Issue XXII.I

TeamMembers

EditorinChief DeboraHan

EditorinChief CharlotteBright

EditorinChief CrosbyRosental

ChiefofOperations ScottElliot

StaffWriter AaniqaKarmali

StaffWriter TéaBreedon

StaffWriter SpencerStarosta

StaffWriter AlexBorgert

StaffWriter JayaKumar

AssistantEditor RheaPuri

AssitantEditor AlexandraDuchesne

AssistantEditor MelissaCardenas

Letter from the Editor

DearReaders,

WelcometoIssueXXII.Iof The Observer,“MultipolarTransitions”.Asweclosethe booksonasummerthatreshapedglobalpolitics,itbecomesclearthatwearewitnessingnot merelycyclicalchangesininternationalrelations,butfundamentalstructuralshiftsinhowpower operatesontheworldstage.

Ourcontributorshavecapturedcriticalmomentsfromthissummerthatilluminate broaderpatternsofchange.AaniqaKarmalitraceshowAmericanprotectionismisparadoxically strengtheningChineseinfluenceinthestrategicallyvitalPacificIslands.TéaBreedon investigateswhetherBRICScanovercomeinternalcontradictionstogenuinelychallenge Westerndominance,orifitmerelyreproduceshierarchicalpowerstructuresinnewforms. SpencerStarostaanalyzeshowTrump'stariffpoliciesareacceleratingAmericaneconomic declinewhileinadvertentlyempoweringcompetitors.AlexBorgertdocumentsthefracturingof WesternconsensusonIsrael,revealingdeepercracksintransatlanticunity.JayaKumarexplores hownuclearpowersareabandoningarmscontrolcommitments,underminingthecredibilityof globalgovernanceinstitutionstheythemselvescreated.

Thesedevelopmentsraisefundamentalquestionsaboutthenatureofinternationalorder itself.Arewewitnessingthebirthpangsofagenuinelymultipolarworld,orsimplythechaotic transitionbetweenonehegemonicsystemandanother?Caninstitutionsdesignedforaunipolar momentadapttomultipolarrealities?Andcrucially,whosevoicesarecenteredinthese transformations,andwhoseremainmarginalized?Aswecontinuetonavigatethesemultipolar transitions,TheObserverremainscommittedtoprovidingrigorousanalysisthatcutsthrough bothtriumphalistnarrativesofWesterndeclineandromanticvisionsofalternativeorders.The worldweareenteringwillbeneithersimplybetternorworsethanwhatcamebefore;itwillbe different,withnewopportunitiesandnewdangersthatdemandclear-eyedassessment.Thank youforjoiningusinthiscrucialworkofunderstandingourchangingworld.

TheObserverwouldliketoclarify,theopinionsofthearticlesarethoseofthewriters andthewritersalone.Opinionspresentedinarticlesdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsofthe Observerasanorganzation,noraretheyaffiliatedwiththeviewsofQIAAorQueen’s.Please keepthisinmindandreadthewriter’sworkswithanopenmind,directinganyquestionstoour email:theobserver@qiaa.orgorfeelfreetomessageourinstagram@the.observerqiaa

Asalways,happyreadingandahugeshoutouttoourteamfortheircontinuedhardworkand dedicationincreatingthisissue!!

TableofContents

01 ThePacificIslands:ATaleofAmericanNeglectandChinese Rescue?

❖Aaniqa Karmali

02 BRICSExpansion:GlobalSouthSolidarityorChina’s StrategicInfluence?

❖Téa Breedon

03 TrumpTariffFanaticism:ThePlungeofDominanceinthe WorldEconomy

❖Spencer Starosta

04 HumanitarianReckoning(LiveStreamedDestruction):How GazaisRedefiningWesternDiplomacy

❖Alex Borgert

05 DoubleStandardsintheNuclearAge:A60-YearLong ChronicleofErodingCredibilityof GlobalArmsControl

❖Jaya Kumar

ThePacificIslands:ATaleof AmericanNeglectandChinese Rescue?

By: Aaniqa Karmali

TheUnitedStates’global partnershipsarecrumblingunderTrump’s rule,andChinahasswoopedintotake America’splace.

