the American side had vivid memories of the isolationist tendencies in the 1930’s that had led to the Neutrality-Acts of 1937 and 1939.27 The Americans believed – in order to avoid the repetition of these tendencies – and to have still all options available – that the work of the EAC should be limited to the preparation Another factor that caused concern on the American of a German capitulation.28 side was its complex bureaucratic apparatus working behind the scenes. It was virtually impossible to keep track of all the position papers and recommendations the various working groups, sub-committees and agencies produced. Combined with some interagency rivalry – especially between the JCS and the Working Security Committee (WSC) of the State Department – most of these papers were stalled somewhere in the process. Especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed many of these plans: “For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ambitious postwar programs that created civilian obligations for the army were distinctly unappealing.”29 The EAC suffered from the circumstance that her members were directly dependent on the guidance from their respective governments. The commission’s charter did not include authority to propose initiatives. Approaching problems on their own initiative 26 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins), Cairo, 25. November 1943; in: FRUS 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, S. 418 27 For the discussion about the Neutrality of the United States in the 1930’s see in detail:Schwabe, Klaus. Der amerikanische Isolationismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Legende und Wirklichkeit. Frankfurter historische Vorträge 1. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1975; Powaski, Ronald E. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901 - 1950. Contributions to the study of world history 22. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991; Adams, Bianka J. From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of Bremen Germany. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2010, p. 1 – 2 28 The Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy) to the President’s Special Assistant (Hopkins), Cairo, 25. November 1943; in: FRUS 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, p. 418 29 Carolyn Woods Eisenberg, Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 - 1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)., p. 27; John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000)., p. 107 – 109

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have never been part of the duties of this commission. Insofar the description and definition of their duties as: “to study and make recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities”30 is misleading. The EAC was not able to produce studies and to make recommendations based on those studies due to the fact that the EAC had to depend on directives. This commission had to discuss documents which were agreed upon to the last detail. The European Advisory Commission could present those plans as recommendations to their governments that had created those documents.31 At the same time, however, the EAC was important and in the end indispensable for the cooperation of the allies. On the one hand, each government had to make its mind about its own positions and had to have them implemented as official policies before those positions could be forwarded to the EAC. On the other hand, the Allies learned in detail about the political guidelines of their partners as this was the case at the more or less periodical meetings of the “big three” and their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic preparations for establishing and installing the European Advisory Commission took a while, so that the EAC could begin its work by January 15, 1944 when the British Delegation presented a document “Terms of surrender for to the other members of the EAC. This document can be seen as four Germany”32 documents in one: It contained a “Summary of Draft German Armistice”33, the “Draft German Armistice” itself34, a document “Military Occupation of Germany”35 and another on “Allied Control Machinery in Germany during the period of Occupation”36. The document entitled “Military Occupation of Germany” carefully examined different typed of a mainly military occupation of Germany and also made suggestions how to divide Germany into zones of occupation.37 The British plan for a surrender document, the “Draft German Armistice” was, with 70 articles carefully describing every detail of an Allied takeover of Germany, very long. Except, that they should try not to be entangled into the administration of that country: “Conditions in Germany at the time of her surrender will almost certainly be chaotic, and the last thing the Allies will want to do is to saddle the High Command with all 30 Protocol signed at Moscow, November 1, 1942, Annex 2, in: FRUS 1943, Vol. I, p. 757 31 See Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn,” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 4 (1950)., here p. 583 32 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 112 – 159 33 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 116 – 121 34 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 121 – 139 35 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 139 – 154 36 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 154 – 159 37 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 139 – 154, for the Zones of Occupation see map between pages 152 and 153

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the vexations attendant on administering in detail a vast, hostile and bankrupt country, smarting under defeat, distracted by dissension and confronted with countless problems arising out of the switch-over from war to peace economy.”38 This consideration probably had its origins in British experiences in centuries of colonial administration. In one form or another, many of the measures proposed in this draft would later become daily routine in all four zones of occupation. All in all, this draft proposal is not a document of capitulation, although these elements can be found in some parts of the proposal, but a very complex set of agreements. The primary objective of this set of agreements was not only to define the German capitulation but also to define the time of occupation. Trying to define the time of occupation can be seen as an attempt in designing the phase of post- hostilities operations, or in other words “Hour Zero”. The Soviets submitted a very detailed military surrender document.39 Besides the usual regulations, such as the handover of Allied prisoners of war, the transfer of warships and aircraft, this proposal included a passage about the partition of Germany into zones of occupation and an explicit statement of a German war guilt. According to this Soviet proposal, all surrendering troops should automatically be declared to prisoners of war.40 The American proposal, drafted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), was also the shortest of all proposals.41 Unlike the others, the wording of the American document was very general and limited to a military capitulation; consequently, it was named “Draft Instrument and Acknowledgement of Unconditional Surrender”42. From the American perspective a more comprehensive declaration like the ones outlined by the British and the Soviets would be counterproductive. Such a document could never foresee all problems and questions that could arise during the phase of occupation. Furthermore, a short declaration would offer much fewer legal possibilities of interpretation. Otherwise the Germans could outmaneuver the Allied efforts.43 In contrast to both, the British and the Soviet proposal, the author of the American proposal was a military institution. On the British and the Soviet side, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs had been as key actors responsible for formulating the proposals. 38 Memorandum by the United Kingdom Representative to the European Advisory Commission (Strang), dated 15. January 1944; in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 112 – 159, here p. 114 39 Memorandum by the Representative of the Soviet Union to the European Advisory Commission (Gousev), dated 18. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 173 – 179 40 Memorandum by the Representative of the Soviet Union to the European Advisory Commission (Gousev), dated 18. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 173 – 179, here p. 174: “The German Government and the Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces, recognising the complete defeat of Germany in the war criminally begun by her against the United Nations, announce the unconditional surrender of Germany, and request the cessation of hostilities against her.” 41 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, Washington 5. February 1944; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 167 – 170 42 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), Washington, 15. February 1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 167 43 See Memorandum in Support of U.S. Views; in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 171 – 172

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The American draft proposal was written by officers of the US Armed Forces with less or no advice of the State Department. Although these are minor differences they reflect also the different legal and administrative traditions of each ally. After a tough round of negotiations, the three powers – with the quick Allied advance after “Overlord” in mind – adopted the final draft of a capitulation document on June 25, 1944.44 It now consisted of 14 very broad articles of mainly military character. Article 12 was a bit different: it ensured unlimited rules of engagement for The preamble of this document reflected the evaluation of the the three powers.45 JCS, by emphasizing the total defeat of the Wehrmacht: “The German Government and the German High Command, recognising and acknowledging the complete defeat of the German armed forces on land, at sea and in the air, hereby announce Germany’s unconditional surrender.”46 German soldiers should be, according to Article 2b, regarded as prisoners of war. But the Supreme Allied Commander should have a certain latitude in this question. This final proposal had an attached cover letter47 in which some provisions of the document were precised: “Under Article 2 (b) of the draft Instrument of Surrender of Germany, there is no obligation on any of the three Al- lied Powers to declare all or any part of the personnel of the German armed forces prisoners of war: it is their right. Such a decision may or may not be taken, depending on the discretion of the respective Commanders-in-Chief. Prisoners of war so declared will be treated in accordance with the standards of international law.”48 Obviously the claims in this document had to be regarded as the lowest common denominator, which urgently needed a clarification before the occupation began. In the final proposal a Supreme Commander of Allied Forces is mentioned. But the cover letter acknowledged the fact that there were three occupying powers with completely different believe systems and intentions as what to do and how to get along with Germany and the Germans. All this explanations, especially those made concerning Article 2b, showed very clearly how small the lowest common denominator was. Article 11 is also interesting. It stated that the Allies were allowed to deploy armed forces and civil installations in all parts of Germany. This rather short statement is enhanced in the cover letter: “The Commission will submit for the consideration of the three Governments a draft protocol on the Zones of occupation and the administra-

44 See in detail Hans-Günther Kowalski, “Die „European Advisory Commission“ als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945,” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971)., p. 271 – 272 45 This final draft can be found in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 256 – 261 (Minutes of the Seventh Formal Meeting of the European Advisory Commission, Lancaster House, London, July 25, 1944, 6 p.m.) 46 FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 256 – 261, here p. 256 47 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 25. July 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 254 – 256 48 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, dated 25. July 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, S. 255

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tion of “Greater Berlin”.”49 This was – long before the Yalta Conference – about the first mention of the division of Germany. Combined with the admission that a universal treatment of Germany is impossible, a development is anticipated, that would become official policy with the Crimean-Conference.50 As late as October 1944, Eisenhower had sent his Chief of Staff, General Walter Bedell Smith51, as representative of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) to the negotiations of the EAC.52 If Smith was the liaison between SHAEF and the European Advisory Com- mission, then it was highly likely that at least he was informed about the status and the progress of negotiations within the EAC. It was also very likely that Eisenhower was informed by Smith about the progress made at the meetings of the EAC. In fact, SHAEF was also informed about the work of the EAC by the Combined Chief of Staff (CCS). On April 25, 1945, troops of the US First Army linked up with Soviet units in Torgau, meeting on the river Elbe. After Hitler committed suicide on April 30, GreatAdmiral Karl Dönitz was named as his successor. Within this so called “caretaker government,” there was a dispute on how to bring this war to an end. It was, however, not a dispute about the necessity of bringing the war to an end. According to Walter von Lüdde-Neurath, Dönitz’ aide-de-camp, the admiral wanted “to end the war as quickly as possible to spare further pointless sacrifice for friend and foe alike – but in a manner “worthy of the unique struggle of the German people,” and above all to save as many as he could from the horrors of Bolshevism.”53 Therefore, the Allied claim for an “unconditional surrender” seemed unbearable. General Admiral von Friedeburg, the emissary sent by Dönitz, arrived in Eisenhower’s headquarters at Reims in late afternoon of May 5, 1945. He received additional support when Colonel General Jodl arrived.54 Both officers tried again to get the separate surrender of the German units deployed to the Western front accepted. They failed in achieving this goal. Instead they tried to soften the consequences of the inevitable surrender of the Wehrmacht. They asked Eisenhower to grant a period of a maximum of 49 Report by the European Advisory Commission to the Goverments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 25. July 1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 255 50 Due to limitations in space, the dismemberment of Germany can just be mentioned. For further details see Wilfried Loth, “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems,” in Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2 (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 201–378., p. 265 – 310; Dülffer, Jost. Jalta, 4. Februar 1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt. 2nd ed. München, 1998 51 To the person of General Walter Bedell Smith see in detail Crosswell, D. K. R. Beetle: The life of General Walter Bedell Smith. American warriors. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010 52 The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State, 18. October 1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 354 53 Lüdde-Neurath, Walter. Unconditional Surrender: A Memoir of the Last Days of the Third Reich and the Dönitz Administration. Barnsley: Frontline, 2010, p. 43, see also Heinrich Schwendemann, ““Deutsche Menschen vor der Vernichtung durch den Bolschewismus zu retten”: Das Programm der Regierung Dönitz und der Beginn einer Legendenbildung,” in Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland, ed. Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann (München: Oldenbourg, 2002), 9–33. 54 See Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1478, further cited as KTB OKW

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four days in order to allow as many military personnel and civilians alike as possible General Walter Bedell Smith, to flee the sphere of influence of the Red Army.55 who, as Eisenhowers Chief of Staff, was responsible for negotiating with the Germans, still insisted on the terms of surrender as laid down in the Casablanca Conference. Facing this, Jodl, who did not have authorization for signing an unconditional surrender – had no other choice than to send a telegram to Dönitz in Flensburg: “General Eisenhower insists that we sign today. If not the Allied front lines will be shut to those persons attempting to surrender individually, and all negotiations will be broken off. I see no other options but signature or chaos. Request immediate wirelessed confirmation whether I have the full authority to sign the capitulation. The capitulation can then come into force. Hostilities will cease on 9 May at 0000 hrs German summer time.”56 After discussing this issue with his staff in a meeting that lasted until midnight, Dönitz resigned himself to this situation and authorized Jodl to sign the surrender instrument. Jodl finally signed the surrender on May 7, 1945 at 0241.57 Jodl also had to sign another document in which he, acting on behalf of the Dönitz government, was obliged to sign another surrender instrument at a place and date designated by the Allies.58 At this second ceremony, the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht and Commander in Chief of Army General Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel as well as the Commanders in Chief of the Air Force Colonel General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff and the Navy General Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, had to surrender formally to the Allies. This second surrender ceremony took place in the morning hours of May 9, 1945 in the Soviet Headquarters in Berlin-Karlshorst. Although the European Advisory Commission had agreed to a draft proposal of the surrender documents, it was never used. Hence, the surrender of Germany had all the characteristics of a hastily improvised event. Though Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff, had been attending the meetings of the EAC and thus had cognizance of the surrender document, he created his own surrender document which was signed by Alfred Jodl on this May 7, 1945. The reason why Smith in the end created his own version of a surrender document can be explained with a mélange of complex reasons. Despite the fact that the “Big Three” had agreed to a surrender document, the agreement became worthless, when France was welcomed as another ally on October 23, 1944.59 55 See KTB OKW, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1479 – 1481 56 Quoted after Walter Lüdde-Neurath, Unconditional Surrender: A Memoir of the Last Days of the Third Reich and the Dönitz Administration (Barnsley: Frontline, 2010)., p. 56, the German original is printed in KTB OKW, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1481 57 See KTB OKW, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1481 – 1482 58 See KTB OKW, Vol. IV / 2, p. 1481 – 1482; further Rick Atkinson, The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945 (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2013)., p. 629; D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The life of General Walter Bedell Smith, American warriors (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010)., p. 917 59 See Wilfried Loth, “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems,” in Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2 (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 201–378., p. 274

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As early as August 22, 1944 the Chargé of the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation in London asked about being informed about the Allied plans for the surrender of Germany.60 Although the British and the American Delegations were very reluctant about the French request, in the end, they had to invite the French to become a member of the EAC on November 11.61 The initiative of inviting the French originally came from the Soviet side: “His Majesty’s Government have now heard from French Embassy that the Soviet Government immediately informed M. Massigli62 of their decision in favor of permanent French membership of the European Advisory Commission. His Majesty’s Government and the United States cannot therefore delay much longer their own decision on the French request.”63 The French had now the possibility to express their own ideas about customizing the zones of occupation and about a policy towards Germany. Although the Soviet Union had put pressure on the American and British side, to welcome the French in the EAC, it treated the French delegation to the EAC as second class ally. At the Yalta-Conference, the dismemberment of Germany became official policy, but the Soviet Union opposed to inform the French.64 SHAEF received a surrender document trough Ambassador John Winant on May 1. This included the amendments made by the French but had no stamp that symbolized the approval of the “Big Three”-governments. As a result, SHAEF was in possession of two surrender documents: One was the approved version that contained the crucial word “dismemberment”, the other one was not officially approved and did not contain this crucial word. To complicate things, Smith told Ambassador Winant that he was not authorized to use both versions since neither Washington nor London nor the CCS had issued any guidance in that matter. Smith was now caught between the devil and the deep blue sea by having two surrender documents that had not been approved by all four governments and also having no directive what to do with them. So he disregarded them and started with drafting his own surrender document, obviously

60 The Chargé of the Delegation of the French Committee of National Liberation in London (J. C. Paris) to the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant), London, August 22, 1944, in: FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 86 – 87 61 President Roosevelt to the Acting Secretary of State, Hyde Park, N.Y., November 8, 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 98; see further a copy of the press statement of the declaration accepting the French, in: The American Representative to the French Provisional Government (Caffery) to the Acting Secretary of State, Paris, November 10, 1944, in: FURS 1944 Vol. I, p. 99; further Wilfried Loth, “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems,” in Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller, Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2 (München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 201–378., p. 274 62 René Massigli was the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs within the French Committee of National Liberation and later on French Minister for Foreign Affairs, see Footnote 76 in FRUS 1944, Vol. I. p. 85 63 The British Embassy to the Department of State, November 7, 1944, in FRUS 1944, Vol. I, p. 97 – 98, here p. 97 64 See D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The life of General Walter Bedell Smith, American warriors (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010)., p. 916

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with Eisenhower’s acquiescence.65 Even so, the work of the EAC was not wasted. By establishing the European Advisory Commission, the Allies were forced to make up their minds about their objectives and goals for both post war Europe and Germany. Condensing the different vague and, in some cases not feasible, plans into the official policy of every single Allied Nation was the biggest and by far the most important achievement of the EAC. Therefore the answer to the question whether or not “Hour Zero” was an event, which could be planned, must be no. Planning “Hour Zero” implied that the Allies knew what they were facing when they entered Germany and took control of it. Although there were many plans on what to do with Germany and the Germans when the war was over, none of these plans survived first contact with the realities in the devastated, destroyed and defeated enemy nation, responsible for the most horrible war crimes in human history. However, “Hour Zero” was – in Germany – executed as a combined operation, based on the “principal Allied objective [...] to prevent Germany from ever again 66 becoming a threat to the peace of the world” . Accepting the surrender of the enemy allowed the Allies and later on Germany to rebuild this nation. The “Hour Zero” imposed by the victorious nations of World War II was necessary to help Germany to grow into a prosperous and stable democratic state. Bibliography

Adams, Bianka J. From Crusade to Hazard: The Denazification of Bremen Germany. Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press, 2010. Atkinson, Rick. The Guns at Last Light: The War in Western Europe, 1944-1945. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2013. Barth, Boris. Dolchstosslegenden und politische Desintegration: Das Trauma der deutschen Niederlage im Ersten Weltkrieg 1914-1933. Schriften des Bundesarchivs 61. Düsseldorf: Droste, 2003. Boog, Horst. “Die Anti-Hitler Koalition.” In Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943. Edited by Horst Boog et al., 3–94. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990. Burdick, Charles, B. “Vom Schwert zur Feder. Deutsche Kriegsgefangene im Dienst der Vorbereitung der amerikanischen Kriegsgeschichtsschreibung über den zweiten Weltkrieg: Die organisatorische Entwicklung der Operational History (German) Section.” Milittärgeschichtliche Mit- teilungen 10, no. 2 (1971): 69–80. Citino, Robert M. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007. 65 See D. K. R. Crosswell, Beetle: The life of General Walter Bedell Smith, American warriors (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010)., p. 916 – 917 66 Directive JCS 1067 to Commander-in-Chief of United States Forces of Occupation Regarding the Military Government of Germany; April 1945, in: US Department of State, ed., Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents (Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1950)., p. 21 – 33

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Crosswell, D. K. R. Beetle: The life of General Walter Bedell Smith. American warriors. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2010. Dallek, Robert. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Dülffer, Jost. Jalta, 4. Februar 1945: Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt. 2nd ed. München, 1998. Eisenberg, Carolyn W. Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944 1949. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Ers, Andrus. “Year Zero: The Temporality of Revolution Studied Through the Example of the Khmer Rouge.” In Rethinking Time: Essays on History, Memory, and Representation. Edited by Hans Ruin and Andrus Ers, 155–65. Huddinge: Södertörns Högskola, 2011. Eschenburg, Theodor. “Deutschland in der Politik der Alliierten.” In Kalter Krieg und Deutsche Frage: Deutschland im Widerstreit der Mächte; 1945 - 1952. Edited by Josef Foschepoth, 35– 49. Veröffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London 16. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York, Toronto: Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. Gaddis, John L. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Gimbel, John. The American occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military; 1945 - 1949. Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968. Glantz, David M. Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War: 1941-1943. Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005. Groß, Gerhard P. Mythos und Wirklichkeit: Die Entwicklung des operativen Denkens im deutschen Heer von Moltke d.Ä. bis Heusinger. Zeitalter der Weltkriege 9. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2012. Harper, John L. American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Jung, Hermann. Die Ardennenoffensive 1944/45: Ein Beispiel für die Kriegführung Hitlers. Studien und Dokumente zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges 12. Göttingen: Musterschmidt, 1971. King, Frank. “Negotiations and Dismemberment of Germany.” Journal of Contemporary History 16, no. 3 (1981): 585–595. Kowalski, Hans-Günther. “Die „European Advisory Commission“ als Instrument alliierter Deutschlandplanung 1943 - 1945.” Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 19, no. 3 (1971): 261– 293. Krug, Esther-Julia. ““Holding down the Fort?”: The War Historical Cooperation of the U.S. Army and Former German Wehrmacht Officers, 1945-1961.” MA-Thesis Emory-University- 2009. https://etd.library.emory.edu/file/view/pid/emory:1dpgv/krug_dissertation.pdf. Kunz, Andreas. “Die Wehrmacht in der Agonie der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944/45: Eine Gedankenskizze.” In Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland. Edited by Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann, 97–114. München: Oldenbourg, 2002. Loth, Wilfried. “Die deutsche Frage und der Wandel des internationalen Systems.” In Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches: Die Folgen des Weltkrieges. Edited by Rolf-Dieter Müller, 201–378. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 10/2. München: Deutsche

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Verlags- Anstalt, 2008. Lüdde-Neurath, Walter. Unconditional Surrender: A Memoir of the Last Days of the Third Reich and the Dönitz Administration. Barnsley: Frontline, 2010. McAllister, James. No Exit: America and the German Problem, 1943-1954. Cornell Studies in Security Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 2002. Mosely, Philip E. “Dismemberment of Germany: The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam.” Foreign Affairs 28, no. 3 (1950): 487–498. “The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn.” Foreign Af- fairs 28, no. 4 (1950): 580–604. Paine, Thomas. Common sense, Rights of man, and other essential writings of Thomas Paine: With an Introduction by Sidney Hook and a Foreword by Jack Fruchtman Jr. New York: Signet Classic, 2003. Powaski, Ronald E. Toward an Entangling Alliance: American Isolationism, Internationalism, and Europe, 1901 - 1950. Contributions to the study of world history 22. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991. Schreiber, Gerhard. “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzuges und der Krieg in Italien 1943 - 1945.” In Die Ostfront 1943 / 44: Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten. Edited by Karl- Heinz Frieser et al., 1100–62. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8. München: Dt. Verl.-Anst., 2007. Schwabe, Klaus. Der amerikanische Isolationismus im 20. Jahrhundert: Legende und Wirklichkeit. Frankfurter historische Vorträge 1. Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1975. Schwendemann, Heinrich. ““Deutsche Menschen vor der Vernichtung durch den Bolschewismus zu retten”: Das Programm der Regierung Dönitz und der Beginn einer Legendenbildung.” In Kriegsende 1945 in Deutschland. Edited by Jörg Hillmann and John Zimmermann, 9–33. Mün- chen: Oldenbourg, 2002. US Department of State, ed. Germany 1947-1949: The Story in Documents. Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1950. Vogel, Detlef. “Deutsche und Alliierte Kriegsführung im Westen.” In Das deutsche Reich in der Defensive: Strategischer Luftkrieg in Europa, Krieg im Westen und in Ostasien 19431944/45. Edited by Horst Boog, Gerhard Krebs and Detlef Vogel, 419–639. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 7. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2001. Wegner, Bernd. “Der Krieg gegen die Sowjetunion 1942 - 1943.” In Der Globale Krieg: Die Ausweitung zum Weltkrieg und der Wechsel der Initiative 1941 - 1943. Edited by Horst Boog et al., 761–1102. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 6. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-An- stalt, 1990. “Erschriebene Siege.: Franz Halder, die „Historical Division“ und die Rekonstruktion des Zweiten Weltkrieges im Geiste des deutschen Generalstabes.” In Politischer Wandel, organisierte Gewalt und nationale Sicherheit: Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Deutschlands und Frank- reichs : Festschrift für Klaus-Jürgen Müller. Edited by Klaus J. Müller et al., 287–302. Beiträge zur Militärgeschichte 50. München: R. Oldenbourg, 1995.

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In mano americana (1943-1946): i soldati dell’Asse e la memoria Francesca Somenzari

on l’apertura del fronte di guerra africano, per gli Alleati si pose con grande urgenza il problema della sistemazione e della gestione dei prigionieri dell’Asse. Fin dall’inizio si assistette però ad una netta differenziazione tra tedeschi e italiani, destinatari di politiche separate: se nell’immaginario americano i primi erano visti come soggetti pericolosi, i secondi godevano invece di una considerazione nel complesso bonaria, in quanto ritenuti uomini semplici e meno indottrinati. Dai corrispondenti di guerra americani in Africa e in Sicilia, i soldati italiani erano descritti con visi sorridenti e sereni, sempre immersi in un clima di ilarità e spensieratezza: “sgranocchiano biscotti, discorrono allegramente con chiunque voglia ascoltarli e chiedono fiammiferi alle loro guardie americane1”. A differenza degli italiani, i tedeschi si portavano dietro un’immagine quasi sinistra che era chiaramente legata alla martellante campagna propagandistica anti-tedesca che aveva caratterizzato i paesi anglo-sassoni, e in particolare l’America, ma che affondava le sue radici già alla fine dell’Ottocento: alla Germania era stata automaticamente associata un’idea di minaccia e di terribile imprevedibilità2. All’inizio degli anni Quaranta, nelle più importanti università americane si iniziarono a tenere numerose conferenze di natura storica sulle caratteristiche della popolazione tedesca, che insistevano sulla diversità germanica rispetto al resto del mondo: aggressività, rapacità e inclinazione alla crudeltà erano gli aspetti caratterizzanti e prevalenti3. Il manifesto e la vignettistica furono altrettanto sfruttati per la veicolazione di messaggi e di facili stereotipi. I tedeschi erano spesso raffigurati con sembianze diavolesche o animalesche, ma non umane. Le rappresentazioni furono numerose ed estremamente varie: il tedesco era talvolta un serpente, che doveva essere schiacciato, talaltra era un pidocchio che dava prurito in testa, talaltra ancora era simboleggiato da artigli neri che si avvicinavano lentamente ad una donna e al suo bebè oppure un’ ombra che coglieva all’improvviso un bambino. In altri casi le immagini furono più esplicite: con la svastica in primo piano i tedeschi avevano i tratti somatici di Hitler e la pistola in mano4. La propaganda negativa, che non distingueva tra regime hitleriano e semplici cittadini, 1 Descrizione di E.Pyle, Brave Men, New York, 1944, citata da L. Keefer, Italian Prisoners of War in America, 1942-1946, Praeger, New York, 1992, p. 14. 2 Sul tema rimando a R. Vansittart, Black Record. Germans Past and Present, Hamilton, Londra, 1941. Quest’opera, che presentava la stirpe germanica come rapace e bellicosa fin dall’alba della storia e che considerava il Nazismo come la naturale conseguenza e manifestazione di un percorso tanto aggressivo, ebbe in Gran Bretagna grandissimo successo, con mezzo milione di copie vendute. 3 Sul tema rimando al lavoro di S. Terkel, The “Good War”, New Press, New York, 1997. 4 G. Roeder, The Censored War: American Visual Experience during World War Two, Yale University Press, New Heaven, 1993, pp. 20-21.

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fu talmente forte e martellante da condizionare a fondo la mentalità dei civili e dei militari americani. Il chiaro obiettivo di questa politica fu di educare la propria opinione pubblica e di orientarla verso una visione manichea, che opponeva il mondo della libertà a quello della tirannia: la supremazia morale e culturale, che gli Alleati avevano cercato di conquistare, passò anche attraverso a queste strategie comunicative. Questo, in sostanza, fu il “sostrato” che accompagnò l’arrivo delle truppe americane in Europa e la successiva avanzata in territorio tedesco. L’atteggiamento iniziale riservato al prigioniero tedesco non potè non risentire di questa visione, tanto assoluta e condizionante, e si rifletté in direttive molto esplicite, che imponevano al soldato americano, in un primo momento, durezza e distanza: The German soldier is accustomed to and only respect the maintenance of a rigid standard of discipline; he despises and belittles what appears to him to be a low order of discipline, as evidenced by fraternization or an air of friendliness, and unfamiliarity with rules governing the handling of prisoners of war. He has been thoroughly indoctrinated to hate his enemy and believes absolutely in the inferiority of people other than those of Germanic origin. Infractions of military discipline and lack of purposeful handling constitute added evidence to support his beliefs. Accordingly, he must be re-educated and made to realize that he is now in the hands of a superior power5.

I prigionieri italiani in America: un’abbondante memorialistica E’ fondamentale premettere che la situazione degli italiani negli Stati Uniti fu un unicum nel panorama della prigionia della Seconda guerra mondiale: cibo abbondante, campi funzionali e ben organizzati, buone relazioni tra detentori e detenuti. Queste condizioni rimasero pressoché immutate per tutta la durata del conflitto, con una sola variante: dopo l’armistizio dell’8 settembre, solo quei prigionieri che rifiutarono la cooperazione assistettero ad un cambiamento radicale nel trattamento ricevuto fino ad allora dalle autorità statunitensi. Equiparati improvvisamente ai prigionieri tedeschi ed etichettati “fascisti”, questi italiani furono “ghettizzati” in altri campi e separati da coloro che avevano firmato l’I promise. Su poco più di 50 000- secondo le stime dello Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito Italiano6- o esattamente 51 032- come riportano le relazioni del War Department7- furono circa 13 900 gli italiani che non optarono per la collaborazione8. 5 Bundesarchiv (BA) Koblenz, RG 260/OMGUS-Office of Military Government for Germany/ Allied Control Authority, Office of Records and Archives- Z 45 F – Z 46, 3/176- 2/13, documento del 5 marzo 1944. 6 Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito, Ufficio Storico (USSME), Prigionieri ed internati negli Stati Uniti, Diari Storici, Seconda guerra mondiale 1940-1945, cartella 2256 A, relazione sulla costituzione delle unità di servizio italiane alle dipendenze dell’Esercito degli Stati Uniti d’America indirizzata al Ministero della Guerra, 1. agosto 1944, p. 2. 7 Rimando ai National Archives Records Administration (NARA), College Park, Maryland, RG 389- Records of the Provost Marshal General- Pow-Civilian Internee Information Center 1941, box 1, Orientation Fact Sheets del War Department, documento datato 21 ottobre 1944, p. 3. 8 Un numero di esattamente 36 129 aderì al progetto ISU: 2778 erano gli ufficiali e 33 351 i soldati semplici. USSME, Prigionieri ed internati negli Stati Uniti, Diari Storici, Seconda guerra mondiale 1940-1945, cartella 2256 A, relazione sulla costituzione delle unità cit. Sul tema rimando al lavoro di F. Somenzari, 8 settembre 1943: Gli Stati Uniti e i prigionieri italiani, Aracne, Roma, 2013.

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Di questi ultimi, la maggior parte fu riunita a Hereford, in Texas9. La prigionia degli italiani negli Stati Uniti ha dato vita ad una copiosa letteratura che ha voluto ripercorrere i momenti più importanti di quell’esperienza: sono stati soprattutto i non cooperatori di Hereford ad inaugurare un ciclo di memorie che è iniziato all’indomani del rilascio ed è proseguito fino ai giorni nostri con “Fascists’ Criminal Camp” (1948) di Roberto Mieville10, “Fame in America” (1954) di Armando Boscolo11, “Prigionieri nel Texas” (1985) di Gaetano Tumiati12, “Avevamo vent’anni” (1989) di Fernando Togni13, “Io prigioniero in Texas” (2005) di Mario Tavella14, “Hereford, Texas: onore e filo spinato” (2010) di Adriano Angerilli15… Il panorama memorialistico è molto più ampio in quanto, a queste opere autobiografiche, si devono aggiungere numerosi altri contributi in forma di saggi e diari16. Bisogna inoltre sottolineare che, anche se in misura minore, anche i prigionieri cooperatori hanno rilasciato le loro memorie17: questa differenza quantitativa è riconducibile al fatto che se i non cooperatori furono molto fieri di quell’atto di resistenza che avevano opposto alle autorità americane, e che avevano pagato in termini di trattamento, i cooperatori sentirono meno l’esigenza di una “trasposizione scritta”; al di là di tutto, era stata infatti una scelta più facile e più comoda. Le memorie dei prigionieri firmatari concordano pressoché all’unanimità sull’ottimo trattamento ricevuto dalle autorità statunitensi prima e dopo l’8 settembre 1943. A questi italiani, infatti, erano stati promessi una serie di privilegi- come la libertà di movimento nei campi, l’uso del telefono e del telegrafo per comunicazioni personali, possibilità di ricevere visite- che nella maggior parte dei casi furono mantenuti. La testimonianza scritta di Antonio Romagnino ha i toni di un vero e proprio inno all’America; così parla dei soldati americani e degli Stati Uniti: 9 Hereford era un campo molto grande, che tuttavia non riuscì ad ospitare tutti coloro che avevano rifiutato la collaborazione. I prigionieri “in eccesso” furono, in un secondo momento, trasferiti da Hereford ai campi delle Hawaii. 10 R. Mieville, Fascists’ Criminal Camp, Edizioni Corso, Roma, 1948. 11 A. Boscolo, Fame in America, Edizioni Europee, Milano, 1954 12 G. Tumiati, Prigionieri nel Texas, Mursia, Milano, 1985. 13 F. Togni, Avevamo vent’anni, Edizioni Virgilio, Milano, 1989. 14 M. Tavella, Io prigioniero in Texas. Un paracadutista della “Folgore” da Anzio a Hereford, 1943-1945, Lo Scarabeo, Bologna, 2005. 15 A. Angerilli, Hereford, Texas: onore e filo spinato, Ritter, Milano, 2010. 16 Rimando a G. Roberti, La Cappella del campo 31 ed altri Elzeviri extravaganti, Gallina Editore, Napoli, 1992, A.Manzoni, I ricordi di un non cooperatore in A. L. Carlotti (a cura di), Italia 1939-1945. Storia e memoria, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 1996, pp. 275-280, F. Di Bello, I conigli di Umbarger in M. Sani, Prigionieri. Prigionieri. I soldati italiani nei campi di concentramento, Eri, Roma, 1987, pp. 101-103, A. Scacchi, Grappa di ananas a Honolulu in G. Bedeschi (a cura di), Prigionia: c’ero anch’io, Mursia, Milano, 1990, vol. I, p. 133, G. Santu, La fiamma di combattimento-Missione compiuta in G. Bedeschi (a cura di), Prigionia cit., vol. I, p. 155, R. Bornia, America dolce e amara!, Macchione Editore, Varese, 1998, M. Carlesso, Memorie di un soldato prigioniero degli americani 1943-1946, Istituto per la storia della Resistenza e della società contemporanea della Marca trevigiana (ISTRESCO), Cierre Edizioni, Verona, 2005. 17 Sulle memorie dei prigionieri cooperatori si vedano F. Grancini, I polli erano del 1917 in G. Bedeschi (a cura di), Prigionia cit., vol. III, p. 185, M. Cau, Erano anni della mia giovinezza in G. Bedeschi (a cura di), Prigionia cit, vol. III, p. 201, A. Romagnino, Diario americano, Edizioni della Torre, Cagliari, 2003, D. Parri, Il giuramento. Generale a El Alamein, prigioniero in America (1942-1945), Mursia, Milano, 2009.

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XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM Quando scesero dal treno, quei volti più in alto sembrarono di amici ritrovati ed il riso un compatimento senza ferocia. Anche la salita della biscaglina apparve più agevole. Il punto estremo sarebbe sembrato anche più irraggiungibile senza quelle risatine ammiccanti. Stefano ce la fece infine, preso al volo da uno di quegli amici-nemici e fatto salire sulla plancia, prima che precipitasse giù la zattera che li aveva accostati alla nave alla fonda. L’America si faceva conoscere subito con quell’abbraccio anonimo18.

Il tenente Grancini, dopo essersi soffermato sull’aspetto ludico di quell’esperienza, caratterizzata da continue partite a ping-pong e a scacchi, rievoca con soddisfazione il momento del pasto: Ogni giorno una baracca preparava il pranzo. Un giorno tagliatelle e un altro giorno gnocchi di patate. Gli ingredienti erano a volontà. Le tagliatelle si facevano con 200 uova […]. Non ho mai mangiato polli e tacchini così buoni19.

La situazione di Grancini migliorò ulteriormente, come lui stesso racconta, quando, nell’ottobre del 1944, fu trasferito, insieme ad altri compagni, a Rock-Island nell’Illinois (un’isoletta sul Mississipi lunga 5 Km), dove le autorità americane necessitavano qui di due ingegneri e due chimici per un arsenale di cannoni. Fu alloggiato in una villetta a due piani nella zona centrale dell’isola ed impiegato in un ufficio tecnico che studiava modifiche per i cannoni. Grancini scrive che stava molto bene e che, oltre agli spaghetti, mangiava carne di maiale e uova20. La memorialistica relativa al campo di Hereford, e quindi di parte anti-collaborazionista, è completamente diversa e merita una certa attenzione in quanto ricostruisce in modo dettagliato il periodo della discriminazione subita dai prigionieri non cooperatori. Ecco le caratteristiche generali del campo, all’atto della sua fondazione: Hereford, un paese del Texas con 2 300 abitanti, fu prescelto nella metà del 1942 quale luogo per ospitare un campo che avrebbe potuto contenere il doppio del numero degli abitanti. Circondato nella sua interezza da due recinti, di cui quello interno percorso da corrente elettrica, con una sorta di terra di nessuno tra i due, nella quale i prigionieri che vi fossero addentrati correvano il rischio di essere uccisi dalle sentinelle, il campo era composto da quattro settori […]. I quattro settori, circondati da barriere di filo spinato, distavano l’uno dall’altro circa dieci metri21.

Per estensione era il secondo campo nel Texas, dopo quello di Mexia, con 165 acri di terreno, corrispondenti a 66 ettari22. Ogni baracca era larga 20 piedi, e cioè 6,16 metri, e lunga 100 piedi, cioè 30, 80 metri, e misurava complessivamente 190 metri quadri23. A. Romagnino, Diario americano cit., p. 90 F. Grancini, I polli erano del 1917 cit., p. 188. Ibidem. F. Conti, I prigionieri di guerra italiani 1940-1945, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1986, pp. 214-215. Conti aggiunge che mentre i primi tre settori erano costituiti da baracche, il quarto aveva invece degli appartamenti, destinati agli ufficiali: i tenenti vi alloggiavano in quattro, i capitani in due, e i maggiori da soli. 22 Rimando al lavoro di A. Angerilli, Hereford, Texas cit., p. 81. 23 Ibidem. 18 19 20 21

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Inizialmente, Hereford era stato concepito come uno dei tanti centri che avrebbero ospitato prigionieri, senza distinzione di sorta; solo in un secondo momento il campo sarebbe diventato il luogo di destinazione esclusiva (a parte un campo alle Hawaii) dei prigionieri non collaboratori. Le memorie di coloro che furono portati qui in questo periodo, o che già vi abitavano da alcuni anni, sono numerose e hanno una grande rilevanza storica per l’insieme di condizioni particolari che si vennero a creare: 910 ufficiali si trovarono a condividere un’esperienza complessa, e per certi versi unica; Hereford riveste una grandissima importanza per la concentrazione di personalità di livello, che nel dopoguerra si dedicarono con successo non solo alla scrittura e ad altre attività intellettuali ed artistiche, ma anche alla politica24. Questo campo si distingue oggi da tanti altri campi, non solo negli Stati Uniti, ma anche nel mondo, per la quantità di testimonianze scritte che su di esso sono state prodotte. Tutti i racconti insistono sull’aspetto della denutrizione, che fu causa per tutti di un calo di peso di almeno venti chili. A proposito della starvation, leggiamo qualche riga di Tumiati: Gli americani hanno cominciato gradualmente a diminuirci le razioni. Prima hanno chiuso lo spaccio, poi hanno abolito le salse, il burro, l’olio e le altre cose […]; infine hanno sospeso la distribuzione di ogni tipo di carne, fresca, congelata o in scatola […]. Siamo passati a una specie di magro rancio, molto più misero e scarso di quelli africani del tempo di guerra25.

