Issuu

~I JOURNAL OF THE ITALIAN ARMY FOUNDED IN 1856

NOVEMBER DECEMBER 1988 LIRE 4,000 $ 4 D.M. 6 £ 3

ANTONIO

EST

The evolution of Italian society and military institution

Taxe Pen;ue (T-

rlscoaaa) Roma · Italy

ITTORIO BERNARD

NATO after the agreement on the euromissiles

ENRICO GIMELLI

Scientific research in Italy of interest to the Army

Sped. in abb. post gr. IVl70%

opolo e 路 Forze Armate .路nel 10路 anniversario della Vitt 路

CONTENTS

Number six 1988 November-December

R'vista Militare aims a, broaoen1ng anc updating me technical and vocat'onal ua n ng of Officers and i\.COs. It ·s thus a means of propauating the m lilary way of thinking and a forum of study and debate Through lhe oul) lication of articles of technical and sc en11f,c interest Rivista Mditare also a ms at informing the general pul)ftc on the Army ano on mil tary issues

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Politics, Economics and Strategy 2

The evolution of the italian society and military institution. (Antonio Viesti)

The Atlantic Alliance, which must take ,nto account both general defensive problems and lhe different realities of member countries. Involves an ever growing commitment and a greater participation aimed 81 purshing the path of stability and peace undertaken ,n the last forty years.

14 NATO after the agreement on the euromissiles. (Vittorio Bernard)

26 Between politics and defence. (Fabio Mini)

BIMONTHLY Supplement to number six of Rivista Militare

36 The contribution of the Army to civil protection . (Remo Gaspari)

Editor in Chief: Pier Giorgio Franzosi Management and Edttoriaf Office

8. Vie di S. Marco 00186 Roma Tel. 47357373 Advertising Care ol the Secretariat of Aivista Mllitare Tel. 6794200. Printer Tipogralia FUSA Editrice s.r.l. Via Anastasio II. 95 • 00165 Roma

Science, Technology and Training 43 Scientific research in Italy of interest to t he Army. (Enrico Gimelli)

50 The Italian technological and industrial policy. (Umberto Marino)

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Sociology and Problems of Personnel 59 The social influences of t he war. (Francesco CeNoni)

66 A better employment for corporals. (Vito Antonio Martino)

73 Book Reviews

Issue edited by: Augusto Mas1rofini

e scien1if1ca riservata

Member or USP! Unoone Stamoa Penod1ca llalia'la

Instructions for contributors: Anyone may conmo1.,te To garantee 1he tfghest ob1ec,iv1ty of informat on. R1v sta Militare leaves contributors considerable freedom ,hougt1 : does not tecessa ri,y share their opin ons The AJthor s 1hus solely rcspons ble for ihe arlicles which Pl1blishea ,,nediteo and w11Mu1 editorial ties. exclusively reilect r1c rn~1~on;:; (leas Art cles mL.st be orig,nal in t11oughl and snoulo no, cxceeo ten lyoe :.r tten pages. Once the A1,.:l'O' spa o for n,s article. ne loses all exclus,\e r ghts. R, sta lvlilitare may men oass tne ar ticle on to ot11er pub cat c - s i'l"O EMPA (European Mil'tary Press Agency) pe'1ooicals. Articles should be accompaniec by su table pt1otograons. ll•Jstrauons ano explanatory tab les A photograp,1 of the AL1thor. together with a brief ·curr'culum vi:<1c · <11 ·,r: a 10 line typewritten summary of tt1e a1t:cle would be muci1 apprec iated Rivista Mi! tare claims the right :o cha"ge ·nc I tie oi art clcs and choose the typeface oeemeo mos: SLi table

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.K. . From ~he secon'd ·po~twar' p;riod, tq rp.is, day our Country h~s maa_e

a',Jong journey through liberty, and by proclaiming.'the Republic ,, has opened a new chapter in the history of the young unitarian • '\_,; sta._te ,.wh{c~, i!l the course of only o!le century, _between 1818 and ~ :'~ "'f;-.< .1945,,. had borne the bw:den of three- wars of mdependepce, two . -;:• t · .'j?o •, :wJr/'d c~1![lict$ -~nd, l;is~l;:., the libe,:ation ' war. _ ' ~ The·.r;elat1ons__.between c1t1zens and state, the atmosRhe!e and the , r-; , . .,: ,m_eU!oils ~~ed bjr"the p.oliticaJ battles .have changed, the citizens' · i1 ~~· ~ ,;. ,1, ~ ' averag~· ~d/}ca f;on h~ greatlyj mproved and so has the critical par;;... ~ . 'i:t :·;,)i ticip':ttipn in . social ~fe; a rµore and JJ.1.0re .mature and. vigilant public •·::; , '' : .' ,• 'opinil n keeps :ii' constant and close watch over tfie wor/( of the ;,., . , · , ~onst'ftu~onah, po!ltical, jurisdictional and administrative organs _of . ""i .. , • .1 • • t, .h e state; ·, ,, . -. ... • The condemnation of terrorism, springing from the conscience of. • • :, . -,. 1 · Jµr peoglt:: · h:;is confirmed the level of. love of freedom and civil " '4' ' · ~ order attained· by the Italians:. The -economic and social develon.-.·, . : , .. \ ' ''I' r ~ .,• ,. . m ent has k fiown no respite, despite the ,presence of a considerable "t structural .unbalance between· North and South, difficult interna1\•I -~. ~· J 1 ' ~ • ltional siiua'ii ons and •scarcity., @f raw materials. • ' ' ' ' .. • ,. p,:''. . \; '

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To the right: E. Prampolini: Project of the hall decorated and furnished for the Aeronautic Body. On the next page: E. Prampolini: Project.

With great sacrifices, muc h work and fervent hope, a ravaged country has rebuilt and improved its economy, has reacquired its place a!. a respected and heeded component of the international community, has offered, and offers, a determinant contribution co the process of E uropean unification, and to the system of common security: a great and nonuco pian political design emerged fro m the ruins of the second world war. The great headway made by the sp1nt of tolerance has facilitated meeiings and constructi ve debates within different philosophical and religious experiences, a great openmindedness towards other people's problems, of a sentiment of international solidarity which has passed the most cruc ial tests in man y difficult moments. As a great constitutionalist observed: "With the birth of a D emocratic State, t he relatio ns a mong individual nations come to take a new course: t he technique of liberty in constitut ional law ties with the technique of peace in international law. The fathers of our Constitution were so aware of t his that they passed A rt. 11 which states: " Italy repudiates war as a means of offence to other people's liberty and as a means of solving international disputes". We have kept this solemn promise, precisely as we have safeguarded the dignity and the interests of our Country using the peaceful means envisaged by the United Nations Charter. The association with other democratic countries in the Atlantic Alliance, now approved by most po1itical forces, is the most u nquestionable sign of Italy's international standing and of her determination t o defend its independe nce and freedom. 1n these last years Italy has cer4

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tainly undergone hard trials, mome nts of great political and social stress, periods of separation between the "legal" country and the "real" country, days of deep suffering: nevertheless she has always found the necessary strength to start again on the road of progress. 7

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY We have moved, or arc moving, from agricultural society ro industrial society, from industrial society to tertiary society, from production society to service society, from rural ro urban society, from an austere and chrift y society co a consumers' society, from a society based on traditional culture to a society of data processing and telecommun1cac1ons. The postwar period may be divided in three great subperiods: • the first, t hat of the country's reconstruction after the crisis of \Xf\XIII, which has coincided with the

republican choice, the development of de mocracy a nd the relaunching of national economy; • the second, from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties, in which the country has go ne thro ugh a p hase of industrial growth and development of private consumption; • the third, after t he seventies, which w itnessed, fi rst, the "crisis" of the development process hinged on major industries wh ich was overcome by the polycentrism of production plants and, sub equently, the growth of tertiary industries, the advent of a pose-industrial society, the explosion of socia l co mplexity. These, of course, are not strictly delimited periods. Nevertheless they have their own identity and an Lmportant explanatory function. from their sequence and their intermingling with the preceding schemes o ne understands that the ltalian development is the result of a long hisrorical dri ft and not the outcome of vehement passages and decisive events. Society has evolved slowly, relying on its own roots. In other

words, lhe modernization process of the country was grafted on tradition. Unlike other countries, where the econo mic developme nt brought about a rejection of the socioeconomc order and craditionaJ lifestyles, the long and rich Italian tradition as a whole has been an asset rather than a drawback in che development. This may be observed at many levels: â€˘ economically speaking, in the development of " localism" and of an economy which spreads through areas characterized by rich handicraft traditions and by a fa mily economy rapidly transformed and open to innovations without cutting the ties and the contin uity with the past; â€˘ socially speaking, in the permanence and centrality of the family as a unitary subject, as producer, consumer and economizer, although immersed in a wide r process of complication and segmentation of lifestyles and social patterns; â€˘ socially speaking, in the develop-

menc of local administrations, in political decentralization, and in the growth of che Regions as selfgoverning bodies rooted in traditional local enviro nments. Therefore, if we are to suggest an interpretat ive guideline - and, as such, a necessarily simplified one we can say chat this " mix" of modernity and tradition has coagulated in an increase of subjectiveness. Rather than producing a standardized and homogeneous society, the Itali an model of development has emphasized the subjectiveness and the many individualities expressed by Italy, with her hu ndred Cities an d Comm unes. Such subjectiveness today may be detected in the increasing entrepreneurial qualities of the system, in the developme nt of independent work, in the advancement of the products "Made in Italy", which proceeds side by side with the re1au n c h ing of lhe bi g conce rn s through technological innovation, financial reconstruction and the openi ng up of foreign markets.

THE EVOLUTION O F MILITARY SOCIETY In paralle l wit h the evolution of civilian society mi litary society has also evolved in a more and more interdependent and integrated way. 1n order to better understand the extent of such transformation we deem it expedient to make a shore outline of the historical heritage of our Army, from the unification of Italy to the eve of the last World \Viar. The constitution of our national Army, wh ich incorporated the Piedrno mcsc Army and imposed structures, hierarchies, disciplinary rules and traditions that seemed to prefer loyalty to the dynasty to the consent and participation of the citizens of the an nexed states, shows a weak point right from the ~tart i.e. the lack of that material and spiritual amalgam which is a factor of cohesion and efficiency in every military organism. Suffice it to mention the refusal 5

E. Prampolini: Alto Adige.

of the southern popu lations co identify with the new m ilitary instrument and the consequent massdodging of military service. T he ensuing necessary repressive measures produced an atmosphere of hostility towards both the Government and the military institutions, a hostility which was to last over the years and is in part still alive, tho ugh in inconscious and almost instinctive forms. The choice of nationwide recruitment and the rule of sending the young men as far as possible from their native regions, if on the one hand answered real operational and security needs, on the other created in the young military a fee ling of being subject co a violent imposition closely linked to a reality they felt alien to them. The pr inciple of personal duty, already sanctioned in the past century by the "Ricotti reform" has only become fu lly operative in recent times and, in particular, with the 6

constitution of the Republic. As a matter of fact, art. 52 of t he Constitution points out that the citizens have the sacr ed duty to defend their Country and also states the principle of the compulsoriness of mil itary service. The same duty is concretely and fully specified by Law 382 of July 11, I978 "Principles o n Military D iscipline" , which in confirming the words of the constitution also states two other requirements in meet ing w hich the Armed Forces are called to participate: the "safeguard of free instiLUtions" a nd the "welfare of t he natural community in case of public calamities" . The compulsoriness and universality of m ilitary service, as sanctioned in turn by laws implementing the words of the Constit ution, have given t he Armed Forces of the Republic a character quite different from that of the preceding periods. It may t herefore be said that no other of our Country's organization reflects the ch:iracteristics, demands and yearnings of the llalian society as much as the Armed Forces.

THE ARMY: A UNIFYING OPPORTUNITY AND A CONNECTING ELEMENT BETWEEN STATE AND SO CIETY Military service, in fact , as a representation of the moral and material un ity of t he citizens, expressed by the affirmation of t heir loyalty and allegiance to freely elected Institutions, constitutes a unifying occasion and an irreplaceable link between State and Society. The idea that m ilitary instiLUtions, as upholders of the principles of authority, hierarchy, subordination and, therefore, d iscipli ne, arc in themselves antidem ocratic and aloof from the context of Society, must be reconsidered in the light of t he adaptations t hat t he regulations and the disciplinary provisions have undergone in the course of t ime in o rder to correspond to the in novat ive ferments which have marked the evolution of non-military society. In fact, today's hierarchical rank is no more a status but a functio-

nomic, normative and social requirem~nts of personnel and_ make the ensuing concrete suggestions. T he Cadres' and subordinates' pronal level, w hile the concept of subordination as sharing contribution fessionalism has also follow ed an by t hose placed at the various func- evolut ionary t rend of its own. T he military professional has totional levels is more and more emned down the warriorlike, heroicphasized. T he very adjectives " respectful and leader conception, to adopt t he moabsolute" in reference to "obedien- re modern role of military manager ce" are in disuse, because now "obe- and soldier-technologist. Together with this, the fo undadience" is referred to as " conscious .tions of com mand have also chancollaboration" . T he new regulations, in the a bso- ged, see the authority of the comlute observance of the fu ndame ntal mander legit imized by his " fun ctiodemocratic principles, envisage a mo- nal value" and by his commanding re modern connotation of the corps' capabilities. According to the new tasks, a prodisciplinary sanctions, reducing to a minim um the afflictive content of fessio nal office r should more and punishment for t he military of any more develop the capabilities and outlook of t he civilian manager and rank. This provision fo llows at close di- administrator, without nevertheless stance the one concerning t he ap- forgetti ng t he special characteristic proval of the new enforcement pro- which has always distinguished him: visions of Military Representation. that of com mander of men, responThis seven-year-old organization is sible fo r t heir lives. Authoritarianism has given way to a living and working reality, whose essential fu nctions arc and m ust re- trust in persuasion and consensus. The professional profile of t he Camain those of helping to form and define a reliable picture of the eco- dres is increasingly characterized by

Giulio Evola: Support troops under the ra in.

a marked sense of responsibility, deep commit ment and thorough competence, considerable managerial flexibility and rationality, very high aptitude for command and coordination, culture a nd me ntality open to innovations coming from t he out~ side but permeated by the highly stabilizing value of tradition. The grow ing tcchnicalization has moreover increased the importance of the intermediate Cadres and of the functional areas, w ith an ensuing decrease in the number of direct functio ns, replaced by the derived ones. As for the en listed men, the role of non-specialized soldier has almost disappeared due also to the increased mechanization. The old relationship between man and his equipme nt bas been reversed. The armed man has become an equipped weapon, and in both cases, groups, squads and crews m ust often serve machines and weapons. Physical effort has been replaced by mental tension, through w hich other hu man faculties are called into play. 7

Virgilio Marchi: Impression of the tunnel in Rome.

The crew of a gun, a radio station, a helicopter or a tank is held together not only by a common commander, but also by a commo n task, which can be satisfacto ri ly carried out only by a team. In these operational groups, an authoritarian disciplinary model is not o nly less possible but also less necessary . This was, in short, a picture of how military men of every standing and rank are changing. It is an incessant and continuous evolution which occurs in close connection with the legislative, normative and structural framework, to give a coherent answe r to the demands which, with ever increasing insistence and force, come from a restless 8

civilian society, which is more and more intent on pursuing its rights - immediately and first of all - sometimes forgetting its duties towards the Country.

THE DEMANDS OF MODERN SOCIETY What are these demands? S hortened term of service, service quarters near the habitual residence, constant revision of the exemption or deferment cr iteria, so a!> to ensure maximum impartiality and consideration for the needs of the individual, be they of a familiar, moral, professional or economic kind. A further request concerns more

comfortable, better equipped barracks, as regards both infrastructure and hygiene. Moreover, modern society wants co be informed and involved in decisions. It needs, in short, to know the reasons for the activities that are carried out, both in the purely institutio nal and in the non inst ituti onal fie lds. The Army is meeting these demands both in direct and indirect fo rm, always keeping well in mind that its constant aim is to safeguard the fundamental princples of t he Constitution. These answers concern rwo priority sectors, important for t he efficiency o f the Service, i.e. personnel and the structure of the military instrument proper, which must be abreast of the times. As regards personnel, the new automated procedures, which will be fully operational by the end of d1c year, will permit to reach a degree of regio nal employment of about 70%, which completely reverses the rule of sending the men as far as possible fro m their home regions as was the custom in the post-unitary Army. The progressive enforcement of the recent law reform ing conscription, and the complete implementation of the programmes of cooperation with Regions, Provinces and Municipalities, will lead to further improvements from t he viewpoint o f service as well as from that of socializat ion and individual promotion. The law has moreover introduced concrete incemives as regards voluntary service, today m ore and more necessary for providing an adequate professionalism at basic level, and a minimum of continuity wh ich cannot be ensured by an only 12 months' military service. Moreover, the entire structure of the medical service has been revised. In particular, it has been deemed expedient to constitute four military general hospitals capable of caking care of a wide range of disea-

E. Prampolini: Figure p lus window.

ses and of assisting the civilian employees of the Min istry of Defence and t heir dependents too. Other Military H ospitals have instead been entrusted o nly with the care of the r ange of disease more common among conscnpts. The full implementation of the programme will permit further quality improvements in medical assistance, also by means o f a closer interaction between Military and university-sponsored Civilian General Hospitals. Moreover the system's rationalization w ill give the young men a better approach to the military organization and a more rapid and efficient service to the citizens concerned with medicolegal aspects.

CONSCRIPTION AND RECRUITMENT In addition, the arc:i of conscription-recruitment has been completely restructured, introducing new procedures, making widespread recourse to data processing, and reducing its size. In particular we have been :ible to concentrate in Regional Districts the main activities, leaving the information and certification funct io ns to t he Provincial Military D istricts. Within t his framework , particular attention has been given to the psycho-physical screening of conscripts, in o rder to improve the qualit y level of the recru ited personnel. As a consequence, in the sphere of the Recruitment Boards and the Recruit T raining Battalions, the improvement of t he di:ignostic equ ipment and of the medical teams is in progress. The latter will always include a psychologist. The conscription-recruitment area, in its new configuration, is going to ensure a more scrupolous and punctual service to the entire population, also improving the services of public util ity, information and certification. Finally in the infrastructural field, extens ive plans arc under study for

buildi ng new and more modern barracks and acquiring and building housing fo r the Officers and NCOs. W e must support and implement these projects, because today's efforts and sacrifices are the foundation of tomorrow's efficiency.

MILITARY STRUCTURE ANO DEFENCE MODEL As concerns the 2nd prioritysector, i.e. the structure of the military instrument, with special reference to its glo bal effic iency, the Army has lately been pursuing a policy of " gradual, incessam transform ation of structures and materials, in constant pursuit of a cost-effective

management". In this perspective, in the operational area we have streamlined the line of Command, reducing, through che abo litio n of Div isions, the principal hierarchical levels fro m four lO three. Moreover we have reached a quantitat ive and qualitative balance of t he three Army Corps, each of which is going to include from five ro seven "Brigade modules"; in addit io n co t his, we have also started the reorganization and concentration o f the support~. As regards the long-distance emp loyments in remote areas or on che islands, whenever the traditional land movement appears inconvenient, we have co nstituted a Rapid 9

E. Prampolini: Solar painting.

Intervention Force (FIR) which avails itself of a number of aircraft, to cake advantage of the third dimension, and can also use naval UnttS. As regards our contribution to CiviI D efence, we have established a Ready Intervention Force (FOPI): an operational reality at the country's service which, if endowed with better and more equipment, could certainly be considered a m ost efficient force. Also the training component is undergoing great changes. I particularly refer to t he widespread employment of audio-video equipment, simulators, self-teaching tech niques adequately encouraged, computers with didactic and control functions, and \vargames of various levels of difficulty. 10

Finally, the logistic component coo is going t hrough a restructuring process in t he field of maintenance, repairs and supplies. This will ensure simpler contact logistics in the combat zone, limiting it to control and easy replacement of modules, leaving t he actual repair activities to support logistics at territorial level. These acti vi cies, carried out by 3rd and 4th level military plants, arc complemented by civilian industry, which is called upon to give its assistance. In the future, therefore, as a rule, the actual " repairs" will be done o nly at territorial level, while the operational units will operate only by "substitutions". Th is reorganization will permit saving manpower and financial resources which could be allocated co the high-pr iority operational sector and to investments.

The new m ilitary in strum ent w hich is caking shape is, in short, the product of a military policy hinged on the Atlantic choice, on the European calling, and on the responsibilities deriving from Italy's geostrategic position in t he Mediterranean. Furthermore, it is confirmed by the evolution of the general strategic p icture, which presents two basic operational aspects. The first aspect concerns the renewed role of the conventional forces, w ithin t he strategy of flexible response and in view of a balanced reduction - today increasingly possible and desirable - of armaments in Europe, in the framework of the c urrent dctente process. The second aspect concerns the sicuation of NAT O's Southern flank and , more in general, the Med iterranean area which is characterized by elements of tension which demand constant attention . The Southern Region has in fact become one of the hottest and most sensitive areas of international politics and the centre of recurrent crises, where the old East-West challe nge tends to mingle w ith the uncertain and d ifficult dialogue between North and South. Moreover, in the complex and critical interaction of vario us elements, international terrorism has creeped in; therefore, the most evident result of the crisis in the southern flank is that Italy today stands at the centre of a rather vast conflictual situation. Consequently, Italy must have a harmo n iou s in strume n t, we ll balanced in all its operational components, capable of ensuring the defence of the Northeastern border and of foci ng the progressive movement of the c risis' centre of gravity towards the Mediterranean.

