JOURNAL OF ITALIAN ARMY 1989 N.3 "RIVISTA MILITARE" by Biblioteca Militare

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MAY

JUNE 1989

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CIRO DI MARTINO

Technological Development and Tomorrow's Society

VITTORIO BERNARD

CESARE ROMITI

Disarmament and Security

Italian Economy in the International Outlook

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CONTENTS

Number three 1989 May-June

Rivista Militare aims at broaden ng and Jpoatin g the techn·c al and vocational training oi Officers and NCOs. It is t11us a means of propagating the military way of thinr<ing and a fo rum of study and debate. Tl1rough t11e publication of art:cles of technical ano scientific interest. Rivista Militare also aims at informing the general p ublic on the Army and on military issues.

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Politics, Economics and Strategy 2 Technological Development and Tomorrow's Society. (Giro Di Martino)

8 Disarmament and Security. (Vittorio Bernard)

18 Italian Economy in the International Outlook. (Cesare Romiti)

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24 The Defence of Europe and European Defence. (Vittorio Barbati)

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I TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT~ AND TOMORROW'S SOCIETY I

T he progress of civilization has always followed the rhythm of the evolution of knowledge, as a distinctive mark of man among all the other elements of nature. This is v ividly testified by history for in every event transmitt ed to posterity, history expresses the stages of an unbroken progr ess occurr ing in a constant dialectical condition.

In particu lar, science, in the strictest sense of the word, accomplishes the vict~rious p rocess. of spirit over m~t~ers m_ co ncrete, immediately verifiable- Âąorms. N evertheless, the function of the world as . a cornerstone of civilization did not always have t he same distinguishing features in t he course of historv. From ; n extremely general ized point of view, two ~ain trends ~an in fact be remarked m the relauon between sc.iemists and society. These are the two common denominators around which multiple fac tors and composi te p heno m ena h av e coagulated, as facets of t he same evolutionary reality. The first "system" can be p laced, in a broad sense, between prehistory and the 17th century : science remains a mere activity of research and pure theory, avoiding the " contaminatio" with t he applicatio n techniques of discoveries and inventions, as well as with innovation. Society makes use of the scholars' inventions and experiments t hrough a complicated mechanism of mediations, which helps increase t he isolation of the sphere of knowledge and to widen the gap between the latter and the working world. After 1600, t he com in g o f Enlightenment and of t he great sociop olitical revol utions create more and more bridges between the opposite sides, and the results of theoretical and experimental research head to war ds th e econo mic operators at all levels who ap propriate them and obtain products of practical utility. We have thus the second t rend, i.e . t he con viction, increasingly shared b y th e re p o si cories o f knowledge, that science ought to be at society's service in order to better the living conditions. . There is a gradual evolution from inve nti on to in novation , fr om theory to practice wh ich m arks and ennobles t he times afte r t he 17th century. The philosophy of p ositivism, started in the 19th centurv introduces into civilization the ,;thics of concreteness and fo reshadows the

The disturbing interrogative about the quality of life and of tomorrow's civilization encloses the primary and real problem that confronts modern man, who is thrilled by his wonderful inventions and, at the same time, humiliated by their effects. ensuing experience of pragmatism which is the act ual doorway t0 t he characteristics of present society . Knowledge and technics are increasingly amalgamated an d boost each other in a productive osmosis which tends tO accelerate with growing intensity the p rocess of interdependence of the various components of modern "culture" free by now from old distinctions which were often based on prejudice . T he product of intellect branches out and spreads through thousands of runlets predisposed by the industrial and artisan world, beco m-

ing a general possession and evidence of the full realization of man. T he systems of implementation of the scholars' "suggestions" evolve, giving birch to a proper pseudoscience for t he organization of t he vario us tech niques. Technology is thus born as an effort to coordinate phases and more and more sophisticated building met hods, with t he aim of supplying society with products suited to the gro wing individual and collect ive needs caused by econo m ic changes and by the lively dy namics of civilization which characterizes 3

Although it is evident, in view of the facts, that the industrial component tends to absorb and sometimes penalize artisanship, both concur in giving the market a considerable amount of products in harmonious integration. our t11nes. Hence the birth and increasing diffusion of the concepts of reality, according to which science is to technics what invention is to techno logical innovation. The substantial difference between the technological and technical worlds consists precisely in the analysis and planning functions of technology, aimed at rationally organizing the technical working methods and systems wich a view to obtaining products more and more suited to the various re4

quiremencs and at the lowest possible cost. That is why one can 0peak of "technology" only when referring to industry while "cechnics" muse be ascribed also and prevailingly to artisanship or to limited activities of transformation. Although it is evident, in view of the faces, t hat the industrial component tends to absorb and sometimes penalize anisanship, both concur in giving t he market a considerable ~mount_ of produces in harmonious mcegrauon.

Except for some categories of goods, there is a considerable excess of supply as compared tO the essential needs. Hence the consumers' culture, which entangles modern society in an absurd mechan ism which is by now unescapable because it involves interests of huge proportions. Suffice it to think of the econo mic weight of publicity, fashion, secondhand goods trade, of the enormous circulation of money which supports primary_ aCLiviLie::; fur die 11atiu11al econormes. At the bottom of this race to cons um p ti on there are numerous psychological and social fact0rs, but it is a given fact that it takes the shape of an apotheosis of the ephemeral and the superfluo us, with the ensuing changes in customs and even in morals. Opposite this negative implication there are positive elements, such as a greater possibility to create new jobs in the producing industries, wider circulation of money, the raising of the less prosperous, who can avail themselves of goods that were beyond their reach in the past, t he levelling of the social "classes", at least in the light of some fictitious "image values ". T he traditional "status symbols", prerogative of the lucky few, have undergone a radical change in social consideration and have spread with apparently effortless penetration, especially within the middle classes. The century-old forms of direct or indirect domination of the wealthy classes have been mosdv cancelled by the present reality, fa~ouring the raise of a rea l spo nta neo us democracy, experienced and fostered in the daily facts of Ii fe. Unfortunately, remnants of social inequalit ies are still present in underdeveloped countries and in nations whose local conditions are linked with political or traditional factors which resist the battering-ram strokes of the new times. But the remarkable diffusioÂˇn of the advanced cultures, helped by the exciting advances in the "science" of comm unications which is taking

place in the mass-media, will certainly bear its fruits with time, and promote a greater awareness of human and civil dignity. It is certainly an iilusion to believe that the more advanced societies have reached a true equality under che aegis of the fundam e ntal democratic principles, considered eternal and imm utable. It seems more realistic to say that

the advent of the technological era has produced the levelling of only the exterior manifestations of the quality of life. \Y./e have not reached a real cultural expansion capable of involving every social component, albeit with the understandable individual differences as regards intellectual education and global preparation. T he main causes can be traced back to the extraordinary existential transformations brought about during the last forty years of "civilization of the machine" which, due to its natural limitations, has been able to affect mainly the pragmatic aspects, openly showing its inability to provide a concrete answer to the moral and spiritual questions. As a matter of fact, the latter have become more critical, having been overwhelmed by the progressive intrusion of an arid mechanicalitv. Indirect evidence of ;he widespread interior disconfort are certainly a percepible return of the young to religion and a greater attention to the alarming ecological impairment; reactions which conceal a convinced willingness to contrast the technological oppression. ' These are the emerging forms of an increasing conflict between scientific rationality, necessarily alien to moral problems, and the

irrepressible demands of the soul which may be dormant sometimes but are alwavs viral and ready to proclaim their rights. Attempts at reconciling the two positions have been made, are constantly u nder the attention of ~ualified components of public opinion and are expressed by cultural, confessional and sociohumanicarian movements.

At the bottom of this race to consumption there are numerous psychological and social factors, but it is a given fact that it takes the shape of an apotheosis of the ephemeral and the superfluous, with the ensuing changes in customs and even in morals. These are the symptoms of wider issues which will have to be discussed and better defined in a future which is already starting and is marked by the disturbing interrogative about the quality of life and of tomorrow's civilization. This dilemma exp resses the primary and real problem chat confronts modern man, who is thrilled bv his wonderful inventions and, at the same rime, humiliated by their effects. This phenomenon is progressively altering the structure of collec-

cive and interpersonal relations to the point of undermining the innate processes of thought in order to adjust them to the accelerated pace of the mechanisms. Consider, for instance, the e normous diffusion of computers among che young and especially among students. This results in a reduced effort of reflection and memory training, and the almost complete elimination of the deductive abilities of man, which are encrusted, instead, to complex electronic systems.

The entire society, even in the elementary daily acttv1t1es, risks to be subject to a myriad of automatisms in whose besieging concatenation the will is dispersed and personality is inhibited. T he sociologists of t he thirties had deno unce d the humiliating automatism of action of the men working at the assembly lines. After a period of reversal of trend, we risk to go back to the same condition, entrusting the operators with the mere task of "assisti ng the machines". " Robotization" is proceeding at the same rate; if o n the one hand it offers considerable economic and industrial advantages (for instance in the production of am ornobiles), on t he other it confines the workers to the ranks of mere overseers. The entire society, even in the 6

elementary daily activities, risks to be subject to a myriad of automatisms in whose besieging concatenation the will is dispersed and personality is inhibited. We would indeed fall victims to a biological mechanism the preconditions of w hich are represented by the advent of genetic engineering, which is not always performed in due fo rm and with et hical purposes. "Nlonsters" and "automatons", made famous bv science-fict io n writers, could be' at the door. Apart from such ext re me degenerative deformations of fut ure civilization, quite clear are the chief

causes of the progressive loss of humanity which appears unacceptable from aJI points of view. Essential expressions of it are the absence of moral independence and the lack of choice and of creative autonomy. These are the qualifying aspects which distinguish a real society from a group of individuals organized according to predisposed and coercive schemes, where there is no place for fantasy and for the ethic dimension of existential real ity. W ithout these principles, the civil life of the futu re could only advance in its material aspects, such as t he expansion and bett er sharing of wealth, the demograp hic growth with the ensuing proportional production of goods, t he acceleration of industrial processes. The rapidity of transports and exchanges will encourage the onset of a more widespread consumers' culture in every sense, which will bring the underdeveloped areas close to the more prosperous ones as regards living standards and customs. Co mmunications will employ science-fict ion devices, extraordinary vehicles of information broadcast practically in real time, which will crowd and press the recipient. T he outcome of this hail of news will only be confusion and disorientation, to the detriment of a well pondered and productive interpretation of the facts . Such situation, upsetting in itself, will have absol utely tragic aspects because the technological product of intelligence could preposterously contribute to do away with the remnants of the individu;lity of thought a!IJ uriemation . Hence a "civilization" that can be called amoral in its "scientific" structure, because it would consist of unescapable mechanisms, outside which there can be only isolation from the system or the short-lived and useless rebellion of visionary Don Quixotes. But in such an apocalyptic picture the windmills of Cervantes' hero do nor appear as mirages, because they are a mainstay from which the ideal

motivations of moral and spiritual redemption begin. The teachings of philosophical idealism, therefore, find their corroboration in the d"ialectical dimension of existence which; in opposition to every historical phenomenon, sets a reaction capable of reversing conditions which appear definitive, in a cycle of continuous regeneration. If technology produces automatisms which humiliate and limit the freedom of choice, the universal thought and the universal spirit create the forms capable of producing the sublime reaction of moral reality. Man's revenge is certain because thought only appears liable to be dominated by its own accomplishments. In a mechanistic society, marked by standardization of behaviour and acceptance of the false myths of a consumers' culture, the intellectual activity produces the most qualified effort because ic must meet complex organizational needs and comply with the particu larly vehement dynamics of social demands. Vis-a-vis the traditional organization of society, in the future the wider diffusion of goods will be a permanent stimulus for the cultural operators, to whom humanity especially and permanently entrusts its conquests and its wish co progress. Thus the machine is again a cool consist ing of astonishing mechanisms, but subjected to civilization, which is above all the outcome of a reevaluation of ideas, of the analysis and interpretation of the pn::sent, in order co create Lhe preconditions for the future. The man-subject reasserts its innate functions of driving pivot of the world-object in a continued renewal of Kamian centrality. The Sophists used to say that "man is the measure of all things", with a surprising and not always understood modernity. It is a canon of eternal validity, which cannot be affected by che apparent autonomy of the machine.

A perceptible return of the young to religion and a greater attention to the alarming ecological impairment are reactions which conceal a conviced willingness to contrast the technological oppression. One should not forget, moreover, that Schopenhauer defined existence as a will co live, i.e. a continuous tension of wishes and impulses wh ic.:'1

history's mysterious

mainspnng. Consequently, the society of electronics and artificial satellites, of interplanetary travel and bold exploration of our galaxy, which violates deep space and the abysses of the sea, implies , paradoxically, the triumph of man in forms unequalled in the past. It is the "ego" that dominates, the ego chat creates, the ego that transforms, the ego chat moulds the

quality of life according to his wi ll. Homo sapiens glories in the epic contest with mystery, verifies his skills and improves them putting himself to the test against the immeasurable dimension of thought. In the near future, technology is indeed going to be the direct operative instrument of this eternal reality, as a precious support of creative intelligence, irreplaceable prerogative of mankind, which, through it, perceives the divine afflatus.

Ciro Di Martino 7

For mass media and the greater part of pubblic opinion, the word "disarmament" has become synonymous of the wo1d "peace" and, as we all want peace, we all ask for disarmament fogetting the old Latin saying "si vis pacem para bellum", while several parts of the world are still bathed in blood by war and guerilla warfare. Thus, even the term "security" which according to the logic of history goes abreast the word "peace" more than "disarm ,. meat" does, sÂŤms to have been forgotten. Those, however, who do not follow fashionable slogans and who try to give themselv s ~ &planation of political events, on the basis of the experiences of history, will certainly have wondered: "Are weapons tf e ~ of war? ls it really convenient to disarm if the Armed Forces of NA TO and its nuclear weapons in particular, have f O the longest period of peace history has ever witnessed on the European continent? Could it not be more dangeroi s 'than to continue to arm moderately as done so far? Can we really trust the new Kremlin leader, Gorbachev's pea e

p ~' to me1 these questions are quite justified. The aim of this artide is thus that of giving an answer to these queri.s "lfl~ alisiii as ~ the future of the negotiations under way between the Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pac,. 'O": ddiri.e what cares should be taken to avoid that disarmament invalidate our security and bring consequer t Âˇ ..-y be more serious than those already existing. '?tbi, issue it u necessary to examine the causes that have led to the armament race and which shoul I us and safe results.

"'ride the article into three parts: the past, until Gorbadtev's leadership, the present, fro, ,

~ 8

CHALLENGE FOR HE ATLANTIC TREATY

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THE PAST: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARMAMENT RACE

he 2nd World War ended, the mies of the Western World while the Red Army rcmainar footing with the imposing forces. two reasons for this: because tcd to impose the communist the occupied Countries and feared the West's attack on his ing Empire or a strong pressure which seemed

possible due to the fact that the United States alone possessed nuclear weapons. However, even when some time later the Soviet Union exploded its atomic bomb and established pro-Soviet governments in the occupit.:<l Counries without the West opposing any really threatening reaction, it continued to maintain its military war apparatus with a great number of Divisions deployed right behind the "iron curtain" which divided the world in two. Obviously, there was another reason for extending in time the state of readiness and advanced deployment of so many forces. This reason has remained the basis of the military policy and strategy of the Soviet Union to our days and it must be borne in mind while negotiating on disarmament with Moscow.

According to Kremlin Leaders' reckoning, the Soviet Union has a "security suited" to guarantee the stability and survival of its empire only if its Armed Forces are able, in case war breaks out,. to conquer Western Europe, in an extremely short period of time, and that is in less than 30 days, before America can mobilize and move its reserves on this side of the ocean and transform its great economic power into a military strength to be employed in defence of the Old Continent. In other words the Soviets, who have an economic power and thus a "war potential" inferior to that of America, have to take possession of Western Europe's resources (human, economic-industrial~ technical scientific, etc.) to sustain with some chance of success a long lastiitJ wa~

The unitank potentiality of a modem anny is of the utmost importance in order to op· pose ejfu:aciously the enemy armoured units.

This would have been considerably burdensome and would have detracted financial and human resources to the economic recovery of Europe after the destructions of war. Moreover, when the Soviet Union, after about two decades, reached a rough equality with the United States as regards nuclear weapons and was able to strike the United States itself, the strategy of "massive response" no longer seemed valid. NATO then adopted the doctrine of the

againts the capitalist world's Superpower. In fact, without such resources and also in consideration of the Chinese threat hovering over them, they might resist long, but not win. The above, obviously, in view of an essentially conventional war, for total destruction through the generalized use of nuclear weapons on both parts, would give them no advantage whatever and would leave them neither winners nor defeated. However, in Lenin's thought, a war between communist and capitalist Countries was considered inevitable, the almost natural consequence of class warfare. This is the reason which brought the Soviet to seek, in the four decades following the war, a remarkable superiority of forces of all kinds over the Western World and to develop an extraordinary, gigantic race for armaments unprecedented in history and which demanded further sacrifices of the people of the Soviet Union and satellite Countries. With this mighty effort continued in time which has absorbed and still absorbs about 15-16% of the GNP (consider that the average GNP percentage for NATO countries is 5%, while Italy dedicates it only 2.1%), percentage deemed only roughly true by the present Soviet Secretary of State for War, the Soviet Union has created the most powerful Armed Forces of the world: 5 million men, 211 Divisions, 52,800 tanks, 5,170 battle aircraft, 696 surface battleships, 373 submarines, 915 Navy battle aircraft, 4,224 ~'trategic nuclear missiles. Thus: • it has maintained and strengthened on European soil a remarkable superiority in Warsaw Pact ready intervention forces as compared to those of NATO in a ratio about 2 to 1 as regards Divisions, tanks, infantry combat vehicles and aircraft and 10

3 to 1 as regards artillery.

The disproportion increases if we consider the mobilization reserves. The ratio of forces, however, varies greatly from one theatre of operations to the other; • it has achieved superiority also as regards nuclear weapons, tactical ones especially; • thanks to its war Navy it is in a position to prevent the flow of reinforcements and supplies towards Europe from overseas; • militarily, it may intervene efficiently in all parts of the earth, called by favourable political situations, in support of pro-soviet regimes or movements. Imposing Forces such as mentioned above have been used by Moscow as a means of repression within its empire and as a means of politico-military intimidation abroad, but they have also been employed to invade foreign countries (Afghanistan). MILITARY POLICY AND NATO STRATEGY The Atlantic Treaty, established in 1949 with defensive aims to face the massive and threatening presence of Soviet troops behind the "iron curtain", had obviously to rearm and prepare a complex of forces of various kinds apt to discourage an eventual aggression. The superiority in quality and quantity of the nuclear armament of the United States and the adoption of the strategy of " massive response" with which the Washington Government engaged in response to any kind of attack from the East by launching atomic bombs on Soviet soil, gave way to an efficacious action of deterrence, wit hout necessarily having to counterbalance the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and satellite Countries with the same number of units of the Countries of the Treaty.

so-called "flexible response" and decided to strengthen its conventional forces and put them in a position to drive back, on frontier positions at least (advanced defence), the enemy's first attack echelon, even if this meant using nuclear weapons first, with a gradual employment, escalating in time and space when the resistance of conventional forces became insufficient and thus making the enemy cease hostilities before turning to a generalii.ed nuclear response. With the political aim of avoiding war and not of winning it, and with purely defensive operational designs, the Atlantic Alliance so far has not had to face the Warsaw Pact forces man by man, tank by tank, aircraft by aircraft, missile by missile. It has however, had to develop plans regarding forces and armament production aimed at containing the power dispropor· tion of the relative military instruments on our continent within a limit apt to make the enemy uncertain as to who would win the battle for the conquest of Europe in the short term required. With an amount of forces divided into three main items - n uclear strategic, theatre nuclear and conventional - the Atlantic Alliance has sought and obtained a "general strategic balance" and not a balance of each item with that of the enemy. Albeit not relinquishing the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons, it has had to strengthen considerably its conventional forces, especially in the last decade. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC PLANS We may thus conclude from the above that the armament race by the two blocs was caused and developed on the basis of two completely opposing concepts of "security". The first, the Soviet one, needs superiority to be able to conquer Western Europe in less than 30 days, possibly without having to employ nuclear weapons, and take possession of its uninjured or little damaged resources. The second, that of Nato, only wants to resist at least more than 30 days, employing nuclear weapons if necessary, to allow the flow of reserves from over the Atlantic and contain, however, the attack as far

C-130 of t.he 46th Air Brig,ide. The air

transport of the fighting units is essential for rapid deploymer!l of fo rces.

forward as possible without having to surrender vital areas to the -enemy. It is obvious that, with such different concepts, a proportionally balanced equilibrium of the various opposing forces - to be achieved through a gradual disarmament process - would mean "insecurity" for the Soviet Union, in the likelihood of an armed conflict. For NATO, instead, it would signify a substantial improvement of the present situation, chiefly based on American nuclear weapons but made uncertain by doubts whether they wouild really be ready to employ them in defence of Europe and risk destroying their own cities. This explains how, in the dialogues at a distance between the two blocs and in the direct negotiations which have taken place in several headquarters, the Western bloc has always tried to make the principle of balanced equilibrium accepted and to agree upon a limit of forces of each kind as the final objective to be achieved, while the Soviet bloc has tried to obtain a kind of official recognition of the positions and advantages already achieved, together with a limit to the strategic nuclear armament race and a stop to the countermeasures planned or already under way which the Western world might have continued to develop. This appears obvious even from a rough analysis of the results of the negotiations which were held during the period under consideration. During SALT l and 2 it was agreed to limit the strategic nuclear weapons of the two superpowers and negotiations gave the Soviet Union some advantage as Âˇregards carriers. With the ABM treaty a limit was put to the antimissile defence system of the two parts which, together with the limitations of SALT 1 and 2, safeguarded the capacity for mutual destruction and, in practice, neutralized the respective strategic arsenals. With the conference on security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Soviet ~nion obtained the official recognition of its 2nd World War conquests (inviolahility of the boundaries estabilished during ~he war) in exchange of the promise that 1t would respect human rights and some measure of control of drill and troop movements in boundary areas. However, the Vienna negotiations on the balanced reduction of forces in central E~rope (MBFR) went on for over 14 years without any substantial outcome due to the Soviets' obstructionism. Actually, for Soviet Union strategy, all mutual engagement which may limit or reduce nuclear weapons is to their own advantage while if conventional forces are limited or diminished it is to their damage.

THE PRESENT ELIMINATION OF GROUND BASED TH EATRE MISSILES (DOUBLE ZERO OPTION) Gorbachev's leadership, started in 1985, marked the turning point in the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union, but it did not affect the military policy, a~ I shalJ further prove, even though the agreement regarding the so-called "double zero option" concerning the INF or euro-missilcs, signed in Washington last December, has brought an important change in the development of the long negotiations between the two blocs and an improvement in the quality of the above: from the "control of armaments" to a first "reduction". The change took place in the Soviets' approach towards the negotiations and not in that of the United States and NATO which remained coherent to the so-called "Harmel doctrine", which became official in 1976 and acknowledged the need for continuing the process of strengthening and modernizing the forces of the Alliance to keep them in a position to accomplish their tasks of deterrence and defence, together with the opportunities of carrying on the dialogue with the counterpart in the seek for a mutual balanced reduction giving a higher guarantee of safety for a steady peace. The agreement for the mentioned first reduction of theatre nuclear weapons as euro-rnissilcs arc also called, rewarded NATO coherence, its determination and its bravery, I would say, in driving back Moscow's intimidations. Italy gave an important example of this by deciding, first among European Countries of the Alliance, to install cruiser missiles on its territory (Comiso) to face the threat of the "SS-20" and the attempt

at political blackmail. Moreover, the above agreement which includes the elimination of 931 missiles by the United States (including the 72 "Pershing lA of Federal Germany) and 1,836 by the Soviet Union, might seem at first sight very favourable to the West, but on the contrary it reduces the threat hovering over the Soviets and therefore NATO's capacity of deterrence in Europe while hardly affecting the Soviets' threat in our respect. They can continue keeping European countries under the fire of superior strategic weapons and tactical nuclear ones (range upto 500 Km) of which they have a much higher number (10-12:l). No doubt, however, that the agreement is politically important for the policy of control which it demands as well as for the reduction which it introduces for the first rime. A 50% REDUCTION IN INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS Meetings between Reagan and Gorbachcv have given a considerable impulse to the talks being held in Geneva since March '85 concerning the 50% reduction in intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons as well as to those regarding space defence. (Nuclear and Space Talks). As well known, it was hoped that negotiations might have a positive conclt,sion before the end of the present United States President's term of office and that he in person might undersign the new agreement. This hope may now be considered waned because of political difficulties regarding certain kinds of arm systems and technical problems concerning controls which are much more difficult than those regarding theatre missiles which will shortly be completely eliminated. Both

l.ynx TOW !-!elicopter. No'wad,1ys the antitan.i? helicopter is 1he mos, efficacious response agains. an annoured unit oj}"'ensive. not yet been decided who will take part in the talks, whether only the countries of the two blocs or also other non-alligned European countries. Neither have the modalities nor the mandate to be granted to negotiators been defined. So far it has only heen a question of preliminary talks, but one can already see that objectives and points of view differ considerably. Negotiations, for example, should concen1 Europe, from the Urals to the Atlan-

sides, however, believe that suitable solutions will be found and that the agreement will be reached shortly. However, it will not greatly change the ratio of forces of the two superpowers, nor of the two related blocs because it starts from a situation of near equality and hardly affects the mutual destruction capacity, which will only be mutually controlled. This too will thus have an important political significance and a limited military strategic effect, albeit reducing the United States' threat of a nuclear retaliation on Soviet Union territory to an eventual Soviet attack. BAN Of C.H EMICAL WEAPONS Another favourable short term prospect of agreement concerns the ban of chemical weapons for which negotiations arc under way in Geneva. This does not regard only NA TO and Warsaw Pact countries, but many others too. Everyone seems to want this and there have been many signs of goodwill on both sides. The Soviets have informed on the quantity of chemical weapons they possess, showed the kinds thev have and stated their determination t; build a plant in which to destroy them. The British have given permission to visit their laboratories where chemical defence is studied. The United States has disclosed its production plants. Both experts and non experts, however, wonder how one can see whether the relative toxic substances are produced for they are now very easy to manufacture as Iran and Iraq have proved during the recent war and just as easily disguised as other products of the chemical industry. Bearing in mind the Soviets' considerable superiority regarding chemical weapons and the fact that thcv continued modernizing and empowering their arsenal while

Americans stopped production for over twenty years (production was started again only recently for reasons of deterrence with the so-called binary gas which becomes harmful only while going through the bullet container) their actual and verified destruction would greatly reduce one of the most serious threats now burdening the NATO forces. The above because their employment, in support of a conventional attack, would greatly increase the penetration capacity as the protective equipment of several Allied armies, including the Italian one, is scanty and not very efficacious, as are, generally speaking, their troops. In fact, NATO has so far considered reacting to a chemical attack mainly with nuclear weapons. Hence, an agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons would make a war carried out with nuclear weapons, as a means of retaliation though with a limited and selettive employment, much less probable. Obviously, such an agreement would not eliminate the need for protective equipment and relative training, for it must not be forgotten how easy it is to evade production controls in time of peace and sea.r t production of new chemical weapons in time of war. CONVENTIONAL STABILITY (CST) Under the thrust of the new relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and Gorbachev's declared willingness to reduce conventional forces and eliminate the disproportions existing between the two alliances, new talks called CST (Conventional Stability Talks) started last year in Vienna within the CSCE, designed to reach a balance as regards conventional weapons too, bringing them, if possible, to a lower level than the present one. The above talks have not replaced negotiations on the MBFR because it has

tic Ocean, but the definition of the area concerned alreadv causes difficulties because Turkey also borders Asia. The Soviets want all European countries, as well as American and Canadian, to take part in the negotiations, while NATO wants negotiations to be limited to the countries of the two alliances at first and later involve the other countries in succession of time. The Warsaw Pact wants to discuss tactic nuclear weapons or SNF (Short Nuclear Forces) and double capacity arm systems, that is conventional and nuclear. It also wants to establish denuclearized areas as soon as possible. Certain NATO countries believe that such weapons or arm systems should be the object of separate negotiations after essential measures have been taken to stabilize conventional forces. Federal Germany, moreover, seems in favour of the Eastern bloc proposal for obvious reasons of domestic policy. However, some steps forward have been taken and the Soviets have given in on some important points. We thus hope to start negotiations true and proper by the beginning of next year. These will be the testing bench for the Soviets' real intentions on the one hand, and for the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance on the other. The problem shows diffirnlties of a political kind, but mainly unprecedented military-strategic and operational problems beause we shall have to verify a considerable number of different elements on a very vast territory. We shall thus almost have to invent a new sciance or "art" to be added to strategy tactics, logistics, personnel: the science of disarmament and armament control. The "new challenge'' rises from the above problems and not only from these as I shall further explain, and puts our Alliance before the fact that each step of the process towards new balances of forces, will have to be taken without diminishing the security. This is no easy task. As regards this issue, all I can do is define the stages of the conventional disarmament process in Europe:

AMX of the Military Aviation. Air support is particularly important on the battlefield in order to facilitate che advance of attacking units. • elimination of the differences and disproportions regarding elements having a greater destabilizing effect and thus of armaments more suited for surprise attacks or large scale offensive operations, such as tanks, artilleries, infantry combat vehicles, airborne forces. This obviously requires an exchange of preliminary data and a mutual control of the latter on the basis of information already held by both sides. Such elimination of differences would bring substantial reductions in forces by the Warsaw Pact and particularly in the Soviet ones in advanced deployment in sateJlite Countries; • a first establishment of a control system on the spot, in addition to those supplied by special technical means (satellites); • a subsequent, further mutual reduction which may also concern other kinds of forces, both of ready intervention and mobilization, until a global limit is reached. This is to be fixed beforehand together with eventual partial regional limits and must take into account the demands of self-defence and the geographic differences between the two blocs and the Countries concerned; • a consequent extension of the network of mutual controls; • the transformation of part of the units, especially those that must remain deployed on border areas, into units of an essentially defensive kind, that is with a limited breakthrough and penetration capacity (e.g. motorized infantry or "blocking" infantry rather than mechanized). In conclusion, the "present" has brought forth a substantial change in the relations between East and West. the first real agreed reduction of forces has taken place and peace proposals have been discussed, which arc far more interesting than Kruschev's or the ones introduced by Brezhnev's detente. This is because Gorbachev has changed the Kremlin's foreign policy and not because the United States and the Atlantic Alliance have changed. The above ensues from the agreements already established and from the ones expected from negotiations under way as well as from the other written or unwritten agreements of greater or lesser importance which have allowed to cease or reduce conflictuality in other parts of the world (e.g. Persian Gulf and Southern Africa), reduce the risk of accidents, survey heretofore secret data and information, and thus increase mutual trust. All this is so ~xtr~ordinarily different from the past that 1t still seems unreal. .Its impact on international public opirnon almost makes the new Kremlin leader look like the only true arteficer of world peace.