Angerilli specifica: Ridicola la giustificazione, quando le cucine furono private del normale rifornimento di sale: “non reperibili nei magazzini Amarillo”. Demoniaca trovata, perché i cibi completamente insipidi sono notoriamente stomachevoli26.

Da altri apprendiamo che per arricchire il pasto, venivano tritate anche le bucce di patata, che una volta cotte insieme, davano l’idea di una purea dal colore grigio. A detta dei prigionieri, questo intruglio lasciava nello stomaco una specie di bruciore che durava per parecchie ore e che grattava dall’interno, come se fosse stata sabbia27. Tra i rimedi provvisori che i prigionieri trovarono, bisogna citare quello della brillantina: qualcuno aveva scoperto che questo prodotto, che serviva per fissare i capelli e che lo spaccio vendeva, conteneva tracce di sostanze saline. Ecco quindi che a Hereford, per qualche tempo, la brillantina diventò una forma di condimento28. Quando gli Americani se ne 24 Sull’eccezionalità del campo di Hereford e sull’importanza delle memorie scritte dagli italiani che vi passarono l’ultimo periodo di prigionia, segnalo i saggi di A. Bendotti, Hereford, Texas, Usa. Scritti e memorie dei prigionieri in “Studi e ricerche di storia contemporanea”, n. 51, giugno 1999, pp. 121-138, E. Lorenzon, Le memorie dei prigionieri di guerra nel campo di Hereford in “S-Nodi, pubblici e privati della storia contemporanea”, Napoli 2007 (1), pp. 105-112 e Destinazione: Hereford, Texas, USA in M. Isnenghi (a cura di), Le rotte dell’io, Scriptaweb, Napoli 2008, pp. 209- 237. 25 G. Tumiati, Prigionieri nel Texas cit., pp. 164-165. 26 A. Angerilli, Hereford, Texas cit., p. 137. 27 A. Boscolo, Fame in America cit., p. 159. 28 Sembra che sia stato un veneziano ad avere questa trovata, il tenente Foscari. A. Angerilli, Hereford, Texas cit., p. 137.

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accorsero, ne proibirono la vendita. Col passare dei mesi, il regime alimentare non solo non accennava a migliorare, ma registrava ulteriori cali. Il pasto iniziò a limitarsi ad una saracca divisa per otto, cioè un boccone a testa, e due sottili fette di pane leggerissimo, a base di riso: questa sarebbe stata l’alimentazione di un intero anno, fino al rimpatrio. La saracca era una specie di grossa aringa, più o meno della consistenza di uno sgombro, di colore verde oliva con riflessi metallici, essiccata ed affumicata per essere conservata in salamoia o in un barile. Come scrive Angerilli, “cibo misero, per comunità derelitte e indigenti29”. Ma lo spirito di sopravvivenza non avrebbe abbandonato gli ospiti di Hereford, quasi tutti animati da un carattere forte e da motivazioni salde che li avevano accompagnati fino a quel momento. Ecco quindi che si cercò di coltivare il pomodoro; la vegetazione del campo fu setacciata: si mangiava anche l’erba, che veniva prima bollita. Boscolo scrive che in breve tempo il campo divenne “pelato come la testa di un calvo30”. Fu scatenata la caccia ai gatti e ai cani del campo, poi si passò alla caccia della cavallette, che dopo essere state uccise e fritte nella brillantina, venivano divorate, come se fossero state prelibatezze. Era una fame paralizzante e totalizzante, che occupava cioè ogni pensiero: oltre a cercare di procacciarselo in ogni modo, il cibo era diventato l’oggetto di conversazione preferita; sembra che Roberto Mieville fosse diventato “l’aedo” per eccellenza dei sogni gastronomici, dal momento che rievocava spessissimo i pranzi natalizi, di cui illustrava nei minimi dettagli tutte le portate: culatello, insaccati, lasagne, arrosto, pasticcio, fragole con gelato…31 Altri prigionieri invece passavano la giornata a calcolare l’apporto nutritivo fornito da quella magrissima dieta e “su questo imbastiscono interminabili discussioni che spesso sfociano in aspri litigi e in reciproche accuse di ignoranza32”. Un altro espediente per “collezionare” qualche caloria in più consistette nella distillazione di qualche alcolico, poi si fece ricorso al tabacco. I fumatori sostenevano che una sigaretta potesse sostituire una colazione: le autorità del campo proibirono presto anche questo, bloccandone la vendita allo spaccio. I prigionieri cercarono un modo per sostituire il tabacco: prima fu la volta dell’erba seccata e tritata, poi del legno ridotto a segatura e poi della carta. Ne derivarono problemi di indigestione e intossicazione33. Anche dai maltrattamenti fisici non furono risparmiati gli ospiti di Hereford: sottoponendo i prigionieri ad un continuo stress da irruzioni e perquisizioni notturne, pestaggi e violenze di ogni tipo, gli Americani pensavano di raccogliere nuove adesioni. Tumiati scrive: Siamo sottoposti a improvvise irruzioni […]. All’improvviso nel silenzio della notte, un rombo di camionette, passi di reparti in corsa, grida, urla, mentre i fari delle torrette, impazziti, roteano più veloci del solito. Sentiamo che un gruppo fa irruzione nella baracca accanto alla nostra: colpi di bastone, berci da ubriaco, lamenti. Ora tocca a noi. 29 30 31 32 33

Ibidem. A. Boscolo, Fame in America cit., p. 161. Immagini riportate da G. Tumiati, Prigionieri nel Texas cit., p. 170. Ivi, p. 171. Ivi, p. 163.

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Prima che sul “caso Hereford” si accendessero i riflettori con la visita e le proteste dell’ambasciata italiana, sembra che le autorità del campo si sentissero completamente indisturbate nelle loro azioni; Roberto Mieville, ricordando uno dei tanti episodi di violenza, scrive: Quando il Generale Comandante del Campo fece le proteste per i soprusi e le sopraffazioni in netto contrasto con la Convenzione di Ginevra, il colonnello Calworth rispose: “La guerra è guerra, Generale! E le convenzioni di Ginevra sono le convenzioni di Ginevra, qui siamo negli Stati Uniti, Generale! Credo che vi convenga dire ai vostri ufficiali di collaborare. E’ meglio per loro…35

Tutte le memorie concordano sul fatto che sia la politica della starvation sia i maltrattamenti sarebbero serviti, nelle intenzioni americane, a piegare le ultime resistenze e quindi ad ottenere, anche se tardivamente, la collaborazione. Per quanto eccezionale nell’ambito della prigionia in America, il caso di Hereford non rappresentò mai, per la comunità storico-accademica, un fatto eclatante; detto in altri termini, il caso di Hereford fu qualcosa di noto già all’indomani della Seconda guerra mondiale: calate in un contesto in cui la violenza della guerra era ancora un ricordo recente, le memorie dei prigionieri “sedimentarono lentamente”, togliendo ai fatti stessi quel carattere di esplosività e di mistero. Lo stesso non si può dire per la vicenda dei prigionieri tedeschi in mano americana. I prigionieri tedeschi in mano americana in Germania (1944-1946) A differenza del caso sopra illustrato, la vicenda dei prigionieri tedeschi fu, fin dall’inizio, “diversamente gestita”: in Europa, e in particolare in Germania, l’organizzazione dei campi si presentò molto più articolata sia dal punto di vista strettamente quantitativo sia dal punto di vista della localizzazione geografica sia dal punto di vista politico-decisionale. La massa di prigionieri tedeschi a cui il Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) si trovò a dover far fronte fu qualcosa di “oceanico” ed inaspettato: il generale Eisenhower aveva previsto un totale di tre milioni di uomini in mano statunitense sul continente europeo, ma nel giugno 1945 il numero reale ammontava a cinque milioni36. Il carico maggiore supportato dall’esercito americano fu dovuto al venir meno del 34 Ivi, pp. 85-86. 35 R. Mieville, Fascists’ Criminal Camp cit, p. 67. 36 S. Ambrose e G. Bishof (a cura di), Eisenhower and the German POWs. Facts against Falsehood, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge e Londra, 1992, pp. 2-5. Alla fine della guerra, il numero dei prigionieri tedeschi in mano alle quattro potenze alleate supera gli undici milioni. Per un approfondimento quantitativo, rimando anche a F. Cochet, Soldats sans armes. La captivité de guerre: une approche culturelle, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998, p. 120.

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cosiddetto “fifty-fifty agreement”: i Britannici, infatti, dopo essersi accordati su una divisione al cinquanta per cento del numero totale dei prigionieri tedeschi, lasciarono poi agli Stati Uniti l’onere di occuparsi della maggior parte del personale tedesco arresosi nell’ultimo periodo di guerra37. Il secondo problema fu rappresentato dalla dispersione geografica dei campi a cui si unì una dispersione “amministrativa”. A partire dallo sbarco in Normandia e durante tutta la sua avanzata in territorio tedesco, l’esercito statunitense aveva lasciato dietro di sé delle enclosures38 in cui erano stati radunati i prigionieri tedeschi a mano a mano catturati. L’ubicazione dei campi interessò sostanzialmente tre aree: il territorio propriamente francese, la zona di confine tra la Francia e la Germania all’altezza della riva sinistra del Reno, e la successiva zona di occupazione statunitense, e cioè la Baviera, il BadenWürttemberg e parte dell’Assia. A seconda della localizzazione, la realtà detentiva fu diversa: in Francia la custodia dei prigionieri tedeschi era stata totalmente delegata a personale militare appartenente alle truppe degaulliste, sul Reno si era avviata una cogestione americano-francese, mentre nella zona sud-orientale della Germania l’esercito di Eisenhower aveva proceduto in piena autonomia all’organizzazione e al controllo dei campi39. In questo caso ci troviamo davanti ad una dicotomia ben precisa: campi-transito lungo il Reno dall’aprile all’agosto 1945 e campi permanenti nella vera e propria zona di occupazione americana dal settembre 1945 ai primi mesi del 1947. Nei campi permanenti i prigionieri tedeschi conobbero una situazione più o meno normale, a volte anche soddisfacente, mentre nei campi-transito le condizioni di vita furono durissime. Cosa successe qui? Nei primi mesi di avanzata dell’esercito statunitense in Germania, prima del collasso del Terzo Reich, i prigionieri tedeschi via via catturati furono riuniti in una ventina di campi-transito- ribattezzati successivamente dai prigionieri Rheinwiesenlagerche non disponevano di strutture di accoglienza e che si limitavano, come spiega il nome stesso, a dei semplici prati dotati di recinzioni e torri di controllo40. Elencandoli da nord a sud: 1. Buderich 2. Rheinberg 3. Wickrathberg 4. Remagen 5. Sinzig 6. Siershahn 37 S. Ambrose e G. Bishof (a cura di), Eisenhower cit., pp. 5-6. 38 Questo è il termine usato in tutti i rapporti di visita stilati dal Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa di Ginevra (CICR), quando ci si riferisce ai campi statunitensi in Europa. Archivio del CICR, Ginevra, Service de camps, Zone U.S., Allemagne e Service des camps, Zone U.S., France. 39 Nella zona di occupazione statunitense, l’esercito è stato affiancato, nelle sue mansioni, dall’Office of Military Government-United States for Germany (OMGUS). Sul tema rimando a C. Weisz (a cura di), OMGUSHandbuch. Die amerikanische Militärregierung in Deutschland (1945-1949), Monaco, Oldenbourg, 1995. 40 Per una descrizione generale dei Rheinwiesenlager, rimando al lavoro di C. Strauss, Kriegsgefangenschaft und Internierung: die Lager in Heilbronn-Böckingen 1945 bis 1947, Stadtarchiv Heilbronn 1998 e a quello di F. Somenzari, I prigionieri tedeschi in mano statunitense in Germania (1945-1947), Zamorani, Torino, 2011.

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7. Andernach 8. Diez 9. Urmitz 10. Koblenz 11. Bingen-Dietersheim 12. Heidesheim 13. Hechtsheim 14. Winzenheim 15. Bretzenheim 16. Biebelsheim 17. Bad-Kreuznach 18. Ludwigshafen 19.Böhl-Iggelheim 20. Heilbronn

La maggior parte di questi furono stabiliti lungo la riva sinistra del Reno e non lungo quella destra, per impedire ai soldati tedeschi catturati di fuggire e raggiungere facilmente la propria truppa. Così sono descritti nelle relazioni dei delegati svizzeri del Comitato Internazionale della Croce Rossa: Lorsqu’on approche du camp, la première chose qui frappe, c’est la nudité presque complète du terrain, terrain vague, poussiéreux, sur lequel déambulent des gens à moitié nus. Le camp est au tout premier stade de l’organisation. Chaque “stockade” n’est pour le moment qu’une portion de terrain entourée de fils de fer barbelés41.

E ancora: Il n’existait qu’une grande prairie à cet emplacement avant la date d’ouverture du camp. Le sol des “cages” est actuellement dépouillé de toute vegetation, c’est un terrain vague, brun rouge, poussiéreux, argilleux à 50 cm de la surface, de sort que, lorsqu’il pleut, il se transforme en marécage. La plupart des prisonniers couchent sur le sol et manquent de tentes et de couvertures42.

Anche il Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen ha raccolto alcune testimonianze simili: Im Frühjahr 1945 befand sich bei Bad Kreuznach ein grosses Sammellager für deutsche Kg, das zunächst in amerikanischer Verwaltung war und später den Franzosen übergeben wurde. Es gab dort eine schlechte Verpflegung, und die hygienischen Zustände warenmangelhaft. Die Ruhr brach in dem Lager aus. Die Gefangenen mussten auf freiem Feld ohne Zelt kampieren43. 41 Archivio del CICR, Service des camps, Zone US., Heilbronn, P.W.T.E. n. 2, visitato il 12 maggio 1945, p. 2. 42 Ivi, Helbronn, P.W.T.E. n. 1, visitato il 14 maggio 1945. 43 BA Koblenz, Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen Z 35- 327, documento n. 20. Traduzione: “Nella primavera del 1945 presso Bad Kreuznach si trovava un grosso campo di raccolta per prigionieri di guerra tedeschi, che prima era in gestione statunitense e poi era stato ceduto ai Francesi. Lì c’era una cattiva alimentazione e le condizioni igieniche erano malsane. La dissenteria (infatti) scoppiò nel campo. I prigionieri dovevano accamparsi all’aria aperta senza tenda”.

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E su un altro campo: Im Frühjahr 1945 befand sich bei Ludwigshafen ein grosses amerikanisches Sammellager für Kg, in dem über 100 000 Mann untergebracht waren. Die Gefangenen mussten ohne Zelte auf freiem Feld kampieren, durften sich auch keine Löcher für ihre Unterkunft graben. Zelte, die sie noch besassen, wurden ihnen weggenommen. Die Verpflegung war schlecht. In das Lager wurde von den Wachen gelegentlich hereingeschossen44.

In un’intervista che mi è stata rilasciata da un reduce di questi campi, Heinz Heindorf, così vengono descritti i Rheinwiesenlager e nello specifico Heidesheim: Dieses war ebenfalls ein offenes Lager. Da können sich vorstellen eine Pferdekoppel, das war nachts alles beleuchtet und wenn jemand ausrücken wollte, der wurde erschossen 45.

In queste enclosures i prigionieri tedeschi furono selezionati e identificati: furono in sostanza soggetti alle procedure di screening decise dal Supreme Headquarter, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). Prima di essere mandati in campi permanenti e ben organizzati, questi prigionieri furono lasciati in uno stato di grave abbandono e disagio, senza ripari, senza letti, senza viveri, costretti a nutrirsi di erba e a scavarsi delle buche per ripararsi dalle intemperie e dal freddo46. I dettagli di questa esperienza non trapelarono pubblicamente né negli anni né nei decenni successivi, non solo perché non si sviluppò mai una memorialistica, ma anche perché i risultati dei pochi studi sul tema furono tenuti in un estremo riserbo. I due fatti non sono casuali: siamo rispettivamente davanti ad un caso di autocensura volontaria e ad uno di censura semi ufficiale. Nel primo, le vittime di quella parentesi della gestione statunitense non ebbero il coraggio di mettere per iscritto la loro esperienza traumatica in quanto schiacciati dall’onta dell’Olocausto che pesava chiaramente sulla coscienza del popolo tedesco. I prigionieri dei Rheinwiesenlager sentivano di non avere il diritto di denunciare quelle violenze, alla luce di tutti i crimini di cui il Reich si era macchiato. Paragone di certo improponibile e inadeguato, ma questo fu il meccanismo mentale che impedì loro di scrivere. Ci fu tuttavia una memoria orale: erano racconti che i padri tramandavano ai figli, erano voci tenute “sotto chiave” che comunque circolavano; i tedeschi del dopoguerra conoscevano bene queste storie. Nel secondo caso, si trattò, come ho già detto, di una censura semi-ufficiale: negli anni Sessanta i risultati di una ricerca- promossa dal Parlamento della Germania Federalesulla sorte dei prigionieri tedeschi in mano alleata durante la Seconda guerra mondiale, confluirono in una serie di volumi la cui diffusione si limitò ai soli organi istituzionali e a

44 Ibidem. Traduzione: “Nella primavera del 1945 presso Ludwigshafen, si trovava un grande campo di raccolta statunitense, nel quale erano ammassati più di 100 000 uomini. I prigionieri dovevano accamparsi all’aperto senza tende, per cui erano costretti a scavarsi di buchi che fungevano da ricoveri. Le tende che i prigionieri possedevano ancora, furono loro tolte. L’alimentazione era cattiva. All’interno del campo venivano sparati dei colpi dalle guardie, e non casualmente, ma apposta”. 45 Intervista che Heinz Heindorf, residente a Trautenstein (nei pressi di Hannover), mi ha rilasciato nel luglio del 2007. Traduzione: “Era un campo aperto. Immaginatevi un pascolo per cavalli che di notte era completamente illuminato e dove, se qualcuno cercava di uscire, veniva ucciso a fucilate”. 46 F. Somenzari, I prigionieri tedeschi cit.., pp. 77-103.

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biblioteche il cui accesso non era facile47: in clima di Guerra Fredda, questa fu considerata la soluzione più indolore. Questo silenzio sia monografico-accademico sia memorialistico permise ad un giornalista canadese di dubbia professionalità, James Bacque, di strumentalizzare la vicenda, raccogliendo in maniera affastellata e per niente scientifica, un insieme di dati non soggetti a verifica dall’impatto esplosivo. La pubblicazione, nel 1989, di Other Losses48, tradotto poi in tedesco, francese e italiano, trasformò un caso che avrebbe dovuto essere meglio contestualizzato e rapportato ai tempi in uno scoop internazionale, dai contorni macabri e sensazionalistici49. Le fonti primarie BA Koblenz - RG 260/OMGUS-Office of Military Government for Germany/ Allied Control Authority, Office of Records and Archives- Z 45 F – Z 46, 3/176- 2/13 - Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen Z 35- 327 CICR -

Service de camps, Zone U.S., Allemagne - Service des camps, Zone U.S., France

NARA - RG 389- Records of the Provost Marshal General- Pow-Civilian Internee Information Center 1941, Orientation Fact Sheets del War Department USSME -

Prigionieri ed internati negli Stati Uniti, Diari Storici, Seconda guerra mondiale 19401945, 2256 A

47 La Commissione Maschke produsse più di una ventina di volumi sulla prigionia tedesca in mano alleata. Sul destino dei tedeschi in mano americana in Germania, si veda Böhme, Kurt, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in amerikanischer Hand: Europa, vol. X/2, Gieseking, Bielefeld-München, 1973. 48 J. Bacque, Other Losses, Stoddard, Toronto, 1989. 49 Basandosi su fonti tedesche, il maggior studioso sul tema parla di una mortalità che non supererebbe lo 0, 8% su un totale di 557 000 persone. K. Böhme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen cit., p. 203.

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Combined operation of People’s Liberation Army of China A historical reflection: 1949-1991 Qu Aiguo

n Military Terms of People’s Liberation Army of China, a reference book published in 1982, “Combined Operation” is defined as “an operation conducted by two or more arms or services under the unified planning and command for the common task”. The definition reflects the view of Chinese armed forces on combined operation before 1990s. Combined operation is the major type of operation in mechanized warfare. It had been highly emphasized in PLA history, particularly from 1950s to 1980s during which time it was taken as the basic mode of operation, training and maintaining readiness. The idea of combined operation dominated and influenced all aspects of national defense and armed forces building, from operation guidance, structure and system of armed forces, armament development, logistic support, and training and education. Part one: Four steps of development of PLA combined operation theory Combined operation in PLA begun from the coordination of infantry and artillery during the latter period of Chinese Liberation War in 1940s. After the founding of PRC in 1949, theories of combined operation were developed and improved, especially after Korean War, self-defense operations, counter-attack operations as well as some air battles and maritime battles. At the end of 1980s, a set of systemic theories of combined operations with Chinese characters were established.

First Period: from late 1940s to early 1960s Before the establishment of People’s Republic of China, combined operation of PLA referred mainly to the coordination between infantry and artillery. Theories and skills of combined operation developed with fast pace due to the experience in the Korean War, particularly the experience from the coordinated operation between infantry and artillery, and between infantry and tank troop. PLA kicked off a transition from single armed and single service forces to combined armed forces during this period. Since January 1951, PLA started upgrading itself with Soviet made equipments and learning combined operation theories of Soviet military. A series of military operations and exercise conducted during this period also pushed forward the application of combined operation theories into practice. In 1961, first generation of combat doctrine of PLA was issued, which for the first time officially pointed out 10 basic principles for operation, and demonstrated combined operation ideas. It marked the transition of operation theories from single arm based one to combined arms based.

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Second Period: From early 1960s to late 1970s Since early 1960s, due to the significant changes in international situation as well as China’s peripheral security environment, PLA shifted its focus to preparing against a general war with the application of nuclear weapons and new-type weaponry and equipments. In the early 1970s, to prevent large-scale all-out aggression in the nuclear context, PLA focused more on tactics of anti-tank, anti-tank and anti-airborne actions, and developed methods to conduct combined armed operations in NBC context. The Second Generation Combat Operation issued in 1979 registered completion of combined operation theory under the nuclear condition. Third Period: from late 1970s to mid 1980s The world was still dominated by two blocks competing for hegemony from the end of 1970s to mid 1980s, and China was facing the real threats posted by heavy Soviet Union’s troops deployed along the borders. In the autumn of 1981, PLA carried out a large scale combined military exercise in North China which promoted and enhanced the combined operation capability. The Falkland War in 1982 further galvanized the interests and efforts of PLA in study on local wars and armed conflicts in the new situation. Fourth Period: from mid 1980s to early 1990s. In mid 1980s, there were signs of easing confrontations between SU and USA and significant changes were taking place in international security situation. PLA’s main task shifted from fighting a nuclear war to peacetime modernization building, and the focal point of PLA combined operation study also shifted from all-out wars to regional wars. In 1987, PLA released its third general combat doctrine. Based upon in-depth studies on the implication of new technology on armaments development and consequential impact upon tactics, PLA made necessary revisions on the basic principles of combined operation. In 1986 and 1988, PLA Department of General Staff held two PLA-wide operational theory seminars, discussing theoretical issues related with basic ideas, principles and tactics for conducting future anti-aggression war, as well as coordination of various arms and services, and logistic support. A core operation concept, “overall operation, and focal strike” was put forward after the two seminars, which marked the theory and practice of PLA combined operation entering a new level. Part Two Basic principles and methods for PLA combined operations PLA created and developed principles and methods for combined operation during decades of military struggles, and the essence of those principles and methods was included in the operation doctrines issued at different periods. Though the contents of those doctrines may differ from one another due to changed historical contexts and operation targets, the common principles remain relative consistent and are followed by PLA. A. Concentration of strength on principle directions Concentration of strength refers to establish and maintain absolute superiority over the opponent within at a specific time frame and space, in order to win by fighting few

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with many. There may be many directions that troops are needed in one campaign or battle, but the principle direction should be one and one only so that all strength can be focused on that direction. Therefore, one must decide his principle direction either in offense or defense. Dispersing forces without a focus should be avoided. B. Concentration of firepower on major targets at proper timing Use of firepower is highly stressed in PLA combined operation. Main principle is concentrating the firepower of artillery as well as others on the main target at designated time, thus achieving absolute firepower superiority and annihilating the enemy’s effective strength. C. Conducting centralized and individual commands in a flexible manner Generally, PLA will exercise centralized command by deciding the plan and timing for the combined operation or close coordination. In emergent time or when carrying out complicated tasks, it will adopt centralized command with uttermost effort. When the initiative and creativity of commanders at lower levels are needed, or when centralized command is hard to exercise, individual command or decentralized command will be adopted. D. Systematic planning the coordination among different arms and services. Combined operation doctrines clearly and in detail define how to coordinate among various services and arms. (1) The army will take the lead when navy and air force support army in the operation. (In landing operations, navy will take the lead during the phase of shipping.) (2) Infantry or Tank should take the lead when combined operations involve only different arms of army. (3) The troop that carries out major task should take the lead. (4) Local forces, people’s armed police, militia and guerilla forces should play the supporting role to the major combat troops. (5) In counter nuclear attack operations, actions and firepower of various troops should coordinate with nuclear strike to bring nuclear strike effect into full. (6) Actions of electrical confrontation teams should be in concert with combat operations of troops. E. Improve support capability Effective combined operation depends on well-planned operation support, logistic support and technical support. Operation support refers to the use of necessary strength and equipments to protect troops from enemy strikes from air, land and sea, and prevent enemy reconnaissance and harassment, thus to ensure the smooth movement of troops and timely completion of tasks. Logistic and technical supports refer to the support of logistic material, medical and transportation services as well as technical support, and they also involve active struggles against enemy’s attack and sabotage actions. Part Three Main Features of PLA combined operations Combined operation theories of PLA is developed under the guidance of Mao Zedong’s military thought and based upon the experience of fighting People’s War. Theories and methods of combined operations from other countries and from ancient China were bor-

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rowed, and PLA’s own experience was added. As a result, PLA’s combined operation theory has its unique characters. A. Mao Zedong’s military thought has been regarded as the fundamental guideline. Soon after the establishment of PRC in 1949, Mao Zedong made a series of decisions of great strategic significance regarding combined armed forces building and theories of combined operation. Those decisions reflected the true needs for fighting a modern war, and provided guidance for PLA to develop and employ the principles of combined operation. B. Unique advantage of fighting People’s War was brought into full play. The key to the victories of PLA in its long history of revolutionary struggle lies in the fact that the wars that it fought are justified and real people’s war. Because those wars are for the fundamental interests of mass people, it is possible to mobilize people and to obtain their support. “People’s War” is an inexhaustible source of strength for PLA, and also a unique advantage exclusive to PLA and not enjoyed by adversary. C. Flexibility is exercised in war fighting. “We will choose the way of fight according to guns in our hands, enemy we face and the time and location of the confrontation”. This is a highly concise summarization by Commander in Chief Zhu De on PLA’s flexible strategy and tactics. Complexity of modern wars, broadness of battle space and variety of opponents, leave PLA little choice but to give full play to the initiative and creativity to commanders at each level, and to make full use of our strong point to attack enemy’s weak point. Exercising flexibility is a basic principle PLA followed to defeat its enemies and also one of the defining features of PLA combined operation. D. Maintaining heroic and staunch fighting spirit Among the ten grand military principles put forward by Mao Zedong, one is “to carry on the spirit of fighting in a brave, fearless and indefatigable manner and able to fight continuously without rest (to fight several battles in a short duration without break).” Doctrines of each generation took heroic and staunch fighting spirit as a basic principle and fundamental requirement. Combined operation under the modern conditions requires combat persons not only able to handle with proficiency complicated and modern weapons and equipments, but also to endure hardship and difficulty. Therefore, PLA put weight not only on the study of combined operation theories and improvement of weaponry and equipments, but also on the cultivation of fighting spirit of troops. E. Try to defeat better-armed enemies by making full use of equipment we possess Though PLA had been much poorly-armed in comparison with strong enemies it faced during different historical periods, it achieved victory each time. Besides the justice nature of wars it fought, one of the reasons of PLA’s victory was that it was able to explore and develop new combined operation theory according to the arms it possessed, employ the inferior hardware and capable combat persons in a scientific way, achieve the optimum when using backward equipments with advanced strategies and tactics.

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F. Stick to the good traditions of our own and borrow beneficial experiences from foreign military PLA launched a systematic study on and learning from Soviet Union’s military operational theories in the first few years after establishment of PRC. After that, a large amount of military theoretic works, special reports and articles published by Soviet Union, US, Japan, Britain, West Germany and France were translated into Chinese, new ideas in the foreign military theories, information about the latest development in foreign military equipment and weaponry, as well as changes of operational thinking were introduced to China. In the meantime, PLA also conducted a systemic research on our own experiences and recapitulated rules of operations since 1927 when PLA’s predecessor was created. It has been proved that it is an important way to know the opponent and oneself by learning both from foreign military and from one’s own past and to keep the theories and practice of combined operation updated with the world military development.

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The Royal Netherlands Navy in the Korean War 1950-1953. A case study on worldwide ambitions, and international as well as national prestige1 Anselm VAN DER PEET Introduction n November 1951, there was a large-scale attack by a UN task force on the North Korean port of Hungnam, codenamed Operation Athenaeum. One of the ships involved was the Dutch destroyer Hr.Ms. Van Galen. According to the Dutch commanding officer, the participation in the operation was an “excellent exercise for everybody on the ship”, due to many ‘action bombardments’, with aerial reconnaissance and registration of the impacts and corrections from helicopters. The British commander of the task force, rear-admiral A.K. Scott-Moncrieff, was also positive about the efforts of the Van Galen. He congratulated the Dutch “[…] on making an extremely good show of your indirect bombardment”. In addition, the flag officer was “very pleased” that the Dutch ship “had no difficulty in using United States air spotting procedure with Australian pilots”. The reports on this combined enforcement operation on the east coast of North Korea gave great satisfaction to the authorities in the Netherlands. Both in national terms and from a maritime-military point of view, the Dutch government was of the opinion that this action strengthened the country’s own international status. It is a well-known fact that after 1945 the Netherlands made no secret of its willingness to participate in multinational peace operations under the UN flag. What is less known is that the promotion of national interests played an important role in the decision-making process regarding such deployments. In this article that approach is discussed by using the case study on the Dutch naval involvement in the Korean war. In order to be able to place these naval operations in the appropriate context, first the Dutch fleet policy around 1950 will be discussed briefly, and reference will be made to previous multinational naval manoeuvres. Further on this article briefly reflects on the political influence of the navy at the time, and on the fact that the Dutch navy was already familiar with combined operations. After giving an overview of the decisionmaking process, regarding the deployment to Korea and the deployment itself, this article concludes with an analysis whether the objectives both of the politicians and the navy were achieved with this multinational mission.

Dutch naval policy and worldwide multinational fleet operations Around 1950, a vast majority in the Dutch parliament was in favour of a strong Royal 1 This article is largely based on a PhD research project of the author on out-of-area operations of the Royal Netherlands Navy between 1945-2001. This research is a project of the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH), supported by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW).

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Netherlands Navy. References to the Netherlands’ prestigious maritime past, its efforts in Allied context during World War II and the dependency on Sea Lines of Communication, formed the basis for this opinion. The government, which for financial reasons initially was less enthusiast in building a relatively large fleet, gave in to parliament. Hereafter it defended the budget for a sizable navy emphasising obligations arising from the UN Charter, and the protection of Dutch overseas interests in crisis circumstances. The Minister of the Navy ad interim, W.F. Schokking, referred in this context to earlier, pre-war actions by Dutch warships in crisis areas like Shanghai, China, during the 1920s and 1930s, with the navy promoting national interests in ad hoc international naval squadrons. Incidentally, with this policy the Dutch politicians were acting contrary to the wishes of the NATO leadership, which initially saw little point in a large Royal Netherlands Navy. This was at a time when the British and U.S. navies appeared to be sufficient for securing the oceans. The Dutch Admiralty naturally concurred with this national political position, having long propagated the importance of an ocean-going fleet. Naval historian G. Teitler demonstrates that former and serving flag officers mounted a maritime-military counteroffensive, both in terms of publicity and politics, against the lobby from the side of both the Dutch army and air force for more budget at the expense of the navy. The influential C.E.L. Helfrich, Admiral (ret.), highlighted in several magazines and newspapers the value of national oceangoing flotillas. The deputy Chief of the Naval Staff captain H.A., squire van Foreest, declared in a policy document to the Minister of the Navy that a “strong Dutch fleet […] for the national interests as well as those of the United Nations, would be of far greater importance than an army or air force”. Moreover, in addition to being familiar with pre-war ad hoc multinational naval task forces, from 1940 onward the Royal Netherlands Navy also gained experience in worldwide combined operations, through integrated manoeuvres in flotillas of the British Royal Navy. After the Second World War, the two navies continued to cooperate extensively, both in terms of materiel (the majority of the Dutch men-of-war and planes of the naval air service in 1950 was of British origin or design) and in the areas of doctrine and training. War in Korea Communist North Korea, materially and politically supported by both Moscow and Beijing, invaded on 25th June 1950 South Korea, that was backed by Washington. The White House did not want to suffer another defeat in Asia, after Mao Zedong’s victory in China in 1949. It seized the opportunity provided by the Korean conflict to take robust action against further expansion of Communist power anywhere in the world. Moreover, the conflict would give the United States an indication of the willingness of its Western European Allies to conform to U.S. foreign, and security policies. Without the Soviet Union present, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution shortly after the invasion, identifying Pyongyang as the aggressor and calling for a ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops to the 38th parallel. On 27th June, the United Na-

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tions mandated its member states “[to] furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”. On 26th June, U.S. president H.S. Truman ordered his air force and navy to assist the South Korean army. However, it soon became apparent that the South Koreans needed help from the army, too. The Security Council then placed all military units that had been supplied to the UN under the unified command of the United States. Washington, that provided the majority of the military for the UN-forces, hereafter appointed the American General D. MacArthur as Commander in Chief. Dutch deployment decision The reaction of NATO’s European member states to the North Korean aggression was one of shock. Many thought it heralded a worldwide Communist attack on the West. On 27th June, the Americans sounded out various Western European Allies, including the Netherlands, to find out whether they would be willing to contribute to the UN naval and air forces for Korea. On the basis of the consideration that the Netherlands could not refuse the request from its guardian, Washington, in a period when a Soviet invasion of Western Europe seemed likely, the government decided on 29th June to offer a warship that could reach the conflict area quickly. The decision was also influenced by the traditional role of the Netherlands as an advocate of the international rule of law and provider of naval vessels to multinational maritime task forces, as well as the relatively low risk involved. The latter in contrast to a later deployment of an infantry battalion. On 3th July, the destroyer Hr.Ms. Evertsen, in Indonesia at the time, was ordered to head for Korea. The Dutch government understood that providing this relatively quick and simple symbolic assistance, would be appreciated much in Washington. The State Department indeed told the Dutch naval attaché that the offer made an “excellent impression”. The press in the United States was equally enthusiastic. The New York Times expressed her admiration for the Dutch in an editorial. Under the headline ‘Support from Holland’ the editorial board stated: “None has been quicker or more wholehearted in the backing [of the UN enforcement mission] than the Netherlands”. After the first patrols of the Evertsen the Daily News opened with the headline ‘Dutch Navy Guns Pound Korea Reds’. The Royal Netherlands Navy saw the Korea mission as an opportunity to polish its reputation even further. After all, it still had to permanently secure its budget, both at home and within NATO. Participation in the UN force would give the Royal Netherlands Navy, according to the deputy Chief of the Naval Staff commander G. Koudijs, a greater say in the Dutch Defence policy. Former Admiral Helfrich declared that with this mission, the Netherlands could show that it had influence in the world, not only by making statements but also by military efforts, efforts made possible by possessing an ocean going navy. Action in the Korean waters: combined and joint operations Dutch ships were deployed to Korea as part of the United Nations Naval Forces.

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They were under the command of the U.S. Commander, Naval Forces, Far East (COMNAVFE), who was also Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan (COMNAVJAP), Vice Admiral C.T. Joy, USN. He reported to the American General D. MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command. On 6th July, Admiral Joy brought the ships pledged by the British Commonwealth, as well as the other Western naval vessels that were expected, together in a West Korean Support Group, under the British Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes. The ships were organised in an American-style Task Force, TF 96, and subordinate Task Groups, in this case TG 96.8. An East Korean Support Group, which was to be formed with only American ships under the command of Rear Admiral J.M. Higgins, USN, was designated TG 96.5. The U.S. Seventh Fleet operated independently for the time being, on account of its separate command and responsibilities in other Asian waters. On 27th July 1950, both Support Groups merged into one Task Group, TG 96.5. In September 1950, however, the Commonwealth naval forces and all other nonAmerican Allied ships were again brought into a separate Task Group, TG 95.1, under Task Force 95. This Task Force was part of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from April 1951 until the ceasefire in July 1953. The British Commonwealth-flotilla, in which the Dutch men-of-war were divided, had the Japanese port of Sasebo as its main base. Regarding the supply, these vessels (including the Dutch with their former ships of the Royal Navy) would draw their ammunition and spare parts from British stocks in Hong Kong. Food etc. would be provided by the Americans. The British Commonwealth-flotilla/international force was sent to the waters off the Korean west coast and given the following orders: a) enforce a blockade of coastal areas occupied by the North Koreans; b) prevent infiltrations in coastal areas occupied by South Korea; c) if necessary, provide fire support against North Korean sea and land targets. On 19th July, Hr.Ms. Evertsen arrived in the area of operations, joining Rear Admiral Andrewes’ Task Group in Sasebo, Japan. The British flag officer stated that the “business-like appearance” of the Evertsen during her first patrols made on him “a very favourable impression”. New to the Dutch, but to most of the other UN naval forces as well, was that various coastal bombardments were carried out in cooperation with helicopters, which conducted impact observation and reconnaissance for the ships, reporting to them by radio. Keeping the international force supplied with enough ammunition was a constant challenge. Due to the resulting replenishment at sea, which was unusual for the Dutch, they did, however, gradually become used to operating together with all their Anglo-Saxon Allies. This included the so-called ‘Corpen Crazy Club’ method; international flag signals and radio orders in divers variations of Anglo-Saxon ‘slang’, which led to instant changes in the course and speed of carrier and cruiser escort groups. In view of earlier enemy territorial gains on the west coast after China’s direct involvement in the conflict, Task Group commander Andrewes initiated the occupation of islands north of the 38th parallel. They were to serve as bases for coastal blockades and the disruption of enemy mine-laying operations.