CONCLUSIONS From the short panoramic survey of the development of military so-

Giulio Evola: Bunch of flowers.

ciety and military institutio ns, o ne can draw a first partial conclusion : the Armed Forces and the civilian society, scarring from the original separateness which marked their relations from Italy's unification until the immediate postwar period, have become cwo intertwined realities, although there are still misunderstandings and some residual distrust. At this point some basic interrogatives arise, w hich are difficult to answer in full. ls there a comrast between chose who have freely chosen the military profession and those who have instead opted for civi lian life, since, o n che professional plane, the distinction - leaving aside the fo rmal aspects - is becoming thinner and thinner at least at the mediu m-high levels of responsibility? A nd this as regards educatio n, culture, engagement, sense of sacrifi ce. Perhaps in the military the sense of duty and country, the c ult of traditions, are more emphasized and there is moreover a more integrated vision of t he global problems at international level. This approach generates topical questions: in order to defend ourselves, today, do we need spiritual and moral values different from those of the past? In other words, what are the requirements of today's society as compared with the past? What does society ask of the military today? Does o ur citizen become a military professional in answer to a calling or is it a c hoice? Is it acceptable and moral for the citizen to depute his defence to others? Fro m this arises again the old question of a professional army based on volunteer service instead of conscnpt1on. Certainl y the professional Armed Forces afford significant advantages as regards employment: more cohesion, higher operational standard, greater reliab iIi t y. But the question, rather than a cechnico-military problem, is a political, ideological, social and economic one. First of all, conscription

tj-v.-., \:-- l ILi has always been part of our national military tradition. In addition, as we mentioned before, our Constitution envisages compulsory mi litary service as the cornerstone of the recruitment of the Armed forces. Constitutions can be changed, follo wing the d ue proced ures, but it would be very peculiar if the first change were to concern a duty defined as "sacred". Moreover, the requirement of having the availability of hund reds of thousands of effectives ecrnnot be met by volunteers alone, and certainly the country could never bear the financial bu rden of an operatio n of this kind. Furthermore, as a consequence of the economic and social unbalances existing in Italy, t he Armed Forces would become the expressio n o nly of some Regions and some social classes. This would be a nasty return to the post-unity Army mcnt ioned before. The real pro blem , in my opinion, is something else, i.e. t o make the

regular compulsory military service really efficient, rendering it more acceptable to the young m e n of today. l s a Country allowed to entrust the task of its defence to a limited component - well t rained and perfectly balanced t hough it may be? Can we expect justice, freedom and security - w hich are the interface of peace - at che expense of a few? Can o ne conceive a t ype of defence nor involving che enti re society, globally determined to defend its freedom and co nsequen dy its o wn national idenrit y? Jn my belief the Armed Forces must remai n Forces of t he people, representing all aspects of the country: the defence of che rights of democracy, which inspires t he entire formulation of our Constitution, is a duty fo r all citizens, without disuncuon. ln 438 B.C. Pericles said co the Atheniens: "Feedom and D emocracy are a sure possession of those w ho have the wi ll to defend them". In other words, liberty cannot be 11

E. Pra mpo lini: Figure in space.

sidercd a service rendered co the State and for the Scace. 1n closing, I would like to remind these young people, but not them alone, of the words said by President Kennedy in 1961, on the occasion of the opening ceremony of the Academic Year at West-Point: "Ask not what your Country can do fo r you but what you can do for your Country". What we have just enounced are, in fi nal analysis, the fundamental principles and the points of reference of which the Army considers itself custodian, and vouches fo r before the nntional co mmunity. Anto nio Vicsti

let out on contract, The moral legitimation of the deterrent will of the Armed Forces and the need to defend democracy are very well expressed by the Pastoral Constitution " Gaudium et Spes" of the Second Vatican Council, which states: "\Y/ar has un fo rtu nately not been erad icated from the human condition. And until the danger of war exists and there is not an appropriate international authority with efficient fo rces, once exhausted all possibilities to find a peaceful settlement it will be impossi ble to deny the governme nts the right to a legiti mate defen ce". These concise assertions are decidedly fu ll of a convincing truth and should be a warning to all, but especially to the young who so metimes approach military service with a prejudiced attitude. T his occurs mai nly because the youth called to arms co mes from a society impri nted by edonism and consumer's culture, from a school which at best proposes ideas and not ideals, and from fa milies wh ich have carefully spared them hardships and sacrifices. Anyway I should like to say that our young, too often lacking motivation, show a surprising sensitivity w hen true, ideal values are poin12

red out to them without ambiguous rhetoric. T he Armed Forces' determinant task is to propose values, to mnke the young responsible, to see to it chat their experience becomes a moment of transition from youth to maturity. But we are only a link in the form ative process. T herefore, all of us: fam ily, school, local administrations, Government, Parliament, the . . entire country, must give our contributio n in order chnt our young, at twenty, might be in a position to face with serenity :rnd determinatio n the future exacting problems of life. In conclusion the defence of one's count ry is not a sectorial problem but rather a global one: a problem which involves not only the mi litary, but sociely as a whole. 1n this light, the concept of Armed Forces removed from the social context is surpas~ed for good. The Italian Armed Forces have proved and continue to prove lo be lively, fl exible, sound and ready to receive the demands coming from our society through the you ng men who, year aftcr year, come to perform the sacred duty of military service, which therefore must be con-

Lieutenant General Antonio Viesti has at· tended t he Military Academy, the School, the General Staff and Advanced General Staff Courses, and che Joim General Staffs Instit ute. He ha~ been Commander of the 10th lhtcalion, 132nd Tank Regiment :rnd lacer Commander of the same Regiment, Branch Service Deputy Commander, "Manin" Armoured Brigade, and Co111m.rndcr, ··Gr.rna1 ieri di Sardcgna" Mechani zed Brigade. Lt. Gen. Viesti has served as General Scaff Officer at che Headqu:mcrs, "Cremona" Infantry Divisio n, the Defence Ge neral Staff and the Hcadquaners 5th Corps. He has held che following positions at the Army General Staff: Staff Officer at the General Staff Secretariat of the Deputy Chief of Staff; C hief, lst Scccion, Planning and Budget Branch; C hief. General Staff Secretariat of the Deputy Chief ol Staff; Chief of the Procurement Plan, Branc.: h, Dcpuly Chief of the 4th Division. and Deputy Inspector for I,ogistics. LL. Gen. Vicsti has been Chief of the 4th Divi~ion of the Army Gcn\'ral Staff ;ind Inspector lor Logistics; at present he holds the office of Deputy C hief of Scaff of che Army.

it9utftlt<Jitataat opera nel settore dell'ingegneria civile e della costruzione e gestione di grandi infrastrutture attraverso ii controllo di sette comparti operativi nei quali si raggruppano le societa controllate e collegate:

PRINCIPA L! AZll::NDE DEL .GRUPPO

• servizi di ingegneria • costruzioni generali e grandi la. vorz • concessionarie di costrµzione e gestione di infrastrutture • manutenzione di opere pubbliche ed in/rastrutture • concessionarie di edilizia pubblica e di servizio • costruzioni di edilizia residenziale e sociale • infrastrutture urbane di pubblico interesse.

Bonifica

Autos trade Autostrada P ede montana-Lombarda Autostrada Torino-Savona Castalia Cidonio Condone d' Acqua Con .Piem . Edit. Pro. Edil venezia Ga rho li ldrovie I m. Co lnfrasud Progetti Intermctro Isa ltalco nt ractors ltalcco ltaledil halgc nco l talia na Mo nte Bia nco lta lpark Italposte

Le aziende del gruppo italstat costituiscono uno strumento cui le amministrazioni centrali o locali possono ricorrere per avviare concretamente a soluzione i problemi posti dalla realizzazione di importanti programmi di opere pubbliche, nei vari aspetti propositivi, organizzativi, esecutivi o di supporto.

ltalsta t Internatio nal

Progettazione, coordinamento esecutivo, esecuzione, esercizio di qualsiasi opera di ingegneria civile, tutte le fasi cioe del processo realizzativo e della vita di una costruzione, costituiscono la principale specializzazione del gruppo italstat.

S iaca

ltals trade ltahek na ltalter Mantelli Ma ntelli Estero Mededil Metro roma Pavimental Pt m Rav Rep Sapp ro Sa t Sicit Sis te rni Urba ni Societa Au tostrade Meridio nali Sotecni Spa mo Spea St rclto di Messina Svei Tangenziall' di :\apoli

gruppo

iri-italstat

NATO AFTER THE AGREEMENT ON THE EUROMISSILES A CRUCIAL MOMENT OF DIFFICULT DECISIONS IN A CONTRADICTORY F:RAMEWORK OF FEARS AND HOPES FOR THE FUTURE.

At last the Soviet Union and the Uni ted States have signed the agreement on intermediate nuclear missiles, also known as theatre missile~ or Euromissi les bcc:1u~c they are b:1scd on European ground. After many conflicting opinions expressed on this topic before, during and after the final stage of the ncgoti:1tion~, now that thi~ step bas been accomplished it is necessary LO assess, with peace of mind and imparti:1I judgemcm, the pros and cons both for the presem and for the fucure, also 10 determine the possible consequences from the milita ry point of \"icw. This is the aim of this :1niclc which, above all, would li ke LO answer dw following questions: • with the application of the agreement will NATO be stronger or weaker? • will the balance which up to now has kept peace between the two sides, be stronger or more doubtful? • are flllure prospects better or worse than in the past? • in the military fi eld, what meas ures have to be :1dop1ed to move s:1fely 10wards a balanced di~armamem with lower levels of forces? To providc t he most snisfocco ry answers, the problem has LO be clearly examined both from a military poim of view and from a political one, but it is also necessary to take into accoum the psychological effects on the populations of the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance, since they could have great influence on public opinion and therefore have relevant consequences on t he Govern me nts' political and polilico111ili1ary decisions. In such a situation, and with che aim of examining the milicary aspects, there will be first a tec hnical and operational confro ntation of the weapons systems to be dismantled and lhen a confrontation of the strategies of the two blocs in which such system~ arc located. As for the political aspects, ic will al lease be ncces.,ary to roughly review the events and causes which have first led to the decision of installing and then to that of eliminating them. TECHNICAL AND O PERATION AL COMPARISON BETWEEN TH£ WEAPON SYSTEMS TO BE ELIMINATED _Nuclear device ve~icles are generally d1v1ded 111 three ma111 groups: intercontinental strategic, with a range of over 5,500 Km; intermediate or theatre (INF · intermediate nuclear forces) becween 500 and 5,500 Km and tactical or battlefield (S F · shon range nuclear forces), with a range up to 500 km. The agreement signed in Washington on

C HRO NOLOG Y OF lSSUES AND NEGOTIAT IONS Early

O ctober 1977: End 1977: October 1979:

December 1979:

July 1980: November 1981: December 1982: O ctober 1983:

November 1983:

March 1985: November January 1986:

March 1986: October 1986:

June 1987:

July 1987: August 1987: December 1987:

In the European pan of the USSR, the Soviets begin the deploy ment of the SS-20s, modern, mobile b~llistic missiles with 3 indepe ndcm warheads, capable of hitting the who)~ Western European territory. Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the federal Republic of GcrmanyJ calls the West's attention on the threat consticuccd by the SS:20. NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) sees the need to modernize the Alliance's lNF vehicles. Brezhnev, the Soviet General S<!cretary, proposes to "freeze" the situation with the 130 SS-20 already installed, if NATO docs not set up new rNf vehicles, because the "balance now exist~". NA TO adopts the dual track decision: deploy the new missiles (108 Pershing fl and 464 Cruise starting in December '.83) and at the same time negotiate, ready to give them up, 1f the USSR withdraws the SS-20s, co set the balancing of .INF at a lower level. The Soviets accept a negotiation. President Reagan proposes the "zero option" of che LRJNF Beginning of official negociacions in Geneva. The USSR proposes a "limit" for the INF in Europe, including the British and French ones. Ac Momebe)lo in Canada, ATO confirms the need to m?dernize its nuclear arms, deciding at the same time to w1t~draw_ 1400 warheads from Europe in a 7-year period, adding this co the reduc tion of anot her 1000 which had been agreed in December '79. The. first Cmise vehicles arrive from the US to Europe. The ~ov1ets abandon the Geneva negotiations; they have already 10st:illcd 360 SS-20s with 1080 warheads. The negotiations are suspended until Jan uary '85. ~ew negotiations start in Geneva, including strategic offensive arms and theatre weapons and the defence of Space (Nuclear and Space Talks). Meeting, in Geneva, between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, where the re is the first possibility for an " interim agreement" on the lNF. Gorbachcv proposes a plan for the total elimination of nu~lear arms in a period of 15 years and accepts to momentarily exclude the French and British missiles form the negotiations on the INF. Together with the total reduction of LRINF, the US proposes to put some limits on the SRINF. ~~cting between Prcsiclem Reagan and Gorbachcv in ReykJav1k, where they define some important elements for a possi~le ~greem~nt on the LRTNF and SRINF, including the onme 111spcc11ons, on one Soviet condition: that there should be some contraims to the programme of rhe American Strategic Defence Initiative. Ihe Atlamic Council assembled in Reykjavik expresses the approval of the United States position concerning the ncgotianons for the elimination of the lNF and ad vances a reduction _of 50% of the nuclear strategic arms, the ban of chem ical \veapons and the balanced reduction of conventional forces and SNF. Gorbachev accepts the "double zero option". The Soviets ask chat the Penhings of the Federal Republic of Germany be also eliminated, a request which was later accepted by che Bonn Government. Signing of the Washington agreement for the total verifiable eli111in:1tion of the LRJNF and SRINF, to be carried out within three years from ratification.

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...

* • • * ~

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Western Europe, such as launching sites. pons, airport,, communication junction~, depots, command po~ls, trans mission cemres etc. i.e. the vital poims through which provisions for the defensive effort and "the regulating intelligence of th<: battle" pass. Therefore A T O would not be stronger but onl y lc:ss weak bcc:iusc it would be less vulnerable. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES The Soviet Strategy

December 8, 1987 refe rs only to Soviet and US intermediate ra nge missilt:s {INF), which can be launched from the ground againsc land targecs (ballistic missiles or Cruise missiles). T hey can be divided in two secondary groups: LRrNF or long range intermediate nuclear fo rces (from 1,000 to 5,500 Km) and SRJNf- or short range intermediate nuclear forces (from 500 to 1,000 Km); while at the beginning onl y the long range ones were considered in the "zero option", subsequently the "double :tero option" also included the short range ones. As known, the Washington agreement is offi cially concerned only with the above mentioned Soviet :rnd American mi~silcs, buc it practically involves also the German SRlNf-, the Pershing !As, which the

German Government has decided to dismantle, on ils own initiative, when lht: agreement between rhc two superpower~ is put into practice. If we now compare all rhc different ground-based missile wea pon system~ wh ich have to bc eliminated by direct or indirect effect of the agreement, ic seems at first sighc very fa,·ourable for ATO, because it force~ the Soviet Union to "dismantle" a very largt: nu mber of nuclear warheads, many of which arc placed on longer range vehicles (4,700 Km of the SS20, compared to the 2,500 of the GLCMs). In case of a war in w hich both sides use nuclear weapons, this would reduce NATO's vulner,,bility because it make~ it more difficult for the Soviet Union to effectively hie the disranr strategic targets in

J\s known and confirmed by the size and positioning of its forces, the Soviet strategy is an offens ive one since, accordi ng lO the Soviet military thought, the Soviel Union nc:cds lo possess the resources in Western Europe to be able to defend itself. ln fact, only with the availabilit y of such resources, together with its own, wo uld it be able to r;1cc a long term war with the prospect of success against capitalism's superpower, i.e. America (and possibly against the Communist rival superpower: China). (I) Bue, to use such resources, it must nor destroy them beforehand and therefore it must try to :1"oid a nuclear war. With such strategic aims, the Soviet Union has tried to reach a superiority in all che armamem sectors vis-:i-vis I he NA TO forces in Europe and has created a military instrument which, in case of war, must be ready to: • conqtwr Western Europe in a very short ti me using only conventional forces; • discourage NATO and other enem y countrie~ from employing nuclear weapom; • give greater strengt h tO offensive operatio ns carried out by conventional forces in ca,e they arc stopped i:ven by using chemical and nuclc..-ar weapons when necessary, and paraliz.e, when convenicnr, the effort and defensive will o r the Countries of the J\ lliancc, by usi ng the same weapons. Tn such a strategic plan it is clear chat in the Soviet Union the role of the conventional forces and above all of the land forces is considered a primary operatio nal role, while that of the nuclear forces is, first of all, to threaten the enemy and then to support and integrate the conventio nal forces.

NATO Strategy The aim of the Atlantic Alliance is, first

of all, that of preventing war, .my kin<l of war, discouraging any anack against it~ membe rs and secondly that of stopping the aggressor and force it to wi thdraw in case of a failed deterrence. Therefore the Alliance's strategy is onJy a . defensive one. Becaust! of t his, Llw A lliam:c.: has scl up a military instrument based o n three compo nents {strategic nuclear, non-strategic nu clear ;111d convt! nt ional forces) w hich, even in a condition of inferi ori ty, mus1 be able to: • play a role of deterrence, faci ng the potential aggressor with such condition~ of risk as not LO allo w h im to have the cenaimy o f success; • then, resist an enemy au ack from the border positions {forward defence) by employing only co nventional forces al the begin ni ng and comin ue the defence by using nuclear theatre weapons through a determi ned and gradual escalation, from an initial limited use for warn ing to other attacks in orde r LO force the attacker t0 stop, negouate and withdraw, before respondi ng with a strong, generalized attack w ith mass- destruct io n strat egic weapo ns (flexible respo nse <loctri ne). In this strategic ~ituation it is clear that for NATO: • nuclear armaments h ave kep t a primary rol e of deterrence; • conventional forces ha ve a main

resist an ce role, which also contributes to deterrence. But. even nowadays, they need the support of th e nuclear com ponent to resist, and this because of the cxiscing unravourablc rario (t:2-2.5) in o rdinary armaments (canks, arcillery, airpl anes) com pared to chose of t he Warsa w Pace. It is abo in chi~ perspective t hat we mu~t consider the Tcalian Defence, according to which no subsequc nc agreement can be m:1dc tln 11t1c lc.11· problem~ wi tholll th e prrli minary positive conclu~ion of th e negotiations on the conYentional stability in Europe. The Pe,·shings and Cruises, dep loyed on European soil o n request of the European Governments, after che deployment of the Soviet SS-20s, have demonstrated the will co wit hstand the ne w th reat, LO defend t hemsrlves from any risk ar all costs, creating a closer bond with the Un ited Scates and reaching the capability of hit tin g effectively and rapidly t he so urce of the possible aggressor i.e. the Soviet Union, without immediately and d irect!) involving American strategic armaments. But in errect, d1t:ir introducLi on in the Alliance's European arsenals had even before been considered necessary, to modernize the inte rmed iate nuclear force (IN F) and LO ma intain the capabi li ty o r " penetration", which had been lost by t he

old airplanes, to guara ntee the credibility of deterrence. Incidence of the agreement on the two st rategies From what has been said above it is possi ble to deduce that chc elimination of im crn1 cdiate range ve hicles and the ir warheads: • only partly reduces the capability of intimidation of th e Soviet nuclear force, beca u~c the Soviet U nion can aim at the European targets wit h pan of its strategicrange vehicles, including the ones situated beyo nd the Urab: • on the contrary, red uces more heav ily NATO's deterrence capability, since it abolishes the weapon systems which are more dfeccive and mo re reliab le to beat the Soviet U nion, i.e. the ones wh ich are suitable to apply the doctrine of flexible re~ponse. Therefore, it also reduce, the capabi li ty of resist ing and, in a more general sense, that of defendi ng, because it creates li mits and conditions for the "flexible re~pon~c" of the theatre armaments w hich were previously available, lim its and restraints wh ich were to be

71,e Br11tsh .;·.mb,p Am,zon a11d the Amerrr.111 w.rrship Richard E. llyr<l d11ri1111. the J4tb ,JC1it•.11iu11 <Jj tll(• Allrt>I N,1wl 011 Call Foret ur the ,4kdt1er• r,me.m (A'A VOCF()R.\1£D)

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ovcn.:orne with the installation of Pershing and Cruise. We have said "reduces - noc jeopardizes - the capabilit y o f deterrence and defence", because in face, from a technical point of view, there are Olher intermediate range weapon systems capable of hitting the Soviet Union, some of which arc already available, and others have been planned for the furnre, which could be "tied'" directl y to the pr0teccion and defence of Europe (e.g. balli)tic and cruise vehicles launched from mobile platforms, such as submarines, ships, ai rplanes, no t considered in lhc Washington Treaty). But chere will have to be che political will co do it. BALANCE BETWEEN THE T WO BLOCS

If we were lO think on ly in terms of forces, we should say chat the Washington

agreement is lhe first one regarding armament control, which rends to re-establish a balance between the disproportions and the asy mmecries ex isting between NATO and the Warsaw Pace. Bue chis is noc enough, because it is ncce~sary to admit that up to now, peace has mainly been kept by the balance of terror rather than by the balance of forces. Thus, having c~nsidered tht: conflicting aims of the strategics of the two blocs, the different size, capability and characceristics of the respective military instruments, it is necessary to make a comparison of the threats in strategic lerms. 1n fact, when the forces are differen t and asym metrical, ic is necessary, first of all, co obtain and maimain a certain balance. And ic is by comparing the threats that the agreement's imperfeclion comes up, (an imperfection which is admitted also by some of NATO's high authorities) as regards the Alliance's security needs. Looking at the different opcions of employment of the Soviet forces in order to rt:ac h, as soon as possible, their main objective i.e. Western Europe, and analyzing che danger for the Soviet Union rcprc~cmed by the diffc rem means of response which NATO could employ to stop its accack, we can ask ourselves what

is most frighteni ng for each side and therefore make a list of the threats in order of priority. It is clear that with the present agreement N ATO has promised to abolish all weapons which are most worrisome for the Soviet Union, but the agreement docs not involve a reduction of the more serious threat which the Soviet forces represent for I ATO and above all for the Countries of Western Europe. For this very reason, it was suggcsced to bind at least the last stage of the elimi nation of the missiles to a first ~tage of reduction of the conventional forces, an act which was considered too com plex because it would have brought the negotiations to a deadloc k. Hence it is impossible to say chat the Washington agreemcnr makes the world safer, as was righcly written in a ti tle of the Herald T1路ib11ne of December 8, and it is also impossible to say that it comribuces to strengthen the peaceful relationship between East and West fro m the poim of view of the strategic balance of che respective instruments of war. At chis point, we could ask ourselves: why has the agreement been made, since it appears an imprudence if not a risk, from the point of vie\'\' of the strategic balance? 路

T he proposal made in D ecember 1979 by NATO's author ities of not installing Cruises and Pershings if t he Soviet Union was to w ithdraw the SS-20s, has been considered a polit ical provocation. Has the agreemenL Lhen bee n made o nl y tO keep fai Lh co t his political provocation, thinking chat it would fall on deaf cars, as was demonstrated by the first reactions of t he Kremlin leadas? Or has it been signed fo r t he image of the leaders of the two supe rpowers, both facing se rious nat ional diffi culties and needing prestige abroad? O r was iL a consequence of the pressure m ade by Lhe pacifist movements who now consider the

agreem ent on che E uromissiles their ow n success?

POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS Maybe all t he a bo ve mencio ned factors have had so me ki nd of influence, whet her great o r small, o n t he wi ll to carry o n the very difficult negociacio ns unti l t he agreement was reached. But the re is a basic factor, which I consider as fundamental, which has innuc nced and w ill ever more conti nue to infl uence che decis ions concerning th e

militar y energy policy for the future: and that is fear, or co be more precise, th e fear of the " n uclea r". Up to now, this terror has played a decisive role in t he maimainance of peace, but in future it could put it at stake. We are talki ng of a phenom eno n o f mass psychology that even m ost politicians, w ho are aware of che value of the mate ri a l p rop ortion of fo rce in t he balances amo ng Nations or coaliLions o f Nations, cannot bu t cake into accou nt. On th is point, so me people are rightly saying chat fear of che nuclear weapon has alread y started Lhe " post nuclear era", at least in the st rategic-military secLOr.

CLASSIFICATIO N OF THREATS IN DECREASING ORDER OF PRIORITY T he prio rity is determined by co m bini ng the serious ness of the effects and the probability of reali zation of t hat type of threat.

For NA TO

For the Warsaw Pact

Surprise attack by conve ntional forces already deployed wit h the support of chemical weapons. I leavy attack by only co nv miona l forces (after mobi lization and therefore l)Ot a surprise attack). Heavy attack by conve nt ional for ces wi th t he support o f chem ical weapo ns. Heavy aLLack by conventional forces with tht'. suppo rt of tact ical nuclear weapons. Heavy attack by conve nt ional forces ,vith t he suppon of theat re nu clear weapons (SS20-DCA). Heavy attack by conventional forces with the support o f strategic nuclear weapons (ICBM).

Nuclear retaliation aLLack w ith Pershing II and GLCM missiles. uclca r n:taliacion anac k with DCA (du al capable nircraft) and with Pershing IA missiles. Nuclear retaliation anack \virh ballistic and cruise m issiles launched fro m sub rnar ines - (SLBM) and (SLCM) - and cruise missi b bunched from ai rcraft (ALCM). Nuclear recal iacion attack w ith strategic missiles launched from U.S. territory (JCBM). Resista nce of conventional forces with ~upporc of nuclear tactical and chemical arms. Resistance wic.h o nly convention al forces .

INTERMEDIATE N UCLEAR MISSILES TO BE ELIMINATED Soviet Un ion

United Statc:s T ype (single warhead)

Range

T ype (single warhead exce pt SS-20)

Number

PfRSHING 1-A (ballistic)

750

non deployed

1,800

deployed non deployed

PERSHING II (ballistic)

170 120 127

- -247

GLCM or Cmisc

2,500

deployed non deployed

Total

309 133

- 442

859+

the Federal Republic of Germany (ballistic)

SS 23 (ballistic)

deployed non deployed

950

deployed non deployed

2.000

deployed non de ployed

SS 4 (ballitir)

Number

SOO

SS 12/22 (ballistic)

deployed

SS 20 (ba llistic wit h 3 w:irhc:ids)

PERSHlNC I-A of

Range Km

167 33 200 220 506 726

65 105 170 405

4.7SC

11 011

dep lo yed

245 650

1.800

11 ()11

de plo yed

no n deployed

SS 5 (b,1llis t ic) 750

deployed

G/.CW

(crui~e) Total

Missiles

931

Total

Warheads

93 1

To tal Total

M is~ib Warheads

1,irn, 2,486

Lc:op3t'd t,,11{•. nk' comb.a 1.m/...: of ton~-e,u,011,.1/ Jorc:a.