THE FUTURE EVALUATIONS PRESENT

PAST

AND

Before attempting to outline the future, as regards the possibilities of achieving a new balance of forces in Europe, at lower levels than at present and in more secure and steady conditions of security, it is necessary to evaluate the past and the present and compare facts with Gorbachev's words. Moreover, before drawing conclusions, we must also remember that the general strategic balance which has blocked Soviet expansionism in Europe as so far been based essentially on the threat of nuclear weapons employed by NATO to make up for the conventional armament superiority of the Warsaw Pact. As regards the past, we must not forget that the objectives of the military and foreign Soviet policy as regards the West have essentially been the following: • achieve and maintain an important superiority of forces apt to conquer Western Europe, in case of war, in a very brief lapse of time and possibly with the sole employment of conventional forces; • prevent or limit, in view of the above, the Atlantic Alliance's possibilities of employing nuclear weapons. This, both through the achievement of conditions of ~uperiority and intimidation actions and with negotiations and negotiation proposals. In fact, the only negotiations that the Soviets ended with agreements were those regarding the limitation and control of nuclear weapons whlle they froze the ones regarding conventional weapons (see MPFR); • detach the countries of Western Europe from the United States. In sum, the main political and strategic aims during the Soviet leadership of Stalin and Brezhnev were to neutralize the threat to

Soviet security, weaken and divide the Western world. The above is not so much due to ideological and class conflicts between communism and capitalism, but to historical and geostrategic reasons which have always prevented the two empires to co-habit peacefully, without one of them attempting to overwhelm the other and which compel the Soviet Union, economically weaker and, thus, weaker from a military point of view as well, to try to take possession of the territories and resources required to beat the antagonist. As regards the present we must check and ask ourselves whether Gorbachev has really changed the politico-strategic aim of the Soviet leadership. In fact, we may state the following: "yes" as far as words arc concerned, but the facts are still to be seen even if he has established peaceful and friendly relations with the West, diminishing or reducing the most immediate and conspicuous reasons for tension and conflict. This with the obvious aim of creating favourable exterior conditions for the domestic reorganization of the system (Perestrojka), which he has in mind to avoid the economic breakdown of the Soviet society.

GORBACHEV'S NEW WORDS Even as regards relations between East and West and the Soviet military policy, Gorbachev's speeches have been far different from those of his predecessors. Some of his words really came as a surprise, while others, though more eclatante, obviously contained more propaganda than innovation and credible proposals. Let us briefly outline the most meaningful concepts of the above without

• the Soviet union has pursued a military policy based on the superiority of forces and this superiority really exists not a rough equality as stated before and there are disproportions and differences to be eliminated before achieving a balanced equilibrium; • a stable and safer peace requires the above equilibrium together with a substantial reduction of offensive forces; • the generalized armament race is umproductive, if not dangerous, also for the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, when Gorbachev spoke to the leaders of the other Warsaw Pact Countries about the new "military dOLtrine" of "sufficiency", for purely defensive purposes, he put his finger on the historic, politico-

really new relations between East and West and reducing the tension and conflicts in various parts of the world by carrying out a perestrojka (reorganization) in foreign policy, accompanied by a certain glasnost (transparency) also as regards the secret matters of the Soviet military apparatus. Two important fates, in line with his intentions, have impressed the world for their innovative nature and the difference with the policy of the past: the withdrawal of the troops from Afghanistan and the agreement on the INF for the elimination of ground-based theatre missiles. The reason for the withdrawal from Afghanistan is obvious: that war, which had become guerrilla, could no longer be won, as had already happened for America

• eliminate existing disproportions bet-

military origin of the armament race and

in Vietnam.

ween the opposing forces, reduce the level and turn them into defensive forces; • "freeze" and then reduce military budgets; • build a "new" Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. In brief, in his speeches Gorbachev, con· trary to previous Kremlin leaders, implicitly or explicitly acknowledged what NATO has been declaring for years and that is: • the Warsaw Pact strategy has so far been an offensive one and it must be changed; • the Soviet Union has a considerable arsenal of chemical weapons;

declared his intention to eliminate the cause, a~ so often suggested by NATO. Maybe he has understood that a general war between the two modern empires of East and West is now unfeasable and that it is useless to continue preparing to win it.

The reason for the agreement on theatre missiles, though representing a substantial change as regards those undersigned by Kruschev and Bre:ihnev, follows the same purpose: deprive the defence of the West of its nuclear instruments. According to me, the same reason urges Gorbachev to make pressure on the United States, even through international public opinion, to conclude the agreemen; regarding the 50% reduction in intercon· tinental strategic nuclear weapons and to renew the agreement limiting the antiballistic missile defences (ABM), while trying to stop the Reagan initiative for the

CH-47 of 1he Royal Air Force. Helicopter bome troops allrr..v a remarkable mobility of lami forces. however following the chronological order in which they were stated: • gradually eliminate from the face of the earth all nuclear weapons by the year 2000, dismantle certain types of anns and establish denuclearized areas in zones at risk and immediately cease all nuclear experiments; • eliminate all chemical weapons and prevent their production; • apply a new "military doctrine" for the Warsaw Pact, based on the idea of "sufficiency" of forces, solely for defensive purposes, and not on the concept of superiority. invite NA TO to discuss the issue and do the same;

GORBACHEV'S FACTS The new Soviet Union leader's facts have so far been only partially in line with the intentions declared in his speeches. As already mentioned above, Gorbachev has personally contributed to establishing

development of antimmisile space defence arm svstems (SDI). It i~ undoubtedly a good thing to denuclearize, but if this unbalances the present equilibrium, it may be very dangerous for us and (or the peace between East and West. · There are,. however, other, less apparent facts, which are in opposition with Gorbachev's disarmament proposals. Three years after his accession to power, the mighty war production machine and the increase in the quality and quantity of the Soviet military organization have witnessed no slackening. The above, while the United States and other countries of the Atlantic Alliance are planning cuts to military expenditure in spite of the 3% annual increase for the improvement of conventional forces and have deferred the decision concerning the modernization of the theatre and tactic nuclear weapons which will remain after the "Cruise'' and the "Pershing" will have been dismantled, even though NATO has already reduced of its own free will the number of warheads in the depots of Europe. It is enough to mention, as an example, that the Soviet Union continues to build tanks at an annual rythm of about three times that of NATO, introduce new and sophisticated combat aircraft at a much higher speed than the West and build submarines of 5 different types at a rythm of almost one per month. Indeed, under Gorbachev's government we have witnessed a steady annual change of cadre Divisions into operational units. Why is this? According to optimists it has not yet been possible to change the long term planning of the Soviet Armed Forces and war industry. Others state that Gorbachev still needs the full support of the high military leadership to carry out his domestic reforms: he cannot thus reduce the financing set down for the Armed Forces. Another, no less plausible reason, however, is that there is no real intention to subtract resources from the military field for "civilian economy". Moreover, during the many meetings between United States and Soviet military leaders, when asked to explain the new Warsaw Pact "military doctrine" of "sufficiency" stated in Berlin during the Pact summit, the latter answered evasively. This also emerged during the visit to the' Soviet Union of United States Secretary of State for Defence, Carlucci. , Therefore, we must conclude, as General Galvin, Chief Commander of the Allied F~r.ces in Europe, that as regards the military aspect of relations between the two blocs, things have so far not changed at all. Indeed, the situation has become more difficult because, in view of disarmament, it is hard to obtain the approval of governments and the consent of public opinion to expenses necessary to carry out

the so-called "force programmes" even though they are designed to reduce the operational power gap between Warsaw Pact and NATO Armed Forces which is unfortunately becoming wider and wider.

FUTURE PROSPECTS The above comparison between facts and words shows that future prospects are less optimistic and more uncertain than may appe,ir from the atmosphere of the present relations between the two superpowers and relative alliances. At present, only three trends seem certain: • earn' on the denunclearization of the Europea;1 continent; • increase substantially the economic and commercial relations with the West. There is even talk of a new "Marshall Plan" to help the "poor" Eastern countries overcome the economic crisis which is partly the result of the enormous effort made for the production of war materials to face a war which never broke out; • further develop the campaign for the reconciliation of the countries of the two blocs, even by appealing directly to the public opinion of the West. The development of these trends will, obviously, demand new initiatives, more or less p~opagandistic or concrete, to confirm the "absolute good intentions" of the new Soviet leadership. In practice, as regards the reduction and balance of conventional forces, the hopes of the West may be greatly deluded. Moreover, it would be very naif to believe that the Kremlin leaders and the military in particular, are willing to "lose" much of the "security" given by their present superiority and "undersell" or demilitarize masses of tanks, cannons, aircraft and other combat vehicles, as occurred in the West after the 2nd World War, only to give our people and our leaders more confidence and serenity. We may thus reasonably advance that negotiations for "conventional stability" (CST) will be very, very long, difficult and exhausting and that each Soviet concession which may weaken their military instrument, will require some political compensation if nothing else; otherwise, we may be granted things deemed useful to slacken the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and stop initiatives to modernize its forces and improve its general defences though without increases in quantity, as already happened several times during previous negotiations. Evidence of the above came recently from Warsaw when Gorbachev proposed the withdrawal of Soviet airborne units if Italy rejected NATO's reque;-r and reHquished the idea of accepting on its territory the united States "F-16" group which must leave Spain within the next three years. It is therefore impossible not to see that Gorbachev is attempting to achieve the same

aims of his predecessors, most probably with the same ruthlessness and shrewdness, though he applies a policy of peaceful and friendly approach which appeals to the public opinion of the West instead of political pressure and military intimidation. Moreover, as I have already said in a previous article, the Sov.iet Union cannot change its objective of dominating over Europe and thus breaking NATO apart, for this is the outcome of its historic and geostrategic position. Gorbachev may change tactics and strategies, but not the objective itself, whereas a chieflv defensive alliance such as ours could gr;dually disrupt for lack of an immediate threat and danger which the general atmosphere of peaceful relations and the continuation of talks on disarmament will gradually mitigate. H owever, the Warsaw Pact may also be negatively affected for the fading away of the image of an important historic enemy such as the West, may rid its military compages, imbued by propaganda with idcologic motivations, of an important element of cohesion. CONCLUSION From the above reasoning we may understand how new the challenge for the Atlantic Alliance is because "to guarantee security by disarming" is politically, operationally and technically difficult and psychologically hard on public opinion. We must not forget that in the enthusiasm of peace after the 2nd World War, the West - almost unaware - jeopardized security and peace itself, by hastily demobilizing the forces which had re-conquered and liberated the Countries of Western Europe, sac1;ficing manv human lives and economic resources. W~ may therefore advance a new risk which, however, we cannot but accept and face because to overcome it means achieving the final objective of the Atlantic Alliance: i.e. a peace based on a less precarious equilibrium and on more solid foundations. Therefore, as the Atlantic Cabinet Council declared during the Reykjavik meeting of June '87 and repeated during the State Leaders' summit of march '88, if we wish to guarantee peace and security during the years of negotiations and in the years to come, it is impossible to further reduce the nuclear component of the allied forces in Europe, indeed it will be necessary to modernize it; we must continue to improve the operational capacity of conventional forces and maintain a strong solidarity on the two sides of the Atlantic and within the Alliance. In view of the above, commitments and financial support may not be reduced and NATO governments have to see that facts follow words. Italy once again gave a meaningful example which was much appreciated by

SUMMARY OF THE MAI N AGREEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON THE CONTRO L AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

•

• August, 1963 • Treaty on the limited ban of nuclear tests. T he treaty fo resees the ba n of nuclear rests in rhc atmosphere, 1n space and u nder-wattr. • July, 1968 · Treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. Signatory co un tries: U nited Srates, Soviet U nion, United Ki.\1gdom and anot her 59 nations. T he creary scares char nat ions w ith a sdf-sufiicicnr nuclear armame nt capacity m ust no t transfer the nuclear arma ment under the jurisd icati o n oi countries wh ich do not possess it and that the remai ning cou ntries m ust no t p roduce it. • Octqbcr, 1969 · Treaty on sea-bottom arma ments. T he t reaty, d rawn up by USA and U SSR, is approH!d by the United N at ions Committee for total d isar m:irn em o n December, 7th, 1970. it concerns rhe com ro l o f n uclear weapo ns placed o n the sca-bo n o m . • May, 1972 · First treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT 1)). D rawn up between U SA and USSR, it foresees: • a maximu m. of 1.wo deployment areas of defence against am iball istic m issiles (A]M); • a provisional agreement limiting the cam per irir) n an offl' nsivl' sr ,·atP.gi,; ar ms, an d th us frP.ezing t h e m 1mbe r ,)f h:ill isrir miss ile launchers at t he level exist ing on rhe dare oi the treaty. • June, 1973 • Nuclear war prevention. An agreement between USA and USSR w h ic h fo resees mutu al co nsu!t ario ns in rimes of c risis to avoid a n uclear wa r. • June, 1973 . Beginning of talks o n the balanced and mutual reduction of forces in central Europe (MJ3FR). At first rhe NA TO countries p ro pose to red uce troops LO mutu al levels o f 700,000 men for land fo rces and 900,000 for joint air and land forces . Talks have continu ed to o ur d ays without reaching any kind of agreement. • July, 1974 · Treaty on the limitation of nuclear tests. U SA and USSR agree o n lim itin g underground n uclear rcsrs to 15C Kilotons. • November, 1974 · Vladivosrock agreement between USA and USSR on the limitation of offensive strategic arms. It fo resees: • exteJJsion o f t he " ali d ity of t he pro visional agreemenr of 25.5.1972 (SALT 1) to O ctober, 1977 and va li d ity bf th e new agreement till 31 .12.1985; •• < • Ji n; it~tion, o n hoth sides, o i rhe follow in g: total agreed number oi strategic la uncher veh icles; ~ 1 1 I • L 'k,~ • - total agreed number of ICBMs and SLBM, with multiple inde pendent warheads (M LR V); _"'.'t i,.-rt • possibility of carrying on negoti ati ons o n li mi carions in rhe period fo llo wi11g 1985. T he relat ive negotiatio ns arc held in Geneva in 1975. • August, 1975 · Conclusion in Helsi nki of the conference on securit y and co-operation in Europe (CSCE). Signatories: the Soviet U nio n, the United States, Canada and anothe r 32 part icipat ing E uropean nat ions. T he fi nal document foresees, among things, d1e nocificarion o f the main military manoeuvres involvi ng more than 25,000 men, chc participation o f observe rs and ()ther mea:rnres ape ro develop mutu al trust. • June, 1979 · Second treaty on the limitation of strategic arms (SALT 11) between USA and USSR. This foresees rhe following: • a <;eil ing oi 2,250 miss il es and st rategic bom bers on both sides; w ith in t his ceil ing 110 more than 1,320 strategic bo mbers and missiles su pplied with m ult iple warheads or cruise m issiles. Of these, no more than 1,200 ground based, embarked or air LO surface ball istic mi ss iles may have multiple warheads and, o f the ground based ICBM, not mo re chan 820 can have mulcip le warhe~ds; • the d ismantling o f 270 Soviet miss iles; • t he e nd of production and deploy menc of the SS-1 6 by the U SSR; ·, • the exist in g enfo rcement oi the ARi\·1 1972 creacy; ~ • the te mporary 3 year limitatio n on che employment of mo bile lBMs and cruise m issiles; • co,ntrols on the application o f the Treaty via sate llite and other national "intelligence" means. F ollowi ng the Soviet in vasion of Afghan istan (December 1979) SALT 11 is nor rati fied by the U SA, bm it is nonetheless llpp lied by borh parcies. • June, 1982 · Start of strategic arms reduction taU,s (START). This is an approach towards a 50% reduction o f nuclear strategic arms. • October, 1983 · Reduction of U nited Stated nuclear warheads in Europe. T he USA and the N t\ TO aIJ i~s u nil atera ll y agree LO re move Fro m Eu rope 1,400 Un ited Srates nuc lear warheads withi n the next 7 years. these must be added to the 1,000 ;1[readv removed afrec the NATO decision oi 1979. • ) a nua1·y, 1984 · Opc::11i111, uf l11e disamwrnc::ul cuuft:rc:: m;c;: in Europt: (CDE). Designed to inc rease che rn ea~ures regarJing the development of rnu lllal trust and safety already agreed upon during the Helsinki CSCE . • March, 1985 · Start of new n ucle:ir and space :irms talks in Geneva (NST) between USA and USSR. These arc the continuation of ST t\RT and are des igned to establish a comrol on space ar ms. T he agreement on the elim.ination of gro und based t hcacre missiles (INP · d o uble zero o pr ion} o ri gin ates from the above talks. • September, 1986 · C OE agreement. The 35 1ptions o i the CDE conference reach an agreemen t 1.0 reduce the risk o f war in Eu rope. It provides for the mucual notification by borh NATO and the Warsaw Pact o f the main military activities carried o m in the res pective areas of responsabiliry. Moreover, it establishes that inspections shNtld be had to ver ify whether chc agrec mem is ,1p plicd. • May, 1987 · Centres for the reduction of the nucl ear dsk. In G eneva, USA and USSR agree to establish Centres, in rhe respecti ve capi ta ls, w ich the rask of reduciong, :ilso through prcvemive information, the risk of an accidental om break of n udear war. • December, 1987 · Treaty for the elimination of all gro und based t heat re nuclear missiles. U SA a nd USSR stip ulate the treat')' for 1.he eli minacio n o f the ir respective ground based theatre nuclear missiles, with a 5,000 to SOO Km rangt .

&lgian parachute commandos in pacrol operntions. This kind of ,mir may be efficaciously employed, especially during the dete,Tence stage. allied C ou ntries. With the approval by a large Parliament majority, it accepted NATO's request to let the United States 401 Air Group of F-16 station on its territory: these aircraft arc indispensable for the defence of the Southern Region and thus for t hat of our C ountrv too. It thus avoided a first act of uni lateral disarmament which would have been a prejudicial precedent for a correct and profitable development of negotiations for conventional stability in Europe. Firm and coherent with NATO policy and strategy in su pporting and cont ributing to the demands of mutual defence, I t aly has , however, always favoured t he dialogue between East and West, con vinced as it is that men of goodwill, patience a.n d perseverance may at least try to come close to what historv and geostrategy divide and oppose. , However, to achieve and consolidate conventional stability in Europe it will pro-

bably be necessary, in a not too distant future, for the you ng Italian citizens to devote more time and energy to t raining, even by periodical calls to arms, for the defence of t heir land and their homes. We believe that the gradual loss of credibility of the nuclear deter rent, advanced by many, can only be counterbalanced by the will, determination and preparedness of the people of the West to resist all attacks. We could th us have an inversion of relations between the nuclear and conventional components of forces and the conventional ones could, partly at least, replace the nuclear ones and thus contribute more efficiently to discourage eventual aggressions with a lesser risk of a holocaust. In answer to the questions raised at the beginning of this article, we may add the followin g: • armaments are not the cause of war which is due to the determination of one country to overwhelm another or solve conflicts of interest with violence. Armaments, instead, may substantiallv contribute to peace, discou·raging intimidations and aggressions as the Atlantic Alliance has

been doing for the last forty years; • disarmament may be convenient only if the balances of st rength are improved t hus achieving a less precarious relation of m utual security and making peace more certain. At present, however, we cannot advance a total denuclcariz at ion of forces in Europe, because the deterrent effects of conventional forces , as history shows, are insufficient and this is proved by the fact that strongly armed Countries have been attacked by others with inferior forces; • un ti l a more balanced equilib rium of forces is reached, t he Atlantic Alliance must continue to arm to avoid greater risks than the present ones and make the counter-party negot iate reliably; • only when fact s correspond to words also as regards the mjlitary policy and the strategic trend of the Armed f orces of the Soviet Union, shall we be able to trust, with caution, the peaceful and friendly 111tentions expressed by Gorbachcv. Lieutenant General Vittorio Bernard

DIS.ARMAMENT

AND SECURITY 17

ITALIAN ECONOMY IN THE INTERNATIONAL OUTLOOK by Cesare Romiti

E 100 -- Dimens ioni cm 15,1 x 9,2 - Ernissione: 1944

The national and the international situation are so tightly connected that it is difficult to consider them separately. â€˘ However, Italy presents some particular problems on 'which its possibiliti~s of maintai~ing the i:ositions achieved among mdustnalized countries depend. 1987 confirmed the strength of our economic system. According to official figures, the gross national product increased by 3.1 % in real tenm;. This figure followed that of 2.9% of the previous year and was among the highest of t hose of industrialized countries. Investments carried on this positive cycle with an increase of 8.2%. For the first time the industrial production index overcame the 1980 levels. In the first six months of 1988 data resul_ti_ng from sample surveys were pos1t1ve. In particular, by the end of March, the data regarding the comsumption of electricity showed a furt~~r. development of productive activ1t1es. At the same time a further increase in industrial production was registered (6.2% in March, 1988, after 8.7% in February and 7.3% in January). Pessimistic anticipations advanced at the beginning of last year were thus disproved. Real economy seems to have absorbed without relevant damages the effects of that black Monday of 19 October, 1987, to which people ascribed catastrophic consequences. It is however necessary to complete this positive picture with further considerations less favourable to optimism. . A first aspect - not very reassuring, so as to say - is the fact that the above trend of our economy is chiefly connected to the home demand. In fact, in 1987, final home consumption increased at a rate of 4.1%, that is well above the increase of the national product. This means chat an important part

of the demand was satisfied by the ' . import increase. Actually, in 1987 the balance of trade closed with a debit balance of 950 billion lire. Many, if one considers the debits of the early '80s. Few, if one takes into account the balance of the previous year, which was over 3600 billion lire. We are thus moving towards an economy unbalanced towards the inside in which imports increase more than exporrs. This crend is confirmed by data regarding the balance of trade of the first six months of 1988. Moreover, we are not reassured by the fact that certain bearing branches of our economy, such as the textile one, are worsening their balances with abroad. We thus have a problem of global competitiveness which must not be undervalued, despite cases of brillant pe~ormances by some leading enterprises. A second reason for concern 1s that of public revenue. As we all know, this problem is not new and I shall therefore not go into detail. However, I would like to mention some figures. By the end of '87, deficiency in the public revenue amounted to 113,500 billion lire, of which 80,000 billion lire refer to interests, in relation to a National Debt around one million billion lire. These figures place us in a preeminent though not too enviable position among developed countries and have heavy consequences on the outlook of our economy. The need for financing the deficiency in the public revenue, in fact, keeps the rate of actual interests at the highest levels, Spain excluded. This is an objective stop to the possibilities of investment, especially for all those enterprises which need to turn to credit. The payment of interests is, in fact, a re-distribution of income For the Europe of 1992 having eleven different currencies is a sign of weakness in the face of the rest of the world.

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towards domestic coosumption and, therefore, inclines to increase the unbalance between production and domestic demand. Lastly, the volume of the debt and the automaticity of the mechanisms which nourish it, make it impossible to use the National Balance as an economic incentive, limiting the spaces of manageabi lity of the economy. Apart, however, from all other considerations, we must bear in mind that we are inevitably going cowards a regime of international liberalization of capital movements. In the present situation, this may mean higher rates of interest, a more restrictive economic policy, a heavier fiscal pressure. All this does not favour the development of economy nor does it increase our capacity to compete on the international field. The third element of concern is inflation. It may seem strange to talk about it at a time when we are drawing the final balance of that backward trend which, in a few years, brought inflation from 21 to about 5%. However, this 5% seems to be impassable; and 5% is, unfortunately, above the levels reached by most of the other industrialized countries. The causes of this are different and not all easily identifiable. It is certain, however, that an average increase in retributions of 19

8.9% - I quote official data - can in no way be considered a blocking faccor for the cost dynamics of our economy. What are the conclusions to be drawn from this complex picture w ith alternate and contrasting elements? That at present our economy has sufficient impetus to reach strong positions within the international context, but that, at the same time, there are certain factors which may considerably reduce this impetus at the first sign of a weakening of business. It is everyone's responsibility to remove these factors. Firstly, the enterprises which certainly cannot stop at the results reached and slacken their commitment in productivity and in innovation; but most of all of those responsible for the economic policy which should be more strongly directed towards modifying the mechanisms of expenditure in the public sector and strengthening the economic freedoms of our system. Perhaps, the functioning methods of the institutions do not allow to intervene with the necessary determination and it is for this reason too that on many parts the need for institut ional reforms is being considered. What I believe should be underlined, however, is what has to be faced in the international field. The above is dominated by uncertainties and tensions and no matter how things will turn out, competition will be harder and harder. Let us now consider the main actors of this scenario. The United States, though showing many signs of recovery, especially in the last period, is in a situation having many critical elements. The dwindling of the dollar exchange rate has permitted considerable recoveries in foreign accounts and has given an extraordinary impulse co the exports of this country. All this, however, is not enough to bring t he settlement of the balance of payments in a position of security.

