ISSN 2348-1218 (print) International Journal of Interdisciplinary Research and Innovations ISSN 2348-1226 (online) Vol. 10, Issue 3, pp: (14-23), Month: July 2022 - September 2022, Available at: www.researchpublish.com
HAMAS IN POWER DR. BALAL ALI (ASSISTANT PROFESSOR) DEPARTMENT OF CIVICS AND ETHICAL STUDIES ADIGRAT UNIVERSITY, TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.6790225
Published Date: 02-July-2022
Abstract: In August 2005, Israel’s disengagement from Gaza Strip took place, Hamas credited itself that due to its policies and actions Israel was forced to leave Gaza Strip. Hamas’ overwhelming electoral victory in the January 2006 elections shocked the entire world. Hamas won 74 seats out of 132. After a long negotiation, a National Unity Government was formed on 17th March 2007 headed by Ismail Haniyeh as Prime Minister accompanied by a Fatah Vice-Prime Minister. The National Unity Government could not last long. Power -sharing proved to be more difficult than anticipated, exclusively within the field of security. In June 2007, the factional conflict between Hamas and Fatah culminated with scenes in Gaza resembling a civil war. The Palestinian civil strife in Gaza led to a political division of the Palestinian territories divided in the West Bank controlled by Mahmud Abbas and the Gaza Strip controlled by the democratically elected Hamas government. This resulted in a subsequent breakdown in the National Unity Government. Aftermath of Hamas’ takeover of Gaza, major international players and Israel strengthened their plan of siege, isolating Hamas even more and penalizing the whole of Gaza in the deceptive belief that by undermining Hamas and its capability to deliver they would compel Gazans to overthrow it. This paper is an attempt to examine the challenges faced by Hamas in power. Keywords: Hamas, Israel, Fatah, National Unity Government, Factional Conflict.
1. INTRODUCTION ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT FROM GAZA STRIP (2003 – 2005) On 18 December 2003, Ariel Sharon revealed his initiative for a unilateral withdrawal from some territory and settlements at the Herzliya Conference of the Private Israeli University, the Interdisciplinary Centre, Herzliya. Later on, it was disclosed that it will be the Gaza Strip and four isolated, nearly empty settlements in the northern part of the West Bank. 1 In the months preceding Sharon revelation of his Disengagement Plan, there had been growing signs of dissatisfaction and protest within Israeli public. This was further accelerated by a chain of events such as 2 – in September 2003, a group of Israeli Air Force pilots, both on active duty and in reserve, spoke out against the policy of “targeted killings.” In a letter addressed to General Halutz, they refused to participate in the future missions in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank which brought the lives of civilians at risk. Two colonels, five lieutenant-colonels, nine commanders, six captains, and, particularly, General Yiftah Spector, who had led the attack on the Osirak Nuclear Reactor in Iraq in 1981, were the signatories of the letter.3
1
Galia Golan, Israel and Palestine: Peace Plans and Proposals from Oslo to Disengagement, (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2007), p. 119. 2 Ibid., p. 121. 3 Enderlin, Charles, The Lost Years: Radical Islam, Intifada, and Wars in the Middle East 2001 – 2006, (New York: Other Press, LLC, 2007), p. 207.
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