This psychological phenomenon, connected to the terrible evems of Hirmhima and agasaki and emphasi7,.ed today by the Chernobyl accident, now includes the people's desire and the Nations' need to slow clown, and if possible stop, the :irmament race which cakes up infinite resources, and the wish to find a strategic balance with peaceful conditions, less da ngerous fo r the fuc urc of eh<:: whole mankind. Fven the military, like U\, supporter\ and defender~ of peace, cannot but ~hare ~uch asp1 rauons. T hese have been the reason and m0liva1ion fo r NATO's propo\al 10 givc up the idea of in)talling che Pershings and Cn11ses if the So\·iec Union decided to dismantle

its SS-20s. Subsequcndy those aspiratiom also gave rise to the offer of the 7.ero opcion for the LRTNF, even if at the beginning both propos:1I and offer ~eemed to have no prospects, so much so that they had mo re of a propagandistic effect than a political one. Gorbache\·, howewr, the new Soviet leader, not only accepted the offer but, very cleverly, made it his own. T hus he was ready to abandon the superiority already acquired :tnd streni;thened in the LRl F (contrary 10 all paM agrcement~ on ar ma ment control - SA LT and START - wh ich prac tically had only sam:tioned the \Lro ng posilion~ :ilrcaJ} reached by the Soviet Union) and therefore it was clear that che Uni ted

the

hu:J..·/1tmt

States and NATO could not back out. And this, even if there were many doubts on the future stratt:gic and political effects. On the other end, NATO tried 10 obLain more cenai n and favo urable results asking tht: Soviet Union to dismantle also the shon range missiles (SRTNF) - double zero option - where the superiority was even greater, and accept those on-site inspections which they had always rejected. Maybe even Gorbachev, who imends co talk not only \\'ith the Governments but also with the Western people feet~ the pre~surc of Westt:rn public opinion and cannot draw back. It is even better co s.iy lhat he thought he could obtain more imponam and significant advamage~ in the future, with the support of WeStern public opinion itself, if he could win its confidence as we will explain later on. Hence, if we consider the development of the problems and negotiations on this topic (begun for mally with the fa mous d11al mJcf.. rlcc,sion takrn by NATO in December '79 (2) and ended with the Washington agreement of December '87) and above all cake into account the fact that it was the Soviet Un ion who ab:mdoned the initial intransigent positions and then, time after time, gave up its demands (irwolvcrrn:nt of the French and British armaments, inclusion of dual capability aircraft, freeze of the SDI by the Uniced Slates) together with the conditions of superiority already reached, we must consider the agreement as an important political victory both for the PrcsidenL of the United States and for lhc Adantic Alliance. f-irsc of all, this is due co the All iance's determination and solidarity, in the common wish of a joint defence ,It all costs. The positive aspects of the treaty lie mainly in the face that, compared to the past, it brings about two sub~tantial d1angcs in the crend, because: • it creates a real, albeit limited, reduction of nuclear armaments (4°/4,), unlike the p1·cvious :1i;rcemc111s which onl y set a maximum cei ling or level which could not be exceeded; • it est:iblishcs a strict regime of onsite controls, even without notice, which means a change of principles an.:.! mentality in the Soviet leadership which, up to now. wa, oh,e~~ed by the psycho,i, of secrecy. These political and p~ychological aspects of the treat y are the origin of the favourable pro~pcccs for the fu ture. In fact, if the agreement of che I f- is loyally applied, it will noticeably increase mutual

trust, a basic clement which is es~emial for the new agreements on disarmament and for a substantial improvement in the relatio nshi p bet ween the two blocs. But this will also depe nd 911 us, and abo,Âˇe all on the European members of the Alliance, i.e. on the determination, consiste ncy and solidarity whi ch we will contin ue co show in the future for a further developme nt of al l the o ngo ing negotiation~ on disarmame nt, if these prospects turn into reality.

PROSPECTS FOR TI1E FUTURE To som e people, the prospects for the future seem very obscure, while others see them as completely positive. Such differences do not seem to be in0uenced by their political and ideological leanings, but rather on whether they trust the unity and solidarity of t he Alliance, especiall y in co nsideratio n of the pt!ace dri ve whi ch will be short ly launched by the Kremlin leader. Therefore, even those who wish to hear both sides, in order to

get an objeccive idea, have reasons to be doubtful and uncertain. The pessimists think that the consequences of the agreement wi ll inevitahly lead to a kind of pacifist euphoria and therefore to the much feared decouplin[!., i.e. to the detachment of the.' United State, with the w ichdrawal of ics fon.:e~ (conve ntional and non-convt!mio nal) from the O ld Continent, and at t he same tim e to th e dcnuclcarizmion of Western Europe. Thus, the terror of che ''nuclear" which up co now has guarameed peace, would seriously jeopa rdize it. If this were tht: case, co avo id war rh e 'Old Cominenc wou ld have no alternative bur to ~ubmi1 co "Finlandizacion". unless it 1ml the capability, courage and stre ngth - whic h many doubt - co jo in toget her and face by itself the pressure of th e Soviet empire. Moreover optim ists in good fa ith rely on the Soviet economic crisis and thu s on Gorbachev's need to direct the resources from mi litary to civilian produ ction and obtain from the \Xlcst substantial financial help co modernize ics indu ~tries. T hi~ will cncou,-.,gc the Soviet lratk:rs hip

to reach a~ soon ~ pos,iblc su bsta111iall y

reducci\'e agreements with chc \Xlest, on disarmamrnt and armament concrol, showing that it rea lly wants to apply t he new " military doctrine" eno un ced in Berlin in May 1987, during th e Warsaw Pact meeting. It i, a doccrine which would abandon the offemi\'e str,ucgy and the comequent need for superiority, to introduce the concept o r " sufficiency" only for purely defensive aim\, ~incc the war bet wcen th1: t:apitalisc \Xlest and the socialist East is no longer considered "inevitable". In my opi ni on, both hypothcse~ arc bastÂˇd on more o r 11:,; true ,1"un1p1ion,. b.1,ked by historic,11 example, vl a nor wo Ji,t.im p.1sr. /\s a m,ltlc r of fact, th e Allia m;c\ cohesion has been strong onl y in t he prese nce of a threat deeply fe lt by the Governme nts and by public opi n ion, whi le ~ometim,~ tlw pressure in the pacifist '.lt:O'>e has been so strong char 1ATO, for example, has had to re nounce, a priori, the ~o-called "N" bomb (m:utron bom b) o r in ocht:r words, the bomb wich ' 'increa~ed radiacion and reduced de0agracion". T ht! expe rts considered it rh c best nu..: lcar w..::1pon for defen~ivt: use in d1..:

/;a/ia11,11rnde multiple rocket lmmrhfr "Firos 25".

tactical field, a weapon which was lacer achieved also by the Soviet Union and which nowadays, after the JN F agreemcnl, would ' be useful to have. 1n practice, the same thi ng happened with chemical weapons, t he production of which had bee n suspended by che United Scares for more than twenty years, while the Soviet Un io n contin ued l O modernize and improve ics chemical arsenal. Analyzing che prospects from the o pposite side, the optimistic view poi nt, one must co nsider chat the fi rst agreements on armament control (SALT) took place just when Breznev - in foreign politics started his "detente" , with t he precise intention of obtaining, from both West and East Qapan) the financial and technological su ppo rt ne cessary for th e eco nomic devel opment of Asian Ru ssia and for the vast exploitation of the natu ral resources available there, according to his plans (che process of detente was lacer stopped especially because of the opposition of the m ilita ry hierarchy, who had see n in ic a serious danger for the cohesion of Soviet

society and empire, which arc always in need of an "enemy" to remain united). In che uncercaLnty of the above me ntioned hypotheses, the re is one element which should be absolutely ce rtain and al way~ taken in to account: the Soviet Union cannot change its objective of d omin ating Europe, and therefore of disrupting NATO; an aim whi ch is imposed by t he geoscrategic and, r should add, hiscorical context in which it finds itself. Gorbachev can chani;e the tact ics and modify the Strategy but not the aim. Moreover, seeing how his predecessors have failed in forty years of "armed co nfrontation" an d threate ning p o litical, military and ideological pressure on Western Europe, it is not hard to sec why he has been induced to attempt another kind o f approach and a different way, that of "a pacifist confrontation, with arms down", which should guarantee t he support o f Western public opinion and favour the disintegration of t he Atlantic Alliance. An other fucure fact is ce rtain: in the next negotiations on disarmament, which wi ll be more cxlCnsive, complex and d ifficu lt, the Soviets "will not present u s w ith anything" . They arc very clever in

negollaung, very firm in their intentiom and ready to go back to the tactic of press ure, intimidation or enticement on one o r the other member of the \Xlestcrn coali tio n, if they can take ad vantage of any gap or weakness in our political and military "deplorment". [n the perspec tive o f th is new "st.rategy", apparemly peaceful on the part of the Soviet Union, the Western parry and response would seem si mple: not be enchanted by Gorbac hcv's proposals and continue to improve che capability of deterrence and defence w ith the armaments no t included in the Washingto n agreement, in orde r to maintain che str ategic equil ibrium (or t hat of the threats) wh ich - guarantees peace, t hus achieving t he best <:ondit ion~ for ~erious and fruitful negotiations with the Soviets. This occurred once before with t he fNF when, having modern ized and strengthe ned these weapon sy~tcms with the acquisition in NATO's Eu ropean arsenal of Pershings and Cruises, it later became possible, to eliminate all Euro missib from both sides. ln brief, NA TO wi ll h ave to continue to arm itself in order to make possible

the balanced disarmament on boch sides, without putting at risk che security of the Alliance. In fact, as General Rogers used LO say, iL is possible to reduce various types of armarnems but one canpot reduce sccuriry, on the contrary it is necessary to improve it. ls chat possible? I think so. Anyhow it is not easy, also because the measures to be taken arc all together more expensive, involved and complex than the process to deploy Pershing and Cruise. ln fact, within NATO an outline of the aims and objectives to be fo llowed in Ll, e disarmament is beginning to appear with sufficient clarity: • aim: eliminate the possibility of a large-scale surprise auack; • objectives (in a general order of priority): eliminate chemical ar ms and half of the nuclear strategic weapons; reduce con,•entional :mack weapons especially rnnk~. APCs and artillery; reduce other types of nuclear arms, but without reaching a total denuclcari,mion. Even if these aims and objectives arc clear, there are still doubts on whether all the nations of the Alliance will be able to cope with present and future commitments. It is a question of strengthening the "conventional", which involves very high financial burdens, and modernizing the " nuclear", a topic which t0uches too deeply the sensitivit y of public opinion; this is, however, what is needed to guarantee an adt:quate security, e,·en when the Euromissiles are dismantled, and in this way induce the Soviets to negociatc with seriou~ intentions (let us remember thaL che MBFR negoriations in Vienna for the reduction of che conventional forces in Central .Europe have been going on for 14 years with no results :111d that now less than before they arc interested in reducing them and rebalance chem with NATO on the whole Cominem). There arc however some positive signs which I will mention later on.

had, up to now, the courage lO use ic in conflicts against non-nuclear countries, though they have sometimes found themselves in extremely difficu lt siLUacions. They preferred ro do without it rather than face the world's moral judgement. As an example one could mention the Korean war, Vietnam, and now Afghanistan. After all the Western European mi nds have doubted whether the U nited States was really ready to drop its atomic bombs on the Soviet Union to stop a Soviet attack on our Continent, rhus risking its own dest ruction. As we know, it is for this reason too chat France has decided co have itS own nuclear armaments and che European rulers of NATO-Europe asked the United States co install euromissiles on their territories as instruments for a first nuclear retaliation. Moreover ATO itself has tried to increase the value of con"entional forces, ;~ftcr )1avi11g aba~??ned the doctrir~,c of 111ass1ve respon\c 111 favour of the Oexible response". Besides, up to now, the exploding nuclear energy has had a very important "virtual" value, so much so that it has imposed a peace regime between the superpowers which compeLe for the world'~ domination; it is also impossible co exclude the fact that other countries,

wh ich have more or less recently become nuclear powers, might use it in che fururt:. Bm, as demonstrated by the Washington .,grcemcm, even this "virtual" value seem~ 10 be progressively declining. In such a situation, a question arises within NATO: is the strategy of "flexible respo nse" with a righL to "first use" and "forward defence" srill valid and applicable? The answer of the military and political experts is: "yes". Personally I share their opinion, but. l thi nk chat it might be necessary to modify its ap plication. rollowi ng the trend which has been going on ror ycars, that gives greater value to the "conventional", without excluding nuclear weapons, whose "threshold", in any case, should be rai~d. In this framework, there will probably have co be a substantial deepening of the defence, at lea~t on two Defence Positions, Mill beginning the resistance :1t che border (forward defence), thus expecting co fight mo re defensive battles on our terricory, possibly with the fire support of tactic:11 nuclear weapon (SNF - range up co 500 Km). This will be done e\'en before using intermediate and theatre weapons deep inside enemy u.:rritory on )trategic milil.lry targets, as arc the viral supply points or its offensive effort. ··L.1nce·· suif.zt.t··t,nurf.l(e mi)•th: >)'h'm.

CONSEQUENCES ON THE DEFENCE O RGANIZATIO AND CONDUCT Without having to admit thac chc postnuclear era has begun, as the famous American expert l::dwarcl Luttwak says in a rece ntl y published book, it is however necessary to recognize that, after the explosions of 1945 on che rwo Japanese cities :u che end of the Second World War, the exploding nuclear energy has gradually lost most oi its value for military use. This ha~ also been said by the Chief of the Dcft:nce General Scaff, General 13isognicro. in a recent article. (3) ln fact, none of the nuclear powers have

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This is a problem of great conct:rn for the sensitivity of the Germans, for they fear that in the future their territory and chat of their "brothers" beyond the curtain, cou Id become che nuclear battlefield Clf chc two blocs. Lt also concerns the concroversial hypothesis of che third zero option. Within the above abo the old concept of " total defence" cou Id be reappraised wichin NATO, even as a deterrent faccor, to tell the Soviets that the West has the in;ention of fighting wich all pos~ible means, even the nuclear one included tO maintain the integrity of its territory already from the borders. Moreover, if their attack shou ld be successful in ~ome areas and become an invasion, that territory would become another Afghanistan. No doubt, all thesc problems connected to che application of the Alliance's strategy will be subject to greac attention and detailed discussions in the near future, in the perspective of the INF agreemem and of a vaster disarmam ent process. GLOBAL EVALUATION After the answers given lO the introducwry questions, I think that we may conclude the analysis as fo llows. Wich the application of the agreement on the Euromissiles, from a military point of view NATO will neither be stronger nor weaker than before, if there is che adoption of the already foreseen possible measures to "set right" the instrument of nuclear deterrence that assures the strategic balance, which is the real peace guarantee. But NATO can be more self-confidem, because the cohesion an<l decermin.uion shown when facing che great issues of common security, as policy and strategy,

in relation to the opposed coalition, have guarallleed forty years of peace in Europe and have achieved an important ~uccess in the peaceful relations between che two blocs. This offers fa vourable prosp<.!c ts for ocher future disarmamem agreements, even in the other sectors, aiming at a strategic balance that shoul<l be more stable and less risky, with lower levels of force. Besides, the challenge of the Soviet Union to the Western world seems to be new and different: no more political pressure on Governments, based on the threatening presence of very powerful Armed Forces, bu t a psy chological pressure on the masses, with grcac and impressive proffers of peace. lt is a much less conspicuou~ challenge, but not less dangerous than the previous one. l n fact, if this psychological pressure could undermine the support of public opinion and of Parliaments fo r the Governments' prudent policy {intending co bridge, at least partly, before disar ming, tlw ga p existing in conventional and nuclear weapons), i.e. if it brought abouc an immediate halt to the process of modernization of the military instn1me111, the West would practically be on a course of uni lateral disarmament, gi"ing the Soviets a further advantage and worsening the already unstable strategic balance. Consequentl y, with che new disarmament race, the Soviet Union would achieve, at no cost, what it had not obtained up to now with che ,1rmamcm race. Here is the ability of Gorbachev's politicopropagandistic manoeuvre and, the danger, for the Atlamic Alliance, of the Krem lin\ new crcnd. \Y/e can place the proposal made by Honecker, leadcr of East Germany, to

West Germanv\ Prime .Minister, Kimi, a few days aftc~ the signature of the INF agreement. In this context he suggested co "freeze" the tactical nuclear armament (SNF), which has a range of less 1h,1n 500 Km, at the present situation, in order tO prevent NA TO from modernizing its missile systems in this field in which, by the way, the Warsaw Pact has a superiority of about 16 co l. This in view of the new negotiations on disarmament and a total elimination of rhe,e arms (a ~imilar proposal, in a similar si tuation of superiority, had already been made by Brezne\· regarding the I F). This would mean allowing che Soviet Union to ncgociate from a position of strength and ta ke a further step towa rds the total denuclearization of Europe. CONCLUSIONS All NATO's authorities rhink that to accomplish the above fa\'ourable prospects, it is necessary to negotiatl' realisrically, but first of all it is necessary lO strengthen the conventional defence, avoid the coral dcnuclearization of Europe and keep a strong bond between the two sides of the Atlantic, because only in chis way will the Soviets be induced to negotiate wich serious intentions, as demonst rated by I he recent experience. In short - I repeat - ic is necessary 10 arm oursclve~ better in order 10 disarm, even if this seems a paradox. Most of all, European countries and N /\ TO should, in this vital moment. make the greatest effort, both financial and politico-military, to remain t0gc1hcr and united with the United Scates, as has already happened in other difficult periods in the p:tsL There arc doubts on the capacity ,lnd the political will of carrying on thi, effort, also because it is necessary to convince public opinion of the vital need lO do so, and l hi, is nor easy since, after such a long period of peace, che public has become less sensitive to the risk of war. There arc however already ~ome cncournging signs. 1 will mention a few: • che day afcer the signature of che Washington ag reement, the Ducc.:h Government stared its intention 10 keep the nuclear role oi its dual-aircraft, while earlier it had decla red chat, with the deployment, t>f the Crui,c missile~, th:11 role would be discontinued; • a few days lacer, the Federal Republic of Germany annou nced its decision to in

crease, beyond l he already en\·isaged values, the defence budget in the new l'i nancial plan, start ing in l 989; • a ~imilar decision had bccn previously taken by the United Kingd9m, while the French Parliament passed the law on the dcfcncc progr:1111 111ing, which increa~c~ the financing by almost 2/3 by the L·nd of 1991;

Marines of the 111d B.111,1/1011 Combat £11gineen o/JSen'€' 1lx dmphibiom lt111di11g opnHllmu .it Saro.f fl.1), TllrJ1<y,

• Spain lOO, following the example of the french Armed Forces, is fully engaged to guarantc<.' a ~u bstantial contributio n to I he common defence, tho ugh it i~ 1101 integrated in the NA TO organization, and this represents the best increase of the All i:1nce\ conventional ddence capability; • the rep resentatives of t he Governments of the Western European Union (\XIEU), who m<.'t in The Hague at chc end of Oet0bcr, officially declared their will LO create a European idemicy on t he subject of security, consistent with NATO\ effom and recognized the foct

that onh· a mix of convemional and nuclear forces can guarantee it. And what has Italy done ,1nd what can it do? I will answer only by mentioning that. in the critical mome nt of the dual rr,1ck decision of 1979, Italy w:is 1he first lO approve the deployment of Cmise mi,~i le~ on ic~ territory and chat up to now it has been one of the few countries that in the last l°i vt: yea rs h.wc: com inued to im:nw,e the Defence budget by a yearly 3% in n:al terms, as had been agreed by NA TO and the allit:s. Moreover, our coumry i~ one of the l.1st in t he list of the shares of Gross National Product (GNP) to Defence (about 2.1 %, equal to le~, than t/2 the average of NAT O coumric~), so that it was practically impossible to modernize and adapt the imtrunwnt to toda\·'s needs. ;ilso con~idering that the inO~tion of the co,t of military material is very much higher than char of the average cos1 of life. In thi~ situation it is clear t hat the ordinary budgets would not allow u, to stand up to o ur iurure commitmenc~ LO stre ngthen the conventinnal component. O nly .1 speci.11 promo1ion.1I bw cmdd do that. And this could be che best demomtratio n (>f o ur dNcr mina tion to defend oursclve~ vi~-~-vi~ the p()lcl1li.1I enemy, .111J of solidarity the allies, now give, we could faci litate the early and positive o utcome of 1hr new disarmament rn:goriai ion, a, we all hope. l.t. Gen. Vittorio Bernard

Note,

( 1) h " the s.1111c ,tratci:y I lulcr applied, ,n the o pposite way, du l'ing t he Second World W.,r: co n· q ucr 1hc L;SS R'\ i;rc.11 resource, Lo be abk· L<• ddL·.1t the Briti,h I 111pire :rnd ,·,entually t Kc t he

USA. (2) Decision t() mow .tlon!\ two tracks: ,urt the ,k·ploymcnt o f 1lw Pcrshini;, and Crui~e, .rnd .1t the \.\llH.' time h..:~in nc.:~m iation, wit h dw \ovk·t ,, ready to renounce the instalbuon of the nL'W missile, it the So,·,cts were to dismantle their S5·20,, to set eh,· J!lreed balance o f the !NI· .ll a lowc1 level. (3) " 'I he evolmion n l the l1alia11 Defmc,· tn f.i~c a rapidly changing world si1uJtion " by Gen. R. Biso11niero on "I\ATO '\!cw,". October-. 1'}87.

BETWEEN POLITIC

PROSPECT OF THE ITALIAN

~ND DEFENCE

~ILITARY SECURITY

THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY ROLE OF ITALY

At the beginning of t he 80's, when we started to tal k about the Italian role in the Mediterranean, the area was not very calm and the po larizat ion of NATO's defensive system in Central Europe did not leave great initiative to the Italian Armed Forces. The components wh ich were more sensitive to this problem were the ai r and naval forces because in the All iance's general deployment they did not have an important autonomous role and felt penalized by NATO's defensive concept, wh ich did not give sufficient importance to the aeronaval theatre o f the " southern f lank" . The naval th reat of t he Soviet Bloc in the Mediterranean was control led by the US VI Fl eet and the general task, given to the Italian Navy, of controlling the maritim e rou tes from Gibraltar and Suez to the Ital ian ports, was in fac t a minor one. The Air Force too had "lost altitude" . These were the t imes of the doctrine of the Integrated Battle, but it was c learly a play on words: it was first of al l necessary to conq uer the supremacy of the air-space and then integrate it w ith the gro und components. An approximate calcu lation of the missions necessary for the air battle, left very little resou rces for the support of the air-land manouvre. Even these tasks were subsequently transferred to the NATO organ isms in which our air forces were integrated , and the on ly t hing left for our aeronautical pride to cont rol independently, was th e " Frecce Tricolori" acrobat ic patrol. With the subsequ ent doctri nal evolutions of the Extended battlefield, the Ai rland Batt le and its NATO version , i.e. the Follow-On Forces Attack (FO FA), the problem becames worse and probably the inc reas ing number of interdiction missions, will not even leave the famous "Frecce" under nat ional control. There

Mountain Infantry is employed for the defence of mountain areas and in rough and compartmented environments.

will certainly be a reduct ion in the close air support miss ions (CAS) which are so essen ti al for the ground-based forces. Therefore one way or another, NATO's "southern flank" is safely in the hand s of the ground forces, and even in the potential framework of a nuc lear war, the threat represented by about thi rty motorized and armoured Divisions which , supporting the main attack in Central Europe, move from t he Danubian districts to carry out the s imple, old and re liable manouvre of the "resection of t he pen insulae", is still, in our theat re, the only believable hypot hesis of combat between the Blocs apart f rom the possible concurrent amphibian and air-land actions and the insubstant ial threats of some African leader. The ground forces of the Warsaw Pact are in fact dramat ically present and just as 28

dramatically prepared to acqu ire t he enemy terri tory, and ou rs is considered as such, even if Italy is not a neighbouring country. Desp ite thei r good intent ions, the in-between countries, like Aust ria and Yugoslavia, do not seem able to oppose an adequate resistance to a probable advance of armoured troops. Post-Tito Yugoslavia, has problems of internal supremacy, which emphasize national differences and reduce the credibil ity of a defence capable of disjointing a powerful military instrument. Austria, moreover, is t he result of a "m iracle". Like Fin land it pays a very hi gh price for an improbable neutrality. It could not afford more than a weak protest in case a fo rmer invader, of not so long ago, wanted to pass with all its forces. Thus the bond connecting the Italian defensive system to NATO's is indeed very c lose, but to many the Italian role in the Alliance does not seem adequate, firstly because of the economic and

political importan ce achieved by the Nati on , which is among t he world' s seven most industrialized countries, and secondly because of its primary strateg ic pos it ion in a highly turbulent area such as the Mediterranean and Middle East basin. In this scenary, the fortyyear-old defence model begi ns to be "out of date" and the desire of politicians and experts, to obtain a political and military identity in some fi eld "away from home" with more or less multinational intervent ions, becomes more pressing. These interven t ions however, could give rise to new doubts and tensions, for two reasons essent ially. The first is ti ed to t he political legitimization o f a new Italian function on beh alf of the international community and , above al l, of NATO, when the mil itary forces mob ilized and destined to be emp loyed wit hin the Alliance, have to be removed from their institutional tasks to be em ployed in areas

where other countries (belong ing to the All iance or not) have interests which need to be safeguarded. The second one, which is more general, concerns military policy. It does not seem to be so exp lic it to defi ne the role Italy wants to give itself in terms of security. It does not have an org anic and coordinated structure. There are no object ives, purposes and aims. Hence the available inst rum ents cannot be t heoret icall y verifi ed and any expression of autonomous express ion appears to be risky if not ambit iou s. It has been often said that t his depends on an unclear definit ion of foreign policy, from which t he military policy depends. It is not so, or at least it is not always so. In the sector of nationa l sec uri ty, forei gn policy has a ro le which is equal to the military one; indeed, it can be said that t here is no global view of safety, and for thi s very reason foreign, national and mili tary policies, inevitably lack coord inat ion . The definition of security policy, in the absence of a si ngle individual (in t he United States the President, assisted by national security, is the on ly person responsible) is a responsibility of the Government as a whole. It is certainly not a simple way, but t he body exists and the important th ing is to make it work. But it is necessary to avoid giving it , apart from the responsability of co-ordination and defini tion, also the burden of determi ning the security needs in t he various sectors. Every branch , from the industrial to t he military, has the duty to inform t he Government o f its max imum and minimum needs and opt ions. This is t he on ly way to define a security po licy capable of assu ring a coherent position in the internati onal setting an d an economic an d soc ial development co-ordinated on t he internal plane.