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Above all it does not affect the positions of the United States as regards the South East Asian conpetitors, who denominate their exports in dollars. It must be mentioned, moreover, that the American Administration has co face a public deficit of about 160 billion dollars and a foreign debit of over 550 billion dollars. We may therefore foresee that, following the recent elections, severe fiscal and financial provisions will be taken to solve the problem of the home and foreign deficit. Security is for the most part a problem of relations of strength, military as well, but it also has to be pursued through a diplomatic job of mediation and the support of development.

This may also mean a slackening of the home demand of the United States and an increase of its pressure towards exports; that is a slowingdown of world trade, of which the United States represents a consistent pan, and a stronger competitive attack of the U nited States against the rest of the world. Japan, moreover, is proving that the concern for the revaluation of the yen, was probably eccessive. In fact , the home demand responded better than expected and is increasing at a rate superior co 5% and, moreover, the fear of losing competitiveness as regards foreign countries, has driven che industry to new interve ntions of efficiency and rationalization. It would therefore be better not to count on a cns1s m Japan.

On the contrary, we may expect to see it stronger than today and

more aggressive 111 1tS competitiveness with the rest of the world. Especially rowardsÂˇ Europe which, at present, is certainly more vulnerable than theÂˇ United States, as far as foreign competition is concerned. \Y/e may thus expect that Europe, and Italy with it, will find itself under the cross fire of the commercial attack by the two parts of the world. An attack which, surely, we will be unable to avoid completely by raising protective barriers and for which we shall have to get ready by gaining as far as possible positions of force. In view of the above, I believe that the strengthening of the communitarian unity becomes of the utmost importance. There is of course the term of 1992: we are all engaged in respecting this date, but a European market without national barriers is not all. \Y/ e believe that it is necessary to integrate the unity of the market with the unity of the currency because eleven different currencies would mean an additional cost that other economic powers do not have; it costs in terms of exchange risks, it costs in terms of bureaucratic procedures and the fact of having eleven different currencies is a sign of weakness in the face of the rest of the world. No matter how strong the German Mark is, it will never be a sufficient alternative to the yen and the dollar wh ich rest on vaster and stronger homogenous econom ic systems.

It is therefore necessary to make the ECU grow and become a c urrency of domestic exchange and a reserve currency. The excellent performance reached so far is a suitable guarantee for this basic step, however, Europe no matter how great and united, is not an island in the world. All considered, the economy of our continent costs almost as much as that of the United States - about 3,500 billion dollars against 4,200 -

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and more than chat of Japan (about 2,000 billions). It is no small thing, but a division into three of the world economic power is only a situation of unsteady balance, unless we reach agreements establishing mutual rules of behaviour. Once the United States was the dominant power. This gave us - or imposed upon us - institutions such as the \Y/orld Bank and the Bretton \Y/oods svstem which worked brilliantly until the United States was able to support As regards economy, politics and international security Italy will have to play an important role which will certainly not be one of supremacy, but a strategic role in a Europe which we are all engaged in making more united.

t heir leadership. Today, simi lar instruments, regulating exchanges and guaranteeing the freedom of trade, m ust be fo und and managed together, in the interest of everyone. Not only of industrialized countries, but also of the backward parts of the world for which industrialized countr ies are responsible as regards development and securicv. I have jus~ mentioned security and I would like to go further into the ~ubject which is one of particular interest. I am convinced that security is for the most part a problem of relations of strength, military as well, but I am even more convinced that it is possible to pursue security through a diplomatic job of mediation and the support of development. 21

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In this respect, as members of the European Community and of the Atlantic Alliance at the centre of the Mediterranean, we have particular responsibilities. The responsibility of activating whenever possible, the flow of technology; Italian industry is strongly engaged in this respect. The responsibility of maintaining complicated and difficult international political balances in the respect of alliances and national interests; on the whole, I deem that our foreign policy adequately accomplishes this role. Lastly, the responsibility of guaranteeing, militarily speaking, the security of the central Mediterranean; and I believe that, here too,

we are g1vmg an important contribution. All these responsibilities are increased by the current detente between the two superpowers and the Soviet Union's policy of opening cowards \Y/ estern models. Therefore, Italy will have co play an important role as regards economy, politics and international security. This role will most certainly not

I would rather see Italy, once defined the «airer a ft ca rrier of the Mediterranean» as «a bridge». A bridge filling the gap between the Mediterranean and Central Europe.

be one of supremacy, and it would be totally illusory to think it, but a strategic role in a Europe which we are all engaged in making more united. I remember that when Italy cherished unseemly dreams of greatness, people used to say that our peninsula was the «aircraft carrier of the Mediterranean». I would rather see it as a bridge. A bridge filling the gap between the Mediterranean and Central Europe. A bridge where, through the will and the engagement of everyone, welfare and peaceful cohabition may walk over. If this dream came true, we could add yet another de ed of real greatness co our age old history.

Recent international events have again brought to the surface old and new problems related to the long-standing problem of the European role in the defence of western Europe. This is a burning issue, to say the least, and raises a tangle of delicate and extremely complex political, economic, financial, scientific, technological, production and military problems. What are the main issues at stake? Are satisfactory solutions in sight? What objectives are involved?

. THE DEFENCE OF EUROPE . AND EUROPEAN DEFENCE I

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Before attempting to provide an answer to the above questions, a brief outline must be made of the strategic situation in Europe which forms a background to them. The situation in question is essentially intercontinental and, in certain aspects, even planetary, in nature. Europe is the continent on which the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc face each other off materially. It is thus the main knife-edge of the equilibrium entrusted, not only to the forces deployed in it, i.e. the NATO and Warsaw Pact military systems, but also to forces that, if the need arises, can be ferried in from other theatres. Clearly, then, European equilibrium is the result of internal factors, such as the structure of the opposing forces, their levels of efficiency, weaponry and equipment, etc., and of external factors. The latter include the strategic mobility of the reinforcements that can be sent by the two blocs either through the Atlantic and Mediterranean, on the one hand, or through the air-ground spaces of European Russia and Eastern Europe, on the other. Or it may be the result of the greater or lesser capacity shown by the two parties to hinder the movements of the other. This brings into play the capabilities and the possible action of the two super-powers, United States and Soviet Union, the only ones capable of operating .over inLen:ominemal distances. Also linked to the approaches and behaviour of the two super-powers is another planetary fact w hich outweighs all the international politico-military equilibria, beginning with European equilibrium itself: the mutual nuclear deterrence exerted by the huge strategic arsenals of the two countnes. It is against this background that the European defensive systems of NATO and the Warsaw Pact face

each other off. Let us examine some of the main features of both. The NA TO system is characterized by a clear-cut predominance of air-ground forces in the central sector and by air-naval forces in the flanking sectors (especially in the South, with the presence of the US 6th Fleet and large air-naval forces of other countries). The Warsaw Pact system is mainly air and ground based, even though, particularly on the northern flank, it can rely on fairly strong aeronaval forces. Technically speaking, the NATO air-ground forces are mainly defensive in nature, with strong offensivedefensive capabilities in the aero naval field. The Warsaw Pact forces instead have strong offensive capabilities in the air-ground forces, accompanied by strong air-naval offensive-defensive capabilities, but with serious deficiencies of a technical nature (no air cover for units operating at long ranges) and of a geo-strategic nature (the four

A Canadian M109 self-propelled gun in a German village. Although small in peacetime, the Canadian contribution to European defence in time of war could become substantial.

Fleets - North Sea, Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific - into which the Soviet navy is divided cannot give each other mutual support. Moreover, the passages through which Soviet vessels must pass tO reach the open sea are to some extent all 'controlled' by western forces). The NA TO defence system is based on a high degree of coordination of all its air-ground and airnaval components. In the air-ground field, above all in the central sector (where the best equipped forces operate), this system has been given a structure suitable for mobile defence carried ou~ by powerful armoured and motorized units backed up by efficient tactical air forces. The cornerstone of the whole system is "ground-air"

Two A-10s of the 23rd TFW in arrival from the United States, photographed at a Turkish base during a NATO exercise.

cooperation in which, rogethcr with the armoured and anti-tank units, etc., a fundamental role is played by the weapons systems, i.e. conventional artillery, tactical missiles, close air support, interdiction aircraft, etc., capable of hitting not only front echelon forces but also chose of the second echelon, in order to prevent the?'1 from supporting the attack, exploiting any breakthrough or blocking any NATO countcrattack s (1). An essential prerequisite for this type of mechanism to function is to gain air superiority over the whole battlefield and rear echelons. On this assumption the NATO countries have placed the emphasis on two main types of aircraft - 'dual-role' fighters, suitable for both air battles and ground attack, and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), designed to provide air operat ions con trol Western

supenonty 1n electronics . Technology is thus used to offset Soviet numerical superio ri ty in fighter aircraft. This first mechanism is linked to two others, which may be either parallel or alternative: flexible or gradual response, and that of control and use of the air and sea spaces through which appropriate reinforceme nts would be sent whenever the need arose. These topics are discussed in greater detail below. Attention will now be focused on the opposing Warsaw Pact mechanism. As outlined above, the technical characteristics of the Warsaw Pact system are more offensive in nature. Despite the t echnological and organizati o nal improvements introduced over the decades, it is srill basically the sam e system wit h which t he Red Army carried out its final offensives against the Third Reich at che end of World War II. The forces of its allies were officially incorporated in it in the mid fifties

(2).

The present operational mechanism, which clearly reflects these o rigins, is based on the traditional strong points of the Soviet military apparatus (which have been transferred, with all that this implies, to the military apparatuses of the allied countries): armoured and mecha nized units, artillery and tact ical air force (of course, (hese have been upÂˇ dated by the introduction of new weapons systems, such as tactical missiles and attack helicopters). The scheme used is the t ypical one of coordination between fire and movement., sometimes accompanied by t he use of special forces Spetsnaz and with the in-depth support of longer range weapons systems (interdiction missiles and aircraft). Air cover is provided by a large figh ter air force and a powerful anti-aircraft defence system (altho ugh technically defensive, the latter weapons can have an indirect offensive function because the effectiveness of their protection largely determines t he ef. fectiveness of the attacks carried out

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by the armoured and mechanized units with the support of aircraft and helicopters). At even greater ranges, e.g. co nti nental, tran scontinenta l and oceanic, this mechanism can rely on support fro m a large number of bombers, most of which are old and even obsolete, as wel l as on powerful naval force s, the main task of ,vhich appears to be to 'isolate' the European theatre so as to prevent NATO from bringin g in the necessary reinforcements. In broad outline this is the scheme of the oppos ing for ces centred around Europe. It is against this background that an evaluation will now be made of the contribut ions to the common defence made by the U nited States and by the other members of the Atlantic Alliance. For the sake of simplicity, the passing of the years may be said to

have been accompanied by the consolidation of an actual 'structuring' of the contributions made by the various countries. On the whole, this 'structuring' which is determin- Âˇ ed bv differences in the financial, scien;ific, technological and productive resources of the countries concerned, has occurred in two closely interrelated and mostly overlapping sectors, one defined in terms of arms/ equipment categories and the ochcr in terms of types of forces. In very broad outline and without using perce ntage figures of dubious reliability, it is possible to work out a scheme for indi ca t ing t he 'autonomous' capacities of development-production of NATO members (in cluding those w ho are not members of its military organization) in several fu ndamental sectors (Tab. 1). As we have already pointed out, this scheme indicates the capacity of che various countries to develop (i.e. co define conceptually, design, test, develop and produce) autonomous-

ly, whether alone or in cooperation, a nu mber of fundamental types of weapons and equipment. le excludes other capabilities, such as that of making, often very significant , contributions to the development of special technologies (for instance, the Dutch contribution in electronics) or that of designing and producing light weapons (in practice, possessed by all the NA TO countries, although not always at the same level). Also excluded is thl' capability of participating in the production under licence of high very high tech systems (e.g. in aircraft production, with the participation of various European countries, in the first instance, Belgium and Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups (CVBG) each consisting of an aircraft carrier and escort vessels, are used by the US Navy to control the airÂˇsea spaces. In the West, only the United States can now build and maintain large aircraft carriers like tile John F. Kennedy (CV 67) photographed here as it proceeds at full speed.

TAB.1 C31 Systems (Command, Control, Com- United States of America munications) suitable foi- planetary range operations:

Intercontinental strategic weapons United States of America (bombers, ballistic missiles, submarines armed with ballistic missiles) Intermediate-range strategic weapons United States of America, France, UK (on(bombers, ballistic and cruise missiles, sub- ly submarines and nuclear warheads of onboard ballistic missiles) marines): Interdiction-attack aircraft:

United States, France, West Germany-UKItaly (in collaboration).

Fighter aircraft (interception and a ir United States of America, France, Germany-UK-Italy-Spain (in collaboration) superiority): Early warning aircraft:

United States of America

Tactical nuclear warheads:

United States of America, France, U K

Tactical nuclear missiles:

United States of America, France.

Ground artillery:

United States of America, West Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain

Tanks:

United States of America, France, West Germany, UK, Italy.

Large aircraft carriers for CTOL (Conven- United States of America tional Take-Off and Landing) aircraft: Medium aircraft carriers for CTOL United States of America, France aircraft: Small aircraft carriers for V /STOL (Ver- UK, Italy, Spain tical/Short Take-Off and Landing), STOVL (Short Take-Off Vertical Landing) aircraft and helicopters: Very high-tech escort cruisers:

United States of America

'f-ligh-tech naval escort units (destroyers United States of America, Canada, West Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and frigates):

Nuclear propulsion attack submarines:

United Stares of America, France, UK

Conventionally propelled submarines:

United States of America, France, \"(/est Germany, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain

Naval weapons systems (artillery, missiles, United States of America, France, UK, Italy. point defence systems, torpedoes, etc.):

Holland, in the productio n, updating and maintenance of US F-16 fi ghterbombers deployed in the various NA TO air forces; or again, as still happens in the same field, with the participation of Canadian ind ustry in several important programmes) . This sche me also reveals the completely predominant position of the U nited States, the only country capable of developing a1;d produ~ing all kinds of weapons alone. It must be pointed out that the Unire<l States have been included among the constr uctors of medium sizedÂˇ aircraft carriers and conventional submarines even though they have built none of eirher for a number of years, because they have retained their capacity for setting up and carrying o ut rhis type o f construction (3). On t he other hand, they have not been included among che const ructors of V/STOL and STOVL aircraft carriers because, although they have the necessary know-how to design and build such vessels (4) they have given up the idea of doing so, at least for the time be ing. A lso France, although on a much smaller scale than the U nited States, has the capability of designing and producing a wide range of weapons, both convenrional and n uclear . Other NA TO countries have the know-how and tech nology needed to produce them bur have decided not to, above all for poli t ical reasons. T he essential specific features of the N J\ TO forces' structure (including the member countries \vhich are not part of the military organization) are set out in Table 2. Here the situation is practically the same as fo r weapons: clear-cut predominance, or even monopoly, of t he United Stares of forces equipped with the more sophisticated and costly systems, comparative equilibr ium in tactical naval forces, in naval fo rces suitable for supporting roles and in ground forces (often with a considerable lack of uniformity in both equipment and t raining). Furthermore, the U nited States, in addition to their forces 29

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normally deployed in Europe, also have large forces based in the homeland (part of which allocated to the E uropean theatre in time of crisis) as well as large well-equ ipped and trained reserve forces . The distribution of tasks among the U nited States and the other N ATO members follows more or less the same pattern. Once again the dominant and decisive role is played by t he U nited States at both the strate gic n u clear and the conventional-tactical nuclear levels. The flexible or gradual response on which the entire N ATO defensive strategy hinge is based, despite t he ambiguities related to the uncertainties and difficulties involved in establishing the so-called nuclear threshold, on the capacity, which is possessed to t he required degree only by the US forces, to retaliate with constantly increasing violence and effectiveness o ver the entire range from a shot fired by the infantryman to the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles. For the purposes of European defence, t he US forces perform (in peacetime) or arc designed to perform (in case of war) the followi ng functions: • planetary monitoring, by means of a wide range of sensors (opt ical, electronic, space-launched, etc.), of the activities of the potential enemy; despite recent programmes backed ma inly by F rance (' Helios' observation/ reconnaissance satellites, etc.), and despite the acquisit ion by NA TO of eighteen A\Y/ACS nor mally based in Europe, European potential in this fie ld in no way matches that of the U nited Stares; • exercisi ng of nuclear deterrence at all levels; also in this field, European potential is much more limited than that of t he U n ited States, i.e. the deployment fo r N ATO pu rposes of the ' national' nuclear forces of France and the UK is, to say the 30

TAB.2 Strategic nuclear forces capable of intercontinental/planetary range operation:

United States of America

Strategic nuclear forces capable of intermediate range operation:

United States of America, France, UK.

Tactical nuclear forces:

United States of America, France, ·u K

Long-range strategic bombers (suitable also for conveying conventional weapons):

United States of America

Air forces for interdiction/attack/ close air U nited States of America. To varying ex tents, all the other Allied air forces. support:

Air forces for interception/air superiority: United States of America. To varying extents, all the other Allied air forces. Aeronaval forces (aircraft carrier groups) United States of America. for control of oceans and projection of force beyond dry land: Aeronaval forces capable of carrying out (by means of suitable task forces) limited operations to establish control over the seas:

U nited States of America, France, West Germany (according to specific conditions, using limited naval forces with heavy backup from land-based aircraft), UK, Italy, Netherlands, Spain.

Naval forces suitable for merchant shipp- United States of America. To a greater or lesser extent, all the Allied navies. ing protection:

Ground forces:

least, somewhat uncertain, or at least much more uncertain than chat of the US fo rces; • participation in the establishment of air superiority over the land battlefields and rear echelons; in this field, the European contribution is more important and capable of be ing boost ed; nevertheless, without US support, it would never be capable of withstanding the overwhelming Warsaw Pact forces (in case of war, the co n q uest of superiority in the air would be essential fo r N ATO: without it, no grou nd defence, mobile or not, would be possible); • control over Mediterranean airsea spaces, of vit al import in allowing the US air, sea and land-borne

United States of America. To a greater or lesser extent all the other Allied armies.

reinforcements co be ferried in; this is achieved by the CVBG (Aircraft Carrier Battle Group(s)) of the US navy; the European contribution to the establishment of this control may be important, desp ite the lack of homogeneity of the complex formed by t he European NA TO navies, but it would not even be conceivable without the fu ndamental support of the US CVBGs; • t he contribution made by the carrier aircraft to air-ground operations, with possible nuclear deterrent support from the cruise missiles carried by surface vessels and .s ubmarines; a small contribution of t he first type could be provided by aircraft from the French aircraft carriers and by t he V /STOL-STOVL

Leopard 2, forerunner of the second generation European tanks, is designed to withstand the first impact of enemy armour.

of the earners of the other European navies; • contribution to direct protection of the Atlantic routes; also in this case, the European co ntribution would not be negligible; • contribution by large and wellequipped forces to ground defence (in particular, in the central sector, where it is planned to deploy the 7th US Army stationed .in Germany). On the ot her side of the coin, the following potential can be attributed to the European forces: . • capacity of carrying out effective defence (mobile or not), in cooperation with the US forces, partly with well-equipped air-ground units (in particular, as we have seen, in the central sector); • capacity to carry out an important role in both the fight to establish and maintain air superiority and in tact ica l ground attack

operanons; • suitability for making a valid contribution to both control of the seas and the protection of the Atlantic and Mediterranean sea routes. Whether we like it o r not it is clear that, within the framework of common defence, the role of the Western European countries is obviously, if not subordinate to chat of th e US forces, at least autonomous to a very low degree. This is true also for the forces of those countries t hat are not NA TO members, or participate in t he military organ ization of NATO from the 'outside' . This is the heart of the matter: is it possible to enhance this role? If so, how and at what price? For obvious reasons, it is possible here only to po int, very cautiously, to hypothetical, rather than to actual, solutions. Before doing this, however, several essential points must be clarified. To begin with, it would be unreal istic to imagine that a consolidated 'structural' situation can be changed in the short medium term.

Within certain limits, this would be possible only if, within a reasonable period of time, a suitable agreement was reached to el i minat e or significantly reduce the asy mmetries wh ich , precisely in E urope , characterized the relat ionship between the opposing blocs. This hypothesis, although desirable, must be viewed with caution in view of the objective difficulties standing in the way of its implementation (beginning with the problem of defining the 'p arameters ' most suitable fo r 'measuring' reductions to be made in widely differing weapons syste ms). In this article, only the 'instit utional' aspects of the question can be examined. Suffice it to say that all t he terms of the problem would have to be reappraised if some form of federal or confederative European union having effective powers in foreign and defence policy were to be implemented. By limiting the survey to the technical aspects of the problem the issues can be considered from three fundamental, closely interrelated, 31

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points ot view: military (definition of the needs and rational utilization of resources), financial (allocation of resources and incidence on governme nt b udgets) and i nd ustri al (research, experimentation and productio n). In this article it is obviously possible to deal wit h these issues only in broad outline. It may be advisable to consider each "weapons-force" sector fro m t he above mentioned three points of view, beginning fro m che more ambitious approaches, i.e. from chose of the nuclear strategic type. As is known these approaches involve only two countries, France and the UK. The fo rmer, which currently possesses a classic 'triad' (bombers-land-based ballistic missilesn uclcar sub marines armed with ballistic missiles), plans, starting from the mid 'nineties, to renew t he two missile components of the triad, at t he same time dropping the piloted aircraft compon en t. T he latter, which has a deterrent comp rising a submarine launched missile system, plans to replace the four outdated vessels currently in service with the same number of units of greater displacement armed with the US Trident 2 (DS) system, still at the experimental stage. Both programmes are particularly ambitious, in particular because t hey involve the commissioning of very long range missiles (the design range of t he lvf.5 with w hich futu re French submarines arc ro be equipped,, has not been officially announced. However, it will undergo an "augmentation significative" with respect to the M4 which is currently being used to replace the older M20s on five of the six vessels now in commission . Before the U.S. Navy decided to implement a part ial 'disinformation ' approach wir.h regard to its latest systems, the Trident 2 was indicated as having a range of 10-10,000 kilo meters. Fur32

t hennore, the costs of these systems were high and the organizational and operational problems involved difficult to solve. For instance, t he 'management' of the Trident missiles mounted on the British sub marines will be carried out at the US base of King's Bay in Georgia. Apart fro m t he strategic advantages t hat they may provide (i.e. the possibility of using interco ntinental missiles would allow submarines, for instance, to exploit very large patrol areas, thus making it very difficult to locate them; however, more resources would perhaps have tO be devoted to their p rotection) these programmes have one great risk: they represent a heavy drain on financial resources, which must be taken away fro m other programmes, as well as requiring an extremely costly industrial effort, with possible negative effects on the reinforcement and modernization of the conventional-tactical nuclear forces of the two coun tries. As far as cooperation is concerned, the situation is anything but brilliant regardin g co nve ntional European program mes. It must be acknowledged t hat the problems of standardization and interoperability which have plagued NA T O for many years have certainly found no solution (despite the partial consolation that, albeit in different fiel ds, t he \Y/ arsaw Pact countries have the same problems). Suffice it to examine a few examples. Today, two different types of fighter arc bei ng developed, virtually in competition with each other - the A nglo-German-ItalianSpanish EFA (European Fighter Aircraft) and the French ACT/ACM (AÂˇvion de Combat Tactique/Avion de Combat ivfarine) , both characterized by high-tech solutions and (the reverse of the coin) by high costs. It would be in the interest of European industry that both programmes be completed and rhat t he huge stock of know-how and experience gained by implementing t he m not be wasted. However, at t he financial level, it should be reali zed that

the burden due to the fail ure to coordinate such vital programmes can have negative results with vast repercussions, without mentioning the op erational co mplicat ions that may anse. In the mea nt ime, nation al , bilateral, trilateral, etc. programmes to develop new arrack helicopters, new tanks, new vehicle-drawn or self-propelled artillery pieces, new multiple rocket launchers, and so on, overlap and intersect haphazardly. Ac che naval level, each country uses its own capital ships - aircraft and helicopter carriers, etc. - according to its own organizational and operational requirements, often paying little heed to t he small number of existing common programmes, such as the >!FR 90 (NATO Frigate 90), which limp on, fraught wich many difficulties. The key point is the fo llowing: if there is to be a Eu ropean contribut ion to European defence which is truly comme nsurate wi th the political and economic impon ance of the European me mbers o f NA TO, it is necessary to implement a common weapons policy which will ensure, on the one hand, t hat costs are maintained within acceptable limits and, on the other, that t he tec hnology, tactics and operational p rocedures of the various countries can be harmonized at a much higher level than the present one. In theory, the best path to follow in order to achieve a common arms policy wou ld be to impose a unitary strategy upstream fro m this policy (of course, in line w ith NATO strategy, which remains the cornerstone of European defence, although implemented in such a way as to allow the different national strategies of the European members of the Alliance to be merged), thus giving rise to equ al ly unitary technological, organizational and operational approaches. ln practice, however, this does not seem to be feasible. It is at least debatable that a Europe lacking any t rue political dimension can implement such an

French demonstration aircraft Rafale, on which the ACT/ACM (Avion de Combat Tactique!Avion de Combat Marine) to be issued to the French air force will be based.

organic strategic approach. It thus becomes necessary to proceed step by step, even when confronted by events which wo uld otherwise require the pace to be stepped up (on-going or potential events of this kind incl ude also the scheduled introduction in 1992 of the Single European Market, which will necessarilv have au effen 011 die public spendi~g and industrial structures of the EEC member countries. almost all members of N ATO, wit!~ regard to the allocation and utilization of resources for defence purposes). In the present conditions and those of the foreseeable futu re, the step-by-seep approach means laying the bases for a closer and more effective cooperation, particularly in the technical field which can later

be expanded if necessary m order to achieve further, more extensive

developments. Jn order to cake the first steps, even in the absence of anv unitarv political 'guidance', there i~ nothing to stop the General Staffs of the NATO mem ber countries from setting up international interforce study groups to analyse the strategic prospects available to the Old Continent. If necessary, the most likely alternative scenarios (nuclear environment, conventional-nuclear enviru11111euL, Jeuu<.:lt::arizaLiun of certain areas, arms reduction, total or partial elimination of present asymmetries, etc.) could be taken into account, together w ith their financial and production implications. At the juridical level, the establishment of groups of this kind should be possible even by means of simple technical agreements, for which the parliamentary ratification required for international agreements by the Constitutions of the countries con-

cerned mav not even be necessary. If carri~d out with scientific rigour, this kind of analysis could provide precious data of use in identifying and determining the requirements to be satisfied for the various hypothetical scenarios. At the same time, greater impulse could be given co on-going collaboration betwee n the various National Arms Directories of the main producer countnes. In the m eantime, another complementary approach could be atLempLeJ, i.e. die Lempurnry :se<.:uuding of staff officers co operational units from other countries (e.g. Italians to F rench or German units, etc., French officers to Belgian or Dutch units, etc., Portuguese to British or Italian units, etc., Germans to Norwegian or Turkish units, etc., Spaniards to Danish or Greek units, etc. and so on). T his latter solution would probably be technically more suitable for getting to know each other better and for

--~~ I

carrying out useful exchanges of experience than the for mation of mixed units comprising two or more nationalities. The latter solution raises complex problems of organizat ion, command and the prompt transmission of orders which are difficult to solve . By serving for a sufficiently long period in units belonging to other countries, intelligent and compet ent officers would gain the capacity to make a correct assessment of environmental and operational situations different from those upon which their basic training was based. What is even more important, as regards the choice of material, they would be able to gain deeper insight into the proble ms related co t he definition of common requirements w ith a view to satisfying very different needs. T his brings us bac k to the problems of standardization and int eroperability, the solution of w hich forms the indispensable basis of all w ide-ranging strategic, operational and logistic approaches. This is because only by achieving positive, albeit partial, results in the development, production and distribution of common weapons and equipment will it be possible for Europe to make a more effective contribution to its own defe nce, at the same time keeping costs down . Here we must be realist ic. The defence of Europe, at least within the fram ework of East-West con- Âˇ frontation, cannot, still fo r many years co come, be conceived of ou~-

; ide the NA TO (whether or not the Âˇ coumrv concerned is a member of nts military organization). Therefore, nt cannot be conceived of outside the strategic, operational and p roductive schemes outlined in the present article. To imagine that Europe can start bui lding intercontinental bombers or super-aircraft carriers in order to acquire t otal defence capability without the contribution of the United States would be pure

folly. On the other hand, t he defence of the O ld Continent has represented, and will continue to represent, a vital and undefe rrable necessity fo r the United States t hemselves. T h e problem is rather to strike a better balance between the needs and contributions of the two partners, without los ing sight, while doing so, of the opportunities for arms reduction offered by the new atmosphere reigning between the two blocs for the past few years.