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The Evertsen left the mission area in April 1951 and was replaced by the destroyer Hr.Ms. Van Galen. To the satisfaction of the Dutch Admiralty, the departing ship was showered with praise by the British and American naval authorities. This was â€œthe best what a Dutch man-of-war can bring homeâ€?, according to the influential daily de Volkskrant. In the summer of 1951, the land front stabilised at the 38th parallel and truce negotiations began between the warring parties. Meanwhile, the fighting continued unabated. In the autumn of 1951, the support for troops on the UN-held islands in the Yellow Sea increasingly required the attention of TG 95.1. An increasing number of guerrilla organisations supported by the Americans and the South Korean government, as well as personnel of the U.S. Air Force (with early warning radar), were being seen on these islands. In late November, North Korea tried to recapture these outposts. The multinational naval force therefore received a guideline on 2nd December, stating that the defence of the outposts was to be given priority. As part of these new joint tasks, the Van Galen fired on targets near the guerrilla-held islands and enemy troop concentrations opposite the island of Sok-to. On 6th January 1952, the UN command decided to leave the defence of all the important UN-held islands off the Korean coast entirely to the navy. Consequently, the set-up of TG 95.1 was changed. It was assigned a new task element: the island garrisons, TE 95.15, under the command of Colonel W.K. Davenport, USMC. Near the island of Choda, on several occasions in 1952, South Korean marines embarked on the Van Galen, and her successor as of February of that year, Hr.Ms. Piet Heyn, all as part of the joint and combined operations for the defence of the islands. The Dutch also brought supplies to landing craft and patrol vessels close to the coast, and Dutch liaison teams carried out reconnaissance on board of small South Korean craft. The frigate Hr.Ms. Johan Maurits van Nassau, which began operating in Korean waters from January 1953, also focused much of her efforts on the occupied islands. Her shallow draught allowed the frigate to operate closer to the coast and in shallow channels. At the request of the island garrisons or guerrillas carrying out landings, the Dutch ship systematically shelled enemy positions. At the end of May 1953, TG 95.1, including the Johan Maurits van Nassau, bombarded enemy artillery on the northern shores of the Taedong-gang estuary. During these actions Hawker Sea Fury FB XI and Fairy Firefly Mk V planes of the British carrier HMS Ocean provided air spot for the UN naval forces. Three of the pilots of these Sea Furies of 807 squadron were officers of the Dutch naval air service. On 27th July 1953, a ceasefire was agreed and the tasks of the UN naval ships were limited to monitoring the truce. Conclusion The Dutch civil and naval authorities were all satisfied with the deployment of the Royal Netherlands Navy in the Korean conflict. The ships and their crew proved capable of adapting quickly to combined and joint deployment in the area of operations. Without encountering any serious problems, they operated in various roles. To wit: bombardment

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ship, observation platform (directing air attacks, mine look-out, leading amphibious landings), carrier and cruiser escort, constabulary vessel during the coastal blockade as well as (later) monitoring the truce, and transporter. The familiarity with British materiel and with the offensive doctrine of the Royal Navy, as well as the high level of training, were contributing factors in this respect. Given the many operations close to the coast, their flexibility in adapting to a brown water environment was also key. For the Dutch politicians, the objective of the naval mission in Korea in terms of policy and strategy was to please the United States, which had been acting as guardian of the territory of the Netherlands since 1949. Given the responses of the American authorities and media, as well as later praise received from the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy concerning the Dutch deployment, that objective had been reached. In addition, with this naval mission carried out under the UN flag, the Netherlands was able to restore its status as champion of matters such as the international rule of law and the creation of a multinational force, a status which had been damaged at home and abroad by decolonisation issues. With their professional efforts in Korea, the Dutch naval forces also succeeded in increasing their own national and international prestige. In the Netherlands, it helped to promote the existing good reputation of the navy, and as a result, the mission indirectly contributed to the securing of sufficient budget for a strong fleet. In the end, the participation in combined and joint UN forces not only received appreciation from the British and American navies. It was also the prelude to them accepting the role of the Dutch naval forces as an ocean-going fleet within NATO. Archives Nationaal Archief, Archief Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, The Hague. Nederlands Instituut voor Militaire Historie, The Hague. Semi-Statische Archiefdiensten Ministerie van Defensie, Rijswijk. Bibliography Ambrose, S.E., Rise to globalism. American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (1993). British Commonwealth Naval operations, Korea, 1950-53 Naval Staff History B.R. 1736(54) Ministry of Defence, Historical Branch (Naval) HS 2/63 By Command of the Defence Council, September 1967. Brouwer, J.W.L., ‘Dutch naval policy’, in: J.R. Bruijn e.a. (eds.), Strategy and Response in the Twentieth Century Maritime World. Papers presented to the Fourth BritishDutch Maritime Conference (Amsterdam 2001) 42-50. Brouwer, J.W.L., ‘Oorlog en Marine: een einde aan de impasse’, in: J.J.M. Ramakers (ed.), Het kabinet-Drees II 1951-1952. In de schaduw van de Koreacrisis Parlementaire geschiedenis van Nederland na 1945 Deel 4 (Nijmegen 1997) 593-648. Cagle, M.W., and F.A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis 1957). ‘De “Evertsen” terug uit Korea’, De Maasbode, 2-6-1951.

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Field, J.A., Korea. History of United States Naval Operations (Washington 1962). Grove, E.J., Vanguard to Trident. British Naval Policy since World War II (Annapolis 1987). Helfrich, C.E.L., Koninkrijk en zeemacht Uitgave van de Vaderlandse Kring (Schiedam 1951). Hennink, M. van, en J.M. Muys, ‘De smalle marges van het buitenlands beleid. Nederland en het Korea-conflict, 1950-1954, in: D.A. Hellema, C. Wiebes en B. Zeeman (red.), Jaarboek Buitenlandse Zaken. Tweede jaarboek voor de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse buitenlandse politiek in de twintigste eeuw (Den Haag 1995) 45-58. Hoofdstuk VIIIB (Marine) der Rijksbegroting voor het dienstjaar 1950. Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. Memorie van Antwoord (ingezonden 5-9-1950) Algemene Beschouwingen, De Minister van Marine Schokking, Marineblad jrg. 60 (1950) 611621. Hooper, E.B., United States naval power in a changing world (New York 1988). Kretschmer de Wilde, C.J.M., Lichtflitsen onder de kim. Verrichtingen der Koninklijke Marine in de Koreaanse wateren, 1950-53 (Utrecht 1955). Moor, J.A. de, ‘Aan de Amerikanen overgeleverd. Nederland, de Verenigde Staten en de oorlog in Korea, 1950-1953’, in: J. Hoffenaar en G. Teitler (red.), De Koude Oorlog. Maatschappij en krijgsmacht in de jaren ’50 (Den Haag 1992) 163-176. Nash, P., ‘The Royal Navy in Korea: Replenishment and sustainability’, in: G. Kennedy, British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900-2000. Influences and actions Frank Cass series: Naval Policy and History (Oxon and New York 2005) 154-177. Parsons, A., From Cold War to Hot peace. UN Interventions 1947-1995 (London 1995). Scott-Moncrieff, A.K., ‘Naval Operations in Korean Waters’, RUSI Lecture, RUSI Journal Vol. XCVIII, No. 590, May (1953), 218-227. Teitler, G., Enkele aspecten van het maritieme denken in Nederland. 1945-1955 (Den Helder 1980). ‘Torpedobootjager “Evertsen” begroet in vlaggend Den Helder’, de Volkskrant, 4-61951.

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Il contributo del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa Italiana nelle operazioni militari dal xx al xxi secolo Ettore CALZOLARI

a Croce Rossa Italiana, in virtù delle convenzioni internazionali ed in forza delle vigenti leggi in Italia, dispone tra le sue componenti di un Corpo Militare ausiliario delle Forze Armate dello Stato, composto di elementi arruolati volontariamente nelle diverse categorie dei suoi ruoli - con facoltà di impiego per l’assolvimento dei compiti di emergenza in tempo di pace e in tempo di guerra. In tempo di guerra il Corpo Militare della C.R.I. ha per scopo: • contribuire con mezzi e personale proprio allo sgombero,lla cura dei feriti e malati di guerra; • organizzare ed eseguire la difesa sanitaria antiaerea; • disimpegnare il servizio prigionieri di guerra, secondo le convenzioni Internazionali di Ginevra. In caso di emergenza il Corpo Militare della C.R.I. svolge il soccorso sanitario di massa, attraverso l’impiego di reparti, unità e formazioni campali di vario tipo; concorre altresì al supporto della struttura dell’Istituzione destinata ai servizi di protezione e difesa civile. A tal fine, il Corpo Militare della C.R.I. attende sin dal tempo di pace alla preparazione del personale e dei materiali necessari per assicurare un efficiente funzionamento dei servizi in emergenza. Il Corpo Militare della C.R.I. trae origine dalla disposizione emanata dal Ministro della Guerra in data 1 giugno 1866 con la quale il personale delle “Squadriglie di Soccorso”, prime formazioni emanate dal Comitato Milanese per il soccorso ai malti e feriti in guerra, poi trasformatosi in Croce Rossa Italiana, veniva assoggettato alla disciplina militare con adozione dell’ uniforme ed equiparazione gerarchica ai gradi dell’ Esercito. Primo effetto del provvedimento di cui sopra fu l’ulteriore disposizione dello Stato Maggiore, che, sotto la data del 2 luglio 1866, assegnò le “ Squadriglie di soccorso” per l’ impiego alle dipendenze rispettivamente del 1° e del 5° Corpo d’ Armata, con i quali presero parte alla 3° guerra di indipendenza. Unità sanitarie militari del Corpo Militare C.R.I. sempre più tecnicamente efficienti e sempre più numerose, costituite con personale del Corpo, hanno preso parte a tutte le guerre combattute dall’ Italia dal 1866 al 1945. Queste tappe gloriose si chiamano: Custozza e lissa (1866) Mentana (1867), Porta Pia (1870), Eritrea(1845),Eritrea (1895), Libia (1911-1912), Prima Guerra Mondiale (1915-1918), Africa Orientale (1935-1936), OMS (1937-1938), Seconda Guerra Mondiale (1943-1945). Nel 1895 Unità sanitarie militari C.R.I. presero Parte alla guerra per la Eritrea, partecipando a tutte le relative campagne. Nelle tragiche giornate di Auda vennero com-

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pletamente distrutte le Ambulanze Attendate C.R.I. n. 2 e n. 3. La guerra italo-turca del 1911 ha visto una notevole partecipazione del Corpo Militare della C.R.I. il quale, operando sia in Tripolitania che in Pirenaica, fu in diverse circostanze chiamato a difendere dalla furia degli attaccanti le proprie unità ed i feriti ivi ricoverati. L’Ospedale attendato n. 53, incorporato nel Corpo di spedizione del Generale Ameglio, prese parte allo sbarco che portò all’ occupazione di Rodi. Massiccia è stata la partecipazione operativa del Corpo nel corso della prima guerra mondiale 1915-1918 e nel corso del secondo conflitto mondiale, sia alla fase 1940-43 sia a quella 1943-45. Nel corso della Grande Guerra, tra il 1915 e il 1918 la C.R.I. mobilitò 204 ospedali per un totale di 30.000 posti letto, che ricoverarono 696.993 militari feriti. Furono mobilitati 1.160 Ufficiali Medici, 160 Ufficiali Farmacisti, 480 Ufficiali Amministrativi, 130 Ufficiali Automobilisti, 90 Ufficiali Cappellani, 5.750 Sottufficiali, Graduati e Militari di Truppa, 732 Infermiere Volontarie e 4.122 civili. Sul Fronte dell’Albania e della Macedonia il Corpo Militare operò inoltre con quattro Ospedali da campo, un treno ospedale e una sezione di Sanità. Al termine del Conflitto fu conferita da S.M. il Re la Medaglia d’Argento al Valor Militare alla C.R.I. con la seguente motivazione: “Nel compimento della sua nobilissima e pietosa missione dimostrò in tutta la guerra mirabile spirito di abnegazione, generoso ardore, sereno valore, costante devozione al dovere. 1915-1918”. Nel corso del secondo Conflitto Mondiale furono mobilitati 5 magazzini rifornimento, 16 autoparchi, 6 nuclei automobilistici, 56 posti di soccorso ferroviari e portuali, 6 Centri direzionali di protezione antiaerea, 26 Squadre di riserva, 300 Squadre di Pronto Soccorso, 133 stabilimenti di prima cura e smistamento, 84 stabilimenti specialistici, 132 stabilimenti di bonifica umana, 155 Squadre di bonifica del territorio. Furono allestiti inoltre 22 treni ospedale, 24 posti di soccorso ferroviario, 22 Ospedali territoriali, 11 Ospedali attendati da campo da 100 letti, 35 Ospedali attendati da campo da 50 letti, 75 Ambulanze attendate e 9 Ambulanze lagunari, per un numero complessivo di circa 8000 uomini mobilitati ed altrettante Infermiere Volontarie, operanti su Navi Ospedale, Treni Ospedale sul Fronte Orientale, Ospedali da campo in Africa, Albania, Grecia, Dalmazia, Croazia, Montenegro, Russia, Navi di rimpatrio dei Connazionali dall’Africa Orientale. Nell’ ora grigia del settembre 1943, in particolare, Unità militari C.R.I. si prodigarono per il soccorso ai feriti durante i combattimenti per la difesa di Roma e in tutti i Presidi che riusciranno ad opporre resistenza all’invasore, prendendo parte totale alle operazioni per la liberazione della Sardegna. Nei Balcani l’armistizio sorprese un Gruppo Ospedali da Campo C.R.I. mobilitato dislocato in Montenegro, articolato su tre Ospedali Attendati, il 73° e il 79°, i cui resti dopo giorni di marcia a piedi si ricongiunsero con la Divisione “Venezia” e nei quadri di tale Divisione, unitamente alla “Taurinense” confluirono nella Divisone italiana “Garibaldi” ove, fusi con i fanti ed alpini, al loro fianco operarono durante la

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intera campagna nei Balcani fino al termine del conflitto. In Italia, intanto, formazioni organiche del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa Italiana nelle quali erano in forza, come sempre, anche le Infermiere Volontarie, venivano impiegate nell’ ambito di unità del rinato Esercito alle dipendenze del Corpo italiano di Liberazione (C.I.L.) nella 209° Divisione italiana e con il 212° Comando italiano, nonché al seguito della V Armata Americana e della VIII Armata Britannica . Con la partecipazione attiva alla Resistenza, infine, suggellata con l’ olocausto alle Fosse Ardeatine di due Ufficiali, il Tenente Medico C.R.I. Luigi Pierantoni ed il Sottotenente Commissario C.R.I. Guido Costanzi, il Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa Italiana costantemente vicino alle Forze Armate ed al popolo, dava alla Resistenza ed alla Guerra di liberazione, un’ ulteriore silenziosa prova di valore, di patriottismo, di dedizione ai più alti ideali. Il Corpo Militare CRI ha fornito numerosi altri concorsi in situazioni di conflitti all’estero. La guerra accesasi nei Balcani vide nel 1912 la partecipazione di quattro ospedali attendati C.R.I. (nn.4, 8, 51 e 54,) inviati in soccorso ai combattenti. Le unità operarono rispettivamente in Serbia, Bulgaria, Montenegro (dove fu inviata anche l’ Ambulanza attendata da montagna n. 29) e Grecia. Un Ospedale da Campo (n.68) di circa 200 letti, rinforzato con un vasto poliambulatorio ed opportunamente potenziato ed attrezzato per il servizio chirurgico, fu inviato (primo reparto italiano ad essere impiegato all’estero inquadrato nell’ONU) nell’ ottobre 1951 con le Forze delle Nazioni Unite in Corea ed ivi rimase dislocato fino al gennaio 1955. Prestò in zona di operazione un’ opera assai apprezzata, vasta e benefica, riscotendo la calda, commossa riconoscenza dei coreani e l’ elogio vivissimo di tutte le Autorità Militari alleate e locali. Al suo Comandante (Generale medico Prof. Fabio Pennacchi, allora Maggiore) fu riservato l’onore di essere chiamato a rappresentare l’Italia alla firma dell’armistizio di Pannujon che pose fine a quel conflitto. Durante la rivolta del Katanga del 1960, l’Ospedale da campo n° 010 del Corpo Militare della Croce Rossa Italiana fornì l’assistenza sanitaria al Contingente ONU operante in Congo. In riconoscimento del sacrificio, fu concessa la Medaglia d’oro al Valor Militare, alla memoria del caporale C.R.I. Raffaele Soru, trucidato nel corso del sanguinoso conflitto. Dal 1996 il Corpo Militare ha operato a supporto sanitario del Ministero della Difesa durante l’operazione IFOR 1996, mediante l’impiego sul territorio italiano di autoambulanze per il trasporto di malati e feriti e nei Balcani impiegando personale specializzato (medico e logistico), nella missione in Bosnia (SFOR-1997), con inquadramento nel battaglione genio ferrovieri dislocato a Tuzla; ha operato inoltre con un consistente concorso sanitario nella missione Arcobaleno in Albania (1999), richiesto dallo Stato Maggiore della Difesa – Difesa civile, tramite lo spiegamento e la gestione di una serie di formazioni sanitarie in Kukes ed in Kavaje (da marzo ad agosto 1999) per fronteggiare la drammatica fuga della popolazione kosovara a seguito delle ritorsioni della Serbia. Dal 1999 al 2003 ha fornito un supporto operativo ed organizzativo al progetto sanitario bilaterale della Croce Rossa italiana e del Comitato internazionale della Croce

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Rossa (ICRC) a favore della popolazione in Kosovo, per la ristrutturazione e l’allestimento di diversi ambulatori e l’assistenza sanitaria presso Pec/Peje (da gennaio 2000 a febbraio 2003). Dal 2001 al 2003, sempre in Kosovo, ha fornito un concorso al Ministero della Difesa attraverso l’impiego, di medici specialisti presso il reparto di sanità inquadrato nelle forze KFOR e dislocato in Pec. Da novembre 2000, ha operato a supporto del Ministero della Difesa con personale Sanitario aggregato al contingente militare italiano in Eritrea ed Etiopia nel Corso della Missione ONU, denominata U.N.M.E.E. (United Nation Mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia), dedicandosi inoltre all’organizzazione di ambulatori rivolti alla popolazione locale, organizzati dal personale militare di Croce Rossa in collaborazione con i militari delle altre Forze Armate italiane del Contingente, nelle sedi degli Ordini Religiosi Missionari in Asmara, in altre località dell’Eritrea e presso l’Ambasciata d’Italia , con un ambulatorio settimanale rivolto all’assistenza sanitaria degli Ascari ex Combattenti del Regio Corpo delle Truppe Coloniali dell’Eritrea. Dal 2003 al 2006 il Corpo Militare CRI ha fornito un consistente contributo in Iraq, sia a Baghdad, dove la Croce Rossa Italiana ha schierato su richiesta del Ministero degli Esteri un ospedale da campo a favore della popolazione civile, sia a Nassiriyah, dove ha fornito una serie di concorsi alle Forze Armate italiane nell’ambito dell’Operazione militare “Antica Babilonia”. In 1.215 giorni di permanenza in teatro operativo iracheno sono stati impegnati per le esigenze dell’Operazione Antica Babilonia 1.054 tra Ufficiali, Sottufficiali e militari di truppa del Corpo Militare CRI e 265 Infermiere Volontarie CRI. Con una presenza media di circa 50 militari CRI, si sono avvicendati 246 medici, 245 infermieri, 46 tecnici sanitari e 517 tra logisti e addetti alle funzioni di comando e di sala operativa. E’ stato il più consistente impiego del Corpo Militare dal dopoguerra. Al contingente militare italiano (Joint Task Force – Iraq), inquadrato nella Divisione a guida Inglese, sono state assicurati un Nucleo Sanitario con funzione di Role 1+ dedicato al Comando del Contingente, un Nucleo Chirurgico e Terapia Intensiva integrato nell’ospedale da campo Role 2+ della Sanità dell’Esercito, un dispositivo sanitario di emergenza con ambulanze tattiche e con un Major Incident Team con il compito di assicurare una risposta rapida ed efficiente in tutta l’area di responsabilità del contingente italiano. Ulteriori medici specialisti sono stati richiesti per il completamento degli assetti sanitari dell’ospedale da campo e della Sala Operativa Centrale del contingente. Dal 2003, negli Emirati Arabi Uniti, il Corpo Militare CRI è presente con personale medico specializzato in anestesia e rianimazione per il completamento degli assetti sanitari dell’Aeromedical Staging Unit dell’Aeronautica Militare italiana, con il compito di assicurare un team per gli sgomberi sanitari dai teatri operativi iracheni (fino al 2006) e afghani. Dal mese di ottobre 2010 l’assetto ASEU è stato incrementato con due infermieri professionali militari CRI. Dal 16 aprile del 2008, in Afghanistan, il Corpo Militare CRI fornisce, su richiesta del Comando Operativo di vertice Interforze del Ministero della Difesa fornisce un team specialistico AeroMedical Evacuation Team), impiegando oggi due medici e due

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infermieri per le evacuazioni tattiche nel difficile teatro operativo afghano e per il controllo delle acque destinate al contingente. Oltre ai concorsi forniti in situazioni di conflitto o di grave crisi internazionale, il Corpo Militare CRI è stato impegnato anche in occasione di numerose emergenze venutesi a creare a seguito di catastrofi, sia sul territorio nazionale che all’estero. Moltissimi sono stati i contributi forniti sul territorio nazionale in occasione di terremoti, alluvioni ed epidemie (tifo, colera, ecc) che hanno coinvolto la popolazione civile dalla data di nascita del Corpo Militare fino alla fine del XX secolo. Anche nel nuovo secolo gli interventi in Italia ed all’estero sono significativi. Nel solo 2005 sono stati forniti contributi sia in occasione dello Tsunami che ha colpito il Sud-Est asiatico che in occasione del terremoto che ha colpito il Pakistan.

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Formosa MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group): Army Building in a Cold War Hotspot Eric SETZEKORN

hroughout the Cold War period, a key node of the U.S. presence in East Asia was the sustained military partnership with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. During the early Cold War period, Taiwan offered a variety of military opportunities, in terms of foreign military cooperation and strategic basing options, to aid U.S. global strategies but utilizing these possibilities required an organizational mechanism to develop ROC military capabilities. From 1950-1955, the Formosa-Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was critical in the transformation of the ROC military on Taiwan from a group of demoralized refugees into a professional military force, and helped establish a pattern of American MAAG programs throughout Asia. The historical study of Formosa MAAG highlights two key issues during the Cold War era: developing military capability in allied nations and the limited ability to change the political behavior of foreign partners. After the collapse of the ROC military during 1948 and 1949 and its retreat to Taiwan, the United States was faced with the unenviable choice of supporting a government that appeared to have little political competence or acquiescing to a Communist dominated China. Elements of the American military, particularly the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), sought to aid ROC forces on Taiwan through large-scale transfers of equipment, training and logistical support. The Truman administration and the State Department strongly opposed continued support for the ROC and in January 1950, President Truman suspended military aid to the ROC which had been allocated under the China Aid Act of 1948.1 Only after the North Korean invasion of South Korea on 24 June 1950 did American policy shift to support for the ROC government on Taiwan. On 27 June 1950, Truman ordered the U.S. 7th Fleet to prevent any attack on Taiwan and also prevent ROC attacks on China. To develop ROC military capabilities, Formosa MAAG was established under the command of Major General William Chase. Initial strength for the group was set at 116 officers and men, but with the expectation that future expansion would bring the final strength up to 400-500 advisors.2 Formosa MAAG operated under a set of assumptions that the objective of the MAAG was not to create a ROC military capable of offensive action and that American support would focus on areas of funding, equipment

1 Joseph Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem of United States Foreign Policy. (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952), p. 139.; New York Times. Truman Bars Military Help for Defense of Formosa; British End Nationalist Tie. Jan 6, 1950, p. 1. 2 Joseph Ballantine, Formosa: A Problem of United States Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1952), p. 142.

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and transportation where the ROC military was deficient in supporting itself.3 Throughout the early years of MAAG on Taiwan, Americans benefitted from the support of a group of ROC officers who shared their aspirations for the ROC Army. Sun Lijen’s excellent English skills and reputation as a competent commander in the Burma campaign under Stilwell endeared him to American MAAG officers.4 Sun had no strong political ties to the KMT Party or many of the older Generals and Sun, together with many younger and professional officers, stood to gain in power and influence from American plans to increase the combat effectiveness of the ROC Army. Reform through Education Early in the MAAG program, it was decided that a large portion of the American assistance effort would be devoted towards developing a comprehensive, Americantype military school system. General Chase fully supported a heavy emphasis on officer education rather than soldier training, “the more professionally qualified their senior officers are, the more chance of success they have.”5 Drawing on General Chase’s affinity for formal schooling and building from the framework of ROC military schools developed in 1947-1949, a large percentage of American MAAG personnel were assigned to military schools. With MAAG assistance the number of schools was more than doubled, eventually including thirty-eight separate institutions offering nearly four hundred courses.6 The crown jewels in this pedagogical network were the senior officer Colleges: the National War College, Armed Forces Staff College and the Command and General Staff College, all of which were established in 1952. Below these graduate level schools was a large network of officer training programs, with branch schools for armor, infantry, air defense etc., providing the main location for officer exposure to sophisticated equipment and tactics. MAAG’s interest in ROC military schools even extended to assigning an U.S. Army Bandmaster to establish an ROC military band school.7 Supplementing these schools was an extensive program of overseas study with thousands of ROC military personnel, the majority of whom were officers attending civilian and military schools in the United States.8 MAAG officers assigned to ROC military schools tried to remain in the background if possible and let qualified ROC personnel conduct direct training. American advisors 3 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (Lawton), April 17, 1951. Pp. 1634-1635 4 New York Times. Appraisal of Formosa: Chiang’s Island Has Big Potential Power But it Must be Developed and Directed. Hanson Baldwin. April 2, 1951, p. 4.; William Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of William C. Chase, (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 171. 5 Selected Executive Session Hearings of the Committee 1951-56. Mutual Security Program, Part 2. U.S. House of Representatives, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1980. Pp. 574. 6 Ministry of Nation Defense . MAAG’s Decade in the Republic of China. May 1, 1961. Taipei: Ministry of National Defense, Pp. 18.; Headquarters, Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan. Subject: RevisionCountry Statement on MAP, Non-NATO Countries, 10 August 1957, p. 8. 7 Stars and Stripes Pacific Edition. An Army Man of Note: Mr. Music Maker. April 7, 1956, p. 24. 8 William Chou, “MAAG—Saga of Service,” Taiwan Review. June 6, 1966. Pp. 2

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focused their efforts on “training the trainers” and to allow Chinese instructors to be seen as independent, which was believed to be important for morale and in keeping with concerns that MAAG personnel not be seen as a separate chain of command within the ROC military.9 The assignment of large numbers of MAAG officers to widely dispersed military schools, many of which were in the southern part of the island, also had a political purpose in removing American officers from political intrigues in Taipei and avoiding a concentration of American personnel in the capital, which might give the appearance it was an “occupied” town.10 MAAG Opposition to Political Officers Dating back to American efforts to improve the performance of Chinese Army units during WWII, there had been friction surrounding the role of “political officers” within Chinese units. American officers felt that political officers were a form of political interference by the KMT in military operations and a potentially dangerous division of command authority. Chinese political leaders argued that American’s “did not sufficiently understand” the need for ideological conformity and political surveillance within the ROC Army.11 After the collapse of the ROC armies in 1948 and 1949, many KMT Party members, including Chiang Kai-shek, felt that the elimination of the political officers from the ROC Army resulted in decreased cohesion, lowered morale and allowed Communist subversion within military units. In one of the first meetings between General Chase and Chiang Kai-shek, political officers emerged as an area of sharp disagreement. In General Chase’s initial survey of ROC military units, conducted immediately after he arrived on Taiwan, he noted that, “There is, throughout the Armed Forces, a highly objectionable system of Political Commissars, that acts to penalize initiative and undermine the authority of commanders of all echelons.”12 Chase’s use of the term “political commissars,” rather than the Chiang and the U.S. State Department’s favored usage of “political officers” is reflective of underlying negative associations of a Soviet style system of political monitoring of the armed forces. In addition to American military concerns about the erosion of a commanders authority, American government officials were also skeptical of the political officer system because it was perceived to be part of a broader secret police system responsible not to the government of the ROC but the KMT party and Chiang family.13 9 Charles Barber, “Military Assistance Advisory Group Formosa,” Military Review 34:9 (December 1954). Pp.54. 10 U.S. State Department Confidential Files, Formosa-Republic of China, 1950-1954. (Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986).; Telegram: From: Taipei (Rankin) To: Secretary of State June 15, 1951. Reel 5. Secret. 11 Goufangbu zong zhengzhi bu, Guojun zhenggong shigao, (Taipei: Guojun zhenggong shibian, 1960), p. 1499. 12 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Charge in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State, July 6, 1951. Pp. 1730-1732 13 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Chinese Economic Affairs (Barnett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk). October 3, 1951. Pp. 1816-1827. Pp. 1820.

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Rather than cooperate with the political officers, MAAG sought to limit the role of political officers and gradually isolate them within the military organization. American officers resisted assigning an advisor to the Political Department and eventually assigned a token one officer from the several hundred on Taiwan to serve as a liaison.14 MAAG also devoted no resources to assist the Political Department, in spite of the large amount of American funding available. Within military units, American MAAG officers encouraged regular Chinese military officers to fill most of the functions that political officers were assigned to, such as promoting morale through sporting activities, presenting lectures, or helping soldiers with personal concerns such as moving their families after re-assignments.15 The close partnership between the U.S. MAAG program and the ROC military became increasingly constrained by political developments during 1954. In late 1954, MAAG lost its main partner within the ROC Army because General Sun Lijen was removed from his command position and given the empty title of military advisor to Chiang Kaishek. During his period of leadership from 1950-1954, Sun had supported MAAG in opposing the political officers inclusion in the ROC military. By 1954, Chiang’s Political Department had also strengthened its position within the ROC military by installing over 10,000 political officers in all units of the ROC military.16 As a result of continued intransigence by senior Chinese leaders, especially Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the loss of MAAG’s main Chinese ally, Sun Lijen, and MAAG desperation, American military policy changed from isolation of political officers to an attempt to moderate their influence through education. In the words of General Chase, “We could not whip it, so we joined it.”17 This represented a clear defeat for MAAG and highlighted decreasing political influence. Further diminishment of the MAAG influence continued in 1955 with the signing of the Sino-American mutual defense treaty. The treaty stipulated that the United States had a formal obligation to defend Taiwan from attack. This treaty removed much of the urgency from ROC military reform efforts because it could now rely on American military power, including nuclear weapons, to defend its territory. With increased military security, Chiang Ching-kuo was able to move against the ROC’s most effective military officer, Sun Lijen, who was consigned to house arrest for thirty-three years. Lastly, in June 1955 General Chase retired from U.S. Army active duty.18 After the 14 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. The Charge in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State. December 11, 1951. Pp. 1866. 15 FRUS, 1951, Volume VII. Memorandum by the Chief of the Navy Section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Beyerly) to the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Formosa (Chase). November 9, 1951. Pp. 1868 16 U.S. State Department Confidential Files, Formosa-Republic of China, 1950-1954. Frederick: University Publications of America, 1986.; Memorandum for Record: From Advisor to General Political Department, NGRC to K. Rankin (Ambassador) Subject: MAAG Personnel for General Political Department. Aug 1, 1953. Confidential. Reel 4, p. 6. 17 William Chase, Front Line General: The Commands of William C. Chase, (Houston: Pacesetter Press, 1975), p. 181. 18 Chicago Tribune, “Report: Gen. Chase Will Retire as Head of MAAG,” Jun 19, 1955, p. 9.

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retirement of General Chase, successive MAAG commanders did not radically alter the organization of MAAG and had a much reduced role in political issues. For the remaining years of MAAG Formosa the commanding officer would generally service a shorter term, less than two years, followed by retirement. The historical record of Formosa MAAG offers multiple insights into our understanding of the Cold War in East Asia and American military policy in the 20th Century. First, MAAG personnel invested a majority of their time and American funding in creating a system which took years and sometimes decades to train officers. Second, the painful experience of Formosa MAAG with the ROC political officer system highlights the constraints the Cold War situation imposed on the American military to not pursue substantive short-term reforms which might create temporary military weakness and to instead seek a long-term evolution of military capabilities and structures. During the remaining years of the Cold War, the organizational patterns developed by Formosa MAAG were used in numerous countries, particularly in Asia, with South Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan and South Korea all hosting MAAG programs. The Formosa MAAG strategy of emphasizing long-term programs which might take decades or even a generation to achieve their full effect, was successful in achieving the two American foreign policy goals of creating a competent defensive force in Taiwan and solidifying the ROCâ€™s role as a reliable security partner of the United States.

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The coalition warfare within the United Nations framework, the case of UN Command in Korean War Enrico MAGNANI * Introduction n 15 August 1945, after the Tokyo unconditionally surrendered, US and USSR agreed to disarm the Japanese forces in Korea. The dividing line between the two occupying forces was the 38th Parallel. The Soviet troops entered in North Korea on 22 August 1945, while US forces were in Seoul on 8 September 1945; both countries established military governments in their respective occupied territory. US withdrew its forces three years later and handed over the Korean issue to the UN after the failure of a political agreement with Moscow on a process for restoring a united Korea, on 17 September 1947, while the Soviet forces remained in the Asian peninsula till 1950. The General Assembly established the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to witness the general election for the peninsula. The UNTCOK was denied access to North Korea by USSR and therefore it observed the general election only in South Korea. As a result of the election, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established on 15 August 1948, but North Korea established the DPRK, supported by the Soviet Union and several of its Eastern European allies, in 9 September 1948. The UN General Assembly declared the newly born Government of the Republic of Korea as only lawful government on the Korean peninsula. The General Assembly decided to withdrawn the UNTCOK and replaced it with the UN Commission in Korea (UNCOK), tasked to monitor the withdrawal of both the US and Soviet forces and the increasing tensions between the two Koreas. 1 On 3 November 1950, during the counteroffensive of the UN forces, which crossed the 38th parallel against the North Koreans, the General Assembly replaced the UNCOK

* The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of UN 1 The Colonel Alfred G. Katzin (UK) was the Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General to the UNC and Chairperson of the UNCOK and UNCURK (and later, first ever UN Under Secretary-General); UNCOK and UNTOCK where bodies consisting around 30 individuals, in majority diplomats and a small group of military observers from Member States; Member States of UNCOK where: Australia, Canada, China, El Salvador, France, India, Philippines, Syria, Ukraine (which did not participated in the works of the Commission); the UNCURK Member States where Australia, Chile, the Netherlands, Pakistan Philippines, Thailand and Turkey; it should be noted that was common practice of the UN field operations (as it was for the League of Nations field activities) in the early times, like in the ones in Indonesia/Netherlands East Indies, /Israel/Palestine, India/Pakistan/Kashmir, Greece/Balkans, that not only the military personnel was seconded, but the civilian staff of the bodies dispatched on the field were, in quasi totality, diplomats of the Member States due also to the limited numerical strength of UN regular staff at time; now, the civilian staff on the UN operations (field missions and/or diplomatic missions) is fully formed by Secretariat personnel and/or ad hoc recruited while the uniformed personnel (military and police) is seconded by the Member States;

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with the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), which also liaised between the UN entities in New York and the Unified Command on the ground, like the predecessor body. 2 The Unified Command The invasion of North Korea changed the situation and the crisis raised at the highest level, becoming a major issue of the Security Council. The first resolution, 82 S/1501 25 Jun.1950, which the Security Council passed3, referred to the need for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a withdrawal of North Korean force to the 38th parallel. The second one, the Resolution 83 S/1511 of 27 June recommended “that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area”. This purpose was confirmed in paragraph I of the third resolution, 84 S/1588 of 7 July 1950, which established the Unified Command. While the mandate of the UN Forces was thus clear enough, some controversy did arise as to whether it envisaged the achievement of the objective of reunification by military means. The UN was, in principle, committed to the notion of a unified Korea;4 and General MacArthur clearly thought that the UN forces should not forfeit the military opportunity of reuniting the country. This controversy arose sharply in the context of whether he should cross the Yalu River in order to destroy the sanctuaries of Chinese support for North Korea itself. The majority at the UN General Assembly came to be, especially in the light of military hardship, that the purpose of the UN action was limited to repulsing the attack against South Korea and securing an honourable e peace. Ultimate reunification, however, remained a UN political objective, as several resolutions of General Assembly witness it. The constitutional framework and the political control The constitutional basis of the UN action in Korea has been the subject of much controversy. Argument had centered on two major factors: first, the absence of Soviet Union from the Security Council when the three crucial resolutions of that organ were passed; and, second, and the fact that the UN was de facto engaging on enforcement action without Article 43 of the Charter ever having been implemented. The Unified Command was established at the request of the Security Council, and may thus be seen as a fully agent of the UN. So far, military and strategic authority was exclusively with the US, under whom the Unified Command had been formed. Even in political matters the Unified Command retained very considerable latitude, though here there was a somewhat greater interplay with the UN Secretariat and 2 UNGAR 377 (V) 3 Nov. 1950; P. Londey, Other people’s wars. A history of Australian peacekeeping, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004; pp30-39; UNCURK operated till 1964 3 UNSCR 82 S/1501, 25 June 1950; 4 UNGAR 377 (V) 3 Nov. 1950;

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Secretary-General, Security Council and General Assembly. In the military field the control of the United States government was complete and exclusive; in the political consultations between US, UN and some TCCs the contacts were more frequent, while on occasions the UN made various recommendations. In the final analysis however, a large range of political decisions was taken by the US government alone. According to his book of memories, the Secretary-General Trygve Lie proposed, on 3 July 1950, to set up an ad hoc body, the Committee on Coordination for the Assistance of Korea, which should be composed of the ROK and the TCCs. The Committee would be tasked to coordinate at the highest level the whole UN action in the Asian peninsula and to reinforce the legitimacy of the international action. This suggestion, which apparently found the favour of some Member States, notably UK, France, and Norway (the country of the first Secretary-General), was strongly rejected by the US.5 General MacArthur clearly took the view that the Unified Command had been given a mandate by the UN to run the campaign, and that it was not subject to day-to-day direction from the UN. During a hearing before the US Senate he stated: “my encounter with the United Nations was largely nominal ... I had no direct connection with the United Nations whatsoever”. 6 Once it was established that a subsidiary committee was unacceptable to the US, it became inevitable that political control would effectively lie with the US government, because there was no other UN organ suitable for the task of political directives. This situation necessarily flowed from the Charter intention that collective UN action against a particular state taken by the joint consent of the permanent members. Once the Soviet Union returned to the Security Council, that organ became clearly incapable of discuss it.7 The General Assembly contained representatives of all the Communist states, and was in any event too cumbersome body for such task. As said, the Secretary-General appointed a liaison officer to the UN Command and the US made regular reports to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 6 of UNSCR 84. The US used this practice to provide information, rather than to seek political guidance. Administrative and Military Control The operational control for the action in Korea lay with the United States, in her capacity of UN Command. The proposal for a Unified Command was made in a joint United Kingdom and France draft resolution to the Security Council. The resolution, which was adopted by 7 votes to nil, 3 abstentions and one member absent, provided at the point 3 and 4 respectively: - Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance 5 Trigve Lie, In the cause of peace: seven years with the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1954; 6 Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Forces and Foreign Relations, US Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, pt. 3, page 1937; 7 Bowett D. W., UN forces, a legal study, Praeger, New York, 1964, p. 41;

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pursuant the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to the Unified command under the United States; - Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces; In accordance with this resolution, the US designated General Douglas MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of UN Forces in Korea and he was presented with the UN flag which had been used in Palestine.8 The US issued a communiquĂŠ announcing the establishment of a UN Command. The Unified Command largely coincided, from an operational point of view, with the US Far East Command (with the HQ located in Tokyo). It was composed exclusively of US officers, though they were later joined by a British Commonwealth Deputy Chief of Staff. The appointment of General MacArthur was, under paragraph 4 of resolution S/1588, within the prerogative of the US and not subject to subsequent confirmation by any organ of the UN. Subsequently, when President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his command, the decision was taken without reference to the UN- as was the ensuing appointment of General Mark Clark. At no time was it the habit of the US to do other than inform the UN of changes in command which had been decided upon. The military chain of command ran from (bottom to top) the UN Command to the single US forces armed services Chiefs of Staff, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the US Secretary of Defence, and thence to the President of the United States. Sixteen Members States of the UN, which their offer was accepted by Washington, placed their forces under the operational control of the UN Command.9 Unlike UN operations carried out later on, such as UNEF (in Suez Canal area and Sinai Peninsula), the ONUC (former Belgian Congo), or the UNFICYP (Cyprus island), the selection of the TCCs to participate was not in the hands of the Secretary-General. This responsibility was assigned to the US as lead of the Unified Command. Detailed arrangements for the utilization of assistance offered were made as a result of a network of bilateral discussions between the Unified Command (via the US government) and the TCCs. These discussions were carried out first between the Unified Command and diplomatic and military representatives of the TCCs in Washington, followed by formal military staff conferences both at Washington and in the theatre of operations. The general framework for integration of military assistance was provided in the agreements between the TCCs and the Unified Command. The implementation of the plans was assisted by contacts between the TCCs and 8 UNSC Resolution 84 authorized the use of the UN flag concurrently with the flags of the participating UNC nations; 9 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, UK. Sweden, Norway, and Italy (at time not part of the UN), provided medical units; Denmark provided a hospital ship. Bolivia, China (Taiwan), Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Panama offered troops and support. The military assistance was deferred and in some cases the logistic support was accepted; other States (Member and not Members) as well as Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Ecuador, Iceland, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Uruguay, Vietnam and Venezuela provided transportation, medical supplies, food, funds and other miscellaneous supplies;

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advisory groups, mission, military attaches, and/or other US entities stationed in the TCCs. After the arrival of the contingent in the operational area, the contingent came under the full operational control of the Unified Command. One of the most important problems in connection with the integration of national units concerned command relationships in the theatre. In Korea, all units provided to the Unified Command were attached to one of the major organizations previously designated as components of the Command: Army, Navy or Air Force. The ground forces of the various contributing members of the UN were thus incorporated as units into divisions of the US 8th Army and were under the command of a US officer, except that, after 27 July 1950 all British, Australians, Canadians, New Zealanders and Indians ground assets assigned to the UNC, were combined into an ad hoc established unit, 1st Commonwealth Division.10 All naval and air assets from TCCs were similarly attached to the 7th Fleet and Far East Air Force/5th Air Force, respectively. All the non-US forces within the UN Command operated fully integrated within major US units and received orders form the US HQs. It may also be noted that the forces in Korea from a non-Member State of the United Nations (as was the case of Italy, which dispatched a MASH for the military component of national Red Cross) were incorporated into US forces units, as well was for the South Koreans (grouped at divisional level). The channel used by the US for keeping contributing members informed of military developments was the Committee of Sixteen in Washington. This Committee was composed of the Washington-based diplomatic representatives of the TCCs, but South Korea was not part of the Committee. The Committee was used exclusively to relay information to the TCCs and not for prior consultation on the conduct of operations or decision-making for the negotiations with the other side. It will be seen, therefore, that in military and operational terms, control was firmly in the hands of the US. However, the parties involved clearly regarded the US as the agent of the UN and the action in which they were engaged as a UN action. The TCCs governments used the term ‘United Nations Command’ when communicating with it; the agreements between them and the US employed the same term; and UN resolutions (Security Council and/or General Assembly) referred either to UN Forces or to the UN Command. The US dominance over the UNC actions and policies was witnessed also in the negotiations phase, when was established the UNC-MAC (UNC Military Armistice Commission), and in the choice of the States of the two bodies which followed the end of the hostilities, NNRC and NNSC.11

10 Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study, Manchester University Press, 1988; 11 UNC chooses for its own side Sweden and Switzerland while North Koreans and Chinese Volunteers, Poland and Czechoslovakia as members of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and Neutral Nations Supervision Commission; UNC, North Korea and Chinese Volunteers co-designated India as Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission;

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Conclusion The UN Command derives its legitimacy from the United Nations Security Council resolutions with the original purpose to provide a command structure for multinational operations against the communist invasion. The Armistice Agreement signed in 1953 in Panmunjom by the Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command stopped the armed conflict and has provided a way to manage the crisis effectively for over 50 years. North Korea realized that the UNC prevents her attempt of reunification by force and imposes a heavy burden, politically and militarily, to Pyongyang, which tried repeatedly to dissolve it and replace the Armistice Agreement with a bilateral US-North Korea Peace Agreement. However, the UN Command, which saw recently enlarging again its membership with the renewed accession of Member States which were excluded for years, like South Africa in 2010,12 continues to provide an effective mechanism to maintain the framework for multinational operations. It is a valuable instrument not only for the current political situation but also for the future security environment in NorthEast Asia. Until the conclusion of a stable peace agreement, the UN Command will continue to be essential to the peace in the region. Legenda DPRK - Democratic People’s Republic of Korea MASH – Mobile Army Surgical Hospital NNRC – Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission NNSC – Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission ONUC - Operations des Nations unies au Congo ROK - Republic of Korea TCC/TCCs - Troops Contributing Country/Countries UNC – United Nations Command UNCOK - United Nations Commission in Korea UNCURK – United Nations Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea UNEF – United Nations Emergency Force UNFICYP – United Nations Force in Cyprus UNTCOK – United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea Bibliography consulted The Security Council. Working Methods Handbook, United Nations, New York, 2012; US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations - The United States and the Korea Problem: Documents, 1941-51, USGPO, Washington DC, 1953; C. Felici, Korean War, 60 years later, Di Virgilio Publishing, Rome, 2010; D. W. Bowett, UN forces, a legal study, Praeger New York, 1964; J. Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1988; P. Londey, Other people’s wars. A history of Australian peacekeeping, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2004; R. Higgins, United Nations peacekeeping 1946-1967, documents and commentary, II Asia, Oxford University Press , London, 1970; 12 Stars and Stripes, South Africa joins United Nations Command in Korea, 23.11.2010.