It is not up to the military to indicate the c haracteristics of the foreig n policy to be foll owed , th e ind ustrial obiectives t o be achieved or the level of prosperity to be obtai ned. It is not righ t, however, fo r those who have spec ific knowledge and are well acq uainted with the actual problems, not to offer th eir hel p and expect to be listened when al l the rest is an absolute void. Another problem must be added to the two essential factors (internationa l legitim ization and definition of the security policy) which can not be excluded from t he new role. Th is is the technicalmilitary issue relating to the type and size of forces needed to demonstrate this politicomilitary autonomous position . The main thing is to decide the other needs in a situat ion made up of delicate balances and lim ited resources when the available forces have already been tasked w ith well-defi ned missions.

BASIC TACTICAL COMPO NENTS OF OPERATIONS

As for the ground forces, in the framework o f the modern defensive needs o f a territory, the roles of the tactical components of combat, are well defined. Generally s peaking, they can be divided into: Basic components:

• armour (tank and mechanized units): dest ined to operate on gro unds which allow and make the most of the use o f their vehicles and the manouvres against simi lar forces. They give life to flexibl e, powerfu l and econom ic un its (in t he operational sense) as long as the territory and the nature o f the cont rast ing forces allow it. They usually fight from their vehicles; • non-mechan ized In fantry (or infantry tout court): th ey operate on ground which does not perm it the use of armoured

veh ic les or which makes it t oo expensive and not very dynam ic. They adju st to an y t ype of ground, enemy forces and operational envi ronment. They can take advantage of various t ransport possibilities, whether org anic or in reinforcement , but they fi ght mainly on foot. In highly inhabi ted territories (villages, cul t ivated fields, com unicat ion routes etc.) they can real ize effective anti-tank and antiinfant ry de fences using t he grid defence. • special Infant ry (or spec ialities): they are fit for very particul ar tasks, s ituations and terrains. They express t hei r best qualities in the conditions for which they have been c reated. Thi s is why they can not be "deprived o f their ind ividuality" . Moreover, the fac t that they are given different funct ions or so-cal led " polyvalences", has a st rong influence on their operational capability. Because of her territorial pecu liari t ies and traditions, Italy has probably the highest nu mber of speci al Infantries in the world. Anyhow , in modern func t ional t erms, the followi ng requirements can still be just i fied: • mountain Infant ry: to defend mountain areas and be employed in difficult natural environments; • parat roop In fantry: for t he strategic or tacti cal operations requiring airdrops (conditio sine q ua non); • amph ibious Infantry: for operations in that specific environment. To the above mentioned types, it is necessary to add the high-mobility Infantry, for a rap id use in Army Corps sectors or in some sensitive areas of the territory. It is not really a new func ti on (the Bersaglieri were " invented" for t his very reason) but the extreme flui dity of modern combat, in time and space, has emp hasized its necessity. Such forces give t he High Commanders the c hance to intervene directly in the battle

Paratroops are employed in strategic and tactic operations requiring airdrops.

w ith means which guaran tee the saturat ion of "dynam ic" empty spaces, the control of enemy formations in their area of responsibility and the security of the command and cont rol system. Supports:

some (such as Artillery, Engineers, Signal. Anti-aircraft Art illery and A rmy Aviation) guarantee and increase the power and efficacy of the basic components. Others carry out special tasks such as m ilitary po lice, military intell igence, electronic warfare, data processing, rangers, and psychological warfare. Finally, others assure a technico-logistic support in the various activities concerning personnel and materi al. The mil itary land instrument s are formed by gaug ing and " mixing " basic components and supports (1 ) in rel at ion to the territory in w h ich they have to operat e, the enemy, the doctrine employed and the available resources. LIGHT INFANTRY AND FIR (Rapid Intervention Force)

From a purely techn ical and mi litary point of view, all the components which have been described so far, seem to satisfy the operational needs of any country. And what about light Infantry? There is a lot of talk about it, but it has not been mentioned in the previous li st. Therefore some questions come up spontaneously: what is light Infantry today? Is it a d ifferent name for someth ing which already exists? Why is there an ever growing interest for it? By a simple analysis, to see how it differs from the above mentioned component s, we cou ld answer the first two questions by saying what light

Infantry is not. It is not a force which has been structured in relation to the restraints imposed by the terrain or by the operational situation. In fact we have seen that a terrain particulart y connected to a permanent o r highly probable operational requirement, gives life to a speciality (2). It is not a non-mechanized Infantry. Because of t he specific way in which it fits the terrain on wh ich it o perates, the type of avai lable transport (wheel ed , armoured, heavy and/or protec ted tracked veh icles), the eq uipment, training and logi stic autonom y, th is t ype of Infantry is everything but " ligh t". It is not a high-mobility Infantry or at least it cannot be

just that. In fact, to act effectively in t he Army Corps or in the Military Region , this type of Infantry needs to be highly flexible but always in a range of possible employments wh ich can actually be carried out according to the specific sector and threat. In terms of " weigh t" it can be light only in certain c irc umstances, whi c h anyhow cannot affect beforehand its planning and use. It is not a force for forwa rd defence in a static framework. It cou ld defend the areas behind the front but only when there is great availabi lity o f it and after having guaranteed the forward defence. So by a simple p rocess of elimination , it is possible to find the definition of the only function carried out

over-amb iti ous. These last c haracteristi cs should be considered negative, but (power and baseness of politics !} t hey also serve very well to excite certai n sectors of public opin ion and to obtain various different kinds of approvals THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF REFERENCE

by the modern ligh t In fantry. A set of forces fitted with light arms and equipment, with limited initial logistic autonomy, but capable of achieving great operational autonomy because it has the capability for survival in various natural environments and also large availability of support. It can temporarily oppose limited armoured and motorized threats or it can lead a co-ordinated joint action or fight in a situation of isolation; H-24 ready, mobile, flexible, fitted with command and control systems which can be integrated in any nationa l and international operative network. This definiti on now desc ribes clearly enough that light Infant ry is t he basic land c omponent of the Rapid

Intervention Force (FIR). Only this force does not have a priori clearly defin ed missions and needs to be j ust as reliab le as t hey have to be flexible to be quickly employed in the whole national territory and even outside it. But there is more, and here it is possible to an swer the third quest ion . Whil e there is a gen eral apathy reg ard ing general operational problems, there is often more and more favou rable talk on light In fant ry and FIR, because t hey are not so real ly tied to spec if ic technical and military requ irements, but t hey are closely con nec ted with more general requirements of mi litary pol icy, even if someti mes t hese are vague, possibi li st and even

At a t ime like t he present, when there are discussions on t he new size of the Army, when t here are plan s for new types o f elementary Major Un its and w hen completely new types of mi litary co-operation are achieved in the internat ional field, it is necessary to make a very careful and brave analysis o f the real necessities of t he coun try in an international framework of reference which, in these last few years, has been offering ideas for great innovat ions. The contrast between the blocs is still greatly, em phasized, mi litary are more powerful than ever before but , at the same t ime, on bot h sides there are efforts to c reate a security screen without giving up the unilateral prospects of power. The fo llow ing are t he main points of this global p icture: • t he attempts to reduce nucl ear arm aments, which mean leaving behind a logic as deeprooted as it is perverse, which from a simple viol at ion of borders could bring to MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction}; • t he revaluat ion o f conven tional armaments w hich brings a possi ble armed conflict back to a "more hu man" level , t hough it inc reases t he ri sk of · subnuclear conflicts and does not red uce their lethality (as for the ir effects, the modern conven tional system s are in no way inferior to nuc lear weapons); • the search for meas ures which w ill bri ng to greater mutual confidence, which, wit h the Stockholm ag reement s have made a remarkable step forward ;

The Rapid In tervention Force avails itself of adequate transportations, personnel trained tor a wide range of employments, sophisticated armament, and an autonomous/in tegrable command and control system.

• the multilateral efforts to stab il ize the "hot areas" in the Med iterranean and the Midd le East; • the attempts to build a European po le with autonomous interlocutory capabili ty al so in the mi litary sector; • the studies on the concept and realization of nonprovocative defensive systems, or, more generally, of a Non Offensive Defence (NOD). Al l this is im portant and now, more than ever, po litics and defence have to be considered in a g lobal context. MILITARY POLICY AND SECURITY

There is a very vast range of options relative to the construct ion of a security model available to every country. Nevertheless, the fo llowi ng general cases can be identified: • it a nation th inks it needs only a defensive mil itary instrument, li mited to the operat ing range of its ow n territory, it has two ways of solving the problem: • examine the territory, evaluate the threat, choose the most appropriate defence and allocate the necessary resources to realize it. Every part of t he territory w ill have the most su itable forces to defend it. It is the ideal and maybe also utopian condition. Considering the cost s o f armaments and the technological innovations t here is no nation capable of doing it in fu ll. There is not much space for FIR, but non-p rovocat ive defences can be set up by basi ng them on non-motori zed infantry grid systems, permanent fort ificat ions, antitank obstac les etc. The emp loyment of the arm oured forces cou ld be I imited to counter-attacks or

other dyn am ic actions. • In the most frequent case, i.e. when there are not enoug h resources to form and keep a " specia lized" instrument , it is necessary to limit t he specializat ion t o the areas in which the th reat is greater, give more possible tasks to the same units and set up flexible reserves. In this s ituation it is possible to turn to the FIR, but in a reg ime with scarce resou rces these forc es have a li mited range of action , operat ional difficulties and scarce cred ibility. Italy finds itself in th is situat ion since there have been tal ks of possible t hreats from

"all s ides" without having established a clear mi litary pol icy. Therefore, presently, there is a spec ialized instru ment at the lan d border, while in t he rest of the territory there are mechanized units which owe such characteristics more to economic reasons than to operational requ irements. Today's FIR re flects the labou r of thought and material which was needed to create it. The missions have been inc reased, the forc es have remained the same (or have been reduced) and new resources have not been allocated . Techn ically speaking, the new operation al problems

are solved all the same by assigning new tasks to units wh ich are already emp loyed, but certain ly t hese compromise solutions do not represent the forces which would everrtually be necessary, while their effectiveness depends more on the individual efforts than on their structural reli ability. • The establishment of FIR becomes an imperative when a nation recognizes its role in mil itary policy beyond the li mits of its own territory, and bases its polit ical survival and credibil ity on the projection of power in a certain area of interest. The projection o f power, wh ich in theory can be achieved even without moving the forces, t herefore becomes feasible on ly through the physical projection of th e instrument of pressure. In th is case it is imposs ible to economize, to compromise or to adopt "th ird world" solutions. It is necessary to renounce a priori a strictly defensive and "non-provocative" choice to take up a ro le wh ich impl ies - under penalty of nu llity and ridicu le o f the whole system - external objectives, determination in pursuing them, adequate forces to reach them. In this situati on, FIR is constant ly a joint force (or, rather, a "supraforce") and must rely on: • means of t ransport technically and numerically adequate to the movements and possible act ions in the area of interest (which, according to the level of geo-political involvement, can be eit her local, reg ional or global); • trained personnel for a vast range o f tasks and operat ionall y ready (long-term personnel-t rained and replaced by "ad hoe" units or professionals); service with ad hoe or professionals • powerfu l and lightweight sophisticated weapons; • lim ited log ist ic load, but constant flow of supplies capable of reach ing even t he most isolated com ponents; • autonomous system of command and con trol ,

integrable in the various national and international operative systems. A fo rce li ke this is not c heap, on t he contrary it implies costs which can be borne only by countries with large resources. The United States is already in possession of a s imil ar airborne force, the Rap id Deployment Force (RDF), but is not happy wit h it. The strategic mob ility is not 100% adequate and the tactical capabil ity needs prepositioned vehicles and materials. The Soviet Union 's FIR is much more comp lex and powerfu I (3). Thus, the second case prefigu res superpower roles which no nation can keep up autonomously, with the except ion of the Un ited States, the Soviet Un ion and, if and when , Ch ina. For these " big ones" FIR has a global function also and above all in a regime of nuclear redu ctions or SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative). Th is ki nd of forces can in fact become substitutes for short and medium range nuclear weapons and t hey can allow both the development o f autonomous act ions and the inclus ion in cooperation plans. But even for the superpowers it is not easy to manage global security independently. While the resources can allow great in iti atives from a mi litary point of view, from a political viewpoi nt there is always the need o f integ rat ing the efforts, especiall y in the Western bloc. On this account one shou ld cons ider the frequent American appeal to the Allies to t ake on a fair share of responsibility, and the attempt s to establi sh a European mil itary pole. A POSSIBLE ITALIAN MODEL

It is therefore possible to imag ine a s ituation of comprom ise in which Italy and other nations can obtain and justi fy greater political and

st rategic ro les w ithout seeming overambitious or affected by unj ustified meg alomania. But what has to be achieved is only international cooperation. No do ubt in this case it wi ll be necessary to renoun ce part of the sovereign power: that which derives f rom the use of all poss ible means to defend national interests. It is unthin kable that this use can be ent irely delegated to others, whether allies or fri ends. It is also t rue that, in terms of reality, no nation can have the right to shake delicate balances, creating th e possibi lity of world crises, only for the sake of exercising a po liti co-military role of its own, not included wit hin international cooperatio n. It is a k ind of sel frestriction, dictated by the realistic realization of facts and therefore for Italy the followin g general principles can be established: The assumption of an autonomous politico-military role in any area of the world is unjustified and untenable. On the other hand it is necessary to adopt a role, proportioned to the politicoeconom ic, and geo-strateg ic c haracter of the cou ntry, within t he framework of the alliances and of the poss ible agreements in relat ion t o the security policy: The defence of territory is an essentially national factor and must be seen in a unitary framework in view of the changes in the reference international scenary. Hence, the subd ivi sion of the defensive system in fig hting and territorial areas and the distribution of nat ional and NATO responsi bilities, have no reason to exist ; The defence of national interests outside the territory, cannot exclude international balances and therefore must be regulated by supranational organi sms. The interforce missions established by the "White Paper" should therefore be 33

Non -mechanized Infantry is suitable for any type of terra in, enemy and operational environment, and operates where armoured units cannot be employed.

re viewed in the light o f these princi ples. The military instrument should be divided into two main components: one relative to the conventional problem of the defen ce of the borders, the ot her relative to the participation in internat ional or supranational security missions (withi n the All iance, in the framework of mu ltin at ional agreemen ts or within the UN) in an area of interest which could be identified in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. In the first case, there can be a motivat ion and a justification for the measures taken to revaluate t he conventional instrument, sti ll adopting a defence adequate to the national needs. In the second case there is place for a FIR of such dimensions and capabil ities that it wou ld be sufficient to autonomously face local emergenc ies, but it would need adequate international cooperation and integration for any role of a regional level. The first component wou ld therefore be only a national respon sib ility. There will have to be operational and doctrin al measures for the coordination with other nat ions of the Al liance, but the defence of the Northeastern sector should be integrated with t hat of the remain ing territory also as far as responsibilities are concerned. The Defence General Staff could become the real coordinator of the defence instrument, acting as an intermedi ary between the al li ed structure and the Chiefs of Staff, each of whom should be given the com mand of the respective Service. The Defence techn ical management wou ld thus be jointly directed by the Chiefs of Staff Comm ittee and by the organs in charge of Civi l Defence. 34

The second component (FIR), is geared to the strategic and tact ical missions of cooperation in a t heat re within the framework of the All iance. It shoul d necessari ly be subordinate to an allied structure which, for the po lit icomi litary and technical operational aspects, should be in c lose contact with t he Defence General Staff.

CONCLUSIONS

International framework, fai r share, need to "show the flag " , economic interest related to the nat ion al industrial dimension , zero opt ion s, revaluation of the

European mi litary po le, all these points lead , practically by force, to a solut ion simi lar to t hat wh ich has just been mentioned . They also make one th ink, at least at an operational leve l, of the possible creation of a "fourth service" of international dimensions. There are sti ll the problems of resources and of the internal consent. In a strict and pragmat ic log ic, if one accepts the preliminary point (rea l requirements) one must also accept the conclusions (resources and consent). But this is not t he case for Italy. In our country the art of adaptation has evolved in the "science of man ag ing

national territory, of defences w hich cannot be perceived as " provocative" ; • the reinforcement of th e alliances' framework, th roug h specialized intervent ions; • the most appropriate use of resources and of the avai lable military instruments; • the international justificat ion of the interventions ou tside the borders; • the real possibility of establish ing elite plurinational un its or even a European army, tasked to act as politicostrategic deterrent and operational instrument. Col. Fabio Mini

NOTE

(1 ) Some particu lar speculations can even include a support in the group o f basic com ponents. Recent defence studies carried out by the Max Planck Ins titute (FRG) show, for example, the possibility of creating " non-offen sive" de fences by co ntroling the territory with m ili tia units an d the extensive use of smart-ammunition artillery. (2) Historica lly speaking it is \h e case of the Alp ini but, from an operational point of view, of lhe armoured troops too. (3) For more info rma tion on the different FIRs, see Rivista Mili ta re no. 2/1987 " Operation al readiness" by Gen. Lu igi I nnecco.

somehow" and often we see structural solut ions which , fo llowing t emporary pressures or false needs, "make a permanent mess" of sim ple situations. On the other hand the two parameters - resources and consent - are essential. The former, for the accomplishment of something serious, the latter for the main tainance of the democratic character wh ich every mil itary inst rumen t must have in Italy and to avoid humil iating "seesaws" when decis ions have t o be taken during t he management of crises. Anyhow, as for the resou rces, t he rationalization of the conventional instrument ,

whether naval or airland in strictly defensive terms, would perm it the creation of a FIR adequate to the needs and would no doubt be approved by all pol itical and social forces interested in f inding a serious solution to the problem. As fo r the approval, it should not be lacking initiatives aimed at guaranteeing: • fu ll nat ional autonomy at local level and in the defence of t he territory; • a regional policy integrated in a framework of international cooperation ; • the con tribution to the increase in the mutual confidence between t he blocs through th e creation , on the

BETWEEN POLITICS AN0 DEFENCE Prospect of the Italian military security

THE

CONTRIBUTION

OF a

CIVIL

PROTECTION

THE

ARMY

Present Italian military doctrines have a modern view of the idea of global defence of t he territory; global defence, that is, designed as engagement of the Army in the forecast and prevention of natural calamities and in works for the safeguard of the environment together with the better known and larger task of assisting population s struck by calamities as recently happened in Lombardy and Alto Adige. Within the activities for the safeguard of the environment and the forecast and prevention of natural calamities the Army has taken multifarious initiatives fu ll y in line with its institutional aims. Among the most important activities I would like to underine the following: • the network for seismic observation established by the Army - as a resul t o f its cooperation with the National lstitute of Geophysics - in Veneto, Tuscany, Sard ini a, Sic il y and Lampedusa through the p lacing of appropriate sensors at the junctions of the army and the transmission of data through the mi li tary telegraphonic network. The possibility of enlarging this network including the Seismologic Centre of the Malta Uni versity is at presen t being studied; • The Meteomont Service, established in the winter o f 72/73 for military aims exclusively, is now of the utmost importance at national level. Th is service is carried out annually by the 4th Alpine Army Corps in co-operation with the meteo Service of the Military Air Force and with the State Forest Corps to obtain the necessary information on the state of danger of the snow c loak and to process tog ether with the Military Geographic lst itute, the «monographies of avalanches»; • The activity carried out by the Military Geographic Institute. Particularly important in this fi eld is the geodetic survey of the Institute for 37

topocartographic survey in the study of natural phenomena: earthq uakes, subsidency, bradyseism, novements regard ing the earth 's crust. Mention must be made of the support supp li ed by the Italian Mi litary Geog raph ic Institu te to the safeguard of the environment such as the geodetic con trol of the movement of the coasts of Calabria and Sicily, the control of the stab ility of t he Tower of Pisa, the detection of vertical movements in Piceno, soi l control in Fri uli, the subsidency of Ven ice and the bradyseism of the region of Naples. Besides the above mentioned activities and services other similarly important activities are carried out by the Army. Among these we must remember the following: • the act ivity of study, analysis, planning and third party support which basically consists in helitransport of techn ical person nel designed to

carry out surveys and research from above aimed at safeguarding the environ ment; • the interventions of the Military Engineers Corps which , besides satisfying several req uests connected to the institutional tasks, has always been engaged in the spec i fic sector of the safeguard of the environment. I would here li ke to mention one of the most important operat ions carried out recently such as the establishment of two artificial basins designed to gather meteoric waters to act as fire extinguishers in the pres ident ial estate of Castelporziano, considered a high risk area; • the fire service carried ou t by helicopters .equipped for the transport of water and delaying liquid; mention must also be made of the parallel land operations performed by the mi litary un its of all th e Arms and specialised branches together with the Firemen; • the safeguard of the

Architectural Estate which has seen a great number of recruits - most ly engineers, architects and surveyors - together with Archeologists of the Archeologic Super-lntendency of Naples and Caserta, carry out in a short t ime, a very detai led survey of all the structures required by t he Archeologic premises of Pompei. This has an enormous scientific importance which has increased t he interest in the nat ional archeologic estate; • the activi ty for the safeguard of the faunistic balance. In th is field too the Army worked wi th success carrying out , in a short time, an operation of faunistic re-balance. With the help of military personnel, deers and roe-bucks were gathered together and taken, wit h the necessary care and attention, from one area to another in the National park of Abruzzo and in the area of Livorno. The Army, however, proves an unreplaceable means of c ivi l protec ion in the activity of assistance in emergency

situations of particular seriousness. The readyness of the intervention, the deployment of special technical means, the comm itlment of men and the excellent organisation make the Armed Force a point of reference on which to count. The experience obtained during the intervention in Friuli and in Campania-Basi licata allow the Army to look ahead with a rigorously methodic planning of future interventions which has required long and detailed study. In fact, the development of macro-emergencies has taught us that the work of assistance and support to damaged populations requires three kinds of interventions in three subsequent stages: • first stage: rescue and assistance by immediate interventions and initiative; • second stage: that of survival by interventions designed to supply the

population with qualified assistance and housing; • third stage: of consolidation through interventions designed to restore a normal situation. For the above reasons the Ready Intervention Force (Fo.P.I.) was established, capable of assuring a qualified intervention - especiall y in the second stage - on al I the national territory in case of public calamities. It is a joint force group formed by operational units chosen among those already existing, appropriately trained and equipped with particular means, designed to integrate the organ isat ion estab lished on the moment by the Military Region concerned by the event. This force forms the linking ring between the ready intervention of the local forces (first stage) and the mass intervention (second stage) requiring more time and therefore designed to remain In the area of intervention for a limited lapse of time. The

Ready Intervention Force centred on a Brigade headquarters already existing in Central Italy and therefore in a barycentric position - is formed by a land component, with operational and specialised (engineers corps) «pawns», a naval and amphibious group and an air group. Specific trainin g designed to give Fo.P.I. readiness of intervention and the highest suitabi lity to operate efficiently In the areas struck by calam ity - is carried out on the basis of a preorganised planning of real scenarios. Besides the Fo.P.I., which rightly represents the pride of the Armed Forces, other support activities are carried out daily by other bodies of the Army in the field of civil protection. Among the above I would like to mention the Selfsufficient Task Force for the Recovery of the Movable Property of Civil Protection with the task of recovering, repairing

and stocking in definitive areas the hou sing units distributed to the populat ion struck by sei sms in 1976, 1980 and 1984. From its establishment to our days the above Force has recovered over 30 thousand hous in g units, it has repaired about 7 thousand and has, subsequently, stocked them on different areas of the national territory to guarantee quick and well-aimed interventions. Among the assistance activities I would like to mention the work carried out by the Army as regards water emergency. During 1987 and the early months of this year, several tanks have been installed and several tankers have been employed to bring water support to the populations of Agrigento, Enna,

Trapan i and Naples who lacked water and to people of certain municipalities of the provinces of Pordenone and Vicenza due to pollution of the water-bearing strata. I cannot, however, conclude this brief survey wi thout mentioning the main interventions in favour of the people struck by natural calam ity, carried out by the Army in 1987; these required a remarkable effort to face the snow falls during the winter months and the bad weather in Lombardy and Alto Adi ge. In Valtellina the exceptional bad weather conditions of mid J uly caused various floods, road interruptions and land s I ides one of which , of enormous proportions, buried some villages of the munic ipality of

Sant'Antonio Mori gnone (Sondrio), blockin g the course of the Adda river and creating a lake, in Val Pola, of over 15 million cubic metres of water. In that sam e period, the abundant rainfall in Alto Adige caused vast floodings and interruptions in Val Brembana, Val d'Adige, Val Venosta and Val Passiria isolat in g many inhabited areas. The work of the 3rd and 4th Army Corps units employed for the above went on for over two months, from July 18th to the end of September, 1987 and , upto that date, implied an engagement of remarkable dimensions. The activity of ALE (Light Aviat ion of the Army) must he re be menti oned. On this occasion , it allowed foodstuf f and goods of first necessity to reach people living

in areas which cou ld not have been reached otherwise. it transported over 1.200 tons of materials and 9.000 people. Mention must be made of the Ch-47 helitransport of pipes for the bui lding of a pipeline to empty the Val Pola lake wh ich sometimes required to emp loy t he aircraft almost beyond its technical capabi li ties. During the above operat ions seven Bailey bridges were cast in several localit ies in order to restore the interrupted viabi lity. Again, this activity testified the valid contribution the Engineer Corps is able to supp ly the Nation. In Valtellina, moreover, a high techno log ic contribution was supplied by the Miltary Geographic Institute with the use of sophisticated equipment

which, in stall ed on the Val Pola landslide, perm itted to readily detect eventual movements of the sliding mass thus al lowing those working at the bottom of the val ley to empty the lake, to operate in conditions of safety. I s hall now conc lude as following: Faced as we are by environmental and eco logic debasement becoming more and more evident and alarming, t he establishment of a mutual culture as regard s the safety of the territory becomes abso lutely necessary. Th is must become t he heritage o f everyone in a chorality of thought and action favouring civic and social so lidarity. I here wish to aknowledge th at the Armed Forces - and

especially the Army - with the ir con tri bution in work and thought, represent the indispensable element for the creation o f the above culture. The populat ions struck by t he various calamities look onto t he Army with gratitude and admirat ion; the entire Nation looks at t he Army aware that the Armed Force is a credible stronghold and a sure response to the increasing demands of safety ris ing from our co untry.