Vittorio Barbati NOTES (1) These systems, above all including the l onger-range ver sions, ensure the achievement of the postulates laid down in the doctri ne d raw n up by the former SACEUR

EH-101 Anglo-Italian helicopter designed especially for naval purposes but also capable of being used in different ways in other sectors. Photograph of second prototype (first Italian construction) on take-off.

Supreme Allied Commander in Eur ope , General Rogers, formally adop ted by NATO i n 1984 and al so know n as the FOFA (Follow-On Forc es Attack). (2) The signing of the Warsaw Pact in 1955 represen ted t he formalization of a multi-nation alliance that the Soviet Union had already set up in the forties by means o f a series of secre t bil ateral agreement s. (3) Currently the United States has in c ommission or under construction a number of units designed for amphibious operations which are comparabl e in size and co nst rueÂˇ tion characteristics to medium di splacement carriers. (4) The Spanish helicopter carrier Principe De As turias is based on the adaptat ion of an American design.

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THE HISTORY OF THE

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ITALI N MARINES

The first marine corps in recorded historv was formed in Italv. lt was composed of Roman soldiers, who were used for the first time in 260 B.C. under the command of Caius Duilius off Milazzo (Messina). T he battle ended with the defeat of the Carthagin ians. The history of the US marines began in M;y 1775, at a meeting held inside the T un Tavern iri Water Street, Philadelphia. During the meet ing it was decided to establish rhe famous Corps, a decision that was ratified bv the US Congress on 10 November of the same year, which became the official date of the birch of the US Marine Corps. Their fame is equ al to that boasted, at different times, by the Roman Tenth Legion, the Spanish Flanders Regi me nt, Napoleon's Imperial Guard, the Folgore paratroops, the Green Berets in Vietnam and other similar special corps, units and forces. However, the deserved renown of the US marines must not be allowed to cloud the fact that it was in Italy that the first units used as seaborne assault troops were established . In 260 B.C. the Roman fleet faced Carthaginian naval forces consisting of 120 quinqueremes and having a superiority of 20 units. The Can:haginians were greatly feared for their valour and prowess in naval battles and the outcome of that particular battle would probably have been different had the Romans not chosen the occasion to cry out a new tactic based on combined naval and infantry tactics, namely that of coming alongside and boarding the enemy vessel. The Roman ships were equipped with "corvi" (sLruHg; gangplanks in the form of hookshaped bridges) which they used to grasp the Carthagi nian vessels, thus allowing their own troops to board the enemy ships and engage chem, as they would on land, in hand to hand fighting. The Carthaginias were thus compelled to accept a kind of battle in which the Romans normally excelled. Fortune smiled on Caius Duilius, who won the battle and inflicted 37

The 'lagunari' company of the "Truppe Anfibie"

heavy losses on the Carthaginians: 45 vessels sunk, 31 captured, 3,000 killed and 7,000 prisoners taken. The battle is still commemorated at the Roman Forum by the "rostral column" , so called because the Roman quinquerernes were decorated with rostra. The troops of Caius Duilius, by boarding enemy vessels and forcing the enemy to accept battle before landing, that is, on the hooked bridges, may rightly be considered as the forerunners of the marines. But even without going back as far as 260 B.C. Italy can in any case claim tO have been the first to introduce this prestigious specialization. It is sufficient co return co the year 1203, i.e. nearly six centuries before the foundation of the US

marine corps, to the year in which t he okl Doge of Venice, Enrico Dandolo , hired n earl y 40,000 French, Flemish, Lorrainian and Venetian soldiers to carry out seaborne military actions during the Fourth Crusade, during wh ich Byzantium (Constanti nople) was conquered. In April 1203, a fleet composed of 72 galleys and 140 transport vessels carrying the crusaders sailed from Zara towards the Bosphorus. T wo moths later, it reached Constantinopole. After attacking t he line of bastions protecting Byzantium and after occupying the imperial city, Enrico Dandolo set upon the throne the legit imate pretender Alessio IV. However, the reign of the latter was shortlived. Soon after the Doge's departure, the garrison rebelled, and Alessio IV was dethroned and strangled by his

usurper, Alessio Murzuflo. Led by the Doge Enrico D andolo, French troops were transported tO the spot on Venetian vessels and Byzantium fell for the second time on 13 April 1204. Fou r horses, which still decorate St . M ark' s Basilica in Venice, bear witness to that victorio us expedition and to the rich booty obtained. In both operations the Doge Enrico Dandolo used a regiment of 'soldiers' subdivided into 10 compan ies. T he established strength of these troops could vary from 1,000 in peacetime to 5,000 in wartime, and on exceptional occasions could be increased to 10,000 men. During the operations, the commander of t he regiment would be on board t he flagship, while .each ship would carry one or two companies. The on-board units provided all the armed guards: an ensign, a sergeant, t wo corporals, a drum-

mer, a piper, 50-80 infantrymen. This regiment had its headquarters at the Venice Lido, at San N icolo, in che Quartiere Grande or Soldiers' Palace. However, t he troopsÂˇ of Enrico Dandolo were the forerunners of the "Fanti da mar" of the Venetian Republic (to which the present-day 'Lagunari' are related). They have been known by this name since 1550 and certainly also represent a 'marine corps' established before 1775. The hiscory of t he 'fanri <la mar' is closely rel;red to the development of Venice and che gradual adjustm ents made co its defensive system wich reference co t he structures located at the port entrance at S. Nicolo di Lido. The need for these structures became apparent as early as 1203, when Enrico Dandolo had large wooden hues built ac San Nicolo to quarter the soldiers, and stables for the horses. To achieve this he used expedition type 'hurrnents' capable of satisfying the logistic requirements of che 40,000 men of the Fo urth Crusade. The same solution was adopted about one century lacer, during the Chioggia war ( 1378-1379). On chat occasion che Venetian Republic, threatened bv the Genoese, encrusted its d efenc~ to Vettor Pisani (1324-1380). The latter had two wooden towers built on each bank of the canal at the entrance to the port o n wh ich h e placed crossbow men and cannon. Between the two towers he placed small boats linked together by chains and separated by three ships armed with archers. The ships were covered with fresh hides in order tO make them invulnerable to the enemy fire. Pisani also had a ditch with a 'ramparo' (stone lined embankment) dug across the Lido to protect the Abbey of S. Nicolo, behind which he had large hurments constructed for From top The coa t of arms of the 1st lagunari btn. of the "Serenissima " and of the "Sile" amphibious battalion, followed by several phases of the trai ni ng

t he troops. The latter complex, originally kno,vn as the 'Serraglio', was lacer to be converted into the present-day G ugl iel mo Pepe Barracks. In 1229 the " Bersaglio" was built at San Nicole'> di Lido to train young men in the use of the crossbow. Infantry, cavalry and artillery units were stationed in this area, and where the Jewish cemetery now stands, there were also forges which provided the Lido garrisons and other Venetian strongholds with arms and ammunition. Of special interest are che fortifications built between the 14th and 16th century: Castel Vecchio Fon (of which only a few drawings remain) and C ast el Nuovo Fort, also known as S. Andrea, built between 1544 and 1559 by Sanmicheli , restored in 1571 and still in a good state of preservation even today. Work on the Guglielmo Pepe barracks, a symbol of freedom and independence for Venice, began in 1591 and was completed in only five years. Ics construction fina lly solved the problem o f provi ding quarters fo r the troops chat_ the peculiar defensive function ot t he Lido had brought to t he Doges' attention as early as 1203 . Even today (t retains its original shape of a square with a large internal courtyard. The entrance is surmounted by a bas-relief consisting of three pans. T he upper part represents a walking lion which, behind an opened Gospel, bears a standard and a battlemented cower to indicate the military function of the bui lding. In the middle part there arc four blazons, carved during the Napoleonic period, perhaps those of the Doge and the four Superintendents of the fortifications, under whom the construction was carried o ut. T heir names, rogether with the vear of foundation of the Barracks, 'are recorded in the Latin epigraph below: "In the reign of the Doge Marino Grimani these suburban quarters were built for soldiers bv decree of the Senate, in the year of Christ 1595, by Giovanni Priuli, son of Giacom o Pierro Lando, 39

The war flag of the lagunari on parade

Domenico, son of G iovanni and Bolano, son of Marco, the triumvirate respon sible for the fortifications" . le is also possible that even Sanmicheli himself was consulted and even had a hand in che design. In face, the entrance portal of the building (in Doric style) is reminiscent of the style of the entrance to Castel Nuovo (S. Andrea Fort). For Âˇ the construction of chis Barracks, capable of housing 2,000 soldiers, so me 4,000 ducats were spent, and the Venetian Senate coined a commemorative medal for che occasion. F or che 'lagunari' of che Amphibious Troops it symbolizes che ideal concinuicy of a line of development which illustrates their reason for being as a mechanized amphibious specialist corps and at the same time acknowledges them as the depositaries of a glorious tradition born with the 'fanci da mar', boosted by the 'Cacciatori del Sile' of che Venetian Republic, the Reggimenro Real Navi of the Kingdom of Sardinia and the Borbonic 'Corpo della Real Fanteria di Marina'. The valour of the 'Fanti da mar' has emerged in numerous wartime actions, such as the deeds of Famagosca and Candia, the attempt 40

co force the port of Venice, which represented the 'casus belli' leading to che foll of the Venetian Republic and the wartime episode of the Cavallino, which made the 'Cacciatori de] Sile' famous. Ac Famagosta, after the T urkish landing in Cyprus in 1570, in MayAugust the year after 150 ships and 80,000 Turkish soldiers led by Ali Pasha joined battle with 4,000 Venetian soldiers and the inhabitants of the city itself. Marcantonio Bragadin, the commander of the Venetian together with Luigi Martinengo, realized t hat there was no chance of receiving reinforcements from the outside and negotiated a ceasefire with the Turks. On 4 August he led his men out of Famagosra. However, che Turks did not respect the agreement and, ou

18 August, killed Marcantonio Bragadin after subjecting him to atrocious rorture. In the ensuing bloody battle for the defence of the cirv, 2,000 Venetian soldiers and so:ooo Turks died. At Candia, on 6 September, 1669, after three years of Turkish siege, the Venetians, led by Francesco Morosini, were forced co surrender. Morosini was accorded full honours by the Grand Vizir, Koproli, who,

together with General Jussuf, had organized the Turkish siege. In that battle 39,000 Venetians and their Christian allies died and 100,000 Turks. On 20 A pril 1797 three French warships appeared at the mo uth of the port of Venice. On peremptorily being ordered to withdraw by Pizzimano, the commander of S. Andrea Fort, one of the vessels did not obey and the garrison opened fire on the ship and then boarded it. Several Frenchmen, including che ship's captain, were killed in the action. Napoleon Bonaparte was so incensed by chis chat he demanded the arrest of Pizzimano and the end of the ancient oligarchic regime of the Republic of Venice. This was decreed by the Maggior Consiglio on 12 May 1797 to avoid the city being put to rhe sack. However, the most important wartime episode was the gallant attempt at defence by the Venetian Republic during the 1848-49 siege. The rerrit0ry at the time was divided into three sectors. The Lido, the third sector, was equipped with thirteen forcificacions and infantry, cavalry and artillery garrisons, which had distinguished themselves during the defence of Rome, were quartered at Serraglio. It was here chat the troops were trained and one of their exercises, involving an attack on the Lido, was witnessed by Daniele Manin, together with two triumvirs, on 24 September 1848. At the time also che 'Cacciatori de! Sile', a Venetian volunteer corps totalling some 500 men, organized by che cities of Treviso and Padua, were also quartered in the Pepe Barracks. On 21 October, by m eans of a simultaneous ground and sea attack, and in bad weather conditions, this unit surprised the Austrian posici-ons of Cavallino and seized them. On 23 October General Guglielmo Pepe, commander in chief of the Army of the Venetian Republic, in

Lagunari on parade in Venice

specced the 'Corpo dei Cacciatori de! Sile' ac che Lido, w ho were congratulate<! over t heir victory wh ich allowed the defenders of the besieged city to break out of a long period of demoralizing operational deadlock. The vigorous defence of Ven ice came t o an end w ith the intervention of Field Marshal Radestskj, who brought the city back under Austrian do minion despite the heroism of che troops who laid down their lives for che city's independence. Like the Venetian Republic, also the Sardinian and Bourbon Armies had marine units. The Sardinian Army had che Battaglione Real Navi, founded in 1821 during the reign of Carlo Felice. The Bourbon Army had a Corpo della R eal Fanteria di Marina from 1806 which was used for fire support, boarding and landing operations. The ' Fant i da mar' of the Venetian Republic, who were swallowed up by t he desperate defence of Venice, therefor e survived in the Sardinian and Bourbon Armies. When the Kingdom of Italy was fou nded (17 March 1861) no provision was made for this specialist corps in the new establishment until 1877. That year, in order co provide for the specia l mi litary transport service in Ven ice a 'Reparto Genio Lagunari', che 14th Compagnia Zapparori Lagunari of the 2nd Pioneer R egiment, was set up and became the firsr Italian milirary unit to be given the name 'lagunari'. On 1st January 1883, in accordance with the Establishme nt Act of 29 June 1882, t he 4th 'Genio Pontieri' Regiment was set up ac Piacenza. It included also a 'lagunari' Brigade with two companies (obtained by splitting up t he 14t h 'Compagnia Zappatori Lagunari' relinquished by the 2nd Pioneer Regiment). In accordance with the Establishment Act of 23 June 1887, the 4th Pioneer Regiment lost che denomination of 'pomieri' and incorporated also the

lagunari Brigade w ith 2 companies (9th and 10th), increased to 3 (9th, 10th and 15th) in May 1915 (when Italy entered che war) and then to 8 (9th, 10th , 15th, 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th) o n 1 December of the same year . In September 1918, with the lagunari companies transferred from the 4th Pioneer Regiment, the 8th Lagunari Regiment was set up with 2 battalions, each of 4 companies. Ac the time of demobilization ac the end of World War I, the Lagunari Regiment was disbanded and its units incorpo rated in t he 4th Reggimento Pontieri which, on 1 April 1920, was given the name of Reggimento Pontieri e Lagunari de! Genio, which it retained until 1933. On 15 May of that year, in accordance witl1 Royal [)ecree of 28 Dece mbe r 1932, the Regiment was disbanded, definitively losing the denomination of 'Lagunari', in order to create the 1st Reggimenco Poncieri of Verona and the 2nd Reggimento Po ntieri of Piacenza. As part of the Pioneer corps, between 1915 and 1918, the Lagunari were respo nsib le for the river triangle between Mancova, Ferrara and Marano Lagunare, ensuring navigability over 1,700 km of rivers and canals. T hey participated in the defence of the lower Piave in J uneJ uly 1918, winning t he praise of the S up r eme Com mand and being awarded three Silver Medals and six

Bronze fo r M ilitary Valour. At the same rime the Italian Navy continued the marine traditio n by setting up the Corpo Fanteria Real Mari na in accordance with Royal D ecree of 28 March 1861. After this was disbanded (1878), special units were for med o ut of ship crews to carry o ut land operations . One of the memorable actions of these landing forces is the occupation of Tripoli (1911). The heroes of t his operatio n, led by Umberto Cagni, ,vo n th e mselves the name of 'Garibaldini' of the sea and their flag was decorated w it h t he Gold Medal for Mi litary Valo ur. T his flag later became the flag of the Italian Navy and is kept on the flagship of the fleet. D uring \\lorld War I, in Ocrober 19 17, the seamen of che bases of Monfalcone and Grado and the Lower Tagliamento were incorporated into a battalion w hich participated in the defence of the Cortellazzo bridgehead on 9 November. On 20 N o vember of the same year t he unit was converted into the Marine Regiment, with 3 battalions, and was given the sectorial responsibili t y of defend ing the Lo wer Piave. T he citv of Venice, as a coken of its g(atitude, offered the Marine Regiment its battle fl ag on 19 Mav 1918. T he A ustrian offensive of 15 June 191 8 was halted in the Piave delta w ith the decisive help of the 41

firepower of more than one hundred guns of the Navy Artillery Group and the Flag of the Sea Infantryman was decorated with the Cross of the Knight of the Military Order of Savoia and with the Silver Medal for Military Valour. On 3 November of the same year, units of the Marine Regiment landed at Trieste, cogecher with the bersaglieri of the 7th and 11 th Regiments, thus bringing the Italian flag also tO Istria and Dalmacia. Venice made the request chat the Marine Regiment should be given the name of San Marco Regiment and that it should bear as an emblem t he century-old winged lion of the city . T he request was granted by Roya! Decree on 17 May 1919. Transformed into a battalion immediately after the war, the San Marco was again brought up to regimental strength at the outbreak of World War II (1940), and distiguished itself at Tobr uk and in T unisia. In 1944 it fought at Cassino and, together with the Nembo paratroops, it took part in the Libe r atio n Campaign. It was reorganized into the San Marco Battalion and attached to the Folgore Division. Somewlhat similar to the San Marco Regiment are the A mphibian Troops, a modern mechanizedamphibious specialized corps of the Army. Although restr uctured several times, its origin goes back to 15 January 1951 when the Comando de] Settore Forze Lagunari was established at the G. Pepe Barracks. It was conceived as an Army-N avy inter-service unit under the command of the V Comando Militare Territoriale (Comiliter) of Padua and the Comando M ilitare Marittirno Auconomo of the Upper Adriatic (C.MM.AA.) as far as disciplinary matters were concerned. The first CO of the Sectore For ze Lagunari w as Rear-Admiral Giorgio Ghe, who held the post from 15 January 1951 until 8 October 1952. On 1 July 1951 the establishment of the headquarters was completed and chat of the Marghera Comando costiera lagunare was begun. On 15 October 42

From top The badge of the amphibian troops, lagunari during training, and their emblem

1951 the San Marco Battalion became part of the Settore Forze Lagunari, but only as far as training and discipline were concerned, remaining under the operational command of the Folgore Division. The San Marco Battal ion was organized along the lines of an in-

fantry battalion but was almost entirely composed of naval personnel. On 1 December 1951 th e establishment of the Comando Settore Forze Lagunari and of the Marghera Battaglione costiero lagunare was officially recognized. On 1 January 1952 the Settore Forze Lagunari was placed under the direct command of the V Comando Militare T erritoriale. On 15 J uly 1952 the 'Reparto lagunare d'appoggio' (support unit) of the Marghera Battaglione cosciero lagunare was established, while the Piave Battaglione costiero lagunare was sec up on 1 September. On 1 January 1953, the Comando Settore Forze Lagunari of the V Comando Militare Territoriale was transferred to the 5th Army Corps, which had been established on 1 May 1952. On 1 January 1955, the ' Gruppo Mezzi da Sbarco' (landing craft group) was officially established wicb headquarters on the Island of S. Andrea (Vignole) and staffed with N avy personnel. On 15 January 1956 it was renamed Gruppo Mezzi N avali. On 1 July 1957 the San Marco Battalion was converted into the lsonzo Battalion, with personnel, material and vehicles provided by the Army. On 1 September 1957 the Settore Forze Lagunari, which had been commanded by army colonels since 1 March 1956, was renamed 'Raggruppamenro Lagunare'. With the inclusion of the Isonzo Battalion and the concentrat ion of the 'Reparti lagunari d 'appoggio' into a single unit, it came to have the fol lowing organizati.o n on 1 May 1958: • Group Command • Command offices • Command company • Training company • Signal company • Marghera amphibious battalion • Piave amphibious battalion • Isonzo amphibious battalion • Adria motorized battalion (on1y 3rd corn pany established rn peacetime) • Light aircraft sectio n • Lagunari support unit • Naval vehicles group (N avy personnel and vehicles)

..,---._ ~ , ; ~ l/-!

Drawing of sea and air landing by amphibious troops

• Light workshop On 25 October 1959 the Raggruppamenro Lagunare received its battle flag in St Mark's Square. In order to satisfy the need for modernization of the 'lagunari' units they were given the capability of operating not only in an amphibious environment bur also on land, using mechanized units, thus increasing their capacity to react and their firepower. In 1963 they were thus transformed into mechanized amphibious units, while in 1964 the Group's 'lagunari' support unit was restructured into a tank battalion initially equipped with Sherman tanks, and later with M/ 47 tanks. Although a newly established unit, the XXII Serenissima Tank Battalion, which was the name given to this unit, was based on the XXII Tank Battalion which, together with the IV, XXIII and XXXll battalions, was incorporated in the 33rd Light Tank Regiment set up in 1939 at Parma.

By order of rhe Chief of the General Staff on 24 May 1964, the Army reorganized the 'lagunari' into the Serenissima Lagunari Regiment. This entailed the loss of the Grupp<> mezzi navali, that is, of the last remaining Navy personnel, while the Serenissima Lagunari Regiment rook on the following structure: • Regimental headquarters (Venezia Lido) • Command offices • Command company • Marghera amphibious battalion (Malconrenta) • Piave amphibious battalion (Piave) • Isonzo amphibious battalion (Villa Vicencina) • XXII Serenissima Tank Battalion (S. Vito al T agliamenco) • Boat section (Isola of S. Andrea) • Amphibian section (Ca' Vio) • Light workshop On 1 January 1965, the Navy began re-forming (or rather reviving among its own units) the San Marco Battalion. This unit received its battle flag during a ceremony held on the Cruiser Garibaldi off Naples on 10 June of the same year.

,a . 1,,,• .-

The present San Marco battalion, quire apart from its actual size at any given historical moment, is thus essenriallv a continuation of the tradition; of the Marine Infantry of the Kingdom of Sardinia. The process of restructuring and reduction which was to affect army units during the following decade, did not spare the 'lagunari'. Quite the contrary. The Serenissi ma Lagunari Regiment was extensively redimensioned and reorganized on 20 October 1975, when it was placed under the command of the mechanized Folgore Mechanized. It consisted of two battalions (1st Serenissima Lagunari Battalion, the Sile Amphibious BaLLaliuu) p]u::; a recrniL company (Amphibian Troops Lagunari Company). The latter supplies the tactical units by training national servicemen recruited in the Upper Adriatic regions. The 1st Battalion Lagunari "Serenissima" has inherited the flag and traditions of the Regiment ro which the amphibian battalions Marghera, Piave and Isonzo belonged, and which were disbanded after the restructuring. The Sile Amphibious Battalion, in43

Landing by Jagunari

itially called Battaglione Mezzi Anfi bi "Sile", was established with the creation of the Amphi bian Troops Headquarters fo r the purpose of concentrating into a single unit all the alternative equipment (boats, amphibians pneumat.ic boats, etc.) on issue ro thtÂˇ spec ialist un it. The "Sile" also includes the Explorers Plaroon, an essential unit in amphibian operations. At the recom mendation of the Army Chief of the Ge neral Staff, the Si fe Batta! ion received its War Flag fro m the Head of State Ciovanni Leone on 10 October 1976, which thus confirmed the operational status of the unit and satisfied all its personnel, who aspired after th is symbol. By decree signed on 25 June 1984 bv Defence Mini ste r Giova nni S{)adolini it was officially recognized that the 'Lagu nari ' specialization of the Italian Infantry had existed since 9 January 1951. It was decreed by the Military O rdinary, Monsignor Gaetano Bonicelli on 26 August 1984, that St Mark the Evangelist is the Patron Saint of the Amp hibian Troops and thus of this specialist unit. Lastly, by decree n. 550 of 17 .June 1985 of the President of the Republ ic Sandro Pertini the Associar ion of A mphib ious Lagunari Troops (A.LT.A.), set up on 15 June 1983 in Venice in order to st rengthen th e t ies betw een 'lagunari' in service and reti red

members, was recognized as having legal status. T he Amphibious T roops, under the direct com mand of the 5th Army Corps since 31 October 1986, in accordance with their planned tactics, are r.rained to li ve, move and operate in a lagoon environment where the infoncrv have difficulty in operating in optimal conditi~ns. Linked as it is essentiallv to the nature of the ground ov~r which

they will be called upon to operate, their train ing marks them our as great specialists. The 'lagunari' are trained to use all rhe available vehicles and boats and are given intensive instruction in all amphibian aspects: swimming, sea and river navigation, landing techniques. The unit can act in a purely amphibious, mechanized or mixed mode, according to the tactical situation. In defensive situations to control the lagoon environment, the mouths of rivers and watercourses in general and in landing operations (beach reconnaissance, establishment of beachheads, etc.) the perfect knowledge of land and amphibian tactics possessed by the lagunari allows them to operate effectively. Modern lagunari display a high degree of specialization based on physically fit, well-trained personnel with a high mvrale. These well train ed troops are therefore completely at ease in operations carried out in a lagoon environment . They can adapt easily to a wide range of climatic conditions and have a great capacity for survival in all situations. Experienced in the techniques of infi ltration, ambush, raids and sur prise attacks, the lagunari for m a high yield group, welded in to a multi-purpose, modern, efficient mechanized and

amphibious unit. In short, it is an all-weather unit which deploys men and special vessels and vehicles according rn specific tactics not only in its traditional environment, i.e. where the water and the land meet and merge. but also on ground where mechanized uni ts normally o perate. The lagunari units have a wide range of equipment (boats, tracked and wheeled vehicles) which allow them to move ove r land , sea, lagoons and marshes. T his equipment contri butes to the multipurpose capability displayed by the Amphibian Troops both in their traditional lagoon environment and in other operational zones. The lagunari were recently included among the Rapid Intervention Force (Fo.P.I.) to be deployed in all types of public calamity (floods, earthquakes, etc.). In this capacity the Amphibian Troops participate actively in controll ing and temporarily repairing the embankments of the watercourses in the Cavallino Peninsula (Province of Venice) each time they flood as a result of the 'high water' phenomenon afflicting rhe area duri ng the Autumn-Winter season. In the prest igious name of "Serenissima", which evokes memories of ancient glories and the

MOTOR VESSEL FOR PERSONNEL TRANSPORT

Personnel transport vessel. Used mainly to ferry troops going on leave from the Island of S. Andrea to Venice Lido, but also used to transport personnel on the occasion of ceremonies and the transfer of units for logi stic and train ing pu rposes.

CARATTERISTICHE PRINCIPAL! m 22.90 X 4.60 X 2.07 lunghezza U. x larghezza x altena ton 35.7Âˇ20 dislocamento 11 145 persone traspor1aoih ncdi 12 velocita massima _ _ __ __ __ __ l_ S _ott.le pi'.01a. 1 Sou.le motorista. 2 lagunari pr6die!!_ equipaggio

mo1ore autonomia

AIFO 828 M con vna 001el'za massima d, 206 hp a 2100 rpm 30 ore moto

symbol of the majest ic lion, the Lagunari continue with great pride in the tradition of the 'Fami da mar'. Their enthusiasm is the same as that which animated the Venetians at the time of the 4th Crusade. They participated in the historical evems leading up to the birth of national awarene:;:;. Iu com.-lu:;iou, while it is true that today the amphibian operations of the lagunari, which take place in waves, must be supported by naval and air units, and that helicopters are required for special operations related to the sea, it is also true that the predominam ~orce of an amphibian 'wave' comes trom the courage, determination and boldness of the men themselves the Lagunari. 'St. Mar k! ' is their enthusiast ic battle cry.