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T. Lie, In the Cause of Peace: Seven Years with the United Nations, Macmillan, London, 1954; W. Dorn, The evolution of peacekeeping: early UN observer missions (1946-56), Canadian Forces Staff College, Toronto, Ontario, 13 Apr. 2011; United Nations documents consulted General Assembly Resolutions UNGAR 377 (V) 3 Nov. 1950 UNGAR 384 (V) 14 Dec. 1950 UNGAR 498 (V) 1 Feb. 1951 UNGAR 500 (V) 18 May 1951 UNGAR 610 (VII) 3 Dec. 1952 UNGAR 705 (VII) 18 Apr. 1953 UNGAR 711 (VII) 28 Aug. 1953 Security Council Resolutions UNSCR 82 S/1501 25 Jun.1950 UNSCR 83 S/1511 27 Jun. 1950 UNSCR 84 S/1588 7 Jul. 1950 Letters to the Security Council President - Communications of USA on the UN Command 1st report S/1626 25 Jul. 1950 2nd report S/1694 17 Aug. 1950 3rd report S/1756 2 Sept. 1950 4th report S/1829 1 Oct. 1950 5th report S/1834 5 Oct. 1950 6th report S/1860 21 Oct. 1950 7th report S/1883 3 Nov. 1950 8th report S/1885 6 Nov. 1950 9th, 10th report S/1953 28 Dec. 1950 11th report S/1996 31 Jan. 1951 12th, 13th, 14th report S/2021 24 Feb. 1951 15th, 16th report S/2053 26 Mar. 1951 17th report S/2096 18 Apr. 1951 18th report S/2107 26 Apr. 1951 19th report S/2156 18 May 1951 20th report S/2170 25 May 1951 21st report S/2204 19 Jun. 1951 22nd report S/2217 28 June 1951 23rd report S/2246 16 Jul. 1951 24th report S/2265 28 Jul. 1951 25th report S/2277 3 Aug. 1951 26th report S/2333 10 Sept. 1951 27th report S/2377 16 Oct. 1951 28th report S/2408 13 Nov.1951 29th report S/2410 29 Nov. 1951 30th report S/2412 15 Nov. 1951 31st report S/2432 7 Dec. 1951 32nd report S/2469 7 Jan. 1952 33rd, 34th report S/2507 31 Jan. 1952

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35th report S/2514 7 Feb. 1952 36th report S/2541 27 Feb. 1952 37th report S/2550 6 Mar. 1952 38th report S/2593 10 Apr.1952 39th report S/2605 16 Apr. 1952 40th report S/2619 30 Apr. 1952 41st report S/2629 9 May 1952 42nd, 43rd report S/2662 13 Jun. 1952 44th report S/2700 14 Jul. 1952 45th report S/2715 23 Jul. 1952 46th report S/2768 9 Sept. 1952 47th report S/2774 15 Sept. 1952 48th report S/2789 25 Sept. 1952 49th report S/2805 9 Oct. 1952 50th report S/2835 4 Nov. 1952 51st report S/2836 5 Nov. 1952 52nd report S/2837 5 Nov. 1952 53rd report S/2875 & Corr. 1 19 Dec. 1952 54th report S/2897 6 Jan. 1953 55th report S/2898 6 Jan. 1953 56th report S/2920 30 Jan. 1953 57th report S/2970 30 Mar. 1953 58th report S/2971 30 Mar. 1953 59th report S/2972 30 Mar. 1953 60th report S/2982 3 Apr. 1953 61st report S/2991 16 Apr. 1953 62nd report S/2999 27 Apr. 1953 63rd report S/3017 22 May 1953 64th report S/3037 & Corr. 1. 18 June 1953 65th report S13038 18 Jun. 1953 66th report S/3070 24 July 1953 67th report S/3084 20 Aug. 1953 68th report S/3090 1 Sept. 1953 69th report S/3091 1 Sept. 1953 70th report S/3096 11 Sept. 1953 71st report S/3117 19 Oct. 1953 72nd report S/3132 30 Oct. 1953 73rd report S/3133 30 Oct. 1953 74th report S/3143 23 Nov. 1953 75th report S/3148 3 Dec. 1953

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Learning to project power in an era of declining access: joint forces, expeditionary operations and the Royal Navy, 1956-1982 Ian Speller

his paper examines the way in which the British Royal Navy sought to exploit the reach and flexibility of joint expeditionary forces in order to meet the needs of foreign and defence policy beyond Europe in the period from 1956 to 1982. It focuses particularly on the navy’s concept of a Joint Services Seaborne Force (JSSF), which was developed in the 1960s, and it discusses the reaction of the other services to this new approach. It will allude to a number of expeditionary operations that were undertaken by the British in this period but, unfortunately, there is not enough space to allow us to examine these operations in detail.1 The 2007 US Maritime Strategy argued that we are entering an ‘era of declining access’ where third-parties will be reluctant to offer bases and transit rights to western forces and where western governments will be reluctant to see their troops based on foreign soil where their presence could engender a hostile response and where they are vulnerable to guerrilla and terrorist attack.2 The same point is repeated in more recent US policy statements and is also reflected in the calculations of a number of other navies. Nations, and navies, it seems, will need to find new ways of projecting their power and influence overseas. Maintaining a footprint on foreign soil may not always be an option and, even where it is, it may come at a prohibitive cost.3 This is not an unprecedented development. The British faced a similar problem in the 1950s and 1960s. Decolonisation and a growth of nationalist sentiment in Africa and Asia threatened to deprive Britain of the string of overseas bases on which its military policy had previously been based while, simultaneously, there was an appreciation that the European withdrawal from empire and Cold War rivalry made instability in these areas more likely. In the first years of the Cold War British defence policy had focused on the threat of a major war in Europe and the Royal Navy was preoccupied with the challenge of securing sea control in an anticipated third Battle of the Atlantic, this time fighting the Soviets rather than the Germans. By the mid-1950s British planners began to appreciate 1 This paper is based on a shorter work previously published as Ian Speller, ‘Inter-service rivalry: British defence policy, 1956-69’ in Royal United Services Institute: History and Policy Series, Spring 2010. 2 A Co-operative Strategy for the Twenty-First Century, October 2007. Available online at http://www.navy. mil/maritime/Maritimestrategy.pdf 3 For example see the US Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (2012), the US Joint Operational Access Concept (2012), or the Australian Defence Force, Future Maritime Operating Concept -2025. Maritime Force Projection and Control.

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that the emerging nuclear stalemate made a major war against the Soviet Union unlikely and any war that did occur was likely to result in a nuclear exchange at an early stage. In such circumstances there was little point in maintaining the conventional forces required to fight a long war but there was both a need and an opportunity to deal with instability overseas.4 The result was a growing interest in mobile and flexible forces able to deal with unforeseen crises beyond Europe, particularly in the area ‘east of Suez’ where Britain retained residual interests and responsibilities.5 This process received a significant boost after the 1956 Suez crisis demonstrated the weakness of Britain’s existing expeditionary capabilities. In the years after Suez there was a notable emphasis on the development of such forces and also on increasing joint co-operation. In the aftermath of the Second World War British imperial defence had basically reverted to its pre-war form built around a global system of bases and garrisons held together by sea and air communications. The system worked tolerably well insofar as it enabled Britain to maintain access to and control of its overseas possessions at a reasonable cost, but it did have major short comings and these were becoming more apparent by the mid-1950s.6 Bases were of limited utility without credible mobile forces able to operate from them. During the Abadan crisis in 1951 the absence of any significant expeditionary capability badly undermined British military planning.7 Five years later, during the Suez crisis, the military were unable to provide useful options until months had passed, by which time the options were not useful anymore. Operation Musketeer in November 1956 showed up the danger of relying too much on static bases that were either too distant (Malta), under-developed (Cyprus) or unavailable for political reasons (Libya, Jordan and Sri Lanka). The ponderous conduct of Musketeer further demonstrated deficiencies in Britain’s expeditionary capabilities and made a material contribution to the political collapse that occurred back in London.8 The history of the Suez base provided ample testimony to the political difficulties inherent in maintaining bases on non-sovereign territory. It was significant that Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal only days after the last British troops vacated a base that had become untenable in the face of opposition from the host nation. In the aftermath of the crisis Britain was to lose access to important facilities in Jordan, Iraq and Sri Lanka, further underlining the difficulty of relying on bases in foreign lands, while the 4 See UK National Archives (UKNA) DEFE 5/59. COS (55) 176, 25 July 1955. 5 ‘East of Suez’ was a term used to refer to the Asia-Pacific region in general, and particularly to the Indian Ocean littoral, the Persian Gulf, South East Asia and Hong Kong, areas where Britain retained major defence commitments. 6 For an overview of British policy see Phillip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-1968, (1973). Also see Jeffrey Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez. The Politics of Retrenchment, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998) and Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez. The Choice between Europe and the World, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) 7 See ‘A Splutter of Musketry. The British Military Response to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, 1951’ in Contemporary British History, Vol. 17, Issue 1, Spring 2003, pp. 39-66. 8 For further reading on the Suez Crisis see Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East, (2002) and Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez. The Double War, (1979).

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progressive withdrawal from empire reduced options further. This did not stop heavy investment in major new bases in Kenya and then Aden, the former vacated in 1964 even before it was complete and the later evacuated in 1967 as Britain abandoned Aden to insurgency. Overseas bases were becoming a real problem for the British. To make matters worse, host nation support was not even guaranteed in cases where the host depended on British support for their defence. In 1961, during the Kuwait crisis, British policy was hampered by the refusal of the Emir to allow British forces to be based permanently on his soil. To have done so would have undermined the legitimacy of his rule. In the face of an apparent threat of Iraqi invasion Britain initiated Operation Vantage and deployed to Kuwait a reinforced brigade group, but London was aware of the need to withdraw this force at the first opportunity. They were replaced rapidly by Arab League troops that were less capable but more acceptable politically. That crisis also highlighted the danger of third parties closing their airspace to military flights and without the maritime contribution, unencumbered by such considerations, the early stages of Operation Vantage would have been a shambles.9 Indeed, during Vantage the only troops that arrived on time, ready to fight, with all of their equipment and transport, were those that came by sea. Unlike their sea based equivalent, the arrival of air transported troops depended on the agreement of neighbouring countries, whose air space they had to cross. They also needed a secure airport at which to land, providing the Iraqis with an obvious, static and largely undefended target which, if destroyed, would have scuppered the entire plan. As it was the air plan was badly disrupted by the temporary refusal of Turkey and Sudan to allow over-flight of their territory which, in conjunction with the existing ‘air barrier’ presented by the refusal of Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia to allow British military flights over their territory, made the air lift of troops to Kuwait extremely problematic. Even when these problems had been overcome airlifted troops arrived in non-tactical formation and without key equipment, suffered disproportionately from heat exhaustion and were so short of tactical transport that an Army study concluded that they were fit for nothing more than a static defence.10 The negative impact of maintaining a footprint on foreign soil was reinforced numerous times. For example, in January 1964 President Nyerere of Tanganyika requested British assistance in the face of an army mutiny. The response was immediate and effective. Royal Marines from No.45 Commando were landed by helicopters from the aircraft carrier HMS Centaur and restored order with minimum loss of life. It is noteworthy that, while British forces intervened at the behest of the legitimate government and were initially welcomed by the general population, as the weeks passed their presence began to excite negative comment. London was well attuned to this and the marines soon withdrew to poise out of sight offshore in amphibious shipping. At sea they provided a 9 See Ian Speller, ‘Naval Diplomacy. Operation Vantage, 1961’ in Ian Speller (ed), The Royal Navy and Maritime Power in the Twentieth Century, (2005) pp.164-180. 10 For further details see Ian Speller, ‘The Seaborne/Airborne Concept: Littoral manoeuvre in the 1960s?’ in Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 Feb. 2006 pp.53-92.

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capable force in readiness without offending local sensibilities.11 The simple fact of the matter was that few people welcomed foreign troops on their soil even when such troops were there to help. They were also unlikely to want to become drawn into a crisis by offering transit rights. The problem for Britain was to find a means of projecting power and influence overseas with a reduced emphasis on bases in and over-flight of other countries. In response to this the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force (RAF) were to develop rather different solutions. The Royal Navy developed a concept for mobile and flexible maritime task forces capable of landing a full brigade group and all of the logistic support to sustain it in combat against modern opposition. Described by the Navy as the Joint Services Seaborne Force (JSSF), the concept was designed to cater for operations against ‘moderate opposition’, but did not envisage assault landings against heavily defended beaches. It was designed to reduce dependence on overseas bases, anticipating a time when Britain might have access to only one major base east of Suez, probably in Australia.12 In this respect it reflected government policy. The 1962 Defence White Paper emphasised the need to insure against the future loss of bases by increasing the strategic mobility of British forces.13 The concept was overtly joint. While the Royal Marines were to supply the amphibious spearhead of the JSSF the Army would provide support and follow-on forces. The Navy’s new amphibious ships (HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid) were designed specifically so that they could embark the full range of Army equipment. Aircraft carriers would provide mobile air defence and close air support for the embarked force while land based RAF aircraft would offer additional support and long range strike capabilities when within range and RAF transport aircraft would bring reinforcements into theatre once secure reception facilities were available.14 In order to create synergies between air and maritime forces in the expeditionary role a new concept of operations was required. The result was the seaborne/airborne/ land concept developed, after tri-service consultation, in 1959/60.15 The concept was eventually incorporated into the first Manual of Joint Warfare in 1965.16 This was matched by institutional developments, notably with the establishment of a Joint Warfare Committee, Joint Warfare Staff and Joint Warfare Establishment to develop 11 Captain Steiner, Report to Flag Officer Middle East, UKNA ADM 1/29063. 45 Commando Royal Marines, Preliminary Report on Operations in Tanganyika, Feb. 1964, UKNA ADM 29063. Report on the Activities of 41 Commando Royal Marines, 1 Jan. 1964 – 10 April 1964, UKNA ADM 202/510. Lt-Col Stephens, ‘A Joint Operation in Tanganyika’, RUSI Journal, 637, February 1965. 12 For example, see ‘Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme’, 17 May 1961, UKNA ADM 205/192. For further details see Ian Speller, ‘The Royal Navy, expeditionary operations and the end of empire, 1956-1975’ in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez, 1900-2000: influences and actions, (2005) chapter 8. 13 Statement on Defence 1962: the Next Five Years, Cmnd.1639. 14 See UKNA ADM 1/29638. ADM 205,192, ‘Presentation of Alternative Long Term Naval Programme’, 17 May 1961. 15 UKNA DEFE 2/2074. COS (61) 180, Seaborne/Airborne/Land concept, 8 June 1961, UKNA DEFE 5/114 16 Manual of Joint Warfare, Vol1, UKNA DEFE 73/1.

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policy and promote training and experimentation.17 In 1959 the first unified (i.e. joint) overseas command had been created at Aden (Middle East Command), followed in 1961 and 1963 by Near East Command (Cyprus) and Far East Command (Singapore). The Ministry of Defence was also undergoing change, strengthening its central powers at the expense of the individual Service Ministries under the reforms supported by Admiral Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff. In stressing the joint credentials of the JSSF the Royal Navy tapped into an issue of growing prominence in British thinking. The Navy’s new concept does not appear to have worried the Army too much. The main concern of the War Office, busy adjusting to the shift to voluntary recruitment, was to protect historic regiments from the axe. Their periodic interest in the amphibious role is best explained in this context and the expansion of Royal Marine Commandos to five active units was viewed with jealousy and alarm. The Admiralty had to fend off Army attempts to take over the role of one or more commandos and also to take command of the Commando Brigade. Some within the ‘dark-blue’ element of the Naval Service recognised that the marines could be sacrificed in order to buy Army support for the JSSF but little came of this. The Royal Marines’ expertise in expeditionary warfare was too obvious an asset to be given up lightly.18 To say that the concept caused a heated reaction from the RAF would be an understatement. The RAF’s concept of operations east of Suez was radically different. The latter focused on balanced forces able to deal with moderate opposition, with a reduced reliance on overseas bases. The RAF developed an alternative concept built around strategic air transport and the delivery of long-range fires from a series of as yet undeveloped bases in the region. Their approach required more bases overseas than already existed. They saw little need for sophisticated amphibious forces and no need for large aircraft carriers. Focusing on a much lower level of potential opposition than did the Navy, intervention without ‘red carpet’ reception facilities was reliant on airborne forces operating up to 1,000 miles from the mounting base. In operations at such ranges, and in the absence of aircraft carriers, dismissed as expensive, vulnerable and unnecessary, air superiority would be achieved by pre-emptive air strikes and fighter aircraft could be flown forward once (if) an airfield was secured.19 Opposition to the Navy’s plans to construct new aircraft carriers lay at the heart of this scheme and this reflected a longstanding, almost reflexive opposition to such vessels. The RAF were willing to countenance small ships, somewhat akin to the later Invincible class but they virulently opposed anything that might challenge their role as the main providers of strike aircraft overseas. The loss of the nuclear bomber role to the Navy’s submarines did not encourage them to compromise on this issue. The RAF showed no

17 COS (62) 12, Seaborne/Airborne/Land Operations, 4 Jan 1962 and COS (62) 84, Joint Warfare Sun-Committees and Joint Warfare staff, 28 Feb 1962, UKNA DEFE 5/123. COS 365/63, Joint Warfare Committee – Terms of Reference, 8 Nov. 1963, UKNA DEFE 5/144. COS (62) 426, Joint Warfare training and development, 31 Oct 1962, UKNA DEFE 5/131. COS (62) 68 mtg, 20 Oct 1962, UKNA DEFE 4/148.. 18 For example see UKNA DEFE 7/1681, ADM 202/185, ADM 205/191 and ADM 201/135. 19 UKNA AIR 8/2354 and AIR 20/11423.

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real interest in accepting the Admiralty’s offer of partnership in the expeditionary role.20 Even as the services laid plans for an expeditionary future the pressure of events tested some of their basic assumptions. The ideas underpinning the JSSF were proven in a number of crises, including Kuwait (1961), Tanganyika (1964), Zanzibar (1964) and the withdrawal from Aden (1967).21 A joint capability was required to meet Britain’s defence needs east of Suez. Operations in Oman in 1957 and in Aden in the 1960s demonstrated the limitations of independent air action. Air control theory did not work.22 Air transport was very useful in delivering troops to secure airfields but long range air transport or airborne operations were not possible without air superiority and without an aircraft carrier the RAF could not provide this at significant distance from their fixed bases. That much was evident at Kuwait in 1961.23 Their suggested alternative, of preemptive air strikes, neglected political reality and had been explicitly ruled out during Vantage. In the real world of operations short of war the enemy air force was likely to be given the first strike. Meanwhile, as the RN and RAF squabbled over the expeditionary role, Army interest east of Suez focused on the requirement to fight insurgencies in Borneo and Aden and the need to support them in this often tied down expeditionary forces, particularly the navy’s amphibious ships and helicopters, reducing their availability elsewhere.24 The JSSF concept was well-suited to British defence needs as they appeared in the early 1960s and on this basis the Macmillan government rejected the RAF island strategy and agreed to build a new large aircraft carrier, which would have been named HMS Queen Elizabeth. As is well known, the carrier did not progress beyond the drawing board still less did the Navy get the second ship they had anticipated. In 1966 the Labour government, bequeathed unsustainable spending plans by the previous administration, cut the programme.25 This did not represent a victory for the RAF’s alternative vision as much as an overall reduction in British aspirations. The island strategy did not, could not, provide the flexible range of options offered by the JSSF but the government decided that it did not require such options and with ambitions suitably reduced, the RAF plan would suffice. Quite how a total of twelve F-111 aircraft would truly have served British interests, out of sight and out of mind at airfields remote from many 20 Eric Grove, ‘Partnership Spurned: the Royal Navy’s Search for a Joint Maritime-Air Strategy East of Suez, 1961-63’, in N.A.M. Rodger, Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, (1996) pp.227-41. Also see Gjert Lage Dyndal, Land Based Air Power of Aircraft Carriers. A case study of the British debate about maritime air power in the 1960s, (London: Ashgate, 2012) and Tim Benbow (ed.), British Naval Aviation, The First 100 Years, (London: Ashgate, 2011). 21 See Speller, ‘The Royal Navy and Expeditionary Operations’. For Tanganyika and Zanzibar see ‘An African Cuba? Britain and the Zanzibar Revolution, 1964’ in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vo. 35, No. 2, June 2007 pp.283-301. 22 Darby, British Defence Policy, pp.130-133. Air Chief Marshal Sir David Lee, Flight from the Middle East, (1980). Spencer Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955-1967, (2005) 23 Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Branch, Box T2644-T2673, Summary of lessons learnt by FOAC from the Kuwait Operation, 25 Oct 1961. Lee, Flight from the Middle East, p.180. 24 For an examination of the impact of Confrontation on maritime forces see Christopher Tuck, ‘The Royal Navy and Confrontation, 1963-66’ in Kennedy (ed)., British Naval Strategy East of Suez. 25 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1966. Part 1. The Defence Review, Cmnd. 2901.

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potential trouble spots, was never put to the test.26 Within just two more years it was decided to withdraw from east of Suez altogether. There were insufficient funds even for this token capability.27 The 1982 Falklands Conflict provided another, rather belated vindication for the JSSF concept. British success in Operation Corporate rested on the remnants of the joint maritime expeditionary capability created in the 1960s, but was missing some key assets, cut from the fleet by changing priorities which, once again, emphasised antisubmarine operations in the North Atlantic. Most significant was the absence of a large aircraft carrier such as HMS Ark Royal (decommissioned four years earlier) and either of the two LPHs that had previously been maintained. Without the former the air defence environment remained problematic while the absence of the latter condemned the British commanders to adopt an approach to amphibious operations that was a generation behind that employed in the 1960s. There is no question but that this increased British casualties and gave Argentina opportunities for victory that they proved unable to exploit. The RAF made its most significant contribution to success through the deployment of Harrier GR 3 ground attack aircraft on HMS Hermes and Invincible, where they operated in the carrier role that their parent service had opposed so vociferously. This has not always been the contribution that the RAF has subsequently chosen to emphasise.28 The war in the South Atlantic was sufficiently out of kilter with existing policy to be considered an aberration, it did not have a major impact on defence priorities. It was not until the 1990s and end of the Cold War that expeditionary capabilities once again gained prominence. In a manner not entirely dissimilar to thinking in the 1950s, the reduced threat of war in Europe was believed to coincide with a increased probability of instability overseas and once again British defence policy took on an expeditionary hue. Amphibious and air mobile capabilities were enhanced and joint institutions and initiatives proliferated. Most prominently, perhaps, Navy plans to construct two large aircraft carriers gained government approval in 1998. 29 Today, as British operations in Afghanistan draw to a close and the nation counts the human and financial costs of the long wars there and in Iraq, there is clearly a value in finding ways to support foreign policy without the deployment of large military forces overseas. Certainly there appears to be little appetite for anything that might engender a commitment abroad, as the recent debacle over British involvement in potential strikes 26 The 1966 Defence White Paper announced the decision abandon the new carrier and to purchase fifty F-111 strike and reconnaissance aircraft. Of these only twelve were to be stationed east of Suez. Darby, British Defence Policy, pp.306-7. 27 For an analysis of the British decision to withdraw from ‘east of Suez’ see S. Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice Between Europe and the World?, (2002) and J. Pickering, Britain’s Withdrawal from East of Suez. The Politics of Retrenchment, (1998). 28 The best recent source on the Operation Corporate is the official history, Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, 2 vols. (London: Taylor and Francis, 2005). For an analysis of the amphibious operations see Mike Clapp, Amphibious Assault Falklands. The Battle of San Carlos Water, (London: Pen and Sword, 2006). 29 Ian Speller, ‘Delayed reaction: UK maritime expeditionary capabilities and the lessons of the Falklands campaign’, in Defense and Security Analysis, vol. 18, no.4, Dec. 2002

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against Syria has illustrated.30 Even a limited form of intervention is difficult to sell to the public. In this context the Navy continues to emphasise the utility of flexible and mobile joint maritime forces able to project limited power overseas without a large footprint ashore.31 This continues to cause debate and controversy as the government seeks to identify priorities in a time of financial hardship and the three services compete for resources. Only the most generous commentator could suggest that they have made a good job of this. The two carriers approved in 1998 are slowly approaching completion, although the muddle over their design, air group and role might offer to future historians a perfect case study of incompetence within defence planning. On a more positive note, the 2011 campaign against Libya provided yet another illustration of what maritime forces can achieve in limited conflicts. In this case they did so in cooperation with landbased air-power, creating the kind of synergies that the Royal Navy of the 1960s described in the JSSF.32 If we are indeed entering an ‘era of declining access’ such capabilities are likely to remain important. The JSSF, or its equivalent, would offer options as useful to a medium power in the twenty-first century as they were to the British in the 1960s. It remains to be seen whether these options will be taken.

30 ‘Cameron loses crucial vote on military intervention in Syria’, The Guardian, 30 Aug 2013 available online at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2013/aug/30/cameron-loses-syria-vote-video 31 For example, see the Future Maritime Operational Concept, 2007 available online at http://www.da.mod.uk/ colleges/jscsc/courses/RND/supporting-documents/20080122_FMOC07_U_DCDCIMAPPS.pdf/view 32 Geoffrey Till and Martin Robson, UK Air-Sea Integration in Libya 2011: A successful blueprint for the future?, Corbett Paper No.12, July 2013.

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Green Mountain’s War 1957-1959 Saif al Bedwawi Introduction fter World War II British interests’ in Oman and the Gulf centered on vital strategic points. On the one hand, Oman was considered an important strategic base for the British Royal Air Force (because of its location in-between Africa, the Middle East and the Far East) while on the other hand it was considered important due to the oil fields in the Gulf and in Oman itself. At the same time, Oman controlled the strategic Straits of Hormuz through which all tankers entering and leaving the Gulf had to pass. Finally, Britain considered Oman so important that it developed close friendship with Sultan Sa’id bin Taymur of Oman (1930-1970). Therefore, Britain responded quickly to the Sultan’s difficulties in the 1950s during Green Mountain war.

Map of Oman (Green Mountain in the circle)

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Geographical and Historical Background: The Sultanate of Oman extends, from Yemen in the east, to UAE and Saudi Arabia in the North. Also itâ€™s surrounded by Empty Quarter of Arabian great desert. Between the coastal plain and the desert the ground rises to 10,000 feet in the Jebel Akhdar, Green Mountain, a mountain region of some 200 square miles in extent. The Omani Arabs are concentrated in the Mountain villages, and they have a very strong tribal connection. Furthermore, they are an orthodox religious people believed in Ibadism, which is a small sect of Islamic faith that drew its roots from early Islamic Kharijate group. According to Ibadism, the leader of the state must be elected from those wise and well learned subjects by the scholars and the tribal leaders. As a result they had established themselves in the mountain area with their elected Imam since early Islamic era. In 1955 Imam Abdullah al Kalili passed away, and the community had elected Imam Ghalib from Green Mountain area as their new leader (1). Omani rebels of the Green Mountain: In December 1955, Sultan Saiâ€™d bin Taimour ordered Muscat & Oman Field Forces to occupy Nizwa, capital of the Imam. The purpose of the attack was: 1. To control over the interior 2. To give oil concession to British Petroleum (BP). 3. To abolish Imamate from Oman for good. Rebels with their white flag

1 . For Background on Oman see, L. G. Lorimer, (1915) Gazetteer of the Persian gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia. Vol. I, Historical. Calcutta Superintendent Government Printing, India.

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That was the beginning of a long Green Mountain War from 1955-1965. After the Sultan Forces swept interior Oman, arresting those oppose the Sultan and killing many Omanis, a revolt throughout interior had spread headed by Imam Ghalib and his brother Talib of Green Mountain. They had established an Omani Liberation Army, which was supported by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and American Oil Cos. By 1957, the Omani liberation Army was ready to push back Sultan army from the interior, and declare independent Oman. Even they had a spokesman at Cairo and sent an envoy to UN, China, and other countries. The British Involvement: Sultan Saeed was unable to deal with the uprising, thus he turned to Britain for assistant. He first had asked for nominal help by requesting for British Royal Air Force (RAF) to make reconnaissance flight over the Green Mountain area. In a letter to the British Council-General in Muscat, he wrote that he decided military action will have to be taken and that “ he will be grateful if the Royal Air force could help by making reconnaissance flights over Shargiya and drop messages on loyal tribes telling them what the government are doing. There may also be requested for communication flights between Muscat and Tawi Salaim near Dariz.”(2) The British Government was more than happy to respond to his request because that would keep the Saudi away (which meant to keep ARAMCO or Arabian American Oil Company). The British assistant to Sultan of Oman rooted in the special relationship between Her Majesty Government and various Sultans that had ruled Oman since 1800. This special relationship had grown up from excluding the French from Oman in Nineteenth Century to run the Sultan’s army in 1957. Having said that, the British assistant gone through various steps: Sir Percy Cox, British Council in Muscat with Sultan of Muscat and his Ministers in India 1903. Source: Peyton, W. D. (1983). Old Oman. London: Stacey International. P., 32. First step: they had asked Sultan Saeed to make public announcement. In a telegram in May, 1957 Sir Bernard Burrows (H.M.Poiltical resident in Bahrain 2 . Bahrain Telegram No. 525 to foreign Office. In Records of Oman, 1867-1960. Vol. 9. Historical Affairs 1955-1960. London: Archive Editions, 1992. P., 143.

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1953-1958) wrote to the Foreign Office, “The Council-General told the Sultan that we would probably wish to advise that some public announcement should be made”(3). The Sultan welcomed the idea and he made the following announcement that RAF had dropped on his subjects: “Some disturbance in a district of Oman has recently occurred instigated by troublemakers living in a certain foreign country. The Sultan has ordered a part of his armed force to disperse men who have gathered so as to prevent a breach of the peace and to restore public confidence. He has asked the royal Air force to distribute some leaflets on his behalf to reassure the people living nearby4.” The leaflets were actually had no values because Saut-al-Arab (Cairo Radio Broadcast) were reporting that rebels were winning and the Sultan was a stooge of the British. It was realized by British authorities that any such propagandas would increase hostile backfire against the Sultan as well as the British. Second step: Britain came to realize that the rebels were winning and that the Sultan forces were no matches to the Liberation Army of Oman. It Britain did not respond quickly and in a more forcefully way, then Oman would be lost forever and that would jeopardize her interests there. Accordingly, on July 18th 1957 a new policy was issued by the British Foreign Secretary as follows: “Her Majesty’s Government have decided to assist the Sultan to restore control in Central Oman, and the Chiefs of Staff have sent the necessary instructions in telegram No. COSME 47” (5). The instructions to the British Council-General in Muscat to inform the Sultan that British government had decided to assist him to reestablish his authority meant to send British troops including RAF. Besides that, the British Government agreed to supply new equipments to the Sultan Forces so they can be used to fight the rebels though under British supervision. Third Step: TOS role The Trucial Oman Scouts were established in 1951 by Britain to look after security in the Trucial States (Now United Arab Emirates). They were mostly Arabs from the local subjects, though, officered by British commanders in each squadron and indeed the Commander of the whole TOS who were stationed at Sharjah (6). The TOS were at hand as Arab forces that can be used by Britain to assist the Sultan, taking in mind the Egyptian and Saudi pressure and propaganda of British soldiers fighting in Oman. The Commander of TOS was Colonel Carter, who had flown to Ibri close to Nizwa the capital of the rebels in July 1957. Carter had established a tactical command in the area. A few days latter two TOS squadrons came from Buraimi (80 miles North 3 . Ibid, P., 144. 4 . Ibid. 5 . From foreign Office to Bahrain. No. 1109. 18.7.1957. In Records of Oman, Ob. Cit. P., 228. 6 . For more information see, Michael Mann, (1994), The Trucial Oman Scouts: The Story of a Bedouin Force. Norwich: Michael Russell.

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of Ibri), and another squadron (B ) came from Sharjah on 24th July 1957. The Force was given the name Carter force, and had consisted of the following:7 (1). Tac HQ (2). One Troop of Hussars of armored cars. (3). TOS three Squadrons (4). One Squadron of Sultan’s Frontier Regiment (5). Political & Air Contact team.

Col. Carter on the left in 1961

Fourth Step: Involvement of British land forces Even though Britain tried to avoid using her land force in the Jebal Akhdar (Green Mountain) war, but came to the conclusion that some detachment had to be involved such as Cameronians troops coming from Kenya and Bahrain. Furthermore, some other British infantry were deployed to Oman such as Hussars 13/18, and one squadron of Life Guards. Later on, the British commanding the Sultans’ Forces, Colonel Smiley, had requested for additional troops mainly from a Special Air Service unit that were more capable with the mountain warfare(8). Fifth: RAF Role The RAF had played important role in the Green Mountain from the beginning to the end in 1960. If it was not for the RAF, the war could have taken another direction 7 . Mann, Ob. Cit., P. 88. 8 . Operations in Muscat and Oman 1952-1959. Restricted. Prepared by Historical Section of Army Department Library, Ministry of Defence, Whitehall. S.W.1. July, 1964. P., 22.

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due to the harsh terrain that was hostile for movement of regular troops and or machines i.e. armored tanks. In the British Telegraph in 2012, an article was written about British pilot, Blyth, who flew RAF Venom over the Green Mountain in 1957. We can learn from such article about the RAF role in the fighting. The article was as follow: In the aftermath of Suez, trouble in central Oman flared up in July 1957. No 8 was ordered to Sharjah, and within days Blyth was leading strikes against rebel positions in the Jebel Akhdar region. Operating in support of land forces, the Venoms attacked fortifications with rockets, and Blyth led his squadron with great dash and efficiency until returning to Britain in December that year (9). The RAF during that Green Mountainâ€™s war had flown 450 Shackleton sorties and 1,050 Venom sorties; 1750 tons of bombs were dropped; 3,843 rocket projectiles & approximately 100,000 pounds of supplies were air dropped, with uncounted leaflets. A far as communications the RAF aircrafts flew approximately 2000 sorties carrying supplies, freight, evacuating casualties , and on reconnaissance tasks (10).