Remo Gaspari 41

SELENIA. A LEADER IN DEFENCE SYSTEMS

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Over thirthy years of active involvement in major defence projects. have given Se enia a profound understano ng of the complex needs of such systems. as well as the capability to provide solutions througr an in-d epth systems approach.

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~ -

Defence Systems Division Via Tiburtina km 12,400 · 00131 Rome. Italy Telex: 613690 SELROM I · Phone: (06) 4360 2890

RAGGRUPPAMENTO SELENIA ELSAG

IRiGPOUP

SCIENTIFIC . RESEARCH

I believe we may say that in all times the techniques and technology employed in systems of defence have represented the most advanced peak of «technical knowledge» of that age; I do not kn ow what the hidden reasons for this really are, but I imagine that among these, three at least are of the utmost im portance: • The first, perhaps, is that one's own defence, which in many cases means one's own survival, is the prioritarian demand, I wou ld even say a preexisting cond ition needed to sat isfy al l the ot her requ irements: thus, muc h attention, care, human and financial resources have always been employed in th is f ield . • The second is that, being these resources spent in a well-aimed manner, the effectiveness of such an investment has general ly been very high. I believe t hat in modern ti mes we may quote an on ly examp le of wel l-aimed technical and scientific effort - outside the military fi eld , but with comparable results- : that of the Apo llo programme which sent man to the Moon; t his certainly has many sim ilarit ies with mi litary programmes, .. . and perhaps some mutual ascendancy.

• The third is that in the innovations for defence, the antagonist (that is that thing wh ich represents the spur to improve), in this case the real or potential enemy, is dynamic: not a static obst acle to be overcome. Not t he great ocean to be crossed , not the interplanetary space t o be conquered: enormous, but always the same. An antagon ist whi c h changes, improves more or less as I do and thus makes me do always bet ter a nd more. Whatever the causes, this phenomenon , the conti nuous change, indeed accelerated, is one of the basic characterist ics of products for the defence; thus the q uantity and quality of investments in research and development, main instrument (though not the onl y o ne, as we shall see further) of in novation, become a very s igni fic ant means of testing the state of health of the «defence System» of a nation ; and even more a means with which to a nticipate the chances of li fe and future survival. Moreover, accelerat ion means that what has been done in the past is no longer sufficient in the present and wi ll be w holly inadequate in the futu re: as already said, this is not on ly true of t he quantity o f Research and Development, but even more of the quality and the organ isation required to face it. Before antic ipat ing considerations wh ich m ay represent a conc lusion, let us see what the situation in Italy is today and where we stand with in the industri alised countries o f the West. RESEARCH IN ITALY

Nowadays, in Italy, expenditu re for research reach es about 1.5% of the Gross Nat ional Product (j ust over 13 thousand bi llion li re in 1987). If we look at the t rend of the last 10-12 years and com pare it with other co untries such as France, Great Britain,

Germany and also Japan and the Un ited States, we immed iately realise that Italian research is the most neg lected. For the sake of accuracy, the term research previo us ly used must be understood in its wider and general sign ificance of Research and Developm ent (including the making of prototypes), and not only as scienti fic research designed for the acquisition of p ure technology which represents a minor share of the entire expenditure. Military Research and Development too is at lower levels than in other cou nt ries, France and the Un ited States in particular. In recent years expenditure fo r mil itary research has been around 2.8% of the budget for the defence (400 billion lire in 1985, 500 in 1987). We must note, however, that in 1988 there will be an important increase, to about 900 billion lire_ This is a considerable leap (we hope it is not a peak, but a trend designed to consolidate), wh ich brings the per cent rate of Research and Development as regards t he Budget for t he Defence t o 4.5 %. To this f igure we must add another 400-500 bi llion li re of the firms' se lf-financ ing, t he IMI fund for technologic innovat ion and the MICA rotation fu nd . The above data inform us that as regards quantity, t he investment for innovation in general, and particu larly t he country's investment for innovat ions in the military field is far lower t han in milit ary allied countries wh ich are also our allies/competitors in t he econom ic/industrial field. Though precise data regarding the qual it y of investments is not availab le, we may state that the numbe r of boards assigning the funds and the number of board s usi ng them (indust ries , u niversities, various boards of research) split up expenditure probably more than our above mentioned partners.

The res ult of all t his is that in our country on the average, technologic develo pment is probab ly inferior to t hat of our most im portant military/commerc ial partners of the Western world: what is even worse is that as the investment rate remains inferior, the gap between us and them will witho ut any doubt increase. The reason I use the expression «on the average» is that in fact the actual situation differs great ly f rom a rea to area. Thus, in certain fields we are better off t han f igures ind icate; in certain limited areas we reach a degree of excellency at international level; in many areas, the s it uation is

extremely serious. It may be in struct ive to examine some of the above and an alyse the facts that have made us excel in certain fields. As an example, I shall exam ine the ones I know better. The technologic fields I intend examin ing are those wh ich, accord ing to me, concern the Italian Army for they are connected w ith its spec i fic miss ions within jo int force operations and with the development of the general strateg ic situation. I must however underline that, as shown by the experience o f recent years, advanced technology is usually the mutual basis of the three Armed Forces for the

achievement of specific renewa l programmes and therefore its acquisition must be seen with in the situation of joint forces. I shall briefl y speak of the fo llowing areas: • C3 I systemistics; • Missile systemistics; • Technology and radar sensors; • Technology and electro-optic sensors; • Artificial intelligence and expert systems. In the last twenty five years Ita ly has progressed greatly in the above fiel ds; the main ac hievements (table 2 and 3} are a heritage of g reat importance even if, as mentioned above, we must

observe that it is not uni form throughout the di fferent fields.

C3 I SYSTEMISTICS Accord ing to me, the degree of competence ex isting in Italy is quite high. This has been achieved th rough a number of programmes, first in cooperation and then autonomous, which have perm itted Ita lian firms to develop considerably: I would like to mention the NATO NADG E p rog ramme which permitted SELENIA to develop and produce all the consolles of the System (from Norway to Turkey). The naval prog ramme

SADOC developed likewise. This involved SELENIA (start ing with a licence) on C and C preocessors in act ual time, as well as . in the f irs t examples of software developed in Italy. Th ese bases consolidated through autonomous developments promoted by the Ital ian Armed Forces, or developed for many foreign customers. I shall ment ion IPN and the STANDARD components in the naval field, and the C and C stations model land MRCS, as well as the integrati on of air reconnaissance radars within a national network of C3 I. A leap in qual ity wi ll be

represen ted by integrated systems such as CATRIN and SIACCON which most of the national indust ry is engaged in and which will employ advanced technology and concepts such as that of artificial intelligence. SYSTEMISTICS IN THE FIELD OF MISSILES Here too I consid er the Ital ian s ituation good, indeed very good. This of course, only as regards those groups of products which concern ou r industry (excl ud ing all that is beyond short and med iu m distance dead ang le defence).

Here too the f irst experiences arose w ith the big programmes of international cooperation started in the 60s. For many Italian - and Eu ropean - firms the HAWK became the opportunity to pass from a product ive typology of the small industry (even though of fair dimensions) to an industrial one in the modern sense: it is enough to think of the formal isation o f the procedures of production and of quality control. The HELIP (HAWK improvement) has furt her increased the systemistic and spec ialistic knowledge of the big rocke try systems, especia lly as regards the sensor part o f missiles and the battery con trol automation. In the field of the dead angle defence systems another opportunity was represented by the prod uction of the SPARROW miss il es and the participation to t he NATO SEA SPARROW multinational programme. Here the quali ty leap took p lace in the 70s when the Italian Armed Forces had the courage, on the bas is of technologies acquired in the above programmes, to plunge into very important national d evelopments which might even today appear reckless. I mean the mu lti-role mi ssi le ASPIDE developed by SELENIA and the surface-to-surface miss ile OTOMAT developed by OTO together with MATRA. Technologies involved , all at the highest levels, are o f the most varied type; from aereodynamics to materials (the ASPIDE in the air-to-air version reaches the speed o f MACH 5) , from tho radaristics of selfguid ing heads, to the gu ide and contro l systems, energy generation, propulsion, warheads and so forth. Export markets have also been an incen tive for investments and a great help in contributing to the fin ancial aspect, th e overhauling and the operat ional improvement in the most varied conditions. This of course is tru e o f

ammunit ion as well as of the rocketry Systems which emp loy it such as the ALBATROS, t he SPADA, the SKYGUAR D-ASPI DE, sold to many customers all over th e world. In conclusion, I would like to say that Italy has a very important heritage of techno logy and system istic compet ences which has to be nourished w ith further nat ion al Research and Development programmes so that it may play an adequate rol e in th e intern ational cooperations representi ng the future in this fiel d.

SENSORS AND RADAR SYSTEMS

Here the Italian sit uation is at its best: for certain products we reach exce ll ency at international level. Here our Armed Forces have invested with conti nuity from the first tube ORION firing radars to the new mono-pulse version of the same; from long range detection (ARGOS) to medium and long range tridimensional detect ion (RAT 31S - RAT 31 SL), to the low site one (PLUTO). More recently, the development at European level of the Mu ltifuncti onal EM PAR radar was started (SeleniaThompson-Marconi); the developm ent for the Arm ed Forces of the United States of special radars for air traffic control MATCALS (SeleniaSperry). For the future, the development already under way of the SAR (synth etic opening radar): a tech nology which has found ad enormous impulse in the recent developments o f quick s ignal process ing; applications for the surveillance of air and space platforms. Mention must be made of t he special micro-wave components; and in particular the research activity in the field of Gallium Arsenide components which assure high speed to processing and a greater immunity th an Si licon components.

SENSORS AND ELECTRO-OPTIC COMPONENTS

In this field unbal ances and differences in situation are very evid ent. There is a good competency in the fiel d of televis ion sensors and in that of IR sensors: but in no field do we have groups of products whi ch may be considered competitive at internation al level as that of radar sensors. As regards laser telemetry, the situation Is similar. Th is is rather worryn g, considering the ever growing role that these new technologies wi ll play in the new systems of weapon

survei llance and guidance. The situation is very different when , within the requ ired functions, the processing and intelligence component becomes predominant: t his is the case of the so-called SMART sensors, for which Italy (S ELEN IA) has had a contract of development as Sole Source withi n the SDI programme. ARTIFI CIAL INTELLIGENCE AN D EXPERT SYSTEMS

Th is sector is rather young for military applications; and it is on e o f those fields (as usually happens In many

sectors of informatics) where civilian applications relapse on m il itary applications more than vice-versa. In Italy, advanced studies and applications at international level began in the early 70s with the development by ELSAG of the EMMA computer (MultiMini-Associative-Processor), centre of an Automatic Recognition System of written texts on ELSAG licence applied in more advanced countries (In France by licence of ThomsonHotohiss Brandt and in the USA by licence of Pitney Bowes). Advanced studies and important achievements have been going on for the last 15 years in the field of industrial automation; from the recognition of the written word to that of the spoken word and upto the recognition of more complex forms designed to reach artificial vision (intelligent and seeing robots). Militarily speaking, the first aplications, in ELSAG, concerned systems of helped/automatic recognition of acoustic «markings» of barriagetenders; in SE LEN IA, recognition systems applied to radar sensors and, as mentioned above, to electro-optic sensors. Other activities of research, with an enormous potential, are under way, again in SELENIA, and concern the man/mach ine vocal interface and expert systems employed to help decisions in difficult situations; an example in the latter field worth mentioning regards the CATRIN System, within which SELENIA is studyng techniques based on knowledge useful for the planning of missions of the Light Aviation of the Army. CO NSIDERATIONS AND CONCLUSIO NS From the few examples mentioned , we may draw some considerations of a general character. The panorama examined is in many ways more positive than what the Research and Development national

investments allow us to imagine; in fact, factors which have brought about this level of development are many and include the following: • Research and Development financed and addressed by the military customer to other research boards; • the participation in multinat ional develop ment and/or production programmes; • Research and Development self-financed by the firms themselves, especially thanks to an important export market; • the partic ipation (rather scattered to say the truth) in internat ional development programmes such as CTP and NUNN, etc .. There are many differences in level from one area to another; the level is good and excellent in some cases, where the concomitance of more than one of the above mentioned factors has permitted a

continuity of investments. In many cases, the development of new systems was favoured by the need of procuring the same; investments in basic research or pure technologic development are rather low. The above circumstances give rise to the fact that technically good products have been put onto the market after s imilar products of more qualified competitors; it is what a colleague of mine called «development of an imitative kind». Inconveniences, however, were limited: our Armed Forces accepted this small temporal gap; our export market - chiefly formed by devel oping or recently industrialised countries absorbed these products well. Hoever, things have changed and will always change in the future. As mentioned at the beginning , the new generations

force programmes) and «offer" (rat ionalisat ion of the ind ustrial aspect of defence). • Aimed and selective employment of resou rces by the institutional customer to direct the industrial system towards a greater spec ialisation and com pletion of roles so that competences will be accumulated and not dispersed. • A tighter co-ordination of the «Defence" system with the industrial world and other boards promoting and financing Research and Development (U niversity, CNR, ENEA, etc.). • Government support to export withi n c lear regulat ions and transparency of procedures, as an absolute ly necessary instrument for the survival of the sector, as systematically pursued by our al li ed Governments and our partners in the Eu ropean Commun ity. Enrico Gimelli

of systems for the defence require ever growing investments; t he gap between us and our European partners (and even more the Americans and, in future, the Japanese) w ill inevitably grow if our investment rate continues to be so much lower than theirs. Traditional export markets have been drastically reorganised, and where they st il l exist, competition is much stronger and the red uced margins limit the firms' capacity of self-fin ancing research. Budget demands, costs and ever growing comp lexities of development and a greater awareness of the requ irements of an inter-operationability among the di f ferent Armed Forces have given great impul se to internat ional co-operat ions (espec ially European) in all fields of defence. Th is fact, extremely pos iti ve by itsel f, becomes a very

serious danger for national industry if not faced in conditions comparable to those of our Eu ropean partners/compet itors. According to me the above considerations point out the directions to be followed: • Investments in Research and Development comparable to those of our Eu ropean partners as regards quant ity and quality; emp loyment of Research and Development as add ress to be foll owed and preparat ion for international development programmes. • Long term planning of investments for development over a certain number of years to give f irms a clearer poi nt of reference and permit coordination and cont ribution to jo in inter-all ied plan ning. • Improvement to the highest possible degree of the employment of resoures, both as regards «demand » (joint

Mister Gimelli was born in 1937 in Genoa where he comp leted his studies and g raduated in Electronic Engineering. For about ten years he was assistant to the Chair of tech nique of Regu lation at the University of Genoa. After a first working experience in the industrial field at ITALSIDER, he enters the Nuova San Giorgio in 1963 starting his activity within the industrial group for whi ch he is still working. In 1969, the electronic activities of the Nuova San Giorgio were d ismembered and the ELSAG established. Gimelli passed over to the new society. He is appointed manager of the Naval Systems Division and later Deputy General Manager of the society. He then moves over to SELENIA wh ere he is appointed Co-general Manager responsible for the Operational Division first and then General Manager. At present he is Manag ing Director and Responsible for the SELEN IAELSAG group.

AND

POLICY

INDUSTRlt

Rather often the press and the research carried out by prestigious institutes underline and denounce a situation which is difficult and backward in our country compared to the scenary found in the main industrialized countries, as regards the capacity of innovation in the sector of technological development.

SISTEMA C/ C MILAN

CARATTERISTICKE E PRESTAZIONJ PRINCIPAL! -

Peso del posto tiro con treppiede: LS,S kg Peso del lreppiede: 3,7 Kg

- Poso deUa munbione: ll,8 Kg -

Gillala mbl;l!lima: 2000 m

Gillata minima: 25 m

Calibro della testa. di gucrra: 103 mm

The traditional technological indicators and the usual statistical analysis, suc h as the pe rcentage spe nt by Italy on research and development within the OECD, teli us that our posit ion in th e international l ist is behind industrial giants such as the United States, Japan, Germany, France and Great Britain and, for the number of reg istered patents, we fo llow countries such as Switzerland and Canada, whose demographi c size and industrial structures are far beh ind Italy's. In fact our co nt ri but ion to research and development within t he OECD is 2.5% of the ove ral l costs and is equal to about one twentiet h of what is allocated by the United States, less than one sixth of Japan's, one qu arter of Germany's and about halt of what is contributed by France and Great Britain. Appare ntly the resu lts of 52

the ResearÂˇch and Development activity are also modest, an d the space ocG-Upied by our country in th e internat ional scene sees us taki ng part with only 1.2% of the patents released in the United States in the 1977-84 period, and 3% of those released in Europe (by the Europ ean Patent Office) between 1982 and 1985. The situation is even more serious when we analyse our techno logical position in the various industri al sectors. Ou r innovative capacity is, above all , transformed in patents in the more traditional sectors, t he ones of the " made in Italy" , while in all the technological fields with a higher scienti fic cont~nt we occupy a rear position as regards our capabi lity to produce in novat ions . This is confirmed by the heavy debits in the technological balance in general and in particull ar in the ba lance of

sectors such as electro nics, fine chem istry, oil, byproducts etc. In actua l facts, though the situation of our country's techno logical development is a diff icult one, it is less serious than it appears from these fi gures and can be represented as a mixture of lights and shadows where, next to posi ti ons of undoubtable excel lence there are un endurable situations of technol ogica l backwardness in the development of whole industrial sectors. But if this is true, it is al so necessary to acknowledge that in recent years the situation has changed radically , with the incidence of the research and development costs on the Gross Domest ic Product which has passed from a relatively constant level in the sixt ies and seventies, w ith val ues arou nd 0.8% to about 1.3% in 1985 and 1.-6% in 1987. These few figures show complex changes in the Italian companies ' research and development structu re in recent years, induced by a whole series of causes, such as the phenomena of industrial conversion, t he changed attitude of the Italian com pan ies vis-a-vis tech no log ica l innovations, the growin g formalization of the innovative act ivity of the c ompanies and the increase of pub lic sup port for the Research and Development act ivity. But, as a confirmat ion of th e fact that the si tuat ion of technological innovations is characterized by " lights and shadows ", we must also remember that next to a firm recog nition o f the strategic importance of techno logy and the subsequent in creased effort in Research

and Development at company level, there is the characteristic of the Research and Development carried out by the Italian com panies which is not necessarily innovative. This ch aracte ristic is confirmed by the fact that only 33.7% of the expenses for Research an d Develop men t is spec ifically designed for actual innovative research , wh ile 66.3% is for imi tative and " fol low-up" research , a percentage whi ch increases even more in adva nced technology sectors. To th is, one shoul d add that in 41 % of the cases, the Italian industrial Research an d Development is directed to productive processes (especially cost red uction), rationalization or improvement of the already ex isting processes, wh ile only 59 % is directed to produ cts: a very low percentag e compared to that of the main OECD countries, wh ich also confirms that in Italy there is a predominance of Research and Development for adaptatio n and imitation. In 1987 the total amount of fi nanci al resources allotted to Research and Deve lopment has been of more th an 13,600 billi on Lire, with an increase of more than 22 % co mpared to the prev ious year. Of these, about 7,300-7,400 billion are related to the compani es; the remaining 6,300 bil lion have been spent, for Research and Develop ment, by Governmental administrations, research bodies, other pub li c agencies, the regions and local institutions and Universities. We see that th e cost for Research and

LANCIARAZZI MLRS

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C ARATTERIST!CHE E PRESTAZIONI PRINCIPALI

- Peso do) si1t1ma v1.1oto: 20 l - Peso deJ si1t1ma in ord1ne di combathm•nto: 25 t D1mens1om (L X C X H ) 6.83 m x 2,97 x m X 2.60 m Mo1or o· d10ffl do SOO HP

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- Autonomia : 490 km - Gittata: • con rano • bombotta 30 h:t • con r•no • minelta: 40 _,m - PossibihtA d, tuo: rauo 11noolo o pnJ r.uzi conlemporanea.menlo fl no al ma111mo di 12 - C elerit8 di Hro r.iassimo: 12 razz.i/min - Eq u.ipagqio: 3 uornini (c:apopeu o, operatore ele1tron1co, pi1ota)

VCC-80

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incl,vlduale Dunen1ioni:

• Junqhezza: 6,105 m • larohouo: 2,980 m • altena: 2,6 m Peso: 21,S t

Deve lopment in the sector of the Italian compan ies has grown by 250 % between 1980 and 1987, reaching , as we have just mentioned, about 7,400 billion Lire in 1987. Among the factors responsible for the increase of Research and Development costs in the Italian com panies in the 80's, the most evident is probably to be found in the growing public support for the Research and Development carried out by the companies. The publ ic financial contribution to th e overa ll research carried out by the firms has gone from 2% at the end of the 60's, to 9% in the early 80's, to 12% in 1982, 18% in 1983 and to approx im ately 20% in recent years , thus placing Italy in line with the main industrialized countries , with the exception of Japan. Despite these undoubtable improvem ents, it is however impossible not to mention or leave behind the negative aspects , attributed to fragmentation , delays and duplicat ions. Thus, a constant growth of the resources avai lable for technological development, but also the need for an ever more clearcut action of coordination, continuity and exchange for the optimizat ion of th ese resources, which must evident ly be directed to the more cohere nt stim ulation of technological development and modernization of the productive system. If this fact acq uires particularly acute relevance for the orders regarding high-technology productions (as for example the aircraft and military indu stry, computers and telecommunications, the

energy industry, pharmaceutical chemistry etc.) it does not mean that it is less important for " traditional " productions, even if - in the case of the military and aerospace industries - the determining importance of public demand is increased by the techno logical fal lout of these sectors, which is traditionally rich and extensive. If the above remarks have an element of truth, we must admit that inside the country's technical and industrial system there are realities which differ from the national average and present a situation characterized by more efficient and effective results, even if it is not the best possible one. This gives me the opportunity to make a few considerations on the industrial sector, which obviously involves me more, as an individual and as a person in charge of a company. I am evidently referring to the sector of equ ipment and systems for defence which, despite the recent difficu lties due to a series of exogenous factors , is realistically destined to have an essential role in the industri al and tec hn olog ical development of the industrialized countries. In ou r count ry, the basic data show that of the over 6,300 billion mentioned before, allocated in 1987 for research in the public sector, about 522 refer to the Ministry of Defence, in this case second on ly to the Ministry of Educat ion and more in general, in the public sector, preceded only by CN R and EN EA (Nat ional Committee for Nuclear and Alternative Energies).