The winged lion is their emblem. Their motto is "Like the reef I break... Like the wave I overwhelm!", an oath which reflects a great ideal force . Faithful co the unalienable values of their tradition, the Lagunari of Traly face the present with pride, encuu r aged by the appr eci,1t.ion and esteem expressed by the civilian an<l military authorities. "Irreplaceable components of our Army ... " is the definition given by General Ciro Di 1vfartino, Ch ief of the Army General Staff, on the occasion of the celebration on the 25 June 1987 of the third anniversary of the official recogrntton of this specialist corps.

Mario Garano Rosario Mangione

Colonel Rosario Mangione' atte nded the Military Academy, Service Branch School, War College, Imerserv icc Staff Institute and the NATO Ddense College. He has served wit h t he Ragg ru ppamento Lagu na ri " Screnissima" as OA IO Orficer, wi th HQ of "rolgore" .Mechanized Division as OAIO office r and Head of Operations Section. at HQ Allied Cround Fo rces in Southern Eur.o pe as Head of Planni ng Office of the Operat ions Bureau, Head of the Studies and Jnspcctions Section of the Training Office and Head of rhc Genera l Staff Secretariac. He commanded a platoo n and a company o f the Reggirncnro Lagu nari "Sere nissirn a" and has also com manded the ls! Battalion L1gunari "Serenissima" . He gr,1duated in Political Science (political-adm inistrative division) at th e Un ivers ity of l\1dua. Since 23 Septembe r 1987 he has been CO ui the "Serenissima" Amphibian T roops.

Mario Carano has been a professional jourÂˇ nalist since 1968 and, for more than twenty years, has followed Defence maccer,. He ha, worked for dailies and periodicals, and did his apprentice~ hi p with che "Mcssaggero Veneco" of Udinc. Since 1972 he .lus headed the Venice Regional Office of AG] (Agenzia Gio rnalist i, ,1 Itali,1).

Once the wheat is harvested, the tanks begin to sprout. This could be the key to the reading of the ha11d-book on the annual series of autumn exercises called Autumn Forge published by SHAPE, the Allied Headquarters Europe, in the month of August. Exercises of various kinds and dimensions are listed: from strictly air-sea ones to land exercises, from those involving a few thousand men to those involving the participation of over 100,000 soldiers. As usual the lion's share is taken by Central Europe.

The AFCEN T headquarters is privileged for two reasons: firstly , the great number of soldiers of the most diverse nationalities which in case of war would form the forward defensive shield along the border with Warsaw Pact countries, and secondly the possibility of training land units on the territory without "closing them up" in firing ranges. Moreovor, the very word "land" implies a greater facility in the management of relations with information agencies while it is much more difficult to give the idea of what is going on in the sky or at sea. After some years' absence, we went back to the tactical stage of the Reforger exercise, which besides support units air-sea bridge borne from the United States, engaged units of five nationalities quartered in Europe. It must also be remem bered that this year's Reforger is the twentieth of the series, begun in far off 1969. The origin of the annual exercise aiming at strengthening the European front dates back to the United States' decision to withdraw one of the divisions then quartered in Germany, the 24th Infantry Division, leaving in Europe only one of its Brigades and moving Headquarters, support un its and 2 Brigades overseas; the decision was accepted by Great Britain and Federal Germany provided that the United States committed itself to move the Division to the old continent each year. it was also decided that the heavy equipment should be left in Europe in special depots, thus allowing the Division to take part in an exercise. The agreement, known as the London Trilateral Agreement, was signed in 1967 and two years later the first Reforger was held. Since then many Divisions have come to Europe with the Reforger to 'rake part in the exercise which usuallv proves the most crowded of th,e ~utumn Forger. This year's exercise was preceded by a manoeuvre led by units of the Southern Headquarters of the German Territorial

Army which guaranteed security along the routes of approach and in the communication areas. Thev also built bridges over the main 'rivers where part of the units corning from the United States passed, shaming what should be one of the tasks of the Territorial Army which in times of war would rest under national command. This year the Certain Challenge, this the name given to the exercise, saw for the first time the two United States Army Corps fight one against the other. These were the V (Frankfu rt) against the VII (Stuttgart), which took part in the manoeuvre with some of their Divisions reinforced bv two German Divisions, by the 4th team of the Canadian Brigade and by small Danish and French groups: in fact the French, especially a reduced grou p of t he 13th Parachutist Dragoon Regiment, the special forces from beyond the Alps, took part on a bilateral basis in a United States long range patrol exercise later included in Certain Challenge and this because France is not comprised in the integrated military system of the Alliance. We shall not go inco the details of what is implied in activating and moving the units. It is enough to underline the effort required to move 17,000 men be longing to different units among which the 1 Infantry Division (Fort Riley,

A column of M 1A 1 Abrams of the 3 Infantry Division of the United States Vil Army Corps in action in the German countryside.

Kansas), the 3 Armoured Cavalry Regiment (Fort Bliss, Texas), the 197 Independent Infantry Brigade (Fort Benning, Georgia), the 1 Army Corps Headquarters (Fort Lewis, Washington) and the 2 Battalion of the 128 Infantry regiment of the Wisconsin National G uard, besides about seventy other minor units coming fro m ,about thirty States. It must be noted that the 197 Brigade moved to Europe with all its vehicles, both light and heavy. As already said it was the first time that both United States Army Corps took part in an exercise under the control of the US Army Headquarters in Europe, better known as Usareur. The participation of command posts at Army Corps level brought commanders of the United States Army, together with those in charge of the Central European Army Group (Centag) to consider the basic aspect of command, control and communication operations. Without a reliable C3 system, in fact, it is impossible to manage the activities of 7,000 tracked vehicles, of which 1,000 tanks, 15,000 wheeled vehicles and over 600 helicopters. In honour of the detente the op47

posing parties were o ne south and the other no rth of the front, w ith the southern troops characterized by gold and the northern ones by blu. The VII Arm y Corps o perated in the South and deplo yed a sing le Division, t he3 Infantr y o ne, while t he 1 A rmoured D iv ision, engaged as umpire, was replaced by the 1 Infantry D ivision co m ing fro m the U nited States. These two large units w ere joined by the 12 German Panzerdivision, the 4 Ov1BG / Canad ian Mechanized Brigade Group) and t he 2 Armou red Cavalry Regiment . To the n o rt h, t he Corps participated w ith all rhe units of the o rganization, 8th Infantry Division, 3th A r moured Division, and 11th A rmoured C avalry Division, joined by t he 10th Panzerdivisi o n, t he 197th Independent Infant ry Brigade and t he 3th Arm oured C avalry R egimen t. D uring t h e Certain Challenge the game was complete1y free, w hile t he aircraft of the 4 AT AF ca rried o ut about 550 m issions a day both in t he go ld and

in the blu role w ithin t he Cold Fire exer cise. The area of the exercise fitted more or less in the N urenber g - Stuttgart - Ulm t riangle, but in fact operatio ns were carried out around the front sit uated a little so uth of \Vurzburg; the fact that t he exercise w as not " guided" by the Higher Headq uarters caused combats to be carried out in a very restricted area, with some com plaints by those w ho found the ir houses besieged by t anks belonging fi rst to t he one opp osing party and then to t he other. Attacks lead by both pa rties after having accurately sought t he " weak side" of t he enemy brought to a rotation of rhe fro nt m o re than a shift: in fact both parties attacked o n t heir o w n left flank and tried to pe net rate t he enemy defences. T he tro nt, t her efo re, changed slo w ly fro m north -west t o south-e ast . N onetheless, those in charge were sati~fied: "The Certain Challenge exercise was m many ways very productive", said G eneral G alvin, C hief N AT O Commander in Euro pe.

"Firscly, it involved both A r my Cor ps Headquarters, bri nging t rai ning to the h ighest degree, secondly. t he beautiful weather favoured t he exercise and r educed damages. T he high international p articipat io n proved chat we are capable o f wor king cogether. T he availability rate of equipment was superior than that o btained before in similar manoeuvres. Lastly, we registered less accidents than in the past, though some unfortunately occurred. \Y/e t h us ach ieved t he two appointed goals: prove o ur p reparation for d eterrent p u rposes and increase our training levelÂť. Among the new arm syste ms seen o n t he fie ld tw o greatly influenced the trend of t he bat tle; as regards reconnaissance along t he fro nt , the b lu fo rces emplo yed the fir st OH-58D in Europe. W ith their TV m onitors and infrared FU R (forward looking infr; -red) placed in the ball lopping above t he rotor the abo ve aircraft o perated sheltered from natural obstacles ex-

Left

Soldiers on an United States M 1A 1 Abrams check a possible axis of penetration taking advantage of the cover of the terrain. Right

Similar to M 901 tank destroyers the artillery observation vehicles FISTV M 981 equipped with laser indicators are nowadays constantly present at the front.

posing only the sensor group thus remaining almost out of sight of the opposing party; attack helicopter units based on the AH-64 Apache will shortly receive this aircraft which will permit to improve the action of command and control by the "airborne captain" at present compelled to fly on an AH-64 with a resulting waste of resources. The other essential point is the ever ~ greater importance given to artillery. "This was one of the main aims", said General Saint, Commander of the Central Army Group, of the US Army Europe and of the 7th United States Army Corps. "I wanted to see how the available fire was exploited, by putting a finger on a point on the map and asking how many pieces of artillery could hit that point and in what way the fire would be directed". The primary support action by indirect firing arm systems became obvious because of the very high number of tracked vehicles for fire observation deployed on the field. The United States added a M981 FISTV (Fire Support Team Vehicle) to each front line unit, especially to the armoured ones; based on the hulk of the Ml 13A2, the above vehicle is much like the M901 ITOW as even the turret is in every way similar to that of the tank destroyer. Indeed, some crews have painted the two back vent holes of the launcher black, being this the main difference between the two vehicles, in order to increase the likeness, as for the enemy to eliminate a M981 means to avoid the intervention of one or more artillery batteries. Equipped with a navigation system and an indicating and spotting laser,

the above vehicles may be employed both for advanced observation and target designation for laser guided arm systems. In this respect general Saint stated: "We did not sham the use of Copperhead grenades or of the Hellfire as this is difficult when the laser cannot be employed because of the danger it represents. I therefore decided not to employ these systems as, moreover, the procedure is quite simple: it is sufficient that the vehicle aim the ray against the target and someone further back load the round and fire". We got the same impression from another exercise we saw, the Free Lion a five-year exercise of the 1

One of the new United States hummer jeeps. The only problem that these extremely mobile vehicles have to face in central Europe is due to their remarkable size.

Dutch Army Corps which engaged on the field, in an area south of Hanover, two German mechanized Brigades, one United States armoured Brigade and a British airborne battalion for a total of 44,000 men. Here too the United States and Germany deployed observation systems; if the US Army employs M 981 FISTV, the Bundesheer employs various systems. Two systems are used for observation, the

Above Canadian soldiers engaged in the Certain Challenge; they are armed with the recently adopted weapons: the M16A2 rifle and the MAG machine-gun. Right

A Dutch Leopard 2 in action during the Free Lion Exercise: an agreement between Holland and Germany states that the Leopard 2 of the two armies be absolutely identical.

most complete of which is based on the omnipresent hull of the M 113 and is equipped w ith a laser rangefinder, navigation system and data link, while on pare of the old 90mm cannon-equipped tank destroyers t he weapon has been removed and replaced with an obser. . vat1on periscope. Double line also as regards artillery radars supplied at Division level and fitted onto M 113: the excellent French RA TAC radar is employed in support of the old Green Archer and is capable of acting as a surveillance radar and of observing friendly artillery fire. Mention must be made of the participation in the Free Lion exercise 50

of the 11 Electronic Warfare Company, first unit of this kind within the Dutch Army which employed materials of a German unit exactlv like those it will be allotted in th~ near future; a further sign of the interoperability already pursued by Dutch and Germans as regards the Leopard 2.

Worthy of notice was the visit of a group of about thirty observers to t he Free Lion exercise. For the most part they came from Eastern countries such as H ungary, . the Soviet Union, Poland, Bulgaria and Czecholovakia, but ne utral and N A TO nations, among which Italy, were also represented.

Right A Dutch reconnaissance patrol on a Land Rover.

Above A German M113 equipped with a RATAC radar for the surveillance of the battle field and the direction of the fire.

We met them while they were visiting the 3/66 United States tank battalion where thev were able to observe closely a Co~unand Post, an MlAl Abrams tank, an M981 FISTV, a Hummer, the new US Army jeep, some systems allotted to the Corps of Engineers and other equipment. These visits are carried out in conformity with the agreements signed in Helsinki in 1975 and in Stockholm in 1986 which consider an exchange of observers when training activities involve over 17,000 men. Other delegations visited the various exercises in course, among which, of course, the vaster of them all, the Certain Challenge. At that same time, t hat is around mid September, another important exercise, called Golden Crown, was being carried out. Here the Belgian Army Corps tc,gether with British and German troops for a total of 30,000 men played the leading role. T raditionally, the main British exercise is held later: this vear it was the turn of the 3 Arm~ured Division which was engaged for all the month of November in the Iron

Hammer exercise together with a German Brigade. This was the first t1me that the new Br itish YCC Warrior was employed on the terrain. This made a rapid appearance in a reduced number of samples during the most important British after-war exercise on European territory called Lionheart which cook place in 1984. It must here be remembered that the British Army will soon have to decide what to replace the Chieftain with, and for the first time the choice is not limited to a nationally produced vehicle; exercises such

as the Iron Hammer may thus be useful also to compare the vehicles allotted to the various allied armies, thus completing the tests carried out in the firing ranges . . As customary, therefore, the series of exercises held in the central sector of the Alliance have permitted to evaluate the degree of readiness of the units of t he various nations. This is much more difficult as regards the southern and northern fronts characterized by the primary importance of the air-sea instrument.

Paolo Valpolini 51

THE WAR IN THE MOUNTAINS by

RUDYARD

KIPLING 1917

III ONLY A

FEW STEPS HIGHER UP FOR A SPECIAL JOB, specialists, but for all jobs, youth above everything! That porcion of the Italian fromier where men must mountaineer as well as climb is held with che Alpine regiments. The corps is recruited from che people who inhabit, and know what is the mind of, the mountains - men used co carry loads along eigh teen-inch p:n hs round thousand foot drops. Their talk is the slang of mou ntains, with a special word for every mood and state of snow, ice, or rock, as elaborately particular as a Zulu's talk when he is describing his cattle. They wear a smash hat adorned with one eagle ftaLher (worn down to an honourable stump, now); the nails upon their boots resemble, and arc kept as sharp as, rhe fangs of wolves; their eyes are like our airman's eyes; their walk o n t heir own ground suggests the sea; and a more cheery set of hard-bitten, clean-skinned, steady-eyed young devils I have never yet had the honour co meet. 'What do you do?' I was foolish enough to demand of them from the security of a Mess-room seven thousand feet up amo ng pines and snows. For the momem, 1he forest cut off the oppression of the mountain view. 'Oh, come and see,' said these joyous children. 'We are working a few srcps higher up che road. It is only a few steps.' They cook me by car above rhc timberline on the edge of lhe basin, to the steep foot of a dom inant rock wall which J had seen approaching, for hours back, along the road. Twenty or thirty miles away the pillared mass of it had looked no more rhan implacably hostile - much as Mnnt Blanc: looks from che lake. Coming nearer it had grown steeper, and a wilderness of wrathful crags and fissu res had revealed itesdf. Ac close range from almost direccly bclo,v, the thing, o ne perceived, wc nc up sheer, where it did not bulge out ward, like a shi p' side at lauching. Every monstrous detai l of ics face, etched by sunshine rhrough uuerly clear air, crashed upon the $ight at once, O\'C rwhclming the mind as a new world might, wearying the eye as a gigantically enlarged phorograph does. le was hiddcd by a snow tunnel, wide enough for a vehicle and two mules. The tunnel was dingy brown where its roof was thick, and lighted hy an unearthly blue glare where ii was chin, till ii broke into blinding daylight where the May heat had melted out che arch of ic. Bm there was graded gravel underfoot all Lhe way, and swilling gutters carried off the snow-drip on either side. Jn the open or in the dark. Italy, makes but one kind of road.

This is our new road,' rhe joyous children explained. 'It isn' t quire finished, so if you'll sit on this mule, we'll cake you the lase few Sleps, only a few steps higher.' I looked up again between the t0wering snowbanks. There were 1101 even wrinkles on the face of the mountain now, but horrible, smooth honey-coloured thumbs and pinnacles, clustered like candle-drippi ngs round the main core of unaffected rock, and the whole framing of it bent towards me. T he road was a gruel of gravel, stones, and working-panics. No one hurried; no one got in his neighbour's way; there were very few orders; bur even as 1he mule hoisted herself up and round the pegged-out turns of it, the road seemed co be drawi ng itself into shape. There are little engine-houses at rhe foo1 of some of the Swiss bob-runs which, for fifty centimes, used to hoist sportsmen and their bob-dcds up to the top again by funic ular. T he same arra ngement stood on a platform nicked our of rock with the very same smell of raw planks, petrol, and snow, and the same crunch of crampons on slushy ground. But instead of chc cog railway, a steel wire supported on frail strurs and carrying a steel lauiced basket, ran up Lhe face of the rock at an angle which need not be specified. Qua railway, it was nothing - the merest grocery line, they ex plained - and, indeed, one had seen larger and higher ones in the valle vs lower down; but a cenain nakedness of rock and snow beneath, and side-way blasts of air out of funnels and rifts

that we slid past, made 1t ,nccrcsting. i\1 che termin us, four or five hundred feet overhead (we were more than cwo thousand feet above the i'vless-house in the pines), there was a system - it suggested chc marks that old ivy prints on a wall after you peel it off - of legends and paths of slushy trampled snow, connecting the barrac:ks, the cookhouse, the officers' 'Mess and, I presume, Lhe parade ground of the garrison. If the cook dropped a bucker, he had co go down six hundred feet ro retrieve it. If a visitor wenc too far round a corner ro admire the panoramas, he became visible 10 unartistic Austrians who promptly loosed off a shrapnel. All th is eagk-'s nest of a world in two dimensions boiled wi th young life and energy, as the planks and girders, the packages of ocher stuff came up the aerial; and the rnomain above leaned outward over ir ~11, hundreds of feet yet to the top. 'Our real work is a little higher up - only a few Steps,' they urged. Bm I recalled that it was Dante himself who says how biuer it is to climb up and down other people's stairs. Besides, their work was oi no interest to any one except rhe enemy round the corner. it was just rhe regular routine of these parts. They outlined it for rhe visitor. 'You climb up a fissure of a rock chimney - by shoulder or knee work such as montainecrs understand - and at night for choice, because, by day, the enemy drops stones down the chimney, bur then they had

to carry mach ine-gu ns , and some other things, with them. ('By the way, some oi our machine-guns are of french manufacture, so our Machine Gun Corps' souvenir please take ic, we wa ne you co have it represents the heads of France and Italy side by side.') And when you emerge from your chimney - wh ich it is best to do in a storm of a gale, since nailed boots on rock make a noise - you find either that you comma nd the enemy's pose on the cop, in w hich case you destroy him , or cut him off from supplies by gunning the only goat-path that u nsuspected chem; or you find the enemy commands you irorn so me unsuspected cornice or knob of rock. Then you go down again - if you can - and try elsewhere. And chat is how it is done all along that section of iromier where the ground does not let you

'But surely you know all abom this. You've seen the Castelleno,' some one said. It stood outside in the sunshine, a rifted bastion crowned with peaks like the roots of molar-teeth. T he largest peak had gone. A chasm, a crater and a vase rock slide took its place. Yes, I had seen the Cascellecco, b ut I was interested to see the men who had blown JC up. 'Oh, he did that. T hat's him.' A man w ith the eyes of a poet or musician laughed and nodded. Yes, he owned, he was mixed up in t he affai r of the Castellecto - had written a report on ic, coo. T hey had used thirty-five cons of nitroglyceri ne for that m ine. They had brought it up by hand - in the old days w he n he was a second lieutenant and men lived in tems, before the wire-rope railways were made - a long time

do otherwise.

ago.

Special work is somewhat different. You select a mountain-cop which you have reason co believe is filled with the enemy and all his works. You dfccc a lodgement there with you r teeth and toe-nails; you mine into the solid rock with compressed-air d rills for as many h undred yards as you calculate may be necessarv. When vou have finished, vou fill your g.-illeries w'ith nitroglycerine ;nd blow the top off the mountain. T he n you occupy the crater with men and machineguns as fast as you can. Then you secure yo ur dominating position from which you can gain other positions, by che same means.

'And your battalion did it a!P' 'No - nu: not at all, by any means, but - before we'd finished w it h the C astelletto we were miners and mechanics and all sorts of things we neve r expected co be. That is che way of this war.' 'And this mining business st ill goes on?' Y cs: I might take it that the mining business did go on. And now would I, please, come and listen to a little music from their band? It lived on che rock ledges and it would play the Regimental and the Company March; bm - one of the joyous ch ildren shook his head sadly - 't hose

Austrians aren't really m usical. No ear io:Âˇ music at all.' G iven a rock wall chat curves over in a sounding-board behind and above a zeal ous band, to concrntracc che melody, and rod,, ri bs o n either side co shooc the tune dow:1 a thousand feet on co hard sno'l\fields below, and thunderous echoes from everv crann v and cul de sac along half a mile' oi res,;. nant moumainface, the resu lt, I do asstt r(Âˇ you, reduces Wagner to a whisper. That che\ w anted Austria was noth ing - she w as or;ly just round the corner - b ut ic seemed co me that all Italy muse hear chem across those gulfs oi thin air. They brayed, cher neighed , and t hey roared; the bandsmen \ faces puckered with mi1th behind the brasse,. and che mountains faithfully trumpeted fort h their insults all over again. The Company March did not provoke any applause - I expect the enemy had hea rd it too often. We e mbarked on nation al ant herns. The Marsellaisc was but a success d'estime, drawi ng a perfu nctory sh rapnel or so, but when the band gave thern and chc whole accusing arch of heaven the Braba nconne the enerny were rnuch moved. 'I told you they had no caste,' said a young fau n on a rock shelf; 'still, it shows the sw ine have a conscience.' But so me folk never know when to stop; besides. it was time for the working-panics tO be corn ing (rn off the roads. So an announcement was made from high overhead co o ur unseen audience th at the performam:e was ended and they need nm applaud an y longer. It was p ut a little more curtly than this, and ic sounded exactly li ke ears being boxed. The silence spread wich the great shadows of the rock towers across the snow: there was capping and clinking and an occasional stone-slide far up the mountain side; the aerial railway carried on as usual; the working parties knocked off, and piled tools, and che n ight shifts began. The last I saw of the joyous children was a clusccr of gno me-like figures a furlong overhead, standing, for there was no visible foothold, on notl~ing. T hey separated, and went about their jobs as single docs, moving up or sideways on the face of the rock, till they disappeared into it like ants. Their real work lay 'only a few seeps highe r up' where the observationposts, the sentries, the supports and all the rest live on ground compared with which the baboon-tracks round the Mess and the barracks arc level pavement. Those rounds must be taken in every weather and light; chat is, made at eleven thousand feet, with death for company under each foot, and che w idth oi a foot on eac h side, at every seep of the most uneventful round . Frosty glazed rock where a bluntÂˇ nailed boot slips once and no more; mountain blasts round the corner of ledges before the body is braced to them; a knob of rot-

ten shale crumbling beneath the hand; and ankle rwisced at t.h~ bottom of a ninety-foot rift; a roaring descent oi rocks loosened by snow from some corner the sun has undermined through the day - . these are a icw oi rhc risks they face goi ng from ~nd returning ro the coffee and gramophones at the Nless, ' in the ordin·ary discharge of their duties.' A rum of the downard road shur them and their world from sight - never to be seen again by my eyes, but the hot youth, the overplus of strengt h, the hap py, unconsidered insolence of it all, the gravity, beautifully maintained over the coffee cu ps, but relaxed when the band played to the enemy, and thL' genui ne, boyish hi11d11e,,, will remain with 11ie. Bur, behind it all, fine as che steel wire ropes, im placable as the mountain, one was conscious of the hardness of their race.

THE TRENTINO FRONT Ir does not need an expert to distinguish rhe notes of the several Italian fronts. One picks them up a 10 1111, way behind rhe lines, from che troops in rest or the traffic on the road. Even behind Browning's lovely Asolo where, you will remember, Pippa passed, seventy-six years since, announcing that 'All'a right wirh the wo rld,' o ne felt the tightening in the air. T he officer, too, explained frankly above his map: 'See , where our iromier west oi the Dolomites, dips south in this V-like spearhed. That's the Trentino. Garibaldi's volunteers were in full possession of ic in our Wa r oi Independence. Prussia was our ally then agai nst Austria, but Prussia made peace when it suited her - I'm talking oi 1864 • and we had to accept the frontier that she and /\ustri a laid down. The Italian frontier is a bad one everywhere - Prussia and Austria took care oi that - but the T renri no section is specially bad. ' Mist wrapped the plateau we were climbing. The mountains had changed into rounded, almost barrel-shaped heights, steep above dry valleys. T he roads were many and new, but the lorries held their pace; the usual old man and young boy were thl're to see to that. Scotch moors, red upland~, scarred with trenches and punched wich shell-holes, a coniusion oi hills wit hout colour and, in the mist, almost without shape, rose and dropped behind us. They hid the troops in cheir folds - always awa iting troops - and the trenches multiplied themselves high and low on their sides. We descended a mou ntain smashed into rubbish from head to heel, but still preserving the outli ne, like wrin kles on a forehead, of trenches char had fo1lowed irs contours. A narrow, shallow ditch (it might have been a water-main) ran vertically up the hill, cutti ng the faded tre nches at right angles.

'That was whe re our men stood before the Austrians were driven back in their last push - rhc Asiago push, don't you call it? It wok the Aust rians ten days to work half-way down from the t0p of the mou ntain. Our men drove rhar trench straight up the hill, as you see. T hen they climbed, and rhe Aust ri ans broke. It's not as bad as it looks, because, in th is sore oi work, ii the enemy uphill misses his footing, he rolls dow n among you r men, bur if you stumble, you only slip back among your friends.' '\Vhat did it cost you>' I whispered. ' A good deal. And on that mou ntain across rhc gorge - but the mist won't let you sec it - our men fought for a week - mostly wit hout water. T he Austrians were the first people to lay out a line of rwelve-inch shellholes on a moumain's side to serve as rrcnr.h~$. lr' s almmr. a ree,ulation trick on all the fronts now, bur it's annoying.' He to ld rales of the long, bitter fight when the Austrians thought, ti ll ge neral Cadorna showed them otherwise, they had rhc plains LO rhe south at their mercy. I should not care to be an Austrian with the Boche behind me and che exercitus Romanus in front. It was the quietest oi iroms and the least ostentatious of arm ies. It lived in great towns among forests where we found snow again in dirty, hollow-flanked drifts, tliac were giving up all the rubbish and refuse that winter had hidden. Labour battalions dealt wich the

stuff, and there were no smells. Other gangs mended shell-holes with speed; the lorries do not like being checked. Another wwnship, founded among stones, stood empty except for rhe cooks and a bored road-mender or two. T he population was up the hill digging and blasting; or in wooded park- like hollows of lowland. Battalio ns slipped like shadows through chc mists between the pines. When we reached the edge of everything, there was, as usual, nothing whatever, except upwrn breadths of grass and an ' un healthy' house - t he bartered core of what had once bel.'n human - with rain-water dripping through the starred ceilligs. The view from ir included the sight of the Austrian trenches on pale slopes and the noise oi Aust rian gu ns - 110! lazy o nes this time, but cager, querulo·us, almost questioning. There was no reply from our side. 'If they wam to find out anything, they can come and look,' said the officer. One speculated how much the men behind those guns would have given for a scar in the car through the next few hours that wok us along yet another veiled line of arms. But per haps by now the Austrians have learned. "T'he mist thickened around us, and rhe far shoulders of montains, and suddenly-seen masses of men who loomed out of it and were gone. We headed upwards till mists met t he clouds, by a steeper road than any we had used befo re. It ended in a rock gallery

where immense guns, set to a certain point when a certain hou r should come, waited in the dark. 'Mind how you walk! It's rather a sharp turn there.' The gallery came out on a naked space, and a vercical drop of hundreds of ieet oi striated rock tufted with heath in bloom. ,l\t the wall-foot the actual mountain, hardlv less steep, began, and, far below that again, flared outward till it beacame more reasonable slopes, descending in shoulders and knolls rn the immense and ancient plains four thousand feet bd ow. T he m ists obscured the no.r thern view s, but to the southward one traced the courses of broad rivers, the thin sh ad ow of aqueducts, and the piled outlines of city after city whose single past was wo rth more than the iutu re of all the barbarians clamouring behind the ranges t hat were pointed out to us through the obervatory windows. The officer fi nished his tales of year-long battles and bombardments among them. 'And that nick in the skyline to the right of that smooth crest under the clouds is a mine we sprung,' said he. The observation shmter behind its fr inge o i heather-bells closed soft ly. They do

everything withom noise silem b nd.