Venoms at strike from Captain Sir David Stewar 1957

Forces Advances on 6 August 1957: The deployment area was in Ibri of all the troops that had contained: a). Muscat Regiment (Huff Forces) b). TOS c). Cameronians d). Tactical Head Quarter of Carter Force 9 . British Telegraph. 29/4/2012. 10 . Despatch No. 49. From British Residency in Bahrain to the foreign Office. The situation in Oman 1959. In Records of Oman. Ob. Cit. P., 684.

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XXXIX Congresso della Commissione Internazionale di Storia Militare • CIHM Deployment of the troops in Ibri

On 6th of August 1957, Carter forces were given order to advance toward the rebel’s area. However, there was a fear that the Sultan forces might run in case they met the rebels, thus they were followed by the TOS, and the British troops. According to Sir David Stewart, who was a Captain in 1957: “we had a feeling that under fire the Muscat soldiers might run away, and the plan was that politically speaking they must be in the front? But in case they run away, they were followed by the TOS, there was a little fear that TOS, (who weren’t heavily prepared for such and it was the first little warfare for us) might turn round and run away, so they brought the English regiment, the Cameronians in behind us, so you got Muscat troops, the TOS, and the Cameronians. (Sir David added that) we did not run away, so the Muscat regiment. So we had two Arabs armies, Muscat regiment and TOS, in front doing the basic Capt. David Stewart contact work, and the heavy stuff being done by the RAF, and the Cameronians with their support weaponry of mortars and machineguns. Everything went quite for a while until next year”(11). Attack on Nizwa the Capital of the Rebels. Source: drawn by Staff Col. Badir Abbas, UAE Military Museum. With the defeat of the rebels the search at for smaller cells in nearby villages had continued, but no attempt was made to follow them into the Mountain. On 12th of the same month Carter Force was capable to advance on other cities like Izki and was met with only slight opposition. During the next two days patrols followed in pursuit of the rebel leaders but had 11 Interview with Captain Sir David Stewart, who participated in the Green Mountain War in 1957. Exeter, 17th July 2012.

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no success because they early had escaped to the Mountain. nspection of further rebelsâ€™ area 1959 End of rebellion in Green Mountain: Throughout 1958, the rebels laid at least 120 anti-tanks mines and about 80% of these damaged vehicles. M6 mines were also laid and one reported incident killed five causalities. The other tactics that were used by the rebels is to attack at night and withdrew under the cover of fire and darkness. The British replied to that by using air power of RAF. In December 1958, for example, four Venoms of 8 squadron RAF flew from their base at Sharjah, 94 sorties dropping rockets, and using 20 mm guns at rebels in Green Mountain. There were though 3-4 RAF plains that were hit by rebels using their guns collectively shooting at the plain from their caves in the mountain.

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The plan to carry an attack on the Mountain was possible during the full moon, so to surprise the rebels. The assault was on 26th January 1959, mostly was carried by British Special Air Service that they had climbed the Mountain at 2030 hours and went on to the top of the mountain. They were a few resistant because RAF had destroyed the rebel’s bases and villages. There were though some minor administration problem that had created some delay which was caused by hiring 100 donkeys to carry food, ammunition, blankets, water, and signals. Donkeys were the most suitable animals to go through tiny roots of Green Mountain, therefore the SAS were dependent on the cooperation of locals to carry their weapons and food by their donkeys.

Typical donkeys of Oman

The rebel’s leaders went to Saudi Arabia in exile, mainly the Imam and his brother Galib, Sheikh Suleiman bin Himyer, the two sons of Talib, and about sixty followers. They left the Green Mountain by foot until the coast and from there they went to Dammam of Saudi Arabia (12).

12 . British Residency, Bahrain. To the Arabian Department, Foreign Office. April 3, 1959. In Records of Oman. Ob. Cit. P. 672.

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Omani rebelâ€™s leader meeting President Nassir 1959

Findings of Green Mountain War: 1. Difficulties of Bedouin of the desert to fight in the Mountain. 2. Secular Arab Nationalism of Nasser to fight along Imamate. 3. Saudi/British Buraimi dispute of 1952-55, and its consequences over Green Mountain war. 4. Oil companies hidden war 5. Important of donkeys in mountain warfare.

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Mandala Operation: the encourage factor of West Irian dispute accomplishment in 1962 I Wayan Agus APRIANA

Chapter I - Introduction

1. General. est Irian was a region in the eastern part of Indonesia which is directly adjacent to the country of Papua New Guinea. This territory after the Dutch colonialism era in Indonesia had been a source conflict between both countries. The Round Table Conference was held in Den Haag on August 23rd to November nd 2 1949. One of the decisions agreed that the accomplishment of West Irian dispute will be finished one year after the transfer of sovereignty. But in reality, both countries did not face deal for years. Indonesia strongly assumed that West Irian was former territory of Dutch East Indies which must take over to Indonesia based on the deal. Meanwhile the Dutch assumed that West Irian was under-developed region which need their arrangement till the time for self-determination. As the deadlock of negotiation, Indonesian government decided to put in military way for liberation of West Irian. All plan, process, preparation, and the execution of military way to support the integration effort of West Irian to Indonesia was an interesting topics to be written. Dealing with the great goals to be achieved, the mobilization of military power should be a great joint and combined operation, including mobilized all national potentials of Indonesia. How the end and the action of military in dealing with the government decision to finish this dispute were important for evaluation to military institution.

CHAPTER II - TRI KOMANDO RAKYAT AND THE FORMING OF THE MANDALA COMMAND

2. Military Preparation. Because of political decision of the Indonesian government to include military for suppressing the process of negotiations with the Dutch, the Indonesian Armed Forces

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(APRI) prepared them selves to build its military offensive potential. However, the inside military forces was still weak at that time, hence the government on April 6th, 1958 processed the purchase contract of warships and aircrafts from countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. In 1959, The Army Chief of Staf , General A.H. Nasution also made weaponry purchase agreement contract with the United States and Western European countries, but as political problems, they cancelled the delivery of such weapons. Then on January 3rd, 1961 at Kremlin, Soviet Union, has signed the contract (agreement) of weaponry purchasing with long-term credit and became the biggest weaponry purchasing contract by Indonesia. In the end of 1961, the military equipments began to be sent by Soviet Union and Indonesian military power became the strongest country in Southeast Asia. 3. The Command of the People. On April 5th 1961, the Dutch inaugurated the Papua Council and completed with flag and national anthem of Papua. That action caused culmination of anger from Indonesian side. According to the fact that the Netherlands remains adamant, the concrete planning which based on military power was absolutely needed as guidance for liberation of West Irian. On April 12th 1961, the Minister of National Security/ the Army Chief of Staff, General A.H. Nasution informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff (GKS), that the President/ The Highest Commander in Chief had ordered GKS to prepare Joint Operations for West Irian. The Dutch government then accelerated the idea of self-determination not through Papua Council, but by forming of Papua National Committee who was inaugurated on October 19th 1961. The Indonesian government took immediately actions by establishing the National Defense Council (DEPERTAN) which had a duty to arrange the way for integrating the whole national potential in the struggle of West Irian Liberation. DEPERTAN was inaugurated on December 11th 1961 and chaired by the President/ The Highest Commander in Chief of the Indonesian Republic Armed Forces with members from high military officials and civilians. The DEPERTAN meeting on December 14th 1961 had decided the establishment of the Highest Command of West Irian Liberation (KOTI Pemirbar) with The Highest Commander in Chief of KOTI, The President Soekarno, Deputy Commander in Chief, General A.H. Nasution and assisted by three Chiefs of Staff/ Commander in Chief of Army, Navy, and Air Force. DEPERTAN produced a conception was which known as Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikora). On one momentous Roll Call at LOR Yogyakarta Square on December 19th 1961, President Sukarno declared Trikora which contained: a. Foil the forming of Colonial Dutchâ€™s Puppet State of Papua. b. Hoist the Red and White Flag in West Irian, the motherland of Indonesia. c. Be ready for general mobilization to defend the independence and unity of our national homeland. 4. GKS concept of West Irian Liberation Operation. According the instruction of President Soekarno, GKS formed The Arranging Committee of West Irian Joint Operations which met firstly on June 13th 1961. Then

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based on the Staff Review from the Committee, GKS suggested the President about the military operation planning by seizing and keeping the entire territory of West Irian in the shortest possible time to obtain de-facto authority in West Irian. Diplomatic struggle was still continued together with the pressure from military operation results. The phases of operation campaigns were run as follows: a. Infiltration Phase. This phase was planned to be done until the end of 1962 and conducted by infiltrating operation within 10 months. Ten main force companies were expected to infiltrate and formed Indonesian defense posts in West Irian. b. Exploitation Phase. This phase was estimated to conduct in the beginning of 1963. The purpose of exploitation phase was demolished the main military power of the enemy hence the entire territory of West Irian could be going to the Republic of Indonesia. c. Last phase was Consolidation Phase. This phase was a consolidation of authority of Indonesian Republic in the entire territory of West Irian. The specific task for components of Mandala Command was divided according to the schedule phases. On the other hand, the planning, preparing, and organizing infiltration operations were conducted together whereas each component of army, navy, and air force were supported each other. The time planning of starting and finishing each phase as follows: a. In the beginning of 1962, infiltration phase began and prepared for next phase. b. In the end of 1962, prepared for exploitation phase and should finished minimum. c. In the beginning of 1963, the exploitation phase began if it decided politically by continuing infiltration and preparing for the last phase. d. The end of 1963 was the end of exploitation phase and the beginning of the last phase. 5. The Forming of Mandala Command for West Irian Liberation. Based on the discussion results of DEPERTAN in Bogor on December 31st 1961, the President issued a Presidential Decree No. 1 year 1962 on January 2nd 1962 about the forming of Mandala Command. The term “Mandala” mean “Theatre” or a part area of war square included area of mainland, oceans, and aerial which needed for military operations. An area of “Mandala” was determined by the Highest Commander in Chief after hearing suggestion from Joint Chief of Staff. Therefore, the Mandala Command for West Irian Liberation was a joint and combine forces under Commander in Chief of united Army, Navy, and Air Force, and other national components whose have been tasked. The Headquarter of Mandala Command was in Makassar city, South Sulawesi. On January 11th 1962, the position of Commander in Chief of Mandala Command was given to Brigadier General Soeharto who at once promoted to the rank of Major General.

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Here is the organizational structure of the Highest Command for West Irian Liberation included Mandala Command inside.

Table 1 : Organization Structure of The West Irian Liberation Highest Command

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Table 2 : Organization Structure of General Staff of Mandala Command

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6. The Establishment of Command Posts. The function and position of Mandala Staff Command were regulated at command posts which were divided into three levels. The Reserve Post was a part of Command Staff with administrative duties and functions. The Main Post covered functions of Intelligence, Operational, Personnel, Logistics, Territorial and Transportation as well as made tactical or strategic planning. The small and nippy tactical staff was placed in the Front Post and completed by needed staff personnel to assist the Commander in Chief. As the communication was very important, the placement of posts was tried to accommodate the easiest communication between posts to up level command. In addition, the placement also concerned about the possibilities of troop placement, operational plan, and the area which has quite protection and secure. 7. The Dutch Military Power in West Irian on Trikora Period. Based on Netherlands Marines information, the Dutch military power which was led by Commander in Chief of the Dutch Armed Forces and based in Hollandia amounted to approximately 4.500 soldiers on December 1961. Their power consists of the Navy with several warships, marines units, and its logistical supports, the Netherland Army, and two Dutch Air Force squadrons. In 1962, the Dutch military forces on August were added up to about 9.600 soldiers. From these data showed that the Netherlands strengthened its military since Trikora was announced by Indonesia. According to these data, the Mandala Command made a calculation hence the forces mobilization of Mandala troops were greater than the Dutch military forces in West Irian. CHAPTER III - THE INFILTRATION OPERATIONS

8. The Infiltration through Sea. a. The Infiltration through Sea towards Mandala Operation. 1) Guerilla Troops 300 (PG-300) On March 18th 1962, two platoons of Team-1 PG-300 had departed from Gebe island to Waigeo island. In the mid of their cruise, they wer detected by the Neptune Dutch Patrol Aircraft, so that direction of boat was deflected to Gag island at west side of Waigeo island. The Dutch then attacked Gag Island. On March 25th 1962, fire contact was occurred between Dutch warships with Indonesian aircraft which resulted in the burning of a Dutch warship. The Dutch Marine troops cleaned the area of Gag Island on April 15th 1962. This opportunity was used by guerrilla troops to approach the shore and infiltrate inland. Meanwhile, on March 20th 1962, two platoon of Team-2 PG-300 departed from Yu Island towards Tanjung Dalpele at Waigeo Island. In the mid of the cruise, they wer detected by the Dutch Neptune Patrol Aircrafts but they could hide and then beached safely. 2) Guerilla Troops 400 (PG-400). On March 1962, 39 members of Guerilla Troops 400 which mostly from Army

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departed from Gebe Island towards Lamlam. This infiltration was succeeded making defense post there. 3) Guerilla Troops 500 (PG-500). On July 15th 1962, 87 members of PG-500 departed from Gebe Island to West Irian land. When they arrived at Waigeo Island, they met with Herlina group. Herlina was a leader of a volunteer group who became liaison for other guerilla troops. They also spread pamphlets and wrote a story about Indonesia struggle for West Irian. PG-500 then successfully came at Sansapor on July 17th, 1962 and destroyed the Dutch radio installation on the next day. 4) Guerilla Troops 600 (PG-600). On March 23rd 1962, 31 members of PG-600 from Ujir and Karwi region were departed to Jera river. 24 soldiers successfully infiltrated alive but the other 7 soldiers who still onboard were shot by Dutch Neptune Aircraft at Etna Bay on Watubelah Islands and assumed lost. 5) Observer Unit. The intelligence unit which centered in Gorong Island/ Seram had goals to obtain intelligence information and infiltrated several times into territory of West Irian since March 13th until May 1962. They also deployed pamphlets to raise the struggle spirit of local people. b. The Infiltration through Sea on Mandala Command Period. Since the forming of Mandala Command, the infiltration activities through sea towards Mandala period were continued to the forces and bases progression. In facilitating command control, the infiltration task area was divided into posts as follows: 1) The Infiltration from Post 101/ Hanggada. The South Post (Pos 101) has been extended till Tual. The Battalion 521/ Brawijaya was planned to go to Kaimana through Badar Lumut Operation Order. The infiltration did not work at all because the Dutch warships patrolled so tight. 2) The Infiltration from Post 102/ Kapi Jembawan. On August 7th 1962, Menpor Brimob and the volunteers were successfully beached at Rumbati beach near Patipi. When the boat returned, it was attacked by the Dutch Neptune aircraft but soon defended by Mig 17 aircraft from Indonesian Air Force. Hence the boat could return safely. 3) The Infiltration from Post 103/ Hanilo. On June 1962, the Battalion 515/ Brawijaya through Bandar Besi Operation was moved from Gebe Island and escorted by Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB) towards the land of West Irian. However they were blockaded by the Dutch warships and failed to infiltrate. 4) The Infiltration from Wahai Post. On August 9th 1962, 90 soldiers of Raiders Company Kodam XV from Wahai were successfully crossed Sioh Sea towards Misool. However in the next infiltration on August 11th 1962, they went back because met the Dutch destroyer ship. Then the beaching effort of Raider troops on August 12th 1962 was hardly attacked by the Dutch but they could be safely beached.

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9. The Operations of Mandala Navy. The operations of Mandala Navy on Infiltration Phase were conducted by Mandala Navy Submarines such as: a. Antareja Operation. It was conducted from February 28th to May 2nd 1962 with RI Nanggala submarine. She observed the port cities along the coast of West Irian by patrolling to enemy territorial water. b. Alugara Operation. With the elements of Submarine Units, they had jobs to sink the enemyâ€™s warships and merchant ships along the northern coast of West Irian. This operation was conducted since July 28th to August 26th 1962, but ordered back on August 15th 1962 because the New York agreement. c. Cakra Operation. This operation was conducted from July 20th till July 29th 1962 and used RI Submarines Unit. Their jobs were observing the important port cities in West Irian by free hunting and border clash. d. Lumba-lumba Operation. On June 25th 1962, RI Candrasa, RI Trisula, and RI Nagarangsang Submarines dived close the target and beached the troops at around Kotabaru. RI Candrasa beached part of troops at Tanah Merah, Kotabaru. Meanwhile the others submarines could not infiltrate the troops because she always got contact with the Dutch aircraft and Destroyer ship. e. Gurita Operation. Gurita Operation was planned on June 28th till 30th 1962 to conduct reconnaissance at Kaimana Bay for infiltration by using 5 Motor Torpedo Boats (MTB). Because of the enemy fleet power was in Kaimana Bay, this plan was canceled. 10. The Formation of Air Combat Units. The Combat Units (KT) was formed as Mandala Air Forces bases for its aircrafts in the eastern side of Indonesia near the border of West Irian. Those Combat Units (KT) were: a. KT Senopati, at Morotai airbase, consisting of aircraft IL-28, Mig-17, B-25/26, C-47 Dakota, Albatros / Catalina and Helicopters. The task of KT Senopati was preparing itself to be ready in combat condition on June 1st 1962. b. KT Baladewa consisted of 6 transport aircrafts C-47 Dakota and based on Hasannudin Airbase, Makassar and had ability in transporting personnel, logistics, war victims, and SAR tasks as well as flight review. c. KT Bima Sakti was based at Letfuan Airbase with 4 planes of B-25, 2 planes of B-26, 6 planes of P-51 Mustang, and 1 Catalina aircraft. The duties were protecting the Navy patrol at the border area, destroying the determined targets in West Irian, assisting other forces, and conducting aerial photography.

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11. The Infiltration Operation through the Air. The operations which conducted by Mandala Air Forces were jumping operations such as: a. Banteng Operation. Banteng operation was jumping operation which used 3 C-47 Dakota aircrafts to Fak-fak Peninsula by Banteng Putih and Kaimana by Banteng Merah troops. The whole command of this jumping operation was led directly by Commodore Leo Wattimena because it was the first jumping operation in West Irian. This operation was not easy because the plane might avoid the enemyâ€™s radar and attack, as well as found a good dropping zone. Nevertheless, all troops with their equipments and logistics could be dropped well. b. Garuda Operation. KT Baladewa took important role in the departure of planes from Pattimura Airbase (Ambon). On the first jumping day on May 15th 1962, 3 C-47 aircrafts, 1 B-25 aircraft, and 1 Catalina aircraft were deployed to the areas of Sorong and Kaimana, while 3 P-15 Mustang aircrafts were deployed to Fak-Fak area. At the next day, they could not deliver the paratroops as the bad weather and depleted fuel. On May 17th 1962, Garuda Operation was continued to Sorong and Kaimana and successfully grounded the paratroops. At the return time, T-440 Dakota aircraft suddenly got attack from Dutch Neptune aircraft. Dakota could not make counterattack as not armored and it was shot and then ditching in the east of Batu Belah Islands. The paratroops jumping on May 19th 1962 by Garuda Merah troops and on May 25th 1962 by Garuda Putih troops could be run well. c. Serigala Operation. In Serigala Operation on May 17th 1962, Dakota aircraft had grounded 39 soldiers at the top of Dutch army dormitory. The battle soon happened and after several days, the troops succeeded to hoist the Red and White flag there. This incident became a symbol of establishment of Indonesian Republic at that area on May 21st 1962. Then on May 19th 1962, the Hercules aircraft had grounded 81 paratroops at Sansapor. d. Kancil Operation. According to the plan, Kancil operation would be conducted on May 15th, 16th, and 17th 1962 and divided to three objectives of Sorong, Fak-Fak and Kaimana. The goals of this operation were reconnaissance and photo shoot. But as the weather was not good, this operation was delayed for several times. e. Naga Operation. This operation was conducted on June 23rd 1962 by 3 Hercules aircrafts. The jumping was successfully conducted and they soon formed guerilla posts. f. Rajawali Operation. Rajawali operation was conducted on July 31st 1962 with the task of adding troop power and logistic supplies at the dropping area of Merauke and Kaimana. g. Lumbung Operation. Lumbung operation had a duty to increase the supply of the soldiers who have

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been placed in the area of West Irian. h. Jatayu Operation. Jatayu operation was conducted on August 14th 1962 and had same task with Rajawali Operation. CHAPTER IV - EXPLOITATION PHASE AND JAYAWIJAYA OPERATION PREPARATION

12. The Preparation of Exploitation Phase and Jayawijaya Operation. In the middle of 1962, the diplomatic struggle progress had forced the development of military situation to accelerate the plan for 6 months forward. The evaluation result showed that the infiltration through sea was difficult to be conducted because many interceptions from the Dutch Navy. However, the jumping operation from the air was more successful. This situation encouraged the further open operation as a part of Exploitation Phase called Jayawijaya Operation. According to the calculation of political achievement and the own capabilities, the Mandala Command had decided important targets that must be occupied. Biak as the enemy’s center of military defense was becoming main target. The other targets were Kotabaru and Kaimana as political targets, Biak, Sorong, and Kaimana as military targets, and Merauke as psychological target. Considering that, the Operation Instruction No. POPS-06/SR/6/62 on June 20th 1962 was issued. That instruction was about the seizure of Biak and the amphibious beaching which was preceded by the grounding of paratroops. The phases of operation were as follows: a. Jayawijaya I Operation with the duty of taking over the air and sea superiority. b. Jayawijaya II Operation with the duty of seizing Biak area by vertical attack from Task Unit I and II, as well as horizontal attack from Amphibious Task Force (ATA) -17. c. Jayawijaya III Operations with the duty of seizing Kotabaru area which was conducted by Combat Unit of Gatotkaca. d. Jayawijaya IV Operation with the duty of seizing Kotabaru area which was conducted by Combat Unit and strengthened by Lesmono Division. For air combat, AULA had formed Combat Units which placed as follows: a. Combat Unit (KT) Parikesit at Morotai airbase. b. KT Antareja at Amahai airbase. c. KT Aswatama at Pattimura/ Ambon airbase. d. KT Wisanggeni at Letfuan airbase. e. KT Wesiaji at Iswahyudi air base Madiun. f. KT Anggada at Halim Perdanakusuma air base Jakarta. The units of maritime defense were included: a. Torpedo fast boat units or KKCT-16.

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b. Submarine units or KKS-15. c. Amphibious Task Forces or ATA-17. d. Beaching troops or PASRAT-45. 13. The Concept of Jayawijaya Operation. The plan of Jayawijaya Operation has been stated since May 18th, 1962. On the concepts of Jayawijaya Operation, it had determined that the day of attack was on August 12th 1962. On July 17th 1962 or H-26, all troops in the Amphibious Task Force (ATA-17) began to move from the initial bases and should be already gathered on the H-10 at Gathered Area I on Peleng Gulf, Banggai Islands East Sulawesi in order to power consolidation. On the H-6, ATA-17 moved toward Gathered Area II at 60 degrees North latitude of Morotai Island. Then on H-4, ATA-17 continued its movement towards the target of Biak. During sailing on own water territory, AKA-17 was protected by Mig17 and AS-4 Gannet aircrafts and when it entered the enemy territorial water, they would be escorted by TU-16 and TU-16 KS aircrafts. Meanwhile the Air Combat Units on H-2 started to deliver the troops from Reserve Post to paratroops centralization on Ambon, Amahai, and Letfuan Posts by transport aircrafts. The paratroops consisted of 2 Brigade paratroops (TF-1 Seno and TF-2 Gatotkaca). On that day, the attack started to the enemyâ€™s air forces at Sorong, Fak-fak, Manokwari, and Biak to seize the air superiority. On the day, the grounding would be done by TF-1 Seno to the target area for seizing the airbase and the only spring in Biak. On the day H+2, ATA-17 beached Pasrat-45 (TF Wibisono) as many as 8.100 soldiers and followed by TF Hanoman as many as 8.000 soldiers. In attacking plan of Biak, Frogmen soldiers cleaned the beach from natural and human obstacles. The Mine Sweeper Ships Unit cleaned the water area of beaching spot. Then it was followed by the beaching of Amphibious Tank Company and Pasrat from Battalion 1 and Battalion 2 Marines. Meanwhile the Battalion 3 Marines seized Owe Island which previously attacked by 1 company of Kipam. The soldier of Battalion 509 was still onboard and waiting the beaching order. Then the Brigif 1 (TF Hanoman) beached and moved directly to Biak to make link up with TF Seno. Based on the planning of the day H+3, Division II Command (TF Lesmono) beached and took over all TF command on land. The overall operation was estimated complete in 5 days, hence the Proclamation of August 17th 1962 might also be celebrated in West Irian. As a backup, the Para Brigade (TF-2 Gatotkaca) was prepared to seize and occupy Hollandia. Meanwhile the Brigade 2 ADLA was prepared to seize Sorong. In reality, the preliminary phases of Jayawijaya Operation until the ATA-17 forces concentration at Gathered Area I Banggai had been done. The diplomatic progress showed the possibilities of the Dutch to solve this dispute through negotiation. 14. The Diplomatic Progress and Cancellation of Jayawijaya Operation. International forum actually gave concern to this problem. United Nation (UN) initiatively tried to open peace negotiation again. Then on May 26th, 1962, a peace

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concept called Ellsworth Bunker Proposal was proposed. It consisted of the planning of administration government taking over to Indonesia through such a UN temporary government board and the guarantee of conducting self-determination for the people of West Irian. For Indonesia, that proposal principally could be adapted. Meanwhile, Mandala Command always struggled in order to push the Dutch to negotiate again based on Bunker Proposal. Then because of the intervention from United States and England, the negotiation could be opened. The Dutch finally agreed with Bunker Proposal and then the agreement was prepared. In reality, the beginning phase of Jayawijaya Operation has been started until the gathering of ATA-17 forces at Banggai Island. Concerning with the progression of diplomatic struggle, the Mandala Commander in Chief has arrived at Banggai Island on August 5th, 1962 and delivered his decision to postpone the H day of operation to become H+14. The New York Agreement which officially ended West Irian dispute between Indonesian and the Netherlands finally signed on August 15th, 1962. Through the end of hostility decision from Indonesian government, all preparations of Jayawijaya Operation had stopped on August 25th 1962. On October 1st, 1962, The Dutch Government took over the authority to The United Nation Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA). On December 31st, 1962, the Flag of Indonesia was started to hoist besides the UN Flag. And finally, on May 1st, 1963, the Government of Indonesia officially received the authority in West Irian from UN. Meanwhile the implementation of self-determination (PEPERA) was conducted on July 5th, 1969 with result of local decision to be integrated with The Unitary State of Indonesia Republic. CHAPTER V - CONCLUSION

The implementation of West Irian Liberation in form of Tri Komando Rakyat (Trikora) with Jayawijaya Operation as its climax has showed the relationship and cooperation between military and diplomacy activities. By the forming of Mandala Command and military situation which have been created, they were proved that they could open negotiation in solving this problem. In spite of Jayawijaya Operation had been postponed and then canceled as the peace negotiation, those preparations became decisive element. It had a correlation of a good strategy to win a war without fighting. In operational side, this was the biggest joint operation that Indonesia ever done which involved all Indonesian military forces. The infiltration strategies which formerly infiltrated the forces through sea and then intensified through the air seemed working well. However, this way was tactically disadvantageous because the field difficulties that faced by the troops. Nevertheless, the struggle spirit of Indonesian soldiers were so high which result in the jobs well done. As the end of this operation, the Indonesian government got legal acknowledgment for the authority of West Irian as a part of the Unitary State of Indonesian Republic. The accomplishment of West Irian dispute did not result in the great open war between

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Indonesia and the Netherlands. Even though from Indonesian government had prepared such open military operation in great scale to liberate West Irian, the government mainly took result from peace negotiation. The diplomatic way that still followed by the Indonesian government has showed our sightseeing to prefer and respect to the peace negotiation in solving a dispute. The operation and military stressing from Indonesian Armed Forces were a government politic decision to support the diplomatic struggle that was main way for the Indonesian government. Bibliography Cholil, Drs. M. 1979. Sejarah Operasi2 Pembebasan Irian Barat. Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah ABRI. Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI. 1995. Tri Komando Rakyat, Pembebasan Irian Barat (Trikora). Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI. Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI. 1995. 50 Tahun ABRI. Jakarta: Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi ABRI. Pusat Sejarah dan Tradisi TNI. 2000. Sejarah TNI Jilid III (1960-1965). Jakarta: Pusjarah TNI.

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Les operations multinationales croisees au Congo. Le cas du Katanga (Shaba), 1960-1964 Mor NDAO Introduction es opérations multinationales sont devenues, après le second conflit mondial, suite à la création de l’ONU, un mécanisme fréquent de règlement des conflits. En Afrique, du fait de la fréquence et de la multiplicité des conflits, elles sont devenues une donnée récurrente de la géopolitique du continent. La complexité des opérations militaires est, en Afrique, notamment dans le cas du Congo, à la dimension et à la nature des conflits où interviennent et s’enchevêtrent des facteurs différents, divers auxquels s’ajoutent des enjeux multiples aux intérêts divergents, voire opposés (économiques, politiques, ethniques, géopolitiques, etc.). Avant même que le pays n’accédât à la souveraineté internationale, les soulèvements anti coloniaux et les divisions ethniques et régionales, attisés par les élections organisées entre le 11 et le 25 mai 19601, la mutinerie des forces armées créées par les autorités belges depuis la période coloniale en grande partie pour assurer les fonctions de police (répression sanglante, maintien de l’ordre, chasse aux opposants), l’africanisation de l’armée2installent le pays dans un chaos prérévolutionnaire et une « accélération d’une indépendance imprévue »3. On peut comprendre, dans un contexte de guerre froide4que l’indépendance du Congo s’effectua dans la précipitation5, la confusion et la guerre civile qui devaient se dénouer après l’intervention des troupes onusiennes (ONUC Opération des Nations Unies au Congo juillet 1960 – juin 1964)6, la deuxième en Afrique après la crise du Canal de Suez et Sinaï (première force d’urgence des Nations Unies FINU 1, novembre 1956 à juin 1967) et la troisième dans le monde (après le Groupe d’Observation des Nations Unies au Liban). Quels sont les facteurs à l’origine du conflit et les forces en présence ? De quelle

1 Documents Diplomatiques Français, Commission de publication des DDF.Pièce 177, Note de la sousdirection d’Afrique « Politique américaine au Congo et intérêts français », Paris 15 mars 1965, pp. 447-448. 2 Vanderlinden J, 1959-1960, la crise congolaise, Editions Complexe, 1985, pp. 131, 139,140, 141, 144, 145, 147. 3 Libois Jules Gérard, Congo 1960:échec d’une décolonisation, GRIP, 2010, pp 77-79. 4 Min TiêtTrân, Congo belge, entre l’Est et l’Ouest, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1962. 5 Hoffherr René L’avènement du Congo belge à l’indépendance In: Politique étrangère N°2 - 1960 - 25e année pp. 110-121, pp. 110. 6 Gendebien Paul-Henry, L’intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960-1964, Mouton et Cie et IRES, Paris, 1967, pp. 28, 33, 45,46,132. King Gordon J, The United Nations in Congo: a Quest for Peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962, pp 123, 124, 182.

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manière furent menées les opérations des troupes de l’ONU entre 1960 et 1964 ? Comment organiser une force multinationale dont la mission, à elle assignée, devient de plus en plus complexe, lorsqu’il s’agit, en milieu équatorial, dans un espace immense (grande comme plus de quatre fois la France) d’assurer les fonctions d’interposition entre les parties en conflit, de maintien de l’ordre et de reconquête territoriale? Quelles sont les exigences opérationnelles et les défis auxquels ces missions devront faire face ? Comment faire face à un mouvement sécessionniste, appuyé par des mercenaires et des puissances extérieures aux fins de recouvrer l’intégrité territoriale du Congo Léopoldville ? Quelques décennies après l’expérience de l’ONUC, un regard sur l’opération a soulevé des controverses des plus passionnées autour des réussites et /ou échecs des Nations Unies au Congo7. Au lieu de procéder à un regard manichéen, il vaudrait mieux s’interroger sur la portée et les limites de l’ONUC aux fins de tirer des enseignements et leçons des Nations Unies au Congo. Ainsi, le cadre restreint de cette étude dicte des choix. Au lieu de se focaliser sur les opérations strictement militaires, elle insiste sur les enseignements à tirer des opérations multinationales dans le Congo Kinshasa, notamment dans la province du Katanga (Shaba). Elle est structurée en deux grandes parties. La première étudie les facteurs multiples à l’origine du conflit et analyse ensuite la spécificité du Katanga. La dernière, enfin, réfléchit sur la nature des opérations des troupes de l’ONU entre 1960 et 1964 et sur les enseignements et leçons à tirer de l’ONUC. I. Aux origines de la crise congolaise

Carte 1 Situation du Congo (ex Zaïre)et les Etats voisins

1) Données historiques et origines de la crise congolaise En 1876, suite à l’implantation de comptoirs commerciaux sur le fleuve par l’Association internationale du Congo, le territoire congolais devient une propriété personnelle 7 International Crisis Group, Katanga : the Congo’s forgotten Crisis, Africa Report, No 103, 9 janvier 2006.

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du roi Léopold II de Belgique. Après le congrès de Berlin (1885-1884), l’immense territoire octroyé à Léopold II est dénommé Etat Indépendant du Congo (EIC). Le Congo léopoldien, considéré comme « le temps des exterminations » fut tenu d’une main de fer (travail forcé, traite des esclaves, corvées, brutalité inouïe, exécutions sommaires) au point d’attirer l’attention d’une opinion internationale de plus en plus sensible au sort cruel réservé aux indigènes. En 1903 et 1904, les récriminations du Rapport Casement et de la Commission d’enquête, confirmées par les commissaires de l’enquête de 1905, s’indignent devant le système léopoldien (mains coupées, exécutions sommaires, pires formes de travail, etc.) poussent le roi à se démettre et à transmettre le Congo à l’Etat belge. Après la seconde guerre mondiale, soufflent des « vents nouveaux » qui allaient être décisifs sur l’avenir du colonialisme (guerre en Indochine, essor des mouvements anticolonialistes). Si, dans les empires français et britanniques, les puissances coloniales, préoccupées par les mouvements sociaux et nationalistes essaient d’anticiper (création de l’union française en 1946 dans l’empire français), le rythme, dans les colonies belges, particulièrement au Congo, semble beaucoup plus timide. C’est à partir des années 1950 que l’opposition se politisa. Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, l’exode rural consécutif à l’industrialisation du pays fit émerger brutalement « les masses urbaines prolétarisées dans le champ politique »8. Cette irruption va accélérer le processus d’émancipation alors que la métropole, sclérosée, semblait incapable de lire le sens et le cours de l’histoire. En effet, dès 1956, parut le Manifeste de la Conscience africaine initié par un groupe d’évoluées réclamant l’indépendance. Dix ans après la création de l’Union française, le professeur Van Bilsen publia un Plan de trente ans pour l’émancipation politique pour l’Afrique belge qui préconisait l’émancipation progressive du Congo sur une période de 30 ans (1985). Au livre de Van Bilsen qui fit scandale en Belgique (l’opinion était radicalement opposée à l’indépendance), répondit le Manifeste de l’ABAKO de Kasa-Vubu plutôt favorable à l’indépendance immédiate. Mais les événements (émeutes, soulèvements, grèves, etc.), signes annonciateurs du crépuscule du colonialisme, allaient pousser l’administration belge à précipiter sa colonie vers l’indépendance. Aux rassemblements anticoloniaux et les soulèvements à l’orée de 1959, répond une répression d’une brutalité inouïe de la Force Publique occasionnant des centaines de morts. Au décours de 1959, l’arrestation et l’emprisonnement de Patrice Lumumba, leader du Mouvement National Congolais, les émeutes et confrontations sanglantes installent le pays dans un chaos prérévolutionnaire notamment dans la province de Léopoldville dominée par KasaVubu (Abako) et Giizenga (PSA). Dépassée par les événements, la Belgique convoque le mouvement anticolonial le 27 janvier 1960 autour d’une Table Ronde, libère Lumumba et cède sur la question de l’indépendance envisagée le 30 juin. Avant même la proclamation de l’indépendance, après les élections remportées par le MNC de Lumumba, le Parlement belge modifie la Loi fondamentale provisoire, brèche 8 Mobe Fansiama A, « La question de l’armée et au Congo au Congo démocratique», Les Congos dans la tourmente, Rupture-Solidarité, Paris, Karthala, 2000, pp.31-6, p.35.

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permettant à Moïse Tshombe de former un gouvernement au Katanga. La mutinerie de la Force Publique, la sécession du Katanga appuyée par la Belgique, l’arrivée de mercenaires et l’occupation d’une partie du territoire par des soldats belges installent le pays dans le chaos. Sollicitée par le gouvernement congolais, l’ONU, qui reconnaît « la nécessité impérieuse de restaurer les institutions au Congo », envisage l’utilisation de la force pour « empêcher le déclenchement d’une guerre civile au Congo ». 2) La question Katangaise Le Katanga, province la plus méridionale du Congo, est situé au sud-est, dans l’hémisphère austral ; par sa superficie, il figure à la deuxième place après la province Orientale avec 496 965 km2, soit environ la taille de l’Espagne. Grand carrefour, le Katanga est limité par le Sud-Kivu au nord-est, le Maniema au nord et les deux Kasaï au nordouest. Le Katanga partage la frontière du Congo avec l’Angola au sud-ouest, la Zambie au sud et au sud-est et la Tanzanie à l’est. Rythmée par deux saisons (saison des pluies et saison sèche) et deux types de climat, le Katanga est marqué d’une part, par un climat tropical humide avec une saison sèche et froide qui dure deux à cinq mois selon la région, d’autre part, la province connaît un climat tempéré avec une température pouvant descendre au-dessous de 0 °C.