If we then move on to an analysis according to disciplinary typology, we observe that last year the Ministry of Defence destined, to the engineering and technolog ical researc h about 483 billion of the 522 billion available, thus greatly surpassi ng all other public institutions and representing over 42% of the total engineering and technol ogica l research handled by the public sector. It is true that in absolute terms such values are still not enough , and that in 1987 only 8.2 % of the allocations for Research and Development in the public sector have gone to the Ministry of Defence. But it is also true that in the 1988 budget there has been an increase by more than 70% of the fu nds destined by Defence to Research and Development (from 522 to 906 billion) as compared to the previous year. This trend corresponds to the need to align the structure of the Italian military expenses to t hat of t he other European countries; and it is a trend which will continue. In 1988, the funds for Research and Development are about 4.5% of the defence budget, compared to 10-12% of the French and British budgets, which moreover are more than twice the Italian budget. It is also true that the Ministry of Defence is a public i nstitution inside which there is no worrying fragmentation in the destination of resources, th erefore one can fee l that there is a programmed technological policy aimed at the technical innovation of production. This statement is

indirectly confirmed by a multiplicity of data, all indicating a " diversity" of the defence system , compared to the larger " Italy system " , in terms of incentive, coord ination and planning of the sectorial technolgical development. Particularly in recent years , within the genera lized renewal of the role and meaning of the defence system, we have to underline a growing interaction which is neither fragmentary nor marginal, ever more binding the defence system to the country and to its more advanced sectors in the technolog ical field. This makes the expense for Defence one of the most qualified among those admin istered by the State and in this case it becomes a choice of technological innovation and qualification of the expense itself, which has a multiplying effect on the country's economy. Even if it is not correct to stress a situation which is certainly not ideal (even if on ly for the quick obsolence of the defence systems, which often forces to a breathless chase for substit utions), we mu st recognize the role, which is certainly not a secondary one, played by the defence administration inside the research and innovation sector, through the constant demand for highly sophisticated equipment, which produce stimulating effects on the in dustrial system connected with defence. But what most qualifies the relati onship with in dustry and authorizes us to declare the existence of the beginning of a true industrial and technological policy is, in actual facts, the 55

SEMINATORE TERRESTRE "ISTRICE"

A11,.iu.t1i1r• per lo.sehter•mHuo :'1.;ndo di ~aeoli mu1ttJ da ve:colo naota10 o c1nqol•10, co.t:luita d• p111 wutA di lant:)O (4,-6-8) "1111ervue od -an proorur~~e!:cr• t ltmo:tico di dtn111!

CARATTlJUSTICHE E PRESTAZIONI PRINCIPALI Lanciatore • 6 unlt6:

- Dimen1loni: 190 X 220 x 130 (h) cm - Capaciti: 5968 mine a/u o 1440 rrune a/ c o un carico misto di nw:ie a/u e a'c S1.11em1 di aemina: automatico 1econd0 unn cadenza di 1om1na prelmpotloto suJ pr09rammal010 eletironlco - Gitta ta.: 60-80 m, larohoz.zo d ella .striscia 20 m - VelocHA del veicolo vettore; va riabile- da Sa SO km/ h - Cadenza oa.x di Nm.ma: 500 mine a_·c o 4200 mu:e alu al mu;uto

interaction of the defence system with the national military industry, a process which cannot be restricted to the traditional ratio between demand and offer, but presents itself as a close relation of functional interdependence of the defence system with military industry, within which there are the cooperation programs on which industry is working now, which strengthen the interaction with the similar sector in the most industrialized countries of Western Europe. I would like to repeat, once again, that what must be considered important is not so much the size (which is by no means small) of the relation defence-industry, but the quality of the relationship itself, that for its own physiology automatically includes a strong acquisition of knowhow, as well as an exposi tion on international markets and a continuous comparison with the technologies of the other

industrialized countries. Just when our sector is showing signs of the attacks of international competit ion and is suffering from exogenous interferences, maybe legitimate but certai nly paralyzing, it would be wrong for me to end these remarks without saying that there is still a lot to do before we can declare the existence of an adequate industrial and technological sectorial pol icy. And there is little time to carry out such interventions, as is shown by the worrying losses of our international positions. I think there are no doubts on the fact that the only answer is that of technology and then that of the availabi lity of financial and organizational resources, as regards their size and, above all , the methods by which they are allocated. On its part, the industry producing defence equipment and systems, having recognized its need for cooperation and research of industrial and financial

sinerg ies, is reacting to the changes which are taking place, through a certain number of initiatives, the most important of which has been the recent estab li shment of many consortia among companies. They are destined to coordinate the activity, especially in research, development and planning. From the point of view of the companies ' system, what is important, apart from an adequate support of their presence on foreign markets, is a predictable, reliable and adequate public intervention. In this perspective, we consider ourselves capable of suggesting that one of the possible ways of intervention by public powers is that of giving adequate space to the programs considered by Defence, within those promoted by the National Research Counc il and the Ministry for Scientific Research; another - and global - way, is that of reviewing in detail the present regulations on royalties. As regards those due to the State, relevant to products developed with Defence financing, there should be the possibi lity, for the Defence itself, to invest them in new research and development activities. This aspect is all-i mportant, if one thinks that the Defence market allows for a generation of cash, especially in the case of exports; hence the possibility of investing again for development, just as happened on some occasions. For a continuous improvement of national planning in the defence sector, it could be possible

LANCIARAZZI CI C FOLGORE

to set up c lose, co ntinuous and stable re lations between Armed Forces and industry, as are for examp le those existing in the major NATO countries , where there· are permanent defence groups, made up of officers and industrial experts. Even the problem of budget cu ts has to find a solution for investments, both on ord inary budgets and - through the consol idation of funds for specia l programs (for example promotiona l laws, within which part of the fun ds should be earm arked for studies and designs), exc lu ded from cont ingencies and suffi cien t to guarantee the ful l realization of the programs. Then , inside these special programs, it is necessary that the realization of licensed products be always seen in a strategic perspective, allowing not only the passi ve acquisition of updated know-how, but also its new elaboration in the national context, and finally the opportunity of joining evo lutionary international programs of the li censed technology; the support to research can be carried out through th e exp licit ref inancing and destinat ion of part of the funds for technologica l development, setting aside all psychological, formal and pol itica l restraints. We 'are aware of the difficu lties brought about by these suggestions in the implemen tation phase, an d of the fact that , from a more genera l point of view, the public policy supporting innovation and tec hno logical propagation fi nds itself facing a rather di fficul t and complex task. This is probably also due to the

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fact th at a conceptual reference capable of establishing an ideal strategy does not exist, and because pub lic intervention itsel f has to be diversified, but at the same time flexible, adaptab le and sensitive, to be able to man age the complexity and changes wh ich are characteristics of industries with high innovative rythms. But time is short and the challenge is worth accepting, since the alternative is incompatible with the Country 's industrial development and with th e income level reached in these years . Umberto Marino

c iana S.p.A., where he has been for 35 years. During his career, Dr. Umberto Marino worked in the various sectors of the company (production, qual ity con t rol, studies, analysi s o f times and methods, organization etc.). Appoin ted Executive in January, 1962, w ith t he resp onsabil ity for the whole Production Service, he was subsequently appointed Procurator in February, 1966, General Manager in September, 1974, Managing Director in May, 1980 and Chairman on 7 May, 1981. In 1981 he became a member of the Board of Directors of many companies of Finanziaria E. Breda, including OTO Melara S.p.A. of La Spezia. In 1986 he was appointed Chairman and Managing Director of OTO Melara S.p.A., resigning from the office of Managing Director of FEB. At present, Dr. Marino is chairman of the Raggruppamento Consorti le Oto Melara, Breda Meccanica Bresc iana and Officine Gali leo, as well as President of the Advanced Center for Technological Research.

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TECHNOLOGICAL ~ AND INDUSTRIAL J POLICY

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THE SOCIAL INFLUENCES OF WAR

War may be defined and traced back t o any confl ict among rival g roups, carried out by force o f weapons o r other means and aiming at being accepted as legal. In accordance with th is delim it ation, th ere may be a state o f war without cases o f violence or c lamour of weapon s. Disorders and acts of individual vio lence are exc luded from the above concept, wh ile upheavals ard armed rebelli ons are included , espec ial ly those whose extens ion is broad enough to be considered as a civil war. The con flicts of primitive man may be c lass i fied as wars if caused by organised group activity or whenever there is a continuity of object ives and action . Al l the battles cau sed by accidenta l or casual acts of violence do not come under the above category.

CON FLI CTS IN PR IMITIVE SOCIETIES

Giovanni Fattori: Explosion of the ammunition chest ( 1880).

Primitive soc ieties inc lude many st ages of development, from the s imp le social o rganisati on o f Eskimos t o t he more complicat ed and varied societ ies of Zu lus or of the Indian po pulations of th e NorthWestern Pac if ic coast. These societies lack a form of written lang uage and th us base t he t ransmiss ion of knowledge on o ral tradition. The life of primit ive po pulat ions is governed by cu stom; soc ial relations w ithin the group and t he techn iques wit h which prim it ive people face the requirements of every day life are sanctioned by the unchanged experience of generators. The war of primit ive peop le is cond it ioned by t he same cust omary reg ulat ions wh ich govern t he other act ivities of the pri mitve grou p. As society is static, weapons and war

tec hniques are also stat ic , thus d if fering from t he weapons o f civilised societies where the methods fo r wag in g war are cont inuously changing. The war of prim itive soci eties differs from that of c iv ilised populations in many important aspects. In prim itive soc iet ies, spec ialisation is al most non-existent; each member o f t he group takes part in all the act ivities of war and t hus the re is no professional o r " reg ular" military class whose o nly task is that of engagi ng in war. In t he primit ive g rou ps t here is no lead ing class and t hus no hierarchic struc t ure, nor are t here any means o f imposing orders and disc ipline. The lack of al l princip le o f aut hority other t han th at ind icat ed by custom is the reason why prim itive groups never ach ieved the t actic organisat ion of the armies of 59

Giovanni Fattori:

Abandoned soldiers (1966-70).

c ivil ised countries. The simp lest form of attack consisted in making an ambush tor the enemy and hitting hi m at a distance with launchers. Many prim itive groups never went beyond th is techni qu e and very few of them were ready to fight bravely face to face or attack forti fied positions. Generall y, in a primitive war, after the two opposing dep loyments had got in touch with one another, the battles broke up int o a seri es o f ind ividual encounters. Rational plan ning of war, as undertaken in c ivilised nations by military General Staff or political corps, is inexistent in the way primitives go about the conflict; planning is generally no more than the omens begotten f rom a ch ief's dream. Due to the scarcity of food resources and to the fact that the warriors are also hunters and suppliers of food to the whole community and that the members of the warrior pat rols are free to return ho me if " the spirit" advises them to do so, no primitive society can wage war extensively. A primitive soc iety cannot lighthearted ly afford to lose one of its vital food producers; therefore, though in a prim itive war the toi l is generally low, the death o f only a few men is usually enough to abandon the

combat. Finally, the reasons tor a prim it ive war are only vagu ely s im ilar to those causing an organ ised and c ivil ised State to wage war. Economic reasons are not very important; most primitive peop le own very littl e which may tempt an aggressor. Wars undertaken to conquer a territory or impose one's domin ion over another popu lation are just as unusual. War is usually waged by a group of ind ividuals, or by the whole tribe, for prestige alone; t hat is, war is waged for the glory obtained by the most dist inguished warrior, or otherw ise for revenge. EFFECTS OF CONFLICTS IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

The natu re of primitive war is tig htly bound to t he social, political and econom ic organisation of primitive society. Changes in the way of wag ing war go toget her with changes in the organisation of the group, followi ng both internal innovat ions and influences of other cult ures. These changes may take place through the ach ievement of a tec hni que Through the study of the solution of conflicts ,;tnd the overcoming of the crisis, it was decided that war could have been prevented if, under the nuclear umbrella, one succeeded in preventing enmities among States to go so far as to become irreversible.

making specialisation possible or through the evolution of political institut ions. When th e royal princ iple was introduced among Zulus, it coincided with the rise of an individual who had enough authority to command. The Zulus, lead by powerful kings, broke through the barrier of custom whi ch prevented changes and developed a system of war wh ich was something between that o f pri mitive groups and that of civilised societi es. Likewise, most of the primitive pop ulations w ho came in touch wi th Europeans, imitated more or less successful ly t he western war techniques. The Ind ians of the prairies obtained horses from the Span iards and became mounted warriors; fire arms increased the shock force; bu t though the Sioux managed to beat Custer's t roops, the Indians' progress as regards armcfments was not foll owed by an equal progress in the org ani sat ion : Ind ian command and tactics remained rudimentary. CONFLICTS AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY AGE

In civi lised societies war differs from many other kinds of vio lence because it is a form of behaviour accepted by at least certain groups within the commun ity. The endemic riots

of the Middle Ages, often considered illegal by eccles iastic and political authorities becau se they represented a threat to the integrity of the Christian state organisation in Europe, were actually a true and proper state of war. The political unity of medieval christianity was large ly theoretic; the conflict among groups was an acknowledged method of settling disagreements and mi li tary operat ions were planned and achieved in an organised way. In modern times the prevailin g type of con flict is war among national States. This type of conflict must be classified as a state of war event i f often denounced as illegal and unfair. Philosophers have often faced the problem o f distinguishing between fair and unfair wars, on the basis of a moral evaluati on of the causes. Nowadays, bearing in mind the statute of the United Nations, some authors maintain that the old type war among national States is illegal and that the only military action to be considered legal is an International police operation to forestail or pun ish the agressor. However, the powers which opposed the UNO forces maintained that their combat had legal aims and that their

cause was just and legal. It is therefore still virtually impossible to find a meaningful difference between legal and just wars and illegal and unjust ones. All organised armed conflict among ideologic or nati onal groups must thus be con sidered simp ly as a state of war. The condition that to be classified as a state of war a conflict must somehow be an organised act ivi ty, may suggest that war is a condition which develops with the evolution of civilisation. In fact, certain phi losophers and certain ethnologists have attributed a mutual origin to war and civilisation. Some ethnologists, in particular, have gone back to c ertain popu lat ions of the Stone Age, such as the Eskimos, to suggest that primitive man was "peaceful"; it may therefore seem c lear that war intensified as man became more "civilised" . According to the above it would be possible to conclude that war is something "unnatu ral ". If it were "unnatural" there wou ld be sound reasons for supporting The XX, century shows a movement towards total war, but it is also marked by an effort to control the plight of war much more aware than in the past.

Giovanni Fattori: The Italian field after the battle of Magenta (etching).

the theory that war may be eliminated; if man is not pugnacious by nature, it is conceivable that a solution be foun d to the evi l which has always distressed mankind. Most of the cultural anthropologists, however, disagree with the opinion that primitive man did not know what war was. They consider primitive man's expeditions in search of food and a wi fe a primitive form of war. The path of c ivil isation has in tensified war at certain levels such as for example as regards conflicts among nations, but it has often subdued its man ifestations at other leve ls suc h as for example within the nat ional State. Few could deny that, within this sphere, the national State has become one of the most important instruments of civilisation created by man. War may not therefore, be considered the particular result of the national State and of extreme nationalism; it already existed before the birth of national States. Whether we accept the t heory that war is the daugh ter of civilisation or support the opposite theory according to which war is the produce of

Giovanni Fattori: Camp at sunset (1885-86).

human nature, it is clear that the development we observe in war is tightly linked to the process of historic change. The social, political, economic and cu ltural progress of man is influenced , for better and for worse, by the armed conflict. The fate of war has often been the determining factor of the process of historic change: Persian wars saved Europe from Asian tyranny; the Roman Empire was established through war and war contributed to its downfall; William the Conqueror influenced the history of England by a victorious war. War was determinant throughout the centuries, especially when other ways o f reaching a decision proved inadequ ate. The results of war are not based on rights but on strength. Even when rights prevailed in waging a war, it is difficult to dec ide if this was accidental or determined by the moral strength given by being in the right. War, however, was often muc h more that the bruta l attempt to decide the course of history with the force of arms. The very nature of war was moulded by social factors and by the evolution of technics,

which were in turn in fluenced by war. There is no need to insist on the fact that war has undergone the influence of social and techn ical changes. Weapons are a product of technics. Arm ies are influenced by the society in which they are established. When there are social or industrial revolutions, when power passes from one class to another, when new administrative or distribution techniques are discovered, war is immediately affected. The ever growing rythm of the sc ient if ic discoveries of our time has made this t ru th c learer than it has ever been in the past. In fact, a British writer of military affairs, general J.F.C. Fuller, maintains that weapons have to do with 99 per cent of a military victory. Though it is difficult t o ag ree fully with such an extreme thesis, a superior armament undoubted ly favours whoever uses it. Due to the speed with which inventions follow one another at present, success in war depends on how The destructive power of the hydrogen bomb is so big that political leaders, scientists and military men have often stated that the fear of the bomb has a dissuading effect against the outbreak of a big-sized conflict.

easi ly soldiers adapt their organisation, tactics and doctrine to the use of even more sophisticated weapons. Success may also depend on the measure in which military chiefs are able to harmon ise the spirit of t he ir units with that of the society the staff comes from. In the past, due main ly to the conservatism imp licit in t heir profession , military men were sometimes slow in adopting already available weapons and methods. Only recently was scientific research accepted as an importan t part of defence; and only in modern times was it realised that an army can in no way remain isolated from the rest of the community. The complementary thesis according to which war has a steady influence on the form of society, raises much more controversial problems. Some th inkers have reached the conclusion that war is a " constructive force" in social and technolog ic progress. Werner Sombart supported the thesis that war favoured the developmen t of the modern econom ic system and thus of modern society. The American social ph ilosopher Lewis Mumford states that machines were introduced by war. Many authors are concern ed with

mi litary virtues as may be fou nd in some individ uals, especially in t imes of c ris is; and some, such as Nietzsche, maintain that war must thus be considered an "ennobling" experience for society as a whole. Of different opinion is Toynbee's Study of History, which, th ough dul y acknowledging the importance of mil itary virtues , states that war is t he " immediate cause" of the downfall of all civi li sat ions in the past. Toynbee's description of the "deat h symptoms" in the periods of disorder of the previous civili sat ion seems s imilar to that of the symptoms revealed in t he periods of the nationali st wars of our time. Many other authors believe that war is a great destroyer of materials and of moral sense . Some con clude that there is a strong and perhaps inevitable tend ency accordin g to which th e efforts spent on the defensive organisat ion and in related operations may lead to excesses of the military spirit wh ich wou ld end up by dis integrating the very soc iety to be defended. The book War and Human Progress by J.U. Net is a detailed study on the effects of

war. It underlines how many statements of the "constru ctive" school on the contributions of war to society are illusory or exagerated and it maintains t hat not war, but the " limitations" imposed on it have lead to social and technical progress. War may be limited in many di fferent ways. It may be lim ited in length, space or collocation , in intensity or in t he way it is fought, in its effects on the belligerant popu lations or in the objective aimed at. These forms of limitations may not be all present at the same t ime. The origin of such limitations is varied. When a war is shortlived it is more li kely to be because one side c learly prevails over the ot her rather than for lack of engagement; a limitation in space may be due to the local nat ure of the obj ect o f strife; li mitat ions in the way of fight ing, lack of effects on the civi lian population and limitations of an objective may be due to physical barriers and to The increasing constructive capacities of man go together with a strictly parallel increase in his power of destruction.

Giovanni Fattori: Episode of the campaign against brigandage in 1963 (1864).

opinions which impose res trictions to the nature of war. Theoreticall y, li mitat ions of the latter kind alread y existed in the Midd le Ages and acted as a strong curb for the illuminist ic period in the eig hteenth century. Quite c learly, the concept of limitation is diametrically opposite to that of the global character of war. Moreover, j ust as limitat ion can never be absolute, war as a whole is a relative and not an absolute concept. Total war, in the fu llest sense of the term, would mean f ighting w ith all one's resources and with all ki nd s of weapons w ithout any limitat ion imposed by human itarian reasons or convenience. No war has ever reac hed this stage. The conqueror cannot wi sh to f ind a desert at h is feet. In war, an absolute total character can only mean chaos and barbarity. What is really meant when speaking of total war is something near totality and by lim itations to war we mean t hat the growing c ivi lis ing effects or the incapac ity of overcoming physical barriers act as a curb

Giovanni Fattori: Episode of the attack on the Madonna de/la Scoperta ( 1864).

and weaken the effects of war on soc iety. Man 's increasing constructive capacities go tight ly together w it h his grow ing power of destruct ion. Likewise, the ever growing capacity of destruct ion goes together and in some way determ ines the need of imposing limitations to war in the name of humanity. Throughout t he centuries, the opposing trends, towards totality on the one hand and towards li m itation on th e other, have been fo ll ow ing in succession. lllu mi nism and the Middle Ages were dom inated by the trend towards lim itation , whi le the Reformation and the French Revolution were marked by a steady ap proximat ion towards totality. In the n ineteenth century it seemed almost as if man were in an intermed iate position in choosing between the two opposing trends. The twenti eth century shows a movement towards total war, but the efforts to control t he pi ight of war seem more aware t han in the past. The invention of t he atomi c bom b seemed to threaten civi li sat ion and perhaps th e very existence of man.

Thoug h th is examp le suggests that war spurred the rythm of scien tifi c development more t han wou ld have been possible in peace it also showed t hat war had become a destruct ive force of unli mited potentiality. The init ial incapacity of employing atomi c power for peacefu l uses, increased the danger hoverin g over mankind. The movements for the abolit ion of war, already spurred by the h orrors of modern confli cts, were powerful ly strengthened. Pacifism , the limitat ion of armaments, co ll ect ive security and even the creation of a super-state by general consent were the means sup ported to put an end to war. The dlestructive power of the h1ydrogen bomb is so great that statesmen , scient ists and m ilitary men s tate that the fear of the bomb h as by itself the power of diss uad ing against a further world conflict. Man 's in stinct of sel f-preservation may, in fact, end up by saving mankind from destruction. Total war, would mean fighti ng with every resource and every kind of weapon without humanitarian or opportunistic limitations. No war has hith erto gone so far. The conqueror cannot wish to find a desert at his feet.