1r1

this hard and

The New Italy Setting aside the incredible labour of everv phase of the Italian wa r, it is this hardne;s that impresses me at every tu rn - fro m the Stripped austerity of general Cadorna's headquarters, which might be a monastery or a laboratory, down ro rhe wavside muleteer white wit h dust, but not a , bead of swea: on him, working the ladder-like mountai n trails behind h i,; an imal, or the single sentry lying-out like a panther pressed against a hump of rock, and still as the stone ex cept for his shadowed eyes. There is no pomp, parade, or gallery play anywhere, nor even, as fo r as can be seen, a desire to turn the best side of t hi ngs ro th e light. ' H ere,' every body seems to imply, ' is the work we do. Herr arc the men and the mec hanisms we use. Draw your own conclusions. ' N o o ne is hurried or over-pressed, and the 'excira ble Latin' of the Boche legend docs not appear. One finds, instead, a balanced and elastic system, served by passionate devotion, ,d1ich saves and spares in the smallest details

as wisely and with as broad a view as it drenches the necessary position wirh th,Âˇ blood of twemy rhousand men. Yet it is not inhuman nor oppressive, nor does it claim w be holy. IL works as th e Italian, or the knife, works - smoothly and quierly, up to rhe hilt, maybe. T he n; tu ral temperateness and open-air existence of the people, rheir stricr traini ng in ecnnomy, and their readiness to stake life lightly on personal issues have evolved rhis system or, maybe, their secular instinct for adm inist rarion had been reborn under the sword. When one considers the whole massed scheme of their work one leans ro the firsi opinion; when one looks at the faces of their generals, chiselled out by war to the very cameos of their ancestors under the Rom an eagles, one inclines ro the second. Italy, too, has a large r nu mber than most countri es of men return ed from moneygetting in the western re publics, who have setrled dow n at ho me again. (They are callÂˇ ed Ame ricanos. They have used the new world, bur love the old.) T heirs is a curi ously spread influence which, working upon the national quickness oi mind and art, makes, I should imagine, for invention and facult y. Add w t his rhe consciousness oi the New Italy created by its own immense efforts and necessities - a thing as impossible as dawn to express in words or to miss in the air and one begins to understand what sort of future is opening for this oldest and youngest amo ng the natio ns. With thrift, valo ur, temperance, and an idea, one goes far. T hey are fighting now, as all civilisation iights, against the essenrial devildom o n the Boche, which they know better than we do in England, becau~e they were once his ally. To that end they give, not wasting or sparing, the whole of their endeavour. Bur rhcy are under no illusions as to guarantees of safety necessary after the War, withour which their own existence cannot be secured. They fight for these also, because, like rhe h ench, rhey are logical and iac:e facts to the end. Their difficulties, general and particular, arc many. But Italy accepts these burdens and others in just the same spirit as she acceprs the cave-riddled plateaux, the mountains, the unstable snows and rocks an d the inconceivable toil that they impose upon her arms. T hey are hard, but she is harde r' . Yet, what man can set out to judge anything' In an hotel waiting for a midnight train, an officer was speaking of some of d'Annunzio's poetry that has literally helped to move mountains in rhis war. He explained an all usion in it by a quoratio n from Dante. An old porter, wai ting for our luggage, dozed crumpled up in a chair by the veranda. As he caught the long swing of the verse, his eyes opened 1 His chin came out of his shin-fron t, ti ll he sat like a little hawk on a perch, attentive to each li ne, his foot softly following its cadence.

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND

POLITICAL

To depict the general political background we must go back to the second half of the XV century, when the Peace of Lodi (1454), putting an end to the war of succession against the Duchy of Milan, stopped the conflict among Florence, Milan and Venice which had torn the peninsula to pieces for half a century. As a result of this peace, Francis Sforza was legitimized Signore of M ilan, Venice extended its dominion to the Adda river while Alfonso of Aragon was recognized Signore of Naples. A political balance was thus reached destined to last till the death of Lorenzo the Magnificent; the latter event was of the utmost importance and gave rise to the wars for predominance in Italy and, in particular, the forthcoming descents into Italy of Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I. The question is how and when, towards the end of the XV century, did the French throw an eye beyond the Alps? Unfortun ately, the reply to this question involves, according to many historians (1), the enormous responsibility of a member of the Sforza family, that is Ludovic the Moor. Let us summarize the facts. When Francis Sforza, founder of the family, died in 1466, his son, Galeazzo Maria, became his successor, In 1476, the latter was a victim of the conspiracy of a man of letters, Cola Montano, who, posing as brutus and probably mindful of the glorious deeds of the Republic of Milan, expected to free the duchy from the tyrant (2). Gian Galeazzo, son of the murdered duke, was now the natural heir to the throne; due to his very young age, he started reigning under the regency of his mother, Bona of Savoia, advised and guided by a very shrewed minister, Cicco Simonetta. Galeazzo Maria's brother, Ludovic the Moor, was not pleased with the situation and from the very start tried to mortgage the duchy, achieving power in successive stages and without worrying too much about the means and methods used: in fact, in 1480, he succeeded in being appointed tutor of the young boy, sentenced Cicco Simonetta to death and had him beheaded, estranged his sister-in Jaw banishing her to a small town of Piedmont and finally deported his nephew to the Castle of Pavia where, in 1494 he had him poisoned. "Typical gentleman of the Renaissance, both refined and wicked, a lover of beautiful things and of art, patron of artists and scholars, bus also capable of deceit and evil as was customary of a time in

which, refiness in art and a life of elegance, one could find in the soul of men skepticism, immorality and exagerated taste for wordly pleasures, irreligiousness." (3) This was Ludovic the Moor, whose unprejudiced escalation for power could certainly not go unobserved. The first reactions were felt in Naples. The dethroned (and later assassinated) Gian Galeazzo had, in fact, married a niece of I'erdinand I, Isabel of Aragon. The Napolitan King's desire to drive out the userper and re-establish order and right was thus more than legitimate. The Moor, fearing the F rench whose claims on the Duchy of Milan had appeased, but not altogether vanished (4), saw no better than draw Charles Vlll's attention on the South of the Peninsula, begging him to enforce his rights as successor of the Angioini. Thus, the machiavellian duke expected to achieve two results in one go; divert the French interests from Milan and eliminate or, at least, make trouble for the Napolitan enemy.

Francis I, the young French King who, after the victory in the Marignano battle, was called ÂŤPrimus domitor HelvetiorumÂť.

The Monarch who had meanwhile consolidated his power in France, was quickly persuaded and in 1494 made his entrance into the peninsula. Among the Italian princes, his presence caused various and different reactions. In Piedmont he was welcomed by the duchess Bianca of Savoia, he was (obviously) acclaimed by the Moor and Picro <lei Medici's welcome was encouraging. However, the people of Florence, Pope Alexander IV Borgia, rather suspicious, and of cou rse the Kingdom of Naples reacted in a very negative manner. Despite these hostile manifcstations,.the first stage of Charles VIII's expedition proved an authentic walk which lead him to conquer the Kingdom of Naples where he was greeted with all the honours, as always happens for the last liberator.

Soon, however, thin gs changed; the easy French success had given rise to man y reasons of worry both in th e Italian States and in foreign ones which looked u pon Italy with in terest. • Thus in 1495 an "antiFren ch League was established in which Ludovic the Moor, Venice, th e Pope, t he King of Spain and even the em peror Maximilian I participated. Charles VIII, fearing that his return might be precluded, hastened back. In Fornovo, though with great difficulty, he succeeded in opening a passage and ret urning to France where he died in 1499. H is successor, Louis XII, soon followed his policy of expansion, though with greate r am bitions (in fact he was intcresed both in the Duchy of Milan and t he l{jngdom of Naples) and wit h a wider and more concrete strategic view made him obtain the alliance of Venice and the Pope before passing the Alps. Thus, in 1499, the French Army, lead by t he Mil:lnese Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, broke into the duchy in which the Venetians too enten:d from the east. After various vicissitudes, the Sforza was definetelv defeated in 150C and thus disappeared f;om history at first and then, in 1508, from the world of tht! living. The fact s which followed were r ather complicated and even a brief description would divert us from the road which takes us to Marignano. It is sufficient to ~-ay that aftt!r a whirl of fleeting alliances and "temporary leagues" which saw t he Italian princes fight each other with the helping hand of foreign countries, in 151 1, in a fit of ante-l itteram national pride, Pope Giulio II Della Rovere (an ingenious character, though extravagant and violent, a condottiere of the Renaissance more than a minister of the Chu rch) gathered all Italians in the so-called " Lega Santa" in which, besides the Pope, Venice, Ferdinand the Catholic, Henry Vlll and the Swiss also took part. As usual, the French fought with great valour, obtaining a clamorous though expensive victory in Ravenna (in fact, the heroic Gastone Di Foix died); Louis XII was thus made to call his army back to France. The following descent ·into Italy (1513) ended unfavourablv in Novara, where the troops of Louis XII were defeated by t he Swiss of Maximilian Sforza, son of the Moor. In these stormy vicissitudes a character which we shall soon meet again Started making his appearance: the bishop of Sion, mattco Schiner, a man with a strong personality, rigid and austere, in whom Giulio II found a kind of "alter-ego" and with whom, consequently, he got on perfectly well. ln 1515 Louis XII died. His successor, cousin and son-in-law Francis I immediately took up the policy of expansion of his predecessors. That same year, after having formed an adequate arn1y, he penetrated into Italy through the Argentera pass. We are on the eve of Mar ignano.

Pope Leo X with Cardinals Giulio de' Medici and Luigi de' Rossi by Raphael (XVI century) - Florence Uffizi Gallery.

THE PARTICULAR SITUATION, TIJf. .\1£N AND THE OPPOSING FORCES When Francis I entered Italy, the situation showed on the one hand the King of F rance and Venice who wished to regai n th e Lombard possessions it had lost in 1513 and on the other hand t he u sual het erogeneous " anti French League" to which Maximilian Sforza, Pope Leo X, succeeded to Giulio II, the King of Spain f.erdinand th e Catholic, the emperor of Aust ria Maximilian and the forces supplied by the Swiss Cantons all to ok part. Let us give a closer look to th ese characters and their genera ls. T he youn g French king, contrary to h is cousin Luois XII, was brave, daring, not very staid, somewhat fatuou s, impulsive, ready to sacrifice everything for the sake

of the "beau gest c". l le had the attitude and the severe look of the maste r. C louet's painting depicts him rather differently, thoughtful and with an intense look in h is eyes, but the reality was different: " Well seated in his saddle, erect, irrcprehensi blc, large shoulders, long legs, he looked the typical French soldier; he kn ew how to handle, with a light and flexible wrist, a heavy lance or a sword, kill a hog or launch a falcon ... " (5). According to Professor 11. Bernard (6) he had an army of 25,000 knigh ts, 48,C00 men, 300 pieces of light ar ti llery loade d onto qu adrupeds, 72 heavy artillery pieces, equal to S pieces every 1000 men; on the battlefield the densit y of the art illery was equal to about 1 piece every 25 metres, a density never agai n reached till 19 l 6.

Field-Marshall Gian Giacomo Trivulzio commanded these forces. He was a man from Milan who serviced the French in hatred of the Sforzas. Rather old, about seventy, his past had been rather agitated. He belonged to a big noble family and had a vivid intelligence and a great tactical sense, which he had fully made use of in Fornovo, in Agnadello against the Venetians and in Ravenna where, after the death of Gastone Di Foix, he took the command of the French army. The pick of che nobility serviced the French forces, such as Baiardo, Field Marshal La Palice, Lautrcc, Bonnivet, Montmorency and Fleurange. In brief, a formidable army for both its moral and tcchinical levels. As already mentioned, the Serenissima Repubblic ~f Venice was allied with the French. Its forces included a great amount of cavalry and were commanded by Bartolomeo d'Alviano, one of the greatest Condottieri of the Renaissance. Before being in the pay of the Pope and of the King of Naples, in 1503 he fought in the Napolitan region defeating the French at Garigliano. In 1507 he passed over to the Serenissima, which - thanks to its wealth and policy - could offer him excellent "working conditions". A capable soldier, he was however rather shortsighted politically speaking, contrary to his predecessor, Bartolomeo Colleoni. We shall now mention briefly the men and forces of the anti French League. We shall not sped too many words (we would need too many) to describe the personalities of Maximilian I, Leo XII and Ferdinand the Catholic. Only a l)JÂˇief summary of their main characteristics. Maximilian I, of whom Diirer gives us an intense picture, rich in psychological penetration, was king of the Romans since 1486 and then, after the death of his father Frederick III, only ruler of the Austro-Hungarian domaines. He was surely a fascinating and capable man, with the qualities and the charisma which make a king popular and loved . A great gentleman, courteous, excellent athlete, he excelled in tournaments and hunting; learned, poet, a patron of humanists and artists, good commander in war, organiser of the German Infantry, made by the famous Landsknechte, he was an artillery expert (7). Durant says of him: ''It wa's as if an Italian Prince of the high Renaissance had ascended the throne of Germanv". His m~rriage policy proved particularly good. By marrying Maria di Borgogna, only daughter of Charles the Bold, he obtained the control of Flanders (Belgium and Holland). Then, by marrying his son, Philip the Fair, the only heir of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabel of Castile, Joan the Mad, guaranteed his family the crown of that Country (this happened with his g.-and-son Charles V). By the same policy he succeeded in guaranteeing the thrones of Bohemia and Hungary to another two of his grand-sons. Pope Leon X, in the world Giovanni de'

Medici, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent, was certainly one of the greatest gentlemen of the Italian Renaissance (8). Cardinal at the age of fourteen, he had grown up immersed in the Medicean society, of which he had absorbed the refined tastes, the elegance and misbelief. A pupil of Marsilio Ficino and Demetrio Calcondila, he had learnt, in the daily contact with the learned men of Florence, to love poetry, history, art, science, mathematics and astronomy. Elected Pope in 1513, he lavished huge richness in orders to famous artists, on the purchase of manuscripts, jewels, carpets, tapestry. A patron to men of letters, humanists and fhilosophers, he p,Âˇotccted aud <::m:ouragt:l them in their study, also establishing the University of Rome. Though he had an inclination for literature and art, Leo X did not neglect politics, aware as he was of the risks connected with a French or Spanish hegemony in Italy. In his passionate fondness of beauty, magnificence and opulence, he did not perceive the serious risk bound to the rise and strengthening of the reformist movement of which he mav be considered ultimately responsible. , The above is his moral and intellectual image: for his physical portrait it is once more the painter (Raffaello in this case) who gives a hand to our imagination leaving us a very famous portrait of the Pope. Ferdinand II of Aragon may rightly be considered the creator of the Spanich absolute monarchy; this job was completed in two fundamental stages: the marriage of Isabel of Castile which brought to the unification of the two kingdoms (1479), and the favourable conclusion of the war of Granada, ended with the defeat and flight to Marocco of the last Calif Boabdil (1492). Events of exceptional historic importance are bound to his name from the discovery of America to the ruthcless and cynic Spanish inquisition and the great .i nquisitor Torquemada, from the strengthening of the central power to the persecution of Jews and Arabs which proved so harmful for Spanish economy. His interest in the peninsula, and more precisely in the Kingdom of Naples, goes back to the Peace of Blois (1504), by which the Kingdom had been acknowledged as belonging to Spain while the Duchy of Milan to France. These three sovereigns, though belonging to the anti-French league, did not give a great contribution to the conflict. Worthy of attention, a contingent of Napolitan-Spanish troops commanded by Raimondo Cardone and a papal army which, under the Duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria Della Rovere, soon lost his Commander who had passed to the enemy as soon as possible. The forces supplied by the Swiss Cantons completed the anti-French coalition; it is here necessary to give some details due to the remarkable importance of these battle-trained contingents in the European disputes of the early XVI century. Switzerland had reached its independence

between the XIV and XV centun detaching itself from the Hapsburgs, defeated several times (Morgarten 1315, Sempach 1386 and Naefels 1389) by th e representatives of the Communities of Schwyz, Uri and Unterwalden and of otherÂˇ five Cantons (Zuc, G larona, Berne. Lucerne and Zurich). In the second half of the fifteenth century, the young State, became an ally of France and Louis XI agaimt the Bold, Duke of Borgogna, who was repeatedly defeated in the battles of Grandson and Murten (1476) and, definetely, at Nancy (1477). Proud people, therefore, jealous of their freedom; extremely valid in the military field and, very important, ready to put these unique natural gifts at the service of the best offerer. This is how Guicciardini speaks of them: "Men fierce by nature, rustic and, due to the barrenness of their Country, shepherds more tha n farmers ... The name of these people, so horrid and uneducated, has become famous through the union and the glory of the arms with which, for their natural ferocity and the discipline of their regulations, they not only have always bravely defended their own Country, but have practised the military art with somma laude outside their Country as well" (9). In the "History of the modern world" by the Cambridge Uni versity Press we read as follows: "In a period in which we passed from a feudal type army to a professional type army, from the heroism of a mounted soldier to the supremacy of the new weapons, the disciplined military valour of the Swiss permitted them to make of war a national industry." To the rather modest incomes of trade and cattle rearing " ... they added, the pay and booty obtained fighting as mercenaries abroad, an activity . mu~? appreciated, by the young especially. Of course, the race for mercenary service was encouraged by the fo-reign Princes, particularly by the Italians, totally unwarlike. thus, it is not surprising that these soldiers, valid, but also venal and greedy, were engaged several times, even fought one against the other and formed, on the eve of Marignano the nucleus of Maximilian Sforza's army reaching about 30,000 in number. They were commanded bv Matteo Schiner already mentioned abov~. The latter, with his p;ssionate and fascinating eloquence, was the only man capable of keeping together forces subject to centrifugal impulse and ready to give up the fight. WEAPONS Brief mention must be made of the weapons with which the armies were equipped. French artillery was known for being modern and efficient. In particular, the commander of the French artillery, Jacques de Genouillac, had, as mentioned above, 72 pieces fused in bronze, drawn by horses,

The terrain as it was at the time of the battle.

with a good firing speed and a tactic mobility eq ual to that of the Infantry. The int roduction of the wheeled gun was an important innovation together with the trunnion for the inclination of guns and iron can non-balls instead of the old stone ones. As regards employment, the pieces were deployeg in a uni form and linear way and t heir intervention consisted essentially in shots aimed at causing disturbance. Seven or eight pieces were generally concentrated together and enfiladed or the enemy was surprised from the hack. Infantry consisted of, on both sides, pikemen and arqu ebusiers. The only difference between Swiss pikemen and Landsknechte (they were about 800 am ong the troops of Francis I) was in the way of grasping the pike: the former grasped it at t he centre and held it slightly turned toward~ the bottom, rhc latter grasped it towards the bottom and turned it towards the top. At the start of the war in Italy the individual firing weapon had greatly improved as regards the time of its birth. During the Hu ndred Years' War two men were needed to move t he weapon, whereas now its weight had been reduced hy about 13 Kilos and could be transported si nglehanded. The barrel was about one metre long and the calibre had bee n diminished to the great advantage of the firin g range and accu rancv. The most r;dical change, however, proved the introduction of "coil". Before this, firin g was carried out by applying a lit

fuse to the weapon. As this, however, had to be held by two, the shooting soldier - as Montgomery notes quite cleverly (10) - should have had th ree hands and three eyes and this was far beyond hi s possibilities, no matter h ow physically gifted he was. The problem was solved with a device {the "coil") formed by a metal lev~r hinged onto the centre, an end of wluch was connected to the trigger while t he other end carried the fuse. Pressu re on the trigger was enough to bring the fire close to the launch ing charge and fire. Results, however, al ways depended on the aim of th e rifle man. Lastly, cavalry had become of the utmost importance. After a century of disastrous tactics on foot, it had again taken up its determining role. THE BATTLE We have already see n that as soon as francis I ascended the throne he imn_,ediately thought of regaining the possession of Lombardy. Supposing that the French king wished to pass by the Susa Valley, the Swiss prepared an am bush at the foo t of Moncenisio and Monginevro. In March, h owever, Trivulzio had carried out a reconnaissance in t he Dauphine and discovered another pass, the Argentcra (the Maddalena Hill). The hardships of the route did not disco urage the French who soon found themselves Âˇat t he head of the river Po where, in a secluded mountain village, they took prisoner the commander of the Pope's troops, Prospero Colonna,

without meeting any resistance. Thus, whil e the Swiss with their pikes, wait ed for the French in the north, the latter spread south towards Milan. The Swiss then retreated in great haste towards the capital of Lombardy swearing against their bad luck. The French army went on quickly towards Carmagnola, Turin, Chivasso and Vercelli and soon occupied all the D uchy of Milan on the north side of the river Po. Meanwhile Bartolomeo d 'Alviano who had settled in Lodi with his Venetians, kept in observation 20,000 Spaniards and Napolitans ca mped in Piacenza. In this situation, Francis I tried to buy the retreat of the Swiss to avoid th e ho;. rors of a siege in Milan. Negotiations did not seem particularly difficult. In fact, the Swiss had not obtained the pay that had been promised them, were dissatisfied and rather indifferent to Matteo Schincr's inflamed sermons ro which they opposed t he phrase " no money, no Swiss" {t 1) showing a sure lack of idealism and just as sure a sense ot reality. In fact, at the start things went quite well for Francis. Th rough the mediation of the Duke of Savoia a conclusion was reached, at least with the more cautions Swiss: if Fra ncis paid them before the king of Spain, they would have returned home. In all haste, Francis gathered one hundred and fifty thousand crowns and sent them to Gallarate where Renato of Savoia, wit h the help of t he French man Lautrec, was working on an agree;: ment. H owever, as this had to be rat ified, Fr ancis re mained u ncertain on the intentio n of the enemy until 12 September, t he day of his 21st birthday.

Moreover, the papal forces with their new commander (the third) , Lorenzo de' Medici - nephew to the Pope - had joined the Spanish-Napolitan army of Cardone. In this situation (see sketch No. 1) Trivulzio positioned between Milan and Mdegnano, thus putting himself between the Swiss and the Spaniards and in a position to operate from within and give or obtain support from the Venetians of the Alviano. The French forces were deployed as follows on the right bank of the Vettabia, small affluent of the Lambro river: • on the front line, the mass of Landskncchtc settled on the right and left of the Milano-Melegnano road (L); on their right French and Gascon bands (G), on the left, a part of the police force (G); • at the centre, the king's household and the remaining police force, at the back, the artillery which Genouillac had deployed on the right bank of the Vettabia; • on the second line, the other Landsknechte watched over the wagons. At three o'clock of the 13th the king was informed that 24,000 Swiss with 8 guns had left Milan guided by Matteo Schiner and moved in three columns towards the royal camp. The prelate, in fact, had made a last, successful appeal, mentioning Novara and despising the enemy, making fun of the latter's difficult position among ditches and canals, laughing at the enemy's effeminancy, praising the male bravery of the Swiss and prospecting the glory and advantages of a victory already at hand. (l2) The three columns were formed as follows: (U) • to the centre the forces of Uri (Imhof and Puntiner), those of Sclnvytz (Koetzi and Fleckle), of Unterwalden (Fluenz), Zug (Schwarzmurer), Glarona (Tschudi), and Grisons (Salis); • to the right, forces of Zurich (Roist) and Sciaffuse (Ziegler); • to the left, Lucerne (Hertenstein) and Vaud (Offenburg and Meltingcr); • in the advanced guard, 500 volunteers from Zug (Werner-Stein). Marching regularly and on a restrained front, this powerful army destroyed everything it found on its way. When the battle started the sun had set and visibility began to abate. Suddenly the Swiss columns annihilated the enemy's advanced guard; the central guard broke down on the French artillery capturing seven pieces and was arrested onIv by a reckless cavalry charge. Artillery fired furiously and, togcthe·r with the cavalry, arrested the right and left columns. Combat continued ruthlessly till dark. During the night no one slept: the French retreated their formation and joined their artillery in a single maxibattery which, at dawn, started firing again. The central column of the Swiss, careless of the casualties suffered, began attacking again; the left column resisted the charges of the french cavalry while the right column, sweeping away all resistance,

thrusted itself straight onto the wagons. Just as it seemed that the Swiss were dose to victory, the troops of Alviano arrived and by a favourable initiative, overthrew the outcome of the battle. After a combat in which their legendary heroism shone once more, the Swiss withdrew in orderly manner while the victors too were at the end of their strength. Thus ended what Trivulzio defined the " Battle of the Giants". According to the legend Francis I, in admiration, gave orders to respect the glorious defeated; the truth, however, is that the victors started chasing the dipersed, killing them ruthless1y. T hree hundred soldiers from Zurich l;ad taken ,-cfugc in a conveul al Saint Giuliano. Cannons were fired against them and as they resisted everything and everyone, they were burnt together with the convent building. Those who died at Marignano were never counted and there is some disagreement as to the figures: it seems, however, that twelve thousand Swiss and six thousand Frenchmen died on the battlefield and it is certain that for decades the plain was disseminated with bones. Most of the survivors passed the Alps again while two thousand men remained in Milan and kept possession of the Castle for another month. On October 11, Francis I made his triumphant entrance in Milan: on the occasion, a coin was minted in which the french king was proudly defined "Primus domitor Helvctiorum", the first to have tamed the Swiss. The peace of Bologna (1515) and of Noyon (1516) sanctioned the French possession of the Duchy of Milan, Venice regained its lands in Lombardy while Francis I acknowledged the Spanish dominion over the south of ltalv. Thus concluded a st;ge of the wars of predominion in Italy.' others, equally dramatic, followed and involved people and dynasties till the Peace of Catea Cambresis (1559) ended the fight for the Households of France and Hapsburg, finally guaranteeing the Spanish hegemony in Italy and in Europe.

CONSIDERATIONS AND TEACHINGS Nowadays, the panorama of the area has changed completely. Where the opposing armies fought furiously and with alternate fortune in swamps and marshlands, we now see the fertile and green plain of Lombardv dotted bv thousands of inhabited a'reas. Howe~er, even if time has changed the face of things, a careful survey (sketch No. 2) allows us to sec the course of the Vettabia, now canalized, the bends of the canal where the adversaries met face to face. With our imagination and our knowledge of the facts we may again live those two epic days and re-establish the whole picture of that far-away event, drawing information and relative teachings.