Carte 3 : La province du Katanga dans l’Etat congolais

L’analyse démographique indique une pluralité d’ethnies dont plusieurs mélangées du fait de mouvements migratoires, des conquêtes et de l’industrialisation assez précoce de la province. Des groupes ethniques, émergent les Lubas, les Arunds (formant le groupe des Lundas, Tchokwés, Luenas, Ndembos, Minungus), Sangas, Bembas et Lam-

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bas. A côté de ces majorités, on distingue des minorités ethniques comme les Bambote, Zela, Bayazi, Ndembos, Batabwas, Kalwenas et Hembas. Région de plateaux élevés (altitude supérieure à 1000 m), le Katanga dispose de richesses minières et agricoles considérables. Le plateau du Katanga, propices aux activités agro-pastorales, dispose de plusieurs fermes d’élevage et d’agriculture. Les parties orientale (Manono) et méridionales (Lubumbashi, Kolwezi) de la province regorgent de très riches gisements de cobalt, cuivre, fer, radium, uranium, et diamant. Ces richesses multiples et sa position stratégique à cheval entre l’Afrique centrale et australe pourraient expliquer les convoitises aussi bien nationales qu’étrangères qui, depuis, vont animer la question Katangaise. L’économie du Congo, depuis la période coloniale, repose, pour l’essentiel, sur celle du Katanga, pourvoyeuse d’une grande partie des exportations. En effet, la province regorge de richesses minières immenses (cuivre surtout, étain, uranium, manganèse, charbon, zinc, cadmium, cobalt, germanium, argent, tungstène) auxquelles s’ajoutent d’immenses potentialités agricoles et hydroélectriques. A partir de 1884, sous la colonisation belge, démarre l’exploitation intensive des ressources minérales par des sociétés européennes particulièrement belges avec, notamment, l’Union minière du Haut Katanga. En réponse à la saignée démographique de la région consécutive à la traite des noirs, les Belges eurent recours à la main d’œuvre forcée grâce à des dizaines de milliers de Lubas (du Nord-Katanga ou du Kasaï), d’Angolais, de Rhodésiens, de Ruandais déportés aux fins de faire fonctionner les activités minières. L’essor de la province attira des dizaines de milliers de colons. L’édification de la voie ferrée BCK reliant la province jusqu’à Port-Francqui dopa l’économie du Katanga qui, au fil du temps, allait devenir le pilier de l’économie congolaise. En mai 1960, les élections consacrent la victoire au MNC de Patrice Lumumba qui prône une gestion bicéphale en laissant la présidence à Joseph Kasa-Vubu, après l’accession du pays à la souveraineté le 30 juin 1960. Toutefois, l’indépendance se fit dans la confusion, la tension et des troubles animés par des grèves, des soulèvements et la mutinerie de la force publique. Dès cette date, les violences de ce que deviendra la crise congolaise se multiplient, tandis que les partis exclus du gouvernement contribuent aux troubles et que les forces armées congolaises se mutinent. Pour assurer la protection des Européens et des intérêts belges, les forces belges stationnées sur le territoire sont renforcées par des troupes venues de Belgique. La crise politique eut des répercussions fâcheuses sur l’économie du Congo. A l’exode massif des ressortissants européens, répond une fuite d’une grande partie des capitaux étrangers qui précipiter le pays vers la banqueroute. Pour parer à une telle éventualité, le gouvernement puise dans les réserves de devises générées par le Katanga, moteur de l’économie congolaise. Les sociétés minières du Katanga, opposées aux mesures du gouvernement central, activent la Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT) qui demande la sécession. Moins de deux semaines après l’accession à la souveraineté internationale (le 11 juillet 1960), Moïse Tshombe, appuyé par l’Union minière du Haut Katanga (UMHK) et la Belgique, proclame l’indépendance du Katanga. Sous prétexte de protéger ses res-

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sortissants, l’ancienne puissance coloniale augmente ses effectifs militaires au Katanga. Le nouvel Etat bat monnaie, réorganise sa sécurité intérieure avec la création d’une police et le renforcement de la Gendarmerie katangaise grâce à l’appui de mercenaires (les célèbres Affreux dont Tony de Saint-Paul, ex sous-lieutenant de l’armée française, et Bob Denard). II. Les opérations multinationales au Congo : l’ONUC (1960-1964) L’indépendance, déclarée le 30 juin 1960, suivit la quinzaine des catastrophes9 (1er-15 juillet) avec des troubles animés par des soulèvements populaires, des grèves et la mutinerie de la Force Publique. La situation est d’autant plus compliquée que le Katanga, la province la plus riche,sous la direction de Moïse Tshombe s’autoproclame indépendant le 11 juillet 1960 appuyé par la Confédération des associations tribales du Katanga (CONAKAT). La décision de Tshombe déclenche une guerre sécessionniste qui fit glisser Congo dans le chaos et « friser le génocide »10. Le 12 juillet 1960, le Gouvernement congolais demanda à l’ONU une aide militaire pour protéger le pays contre l’agression extérieure, restaurer la paix et l’ordre, mettre fin à la sécession des provinces du Katanga et du Kasaï. En réponse, le Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU demande à la Belgique de retirer ses troupes et autorise une provision visant à procurer une assistance militaire au Congo jusqu’à ce que son gouvernement juge sa mission accomplie. Deux jours après la requête du Congo, des troupes onusiennes, composées de plusieurs pays asiatiques et africains pour l’essentiel débarquent au Congo, accompagnés d’experts civils de l’ONU pour aider à maintenir les services publics essentiels11. Durant quatre ans (1960-1964), outre la mise en œuvre d’un vaste programme d’assistance technique (réorganisation de l’armée congolaise, désarmement, déblocage politique, UNESCO, assistance économique), la mission de l’Opération des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) consista à appuyer le Gouvernement congolais pour la restauration et le maintien de l’ordre, de l’indépendance politique et de l’intégrité territoriale12. L’ONUC a été établie par le Conseil de sécurité par la résolution 143 (1960) du 14 juillet 1960 qui « autorise le Secrétaire général à prendre, en consultation avec le Gouvernement de la République du Congo, les mesures nécessaires en vue de fournir à ce gouvernement l’assistance militaire dont il a besoin, et ce jusqu’au moment où les forces nationales de sécurité, grâce aux efforts du Gouvernement congolais et avec l’assistance technique de l’Organisation des nations Unies, seront à même, de l’opinion de ce gouvernement, de remplir entièrement leurs tâches ». 1) Des opérations militaires complexes On entend par « Crise congolaise » (1960-1965) la période de troubles, voire de chaos qui suivit la proclamation de l’indépendance de la Première république du Congo-Kin9 Benot Y, La mort de Lumumba ou la tragédie congolaise, Editions Chaka, 1991, pp. 107-133. 10 ONU, Comité Consultatif, compte rendu, séance No 4, 2 septembre 1960. 11 Hilaire De Prince Pokam,Repenser l’Indépendance : la RD Congo 50 ans plus tard - Actes du Colloque du cinquantenaire. Pole Institute 2010, pp. 75-92, p 76. 12 Ibid

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shasa (30 juin 1960) et se termine par la prise du pouvoir par Joseph Mobutu. Emeutes, soulèvements populaires, répressions sanglantes, mutineries des forces de défense et de sécurité mais surtout la sécession du Katanga (animée par Moïse Tshombe et appuyée par la Belgique, notamment la puissante Union minière du Haut Katanga UMHK) rythmèrent la période. Déclenché en pleine guerre froide au cœur du continent africain, le conflit, qui servit de théâtre aux luttes d’influences entre les USA et l’URSS, devait se dénouer suite à l’opération de maintien de la paix de l’ONU13, mais dans la douleur des milliers de victimes dont le Premier ministre Patrice Lumumba, assassiné en 1961, et celle du secrétaire général des Nations unies, Dag Hammarskjöld, décédé dans un accident d’avion à Ndola. Initialement établie pour assurer le retrait des forces belges, aider le gouvernement à rétablir l’ordre public et fournir une assistance technique, le mandat de l’ONUC a été ultérieurement modifié pour lui permettre d’assurer le maintien de l’intégrité territoriale et de l’indépendance politique du Congo, de prévenir la guerre civile et d’assurer le retrait de tous les conseillers et forces militaires et paramilitaires étrangers ne relevant pas des Nations Unies, ainsi que de tous les mercenaires. La chronologie des événements suggère une répartition des opérations militaires en trois phases : une première phase (11 septembre 1961 - mi-octobre 1961) ; une seconde phase (mi-octobre – fin décembre) et une troisième rythmée par le dénouement et la fin de la sécession katangaise (janvier 1962-janvier 1963). a) Première phase : revers et déroutes de l’ONUC: la leçon de Jadotville. Durant la première phase, l’initiative revenait à l’armée katangaise. Elle démarre le 11 septembre 1961 suite à la réception des plans de liquidation de la sécession katangaise dénommée « opération Morthor » par Conor O’Brien, représentant du Secrétaire général au Katanga. Deux jours après l’échec des pourparlers du lundi 11 septembre 1961 entre le commandant Quinlan (ONUC) et des officiers katangais autour des objectifs de la mission (maintien de la paix), fut déclenchée l’opération Morthor dont le but consistait à anéantir par la force la sécession katangaise. Après le déclenchement des hostilités le 13 septembre à 4h20 du matin par des troupes onusiennes (composés surtout d’éléments indiens et malaisiens) avec l’attaque de la grande poste d’Élisabethville et la prise de la radio, les affrontements entre les gendarmes katangais et les troupes onusiennes (principalement indiennes et irlandaises) gagnent rapidement d’autres localités comme Kolwezi, Kamina ou Jadotville. Mais c’est dans cette dernière que la situation de la compagnie A du 35e bataillon d’infanterie irlandais prise en tenaille après le siège de la ville par les forces katangaises devient critique. À Jadotville base de la compagnie A du 35e bataillon d’infanterie irlandais placé sous le commandement P.J. Quinlan, la situation s’avérait précaire du fait des problèmes d’approvisionnement en eau et en électricité auxquels s’ajoute un équipement, notamment un armement léger fort modeste constitué de fusils Lee Enfield n°4, mitraillettes Carl Gustav M45, mitrailleuse lourde Vickers et un mortier de 81 mm. Ce 13 Gendebien P-H, L’intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960-1964, Mouton et Cie et IRES, 1967, pp. 210-240..

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contexte, des moins reluisants, allait dissuader le commandant Quinlan de toute initiative offensive malgré l’édification, pour parer à toute éventualité, de tranchées autour des maisons occupées autour de la route Jadotville – Élisabethville par les 155 soldats Irlandais contrairement à l’unité suédoise. Appréciant la situation favorable, les troupes katangaises déclenchent des opérations avec des tirs nourris d’obus de mortier sur le bataillon Irlandais qui fut isolé par la coupure de son approvisionnement en eau et électricité et éloigné du commandement central. Pris en tenaille par l’armée katangaise, les soldats de l’ONU sont mitraillés et bombardés par le Fouga Magister de l’aviation katangaise. Dépourvues de flotte aérienne militaire au Katanga, les unités onusiennes à Jadotville et Élisabethville, de même que la résidence de Conor O’Brien, représentant du Secrétaire général au Katanga, deviennent les cibles privilégiées de l’unique Fouga Magister de l’aviation katangaise qui parviendra à détruire au sol deux Douglas DC-4, un Douglas C-47, une douzaine de camions, des installations radio de l’ONU avant d’endommager un DC-6 et un Fairchild C-119 Flying Boxcar basés sur les aéroports de Kamina et Élisabethville-Luano. Pour desserrer l’étau et surtout faire face à la pénurie d’eau, un hélicoptère Sikorsky S-55 de l’ONU, parvient à se poser au sein des positions irlandaises le matin du16 septembre. A peine à terre, il fut criblé de balles et cloué au sol avant d’être récupéré, réparé et inséré dans l’aviation katangaise. Submergé par les problèmes d’intendance (l’eau livrée par le Sikorsky S-55 sérieusement altéré par le mazout précédemment contenu dans les jerricans), isolé en pleine zone équatoriale, éloigné de Léopoldville (commandement central), le commandant Quinlan entama le soir des pourparlers en vue d’un cessez-lefeu. Les négociations entamées débouchent sur un accord oral qui se concrétise par la cessation des hostilités. Le 17 septembre la colonne de secours onusienne déployée pour venir au secours des Irlandais se solde après deux tentatives infructueuses par un échec devant le pont de la Lufira fortement défendu par les troupes katangaises. Ces événements coïncident avec un contexte des moins favorables marqué d’une part par une campagne médiatique déclenchée au niveau international dénonçant les atrocités reprochées aux troupes indiennes et, d’autre part, la capture d’une trentaine de soldats Irlandais à Elisabethville (Lubumbashi) ainsi que la reddition de la compagnie irlandaise de Jadotville.Appréciant la situation très défavorable, le commandant Quinlan se résigna à la signature, à 17h, d’un acte de reddition avec le ministre de l’intérieur du Katanga, Godefroid Munongo.Le lendemain, le 18 septembre, les combattants onusiens, devenus prisonniers de guerre, sont internés à l’hôtel de l’Europe à Jadotville avant d’être transférés à Kolwézi le 11 octobre. La conjonction de ces facteurs défavorables contraint l’ONU à signer le 20 septembre un accord provisoire de cessez-le-feu prévoyant un échange de prisonniers (190 soldats de l’ONU contre 240 soldats katangais) qui a lieu le 25 octobre. L’échec de l’ONUC durant la première phase, après l’analyse des opérations et évènements est imputable, pour l’ONU, au mandat alloué aux troupes onusiennes du Congo concernant l’utilisation de la force jugé très insoddisfacente. En effet, la limitation de l’usage de la force à l’autodéfense et à l’utilisation d’armes défensives représente, à n’en pas douter, un facteur déterminant de la débâcle des troupes onusiennes au Katanga. Il s’y ajoute

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l’absence d’une aviation militaire pour mener des opérations militaires et effectuer des liaisons dans une régions aussi vaste que le Katanga. b) La deuxième phase (octobre – décembre 1961) : retournement de la situation et reprise en main progressive du Katanga Bien avant même les échanges de prisonniers de l’ONUC à Élisabethville contre des soldats katangais, l’ONU constate, avec amertume, dès octobre 1961, le retour de mercenaires expulsés, sous le couvert d’emplois civils. Tirant les leçons de la défaite des troupes engagées dans les premières opérations, notamment les failles au niveau de la couverture aérienne, l’ONU décide de se doter d’une flotte aérienne pour parer à toute éventualité. Dans ce contexte, cinq chasseurs Saab J 29 Tunnan suédois (ensuite 2 J 29C de reconnaissance en novembre 1962 et 4 J 29B en décembre 1962) furent basés à Luluabourg puis à Kamina, 6 bombardiers English Electric Canberra B(I) Mk58 indiens et 4 North American F-86 Sabre éthiopiens à Léopoldville. Consécutivement à la mise en place du dispositif aérien, furent déclenchées des opérations à partir du 5 décembre 1961 lorsque, à 13h30, les forces de l’ONUC attaquent les barrages routiers de l’armée katangaise déployés à Élisabethville en proie à d’intenses tirs d’armes légères et de mortiers. Près de deux semaines environ (6 au 18 décembre) de violents combats opposent à Élisabethville les troupes Katangaises et onusiennes. Les positions katangaises d’Elisabethville sont prises sous les feux nourris des mitraillages et tirs de roquettes de l’aviation onusienne décisive dans l’issue des combats. Les opérations de l’aviation onusienne sur l’aéroport de Kolwezi-Kengere mettent hors de combat la plupart des avions katangais, notamment le Fouga Magister. Les mitraillages de réservoirs de carburant à Kolwezi, de l’aérodrome de Jadotville-Kamatanda et d’installations ferroviaires à Jadotville par l’aviation onusienne se concrétisent, à partir du 18 décembre, par une débâcle de l’armée katangaise à Élisabethville passée sous contrôle effectif des troupes onusiennes. Harcelées, les troupes katangaises cèdent progressivement le terrain au moment où l’essentiel des mercenaires regagne Kipushi avant de se replier en Rhodésie du Nord. c) Troisième phase : la chute de l’Etat du Katanga et la fin des opérations La reprise des hostilités 24 décembre à Élisabethville est consécutive à la destruction d’un hélicoptère de l’ONU par les forces katangaises. En dépit de l’appel à la lutte totale lancé le 28 décembre par Moïse Tshombe et la menace du démantèlement du potentiel économique du Katanga, la gendarmerie katangaise ne parvint à tenir devant les troupes onusiennes renforcées en effectifs. A la fin de l’année (29 et 30 décembre), l’aviation onusienne, notamment les Saab J 29 procèdent à la destruction de plusieurs T-6, d’un DH-104 Dove et des 2 DH Vampire katangais basés à l’aérodrome de Kolwezi-Kengere. De même, des appareils de la flotte katangaise basés à Jadotville-Kamatanda sont cloués au sol suite aux bombardements aériens intensifs. Le 30 décembre la prise de Kipushi, ville ouverte, facilite la progression de l’ONUC vers Jadotville occupée le 3 janvier 1963 malgré la résistance d’unités katangaises et la destruction de 3 ponts sur la Lufira. Après la chute d’Élisabethville, Moïse Tshombe prend la fuite et se réfugie à Ko-

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lwezi. Ne restait dès lors, au début de l’année 1963, que Kolwezi devenu le dernier bastion katangais, repli du gouvernement sécessionniste. Désemparé devant la marche des troupes onusiennes,Tshombe brandit la menace de destruction des barrages hydroélectriques Delcommune et Le Marinel qui, rapidement, suscita l’opposition de l’Union minière du Haut Katanga obligée de faire appel aux services des mercenaires pour le déminage des barrages.. Les dissensions notées à partir du 10 janvier 1963 au sein des forces katangaises hétéroclites (soldats africains, belges, mercenaires, forces tribales) allaient précipiter la chute de l’Etat katangais. Après la proclamation le 14 janvier 1963 de la fin de la sécession par le gouvernement katangais14 et la fuite, le 20 janvier, des derniers mercenaires vers l’Angola, Kolwezi, ville ouverte, est prise par les troupes onusiennes le 23 janvier. 2) Leçons et enseignements a) Portée et limites du mandat La crise du Congo 1960-1964 revêt les caractères d’un conflit armé conventionnel et non-conventionnel. Si le caractère conventionnel s’explique par l’implication des soldats, clairement identifiés, se battant sans utiliser d’armes de destruction massive, l’aspect non-conventionnel fait référence à la guérilla, les mouvements de rébellion et de sécession. La nature et le caractère du conflit expliquent la complexité et la délicatesse du mandat de l’opération ONUC. Le recours à une force multinationale comporte un certain nombre de défis en termes d’efficacité. Il s’agit d’abord de procéder à la création d’un système de commandement et de contrôle efficace (y compris pour le renseignement); ensuite considérer la prise en compte des restrictions nationales régissant le recours aux éléments de force. Il s’y ajoute ensuite l’élaboration d’un système logistique conforme aux exigences nationales et internationales ainsi que la mise en œuvre des mesures afin de renforcer l’interopérabilité, telles que l’élaboration d’une doctrine et de procédures opérationnelles communes. D’une manière générale, les opérations multinationales, menées conjointement par les forces de deux ou plusieurs nations, représentent de plus en plus la norme pour les opérations expéditionnaires. Dès lors que ces opérations sont également interarmées, la compréhension des concepts, de la doctrine et des procédures applicables à la planification, à l’organisation et à la conduite de ces opérations devient un impératif. La crise congolaise et le recours à l’ONUC pose la question des modalités des interventions à l’intérieur des Etats en crise. La multinationalité, notamment dans le cas du Congo, pose la question dont s’exercent le commandement et le contrôle dans le cadre d’une opération multinationale, de forces armées souvent hétérogènes, les structures et relations de commandement et de contrôle lorsqu’il s’agit d’opérations assez complexes, convoquant l’interposition, le maintien de l’ordre, la reconquête militaire, l’assistance technique (formation de cadre, volet formation militaire, etc.). Un véritable dilemme se posait devant l’ONU : le mandat tout en prévoyant le main14 Ludo De Wittle, L’assassinat de Lumumba, Paris, Karthala, 2000, p. 405.

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tien de l’ordre, interdisait une immixtion dans les conflits politiques intérieurs15. Se pose ainsi l’imprécision du mandat de l’ONUC. La tâche s’est révélée ardue sur le terrain lorsqu’il s’agit, outre d’observer la neutralité, maintenir l’ordre, en période de guerre civile animée par les partis politiques, les rébellions et les sécessions. En effet, le maintien et la sauvegarde de l’ordre public constituent des domaines réservés aux autorités étatiques. A l’ origine, les prérogatives des opérations de maintien de la paix se limitaient exclusivement à la fonction d’interposition entre des parties belligérantes dans le cadre des conflits internationaux. Pendant quatre décennies (1956-1986), une seule opération, celle de l’ONU au Congo (ONUC), est allée au-delà de ces prérogatives et de cette fonction classique grâce à l’intégration des tâches d’assistance civile. Pour l’ONU, se pose une question cruciale. Comment s’engager dans la guerre pour une organisation créée dans l’optique de préserver la paix ? Comment concilier l’incompatibilité du principe de la non-ingérence et les impératifs du maintien de l’ordre ? Comment éviter qu’une « force de la paix » ne se transforme en une « force combattante » ? Par sa résolution de novembre 1961, le Conseil donnait mandat au birman U Thant, le successeur de Hammarskjold, à « entreprendre une action vigoureuse, y compris, le cas échéant, l’emploi de la force dans la mesure requise, pour faire immédiatement appréhender, placer en détention dans l’attente de poursuite en justice ou expulser tous les personnels militaire et paramilitaire et conseillers politiques ne relevant pas du commandement des Nations Unies ... » La condamnation de la sécession katangaise fut l’élément moteur du durcissement de l’ONU. La résolution du 24 novembre 1961 reposait sur des principes qui facilitèrent la résolution de la crise : le principe de la non-intervention dans les conflits internes, mis sous le boisseau, était écarté. L’ONU avait reçu un mandat explicite, dépassant les simples implications des résolutions précédentes, pour mettre fin aux activités des mercenaires et l’usage de la force était autorisé sans nulle contestation possible. Toutefois, l’usage de la force prévu par la résolution du 21 février 1961 ne se fondait pas sur les articles 41 et 42, car l’article 42 vise la guerre inter-étatique et la résolution en question ne concernait que la guerre civile16. L’intervention met au jour le rôle accru, l’accroissement considérable du Secrétaire Général de l’ONU qualifié de déviation par le général De Gaulle. Il est évident que l’Assemblée Générale et le Conseil de Sécurité ont considérablement accru les responsabilités assumées par le Secrétaire général. Après l’opération les Nations Unies ont reconsidéré le rôle du Secrétaire Général désormais beaucoup plus circonscrit. Se posent par ailleurs la répartition des postes par Etat ou continent, la subordination des unités, les conditions de transfert d’autorité, les règles d’engagement et les restrictions qui doivent être clairement définies et connues par les états-majors impliqués dans les opérations et les unités de commandement subordonnés. La faiblesse des moyens techniques, l’ambiguïté du dispositif législatif et la complexité du milieu terrestre ne permettaient pas d’avoir une appréciation adéquate de la situation sur le terrain qui peut être souvent biaisée. 15 Gendebien P H, op cit, p.80 16 Doc.ONU, S/RES/5002 du 21 novembre 1961 cité par Gendebien P.-H., ibid., p. 134. Gendebien P.-H., idem, p. 135. 105 Doc. ONU, 5/PV 920, 13 décembre 1960.

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b) Les opérations aériennes Durant la première phase des opérations militaires, le dispositif aérien a été l’une des failles de l’ONUC. En effet, l’absence d’une composante appui aérien, d’une capacité de transport aérien stratégique/tactique ont pesé lourdement sur la déroute des troupes onusiennes. Sans appui aérien, isolées dans la forêt équatoriale, les troupes onusiennes basées à Elisabethville furent cible privilégiée de l’aviation katangaise. Même la résidence de Conor O’Brien, représentant du Secrétaire Général au Katanga, ne fut pas épargnée. Le retournement de situation qui s’opéra durant la seconde phase ne fut rendue possible que grâce à la dotation d’une flotte aérienne composée de cinq chasseurs Saab J 29 Tunnan suédois (ensuite 2 J 29C de reconnaissance en novembre 1962 et 4 J 29B en décembre 1962) basés à Luluabourg puis à Kamina, 6 bombardiers English Electric Canberra B(I) Mk58 indiens et 4 North American F-86 Sabre éthiopiens positionnés à Léopoldville. c) Le financement et le jeu des superpuissances Le Congo des années 1960 constitue un enjeu de la confrontation Est-Ouest17.D’une manière générale, l’utilisation de la force par l’ONUC a eu des conséquences pour le système des Nations Unies dans sa politique de maintien de la paix. Pour plusieurs observateurs, l’ONUC fut assimilée à un outil de la politique étrangère américaine18. Du côté soviétique, dès le début de la crise congolaise, l’URSS, à travers les déclarations de Khroutchev, adopta une attitude menaçante avec des menaces d’intervention qui vont accélérer l’internationalisation de l’affaire congolaise19. En outre, la mission a entraîné une crise financière qui allait retentir dans les opérations ultérieures. Le coût annuel de l’ONUC évalué à 66 millions de dollars, a lourdement épuisé le budget global de l’ONU estimé à 70 millions $. Dans un rapport du SG de l’ONU sur le Congo, la dépense totale pour l’ONUC (1960-1964) est estimé à 433 millions $20. Le déficit budgétaire provoqué par l’opération fut d’autant lourd que la France, écartée par les Américains dans le plan de réorganisation de l’armée congolaise, refusa de contribuer, de même que l’URSS21.

17 Gérard-Libois, J et alii.,Congo 1960, échec d’une décolonisation, 2D. André Versaille, CRISP, 2010. 18 Voir: Gibbs D, « The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of impartiality :revisiting the Congo operation of 1960 », Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(3): 359-82, 2000. Weissman, Stephen R. (1974) American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964, Cornell Univ. Press. 19 Documents Diplomatiques Français, Commission de publication des DDF. Pièce 177, Note de la sousdirection d’Afrique « Politique américaine au Congo et intérêts français », Paris 15 mars 1965, pp. 447-448. 20 Télégraphe de NY No 712/NU du 3 juillet 1964, non publié, in : Documents Diplomatiques Français, Commission de publication des DDF.Pièce 177, Note de la sous-direction d’Afrique « Politique américaine au Congo et intérêts français », Paris 15 mars 1965, pp. 447-448. 21 Nicholas H.G, The United Nations as a Political Institution, 5th edition, Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 65.

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Dépenses militaires de l’ONUC Années 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964

Dépenses en millions de dollars 60 120 120 120 33 Source : Gendebien P-H, op cit, 175.

Un enseignement tiré de l’opération, pour les Nations Unies, fut de reconsidérer le rôle du Secrétaire général désormais beaucoup plus circonscrit. De même, la durée des mandats des forces ultérieures de l’ONU a été revue, voire réduite, même si elle pouvait être prolongée afin de permettre au Conseil de sécurité d’examiner périodiquement les opérations en cours. Deux autres enseignements, et non des moindres, peuvent être tirés du rôle de l’ONUC au Congo. Au premier constat, l’ONU s’est impliquée, voire s’engagée dans des conflits intra-étatiques bien avant les années 199022 (voir Morphet 2000). Au second constat, même lorsqu’il s’agit de questions de gouvernance soulevées par les principes et systèmes de Westphalie (depuis 1648 suite à la guerre de Trente ans), l’ONU, autant que faire se peut, a refusé d’approuver une politique ainsi que des solutions qui n’étaient pas fondées sur l’intégrité territoriale de l’État en question (le Congo) grâce au maintien des frontières issues de la colonisation. d) L’épineuse question de la communication et de la propagande En dépit des contextes différents de l’ONUC (période de guerre froide) et de la MONUC (période post guerre froide), les missions de ces deux organismes, pour certains dans l’accomplissement de leurs mandats, ont plus mis l’accent sur la sécurisation de leurs troupes que sur la protection des populations. Au cœur des opérations, une véritable campagne de désinformation, d’intoxication fut menée à l’encontre des Nations Unies aussi bien par le Katanga que par l’Etat du Congo. L’intoxication de l’opinion, la bataille psychologique, l’exagération des faits par les adversaires de l’opération posent, au fonds, les déficiences des services d’information et de propagande de l’ONUC. A Kisangani, l’Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) se livra le 11 novembre 1961 en présence des forces des Nations Unies à des exactions, Albertville (Kalemie) et Kindu en exécutant 13 pilotes italiens de l’ONUC. e) Autres D’autres limites sont notées au niveau des moyens militaires, à savoir les insuffisances et lacunes au niveau des transmissions, signalisations, transports, support logistique, des renseignements. Intégration de la force internationale : le commandement de la force posait problème 22 Morphet S, “ UN Peace keeping and Election-Monitoring” in Roberts A and Kingsbury B (eds), United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 183-239.

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par configuration. Composée d’officiers et de soldats ayant des traditions et formations militaires différentes, l’ONUC posait le problème de l’intégration, de la communication (langues, problème de l’anglais parlé par les Suédois et Anglais), Un autre problème est lié à l’instabilité dans la structure politico-administrative de l’opération ONUC avec, en l’espace de quatre ans, 9 changements à la tête de la Représentation Spéciale, 6 au niveau du Commandement en Chef, 10 au niveau du Représentant à Elisabethville, 4 au niveau du Commandement de la Force au Katanga. Conclusion L’opération ONUC pose, au fonds, les modalités des interventions à l’intérieur des Etats. La situation fut d’autant plus cruciale que le maintien de l’ordre public interne octroyé par le mandat impliquait l’usage préventif ou actif d’une force de contrainte. L’ONUC, force de police ne remettait-elle pas en question le principe de non intervention dans les affaires internes d’un Etat souverain ? Ainsi, la crise congolaise et l’usage de la force par l’ONUC à l’intérieur du territoire congolais représente une remise en cause du système et des principes westphaliens. La crise au Congo démontre, si besoin en était, comment la combinaison d’une décolonisation précipitée par la Belgique, la fragilité de l’État, la faiblesse de l’autorité du gouvernement central et la fragmentation ethnique et régionale ont attiré dans le guêpier congolais l’ONU qui dût s’ingérer dans les affaires intérieures d’un Etat indépendant en utilisant la force contre un mouvement sécessionniste et des mercenaires étrangers et même soutenir secrètement le renversement du Premier ministre élu, Patrice Lumumba (voir Abi-Saab 1978; Higgins, 1980; Gibbs 2000). Le retrait de l’ONUC s’effectua par étapes après Février 1963, lorsque Katanga a été réintégré dans le territoire national congolais. Les dernières troupes ONUC ont été retirées avant le 30 Juin 1964 alors que le pays continué à recevoir de l’aide civile. L’utilisation par l’ONUC de la force a eu des répercussions importantes sur le système des Nations Unies notamment dans les opérations de maintien de la paix. Comme Alan James (1990: 298) a suggéré, la mission a été largement perçue comme un outil de la politique étrangère américaine (voir aussi Gibbs 2000). Il a également généré une crise financière qui sévit dans les opérations de l’ONU. L’opération a également encouragé les Nations Unies à reconsidérer le rôle du Secrétaire Général désormais beaucoup plus circonscrit. Enfin, toutes les forces ultérieures de l’ONU ont été donnés six mois longs mandats afin de permettre au Conseil de sécurité d’examiner périodiquement en cours opérations. Le rôle de l’ONUC au Congo met ainsi en évidence deux points importants. En premier lieu, l’occasion, l’ONU était prête et capable de s’engager dans des conflits intra-étatiques bien avant les années 1990 (voir Morphet 2000). Deuxièmement, même lorsqu’il s’agit de problèmes exacerbée par les systèmes de Westphalie de gouvernance, dans ce cas, le maintien de l’état dans les frontières imposées durant le colonialisme, l’ONU a refusé d’approuver politique solutions qui n’étaient pas fondées sur l’intégrité territoriale de l’État en question. Parmi les autres problèmes, figurent les ambigüités et limites du mandat, les déficiences des services d’information et de propagande de l’ONUC, les insuffisances et

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lacunes au niveau des transmissions, signalisations, transports, support logistique, des renseignements. Bibliographie Bouvier, P., L’accession du Congo-Belge à l’indépendance, Bruxelles, ULB, 1965. Bontinck F, Aux origines de l’État indépendant du Congo. Documents tirés d’archives américaines, Louvain-Paris, Nauwelaerts, 1966. Cornevin Robert, Histoire du Zaïre, éd. Hayez, Paris, Acad. des Sciences d’Outre-Mer, 1989. Documents Diplomatiques Français, Commission de publication des DDF. Pièce 177, Note de la sous-direction d’Afrique « Politique américaine au Congo et intérêts français », Paris 15 mars 1965, pp. 447-448. Marie-France Cros et François Misser, Géopolitique du Congo (RDC), Complexe, 2006. Ergo, A.-B., Congo Belge.La colonie assassinée, Paris, éd. L’Harmattan, 2009 Braeckman, C. et alii, Congo-Zaïre : la colonisation, l’indépendance, le régime Mobutu et demain, Bruxelles, GRIP, 1990. Epstein, Howard (ed). (1974) Revolt in the Congo, 1960-1964, Armor Books. Gendebien Paul-Henry, L’intervention des Nations Unies au Congo, 1960-1964, Mouton et Cie et IRES, Paris, 1967.. Gérard-Libois, J., Sécession au Katanga, Bruxelles, CRISP, 1963. Gibbs D, « The United Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of impartiality :revisiting the Congo operation of 1960 », Journal of Modern African Studies, 38(3): 359-82, 2000. King Gordon J, The United Nations in Congo: a Quest for Peace, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1962. Lemarchand, René, (1964) Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo, Univ. of California Press. Lumumba P, Le Congo, terre d’avenir est-il menacé ?, Bruxelles, Office de Publicité S.A. 1961. Rapport Casement, Centre d’Histoire de l’Afrique, Université Catholique de Louvain, collection «Enquêtes et documents d’histoire africaine», n°6, 1985. Morphet S, “ UN Peace keeping and Election-Monitoring” in Roberts A and Kingsbury B (eds), United Nations, Divided World, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, pp. 183-239. Vanthmesche G, La Belgique et le Congo. empreintes d’une colonie (1885-1980), Complexe, 2007. Weissman, Stephen R. (1974) American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964, Cornell Univ. Press.

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Operation “Mar Verde” Aniceto AFONSO David MARTELO Background n the context of the wider post-World War II decolonization movement, from 1963 to 1974, in the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau, an armed conflict took place between the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and the Portuguese armed forces. The Portuguese regime, led by Oliveira Salazar, implanted a dictatorship since the beginning of the thirties named «Estado Novo» that fought back the decolonization (the ‘winds of change’ in the words of Harold MacMillan) up to the engagement on three operations theatres against the pro-independence movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The aim of the Nationalist movements was to achieve independence of their territories, supported by a very favourable international environment. Being its territory relatively small (36,544 km2) and very flat, Guinea-Bissau is located on the western coast of Africa. The coastline is very indented, with an extensive river network playing an important role as communication routes between the sea and the hinterland. Along the coast, one can find a wide complex set of islands with very favourable conditions for joint operations, with emphasis on the use of naval assets. Guinea-Bissau, having borders with the Republic of Guinea (independent since 1958) and Senegal (independent since 1960) enable both countries to give significant support to the PAIGC and constituted an important sanctuary for military operations launched against the Portuguese military forces stationed in the territory. The assistance that these two neighbour countries were offering to the PAIGC forces was a matter of concern to the Portuguese government and the military command of the territory, constituting, in his operational concept, an assumed restriction, though not completely sacrosanct. Anyway, there were express recommendations to avoid border violations, which could happen only in extreme situations, and always in a swift manner and as concealed as possible, so that Portugal would never be internationally blamed for those acts. The various occasions the Portuguese forces entered neighbouring countries, thus violating these countries borders, were due to combat actions involving the pursuit of the PAIGC forces as a result of unforeseen incidents and were never too deep in foreign territory. Whenever an operation planning required a potential or even effective border violation, the Portuguese military command chose to use Infantry and Marines units manned by native personnel (African troops), wearing uniforms and armaments different from those of the Portuguese Army and Navy standard issue, and, when necessary, weaponry from Warsaw Pact countries, similar to those used by the guerrillas and the nationalist fighters.

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We are going to present you the synthesis of the only operation of this type planned by the Portuguese command, conducted during the twelve years that the conflict lasted in Guinea-Bissau and that brought lasting and fatal consequences to the Portuguese regime, already with a very weak position in the Concert of Nations. We refer to operation “Mar Verde“ (Green Sea), carried out in November of 1970, in support to a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea. The idea of executing a larger incursion in the territory of the Republic of Guinea arose in August of 1969, when a raid to release more than twenty Portuguese POW (prisoners of war) held in captivity by the PAIGC in Conakry was for the first time considered. Another objective, that seemed easily achievable, was the destruction of the P6 and Komar patrol boats, owned by the PAIGC and the Republic of Guinea respectively, which were posing a serious threat because they were significantly faster than those of the Portuguese Navy, though they were very vulnerable to a surprise attack when docked in the port of Conakry. By the end of 1969, being already under way the planning phase of the operation, the Portuguese military command in Bissau, led by general António de Spínola, learned that the Portuguese government was maintaining contacts with dissidents of the president Sékou Touré, since the summer of 1968. They hoped that Portugal supported a coup d’etat to overthrow the regime in Conakry, at least with financial resources and weapons. In return, they offered the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the liquidation of the PAIGC in Guinea-Conakry. At that stage of the negotiations, it was not demanded to the Portuguese authorities to use the territory of Guinea-Bissau as the departure base for the operation. Instead, the territory of Ivory Coast was envisioned. Having the Portuguese government accepted to collaborate with the opponents of Touré – where the “Front National de Libération Guinéen” (FNLG), headed by Paul Dechanbenoit, stands out –, the idea of a raid gained the strategic dimension of a coup d’etat, something that was not on the initial plans of the military command of Bissau. The change of regime in Conakry and the agreed neutralization of the PAIGC in the country would constitute a blow in the political and military capabilities of the proindependence movement. The more than two years elapsed from the date of the first approach made by Guinean dissidents to the government of Lisbon until the triggering of the operation clearly show the doubts that the Portuguese authorities had regarding the capabilities of the rebels. Therefore, the already existing planning to raid Conakry remained as the basis for the operation. From conception to final execution, the operation was always commanded by lieutenant-commander Alpoim Calvão, a Marine Officer of the Portuguese Navy, backed up by the Portuguese military command in Guinea and by the highest Portuguese political authorities. From the declassified report of the operation, it is possible to extract the mission assigned to the force led by Calvão: • To carry out a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea, in order to allow the rise to power of a government favourable to the “high interests of the Nation”;

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• In parallel with this action, assault the PAIGC premises in Conakry, in order to cause casualties and psychological damage, destroy material and release the 26 Portuguese military held captive by the movement. Both parts of the mission had very different probabilities of success. The execution of the coup d’etat would be favoured by the Portuguese raid, but the success of its execution was very dependent on the performance of the FNLG force and its supporters in Conakry. Moreover, in both cases – but in particular in what was concerned to the coup d’etat – the reliability of the intelligence that would support the planning was of paramount importance for the success of the operation. Commander-in-Chief António de Spínola’s personal commitment in the operation is fairly obvious in his letter, mailed from Bissau on the 12th of November 1970, and addressed to the Prime-Minister Marcelo Caetano (who replaced Oliveira Salazar, in 1968) one week prior the beginning of the operation, in which the Portuguese Commander-inChief clearly states: «Personally, I assume full responsibility for the operation, running the necessary risks, because I’m firmly convinced that, notwithstanding the unquestionable accomplishment in the scope of a social counter-revolution, we will irremediably lose Guinea if we do not neutralize the enemy abroad».1 Within the Portuguese government, the question was not peaceful, contrasting the support granted by the Prime-Minister with the opposition expressed by the Defence Minister and the Overseas Minister, both concerned with the international repercussion of such a dangerous initiative. Preparation The capital city of the Republic of the Guinea has a sui generis configuration, due to being located in a peninsula with an extensive isthmus. In the perspective of an amphibious attack, this configuration has the advantage of presenting all the targets at a short range from the sea. On the 17th of September 1969, when the final decision on the operation was still pending, Alpoim Calvão led a reconnaissance operation to the city of Conakry, due to the fact that the available intelligence (provided by the relevant Portuguese services) was very insufficient and outdated. The reconnaissance operation was conducted by the patrol boat Cassiopeia, previously disguised as a fishing boat. At 02H00, sailing from the south, entered in the canal between the islands of Loos and Conakry and stood poised in the most favourable point for collecting data through the radar, in particular the shape and location of the new piers. At 03H00 the mission was considered completed and Cassiopeia sailed back to base. In January 1970, the operational base for the preparation of the operation was established in the island of Soga, in the archipelago of Bijagós. Concurrently, the recruitment and gathering in Soga of the FNLG combatants was initiated from their places of 1 ANTUNES, Freire, Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, Publicações D. Quixote, Lisboa, 1985, Vol. I, p. 149.