Trump’ssecondtermasAmerican Presidenthasbeenunderscoredbypolicies toutingprotectionismaboveallelse.Butin “protecting”nationaleconomicinterests, TrumphasexposedanAchillesheelin nationalsecurity—thePacific Islands—givingChina,anemergingglobal power,theopportunitytocapitalizeonthis weakness.IfChinacontinuestofillthegaps createdbytheUnitedStates’volatileglobal tradestrategy,itmayindeeddethronethe UnitedStatesasthe“greatglobal stabilizer.”1

OnAugust7th,post-“Liberation Day,”theUnitedStatesimposedtariffs rangingfrom15to50%onnearlyallofits tradingpartners.2 Thesetariffhikes,themost significantsincetheGreatDepression,have beenframedasthesolutiontoostensibly unfaireconomicrelationshipsbetweenthe

1 Edel,C,Paik,K,&Augé,J (2025) Shifting Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown Centerfor StrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS). http://wwwjstororg/stable/resrep71541

2 Minsberg,T (2025,August7) A Timeline of Trump’s On-Again, Off-Again Tariffs TheNewYork Times https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/13/business/econo my/trump-tariff-timelinehtml

USanditstradeallies.3 Whilethis aggressiveapproachhasindeednarrowed thetradedeficit,itmaybecostingthe UnitedStatesitsvaluablestakeinthe PacificIslands.4

GettyImages/MarioTama)"

ThePacificIslandscomprisea highly-contestedregionbetweentheUSand China,actingasastrategicdefencepoint betweenAmericanmilitaryfacilitiesand EastAsianshorelines.5 ForChina,gaining influenceoverthePacificIslandscould effectivelythwartAmericanattemptsto expandmilitarypower,whichwouldfurther threatenAmericanhegemony.Moreover,

3 Harithas,B,Meng,K,Brown,E,&Mouradian, C.(2025,April3). “Liberation Day” Tariffs Explained CenterforStrategicandInternational Studies. https://wwwcsisorg/analysis/liberation-day-tariffs-ex plained

4 Shalal,A (2025,August7) Trump may look like he’s winning the trade war, but hurdles remain | reuters Reuters https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportatio n/trump-may-look-like-hes-winning-trade-war-hurdle s-remain-2025-08-07/

5 Needham,K (2022,September20) Pacific Islands a key U S military buffer to China’s ambitions, report says | Reuters Reuters https://wwwreuterscom/world/asia-pacific/pacific-isl ands-key-us-military-buffer-chinas-ambitions-report2022-09-20/

thisshiftwoulduniquelypositionChinato gatherenhancedintelligenceonAmerican militaryoperations,aswellastoaccess portsandExclusiveEconomicZones.6 The UnitedStates’militarydependenceonthe PacificIslandsandChina’sinterestin enteringtheregionmandatethecontinued stewardshipofpartnershipswiththePacific Islandnations—alongwithstewardshipof theislandsthemselves.

Fordecades,theUnitedStates benefitedgreatlyfromCompactofFree Association(COFA)agreementswiththe RepublicoftheMarshallIslands,Federated StatesofMicronesia,andRepublicof Palau.7 Inexchangeforgrants,accessto federalprograms,andtradebenefits,these agreementsallowedtheUSmilitarytogain accesstoterritory,airspace,andsealanesin theaforementionedPacificnations.8

Thecompactagreementswere renewedin2024bytheBiden administration,andnow,itistheTrump administration’sresponsibilitytoupholdits endofthebargain.9 Otherwise,theUnited

6 Davidson,P.,etal.(2022). China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/ssg-c hina-influence-on-freely-associated-states-of-norther n pacific.pdf

7 Lum,T (2024,April25) The compacts of free association | congress.gov | Library of Congress. LibraryofCongress https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12194

8 Hunt,E (2023,April11) The New Battle for the Compact States.ForeignPolicyInFocus. https://fpiforg/the-new-battle-for-the-compact-states/ #:~:text=As%20logistics%20hubs%2C%20the%20isl ands,(R%2DMO)%20explained

9 CambridgeUniversityPress (2024) NewCompact ofFreeAssociationagreementswithMicronesia,the MarshallIslands,andPalauapprovedbyCongress

Stateswillloseaccesstothisstrategic Pacificcorridor,potentiallybeingreplaced byitschiefrivalintheEast.

Giventheimportanceofthisregion toAmericannationalsecurity,theUShas historicallyuphelditssideoftheCOFA agreements.However,it’suncertainwhether thecurrentadministrationwillbeableto preservethesepartnerships.Trump’s aggressiveprotectionisttradepoliciesand apathytowardsenvironmentalcausescould verywellcosttheUnitedStatesitspower withinthePacificIslandsregion.

AsofAugust7th,theUnitedStates imposeda15%tariffrateonthePacific IslandnationsofFiji,Vanuatu,andPapua NewGuinea—5%higherthanthe “universal”tariffonUSimports.10 Noteven theCOFAstates,vitalpartnerstotheUnited States,escaped“LiberationDay” unscathed—theRepublicoftheMarshall Islands,FederatedStatesofMicronesia,and RepublicofPalauallfacetariffratesof 10%.Whilethesetariffratesarenotthe highestimposedonUStradepartners,they representanoverarchingdisrespectofthe long-standingrelationshipbetweenthe PacificIslandsandtheUnitedStates.