Politically speaking, history has already given its final opinion. During the Renaissance period there was in Italy and later in Europe a true and proper explosion of genius, such as mankind had not known since Pericle's Greece and would never know in future. Master in all sectors of learning and art, Italy was extremely poor as regards politics. Machiavelli's brilliant, but cynic and despairing picture bears witness to the above, particularly those chapters which the Florentine secretary devotes to the influence of mercenariness on the militarv and civic virtues of Italians and the g;eat danger of turning to foreigners for the solution of domestic disputes. In fact, in chapter XIII of "11 Principe" Machiavelli says: "Auxiliary weapons ... that is when a powerful nation is called to help and defend ... These weapons may be good and useful themselves, but for he who calls them they are almost always harmful; because, if you lose, you are defeated; if you win, you arc their prisoner." And further (chapter XII): " ... the arms with which a prince defends his State, they are either his or arc mercenary ... and if one keeps his State based on mercenaries, it will neither be still nor safe; because the latter are at variance, ambitious, without discipline, unfaithful... the ruin of Italy is caused by no other reason that that of having counted for many years on mercenaries. These were considered an improvement by some and seemed vigorous; but as soon as the foreigner arrived, they showed themselves for what they were ... " In conclusion, says Machiavelli, defence cannot be entrusted to anyone: it is a right/ duty of a people in · its whole of which all people must be aware, with the certainty that one cannot be a good soldier if one is not a good citizen and vice-versa: these teachings arc still valid nowadays and it would not be superfluous to meditate on them with the suitable, obvious and necessary adaptations. From a purely tactical point of view, the battle of Marignano is surprisingly interesting. Let us observe it closely from a modern point of view. May the French action of the first day be somehow considered a sort of dvnamic opposition designed to absorb in depth the offensive thrust of the Swiss and Cl'C:tte the basis for a direct reaction on the open flank of the enemy? Further, does not Alviano's intervention have the decisive characteristics of a counter-attack carried out with the mass of the mobile forces against an enemy previously worn out and blocked? Even if means arc completely different, just as completely different arc selfefficiency and firing range, the basic ideas, or part of them at least, seem to have preserved a permanent validity. Morally speaking, the behaviour of combatants still arouses surprise and admiration.

The terrain as it is today.

How else could we judge the Swiss who, after the first bloody day, spent their night in the cold, drenched with rain and mud, without food or drinking water, unable to light a fire in case the French artillery reacted? Despite all this "they decided to remain on t he battlefield to maintain the advantages obtained in battle while the ghostly sound of t he Uri horns called in the darkness to encourage the despaired and admonish whoever might attempt escape." (14) These were the men who, t he following day, careless of fatigue and dangers, again took up the fight, desperately, to the extreme of their strengt h : an example of brave r y, superhuman will-power, firmness and strength of character. And what about the twenty year old king of France? He was fire struck several times and during the night he slept on a gun carriage, in his armour, under a veiled moon. The following day he threw himself in the fight, risking everything, his kingdom and his very life, to guide his men to victory. Is he not an example of how command should be understood? A charisma and fascinating strength, invigorated by the force of example and capacity. Furthermore, how arc we to judge Gerolamo d'Alviano's extraordinary, lucid and decisive initiative, ready as he was to grasp the most suitable time and place to intervene in the battle and decide of its outcome? There would still be a lot to say on Schiner, La Palice, Baiardo, Trivulz.io, Bon-

nivet and Fleurange, but the reader who has patiently followed us to here has the right not to be further bored. It is likely, however, that this summary of an epoch and of an episode, besides recalling forgotten memories, has succeeded in reaching the aim it has been written for: prove how useful and formative the teachings of history may be and what noble and divine, but also fleeting and unavowable things mankind is capable of doing. General Sergio Onnis

Note (1) Other historians do not share the thesis of the " individual responsibility". These see in the antisocial and anti-popular policy of the pri nces the main cause of the catastrophe (See: Fran co Catala no "Lodovico ii Moro" pag. 154 and fo llowing, Edi tor: Dal l'Oglio). (2) The actual executors of the murder wP.rP. Gi~rnmo Olgiati, carlo Visconti and Andrea lampugnano, disciples of Cola Montano. (3) Georg Th0rer Gu ido Calgari "MARIGNANO, tu rn ing point in the Swiss policy " Zurich 1965, pag. 20. (4) Valentina Visconti, sister of Filippo Maria Visconti, last Duke of the fam ily, had

married the Duke of Orleans. The wi ll of Gian Galeazzo Viscon ti, Val entina's father, stated that, it the Visconti family should become extinct (as actually happened), t he Duchy should pass to the Orleans. (5) Francis Hackett: " Francis I" PublishÂˇ ed by Dall'Oglio pag. 12. (6) See: H. Bernard "La guerre et son evolution t ravers les sieclesÂť" Published 1955 Vol ume I: "Les pri ncipes et les reg les de l'art militaire". (7) See: "Storia del mondo moderno" Volu me I. "II Rinascimento", by Cambridge University Press published by Garzanti. (8) For a description of th e personality of Leo X I availed nyself of the portra it made by I. Montanelli and R. Gervaso in "L'ltalia della Controriforma" published by Rizzoli page 78 and following. (9) F. Guicciardini, "Storia d'ltalia", book X chapter VIII. (10) Field-M arshal Mon tgomery - " Storia delle Guerre" publ ished by Rizzoli. (11) Th is sentence is sti ll used in certain areas of Lombardy to underline the inadequacy of fi nancial means compared to am bitions. (12) See: Francis Hackett "Francesco I" published by Dell'Oglio pg. 161 . (13) Publisher F. Leconte " Etudes d'histoire militaire" Lausanne 1870. (14) Georg Thi.i rer and Guido Calgari: " Marignano: fatale svolta politica svizzera" Zu rich 1965 pag. 38.

ENGLISH

ITALIAN

GLOSSARY

cache,

to cache, v.t. cadet, s. cadre, s.

c. exercise cage,

prisoner of war cage caisson, calibre, call, s.

c. sign c. up c. word bugle c. collective c. on c. roll c. sick c. telephone c. to call, v.t.i. to c. for fire to c. to order to c. to arms to c. to a halt

comando , contro ll o e comunicazioni (di una missione) nascondiglio (per munizioni, provviste) nascondere (munizioni, provviste) cadetto, allievo ufficlale quadro (di ufficiali) ese rcltazion e coi quadri recinto recinto per prigionieri di guerra cassonetto calibro (di cannone) chiamata, rich iesta, adunata nominativo di stazione chiamata alle armi nom inativo di mag lia squillo di tromba chiamata circolare su richiesta appello richiesta di visita medica chiamata telefonica chiamare, richiam are, nominare, adunare rich iesta di tl ro richiamare all 'ordine chiamare all e armi intimare di fermarsi

to c. out to c. up camel corps, s. camelry, s. camouflage, s.

c. net c. sm oc k c. unit

electronic c. to camouflage, v.t. c. detection

photography camp,

to go to c. to pitch a c.

c. bed c. kettle prisoner of war branch c. refug ee c. temporary c. transit c. to camp, v.t.i.

sfidare a duel lo, chiamare truppe in aiuto richiamare, chiamare al telefono corpo di meharist i compagnia di meharisti mascheramento, mimetizzazione rete mimetica tuta mim etica unita mascheratori masc heram ent o elettronico mascherare, mimetizzare fotografia antiÂˇ mlmetizzazione campo, accampamento andare al campo impiantare un a.ccampamento letto da campo, branda marmitta camp o aus ilia rio per prigionieri di guerra campo profughi campo di sosta tem poranea campo temporaneo di transito accampare (t ruppe), acc am pars i, atte ndarsi , dormi re all 'add iaccio. 65

campaign, c. plan

to campaign, v.i. campaigner, s. old c. campaigning, s. camping, s. candle, s. smoke c. canister, s. c. shot to cannibalize, v.t.

campagna (di guerra) piano di campagna di guerra fare una campagna militare in campagna reduce, veterano vita di campagna (m il itare), di soldato accampamento candela, candelotto candelotto fumogeno scatola a mitraglia proietto a mitraglia cannibal izzare, smontare motori

cannon, s. c. ball c. shot to cannon, v.t.i. cannonade, s.

to cannonade, v.t.i. cannoneer, s. canteen, s.

dry c. wet c. to canton, v.t. cantonment, s. canvas, s. under c. c. town cap, s. ballistic c.

cartridge, c. field c. mountain c. percussion c. steel c. cap, s. capability, s. c. of action

the enemy's c. capacity, s. to act in one's official

c. beach c. carpet, s. c. bombing carrying c. defensive c. 66

JJ!::H

riulilizzarne i

pezzi (gener. invariato al pl.), cannone palla da cannone colpo di cannone cannoneggiare cannoneggiare, bombardare cannoneggiare, bombardare cannoniere cantina, dispensa, pesto di ristoro, mensa, spaccio, borraccia cantina per provvigioni cantina per bevande alcoliche accantonare (truppe) accantonamento, acquartieramento telone per copertura sotto tenda tendopoli Âˇ berretto, copricapo cappuccio balistico , falsa ogiva capsula, cappellotto (di cartuccia) berretto da campagna berretto da montagna capsula, cappellotto (di cartuccia) elmetto (sl. abbr. di captain) capitano capacita, possibilita possibilita di azione le possibilita del nemico capacita, possibi l ita, potenzial ita agire nell 'esercizio delle proprie funzioni capacita di spiaggia tappeto bombardamento a tappeto portata di un mezzo di trasporto capacita difensiva

fuel tank c. operational c. railroad c. rescue hoist c. road c. transport c. caparison, s. to caparison, v.t. to capitulate, v.i. caponier, s. capote, s. captain, s. to captain, v. t. captainship, s. captive, s. to hold c. to take c. captivity, s. captor, s. capture, s. c. at sea to capture, v.t.

he was captured documents c. from the enemy capturing, s. capturer, V. captor car, s.

armoured c. furnished freight c. carabin, s. carabineer, s. carbine, s. carbineer, s. card, s. calling up c. field medical c. personal ident ity c. cargo, s. allowable c. load

c. boat c. book c. capacity c. compartment

outsize load c. carriage,

gun, c. troop c. carrier, s.

capacita di un serbatoio capacita operativa potenzialita di una linea ferroviaria capacita di sollevamento potenzialita stradale capacita di trasporto gualdrappa, bardatura (di cavallo) bardare (un cavallo) capitolare, arrendersi capponiera (aer.) mantello con cappuccio capitano c.;aÂľitarn:He, c.:ornamJare

grade di capitano, arte di comandare prigioniero tenere prigioniero fare prigioniero cattivita, prigionia chi fa prigioniero cattura, conquista , preda, bottino cattura di nave prendere (citta, ecc.), far prigioniero tu fatto prigioniero documenti catturati al nemico cattura (di nave), presa (di citta) autovettura, (aer) navicella di dirigibile autoblindo carro arredato carabina carabiniere carabina carabi n iere carta, documento cartolina di precetto tabellino diagnostico carta d'identita carico, spazio di caricamento (di un mezzo di trasporto) carico consentito su un mezzo di trasporto nave da carico registro di carico capacita di carico compartimento di carico, spazio destinato al caricamento carico che supera le misure consentite carrozza, carro , treno, carriaggio, telaio affusto (di cannone) treno truppa trasportatore, mezzo di trasporto, corriere

c. striking force aircraft c. air group c. armoured personnel c.

belt c. escort c. troop c. weapon c. carry, s. carrying, s. to cart, v.t. cartage, s.

cartel, carton,

s. s.

cartouche, s. cartridge, s. armour piercing c.

armour piercing incendiary c. ball c. blank c. cartridge belt c. case drill c. dummy c. c. pouch rifle grenade c. rocket c. spotter c. tracer c. to fire blank c. case, s. cartridge c. packing c. pistol c. powder c. casemate, s. to cashier, v.t. to cast, v.t.i. castellated, ag. castrametation, s. casualty,

c. analysis

c. assistance calls officer c. assistance calls programme c. branch

forza d'attacco portaerei portaerei trasporto stormo aereo mezzo blindato per trasporto personale trasportatore a nastro portaerei di scorta mezzo per trasporto truppe mezzo per trasporto armi portata (di fucile) espugnazione (d i fortezza) trasportatore con carro trasporto con carri accordo per lo scambio di prigionieri centro bianco (di bersaglio) cartuccia cartuccia cartuccia a pallottola perforante cartuccia a pallottola perforante incendiaria cartuccia ordinaria (a pal lotto la) cartuccia a salve cartuccera, caricatore a nastro bossolo (di cartuccia) cartuccia da esercitazione cartuccia finta giberna cartuccia per lancio di bombe da fucile cartuccia tracciante cartuccia da aggiustamento cartuccia a pallottola tracciante sparare a salve custodia, cassa, fondina bossolo di cartuccia cassa da imballaggio fodero di rivo ltella bossolo casamatta destituire, degradare riformare (soldati, cavalli) turrito, luoyo ricco di castelli fortificati (archeol. mil.) castrametazione morto, ferito, pl. vittime, perdite (di uomini) analisi dei caduti (per determinare l'efficacia del sistema d'arma ufficiale addetto alla assistenza ai feriti programma di assistenza ai feriti ufficio addetto ai caduti

c. evacuation c. list c. report

c~Âˇ ward the list of c.s catapult, s. to catapult, v.t. caterpillar, s. caution, s. c. area cavalry, s. c. squadron sky c. cavalryman, s. to cease, v.t.i.

to c. fi re to c. firing c. fire line c. check firing to c. loading to ceil, v.t.i. ceiling,

cell, s.

c. chief

central, ag. c. analysis team

c. board of conscientious objectors c. planning team centralization, s.

to centralize, v.t.i.

centralized, ag.

c. control centre, s. Air Control C. (ACC) Airlift Coordination C. (ALCC) Air Support Operation C. (ASOC) Allied Press Information C. (APIC) Antiaircraft Artillery Operations C. (AAOC) Captured document C. (CDC) c. of burst c. of gravity

sgombero feriti elenco delle perdi te rapporto sui feriti ed caduti pronto soccorso la lista delle vittime catapu lta, fionda (a forcella) catapultare caterpiller, mezzo cingolato cautela zona di restrizioni al volo cavalleria squadrone di cavalleria cavalleria del cielo soldato di cavalleria cessare, desistere, finire, fermarsi cessare ii fuoco smettere di sparare linea del cessate ii fuoco ri prendere ii fuoco cessare ii caricamento volare al la quota di tangenza quota di tangenza, limite massimo nucleo di combattimento, sezione di un Comando operative capo nucleo di combatt imento, capo sezione Comando operative centrale gruppo d'analisi della direzione comitato centrale per gl i obiettori di coscienza gruppo centrale di programmazione accentramento, concentrazione di poteri, central izzazion e accentrare, centralizzare, concentrare, Âˇ concent rarsi centralizzato control lo central izzato centro centro di controllo aereo centro di coordinamento del I' aviotrasporto centro operazioni di concorso aereo centro in formazioni stampa al leato centre operativo artig I ieria contraerea centro documenti catturati punto di scoppio (di ordigno nucleare) centre di gravita

c. of resistance Communication C. control and reporting C. (CRC) cryptocommunication c. detailed interrogatio n

Fire support coordination c. (FSCC) Joint air photo interpretation c. (JAPIC) Joint command opera-

centro di resistenza centro trasmissioni centro di controllo e rapporto centre cifra centre di interrogatorio particolaregg iato centre di direzione del tiro centre Âˇdi coordinamento del fuoco centro aereofotografico interforze centre di comando

tion c. (JCOC)

operative in terforze

joint coordination c. (JCC) joint operation c. (JOC)

centre di coordinamento interforze centro operative in terforze centre di controllo dell 'artiglieria contraerea leggera centre di coordinamento logistico centre messaggi centre di mobilitazione centro di controllo movimento centro di controllo movimento centre di controllo NBC (n ucleare, batteriologico chimico) centre di raccolta NBC centro operazioni centro di presentazione centro di ritrasmissione centro di coordinamento del soccorso centro operativo del settore centro trasmissioni sottocentro di racco lta

c. f ire direction c. (FDC)

light antiaircraft artillery control c. (LAAC) logistic coordination c. (Log. C.C.) message c. mobilization c. movement control c. (MCC) movement control c. (MCC) NBC control c. NBC collection c. Operation c. reception c. relay c. rescue coordination c. (RCC) sector operation c. (SOC) signal c. sub-collection c. (NBC)

NBC

tactical air control c. (TACC) certificate, s. medical c. medical c. of the cause of death cessation, s. c. of hostilities chain, s. c. armour c. of command

c. of responsibility c. reaction c. shot

operational c. of command challenge,

centro di contro l lo aereotattico certificato, attestato certificate medico certificato medico sulle cause della morte cessazione cessazione delle ostilita catena corazza, lorica a maglia catena di comando, gerarchia catena di responsabilita reazione a catena palle ramate, palle incatenate catena operativa di comando sfida, intimazione, ii chi va la (della sentinella)

six c. revolver

lanciare una sfida parola d'ordine e con troparola sfidare a duello, intimare (di sentinella) sfidare qualcuno a combattere camera camera di combustione camera di scoppio camera di ionizzazione provvisto di camere, diviso in scomparti rivoltella a sei colpi

change, s.

cambio,

to issue a c.

c. and password to challange, v. t. to c. someone to fight

chamber,

combustion c. firing c. ionization c. chambered, ag.

c. of operational control (CHOP) no c. no c. of oral orders changing, s. the c. of the guard channel, s.

c. of communication

c. of diplomacy official c. c. of in formation present c. supply c. chaplain, s . army c. c. corps c. service chaplaincy, charge, s.

base c. bursting c. demolition c. explosive c. increment c. propelling c. reduced c. to return to the c. to charge, v.t.i. to c. a rifle to c. a demolition to c. with charger,

chariot, s. war c. chase, s. c. gun to chase, v.t. to c. the enemy

variante,

passaggio passaggio di controllo operativo nessuna variante nessuna variante agli ordini verbali cambio ii cambio della guardia canale, via, pl. messi, vie di comunicazione vie di comunicazione le vie diplomatiche trafila burocratica vie d'informazione canale di frequenza predisposto canale di rifornimento cappellano cappellano militare corpo cappellani servizio di assistenza spirituale ufficio di cappellano carica, incarico carica fondamen tale carica di scoppio carica per demolizione carica esplosiva carica aggiuntiva carica di lancio carica ridotta tornare alla carica caricare (arma da fuoco), andare alla carica, approntare, incaricare caricare un fuci le approntare una demolizione dare un incarico, incaricare caricatore (di arma da fuoco) carro, biga biga di combattimento caccia, inseg uimento Âˇ i cannoni da caccia di una nave cacciare, inseguire inseguire ii nemico

chase, s. chaser, s.

bow c. stern c. submarine c. check, s. to keep the enemy in

to meet with a c. c. firing cease c. firing c. po int to check, v.t.i.

to c. an assau lt to c. the enemy to c. orders Chelsea, no. pr.

Chelsea Royal Hospital chemical, ag. c. agent c. ammunition c. biological and radiological operation c. Corps (CH LC) c. defence

c. c. c. c. c. c.

mine operation Service survey warfare warfare agent

c. weapon chemistry, s. nuclear c. chevron, s.

volata (di arma da fuoco) caccia, cacciatorped iniere, aereo di caccia cannone di prua cannone di poppa cacciasommerg i bi Ii scacco, impedimento, ostacolo, control lo, verifica, messa a punto tenere ii nem i co i n scacco subire uno scacco sospendere ii fuoco riprendere ii fuoco posto di controllo, punto di inquad ramento (artigl.) impedire, ostacolare, fermare, controllare , verificare, mettere a punto, contenere fermare un attacco contenere ii nemico control lare gli ord ini imÂˇ partiti Chelsea (quartiere di Londra) osp izio per veterani ed inval id i di guerra (Londra) chimico aggressivo chimico munizione chim ica operazione chimica, batteriologica e nucleare Co rpo del Servizio Chimico di fesa contro prodotti chimici mina con agenti chim ici operazione chimica Servizio chimico ricognizione ch imica guerra chimica prodotto di guerra chimica arma chimica chimica chimica nucleare gallone ind i cante i i gm.do di sottoufficiale

chief,

c. of Army Staff

c. of chaplains c. of combined operations c. of General Staff

c. of ordnance c. of Staff (COFS)

capo, comandante, (arald) la somm ita dello scudo capo di Stato Maggi'ore del I' Eserc ito ordinario m ilitare capo operazion i in terarma capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa capo de ll 'approvvigionamento Capo di Stato Maggiore

c. of transportation commander in c. Joint commanders of Staff c. message centre c. chiefdom, s. chiefship, s. chimney, s. chin, s. c. st rap chivalry,

the flower of c. choking, c1g. c. agent c. gas CIMIC support cipher, s . c. key off-line c. on line c. to write in c. ciphers, s.pl. circle, s. azimuth c. aim ing c. damage c. polar c. circulation, s. circuit traffic c. circumvallation, s. to circumvent, v.t. to c. the enemy citadel, s . citation, s. civil, ag .

c. affairs c. affairs and military government c. service c. rights c. works c. defence c. protection c. war civilian, ag. s. c. preparedness for war c. medical personnel c. personnel manageÂˇ

ment informat ion system c. subst itution c. war dead Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC}

capo trasporti comandante in capo comitato dei cap 1 di Stato Maggiore capo centro messaggi dignita, rango di capo dign ita di capo, autorita (a lpin ismo) camino in roccia mento sottogola (di el mo, berretto) (st.m il.) cavalleria, conÂˇ dotta caval leresca ii fior fiore de i cavalieri soffocante

aggressive soffocante gas soffocante concorso di cooperazione Civile Militare cifrario , messaggio cifrato, scrittura convenzionale chiave di cifrario cifratura fuori linea cifratu ra in li nea scrivere in c ifra un ita delle trasmissioni addette alla cifratura e decifratura dei messaggi cerchio, circolo cerchio azimutale cerchio di puntamento cerchio dei danni circolo po lare circo lazione circolazione ad ane llo circonvallazione circuire, ingannare circuire ii nemico cittadella, fortezza, rocca citazione, enumerazione (al l'ord ine del giorno) civile affari c ivili affari civili e governo militare ammin.istrazione statale diritti civili protezione civile difesa civi le prote7ione civile guerra civile civile, borghese preparazione civile per la guerra in temp i di pace personale medico civile sistema informazioni su lla gestione del personale civi le sost ituzione con civili cadut i di guerra civi li Cooperazione Civi leMi litare

civil-military relations claim, s. to claim, v.t.i. to c. damages clandestine, ag. c. operation clash, s. class, s. c. of supplies

Military Load C. (MLC) Army c. c. of supplies c. I (rations, forage, post exchange supplies consumed at an approximately uniform daily rate under all conditions) c. II (clothing , equ ipment and vehicles, includ ing spare parts)

c. Ill (fuels and lubricants) c. IV (fortification and construction materials, special mach inery and equipment and other special supplies, as well as additional quantities of items identical to those authorized for init ial use) c. V (ammunition of all types, inc luding chemical, explosives, mines, fuses, detonators and pyrotecnics) to class, v.t.

not classed classification, s.

bridge c. route c. security c. c. restricted c. confidential c. secret c. top secret COSMIC top secret unclassified NATO unc. statistical c. of

diseases, injuries and causes of death vehicle c.

relazioni civile-militare richiesta, rivendicazione, reclamo rec lamare, rivendicare, esigere chiedere ii risarcimento danni clandestino missione clandestina scontro, conflitto , collisione classe, categoria classi di rifornimento classe dei carichi militari contingente di leva classi di rifornimento classe I (razione viveri, foraggio, altri materiali di consumo giornaliero)

classified, ag.

c. c. c. c.

document material matter message un-c.

cleaning, c. rod

clear, ag .

the town is c. of the enemy all c. clearance, s.

security c.

c. operation c. hospital field of fire c. classe 11 (vestiario, equipaggiamento e veicoli, comprese le parti di ricambio) classe Ill (carburanti e lubrificanti) classe IV (materiali di fortificazione e da costruzione, macchinari equipaggiamenti ed altri materiali speciali; inoltre materiali distribuiti in aggiunta a quelli di dotazione iniziale)

mine field c. snow c. clerk,

company c. click,

to click, v.t.i. to c. one's heels climb, s. c. corridor to climb, v.t.i.

classe V (munizioni di tutti i tipi (chimiche comprese) , esplosivi, spolette, detonatori e materiale pirotecnico).

climber, s. rock c. climbing, ag. aerial c.

classificare non classificato classificazione, classifica classificazione ponti classifica degli itinerari classifica di sicurezza riservato riservatissimo segreto segretissimo segretissimo NATO non classificato NATO non classificato classificazione statistica delle malattie, del le ferite e delle cause di morte classificazione dei veicoli

c. with pegs only exposed c. free c.

c. flight c. irons

mountain c. roped c. clip,

close, ag. c. air support c. combat c. controlled air in-

terception c. defensive fire

c. interd iction c. support

classificato documento classificato materiale classificato dati classificati messaggio classificato non classificato pulizia, pulitura scovolo per pulizia di armi chiaro, libero la citta e libera dal nemico segnale di cessato allarme autorizzazione, benestare, autorizzazione all'accesso a documenti e materiali classificati nulla osta di sicurezza operazione di sgombero ospedale da campo sgombero del campo di t iro bonifica di un campo minato sgombero neve scrittu rale scritturale di compagnia, aiutante furiere scatto (del grilletto di un fucile), dente di arresto produrre un suono secco battere i tacchi (nel salutare) ascensione corridoio di ascensione arrampicare, arrampicarsi, salire, scalare scalatore rocciatore rampicante, salita, scalata salita aerea volo ascendente ramponi arrampicata artificiale arrampicata esposta arrampicata libera alpinismo scalata in cordata nastro (per armi a ripet izione), caricatore vicino, ravvicinato appoggio aereo ravvicinato combattimento ravvicinato, corpo a corpo intercettatore aereo controllato da vicino fuoco a distanza ravvicinata interdizione vicina appoggio ravvicinato, accompagnamento, appogg io diretto

c. supporting fi re to close, v. t. i. to c. ranks to c. about an army the enemy closed in upon us close up! closed, ag. c. area closure, s. c. minefield to clothe, v.t. clothed in armour to c. with power clothes, s. pl.

civilian c. clothing, s.

ant i-gas c. c. and equipment protective c. cloud,

nuc lear c. clouding, s. cluster, s. clutter,

radar c. coast, s. c. defence

c. guard c. line c. waiter

c. watcher c. watching costal, ag. c. artillery c. convoy

c. navig ation c. refraction c. route coat,

c. armour c,. of arm s c. of mail cock, s. a gun at full c. c. shot c. shy to cock, v.t.i. to c. a gu n cock, s. cockpit, code, s.

fuoco di accompag namento chiudere, ch iudersi, avvi c inarsi, accerchia re serrare le f ile accerch iare un esercito ii nemi co ci circondo serrate le file! chiusoÂˇ zona vietata chiusura campo minato di divieto vestire, abb i glia re , rives tire rivestito di armatura investire di un potere abit i, vestiti , ind umenti abiti civili vestiario, indumento vestito antipiritico vestiario ed equipaggiamento indumento protettivo nuvola, nube nube radioattiva annebbiamento gruppo, grappolo (di bombe, mine, paracadute) rumore, interferenza interferenza radar costa, riviera, litorale difesa costiera pol izia costiera linea cost iera doganiere (per sorveglianza delle coste) guardacoste sorveglianza delle coste cost iero artiglieria costiera convoglio costiero navigazione costiera rifrazione costiera rotta costiera gi acca, soprabito, capÂˇ potto, st emm a, arme , blasone stemma, blasone arme, blasone ri camato sulla cotta giaco cane di fuci le un fucile armato colpo al bersaglio tiro al bersag lio armare, alzare ii cane di un fucile arm are un fucile posizione eretta del cane di un fucile carlinga, abitacolo codice, regole, statuto, cifra, c ifrario

amm unition identification c. brevity c. condensation c. c. Âˇ book c. word exercise c. name c. number c. word Military C. of Justice operation c. un it designator c. to code, v.t. to codify, v.t. coding, s. cold, ag. c. blooded

c. steel c. war collar, s. coefficient, ag.

ballistic c. friction c. collaborationist, s. to collect, v.t.i. collecting station collection, s. c. agency

information c. plan inte lligence c. plan NBC c. college,

mi litary c. NATO Defence C. naval c. War C. colonel,

lieutenant c. colonelcy, s. colonelship, colour, s .

with the c. to call someone to t he

c. c. bearer c. sergeant the national c. regimental c. column, c. cover

c. formation to march in two c. c. gap length of a c.

codice per l'identiticazione del le munizioni codice di abbreviazione codice di abbreviazion e cod ice crittografico parole convenzionali da esercitazione nome convenzional e prefisso parola convenzionale Codice Penal e mil itare cod ice operative codice indicativo di reparto mettere in cifra, cifrare (un di::;Âľaccio), codificare c itrare (un di spacci o) codificazione, ii c ifrare freddo a sangu e fre ddo arma bi anca guerra fredda bavero coeffici ente coefficiente balistico coefficiente di att rito collaborazionis ta raccogliere, ricercare posto raccolta feriti raccolta, ricerca organo di ricerca piano di ricerca informativa p iano generale delle in formazioni raccolta di dati NBC collegio, ist ituto scuola milita re Col legio NATO della difesa scuola navale Scuola di Guerra colonnello tenente colonnello grado di colonnello grado di colonnello co lore , pl. c ol ori, bandiera sotto le armi chiamare qualcuno sotto le armi portabandiera sergente portaban diera i colori nazionali i colori del regg imento colonna protez ione di una colonna allineamento marciare su due colonne intervallo fra gl i elementi di una colonna lunghezza di una colonna in movimento 71

motor c. comb, s .

c.-out to comb, v.t.i. to c. out

combat,

antiaircraft c. close c.

c. air patrol c. available aircraft combat aircrew training

unit c. cargo service c. clothing c. crew training

squadron

c. command c. day of supply

c. echelon

c. effectiveness report

c. efficiency c. in built-up area

c. in woods c. information centre c. intelligence c. logistic support c. outposts

c. patrol c. power

c. readiness c. service support

c. survival

c. team c. zone deadly c.

meeting c. sustained c. to enter c.

autocolonna pettine rastrellamento perlustrare, setacciare, rastrel Iare fare una retata, eliminare (persone sospette) chiamare le leve di riserva combattimento, battaglia,- lotta, conflitto combattimento antiaereo combattimento ravvicinato, corpo a corpo pattuglia aerea di combattimento aereo disponibi le per ii combattimento un ita di addestramento dell'equipaggio aereo servizio di car ico da combattimento abiti da combattimento squadrone per l'add est ram en to dell'equipaggio aereo comando in operazioni approvigionamento per un giorno di combattimento scaglione di combattimento rapporto sull'efficacia del combattimento efficienza combattiva combattimento negli abitati combattimento nei boschi centro informazioni sul combattimento servizio informazioni riservate assistenza logistica alle forze di combattimento elementi in zona di sicurezza, posti scoglio pattuglia di combattimento (terrestre) mezzi di combattimento prontezza operativa sostegno o.llc forze di combattimento misure di sopravvivenza durante ii combattimento gruppo di combattimento zona di operazioni combattimento all'ultimo sangue combattimento d'incontro combattimento prolungato entrare, ingaggiarsi in combattimento

to combat, v.t.i. combatable, ag. combatant, ag. s. combative, ag. combatively, av.