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exile: Sierra Leone, Gambia and Senegal. Most of these combatants were collected by Portuguese Navy units in seashores of countries they were, in small covert operations, previously coordinated with the FNLG leadership. On the island of Soga, in complete secrecy, these FNLG elements underwent an adequate military training. Ultimately, 150 FNLG elements where declared combat ready and approximately twenty more militias of the Portuguese Guinea joined them as they had a fair knowledge of the Guinea-Conakry territory. Because they were not part of the Portuguese Armed Forces, these combatants were commanded by former French Colonial Army Officers and NCOs, being the most senior in command Diallo Thierno, a former Major. Nevertheless, Portuguese officers and non-commissioned officers were responsible for their training. Just five days prior to the departure for Conakry, the Portuguese regulars joined the rest of the force in the island of Soga – native black Marines and Army African Commandos, comprising of one African Commando Company (150 men) and a Detachment of African Marines (80 men). All the personnel involved in the operation wore uniforms different from the Portuguese ones and the armament was of Soviet type. Nobody carried anything that could, in case of capture, compromise Portugal. The few Caucasian personnel that went ashore were ordered to darken the visible parts of their bodies. The transport of these troops was carried out in six vessels: four “Argos class” Patrol Boats and two large Landing Craft Utilities. The force, under the command of Alpoim Calvão, took the name Task Group 27-2 (TG 27-2). Concept of Operation Some of the tasks established for the military action were given top priority, from which success depended the execution of the remaining ones. The priorities were as follows: • Destruction of the enemy’s naval assets (PAIGC and Republic of Guinea); • Neutralization of the Guinean Air Force aircrafts landed at their home base (including the Mig-17), key action for the prosecution of the operations; • Neutralization of the land forces at their barracks. The successful achievement of this sequence of actions should permit, not only a victorious coup d’etat, but also the success of the remaining missions being the most important: the attack to the PAIGC facilities in Conakry, the elimination or capture of the leaders and the liberation of the Portuguese prisoners. The forces were organized in various assault teams, each corresponding to the following objectives: ALFA - Presidential Palace BRAVO - Minister of Interior CHARLIE - Gendarmerie HQ DELTA - Ministers Béavogui and Sayfoulah Djallo residence ECHO - Gendarmerie FOXTROT - La Paternelle (Cubans)

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GOLF - Post Office HOTEL - Radio Boulbinet INDIA - Electrical power plant MIKE - Samory barracks OSCAR - Republican Guard PAPA - Isthmus SIERRA - Airport VICTOR - Patrol Boats ZULU - PAIGC On November 19th, eve of the departure, the commander-in-chief António de Spínola went to the island of Soga, to meet with the troops. At 20H00, on November 20th 1970, TG 27-2, led by Alpoim Calvão, sailed away from the island of Soga. A P2V5 Portuguese Air Force plane overflew the Task Group, surveying the status of the route. Other air assets were kept on alert in support of the operation, particularly during the return to base. The following day (21st), the ships reached unnoticed the outskirts of Conakry, at approximately 20H00. At the spreading point, each of the six vessels manoeuvred to the most suitable location for landing the teams on both shores of the city peninsula. The patrol boat Orion, flagship of the operation, anchored NNW of the jetty protecting the harbour, half a mile distant. Out of the remaining ones, three others anchored north of the city and the other two headed south. Execution The action was triggered at 01H45 on the 22nd, a Sunday, with complete surprise, when only nightlife places were open. VICTOR team left Orion on rubber boats and headed for the break-water and the pier where the ships to be neutralized were moored. Once the sentry was eliminated, the team members entered the P6 patrol boats and started various fires by throwing hand grenades through the hatches. Running across the pontoon, they did the same to the three Komar who were alongside the wharf on the north side, returning afterward to the Orion. In the meantime, team HOTEL left the landing craft Bombarda, in two rubber boats, in order to take control over Radio Boulbinet. However, after coming ashore, the team leader, a Portuguese officer, got confused and therefore unable to accomplish the mission. Consequently, the proclamation of the FNLG was never broadcasted. Then, in two waves, rubber boats landed teams ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF. In the Gendarmerie barracks, initial strong resistance was found, but ultimately dominated; the remaining targets, in downtown Conakry, were seized with little opposition. However, Sekou Touré was not found at the presidential palace. In turn, teams ÓSCAR, INDIA and MIKE, departure from the Large Landing Craft Montante, towards their objectives. The first, in rubber boats, headed the Republican Guard barracks. Here, after a fierce combat, achieved the complete control of the site,

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freeing about 400 existing prisoners. Teams INDIA and MIKE came ashore directly from the landing craft, that came alongside in the Yacht Club pier. Team INDIA managed to control the power plant, after neutralizing the guards. The power outage that followed plunged the city into darkness, contributing to the disorientation of the local forces. Team MIKE marched for a kilometre and occupied, without resistance, Camp Samory, facing, subsequently, a motorized force that showed up at the site. Team ZULU left the patrol boats Dragão and Cassiopeia in ten rubber boats, managing to reach land only at 02H15. Split into three groups, the first one headed to La Montaigne prison, where all the 26 Portuguese soldiers were held in captivity. After a short but violent combat with the local garrison, all the POW were released. The second group attacked the PAIGC headquarters, destroying buildings and vehicles and shooting down some fighters. Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC, was absent abroad, which was not known. The third group stormed the militia camp and Villa Silly, alternative residence of Sekou Touré, but he was not there either. Finally, when team SIERRA came ashore, with the mission to occupy Conakry airport and to destroy the existing Mig-17 fighters planes, heavy gunfire was in progress in the city. The team went on a forced march up to the airport, which was seized without resistance. However, no Migs were there to be found. It was during this march to the airport that Commando 1st Lieutenant Januário, a native of Portuguese Guinea and previously highly decorated by the Portuguese authorities, defected with twenty of his men. The absence of the Migs caused a great deal of concern to the leadership of the operation, as it could give the enemy aerial supremacy. In such circumstances, an air attack against the fleet, at first light, was a likely prospect. This led Alpoim Calvão to terminate the operation at approximately 04H30, ordering the reembark of all forces. Finding out that the FLNG influence in Conakry was much less significant than what their leaders had promised was another factor contributing to this decision. Even so, some of the FLNG militants who took part in the operation chose to remain in Conakry, where, in the following days, engaged in fighting against Touré’s troops, although without any success. The reembark took longer than desirable until the break of dawn. According to the Portuguese military reports, the teams retrieval vessel manoeuvres were observed by a crowd of Guineans, who applauded enthusiastically the Portuguese military, believing they were witnessing the fall of Sékou Touré’s regime. As soon as all the teams were back on board, TG 27-2 sailed to the island of Soga, where it arrived by 16H25 the following day, November 23rd. The Portuguese suffered three dead and nine wounded (military), and inflicted to the enemy casualties estimated to be at about 500 killings (military and civilian). Final remarks From a strategic point of view, Operation “Mar Verde” was a complete failure. Touré’s regime trembled but did not fall and the position of the PAIGC in Guinea was not

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altered. It should be emphasized the success obtained with the destruction of patrol boats and the release of 26 Portuguese POW. Following the operation, whose authorship the Portuguese government refused to recognize, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, at the request of the Republic of Guinea, and an approved resolution demanded «immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and of all foreign mercenaries» out of the Republic of Guinea. On December 8th, resolution 290 of the Security Council was adopted, explicitly condemning Portugal for the invasion of Guinea and, for the first time, considering «the presence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa a serious threat to peace and security of independent African states». The resolution was adopted with 11 votes in favour; France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States abstained. The idea still remaining nowadays is that the action against Conakry was a “shot in the dark”, far from the usual policy followed by the Portuguese government in developing friendly relations with the authorities and the populations of neighbouring countries, though hardly ever with success. The execution of such an operation always raised many questions, because if it had the success that their mentors and performers intended, that could trigger an escalation of violence, always unfavourable to the Portuguese regime and its colonial policy.

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The South African Navy and the war in Namibia and in Angola, 1966-1989: an example of limited but nevertheless important joint operations André WESSELS 1. Introduction n 26 August 1966 the first clash between South African security forces and cadres of the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) took place in the north of South West Africa (SWA; today Namibia). This set in motion a train of events which in due course led to a full-scale guerrilla war; a war that spilled over into Angola and which became intertwined with the liberation struggle and, later, the civil war in the latter country. The war in SWA, and later also in Angola, was mainly fought by the ground forces (South African (SA) Army) of the South African Defence Force (SADF), assisted by aircraft and helicopters of the SA Air Force (SAAF), while the SA Medical Services (SAMS) played an important role with regard to the evacuation and treatment of the casualties. But what about the South African Navy (SAN)? In this paper, the role played by the SAN during the Namibian War of Independence and the war in Angola (usually referred to as the Border War or Bush War) will be analysed, with special reference to the role of the Navy in joint operations. This will include the SAN’s role in Operation Savannah (1975-1976), when the SADF for the first time invaded Angola, with special reference to the support the SAN’s warships and submarines provided to the ground forces; the role played by the Navy’s newly-established Marines on the Zambezi River and surrounding areas (where necessary in co-operation with the SA Army and SAAF); the electronic and other patrol work along the west coast of Africa by SAN warships and submarines in support of the land and air forces; and the crucial support provided by the SAN to missions undertaken by the SADF’s Special Forces. Mention will also be made of the SAN’s Exercise Magersfontein (1988). In order to place the SAN’s role in joint operations in perspective, the developments, achievements, problems and frustrations experienced by the Navy in the years 1966 to 1989 will also be (briefly) discussed, as well as how the Namibian War of Independence affected the SAN. Proceeding from the assumption that the SAN played a limited but nevertheless important role during the Namibian War of Independence, and that their (limited) joint operations with the SA Army and SAAF contributed to the relative success achieved by the SADF during this conflict, it is the purpose of this paper to provide a review of the SAN’s joint operations during the conflict that lasted from 1966 to 1989. Since around 2006, there has been an outpouring of new books on the war. But in most of these publications there are very few if any references to the role played by the SAN. The information used in writing this paper was gleaned from the books in which there

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are references to the SAN’s role; i.e. open sources that are freely available. The paper focuses on the military events. Whether it was a just war, and who were right and who were wrong in this protracted and traumatic conflict, falls outside the parameters of the study. 2. Operation Savannah, 1975-1976 After the then Union of South Africa’s Union Defence Forces conquered German South-West Africa in 1915, the territory – henceforth merely known as South-West Africa (SWA) – was classified as a Class C Mandate by the League of Nations, and South Africa was asked to administer the territory; albeit that in due course it was unofficially regarded by many white South Africans as a fifth province of the Union (and, since 1961, Republic) of South Africa. In 1959 the resistance organisations South West Africa National Union (SWANU) and the Ovamboland People’s Organization (OPO) were founded. In 1960 OPO was renamed the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO). When it was clear the National Party (NP) regime in South Africa (which had gradually become more isolated because of its policy of separate development; i.e. apartheid) was not going to relinquish control over SWA, SWAPO resorted to an armed liberation struggle. The first clash between SWAPO cadres and the South African security forces took place at Ongulumbashe on 26 August 1966.1 Initially the South African Police was deployed to deal with the insurgents, but by 1973 the conflict had escalated to such an extent, that the SADF took over the counter-guerrilla operations.2 As long as Angola was still Portuguese territory, SWAPO had no base facilities near to the northern border of SWA, but when it became clear that Portugal was going to withdraw from Angola, the possibility of SWAPO acquiring bases from where it could launch incursions into SWA, became a major concern for the South African government. On 11 November 1975, Angola indeed became independent. Since 1961 three liberation movements had been fighting against Portuguese colonial rule, namely the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) and the Unição Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). In October 1975 the SADF launched Operation Savannah and invaded Angola in support of the pro-Western FNLA and UNITA.3 The invading South African forces consisted of a number of Army combat groups, with the SAAF providing the necessary air cover and support. The SADF land forces rapidly advanced into Angola, covering 3 159 km and came within sight of Luanda. While the SA Army task groups advanced northwards, the SAN was called upon to patrol off the coast of SWA and Angola to monitor the movements of Soviet Bloc ships that might transport arms, ammunition and other military equipment to the MPLA, and to be on stand-by in case SA Army personnel had to be evacuated.4 The submarine SAS Johanna van der Merwe was deployed to Angolan waters even before Operation Savan1 2 3 4

P Els, Ongulumbashe: where the Bush war began (Wandsbeck, 2007), pp. 53-158. L Scholtz, The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989 (Cape Town, 2013), pp. 7-15. See in general FJ du T Spies, Operasie Savannah: Angola 1975-1976 (Pretoria, 1989). For the SAN’s order of battle in 1975, see A du Toit, South Africa’s fighting ships past and present (Rivonia, 1992); Jane’s fighting ships 1975-76 (London, 1975).

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nah commenced. Then the frigate SAS President Kruger was sent out on patrol (departed from Simon’s Town on 5 November), with the combat support ship SAS Tafelberg also sent north to replenish the other SAN units; and, if necessary, provide logistical support to land forces. Initially the President Kruger spent some three weeks in the vicinity of the mouth of the Cunene River, ostensibly on a fisheries-protection patrol, but in reality to stand by in case she had to assist in evacuating civilians and/or military personnel. SAS President Kruger was relieved by her sister ship, SAS President Steyn on 20 November 1975. Just as SAS President Kruger, SAS President Steyn was also to keep radio silence and avoid contact with other ships. She was also to monitor and record the ground forces’ radio transmissions, and intercept MPLA radio traffic – for later analysis.5 On 27 November 1975, Brig. B de W Roos, contacted SAS President Steyn by radio and asked to be evacuated from Ambriz, to the north of Luanda. Capt. AS Davis let him know that Ambriz was unsuitable for such an operation and that he and his party had to move to the small harbour of Ambrizette, a small fishing village 70 km further north. Davis now also broke radio silence in an effort to get the necessary approval from Navy Headquarters in Pretoria – which was duly given. By 04h24 in the early hours of 28 November, Roos and company signalled that they were ready to be evacuated, albeit that it had to take place from the beach at the town, because the small harbour had no pier. The frigate was 3,5 nautical miles off the coast, when, at 04h40, Davis sent three Gemini boats, under the command of Lt RN Erleigh, towards the beach, followed soon by the ship’s cutter. Erleigh took his Gemini boat to the shore near the town square, and then ordered the other boats to follow. When it became clear that the boats would not be able to evacuate all the men and equipment before sunrise (which would be at 07h10), Davis ordered the ship’s SAAF Wasp helicopter to fly out to the shore to pick up Roos’s communications and cryptographic gear. Capt. (SAAF) Ben van der Westhuizen and his flight engineer (Sgt BB Smit) took off with their Wasp at 05h54 – first to bring on board Brig. Roos and two of his men. At 06h43 the boats arrived back at the ship, and at 06h50 the Wasp landed for the last time before SAS President Steyn turned back out to the deep sea. In total the boats and Wasp helicopter of SAS President Steyn picked up nine South African officers, 15 other ranks, two civilians, as well as equipment, from the beach near Ambrizette – and took them to Walvis Bay.6 This joint operation between the South African land, air and naval forces was limited; but it was successful. Some SADF forces advanced to some 20 km from Luanda, but were then ordered to halt – and then to withdraw. The SADF land forces, with the support of the SAAF and – in particular the SAN – were probably in a position to have captured Luanda, as well as most, if not all, the other Angolan port cities; and could then have handed them over to UNITA and/or FNLA control. That would have made it very difficult, if not impossible, for the Soviet Union and its allies to continue to support the MPLA. But by mid-November 1975, the Soviet Union supplied massive aid to the MPLA, the 5 Spies, pp. 147, 168, 174-176; Through the periscope: South African submarines (Simon’s Town, 1999), pp. 48, 65; W Steenkamp, South Africa’s Border War 1966-1989 (Gibraltar, 1989), p. 51. 6 Steenkamp, pp. 51-52; C Bennett, Three frigates (Durban, 2006), pp. 159-166; Spies, pp. 141-142; Du Toit, pp. 231-232; P Stiff, The silent war: South African recce operations 1969-1994 (Alberton, 1999), pp. 130-131.

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United States of America (USA) and other Western countries had withdrawn support from South Africa, and the SADF faced the possibility of an all-out conventional war in Angola – something the South African government was not prepared to risk. These military, but especially political considerations, eventually made the South African government decide to withdraw from Angola. The last South African troops left Angola on 27 March 1976.7 Although most of the fighting during Operation Savannah was done by the South African land forces, supported by SAAF aircraft and helicopters, the SAN played a small but nevertheless noteworthy role, assuring no foreign intervention from the Atlantic seaboard, and participating in limited joint operations. 3. Electronic and other patrol work While these events were taking place “up north” and “on the border”, the security situation on the “home front” in South Africa deteriorated. This was mainly due to the riots that broke out in Soweto on 16 June 1976, and which spread to other areas. The next year the black consciousness leader Steve Biko died in police custody. These events led to international indignation and condemnation, further isolated the apartheid regime, which in turn led to harsher means to quell opposition – and which led to the imposition (on 4 November 1977) of an all-embracing mandatory arms embargo by the United Nations (UN) against South Africa. The SAN, in particular, was hard hit, because it led to the cancellation of the delivery of two “Agosta” class submarines and two Type 69A light frigates, nearing completion in French yards.8 The South African government had anticipated an arms embargo and had placed an order for three missile-carrying fast attack craft (called strike craft by the SAN) to be built in Israel, followed by a further six similar (albeit slightly modified) strike craft built in South Africa. These small ships were designed for operations in the Mediterranean, but the SAN had to operate them in the stormy seas around the coast of South Africa. In due course these small ships were also deployed over long distances by the SAN for patrol work along the coast of Angola, and also in support of Special Forces; as a matter of fact, for nearly 30 years the strike craft formed the backbone of the SAN’s surface fleet.9 SAN submarines and frigates continued to do operational patrols along the Angolan (and Mozambican coast), with the survey ship SAS Protea also deployed to do electronic surveillance. One of the reasons why the Soviet Union did not become involved in the war on a larger scale, was the presence of SAN submarines. Furthermore, the SAN’s submarines probably also played an important role with regard to shallow water operations – including surveillance and the gathering of information; which could also be of value in joint operations. Another ship that was apparently used for electronic surveillance along the coast of northern SWA and Angola, in support of the SADF’s war effort, was the Department of Transport’s former Antarctic supply and research ship, the RSA. She was taken over by the SAN and commissioned on 23 April 1978; officially 7 Scholtz, pp. 13-29. 8 Du Toit, pp. 281-289; TD Potgieter, “Another apartheid dilemma: corvettes for the South African Navy”, New Contree 47, September 2000, pp. 94-95. 9 Du Toit, pp. 297-309.

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classified as an oceanographic research ship, and in SAN service simply known by her pennant number, namely A331. But, after serving in the SAN for less than two years, the ship was decommissioned in 1980.10 4. Crucial support to special forces From their bases in the MPLA-controlled Angola, SWAPO continued their campaign against the SADF in SWA with renewed vigour. In the light of South Africa’s deteriorating international position, the NP government was reluctant to invade Angola anew, but when SWAPO started to infiltrate SWA with ever-larger growing groups of guerrillas, the SADF received permission to launch a number of cross-border operations. Operation Reindeer (May 1978) was the first of these actions, and included the attack on the SWAPO base at Cassinga – which led to much controversy. Several other cross-border operations followed.11 In due course the Namibian War of Independence became inseparable from the civil war that raged in Angola from 1975 to 2002; i.e. the war between the MPLA (in particular its military wing, namely the Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola, FAPLA) and UNITA (and their respective allies; in particular Cuban and Soviet Bloc advisors and others on the side of FAPLA). The war in Angola was characterised by counter-insurgency operations, but was also semi-conventional in nature, albeit that in due course it developed into a full-scale conventional struggle, with the SADF and UNITA eventually fighting pitched battles against FAPLA, SWAPO’s military wing (the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia, PLAN), Cuban and Soviet Bloc forces. In August 1981, the SADF launched Operation Protea – a large cross-border raid, in which SWAPO and its allies suffered huge losses. After this operation, the SADF did not withdraw all its forces from Angola – small units remained to disrupt SWAPO’s (and its allies’) infrastructure and military capabilities. The SADF also launched several other operations, for example, Operation Daisy (October-November 1981), Operation Phoenix (February 1983) and Operation Askari (December 1983-January 1984). In mid-1987, PLAN and its allies launched an all-out onslaught in the direction of UNITA’s headquarters at Jamba. On its own, UNITA would probably not have been able to survive such an attack, and consequently asked South Africa for assistance. The SADF once again crossed into Angola in numbers, to fight a conventional war, as in Operation Savannah in 1975-1976. In Operations Modular, Hooper and Packer, the SADF inflicted heavy casualties on the forces lined up against UNITA. This included the controversial battles along the Lomba River, including at Cuito Cuanavale – the outcome of which is still in dispute.12 The SADF also embarked on clandestine operations “behind enemy lines”. For this purpose, elite reconnaissance troops (colloquially referred to as “Recces”) and other Special Forces were used. 1 Reconnaissance Commando (RC) was established in Durban, with its base on Salisbury Island – which also housed a Naval Base. In the course of 1978, some members of C Group 1RC, were moved to Langebaan in the Western Cape 10 Ibid., pp. 290-293. 11 Scholtz, pp. 33-157. 12 Ibid., pp. 119-398; Steenkamp, pp. 88-177.

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– where 4RC was formally established on 17 July 1978. This was a multi-racial unit that could be used for a wide range of Special Forces tasks. It specialised in seaborne operations (especially attack diving), but could in practice undertake any task that could be reached by the SAN.13 The SADF had a small Special Forces capability, but – thanks to the SAN – had a large strategic reach. The SAN played a crucial role in transporting the Special Forces to targets, in extricating them again, and provided essential general support. In the course of the past few years, several books that deal with the role played by the SADF’s Special Forces “up north” have been published, but in only a few of these books are there any references to the role played by the SAN – and when mention is made of the SAN ships, submarines and crews, the details are vague. 4RC was dependent on the SAN to take them to as near as possible to their targets. They developed the ability to launch boats from SAN ships, and launching apparatus was developed to be used on board the SAN’s frigates, strike craft and combat support ships. 4RC also continued to operate from the submarines. The Special Forces took part in several operations on the east and west coasts of Africa, as well as on Lake Kariba.14 In 1981, in the run-up to Operation Protea, Recces boarded the combat support ship SAS Tafelberg in Saldanha Bay. They then sailed, accompanied by two strike craft, to some 14 km off the port of Lobito in Angola. The Recces had been practising clandestine seaborne operations for some six months. Four teams went ashore at Lobito and seriously damaged or destroyed an oil and petrol depot, a cement factory, and a gas factory. Before the attack took place, photos of the targets had been taken through the periscope of one of the SAN’s submarines, while photos had also been taken by members of 4RC from a Zodiac boat which one night took them into the harbour. Operation Amazone was, from a SADF point of view, a huge success, boosted the moral of the Special Forces and led to a more daring approach to special operations.15 This led to Operation Kerslig (Candlelight): an attack on the oil refinery at Luanda. The raiding party was taken to just off Luanda on board SAS Protea, while a reconnaissance was conducted by boat crews operating from a strike craft. After the reconnaissance party took photographs of the target, they went to SAS Protea, where the films were developed, the raiding party accordingly briefed, and final preparations made. One SADF soldier was killed and several others injured when one of the charges went off prematurely. The oil refinery was damaged, but not destroyed, and was only out of action for a few weeks. Consequently, Operation Kerslig was not a resounding success for the SADF.16 However, it was also a daring joint operation. Other operations followed. Not long before the end of the war, the SAN acquired a ship that was ideally suited for joint operations. SAS Drakensberg is the largest ship thus far designed and built in 13 P Matthyzen, M Kalkwerf and M Huxtable, “Recce”: a collector’s guide to the history of the South African Special Forces (Johannesburg, 2010), pp. 45-46. 14 Matthysen, Kalkwerf and Huxtable, pp. 46-47; P Els, We fear naught but God: the story of the South African Special Forces “The Recces” (Weltevredenpark, 2000), p. 145. 15 P Matthew, Parabat: personal accounts of paratroopers in combat situations in South Africa’s history (Weltevredenpark, 2001), pp. 154-155; J Greeff, A greater share of honour (Durban, 2008), pp. 269-295. 16 Greeff, pp. 295-321; Stiff, pp. 357-358.

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South Africa. This purpose-built combat support ship was commissioned on 11 November 1987. The versatile ship could (and still can) support military operations over long distances, including amphibious operations, long-range patrol and surveillance work, and search-and-rescue missions. The ship was born in the war years out of the SADF’s need to support smaller SAN units over long distances, and to provide assistance to the SA Army and SAAF in joint operations, and in the context of the type of conflict in which South Africa was then involved.17 5. The role of the marines From 1951 to 1955 the then Union Defence Force had a Corps of Marines. In 1979 the Marines were resurrected as a Marine Branch, now as a part of the SAN, to protect South Africa’s ports, but also in an effort to acquire a greater role for the SAN in the country’s defence, and to ensure a greater role for the SAN in the struggle “up north on the border”. The Marines provided the SAN with the opportunity to partake in joint operations – their activities in the operational area were, after all, part and parcel of the SADF’s operational deployment in general.18 The Marines were also responsible for the protection of South Africa’s harbours. This was in line with the SAN’s new role as a small-ship navy, namely to concentrate on safeguarding South Africa’s harbours and coasts, rather than to defend the Cape sea route in the interest of the West. For this purpose, 30 “Namacurra” harbour protection boats (HPBs) were built in South Africa (1980-1981). These small (9,5 m long) boats were (and still are) known by their pennant numbers (Y1501-U1530), and today some 20 of them are still deployed in a number of ports.19 The Marines also used small (9,5 m long) “Vredenburger” patrol boats for river patrols in the operational area.20 Hundreds of Marines were sent to the Zambezi River, where it forms the border between SWA/Namibia and Zambia, and at the furthest eastward point of the Caprivi Strip, also meets Botswana and Zimbabwe. From their riverside base called Wenela, the Marines patrolled the Zambezi River with their “Vredenburger” launches and smaller boats. But they also served as infantry. In August 1988, the last SADF forces left Angola; and on 20 June 1989 the SADF also withdrew from SWA. This paved the way for the independence of Namibia on 21 March 1990. In the course of the next few years, the SADF was rationalised. Although the SAN did not have to decommission more ships, it was forced to retrench 23% of its personnel. This also led to the disbandment of the Marines in 1990.21

17 Du Toit, pp. 316-322; H-R Heitman, South African arms and armour: a concise guide to armaments of the South African Army, Navy and Air Force (Cape Town, 1988), pp. 183-184. 18 CH Bennett and AG Söderlund, South Africa’s Navy: a navy of the people and for the people (Simon’s Town, 2008), p. 30. 19 S Saunders (ed.), Jane’s fighting ships 2013-2014 (Coulsdon, 2013), p. 749. 20 Heitman, p. 189. 21 Bennett and Söderlund, p. 143.

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6. Exercise magersfontein, 1988 The exercise was to train SADF members in joint operations in the run-up to a planned operation to take the southern Angolan port of Namibe (Operation Handbag) with Special Forces to be deployed from the new combat support ship, SAS Drakensberg, paratroops to be dropped near the town by the SAAF, while Army units were to fight their way up from SWA territory.22 It was the largest SAN exercise ever, and was held at and near Walvis Bay.23 Exercise Magersfontein took place against the background of the negotiations with regard to ending the conflict in SWA and Angola; as a matter of fact, it is probably not far-fetched to say that Exercise Magersfontein played a role in convincing the Angolans, Cubans and allied forces that it was in their interest to negotiate for a settlement. The SAN in practise demonstrated its ability to take part in joint operations; and successfully projected power in support of diplomatic efforts. This successful joint exercise was a huge success – and consequently it was not necessary for the SADF to launch Operation Handbag (the attack on Namibe). 7. Concluding perspectives During the war years, 1966 to 1989, the SAN continued to control the seas around southern Africa, deterred superpowers from intervening from the sea, and enabled the SA Army (supported by the SAAF) to project its power in areas such as the north of SWA/ Namibia and in Angola. It has to be said that the SAN (and SADF in general) built up an excellent track record with regard to military achievements in those years – irrespective of whether one agrees with the policies which underpinned South Africa’s military actions. The last operational SADF personnel left SWA on 20 June 1989,24 and on 21 March 1990 the territory at long last became independent as Namibia.25 In the meantime, the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe had collapsed, and soon the USSR would break up into 15 separate states, while, on the other hand, Germany once again became a united country. And in South Africa, the NP lifted the ban on organisations like the African National Congress (ANC), and freed political prisoners like Dr Nelson Mandela – paving the way for a negotiated political settlement in the country.26 By the time the SADF withdrew from SWA/Namibia in 1989, the SAN had about 700 officers and 6 800 ratings; three submarines, nine strike craft, four minehunters, four minesweepers, one survey ship, two combat support ships, one torpedo recovery/ diving support ship, one small training vessel, two air-sea rescue launches, 28 HBPs, two coastal tugs, one harbour tug, and three small dockyard launches.27 When the SAN’s 22 Lecture by Brig.-Gen. (rtd) McGill Alexander, military history seminar, Midrand, South Africa, 20 April 2013; Scholtz, pp. 393-395. 23 Navy News 7, December 1988, pp. 12-13. 24 Die Burger, 1 June 1989, p. 23 and 26 June 1989, p. 9. 25 Scholtz, pp. 434-435. 26 H Giliomee and B Mbenga (eds), New history of South Africa (Cape Town, 2007), pp. 393-408. 27 R Sharpe (ed.), Jane’s fighting ships 1989-90 (Coulsdon, 1989), pp. 474-477; Du Toit, pp. 246, 255-256, 258261, 296.

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1989 inventory is compared with that of 1975 (i.e. when the SAN for the first time took part in joint operations during the Namibian War of Independence – se also Section 2, supra), it is clear that in the course of the war the SAN underwent major changes; for example, it lost all its major surface combat ships (namely two destroyers and three frigates), without replacing them with similar types of ships. While in 1975, 21 of the SAN’s 26 “major” warships were British-built, the Navy’s 24 “major” hulls by 1989 consisted of only five British-built ships, with the others coming from France (three submarines), Israel (three strike craft), Germany (two minehunters), and Denmark (SAS Tafelberg), while the other ten were built in South Africa (albeit that only two were locally designed). The 1989 SAN was indeed a completely different navy than the 1966 navy. By 1989 the SAN could support land operations (in particular Special Forces) better than ever before, and it had a strong anti-surface capability – but it had completely lost its surface ASW ability. The SAN had lost its blue water capability, and was geared towards defending South Africa’s ports and coastal waters – albeit that, thanks to its joint operations during the war, it had shown that it was still a force to be reckoned with, was able to project power, and could support Special Forces over long distances. In an effort to place the SAN’s role in joint operations in the years 1966-1989 in perspective, it is necessary to take cognisance of the problems and frustrations experienced by the SAN during the war years, as well as indicate the extent to which the war affected the SAN. In the light of the fact that South Africa’s land and air forces bore the brunt of the fighting in SWA and in Angola, defence spending would focus on the requirements of these forces, and the SAN was accordingly scaled down. Consequently the SAN also had to change its focus and policies. Ships were discarded due to a lack of funds and a shortage of personnel. Throughout the war years, and for several years beyond, budgetary constraints hampered the SAN in its day-to-day functioning, as well as with regard to the acquisition of new equipment. This continued until in the years 1998 to 2008, when three new submarines and four new frigates were ordered, built and eventually commissioned. Today (2013) the SAN is a relatively modern but still very small navy – too small for a country that aspires to play a meaningful role in Africa, and even on the world stage. The Navy’s relatively new submarines and frigates can play a role in joint operations, but SAS Drakensberg is the SAN’s only surviving combat support ship. The Navy is in need of a helicopter-carrying dock ship (LHD) to project power more effectively and to enable the post-1994 South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to make a more meaningful contribution towards peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. A lack of unclassified archival sources (and the probable “loss” of a certain percentage of archival sources) makes it impossible to give full credit to the SAN for their military achievements during the Namibian War of Independence and the war in Angola in the years 1966 to 1989, in particular with regard to joint operations – with special reference to their involvement in clandestine operations, when they supported Special Forces. As far as possible, this role must still be thoroughly researched. After all: the history of the SAN’s involvement in limited joint operations in the war years, forms part of the SAN’s fascinating history.

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A Study on the Combined and Joint Operation of the ROK Armed Forces through in the Vietnam War Hong-Guk OH 1. Introduction am very happy to have been invited to speak for the second time following last year’s conference in Sofia. Torino and Korea share a long history together. In 1974, ROK participated in the automobile show hosted at Torino with our first automobile invention, the “Pony”. Thanks to Torino’s help in publicity, the ROK automobile industry was able to flourish and became the first contributor to our economy. Furthermore, when I enterred the national military academy in 1981, the first foreign slogan that we were told to learn was, “veni, vidi, vici.” It was Gaius Julius Caesar’s oral declaration respecting his campaign in BC47. And most recently, here in Torino is where Yuna-Kim won her first Grand Prix in 2007.

2. The outline of the Vietnam War This paper aims to trace the development and modernization of the , ROK Forces while fighting alongside American troops in the Vietnam War . 2013 is a special year, it marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean War armistice. It also marks the 40th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War. On January 27th 1973, the Paris Peace Conference was held and the US Forces and Combined Forces finally pulled out of the Vietnamese peninsula. However, two years later, Vietnam continued to wage war and eventually united under a Socialist leadership. From the end of World War II to 1979, Vietnam has engaged in military combat for 35 years in a series of 4 different wars. The first Vietnam War, a conflict between North Vietnam and France, concluded in 1954 with the battle of Dien Bien Phu. The second Vietnam War started in 1959, included, the Khe shan battle on 1968 and the Spring Offensive in 1972.1 The Paris Peace Treaty in 1973 put an end to the violence temporarily.2 The North Vietnam started the war again. Ultimately, Saigon was taken over in April 1975 and socialist Vietnam as we know, was founded. The unified nation invaded Cambodia in 1978 and fought against China in 1979. The Vietnam War is often alluded to “the war between chess and the game of badug ,” or “the battle of bicycles and planes.” In other words, the Vietnamese soldiers had to face large-scale military offences and weaponry using guerilla tactics. To understand the circumstances of battle of the time, we can look at the remnants of 1 Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context 2 Allan E. Goodman, The search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War(Berkeley, CA: Califonia Univ., 1978), p. 6.

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guchi Tunnels that were strategic means for the guerrilla soldiers. This is located 40km away from Saigon to Cambodia’s direction. The tunnels have a length of 200km in total underground. Meanwhile, the Security of Korean Peninsula was still unstable and was threatened by DPRK. Furthermore, two divisions of US army planned to withdraw from ROK . ROK Forces were dispatched to Vietnam war at that time. It provided the opportunity for the ROK Forces to develop under partnership with the US military in the Vietnam War. 3. Combined Operations ROK Forces and US Forces in the Vietnam War3 Between 1964 to 1973, 32 thousand of ROK Forces were involved in the War. 2 teams of military infantry division, 1 marine brigade, logistics support, and construction teams were part of the plan. These troops were supported from U.S. navy and air force departments. The ROK, Thailand, Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand’s forces also participated in the war. Examples of the US- ROK Forces combined operations as followed. 2-1. Combat Duc Co First, The movie “We were soldiers” has a background Duc Co battle in the valley of Ia-drang. Lt. col. Hal Moore who was acted by Mel Gibson said “First in, Last out!” This was the combined operation of the ROK tiger division and the US 25th division. The troops defeated north Vietnam army on 9 Aug. 1966. After this battle , company tactical base of ROK Forces were called ‘fire base. 2-2. On-ground operation Berrier peninsula The Kehsan battle in January 1968 and the Téth offensive battle were the turning point in the Vietnam War. The violence and despondency of war were aired in Washington through colored TVs. As a result, the anti-war peace protests finally pushed Washington to pull out troops. This is when ROK Forces engaged in the largest scale landing operations after Incheon landing operations of Korean War . Berrier peninsula borders was closely located the 112 base and 4 front of the Vietnamese army. Que Son, a mountainous region, most known for the My Son ruins, was occuppied by the 2 nd division of the North Vietnamese. Berrier peninsula’s central city, HoiAn is approximately 22km away to the south from Da Nang . HoiAn was a strategically significant location. The 3 battalions of ROK marine troops in cooperation with the First battalion 26 regiment US marine forces fought there. First, the US marine battalion arrived on Southern part of the peninsula on the 8th of September 1969. The second regiment arrived on the 12th of the same month near the northern part of the peninsula. ROK and US Marines proved to be rock-solid fighters and allies in Vietnam war. 3 Institute for Military History Compilation, The history of Republic of Korea Forces dispatched to the Vietnam War, Seoul: the ministry of defense, 1964-1973.