Several observers are surprised to see that the development of Soviet nuclear weapon s, believed to cau se t he outbreak of a third world war, has so far had completely di fferen t effects. Nuclear ba lance, or dead lock, between the two big powers, reached around 1959, caused a state of mutual diss uasion: t he balance of terror. It open ed a nucl ear um brel la under which the minor powers cont inued to figh t wars, while t he superpowers thoug h sometimes surreptitious ly givi ng their help, abstained from armed conflicts. When directly involved, the two superpowers accepted restrict ions to their milit ary opera tions and avoid,ed t urni ng to nuclear weapon s. Furthermore, bot h showed mutual reluctancy in sharing the secrets o f the atom and strong ly underl ined the dangers of nuc lear proliferation . CONCLUSION

It is now c lear that a solut ion to the problem of war could be reached only if one superpower conquered t he other or if a world State was created or, alternatively, through an agreement by which each superpower be w ill ing to

relinquish substantial claims. Since for t he time being the superpowers seem to be able to stay out of an actual control imposed by a general international agreement, and si nce political science is unable to abolish or repress war, if not by mere chance thanks to a fragile nuclear balance, theorists have been looking for the key of the problem in a more detailed study of war and its causes with the aim of learning something more on its prevention. The past debate on whether war was the product of human nature or of the development of civilisation is too simp le and out-dated. Attempts of preserving peace by arbitration , disarmament , international org ani sations and col lective security have given no result. In 1858-59, t he year in which the possibilities of t he balance of terror were first understood, new research institutes were established to study what was called the science of peace. One of the most promising prog ramms was the study of the sol ution of the conflicts and of overcoming the

crisis, convin ced as we were that, under the nuclear umbrella, war could have been prevented if an tagonism among States was prevented from going so far as to become irreversible. The balance of terror thus favoured a more scientific study of the origins of war by scholars of social science and other su bjects. No-one expects easy solutions. Even if a general theory on the causes of war was elaborated by making use o f researches made in other fields, there wou ld sti ll be the serious problem of convincing peop le to apply theory to practical situations. Nonetheless, these stud ies are the most promising steps towards peace, excl uding negoti at ions between t he two superpowers on the limitation of nuclear weapons. The study of the history o f war, of its re lationship with society and of the effects of social and technical development, may help to better meditate on the means of controlling or limiting conflict s and therefore eli minating the

Giovanni Fattori: Artillery drill (1859).

danger hoveri ng nowadays over Man and his civilisation . Gen. Francesco Cervoni

THE SOCIAL INFLUENCES

OF WAR 65

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To define the characteristics of corporals we must first analyse the social contest in which individuals are formed before assuming this role within the Military Institution and then, from the problems which influence their behaviours, draw the values and aspects which make them capable of holding a position of command as " intermediate leaders ". Though corporals occupy the first echelon of the hierarchy, they carry out the important task of co-operating with the Commanders at higher levels in the conduct of training. To obtain such cooperators, each Commander must be very cautious in choosing the personnel who will be appointed corporal and act in such a way as to have a valid subaltern, capable of operating efficiently as regards both training and the daily life of the barracks.

OUTLI NES OF THE ITALIAN SOCIETY AN D THE ISSUE OF THE YOUNG To defin e the corppral it is necessary to supply some information on the society where the young man who wi ll occupy this position comes from. As it is impossible here to make a deep and accurate analysis of all the economic and social factors which have affected the establishment of the present structure of Italian society, we shall necessarily limit ourselves to a brief list of some of the most important elements which have somehow influenced it, remembering the following: • the inc rease in population , close to zero growth, has already reached th is limit in certain regions with an ageing of the populat ion equal to about 13%; • the greater industrialization of Northern Italy caused a phenomenon of massive imm ig ration from the Southern regions, better known by the term "southernization". Due to its rapid and remarkable ext ension , this phenomenon soon concerned all State institutions as well as private and public activities; • such a great mass of human material favoured the uncontrolled d evelopment of cities and created problems regarding thei r rational ext ension and an adequate urbanizat ion; • the rapid development of technology demanded specialized personnel while the introduction o f automatic systems prod uced unemployment, with serious conseq uences on the young generations. Alie these particular phenomena together and tightly connected to various other factors, may certai nly be considered responsible for the proliferat ion of various k inds of deviations, w ith worrying consequences for the future of our nation, suc h as the increase in drug addiction,

common and organized c riminality. Somet imes, those who commit crimes are teenagers who have escaped the attention of social groups (family, school and other structures). All this is tight ly connected with the problem of find ing work and the widesperead habit of looking for easily earned consistent sums of money, encouraged by a society which often identifies individual "val ue" with wealth. University, which alone should represent a stage of intellectual growth and maturity, o ften becomes a " parking area" for those who, unabl e to find a suitable job with a high school degree, hope to increase their chances w ith a un iversity degree. This extension of the school years has in fact raised the cultural degree of the Italians, but has also caused , among the young , the phenomenon of "intellectual unemployment" . The result is a devaluation of academ ic titles. The CENSIS report for 1986 confirmed the previous year's trend of the young to look for non-material goods, typical of a post-industrial society, capable of giving sat isfaction and to indicating new values wi th which to give a motivation to life. In a situation of this kind, the young's refusal of rules and social structures which may somehow be coercive, seems quite obvious. In fact, we do not understand how a society with nothing convincing to offer can ask for will ingness, adherence to reality and respect of certain rules. We may thus justify the inborn refusal of an institution such as the military and the rules it imposes, start ing from compulsory military service. Moreover, the image of the Armed Forces presented until now and assim ilated by the young generations is oldfashioned and st ereotyped because of an ancestral and well-known separation between civilian and military society. Moreover, we must add to the

old prejudices the social groups' incapacity of overcoming this division and improving the knowledge of tod ay' s real image of the Armed Forces, of the values they guard and of their actual fu nction, well integrated in t he life of the Country. Therefore, until now mi litary service as been looked upon as a rather "uncomfortable" duty to be fulfilled just as one should enter the working world. With this cultural background , the young, compelled to follow principles wh ich have nothing to do with their previous experiences, often find serious difficulties in adapting themselves to the mi litary and in obtaining the knowledge which might become useful when they go back to civi I ian life. However, despite the general hosti li ty towards military service, it is just in this period that many young men discover in the Army some of those val ues they have been looking for, and transmit them t o their young friends. Yet, if th e mi litary institution wishes to bri ng forth al l its positive aspects, these must be underlined and explained in detail by the Commanders at the lower levels who, for age, interests and daily sharin g of common activities, have a greater credibility vis-a-vis their subalterns. From t he above one may draw the characteristics of the enlisted man: " He is 19 to 27, wit h a good cultural base (high school or col lege) and may thus be em ployed in any sector of the mi li tary with t he assurance that his employment will give good resu lts in the operational activities. He has the characteristics of the social class he belongs to, with prevalenc·e of the middle class. He faces military service w it hout interest and su perficially, indeed he tries to avoid it as it is considered a forced estrangement form his hab its, his loved ones and his work. Once he enters mil itary life, if du ly st imulated and

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interested, he assimi lates the intrinsic values of the institution to sat isfy his personal post-materialistic needs, becomes respons ible for the job he holds and does his best to inc rease the cohesion and reach the objectives of t he group he be longs to" . CORPORAL: INTERMEDIATE LEADER

The characteristics o f the corporal are those of an " intermediate leader". As often happens in industry, he is called " front line man", or "commander's arm" and just as often he pl ays the unpleasant role of "scapegoat", i.e. that of a person occupyi ng a level o f the chain of command from which he must, on the one hand, safeguard the image of the ch ief detaining the power, and on the other, meet t he requi remen ts of the base.

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This delicate pos it ion may negatively affect his working performance and have seriou s consequences on the relations w ith his superiors and subordinates, espec ially because his activity in often carried out in a c li mate wh ich psycholog ists define one of "pragmatic paradoxes" , typical of a highly hierarchical structure. Often the intermediate leader's functions have no direct relation between knowledge and power because, in most cases, opi nions, no matter how valid, may be put aside in favour of suggest ions coming from the higher ranks. In this situation, he who manages t his "false power" feels respon sible for activities in which he has no actual aut hority. Moreover, the control he is su bject to is constant and often shows a c lear dist rust of his act ions and his working capacities. The manner of avoiding

many of these inconven iences, characteristic of high ly hierarchical and bureaucrat ic structures, is to look for a line of behaviour true to the loyalty and honesty pecu liar of the military profession and f ind ing out those elements who may carry out the job of squad leader, gun commander etc., helping them to f ind in their j ob the reasons to figh t al ienation and get adequate satisfact ion. All this must be pursued by those who have the necessary authority. It is well-known that, for each member, the presence in a "g roup" causes obvious changes of orientat ion and behaviour which always go together with a sense of solidarity and the awareness of belonging to " that" group, formed by " those" peop le, wit h whom the dai ly relationship is closer. It is thus logic to speak of the relatio ns develop ing wi thin

a group and which, generally speaking, may be classified as follows: emotional, operational and of dominance. As regards the military environment, it is not difficult to spot out all three types of relations. From the simplest one, of pure social coercion and dominance of the stronger over the weaker, to the operational one, on the basis of a common aim to be achieved, to that, last but not least, of the emotional kind. It seems that in military life true and proper libidinalemotional relations occur. These are typical of . the primary association forms, as was sensed by Freud and proved by psychological and social invest igations. Special mention must be made of the Stauffer enqui ry, carried out within the American Army towards the end of the second World War. What emerged from these different forms of anlysis clearly shows how a dangerous situation st rength ens the existing emotional relations within a group, attracting everybody's attention on the image of the " leader", on which one instinctively concentrates all energy in pursuit of safety and a common aim. Therefore, under these circumstances, the leader (and we mean leader in a charismat ic sense) becomes the symbol and the maker of the entire group's expectations. Without reaching extreme situat ions, it is easy to sup pose that every group feel s the need of finding a person who may become a point of reference and, at the same time, a driving source for al l other members of the group. Speaking of military groups it is obvious that the real Commander should be identified with the leader the young soldiers have chosen emotionally because, from a functional point of view, this will create the best working cond itions. This is how the corporal may become an essential link between the institution and the

mass represented by conscripts. Having the possibility of sharing the entire working day as well as the hours of rest and free time, with the other members of his little group, he is the on e who is c loser to individ ual men, knows the problems and difficulties of each and can help them in overcome and eli minate all the useless prejudices wh ich for many make the service period a "dead period " for many instead of a useful common experience. A corporal who shows confidence in the institution for which he works, who attempts to underline its positive aspects and real meanings (without indulging in useless rhetoric and demagogy) has many more ch ances of being listened by those who, because of their age and condition, already feel him closer than other military men of " higher" rank. However, despite the -fact that society provides young men with an average cultural level und oubtedly higher than that of the previous generations, it cannot be sufficient for a young man just over twenty, just because he is a corporal, to act readily and efficiently as regards the problems of his fellow-soldiers. To come closer to the image we have just drawn, the corporal should undergo a particu lar kind of training regarding not only technical and practical knowledge required by the task he is going to carry out, but also psychology and sociology, so that he may be given an adequate preparation , necessary for an easier relat ionsh ip with the human material he wi ll have to manage. TRAINING OF A CORPORAL

The first difficulties we are faced with in this respect regard the spott ing out of the most suitable elements. This is based on selection or on choice. Psycho-aptitudinal tests have proved quite valid in

selecting the right personnel. Once the selection is over, the chosen men have to be trained. The time available for an adequate training is always insufficient and the means often unsuitable. A command training technique suggestd by a publicationof the U.S. TRADOC, based on the following three stages may be usefu l reference: • spotting the "qualities" required to play the role, by means of intensive theoretic courses, to be started straight after specialization; • a continuous and constant care of corporals , especial ly at the initial stage, for a further improvement; • imitation technique, working side by side with noncommissioned officers with greater experience and optimum training capabilities. The "qualities" to be spotted and improved must be tightly connected to the aims to be achieved and may be c lass if ied as follows: • self-control • control of others • capability of making the newcomers feel at home with in the group; • a deep theoretic and practical knowledge of the teach ing subjects ; • capability of talking quietly and firm ly to a small public and sustaining and leading possible argu ments. • knowledge of the rules of the inst it ution and of t he act ivities to be carried out ; • read iness of action in abnormal situations. All this is in accordance with the present idea that the formation of a military leader can be only pragmatic and social and thus directed towards the technical activit ies to be carried out, as regards precise aims to be achieved employing the capabilities of the avail able human material at their best. This is where the relation between the required qualities and the role to be carried out emerges. It must be remembered that

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the high technical levels reached have brought to a general scale-up of roles: this is the reason (together with the personnel shortage) why corporals find themselves carrying out activities, such as liaison , which were once typical o f the non-commisioned Officers. The iaison activity already mentioned, is certainly one of the most important and difficult the young corporal has to carry out. He becomes the linkage of his men's problems to the superiors and the middleman between the latter and the men. Other tasks are thus directly linked to this function. In the relationship with the troops, a thorough knowledge of his men becomes of the utmost importance. He must know their possibilities of action, reaction and interaction thus permitting a high cohesion within the

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group, easier to achieve if the corporal, acting as a leader, becomes the catalytic element. For this reason the above mentioned knowledge of sociology and psychology becomes necessary and important. A clear picture of the original social substratum and of the relationship with it, as well as a knowldege of the problems accompanying each member of the group, may help to solve apparently difficult problems or attitudes which are often harmful and difficult to understand. Basically, it is the knowledge of the main emotional phenomena which may be emphasized du ring the military service (fear, the socalled " combat anxiety" during combat, etc.); the negative reactions which may develop within the group (emotional leaders, arising of irrational

mass processes, etc.) and, last but not least , the knowledge of t he main needs which may arise within the individuals (from physical needs such as food and sleep, to security needs, social needs and the need for self-confidence in everyday actions, etc.). It could be objected that all this knowledge is excessively burdensome and difficult to transfer, but we should not forget that it regards only the basic notions, easier to understand for those who, just as the youths in question , already have a fairly high cultural substratum. The rest can be left to intuition, experience and personal initiative. In this respect, we must further underline that the capability of acting readily and efficiently, trusting only one's own personal judgement, is another

basic characteristic required of a corporal. This is fundamental for the so-cal led "continuity of command". In fact , when the corporal realizes he is the only commander, he must be able to guarantee a sure and efficient issuing of orders. This condition , together w ith the cohesion shown by the group, is the best guarantee for an adequate and proper ''functioning of the smaller complex" which, moreover, requires a background of technical notions guaranteeing the best employment o f the potential ities of the weapon system. Let us now go back to the liaison activity related to the relations with superiors. This activity, in fact, is made particularly efficient by a frequent and dai ly contact with the Commanders, intended to create a valid and constructive channel of communication and co-operation. To this end, the corporal must be able to draft in the best possible way the message to be transmitted {written or verbal), either to his superiors or to the so ldiers remembering the different variables which , in the process of military commun ications, may alternatively favour or hinder their f low {outlook of addressees, contents of information , attitude or disposition of subordinates and superiors, etc.). A small opinion poll carried out among fellow Officers, company or battery Commanders, on the charact eristics of corporals, mostly confirmed the above. From their descriptions we get the impression of a young corporal with a good cultural level {the choice normally falls on high school, college or college graduates) whose training is nowadays left almost en ti rely to company Commanders and to the sense of responsibility they try to teach him, underlining, at al l times and on all occasions, the existence of tasks and duties

different from those of the other fellow-soldiers. At this point, it is necessary to underli ne the fact that the expectations of the Commanders are faced with certain att itudes which seem aimed at obtaining the exact opposite: there is no way we can talk of "participation", for instance, without talking of confidence in the corporal. A vali d and constructive form of co-operation envisages some freedom of initiative wh ich is not always granted and which, when lacking, reduces the execution of orders to something purely mechanical. It is thus natural to wonder what the reverse side of the medal is, i.e. what the motivations and expectations of the young men occupying the role of corporal are nowadays. It seems that no official investigat ion has been carried out in this respect and therefore there are no complete data on the subject. The only possible reference regards an opinon poll carried out privately within an operational unit with a chiefly technical type of activity and wh ich , though not rigorously scient ific, supplied some fairly interesting ind ications. The answers to a set of questions regarding the corporal 's image and role, posed to young enlisted men , emphasized the fact that most of them wanted and seeked the rank of corporal, for the des ire of carrying out a task deemed instructive, for taking on responsibi I ities considered valid for a further maturity, for obtaining advantages for civilian life, for the acquisition of an image standing above the others, connected to a greater commitment and the gratifying sat isfaction of the Commanders' greater confidence. This is how no less than 86.6% of the polled youths answered; only 6.7 % dec lared to be against all forms of command , considered coercive, and the remaining 6.7% showed some uncertainty and put on an equal plane advantages and

disadvantages of their role. As regards the degree and the kind of education deemed appropriate, 53.3% wished for a better training and professional level; 20% for a deeper study of regu lations; 13.3% a better knowledge of the problems regarding their role and the tasks to be carried out {including their relations with the troops); 6.7 % demanded, quite specifically, an improved social and psychological training whi le another 6.7 % did not point out any particular need. Eighty per cent answered affirmatively as regards the validity of the discip linary and operational role within the unit; 7.7% gave downright negat ive answers and 12.3% were uncertain. As regards relations with the troops, corporals were asked what men they found more difficult to lead, what were the main obstacles to the action of corporals and what were the main forms of transgression within the unit. Opinions varied considerably. As regards " difficult subjects" they are estimated , by those questioned, around 18%-20% of the enlisted men of the un it, 33.3% of whom consisting of the youths who wanted to avoid military service at all costs, 20 % of youths coming from difficult experiences, 26.6% of individuals with a low cu ltural level , 15.5% of those unable to stand any form of authority and discipline, while 6.6% consisted of relative ly older sold iers. The main obstacles to the performance of the task are seen in the relations of an emotional type with the troops {40%) and cohabitation {33.4 %). Twenty per cent of the difficulties are caused by the relationship of subordination to superiors and 6.6% by the low cu ltural level of the troops. Transg ressions are indicated by corporals as concerning 5% of the men. Among these, 20% regards drug-addiction and

homosexuality, 13.3% by drug and alcohol addiction, whi le 33.5% comm it, generally speaking, other transgressi ons found in civilian li fe and 6.6% are involved in drug-addiction alone. We must mention , however, 26.6% of missing or non-pert inent answers. Moreover the limitation s of action in carrying out the corporal's job are attributed by 60% to the fact of being the lowest echelon of t he hierarchic scale (scarce autonomy), by 26.6 % to the limitations imposed by regu lat ions and by 13.4% to the particu lar psycholog ic condition of being considered a "scapegoat" as regards both t roops and superiors. On the whole, however, we obtained a favourable opinion on the present image of the corporal, with 93.4% positive answers and 6.6% negative replies. CONCLUSION

In this attempt at an analysis of the corporal, a ch aracter of the mi litary inst it ution whic h on ly appears of secondary importance, it seemed only fair to let those

directly interested in the subject give us the conc lu sive picture. I believe that, by summarizing the above data, we can notice that, though generally accepting thei r role, these young men demand , more or less imp li c it ly, the desirabl e innovations which would make them fu lly sat isfied with their condition. An im proved and more autonomous relationship with their superiors, a better education in all sectors - from the technical and train ing field to their own sphere of command - the will to accomplish their job seriously, considering it as an experience of commun al relationsh ip and as a means of improving relations wi th others and getting to know them and their problems better seem, to use a t erm dear to our consumer soc iety, a rather low cost to pay, compared to the enormous advantages that the military institution cou ld obtain by a working force which has not yet been adequately exploited (in a positive sense), such as that of corporals. Vito Antonio Martino

Lieu tenant Colonel Vito Antonio Martino attended the 148th Course of the Military Academy, the Branch School, the War College and the Higher General Stall Course. He served with the 1st battalion, 4th Antiaircrafl Artille ry Missile Regiment, and at the War College as assistant professor of Military Soci ology and Psychology. He holds a degree in Mathematics and Sociology, as well as a Diploma in Humanistic Scien ce awarded by lhe Pontiflc ia Universita Lateranense. At present, Lt. Col. Martino serves at the Regulations Branch, 3rd Division, Army General Staff.

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ÂŤLa guerra nel pensiero politicoÂť (War in political thought) _ Published by Franco Angeli, Milan, 1987, pp. 342, Lire 28.000.

Nuclear weapons have not aboli shed war: they have o nly removed it from developed societies, sheltering them f rom the wave of violence and conflicti on wh ich, after 1945, has overrun developi ng countries. By subjecti ng both capitalist and social ist societies to the same risk of total destruction, nuclear weapons have prevented their competition for political leadership and for t he dominion of resources, from ending up once more i n the catastrophe of world war, inevitable vengeance of history on those who establish em pires. By curbing the " climbing to extremes" of t he conflictio n among develo ped soc ieties , nuclear weapons have permitted to stabilize strategic balances at low costs, paying for t his with an increased vulnerability and to stop the Third World's liberati on movement subjecting it to conditions in many ways similar to those of the colonial period. Outside the nuclearized sanctuary or better sti ll outside the happy innocence or nuclear rashness - t he space o f a " limited" war has reemerged, that is of a war that may be ruled, caused and exp lo ited by political rationality, especially that of who is not directly involved. On t he contrary, in the relations among devel oped societies war is, to our days at least, " unimaginable". The aim of strategy has stopped being t he achievement of dominion and victory

to become the maintenance of a dissuasive balance, through a complex mechanism based on a controlled and balanced rearmament and on negotiati ons for disarmament. The technical mechanism which brought nuc lear weapons to have this effect is the inversion of Gen. Clauserwitz's idea of the superi ority of defence over attack, matrix of all rational strategic computation and of t he instrumentali t y of war as regards politics. There is no defence against nuclear missiles; we may only res pond by launching another m issi le on the enemy; a mutually caused destruction would deprive a military victory of all meaning; nuclear weapons would inevitably turn against who ever used them. Hence, the stability of nuclear dissuasion. In fact, it is based on something which i s t he exact opposite o f Pascal's bet: an endless risk for a limited stake, as any political objective always is. The end o f the nuc l ear e ra , however, is to be found in the very log ic of nuclear weapons. So is the invulnerabi lity of developed societies, based o n t he balance of terror and mutual assured destruction which has so far avoided war between East and West. The technologic development of nuclear weapons and their carriers has made them theoretically employable as instruments of a "lim ited" war, first tactical ly speaking and then from a

strategic point of vi ew (that is in the very territory of the superpowers). Inevitably, this is the reason for the race for the development of antimissile defence systems which started as soon as tech no logy permitt ed . Technically speaking, the tradi tio nal relation between defence and attack is being re-established and therefore a conflict, even a nuclear one, becomes once again a concrete reality. Strangely enough, however, those technologic developments whi ch make nuc lear war mi litarily possible also make it less likely than in the past. The Soviet response to the American plan to equip themselves with a " mix" of offe nsive and defensive weapons whi c h wou ld guarantee the United States a relative ly long period of mil itary and technologic superiority and restore its leadership over the Western world, was not a preventive war, but a will to get rid of nuclear weapons unprecedented in the history o f negotiati ons on the subject. This is another proof of the fact that nuclear we apons are less importan t than previously. Negotiations on t he control of weapons and their limitation or on disarmament succeed only if the arm systems at issue are not considered essential; un less negotiat ions actually pursu e diffe rent aims from those stated. This happened, for example, in 1963 as regards the treaty on the partial li mitation of nuc lear experiments

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with which the USA and the USSR planned to oppose t he establishment of French and Chinese nuclear fo rces and with the non-proli fe ration treaty which sanctioned the bipolarism of the two superpo wer s a nd an uneq ual degree of safety between nuc lear states and non nuclear states. The fact that the Soviets are willing to give up their mil itary eq ual ity w ith the Uni ted States in exchage of a panEuropean safety system based on an economic co-operation between the USSR and Western Europe instead of on military blocs and the division of Germany, could radically change t he geo-political map o f the world, and establish that continental bloc from the Atlantic to the Pacific which represented the true stake of the t wo world wars. Nuclear arsenals have compulsorily frozen confliction within capitalist societies which to gether have to face the threat the Red Arm y represents f or the ir boundaries . Everything makes us believe that should the awareness of thi s threat subdu e, t he fight f or po lit ica l, economic and technologic leadership would no longer be arrested by armament technology and strategic motivations. We are li ving in a period of political, strategic and technolog ic changes whose interact ions will affect the history of the world in a manner which cann ot be fo res een even at medium t erm. The Western worl d cannot give a positive response, based on a proj ect and an active pol icy, to the dynamism of the pol icy of the new Sovi et leadership. Western Europe, reduc ed from centre of the world to province of empires and divided by its centreeastern append ix, but still cu ltural, economic and commercial cen tre of t he world, is concerned over its fate. The American nuclear warranty which has protected it for forty years seems threatening an d hardly c red i bl e, though st il l necessary. It has denationalised safety and defence and has thus accustomed Europeans to a comfortable condition of dependence. For Europeans, however, the "zero option" puts a defin itive end to the "zero cost defence" pe riod . Th e dreams of t he super-national empires and of the " Holy All iance" of Yalta, intended to guarantee safety, peace and development to the industriali sed world, are fad ing away. Both the USA and the USSR are behaving more and more as natio ns ra t her t han as capi tals of super-nat ional em pires.