C. in chief

combattere combattibile combattente combattivo, battagliero in modo combattivo, aggressivo combattivita combinazione combinazione di fuoco e movimento combinato, congiunto azione congiunta lnterarma mezzi di uso comune tra llnita diverse sforzi congiunti esercitazione congiunta forza congiunta operazioni combinate. quartier generale delle operazioni combinate comando delle operazioni combinate batteria di bombardamento delle operazioni combinate operazione aereo navale combinata ospedale militare interforze combustione camera di combustione autocombustione motore a combustione intern a comodita, conforto, assistenza aiuto e assistenza comando, ordine, autorita, truppe, zona militare al comando di un capo comando di sostituzione comando in operazioni sotto ii comando di avere ii comando di un esercito essere assegnato ad un comando alto comando

c. post

posto comando

execution c. full c. higher c. operational c. preparatory c. second-in-c. tactical advanced c.

comando di esecuzione comando completo comando supremo comando operativo comando di avvertimento comandante in seconda comando tattico avanzato comando aerotattico Âˇ prendere ii comando comando unificato ord ine verbale comando e controllo

combativeness, combination, s. c. of fire and

manoeuvre combined, ag.

c. action c. Arms c. common user item

c. efforts c. exercise c. force

c. operations c. operations headquarters

c. operations command c. operations bombardment battery c. naval air operation c. military hospital combustion, c. chamber

spontaneous c. internal c. engine comfort,

aid and c. command, s .

alternate c. combat c. under the c. of to be in c. of an army to get a c.

tactical air c. to take c. unified c. word of c. c. and control

c. and liaison circuit

c. control information system c. control requirem_?nts analysis c. control system directorate c. post exercise c. axis c. and signals c. channel c. destruct siqnal c. net

c. maintenance management evaluations c. management inventory accounting c. personnel summary c. personnel management inspect ions

c. post vehicle c. post exercise

c. retrieval informat ion system c. technical inspection to command, v.t.i. commandant, s.

commandantship,

to commandeer, v.t. commandeering, commander,

c. in chief company c. high c. releasing c. unit c. vehicle c. wi ng c. c. in chief Allied

Forces

circu ito per comando e control lo sistema informativo per ii comando e ii control lo analisi dei requisiti per ii comando e contro llo direzione dei sistemi di comando e controllo esercitazione con i posti comando asse di trasmissione comando, co llegament i, trasmissioni catena di comando segnale telecomandato di distruzione rete di comun icazione tra comandi valutazioni sulla gestione e Âˇ manutenzione del comando contabilita inventario del la gestione de l comando rapporto sul personale del comando ispezioni al la gestione del personale del comando veicolo appartenente al posto di comando esercitazione di posto comando sistema per rintracciare informazioni ispezione tecnica del comando comandare , ordinare, essere a capo di comandante (specialmente di una scuola, accademia, distretto, porto, tortezza) tunzioni , utficio di cornandante requisire, arruolare torzatamente requisizione, reclutamento torzato comandante, capo, capitano di fregata comandante in capo comandante di compagnia comandante supremo comandante autorizzato (impiego di armi nucleari) comandante di reparto capo macchina (aer.) tenente colonnello, comandante d'uno stormo comandante in capo del le torze alleate

c. in chief Air Forces

Europe (NATO) c. in chief MediterÂˇ ranean commandership,

commanding, ag. c. officer commando, s.

c. man para c. commissariat, s .

c. department commisary, s. commissaryship, commission, s.

to get one's c. to resign one's c. sh ip in c. c. rank c. tor conventional armaments commissioned, ag.

c. officer non c. officer c. gunner c. commissary officer c. communications officer c. observer c. ord inance eng ineer

c. supply officer commodore,

air c. communication,

c. centre c. satelli te

c. zone crypto c. line of c. confidential c. long line c. radio c. route of c. signal c.

comandante in capo delle Forze Aeree in Europa comandante in capo delle torze del Mediterraneo ufficio, funzioni di cornandante che comanda ufficiale comandante commando, repa rto d i t ruppe d ' assalto, da sbarco soldato appartenente ad un commando reparto speciale di paraÂˇ cadutisti commissariato, intendenza utticio di commissariato ufficiale del cornm issariato, dell'intendenza cornmissariato .brevetto da ufficiale, l'armare (una nave da guerra) essere norninato ufficiale dare le dimissioni da ufficiale nave armata grado di utficiale comitato per le armi convenzionali nominato, autorizzato, munito di autorita ufficiale sottufficiale utficiale fuciliere uffic iale di commissariato ufficiale addetto ai co llegamenti ufficiale osservatore ufficiale del genio addetto ai materiali ufficiale addetto ai rifornimenti commodoro (mar. mil.) generale di brigata (aer. mil.) comunicazione, mezzo di comunicazione, trasmi!'.!'. ione centro trasmissioni satellite di telecomunicazioni zona delle comunicazion i comunicazioni in cifre linea di comunicazioni informazione riservata trasmissioni a lunga distanza trasmissioni radio via di comunicazione trasmissioni, collegament i 73

c. improvement pro-

gramme

c. instructions for reporting enemy sighting c. lie utenant companion, s. c. in arms company, s. c. headquarters headquarters c. headquarters and services c. half c. heavy weapons c. logistical support c.

machine gun c. medical c. mortar c. pioneer c. rifle c. ship's c. supporting area c. tank c. compartment, s. cargo c. cross c. compass,

c. bearing c. card compass direction c. needle c. north gyro c. mariner's c. magnetic c. to compass, v.t. compased by enemies compassionate, ag.

c. leave competition, s. open c. competitive, ag. c. examination competitively, av.

placed obtained c. complement, s. complete, ag.

c. round compliance,

to refuse c. with an order

programma miglioramento comunicazioni

di de lle

istruzioni per comunicare via radio l'avvistamento del medico tenente trasmissioni compagno commrlitone compagnia, (mar.) equipaggio, ciurma comando di compagnia compagnia comando compagnia comando e servizi plotone compagnia armi pesanti compagn ia di supporto logistico compagnia mitraglieri compagnia di sanita compagnia mortai compagnia pionieri compagnia fuci lieri equipaggio di una nave compagnia armi di accompagnamento compagnia carri compartimento compartimento di carico terreno compartimentale bussola, compasso rilevamento con la bussola rosa dei venti direzione della bussola ago della bussola nord della bussola bussola giroscopica bussola nautica bussola magnetica girare attorno, circondare, accerchiare accerchiato dai nemici compassionevole congedo straordinario (per gravi motivi familiari) competizione, gara concorso pubblico

di competizione, di gara, di concorso esame di concorso per mezzo di concorso posto vinto per concorso (mar. mil.) effettivo, effettivi completo, intero, totale munizione intera condiscendenza, acquiescenza rifiutare di ubbi dire ad un ordine

component, ag.s. air c. land c. operational c.

c. life compound ,

prisoner of war c. c. ag. c. helicopter compromised, ag . c. classified matter

c. document

documento

compulsory, ag.

c. military service computation,

enemy strength c. radioactivity detection, identificat ion and c. to compute, v.t. computed air release

point comrade, s. c. in arms comradeship, concealment,

s. s.

cover and c . to concentrate, v.t.i. c. fire to c. the fire of a battery concentration, s.

c. area c. camp c. of fire c. of forces mass c.

strategic c. concentric, ag.

c. fire

com-

promesso (visto da persona non autorizzata) obbl igatorio, forzato serv1z10 militare obbligatorio, obbligo di leva computo, calcolo, stima calcolo della forza del nemico rilevamento di radiazioni stimare, calcolare, valutare punto calcolato di aviolancio camerata, compagno commilitone cameratismo occultamento, copertura, dissimulazione, protezione copertura al tiro e alla vista concentrare, convergere fuoco convergente far convergere ii fuoco di una batteria ammassamento, concentramento zona di ammassamento, zona di radu no campo di concentramento concentrazione del fuoco concentrazione di forze concentramento di massa raduno strategico concentrico fuoco concenlralo in un

concept, s. c. of operations

operational c. condition,

componente componente aereo componente terrestre componente operativa durata di un elemento campo cintato, recinto campo di prigionieri di guerra composto, composito elicottero ibrido compromesso documenti riservati passati a persona non autorizzata

actual c. defence readiness c. meteorological c. operational c. road c.

solo punto concetto concetto, disegno di manovra concetto operativo condizione, ambiente, stato condizione reale stato di approntamento della difesa condizioni meteorologiche ambiente operativo viabilita

weather c. concussion fuse, condensation, s . c. trail condottiere, s .

conduct, s.

c. of attack

c. of defence c. of fire to conduct, v.t .i. to c. the operations to cone, v.t.i.

to be coned

to confederate, v.t.i. to c. oneself with conference, s. planning c. confidence, s. mutual c. confidential, ag . c. secretary NATO c. to confine, v.t.i. to c. to barracks confinement, s.

solitary c.

conflagration, s . conflict, s. conflict alert to confront, v.t. the confronting armies confusion, s.

the enemy was thrown into c. c. reflector to connect, v.t. i. connecting route to conquer, v.t.i. to c. a country conquerable, ag. conquering, ag .

the c. army conqueror, s. conquest, s.

the Norman C., (st.) conscientious, ag. c. objector 路 conscript, ag. s. to conscript, v.t.

condizioni meteorologiche spoletta a percussione condensazione scia di vapore condottiero (di truppe mercenarie) condotta condotta dell'attacco condotta del la difesa condotta del fuoco condurre, guidare, dirigere d irigere le operazioni avvolgere, dare forma di cono (aer.) essere investito dalla luce di riflettori nemici confederare, confederarsi allearsi con, formare una lega con conferenza, rapporto conferenza per pianificare fiducia fiducia reciproca riservato segretario particolare NATO riservatissimo relegare , tenere entro certi limiti, imprig ionare consegnare, punire reclusione, imprigionamento segregazione cellulare conflagrazione conflitto, lotta allarme in caso di guerra affrontare, incontrarsi, trovarsi di fronte gli opposti eserciti confusione, disordine, sba路 rag I iamento ii nemico fu sbarag liato

conscription, c. of wealth

riflettore atto a confondere col legare, unire, connet路 tere rotta di collegamento conquistare, essere vincitore conquistare un paese conquistabile, vincibile vincente, vittorioso I 'esercito vittorioso conquistatore conquista la conquista dell'lnghilterra da parte dei Normanni coscienzioso, scrupoloso obiettore di coscienza soldato di leva coscrivere, chiamare sot路 to le armi

to c. penetrat ion

tQ consolidate, v.t.i. c. a position constabulary, ag.

the mounted c. to constitute, v.t. constituted authority to constrain, v.t. constraint, s.

to put someone under c. construction s. c. equipment under c. director o f naval c. consumption, s. daily c. rate fuel c. unit contact,

to estab li sh c. with the enemy to lose c. with the enemy breaking off c. close c. c. action direct c. imminent c. improbable c. maintaining c. remote c. c. mine c. point c. report to contain, v.t.

containment, c. action

to contaminate, v.t. contaminated area contamination, s . c. control

c. control line

c. control point to contend, v.t.i. contending, ag.

the c. parties contingency,

cosc rizione, leva tassazione straordinaria (in tempo di guerra) consolidare, consolidarsi consolidare una posizione che riguarda la polizia, s. coll. la polizia la polizia a cavallo costituire, fondare, formare l'autorita costituita costringere, forzare costrizione, coazione, vinco lo mettern qualcuno in stato di coazione costruzione mate rial i da costruzione in corso di costruzione direttore del genie navale con sumo tasso di consumo giornaliero unita di consumo carburanti contatto prendere contatto col nem ico perdere ii contatto col nemico rottura del contatto contatto ravvic in ato azione d i presa d i contatto contatto diretto contatto imminente contatto improbabile mantenere ii contatto contatto a distanza mina a contatto punto di contatto rapporto su I contatto contenere, trattenere (ii nemico) contenere una penetrazione conten i mento azione di contenimento, tattica di arginamento contaminare, infettare zona contaminata contaminazione control lo per evitare la contaminazione linea di contro llo della contaminazione punto di controllo della con tarn in azione contendere, combattere, contrastare contendente, contrastante, rivale le parti in lotta cont ingenza 75

c. troops crack, ag . c. regiment c. shot to crack, v.t.i. a rifle cracked cradle, s.

starting c. craft,

air c. hover c. landing c. crampon,

crane, s. c. hook

mounted c. crate, s. crater,

credit,

movement c. nuclear c. to creep, v.i. creeping barrage c. mine creep, s. c. ho le creese, s. crenel, s. crenelle, s. crest, s. to crest, v.t.i. crested, ag. c. note paper crew, s .

air c. c. served weapon gun c. ship c. crime, s. c. sheet to crime, v.t. crimp, s. to crimp, v.t.i. cripple, s. war c. 78

truppe di sicurezza (fam.) scelto, di prim'ordine reggimento scelto tiratore scelto sch iantare, esplodere parti un colpo di fucile culla, intelaiatura di sostegno (di un pezzo di artiglieria) (aer.) culla di lanc io imbarcazione, natante, aereo aereop lano mezzo anfibio a cuscino d'aria mezzo da sbarco rampone, (pl.) brega a gancio, pinza per massi gru gancio della gru autogru cassa da imballaggio, gabbia per mine cavita (aperta da una bomba) credito, accreditamento credito di movimento credito nucleare strisciare, avanzare lentamente barriera di fuoco ad avanzamento lento mina galleggiante strisciamento rifugio sotterraneo pugnale del la Malesia feritoia feritoia pennacchio, criniera, ciÂˇ miero ornare di pennacch io, cresta ornate di cimiero, criniera, pennacchio carta da scrivere con stemma equipaggio, serventi di un' arma equipaggio di un aereo arma di reparto i serventi a un pezzo di artiglieria equipaggio di una nave, ciurma reato foglio delle punizioni incrim inare, condannare arruolatore fraudolento (d i soldati, marinai) arruolare, far arruolare (con inganno) storpio, zoppo, mutilate muti late di guerra

to cripple, v.t.i. he was crippled in the war Crisis Response Group critical, ag . c. point

c. shortage c. situation c. temperature c. terrain c. altitude c. speed

c. supplies ancJ materials c. communications system c. housing shortage

c. intelligence communications cross, s.

the George C. Maltese C. the Red C. to take the c. to cross, v.t.i. to c. swords cross-compartment, cross-country, s. c.c. mobility c.c. vehicle cross-fire, s. cross-servicing, s. cross-road, s.

cross-tell, s. crossbelt, s. crossbow, s. cross-examination, s. to cross-examine, v. t. to cross-question, v.t. crossing,

hasty c. level c. river c. c. area crown, cruise,

s. s.

average cruising speed cruiser, s. armoured c. guided-missile c. light c. c. battle force

muti lare fu mutilate durante la guerra gruppo incaricato per crisi di emergenza critico, vitale punto vitale deficienza critica situazione critica temperatura critica terreno vitale altitudine critica velocita che causa vibrazioni approvigionarnenlu crit ico sistema di trasmissioni critico mancanza critica di alloggi comunicazioni riservate critiche croce la croce di S. Giorgio la croce di Malta la Croce Rossa andar crociato incrociare, attraversare incrociare le spade, battersi a duello terreno compartimentato fuori strada mobilita fuori strada veicolo fuori strada fuoco incrociato assistenza reciproca strada laterale, crocicchio, bivio, incrocio stradale scambio d'informazioni al lo stesso livel lo operative cartucciera a tracolla balestra interrogatorio con contraddittorio sottoporre a controinterÂˇ rogatorio sottoporre a controinterrogatorio passaggio, traversata, attraversamento attraversamento rapido passaggio a livello attraversamento di fiume zona di attraversamento corona di paracadute croc iera velocita media di crociera incrociatore incrociatore corazzato incrociatore lancia missili incrociatore leggero forza incrociatori da battaglia

c. destroyer flottilla c. division c. scouting force c. squadron crump, s.. to crump, v.t. crusade, s. crusader, s. to crush, v.t.i. to c. the enemy the enemy wc1s crushÂˇ ed down by our victory cry, s. battle c. war c. cryptanalysis, s. cryptocommunications,

s. c. centre c. officer cryptogram, s. cryptographer, s. cryptographic, ag. cryptography, s. cryptomaterial, s. cryptopart, s.

cuirass, s. cuirassier, s. culverin, s. cummerbund, cunette,

flottigl ia composta da caccia incrociatori divisione incrociatori forza incrociatori esplorante squadra incrociatori (sl. mil.) proiettile, esplosivo (sl.) colpire violentemente, bombardare crociata crociato annientare annientare ii nemico ii nemico tu annientato dalla nostra vittoria grido grido di battaglia grido di guerra analisi crittografica trasmissioni citrate centro cifra ufficiale addetto alla cifra crittogramma crittografo crittografico crittografia materiale di crittografia crittoparte (divisione di un messaggio per motivi di sicurezza) corazza corazziere (st. mil.) colubrina sciarpa portata come cintura (cavalleria Indiana) cunetta di trincea

to ring the c.

currency, custody,

in safe c. safe c. of captured personnel to take someone into c. customs, s. c. authority to pass through c. c. duties c. house officer c. tariff c. union customable, ag. to cut, v.t.i. to c. steps to c. down to c. off the enemy to c. off negotiat ions to c. off supplies cut off, s. cuthbert, s. cutter, s. wire c. cutter, s. revenue c. cyanogen, ag. cyanogen agent cycle, s .

dare ii segnale de l coprifuoco dati aggiornati al momento dato custodia, vigilanza, imprigionamento in luogo sicuro, sotto buona guardia custodia di personale catturato al nemico arrestare qualcuno dogana autorita doganale passare la dogana dazio doganale doganiere tariffa doganale unione doganale soggetto a dogana tagliare, tagliarsi, intagliare intagl iare gradini sterm inare ridurre tagliar fuori ii nemico interrompere i negoziati tagliare i viveri arresto di un motore a reazione imboscato strumento per tagliare pinza tagliafili lancia armata nave guardacoste cianogeno tossico del sangue ciclo

~ ~~ ~~H~~~ MA is a flexible . company founded in 1943. Since 1948 has been acii ve in design, development and production of electronic equipment tor defence . Main activities are radars tor ground, shipborne, airborne, missile applir:::itions and related display systems. The company broad spectrum permits the supply of turnkey systems tailored to the end-user needs.

SEGNALAMENTO MARITTIMO ED AEREO

R coa~tal MA's basic product lines and business sectors include: High d elinitio n and discriminalion e.J radar control stations. both tor maritime trailic m anagement system s and mililary

/sea ~PPhcatio n (anti in1ru sion. c oastal defence, mine splash dctec;ion}: Shipborne navigation headrc rad~trs de~oted lo low, veryMlow air cover.age {a1,ti sea skimmers): Missile active homing variety ECM dev,c es. _ior SSM (OTOMAT MK2) ~no ASM

SMli~~f.:~~'.dJ2_".''lh a

(M~n_e_':!~2~

oatrol aircr~lt: Standard Pod contained search radars 1or fixed wing :-1ircraf1 lo be emptoyed in conjuntion with ASM; Integrated search and tracking radars for A/A defence 10 be employed bo1h o n sp ec1ahzed trucks (OTOMATIC) or o r, semi-mobite/ fvccd s1aticm for :0oint delence: applied research mmed toward millim e1ric wave~ {u.o 10 100 GHz) in active and passive sensors (rad1orneler); Duct analisys and e!ectroinagoe1ic p rop;1gation for ecas1

BOOK REVI EWS

DI'.FESAOGGI lll:FEi'iCI: TOMY

MARZIANO BRIGNOLI

MASSIMO D~ZEGLIO Una biografia politica

Le lndustrie della Difesa Th e Defence Industries AH NUARI Dllll JNOUST11ÂŁ R AI.IAHf Hl..ff.CH THl ITAUAN Ht-TKH INDUSTIIIES OlltlCTOIHS

"Le industrie della Difesa - Annuario 1988" (The Defence Industries - Year Book 1988). Supplement to No. 2-3 of "Difesa Oggi" (Defence Today), published by Publi and Consult, Roma, 1988, pages 304, Lire 50,000. T he Indusrri es of Defence - Year-Book

1988 is, lOgether wirh T h e A ir-S pace Industries, The Industries of Security and T h e Industries for Civil Protection, part oi the work "Yrar Books of Italian HI-TECH Industries. T he four books arc devoted to differenc economic sectors having in co mmon the use of advanced technologies. Year Books of Italian HI-TECH Industries represents, so as to say, an e ncyclopaed ia regarding those firms whi ch operate in the viral sectors of the industrial structure of the Nation. The Industries of Defence - Year Book 1988 maintai ns the general lines of the previo us edi rion and u n derlines the impo rtance o f a b il ingual , Icalian- Englis h, text, for publications oi t his kind des igned for an international p ubli c. The book is divided into three parts; the first part summarizes in syno ptic rabies the activity of about 800 industries operating in the Defence branch , subdivided into classes of items. in the second part a pictu re of the econom ic sicuario n of the ind ust ries of Deience in Italy is drawn om toget her with an analys is rega rdi ng the tec hnologic con dition and how t he fo reign and domest ic policy affects this field. Lastly, in the th ird part we find a guide co the organ ization, financia l situation, acri v it ies a nd p ro g ra m m es as well as international interests of each industry. T he book is important for all chose w ho wish to be up-dated in this field.

Augusto Mastrofini

.Marziano Brignoli: "Massimo d'Azeglio Una biografia politica" (Massimo d' Azeglio - A political biography), published by Mursia, Milan, 1988, pages 365, lire 35,000. Jvfassimo d'Azeglio may be considered a fairly atypical figure even in the varied world of the minor and major c haracters o f the Risorgimcnr o. Cava lry officer, p ai me r, nove lis t, po lit ica l wr it e r : a sum o f exper iences wh ich reached its peak in the most importan t and mean ingful appointment as President o f the Cabinet of rhe K ingdom of Sardinia which he occu p ied from May 1849 to May 1852, immediately after the defeat o f Novara w h ich ended the first war of independence, to the advem of C avour. In h is politica l activity d' Azeglio p ut so me oi h is easy-going and unconventional art istic style, but above all he put h is honesty. Hr was the firm custodian of the Stature and the n ational flag, at a time when neither the o ne nor the other enjoyed the sympathy of the peop le of Europe and of Italy. \'fhen he was replaced as head of the government by the mo re ingen ious and open-minded Cavour, he retired and started painting for a living, remaining yet a 111,111 on whon to count for di fficult appointments such as the Prefecture of Milan in 1860 and whose sense of duty as regards the lnstirucions would never allow him to refuse engagemems which, in trut h, gave him more rhorns than roses. The book outlines a p ictu re of Massimo d' Azeglio's pu blic life, w ith its lights and shades; it draws o ut the pol it ical personality oi this peculiar m an wit h h is qualities and his li mits. It is designed as a contribu tion to a better underst anding of a man w ho is still today an example oi pu blic loyalty and ho nesty.

Ferdinando Schettino

"Patria indipendente' ' (Indepe ndent Fatherland) fortnightly magazi ne of veterans and the Resistance, year XXXVH, Number 16-17, Rome, 68 pages, Lire 2,0C0 Numbe r 16-17/1988 of " P a1.r iJ indipendeme", set up in coincidence with ths: day celebrat ing the Armed Forces, w ,1s drawn up in a "monographic" k ey to u nderli ne the love, rhe appraisal and the solidarity that this publication intends to gi ve to the Armed Forces. Among the many and very interest ing articles contained in this n umber, compiled both by po litical and military personalities, mention must be made of the article d rawn from President Cossiga's highly significant speech at the C VL meeting in Cu neo; Minister Zanone's interview on th e subject oi security an d peace; those regardin g the formation of the office r and n on com missioned officer Cadres; the first of ;1 series devoted to rhc recruit ment systems ol the armies of ot her Countries; the brief, but s ig nifi ca n t no te d evoted to a heroi c: cornbatam o f rhe Resistance, who w 1, awarded the gold Medal for Military Valour, Lieutenant Co lonel i\ndreani. T he o fficer, after whom the J 1 armoured Bacralion w:1, named, represen ts one of the briglu e,t rxamplcs of patriotism. Lastly, the wriri nb dedicated to the monu ment recently unveiled in Rome in memorv o f the heroic behaviour oi the " Acqu i" Div ision at Cefaloni a and Coriu. "Patria indip~ndente", in fact, has reach d its aim oi wanting, on the 70th an nive rs,1nÂˇ of Victory pay homagr to the Armed Fore,:, , acknowledging the fact that they are p illars of o ur democracy, in security an d 111 peace.

th,-

Massimiliano Angelini

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