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2-3. Operation Ahn khe In 1969, the President Nixon pushed for the “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War. Nixon visited China and the Soviet Union to investigate a transition to a détente. As a result, the majority of on-sight U.S. troops returned home and only 2 ROK Forces division stayed behind. At this critical time, 12 division of the Vietnamese army engaged in Springtime Offensive in April 1972. Located in mid-Vietnam, route 19 number road was a strategically significant point that linked the regions Quy Nhon and Plaei ku. If the Ankhe pass were to be taken over by the North Vietnam, the South Vietnamese army were to be destroyed perfectly. From April 10 to 26, 1972, the armored regiment capital division of the ROK Forces fought against the Vietcong in the Ankhe pass. Over 2,000 soldiers were involved in this infamous battle. The shelling from a 7th fleet U.S. warship and air-strike from 7th Air force. On April 24th, with the fall of hill 638, the battle concluded to ROK Forces victory. The second Vietnam War ended with the Paris Peace treaty on January 27, 1973. However, 2 years later, the North Vietnam invaded Saigon, defeateing them on April 30, 1975. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was founded on 1976 and still stands today. 4. Combined Operations and ROK Forces development There were 4 major trials of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea soldiers gigging tunnels underground of D.M.Z. line. They continue threatening to threaten the ROK sporadically. The ROK Forces learned doctrines of air and ground battles, and acquired battle experiences and strategy from the Vietnam War. Furthermore, that War contributed developing defense technologies and modernization of equipment. Not to mention, ground forces improved technologies and equipment, the number of units has also expanded to 50 divisions. Navy forces have strengthened with destroyer and Aegis warship. The Air Force strengthened itself through F-15 and early warning aircraft. With the pulling out of the U.S. troops in 1971 from the Korean peninsula, the first corps US- ROK Forces was founded. This was a direct result of the trust and confidence the ROK Forces had gained from the US- ROK Forces cooperation in the Vietnam War. Furthermore, in 1978, ROK-US CFC founded and still stands today. Their efforts have deterred threat by DPRK strong defense on the Korean peninsula. The ROK Forces also make great contributions to world peace. In 1991, starting the Gulf War, ROK Forces have been dispatched to Iraq and Afghanistan. After the end of the Iraq War, Oone unit even stayed behind in Ervil to provide assistance to the post-war reconstruction in 2004. In addition, ROK Forces currently are located in parts of Lebanon , gulf of Aden , Haiti, south Sudan this year. 5. Conclusions An oriental strategist SUN TZU, said that the war leaves huge damages, so nations should be cautious about breaking out a war.4 In other words, what is more favorable 4 http://en.wikipedia.or/wiki/The_Art_of_War(2013. 08. 20)

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to winning every fight is to the make the opponent give up. In Cambodia, Vietnam, and Laos, 3.8 million lives were lost to the violence of war. Todayâ€™s war is a battle of military strength and a contest between technological powers. If in the case of inevitable war, the most effective route would be to fight with an allied force. We can learn tactics and military strategy to develop our armies even further this way. A fly can goes 1,000km ride on red rabbit horse for a day 3 Sept. 2013

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Warsaw Pact multilateral military intelligence estimates on NATO’s war plans and military exercises Jordan Baev

he proposed paper aims to compare and analyze the estimates and considerations discussed during the Warsaw Pact multilateral Military Intelligence sessions about the largest NATO joint military exercises in the last Cold War decades. From 1964 until 1990 senior experts of Military Intelligence strategic, operational and radio-electronic branches met regularly (twice in a year) especially for exchange of intelligence information on Wintex/Fallex and some other larger annual/biannual NATO exercises. Of special interest were also the bilateral operations of Bulgarian Military Intelligence services with their Hungarian and Soviet partners for reconnaissance of NATO drills in the South European Flank (the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean). The research was based on the formerly top secret records of Bulgarian Military Intelligence services, which were made available in the last three years according to a Law of December 2006 for declassification of all Intelligence and Security archives for the whole Cold War era (1944-1991). Of special importance were the collections of the protocols, information reports, and expert papers of all multilateral Military Intelligence annual meetings (started in 1964), including those of specific thematic issues like strategic, agent-operational and radio-electronic departments. The author of the proposed paper had a chance to be one of the first historians who received access to those newly declassified archival records. The revealed information could contribute for the clarification of the levels of knowledge and some essential topics of thinking and decision making inside the two adversary military blocs in the postwar years. The strategic doctrines and views of the both military blocs were tested and proved usually by annually multinational staff and forces exercises. The largest NATO drills – such as Fallex/Wintex biannual exercises – were used as main tool for training allied armed forces from the Northern Atlantic to the Eastern Mediterranean in massive joint and combined operations, usually divided in several phases. Logically, the Warsaw Pact authorities tried to gather as much as possible about the actual military plans and intentions of the adversary bloc. The most influential instruments for such a priority task were the East European military intelligence services. While the foreign intelligence activity was subject of more public and expert attention, the military intelligence information and estimates were slightly known due to the fact of relatively scanty access to their records. Perhaps the only East European military intelligence service that was studied closely through its authentic documentary base was the NVA Verwaltung Auklarung of the GDR1. In the last few years there appeared new 1 Wegmann, Bodo. Die Militäraufklärung der NVA: die zentrale Organisation der militärischen Aufklärung der Streitkräfte der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Berlin: Verlag Dr. Koster, 2006)

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publications2, which revealed also the East German evaluations on NATO regular military exercises in Central European War Theater (West Germany, France, and Benelux). Our Western colleagues have as well a unique opportunity to present a comparative analysis about the reliability of the East German intelligence reports based on the additional revealing of the West German, US, British, Dutch and some other military records. We had no such a chance for a parallel approach about the South European War Theater since the postwar Greek and Turkish archives continue to be almost totally closed so far. However, inside the rich collection of Bulgarian military intelligence files we found a lot of new and sensitive information about the Warsaw Pact multilateral discussions particularly on NATO military plans and joint exercises. Here I’ll limit myself for revealing the Intelligence services’ summarized estimates about the largest NATO joint and combined exercises, such as FALLEX/WINTEX, DAWN PATROL, and AUTUMN FORGE. There will be mentioned as well a few regional staff & forces exercises in South Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, which were of special interest for the Bulgarian MI services. In general, the main goals of those large scale exercises with participation of staffs and units from almost all NATO allied armed forces were training and checking the battle readiness of the troops, command and communication, the process of transition from peace to war, and carrying out defensive and counterattack operations in the initial war period with or without use of nuclear weapons. The requested intelligence information was received usually by three parallel sources: HUMINT (both via personal reconnaissance by legal and under cover officers or data obtained through their agents and “confidential contacts”), SIGINT (mainly by Radio Electronic intelligence units, but also with the support of the Air Forces, Naval, and Border troops reconnaissance), and, finally by Open sources analysis (Western media coverage). The first attempts to organize multilateral intelligence exchange and “distribution of goals” among the Warsaw Pact were agreed even in 1955; however, these intentions concerned initially only the foreign political intelligence services. In 1956 the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces Staff started a distribution of a “Special Information” Bulletin with actual data on adversary military build up and war plans, emphasizing especially on US nuclear weapons disposition in Europe. The first bilateral talks for eventual information exchange between the East European MI services started irregularly in 1957-1959, but they had practically very limited results until the early 1960s. For instance, Bulgarian MI service established such exchange in those years only with the neighboring Romanian service, and, occasionally, with the Polish counterpart. When Sofia approached East German General Staff on the matter, the response was negative with the argument that their MI service was in a period of organizational transformation. With the start of the first larger multilateral Warsaw Pact exercises in 1961-1963, however, the necessity of regular discussion on NATO war plans and scenarios grew up significantly. The first massive large scale NATO exercise on the whole European territory, the 2 Hoffenaar, Jan. “East German Military Intelligence for the Warsaw Pact in the Central Sector” – In: Jan Hoffenaar and Dieter Kruger /Eds./ Blueprints for Battle: Playing for War in Central Europe. 1948-1968 (University of Kentucky Press, 2011), pp. 75-92.

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Atlantic and the Mediterranean basin, and with support from military bases in the USA and Canada, was carried out in September 1960 with a code name FALLEX-60. It was analyzed in a detailed paper by the chief of Main Operational Directorate of Soviet General Staff, Col-Gen Semen Ivanov, published inside the newly established top secret theoretical journal Voennaya Misl [Military Thought]3. Gen. Ivanov asserted that about 200 000 serviceman, 200 staffs, 5000 aircraft, and 580 warships from all NATO armed forces (with the exception of Portugal and Iceland) took part in FALLEX-60, which consisted of approximately twenty regional drills. According to the scenario, the BLUE (NATO troops) won categorical victory over the “aggressive” ORANGE (Warsaw Pact troops), which would suffer significant losses – 30 to 60 percent in personnel and 8085 percent in aviation, particularly after the massive use of about 1660 nuclear strikes against Soviet and East European territory during the second phase. Gen. Ivanov made several critical remarks in his analysis with stress on some “weak” points of the scenario, concluding at the end: “The optimism of the NATO Command is ill-founded”4. The broader data about the goals and scenario of the next FALLEX-62 exercise was received by open sources – an article in Der Spiegel of 10 October 1962, and a parliamentary discussion at the House of Commons in London of 27 March 1963. The first ever multilateral meeting of the Warsaw Pact MI chiefs was organized by Bulgarian initiative in October 1964 in Sofia. One of the paragraphs of the signed agreement underlined the prospective task of organizing joint coordination for SIGINT reconnaissance of the larger NATO exercises, like FALLEX5. The second Warsaw Pact MI annual meeting, held in October 1965 in Budapest, decreed that in the second half of 1966 a special joint session of Information and Radio Technical Departments have to be organized for assessment of the next FALLEX-66 exercise. In accordance with that multilateral task the chief of Bulgarian General Staff, Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev issued a special order No. 068 of 19 August 1966 for organization of radio-electronic reconnaissance in all Radio-Technical Intelligence units during the NATO fall exercises6. The proposed session was held for the first time in Prague in September 1966, but a more thorough discussion on the subject was carried out during the third MI chiefs’ meeting in November 1966 in East Berlin. According to a previous decision, the principal reports on the matter were made by the Czechoslovak (for Central European War Theater) and Bulgarian (for Southern European War Theater) MI chiefs with a supple3 The journal was addressed only for highest level officers from Army Commander up; however, in 1961-1962 it was distributed to Washington by CIA agent and a GRU colonel Oleg Penkovsky – CIA FOIA Release 1/16/2006. 4 S. P. Ivanov, “The Fallex-60 Maneuvers of NATO Armed Forces”, Voennaya Misl, Moscow, No. 4, October 1961. Gen. Semen Ivanov and the chief of GRU, Gen. Ivan Serov were removed in December 1962 as result of disclosure of Col. Penkovsky as a CIA agent. 5 The acquired new information on FALLEX-64 was shared during the first multilateral meeting in Sofia. The Bulgarian MI service published a special review “NATO FALLEX-64 exercise in September 1964 at the Southern European War Theater” - Archive of the Committee for Disclosing the Documents and Announcing Affiliation of Bulgarian Citizens to the State Security (DS) and the Intelligence Services of the Bulgarian National Armed Forces (Further – COMDOS), Sofia, VR, Inventory No. 23. 6 COMDOS, VR, Microfilm (MF) No. 01288, File (A.E.) 982, p. 2.

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mentary East German report for clarifying some data on Central European War Theater. Due to the conclusions that some important data was missing and the process of the information exchange was disturbingly slow, the MI chiefs agreed on organization of two meetings annually on assessment of FALLEX exercises – one in advance for coordination of the joint intelligence measures, and second – in February or March for discussing the results of the NATO exercises7. The first session to discuss the results of FALLEX-66 results was held in Prague in early February 1967. The representatives of Czechoslovakia and the GDR informed about the scenarios of the three phases of the NATO exercises in Central European War Theater, the Bulgarians delivered obtained information about the developments on Greek and Turkish territory, while the Hungarians reported about the results of the NATO exercise on Italian territory. According to the information, the second phase of the exercise (code name “Jolly Roger”) was held under the conditions of general nuclear war, while the last phase (code name “Full Moon”) prescribed NATO active counterattack operations. The Polish head of MI Information Department confirmed that their data did not differ from the intelligence information, shared by the other East European services. However, the GRU representatives pointed out the existence of several distinctions in the reports about the stages and the number of staff personnel8. The organized discussions in 1966 – 1967 showed a new problem of the Warsaw Pact MI coordination. During the initial Prague session of Information and Radio Technical Departments of September 1966 and at East Berlin annual meeting in November the Romanian representatives categorically refused to participate in joint tasks, such as reconnaissance of FALLEX exercises, and even to discuss any Strategic Intelligence issues. Because of their reaction, at the session in Prague in February 1967 Romanian military intelligence delegation was not even invited. Thus, the task for distribution of all requested information about the situation at the “Balkan Strategic Direction” was transferred only to the Bulgarian MI service, which had no sufficient technical capacity and equipment to conduct electronic reconnaissance toward the Mediterranean area and the US Sixth Fleet activity. In order to surmount the gap, in February – March 1967 Bulgarian MI chiefs initiated discussion both with the chiefs of GRU in Moscow and of the Intelligence Department of Odessa Military District. The agreement was reached that twice in every year a group of Odessa Military District Radio Technical Intelligence unit (usually between 10 and 40 servicemen) with modern Soviet electronic equipment will be send to Bulgaria for support of reconnaissance during NATO FALLEX, DAWN PATROL and other large joint and combined exercises. A new agreement was signed in November 1975, and renovated in 19899; its purpose this time was oriented to WINTEX/CIMEX, AUTUMN FORGE, and DISPLAY DETERMINATION exercises in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. Though the agreements contained a special paragraph of “temporary disposition” of Soviet electronic equipment on Bulgarian territory, actually, most of the radio transmitters and radar finders were left to the Bulgarians after 7 COMDOS, VR, MF No. 01288, (A.E.) 1051, 1052, 1054. 8 COMDOS, VR, MF No. 01288, A.E. 1053. 9 COMDOS, VR, Inventory No. 3056.

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additional talks between Sofia and Moscow. The “problem” with the Romanian withdrawal was compensated as well by the significant increase of Intelligence information on NATO exercises and operational planning in Southern European flank between Hungary and Bulgaria. The established since 1969 close cooperation of the Information and electronic intelligence departments of the two countries was intensified visibly in 1972-1973 with further exchange of experts and regular comparison of acquired operational data. The reconnaissance of the last NATO FALLEX exercise of September 1968 (with its two phases Silver Tower and Golden Rod) was discussed according to the approved pattern – a preparatory session for coordination of the joint measures in July 1968 in Budapest, and a forthcoming evaluative session in Budapest in March 1969. Following the agreements of July, the Bulgarian Military Intelligence service sent until the end of 1968 several summarized dispatches both to its political and state leadership and to GRU in Moscow, acquired by HUMINT and SIGINT sources. The information stressed on the visits of Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer to Italy, Greece, and Turkey; a large amount of technical data over NATO Southern Flank intercommunication command and staff system and its code signals during the exercise, NATO strike and submarine Mediterranean fleet activity (with special attention on US Sixth Fleet), etc. These topics were as well the key points of the three Bulgarian intelligence reports at the Budapest session in March 1969. The main conclusions about FALLEX-68 were announced by Gen. Patrakeev, Deputy Chief of GRU Information Department, and by Col. Osiecky, Deputy Chief of Hungarian MI service, who made a detailed comparison with the previous FALLEX exercises, starting of 1960. The most significant changes, according to the analyses, referred to the requirement for reduction of the war readiness of NATO troops during the threatening period, the improvement of the four stages alert system10 in the transition from peacetime to military actions, the specific views for use of nuclear weapons, etc. Gen. Patrakeev clarified especially that NATO military strategists had acknowledged that the level of Warsaw Pact battle readiness shown during the invasion in Czechoslovakia was much higher than their previous evaluations11. A new tendency appeared in the last two FALLEX exercises. While in 1966 France withdraw from NATO military activities, in 1967-1968 Greek and Turkish military commands avoided participation in joint drills due to the aggravation of their dispute over Cyprus. In the beginning of the 1970s FALLEX was changed with WINTEX/CIMEX joint exercise, organized biannually in February – March, while in 1976 started another series of large scale summer exercise AUTUMN FORGE with participation of about 250 000 – 300 000 troops. A significant part of AUTUMN FORGE was the massive transportation of US troops to Germany (Reforger exercise, which started in 1969), and the final phase with use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons was ABLE ARCHER exercise. The Bulgarian and Hungarian MI services focused their reconnaissance on the regional South European and Mediterranean exercises, substantial part of AUTUMN FORGE series, like DAWN PATROOL (first started in 1969, and renamed in 1981 to DISTANT HAMMER), DEEP FURROW (started in 1969), DISPLAY DETERMINATION (a joint Air Force exercise, started in 1977), DE10 Military Vigilance, Simple Alert, Reinforced Alert, General Alert. 11 COMDOS, VR, MF No. 01288, A.E. 1057, 1058; MF No. 00467, A.E. I-808.

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TERRENT FORCE (a joint Naval exercise), ACTIVE EDGE (a joint Air Defense exercise, started in 1977), etc. Other regular NATO drills, which were frequently mentioned, were of EXPRESS series (from ARCTIC and POLAR EXPRESS in Norway to OLYMPIC and ALEXANDER EXPRESS in Greece). At the MI annual meeting in Prague in September 1970 it was decreed that a preparatory Information & Electronic Intelligence Departments session should be organized next month in East Berlin for coordination of joint measures on reconnaissance of forthcoming WINTEX-71 NATO exercise. Another evaluative second session was planned until the end of April, but postponed later on for June 1971. Following the “distribution of goals” in the days of WINTEX-71 the two regiments of Bulgarian Radio Technical Military Intelligence service and one Radio Technical Naval Intelligence detachment in cooperation with the three Army Intelligence battalions accomplished 24 hour reconnaissance of NATO command communications in South Eastern Europe, mainly the transmitter bases in Greece (Nea Makri and Kato Souli) and Turkey (Izmir) with NATO Southern Command in Naples and US Sixth Fleet, but also some transitions with SHAPE. In a summarized report to other Warsaw Pact MI services on 28 May 1971 the chief of Bulgarian MI service, Col.-Gen. Vasil Zikulov shared “some conclusions” about the results of the reconnaissance. Bulgarian electronic intelligence had disclosed fourteen new military radio-networks in the area and recorded 1727 electronic messages; a small part of them (in English and Turkish) even were not classified. For the first time in five years the joint session in East Berlin in early June 1971 attended representatives of Romanian MI service, who delivered additional information on the results of DEEP EXPRESS-1970 exercise with about 100 000 troops involved12. The state and amplitude of reconnaissance in those months could be illustrated by the regular Intelligence reports from “Decipher” division (Unit No. 20) at Bulgarian MI service. In 1972 95 summarized Intelligence reports were sent to the chief of MI service, part of them used later on in the weekly Intelligence bulletins issued for the highest military commanders and state leadership. Unit No. 20 informed both about several regional NATO exercises like QUICK TRAIN, SEA LION, DENSE TRAIL, but also of national Greek and Turkish drills like DENIZ KURDU, YILDIRIM (LIGHTING in Turkish), etc.13 Bulgarian MI service published in 1972 a summarized top secret survey on NATO leading exercises for the whole period 1960-1972. The study pointed out that in the early 1960s the tasks to be worked out concerned predominantly the organization of an initial defensive operation with a subsequent surprising nuclear strike at the enemy, carrying out a coastal landing and an airlift and then taking the counteroffensive. In the early 1970s the use of strategic nuclear weapons became more and more limited. The allied troops formation time was changed from 3-5 hours after opening the hostilities in 19631966, to 2,5 - 4 hours in 1971. The survey concluded: ”As a rule the naval units of the USA, Great Britain, Italy, Turkey and Greece permanently placed in the Mediterranean always participate in the amphibious operations at the South European War Theater ac-

12 COMDOS, VR, MF 01288, A.E. 1060, 1090, 1092. 13 COMDOS, VR, MF 01086, A.E. 306, p. 1-254.

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companied by US marines.”14 Another special secret analysis of the operational-tactical and the combat training of the Turkish and Greek naval forces was published too. It underlined that both countries’ participation in NATO naval exercises kept on increasing all the time. For instance, while in 1969 Turkey took part in three naval exercise of the Alliance, in 1971 their number was already seven, and in 1972 - ten. In 1972 only, Greece took part in three international and five national landing exercises in which the new sabotage-reconnaissance groups “Commandos” and the 32nd marines regiment participated. After a permanent Soviet naval presence had been established in the Mediterranean, the Greek Navy was assigned new combat tasks against the Soviet war ships and submarines. The Black Sea Strait Zone was defined in the study as a chief strategic goal at the Southern European Theater of operations. The main tasks assigned to the Turkish naval forces were the defense of the Black Sea Straits, anti-submarine warfare, strategic coastal landing and torpedo-missile strikes. About fifty Turkish war ships and auxiliary ships, tactical and naval aviation participated usually in those exercises. After 1967 one third of Turkish Naval Forces within the NATO complement were based on the Black Sea - mainly torpedo and missile cruisers and submarines.15 The framework and main dimensions of the Warsaw Pact MI multilateral coordination in the course of reconnaissance and evaluation of NATO large scale joint and combined exercises could be viewed perfectly at the operational plan for “interaction” in regard of the forthcoming WINTEX-75 exercise, signed during the Information & Radio Technical Intelligence departments’session in Sofia in January 1975. Bulgaria was assigned the task of reconnaissance NATO armed forces at Southern European War Theater (excluding Italian AF), Hungary – the same direction (excluding Greek and Turkish AF), Czechoslovakia and the GDR – NATO armed forces at Central European War Theater, Poland – NATO armed forces at Central and Northern European War Theaters, while the USSR – NATO Allied Commands at European, Atlantic, and the English Channel (La Manche) War Theaters. The main NATO communication centers, objectives of Warsaw Pact electronic surveillance, had similar allocation among the East European MI services: Bulgaria – transmitters in Izmir (Turkey) and Kato Souli (Greece), Hungary – Andrews Air base, the GDR – US base Pirmasens (FRG), Poland – Karup Air base (Denmark), Czechoslovakia – Brunssum (The Netherlands) and Casteau (SHAPE in Belgium), and the USSR - Torrejón Air Base (Spain) and Siebelbach Air Force Communication Station (Germany). The mutual intelligence exchange envisaged daily and extraordinary summaries, and in three months after the end of the winter exercises a summarized analytical survey with standardized technical data16. The pattern of the summarized surveys could be viewed by an Analytical report (of twenty pages) about the activity of Bulgarian MI electronic units on reconnaissance of WINTEX/ 14 Military Intelligence Directorate-General Staff. Conclusions from the NATO Allied Military Forces’ exercises at the South-European war theater in the period 1960 – 1972, (Sofia, 1972). 15 Military Intelligence Directorate-General Staff. Analysis of the operational-tactical and the combat training of the Turkish and Greek naval forces in the period January 1969 – May 1973, (Sofia, 1973). 16 COMDOS, VR, MF 01288, A.E. 1069, p. 106-109.

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CIMEX-79 strategic command & staff exercises (6-23 March 1979)17 For reconnaissance of NATO winter exercises 30 new electronic stations were deployed by special Radio Technical Intelligence brigade and 46 stations more by the three land forces Radio Technical Intelligence detachments and one Naval Radio Technical Intelligence unit, which meant twice more stations for radio and radar position finding of those used in “a regular situation” period. During the WINTEX/CIMEX-79 exercises the activity of 117 sources of NATO electronic communications were located and followed, 80 of them newly dislocated. In general, 946 messages were recorded, 515 of them were from NATO and US command sources, and the others from Turkish and Greek military stations. About 150 of the recorded messages were sent with open texts, while some of the ciphered messages had used symbols, signals and commands that were disclosed during the previous WINTEX exercises. The acquired intelligence data permitted to disclose in the preparatory period and during the first phase of WINTEX-79 (transition from peacetime to war with change from Military Vigilance to Reinforcement Alert) the disposition of some NATO wartime control facilities in Southern Europe through the messages sent by the communications centers in Naples, Vicenza, Izmir, and Padua. At the second phase of the exercises (first defensive and counteroffensive operations in the initial war period with/without use of tactical nuclear weapons) multiform extensive data was collected about the participating troops and staffs, areas of disposition, command points, control communications systems, etc. One of the most disputed issues about the Warsaw Pact policy during the last Cold War wave (1981-1985) was connected with the so called “Soviet War Scare” reaction toward NATO ABLE ARCHER-83 exercise and the massive intelligence operation VRYAN. In May 2013 the National Security Archive in Washington DC published a collection of several newly declassified documents on the issue18. In the last decade I had opportunity to publish a few papers with several corrections about the terms of VRYAN operations. The revealed new archival intelligence records categorically confirm that the strategic task of disclosure immediate indicators for a NATO “sudden missile-nuclear attack” (VRYAN operation) against the Soviet bloc did not started in 1981 and terminated in 1985, as claimed by Oleg Gordievsky and Christopher Andrew. The task for “disclosure indicators of surprised Western military offensive” existed in Bulgarian Foreign Intelligence directives and protocols even in the early 1970s19. In regard to Military Intelligence decision making, such priority task was constantly formulated at the multilateral Warsaw Pact annual intelligence meetings, starting

17 COMDOS, VR, MF 01288, A.E. 1119, p. 196-205. In new information immediately after the end of WINTEX-79 it was noticed that for the first time from 1973 joint communication between the Greek and Turkish armed forces has been launched, which was reliable evidence for return of Greece into NATO military activity. 18 Jones, Nate, “The 1983 War Scare: The “Last Paroxysm” of the Cold War”, NSA Electronic Briefing Book No. 426, May 16, May 21, May 22, 2013. In one of the documents (a Memo to US National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane from Jack Mattock) it was emphasized: “Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well the population. A degree of paranoia among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.” 19 See: Baev, Jordan. KGB in Bulgaria. Cooperation between Soviet and Bulgarian Secret Services, 1944-1991, (Sofia: Military Publishing House, 2009), p. 216-219.

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with the first one in Sofia in October 196420. However, in the specific circumstances of the early 1980s the task was brought to a leading priority for all intelligence and security services with regular inter-departmental short term “situation analytical summaries”. What about the termination of this particular task, the authentic documentary evidences confirm that in fact KGB informed Sofia only in May 1990 that a new decision has been taken in Moscow for “cease working on VRYAN operation”21. The newly available Military Intelligence records throw some new light on Warsaw Pact views and estimates about NATO large scale exercises in the time of so called “Euro-missiles crisis” in 1983-1984. The regular MI Information and Radio-Technical Departments’ session, held in East Berlin in mid-January 1983 discussed the results of the reconnaissance of AUTUMN FORGE-82 exercises and joint preparations for reconnaissance of WINTEX/ CIMEX-83 exercises. The East German delegation presented a proposal for introduction a new system of early disclosure of NATO measures for alerting its joint forces from peacetime to war. The Czechoslovak delegation shared new information about AUTUMN FORGE-82 scenarios at the Central European War Theater. Soon after the session in East Berlin Bulgarian MI service informed the political, military, and state leadership and Warsaw Pact Unified Command of new sensitive information received from “reliable sources” in Brussels. One of those sources worked at the Secretariat of NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns. Among the received information were the essence of OPLAN Hula Bell for organization of “maritime communications” defense outside NATO boundaries, approved by NATO Military Committee on 24 February 1983; a NATO Nuclear Planning Group discussion on proposed deployment of US missiles in Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany, etc22. After two visits of Hungarian MI electronic experts in Bulgaria in 1982-1983, in June 1983 an official agreement was signed between the two secret services. It included dislocation of a Hungarian Radio Technical Intelligence group (10 to 15 servicemen) at Bulgarian Black Sea port Varna, and a Bulgarian Radio Technical group at Dunaújváros, a Hungarian industrial center on Danube River23. On 27 January 1983 Gen. Atanas Semerdzhiev, chief of Bulgarian General Staff addressed a proposal to his Soviet counterpart, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov for urgent convocation of extraordinary meeting of Warsaw Pact MI chiefs in order to discuss “the aggravated political and military situation” in Europe24. However, such a meeting was not organized until the end of 1983. Besides, no any session was carried out in the beginning of 1984 for immediate discussion on ABLE ARCHER-83 exercise, which aim was “realistic staff training and simulation in the terms of nuclear war”. Actually, in 1983 were carried out two summits of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee, one extraordinary session of Com20 Even in May 1962 an order by Bulgarian Chief of General Staff underlined “the primary task for successful reflection to a sudden attack by the adversary”, while another order of 29 June 1967 defined the main goal of the MI service as “duly warning about the preparation and organization of concrete actions for a sudden attack with missile-nuclear weapons” by the armed forces of Greece, Turkey and Italy, and Sixth US Fleet in the Mediterranean. - COMDOS, VR, Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 983, p. 4, 43. 21 COMDOS, R, Fond 9, Opis 4a, A.E. 196, p. 26. 22 COMDOS, VR, MF No. 1684, A.E. I-1198. 23 COMDOS, VR, Inventory No. 2681. The agreement was in force until 1992. 24 COMDOS, VR, Fond 23, Opis 0928, A.E. 1278, p. 4.

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mittee of Defense Ministers (20 October 1983 in Moscow), and two sessions of the Military Council in Sofia and Prague in May and November (the first one discussed especially the evaluation of NATO REFORGER exercise). The proposed meeting of MI chiefs was finally summoned on 2 February 1984 in Moscow; however, the discussion continued for less than a day. In his report about the meeting the chief of Bulgarian MI service Col.-Gen. Zikulov was perplexed that there was no left any time for discussion after the detailed summary of the GRU chief, Gen. Petr Ivashutin. The Soviet report several times stressed on the “increasing nuclear threat” after disposition of US missiles in Western Europe, considered as “nuclear means for first stroke”. Gen. Ivashutin especially underlined: “Today grows up the probability and threat of aggression from NATO on the cover of organization of larger exercises and maneuvers… The principal task of our MI services continues to be: in due warning about the immediate preparation of USA and NATO for nuclear attack, particularly, for a surprise start of nuclear war.”25 The MI chiefs’ meeting agreed on preparation of a special expert session in January 1985 in Sofia for evaluation of the results of AUTUMN FORGE-83 and AUTUMN FORGE-84, and for coordination of the joint measures on reconnaissance of next WINTEX-85. On 19 July 1987 the Chief of Bulgarian General Staff issued a “Battle Order” in regard to the reconnaissance of the next AUTUMN FORGE-87 fall exercises. The General Staff order focused its attention especially on DISPLAY DETERMINATION-87 exercise in the Mediterranean basin, scheduled for September-October 1987. The document defined 25 different concrete tasks to the MI units and obliged their commanders to report each day at 3 p.m. about the actual situation and the changes of the local environment. An analytical summarized report had to be delivered in two weeks after the end of the NATO exercise26. On 8-11 December 1987 a multilateral Warsaw Pact MI session was held in East Berlin. The discussion was devoted particularly on the results of the inspections of the announced NATO exercises in 1986-1987 in accordance with the Final Act of the Stockholm conference on confidence building and disarmament (19 September 1986). The leading conclusion of the MI session stressed on a significant decrease of the announced NATO exercises (from 30 in 1986 to 17 in 1987 and to 14 for the next 1988), which was caused mostly by the decrease of the participated troops’ number (less than 13 000 in each one exercise). The session in East Berlin clarified as well the “distribution of goals and targets” among the Warsaw Pact MI services: the GDR should organize reconnaissance over the local exercises in the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands, the Poland – in Great Britain and Denmark, while the Soviet GRU – in the USA (CARAVAN GUARD, TEAM WORK, and CERTAIN CHALLENGE which in fact was the code name of REFORGER-8827 field exercise). Bulgarian MI service was responsible for reconnaissance of the ACTIVE EDGE exercise in Southern European War Theater28. The last meetings of MI chiefs before the dissolving the Warsaw Pact military structures on 25 February 1991 were carried out in May 1989 in Warsaw and in June 1990 in Bucharest. 25 Ibid., p. 84-85. 26 COMDOS, VR, MF I-1551, A.E. 1550, p. 102-108. 27 For the first time in many years the next REFORGER-89 exercise was not held due to some observations by the West German government; it was actually postponed for 1990. 28 COMDOS, VR, MF I-1551, A.E. 1550, p. 232-236.

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Meanwhile, the intelligence exchange about the larger NATO exercises continued to exist. For instance, in 1989 GRU chiefs sent to Sofia about 150 intelligence reviews, part of them on WINTEX, AUTUMN FORGE, and DISPLAY DETERMINATION exercises. However, during the MI chiefs meeting in Bucharest in early June 1990 Col.-Gen. Vasil Zikulov addressed a request to his Hungarian counterpart, Maj.-Gen. Janos Kovacz for dismantling of Bulgarian R-369 radio-electronic station at Dunaújváros because of “technical failure” (the station did not worked for more than four months)29. This was, of course, the final episode of the radio-electronic bilateral collaboration of Bulgarian and Hungarian MI services in the Cold war years. The last ever intelligence summary from the Intelligence Department of Odessa Military District about NATO maneuvers in Southern European War Theater was received on 3 November 1990. In December 1990 the new chief of Bulgarian General Staff, Col.-Gen. Radnyu Minchev approved a plan for bilateral cooperation with the Soviet MI services for 1992, which included a proposed visit in Bulgaria of a MI radio-electronic group of 10-15 servicemen from Odessa Military District for reconnaissance of the forthcoming NATO exercises in the region30; however, after the Warsaw Pact dissolution all such bilateral agreements were reconsidered and finally canceled. Summarized surveys on “military preparation and readiness” of Greek, Turkish, and NATO armed forces were published inside the top secret Bulgarian MI Information Bulletin for distribution to MoD, General Staff and Armed Forces main departments in about 50 to 100 copies until the end of 1991. Less than six months after the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization NATO member states proposed to their former adversaries to form a joint North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In the spring of 1992 two “unprecedented events” happened, as qualified by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner – joint meetings of Defense Ministers and General Staffs Chiefs of both NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries. Meanwhile, in December 1991 – January 1992 Bulgaria signed military agreements for “confident building measures” with Turkey and Greece. Several months after joining “Partnership for Peace” initiative in July 1994 Bulgaria organized the first post-Cold War large multinational Naval exercise in the Black Sea area (BREEZE-94), and a year later – a NATO led multinational exercise COOPERATIVE PARTNER-95. Within the next few years (1994-2000) Bulgarian Armed Forces took part in 137 NATO/PfP multinational exercises and other training activities, some of them on Bulgarian territory. It is a matter under consideration did ever Bulgarian or other Central-Eastern European military tried to used their knowledge of NATO former exercises in their way to reach the effective interoperability with the NATO forces and finally to join the Alliance. However, as a historical paradox, that sensitive intelligence information, acquired by the Warsaw Pact MI services, could be used as a new valuable source for NATO own history in the Cold War era.

29 COMDOS, VR, MF 01517, A.E. 1687, p. 19. 30 Ibid., p. 46-48.

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Operations “Escort & Raviv” Benny Michelsohn

uring the War of Attrition, the main operational theater of the Israel Navy was the Red Sea. The Egyptians initiated continuously firing, bombardment and raids on the eastern coast causing the IDF (Israel Defence Force) paining losses. There was a need for retaliation acts against targets that will surprise the enemy at the area where he feels confident and does not expect any raids from the sea. The Israel Navy units attacked the targets located on the western coast of the Gulf of Suez and this way shifted the war to the enemy’s territory. The most dominant operations, in which all of IDF arms participated, were “Escort” and “Raviv” Operations - Commando raid and armored attack on the western shore and amidst of the Gulf of Suez. During the night of September 7th -8th, SOF attacked the Ras Sa’adat anchorage by two “Pigs” and sank two Egyptian P-183 Class torpedo boats in order to achieve naval freedom of operations. In that raid three soldiers of the flotilla were KIA on their way back due to an accident. The day after, tank landing-crafts, landed armored forces on the Abu-Drage shore. The force attacked guarding posts, army bases and radar stations, caused much damage and many losses among the enemy’s lines. The operation shocked Egypt. The Egyptian Chief of General Staff and commander in Chief of the Egyptian navy were dismissed from their duties by Nasser and he himself got heart attack. The media all over the world responded to this daring operation with great headlines. Pre-landing survey On 25th of July 1969, landing beach survey was carried-on towards a large scale ride by armor force on the west bank of Suez gulf. The survey action was carried on 17 July by 707 Unit (defensive divers). The results were negative and the operation was postponed until finding proper beach. Operation “Raviv Katan” On August 13, 1969, a S - 13 force set out to survey a landing beach on the west coast of the Gulf of Suez. A team of two “pigs” and four swimmers, all under the command of Lt Commander Emanuel Paz (“Paulin”), was towed from Ras Sudar by a pair of Bertrams. After eight miles, the “pigs” headed off towards the Egyptian coast, while the Bertrams returned to the middle of the Gulf and waited for the commandos to complete the mission. Several critical discoveries were made over the course of the patrol. The beach found to be appropriate for an armed landing. It basically served as a “live model” for the sinking action and important data was secured about the enemy’s patterns of behavior.

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Terrain and Enemy The area of operation “RAVIV” was an 80 km coast road on the western bank of the gulf of Suez, between Ras Zaafrana and Ras Abu Darag, north to the Egyptian anchorage of Marsa Taalamat. Along the coast were 20 guard posts with one-two squads of camels or patrol vehicles, each. At Ras Zaafrana and Ras Abu Darag were two, company size strongholds with radars and 150 soldiers.8 km south to Ras Zaafrana radar base were 7 T-34 tanks. The decision The GHQ decided to execute the armor riding operation on 5 September 1969. The plan was to move the three LCT from their base at Sharm-El-Sheich to the depprture point at RasSudar during 3 nights (by 3 “jumps”) to maintain surprise. HQ and Forces Commanding HQ was the Armor Forces HQ headed by Major General Abraham Adan (Bren). Air and naval liaison officers were attached to the HQ. The decision to execute the operation depends on the destruction of the Egyptian Torpedo boats by the IDF Naval commando unit – Flotilla 13. The soldiers were TIRAN instructors from the central armor training center (installation 500) and the reconnaissance company of 7th armor brigade. That force had to be landed by LCTs and receive fire support by 130mm artillery guns and air force fighters who will, also, isolate the operation area. 707 unit frogmen and paratroop brigade’s engineer company dedicated to secure the bridgehead.

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Operation “Escort” On the eve of the 7th of September, 1969, in the midst of the War of Attrition, a group of frogmen from 13 Flotilla (the Israeli Naval Commando) reached the Egyptian anchorage of Ras-Sadat. At 22:05 pm they found their targets, two P -183 torpedo boats which were used to patrol the north of the Gulf of Suez and which could jeopardize the IDF’s plans to carry out an armored raid on the western bank of the golf. Two pairs of Israeli frogman attached explosive charges to the sides of the two boats. Before dawn on the 8th of September, 1969, the two Egyptian boats left their harbor in order to conduct a patrol. Suddenly there was an explosion on one of the two boats, as a result the boat was beginning to sink. The second boat hurried towards the sinking boat when a second explosion ripped a giant hole in its bottom, then, ran aground and was taken out of use. This was the outcome of Operation “Escort” which enabled the IDF to achieve surprise and to proceed and execute Operation “Raviv”.

Sep. 12, 1969 Commander of the Shayetet 13 [c.c.:] Commander of the Navy Subject: Operation “Escort” The mission to sink the Egyptian torpedo boats in the Gulf of Suez was the first of its kind to be carried out by the Shayetet. The sinking of the torpedo boats was a condition for the execution of “Raviv,” which was similarly a unique and unprecedented operation.

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The Shayetet was equal to the task, which this time around entailed an exceptionally difficult professional test. Both professionals and layman alike sense the physical, mental, and technical difficulties that the operation demanded and appreciate the fitness, perseverance, valor of spirit, dedication, and wisdom of those that brought it to fruition. With all the sorrow and anguish over the death of LCdr Rafi Miloh, First Lt Shlomo Eshel, and CPO Oded Nir, who fell as a result of a technical malfunction after fulfilling the mission, I would like to express my esteem to you and through you to the Shayetet—first and foremost to those men that personally carried out the mission— for this accomplishment. Haim Bar-Lev, General Chief of the General Staff Operation “Raviv” The force was trained properly, including model drill. Specific code-maps were prepared. On the night of the 8th September, 1969, 6 tanks and 3 APC’S were loaded on 3, 36 meters, landing crafts at Ras Sudar in the Sinai peninsula. All of these were T-55 Egyptian tanks and BTR-50 APC’S which were captured by the IDF during the Six-Day War, this in order to confuse the Egyptians. The landing force under command of Col. Baruch Harel (Pinko), was secured by Israeli naval boats and naval commandoes. The order The Aim: “RAVIV” force will execute a raid along the Gulf of Suez and will hit military targets, without be involved into battles with high probability of many casualties. Concept of Operation: landing an armor force by LCTs on the west bank of the gulf of Suez… destroying the radar site and military camps at Ras abu Darag’ and Ras Zaafrana.

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“RAVIV” The landing began at 03:37 am on the 9th of September, 1969, 40 kilometers south of the Egyptian city of Suez. Immediately the armored landing force advanced south and managed to drive for over 50 kilometers, The force destruct the road behind by “Mazlef” charge, while doing so the force wreaked havoc behind the Egyptian lines, attacking Egyptian guard points, radar stations, military vehicles and other military targets. In the operation a Soviet general was run over and killed while he was driving along the route the landing force was taking. After 10 hours the force was evacuated and returned home safely. AFVs by LCTs, soldiers by helicopters. The results More than 100 Egyptians were KIA and about 400 were MIA. 70 vehicles, including APCs, radar installations, SA-2 battery, camps and bases were destroyed. 2 Egyptian missile boats were sunk. 4 Israeli soldiers (including one combat pilot that was hit down into the sea) were killed, out of which 3 were F’13 fighters who were killed on their way back to base after completing their mission in Operation “Escort”. They died after a charge in their boat accidentally went off. In continuation – the IAF attacked that area one week. The

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operation shocked Egypt. Several weeks Suez Canal area become calm. The Egyptian Chief of General Staff and commander in Chief of the Egyptian navy were dismissed from their duties by President Nasser and he himself got heart attack. The media all over the world responded to this daring operation with great headlines. It was a unique combined operation with remarkable results.