Their relative power over t heir ruli ng area is dwindli ng. Not on ly is it dwindling from an economic point of vi ew, but also ideologically. As supern at ion a l cap aci ty w ears out , the req uest for nat ional references emerges with more and more strength. In Eu rope i t i s co rre cted and completed by uniformity of interests a nd culture. A true process of unification, however, runs up against two problems: the German problem and the imposs ibility of giving a European significance to French and British nuclear deterrents, without France and t he United Kin gdom giving up th e ÂŤsanctuarisationÂť of t hei r territori es. A Europe o f people has proved an utopia, replaced by a Europe of govern ments; General De Gaulle's idea of a Europe of Countries is gaini ng more and more ground. Even if we are not exactly entering a post-n uclear area, as Edward Luttwak, one of the most pessimistic theorists of t he American decl ine, defines it, it is quite certai n that the parameters characterising the present strategic situat ion are chan ging at a growing pace. Churchill' s statement that "in the nuclear era, safety is the daughter of t error and su rvival the sister of destruction" loses valid it y. The " bo mb" is no longer a deterrent: its fun ction is gradual ly being reduced to that of d issuading from using the "bomb" . The task of conventional forces is becoming a cen tral one, even in the USSR, wh ere to the late 60's, strategy took up the doctrines of Field Marshal Sokolovski on the chance s of a nuclear vict ory. In 1984, these were definitely buried by Mashal Ogarkov. The revi sed Soviet doctrines once more confirm the va lue of the fact t hat dissuasion can be but a relative concept, and not an absolute one, and that it must be based only o n the actual capacities of defence. Wi th the predominance of nuclear weapons and a more o r less perfect s ituation of bipolarism, the logic of po li tics, es pec i a lly as reg ards Europeans, had been subjected to that of strategy, thus invertin g the relatio n between politics and war underlined by Clausewitz and by classical strategic thought: talk about war had become talk of war as Andre Glucksmann effectually put it. The politicisation of strateg y respo nded to th e mi litarisation o f politics as sometimes did t echniques and p rin ciples of employment of weapons, thou gh most of the relative st rategic theories were more declaratory than real.

Nowadays, the paradoxes dear to the nuclear strategic thought of the MAD (Mut ual Assured Destruction) period lapse: the idea was to make war i mposs i ble by maki ng it tec h nical ly poss ible (t h i nk the unthinkable); maintain and not lower one' s vulnerab ility to o ff ence by stabil ising dissuasion; base safety o n climbing to extremes and thu s on the possibility of destroying whatever one intends defending. As sent to a peace based on the balance of terror has dwindled, but we still cannot see other solut ions. Therefore, as Lawrence Freedman says, "emperor dissuasion is naked , bu t nonethe less an emperor". But for how long? What are t he alternati ves? Does this change in the situation mean a transfo rmation of the pol itical objecti ves of safety? In these days of uncertain ty, the challenge to the political and strategic t hought is to depose the emperor withou t compro mi sing peace and exposing safety to risk. Th a t of s a f et y o nce again becomes a real problem w hich Europe can no longer hope to solve by entrusting all responsibi lity to t he United States and relyin g on its nuclear umbrella. Europe's reactions and anx ieties over the fact that the " zero option" may make the crisis of the "flexible response" strategy official and reach a " decoupling" (or, better still, a condi tion ed " co u pling") between the defence of Europe and that of the United States, delay an evolution which can certainly not be stopped. We cannot ask the United States for what it is no lo nger able to g ive and has no intention of giving. Nato's attempt to make up for the lesser c redibility of nuclear dissuasion with the development of conventional fo rces, kep t tightl y linked w ith nuclear weapo ns is a m ore co nsistent respo nse, tho ugh partial and temporary. Time may be gained, but this is no lasting solution for the safety problem o f Europe, more and more denuclearised, except for French and British territories. Of course, nuc lea r weapo ns ca nn ot be disinvented. The only role, however, they w ill still be able to p lay is that of dissuad ing t he enemy f rom a nuclear initiative. Dissuasion by means of the bomb wi ll tu rn into a simple dissuasion from the bomb and no longer from war. In the East as in the West the classical strategic thought and the. traditional .idea of di$Suasion based on the possession of a real defensive capacity ("si vis pacem para

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bellum") enjoy great favour. Important contributions such as th ose of the socalled movement for military reform in the Un ited States and the reestablis h ment of the operati onal strategy in the Soviet Union by Marshal Ogarkov and general Akromeev may be added to t he theories on conventi onal dissuasion and defence (territorial and/or manoeuvred) in depth, d eveloped by W este rn strategi c thought, partic ularly German. Negotiations on the control and limitation of conventional we apons w il l on ly give a partial response. In the negotiations on nuclear weapons an ag reemen t between the two superpo wers may act ually be reached. However, as regard s con venti onal and chemical weapons, problems are more complex and prospectives more uncertain, because conventional weap ons may actually be employed and are thus much more fl ex ible and dangerous than nuclear ones, also because the effects of technolog ic innovation in the con venti onal f ield are much more destabilising than in the nuc lear sector. In the conventional fi eld t he ratio of forces expresses only part of the reality: there is no cau salit y relation between techn ical and material input and operational output. The so-cal led " imponderable factors" of war play a decisive role. Moreover, the ratio of forces has no meaning in itself, but in relation to political and strategic objecti ves compared. Whoever defe nds hi mself and thu s leaves t he enemy the initiative of operations and must protect his territory, needs a greater quantity of fo rces than the enemy, who may concentrate them wherever he intends carrying out the final effort. The defensor, however, may change his mind and turn into an agg ressor. It is a vicious circle without solution. There are no technical solutions which may guarantee t he mutual safety of the two blocs. If t he West u nilateraly adopted the so-ca ll ed "defensive defence", proposed in Germany, it could not defend itself efficiently from an attack by the Soviet armoured forces and artill ery. But if this system were also adopted by the USSR, it would inevit ably find itself in potential condit ions of inferiority in a mobilizatio n of superior human, industrial and technologic resources of the We stern world. We cannot get out of this dilemma whi ch sees t he Sovi et Union more or less in the same s ituation in whi ch Germany found itself after 1870, made to maintain consis-

tent forces in times of peace and fores ee their offensive employment at the beginning of operations for a rapid solution of a conflict, before being put in a condition of inferiority by the greater re sources whi ch the enemy could mobi lize. For these reasons negotiat ions for d isarmament a nd limitation of conventional weapons have so far not gone beyo nd the st ipulation of " safety and confidence measures " acting on " operational" dimensions but not on the " struct ural" dimensions of safety. Of course, t his Is no s ma ll p rog ress. Th e above measures lessen the possibility of a su rpri se attack and make the adminstration of the c ri sis more reliable and rational. Only a change in Soviet society (which would surely mark the end of the power of the present leading c lass if not of communism) and the USSR's economic co-operation wi t h Western Europe (which considering t he dynamism of t he Wes t could give rise to the economic "occupation" of the satellite co untries of central-eastern Europe fi rst and later of Russia itself by Europe in competition with the United States and Japan) could lead to the re-uni ficati on and neutralizat ion of Germany and t he withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from Europe. A development of great importance which may not be foreseen or planned in advance and wh ich in the med ium term, may be destabilizing for the safety of Europe, considering the manifold economic and political interests involved and likely to prevent or delay it by all means and at al l costs. After the second World War the reality of war (and of peace) had g iven rise to a process of collective removal in Western European countries. The American nuclear warranty had permitted cu lture, social organisation and the attributions of the national state to rej ect the phenomenon of war. The alli ance with American leadership had denationali sed safety. In the United States there was talk of national safety, while in Europe one talked of " collective safety" with re fere nce to trans-Atlantic rela tion s and of " international safety" as regards bipolar relations USA-USSR. Two of t he four main European States, that is Italy and Germany, had approv ed in their constitutions the State's solemn renouncing what had always been considered the most typical act of sovereignty, that is resort to war for self-protect ion of one's own interests. On ly recently did the above two cou ntries look into

the problem of making the executive take up the actual national political strategic leadership which had here to fore been left comple tely to the chain of command and decisions of the At lantic A llian ce. Like wise did the technical problem of the joint force integrati on of the military summit arise. The inc re ased self-sufficiency of the single Armed Forces was and remains fu nctional even for a greater integration within the Alliance, whi le an increased joint force unification permits the development of a mi li tary and operati ona l p lann i ng and general policy more marked ly national. In Europe, movi ng towards the uncertain stage of non-n uclear safety, the d ifferences with the United States and in t he national interests of the sing le European societies are coming up once more. So is the space and the fu nction of the State as imputation cen tre of nat ional in terest and as regulator of particular interests, t he settlement of w hich may no longer be assured o nly by the ru les of the market. It is in thi s historic setting t hat the demand for a political culture able to face the historic possibi li ty o f wa r retu rn s. Deve lo ped socie ties discover that their own mutual and nati onal interests cannot be preserved fro m t he risk of violence. Once more war must be " though t" as the inte grating part of t he historic process, as regards the fac tors t hat may produce, nourish and govern it. This book is different from the p revious on es " II Pens i ero strategico" (Strategic thought) and " Sicurezza e difesa" (Security and Defence) because it does not analyse the contribution of science and nonmilitary factors to the strategic culture and to the policy of defence, but the space t hat political, human and social sciences devote to the problem of war in their specific setting and under their particular point of view. In the two previous books the au thors analyse t he cultural components of contemporary strateg ic t hought and the non-military factors of the policy of defence and security, s howing how these components and factors integrate in a completely new setting. In a certain sense, this book works in the opposite d irection, taking the prob lems of war back t o the origin al setting. This is absolutely necessary to give all this t alk on war its specific comprehensibility. Here to o , as in the previo us books, essays are not c ultu rally and methodological ly uniform, but they

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develop mutual suggestions according to the manners of re search and the particul ar sensitivity of each author. No general speculative philosophy o n war in modern culture springs up from the se essays , but a suffic ient ly representative fragment of the attitude of Italian contemporary c ulture as regards war as an intellectual problem. On the whole, all the contributions testify the effort national culture is carrying out to get ri d of the conditioning of the specific cultural settings as wel l as that of the A nglo-Saxon internationalist thought. Not a fool ish liberation, but one obtained through the c ritical analysis of talks on war produced within specific doctrines and different ideologic and cultural traditions. No questi on therefore of an empiric analysis, nor of a systematic survey back in to literat ure, but of a well-aimed recon aissance of the variety of doctrines and schemes existin g in Italian cu lture. The book is d ivided into three parts.

The fi rst groups together essays analysing the political theories of war within liberal-democratic thought (L. Bonanate), the marxist thought (U. Curi and Straga), modern catholic thought (R. Buttig lione) and the tradit ion of thought of poli tical real ism (P.P. Portinaro). The second part is formed by essays which analyse the problem of war under t he specific point o f vi ew of p h i lo sop hy of law (S. Cotta). political philosophy (M. Cacciari, M. Dona, R. Gasparotti), moral philosophy (G. Baget-Bozzo), intern at ional relations (U. Gori), the economic theory (N. Bell in an d P. Bianc hi ) and the historiograpic theory (V. ll ari). Finally, the third part concerns the sociologic analysis of relations between safety (national, col lective and international) and supremacy of the State. It includes essays devoted to the attitude of the social state towards war (A. Ardig6), the relation between national interest and national safety (C. Jean), the relation betweeen State

and war seen in terms of development of the political doctri nes (R. Lizzi) and system ic pattern (C. Pelanda). This book ends a firs t stage of research carried out in co-operation w ith the Internati onal Socio logy Institute of Gorizia (lsig); t his stage has been wholly dedicated to cultural information and the logic basis o f strateg ic th oug ht, of the po licy of de f ence and safety and o f the pol itical, sociologic and ph ilosophic theories of war, subjects which are more " metast rategic " than st rategic. We intend opening a new stage of research with the boo ks that will follow and wh ich wi ll concern the analysis of Italy's strategic role, its policy o f safety and de fence and its prospect ives of re-orga nising the military instrument also as regards European defence integra ted as far as possible wi th the different interests an d national geo-stra teg ic c ondition ings. Carlo Jean

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•

MA's basic product lines and business seclors include: H,gh d efm111on and d,scrnn,nauon coastal r adar control s tations. both ior maritim e t;aff,c m anagement systems ano military application (ant mtrusion, coastal dolcncc mine splast> detoc;ion); Shipborne navigation /soorch radars devoted to to w, very-low air covcrago (.;inti sea skunmors); Mi ssile active homing heads. orov dcd w ,th a variol y o l ECM dev,ces. tor S$1"1 (Ol OMAr MK?) and ASM (1,/ ar,P, MK?) apphca11ons_ 360• coverage search and navigation airborne radars for hehcop1ors and maritime

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pairol ailc 1aft: Standard Pod contained search radars fo1 fixed ·wmg aucrnh 10 be employee 1n con1umion with_ A Stv1: Integrated search and tracking r adars for A/ A defence ro be employe:1 both on soec,atized 1rvcks (OTOMA TIC) or o n se mi-"llooile/lixed stat N, for point defence. applir.d reseorch a med toward m 11 t11net11c waves (uo 10 100 G1 IL) ,n active and passive sensors (rad1omo1er). Duct analisys c1nd elec11 omagnc!ic orooaq;n1on ro,ecast

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,.1.1/ possibil ity of a remarkable quality development of the vehicles designed for cross country use and points out how , being the project of the vehic le ti g htly connected wit h th e characteristics of the ground, it is absolutely im possible to speak of a "universal vehicle". The manufacture of cross country vehicles designed for hig h s tand a rd performances is, however, subject to the growth of a precise demand, prerogative of those sectors whi ch play a leadi ng role in the ach ievements of technology: mi litary and space enterprises. Massimiliano Angelini

DOMENICO VECCHIONI V. Romano: "Locomozione fuori strada" Pitagora Publishers, Bologna, 1988, pp. 169, Lire 25,000.

The steady expansion of the use of complicated machines on different terrai ns in activ ities re gard i ng agricu lture, fo res ts, industry, mines, sports touri sm and the military fi eld, etc., demands the solution of ever more specialistic issues. In fact, it seems undoubted ly im· portant to kno w how far the terrain may be covered, how the various kinds of vehicles behave o n the main obstacles, and examine the mobility of a vehic le designed to be used for c ross country and thus single out the elements to be studied duri ng the planning stage. This is the reason w hy "Locomo· zione fuori strada" (Cros s country locomotion) was written. The book, in fact, achieved by selecting and arranging t he most interesting subjects dealt with by the Author during his teachi ng activity at the School of Specialization in Motori zat ion of the Turin Politecnico, informs the reader on the most prac t ical aspects of the various pro· blems concerning cross country movement. Aft e r a historiographic introduct ion, the book examines t he main proble ms of t hi s particul ar aspect of locomotion, according to the most recent experiences, and deals with the kind o f terrain, the perfor· mance of vehi cles on obstacles, si nk· ing ground and the presence of water and the f uture development of the sector, etc ... " Loc omoz io ne fuo r i strada", though not attempting to give a detail· ed analysis of such a vast and complex subject, clearly underlines t he

LA FLOTTA TUDOR 1485 - 1603

When Elizabeth, the last reigning Tudor, d ied, the British had become able seamen and brave seafarers able to rival w ith the Spaniards wh o had undisputedly dominated the seas for centuries. What factors turned pastoral Britain into a maritime country in only one century? How did the " little island" become t he "Mistress of t he seas"? What w as the real contribution of the Tudor dynasty to the s uccess of Britain as a naval power? Domen ico Vecchi on i gives a n answer to these questions bearing in mind the historic events which shook the life of Great Britain: the discovery of the ocean routes towards the " new world" and the innovating drive of the Renaissance. The Au thor conc ludes by saying that if Great Britain rose above all other Nations it was mainly due to the personal action of the Tudors who succeeded in absorbing t he spi ri t of the Renaissance and taught the Brit ish people tha t the fa te of Great Britain lay in t he sea. The book also traces the profiles of some of the greatest " privateers" of the period.

NASCITA DELLA POTENZA MARINARA INGLESE G IUSJ.;PP.1:. C A!=OR IO

EURA PRESS

D. Vecchioni: "La flotta 1485-1603. Nascita della marinara inglese", Eura Edizioni ltaliane, Milan, 150, Lire 18,000.

MILANO

Tudor potenza Press 1988, pp.

In this book the Autho r runs over the stages of the British naval policy underlining the contribution of the Tudor kings to t he development of the Royal Navy. The date whi ch marks th e definitive success of the Brit ish on the oceanic routes and the beginning of the development process whi c h turned Great Bri tain into the world's lirst naval power goes back to 1588 when the Spanish fleet , sent by Phi lip of Spain to invade Britain, was defeated by t he privateering fleet of Elizabeth Tudor. Ab out a century earl ier, w hen Henry VII, first of the Tudor dynasty, became king, Britain was an island of shephe rds livi ng with in a lim ited horizon: the sea was seen as an insuperable obstacle and an element of nature to be feared more th an made use of.

Sociologia e

Forze Armate S i:iluppo .JIOrico de/la sodoiogfa d e/la ,., tilu: ione m i/11,,re

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G. Caforio: "Sociologia e Forze Armate. Sviluppo storico della sociologia della istituzione militare". Maria Pacini Fazzi publisher, Lucca, 1987, pp. 203, s.i.p.

There are two main reasons which brought the author to write t his book. The fi rst is that when, as a pro· fessional o f defence, he decided to in· vestigate on the nature and development of the military institut ion, he

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,/// looked for a survey which would give hi m a g lobal view of what had been said, thought and wri tten on t he subject, finding, however, nothing of interes t. The second reason arises from the observation t hat though the military fact and t he o rga nization of the military society are always mingling w ith t he cultural evo lution of man in his various manifestatio ns, no scientific investigation into the" mil itary phenomenon as fac tor of many basic aspects of an associated and organized li fe has been carried out. After t he birth of sociology as a science, we have had to wai t for t he investigations and theorizations of t he American school before achieving a spec ial soc io logy devoted to t he mi li tary universe. Before t his rather recent development, contributions to sociological investigation o n the military inst itution had been seen w ithin the different disc ip l i nes (history, strat eg y , phi losophy, social psychol ogy, etc.). This special sociology, however, did not fo llow some kind of academic planning, but developed on its own, often influenced by practical pressing demands. If we add the d iffere nces in t he cultu r a l backg rou nd a nd environmental origin of the lovers of t his subject, we realize how import ant it is to revise and compare what has been said and written on the subject dealt w ith by special sociolog ists. The book is divided in to three parts. The first deals with the analyses of the founde rs of the main trends sho wed by th e subject und er reference. The second mentions a few of the main American scho lars wh o have founded schools of thought. The third part speaks of the Italian scholars of thi s special sociology. The book does not speak of scholars of countries such as France, West Ger many and Great Brita in because, though their essays are important, they have not, according to t he author, given ri se to a school which could replace the American one, but have applied the principles of the latter to the single national realities. In the notes to the book Giuseppe Caforio addresses t he leading Cadres, the o f ficers, ou tlin ing how the organizational patterns developed, during the years, by t he mil itary institut ion have been adopted and absorbed by the general society. At a time wh en the identi ty crisis of the mi li tary profession is evident, the above means t hat nothing exempts

the officers from seeking new methods of collect ive organizat ion, w ithin the Armed Forces and their relations w ith the society they belong to, aware that the general crisis of the most advanced societies may once more require to move the studied patterns fro m one sphere to another. Augusto Mastrofini

I PROBL EM/ DI UL/SSE

complex experiences: General Luig i Caligaris, lo ng-t ime commentator of mi l itary strat egy and t he diplomat Carlo Maria Santoro, profes sor of internati onal relations at the Un iversity of Bologna. The book aims at analysing the t rends without pu rsui ng the events and underlines the main structural elements and some of the li kely scenarios of t he safety in the Mediterranean. It is d ivided into three parts corresponding to the general subject s under reference: the fi rst and second part deal with the st ructural elements and t he likely scenarios of the safety in the Med iterranean, while t he third part examines the potential role of Italy. Documentation material closes the cu stomary appendix. The following sentence drawn from the leading arti c le deserves special menti on: "If th e op pos i ng f orces and military strategies, in the Med iterranean just as at planetary level, each aim at some idea of safety, it is but a particular and instrumental objective: the final and more general objective, at planetary leve l ju st as in the Mediterranean, through the reduct ion of t he elements of tension, is peace". Ferdinando Schettino

Carlo Sgorlon Various Authors: "La sicurezza nel Mediterraneo", No. 101 of the fourmonthly review " I problemi di Ulisse" , published by Valerio Levi, Rome, 1986, pp. 221 , Lire 15,000.

Disputes , t ensi on s , th e seriousness of certain situations and t he intensification of terroristic attacks and unlawfu l restra ints make t he Medi t e rr anean one of th e most pug nacious and unstable reg ions of the world. This situat ion, which often affects the vic issitudes of national policy and even touches the sphere of personal safety, is under t he eyes of everybody. The increased sensitivity toward s the problems concerning Mediterranean safety is worldwide and internat ional initiatives designed to analyse t he problems to be faced and coordinate the decisions of the Countries concerned are now being encouraged. This book is the resu lt of thi s general interest and avails itself of the con tribution of two experts whose specialized knowledge is based on

I:armata dei fiumi perduti ~OM AN ZO

Carlo Sgorlon: "L'armata dei fiumi perduti", 1986, pp. 310, Lire 18,000.

Carlo Sgorlon was born in Cassacco, Udine, Friul i in 1930 and is t he author of many novels and essays. In " L'armata dei fiu mi perduti" he writes of t he vic issitudes of t he Cossack Army in Friuli during the last world war. These vi cissi t udes, practically ignored

,.,.,/

BOOK REVIEWS untill recently, had surfaced in 1984 in Claudio Magris' novel "lllazioni su una sciabola". The writer goes deep into the "unsettled and ruthless" period of war which is the "triumph of death" and where the sentiment of life is threatened by an evil omen. The Cossacks, proud, barb aric, innocent, pugnacious and loyal peop le, accepted the rise of the Bolsheviks in Russia as t he advent of the Antichrist. They then began a series of sufferings and migrations in t he illusion of being able some day to go back to the green valleys of Terek, along the Hussur or the Amur {the lost rivers), in Turkes t an or on the Baikal. When Germany attacked Russia,

they started serving Hitler wo, cyn ically, promised them a new Motherland, Carnia, which was to represen t the new Kasakenland. Thus, in the Spring of 1944, men, women, chi ldren, the pope, "jurte" {ten ts), carts, horses, camels, scimitars and icons reached t he valleys of Friuli. They were both homeless victims of war and invaders because they sided with the fore ign tyrant. Akin to t he people of Friuli , they made friends easily, but for the sake of survival they also had to rob and act with vi olence. The moving episode of Aida's death brings this cruel contradiction to its c li max. The curse reigns ruthless ly to the end. Urged by the partisans, in the im-

minent allied victory, the Cossacks, hopeless and decimated by the slaughter, once again start their sad migration and move towards Austria. Many, in a suicidal frenzy of rebellion against fate, prefer to throw themselves together with their women and children into the freezing waters of the Drava. The theme of homesickness for a Country free and in peace gives a vibrated, poetic note to the novel which is a large canvas crowded with people who, against a background of desperation, act a tale of love and death. And Fri u li repres ents a l l the places of the world where man suffers his ruthless destiny.

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lnteruniversity centre for historicmilitary studies and research: "Bibliografia italiana di storia e studi militari. 1960-1984", (Italian bibliography of military history and studies. 1960-1984), Franco Angeli, Milan, 1987, pp. XXVII + 580, Lire 40.000

The Italian Bibliog raphy of military history and studies, sponsored by t he inter- un iversity centre for historic-

military stu dies and research of t he Universities of Padua, Pisa and Turin, drawn up thanks to t he co-operation of sixty specialists and co-ordinated by Giuseppe Caforlo, Pietro Del Negro, Fi li ppo Frassati, Nicola Labanca and Giorgio Rochat, is intended to give a picture of t he Italian historic-mili tary prod uction from 1960 to 1984 with an essential opening as regards surveys on military sociology and those subjects traditionally considered a supplement of military history, yet no less important. The fi rst result undoubted ly regards quantity: three thousand titles in 25 years conc erning Italian military history of the last two centuries are no small number, especially considering that daily newspapers, weekly and fortni ghtly magazines have been exclud ed together w it h several shorter articles published on military journals. The second and more important con tribution of this Bibliography is t he documentary evidence of the richness and liveliness of the various manners of research into mil itary history. The

main o ne is w ithout doubt the t raditi onal idea of re-construc t ing and analyzing the operation s of the Italian Armed Forces i n the vari ous campaigns, but the different forms of antimilitarism, the pacif ist movements and the contradictory problems caused by the prospect of a nuclear war must not be fo rgotten. Research reg arding t he m inor aspects and t he reality of daily mi litary life is another basic and often undervalued sector, sometimes confused wi t h commercial collecting or w ithout any particular purpose. This sector includes u niforms and i ndividual weapons, barracks and the boisterin g of the soldiers' morale, log istics and assistance. All the works mentioned, complete of bibliograf ic indications and, in most cases, a brief comment, are supplied with key words wi th which to establish a detailed analytic index by means of wh ich one may find the existing production by subj ect or p eriod. Ferdinando Schettino

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