Trumphasjustifiedhissweeping tariffapproachbyclaimingit’sameansof “levellingtheplayingfield.”Butforthe PacificIslands,smalleconomieswith

American Journal of International Law, 118(3), 544–549 https://doiorg/101017/ajil202440

10 US tariffs: Some Pacific Nations get relief, others face increase RadioNewZealand (2025,August3) https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/568912/us-tariffssome-pacific-nations-get-relief-others-face-increase

povertyratesofupto37.5%11,thisisnot, whatsoever,amatteroflevelingtheplaying field.12 Proportionally,thesetariffsharm PacificIslandpopulationsfarmorethanthey couldeverbenefittheUnitedStates.Imports fromVanuatucomprisemerely0.0004%13 of totalUSimports,buton“LiberationDay,” hightariffratesjeopardizeditsvitalKava industry—anindustrycomprising70%of thenation’stotalexports,withtheUnited Statesasitsprimaryexportdestination.14 TheUnitedStatesisrecklesslypunching downonthevulnerable,relativelyminiscule economiesofnationsessentialtoAmerican security

Ifonlytodeepenthecut,theUnited Stateshassignificantlycutfundingtothe PacificIslands.OnJune30,2025,the Trumpadministrationofficiallyshutdown USAID,theindependentagencyresponsible forforeignassistance,andhasindefinitely pausedallforeignassistanceprogramming. Trumpplanstocut90%ofallUSAID programming,andthePacificIslandshave alreadybeguntosuffertheconsequences.15

11 BasicStatistics2024.AsianDevelopmentBank. (2025)

https://www.adb.org/mobile/basic-statistics-2024/

12 Edel,C,Paik,K,&Augé,J (2025) Shifting

Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown Centerfor StrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS). http://wwwjstororg/stable/resrep71541

13 United States Imports by Country.Trading Economics (2024)

https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/imports-b y-country

14 ABCPacific.(2025,April4). How do Donald Trump’s tariffs hit the Pacific? Fiji, Vanuatu and Nauru among hardest hit ABCPacific

https://wwwabcnetau/pacific/donald-trump-us-tariff s-on-pacific-fiji-vanuatu-nauru/105138028

15 Edel,C.,Paik,K.,&Augé,J.(2025). Shifting

Tides: The National Security Implications of the

ThePacificIslandsareespecially vulnerabletotheeffectsofclimatechange, whichTrumpinfamouslydeclareda “Chinesehoax”backin2016.16 Asof USAID’stermination,a$2.5milliongrant forthePacificIslandsAmbassador Self-HelpSmallGrantsProgramwitha focusonclimatechangemitigation,aswell asa$905,487grantforthePacificIslands EmergencyManagementAlliance,have alreadybeencancelled.13 WhiletheUShas neverbeentheleadingdonortothePacific Islands,theseprogrammingcutshavehada tangibleimpactonlocalpopulations.For PapuaNewGuinea,Vanuatu,Palau,Fiji, andtheSolomonIslands,100%ofUSAID programminghasbeenterminated,puttinga suddenhalttohealth,conservation,and developmentprojects.Forexample,theloss ofUSAIDfundinghasforcedPapuaNew Guineatopauseaforestconservation programmethatservedasakeypartofits climateactioninitiatives.17

TheTrumpadministration’s2016 movetowithdrawtheU.S.fromtheParis Agreementhighlightsitslackof commitmenttoaddressingclimatechange. StakeholdersfromthePacificIslandshave consistentlyemphasizedtheneedforglobal

United States’ Pacific Drawdown.Centerfor StrategicandInternationalStudies(CSIS) http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep71541

16 Wong,E (2016,November18) Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax Beijing Says It Is Anything But TheNewYorkTimes https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/chin a-trump-climate-changehtml

17 Prasad,S (2025,April7) Do U S tariffs signal an end to business as usual for Pacific? Islands Business https://islandsbusiness.com/opinion/do-u-s-tariffs-sig nal-an-end-to-business-as-usual-for-pacific/

partnerstoseriouslycommittoclimate action,andtheUShasfailedatdoingso.In responsetoTrump’sinitialtariff announcementson“LiberationDay,”Prime MinisterJamesMarapeofPapuaNew Guineaassertedthecountry’swillingnessto replacetheUnitedStateswithothertrading partners.Hesaid,“Ourtradingpartnersin Asia—includingChina,Indonesia, Malaysia,thePhilippines,andothers—have treatedPapuaNewGuineawithrespect, honor,andfairness.Theseareourclosest neighborsandrepresentproximitymarkets thatcontinuetooffergrowingopportunities forourproducers.”15

UndertheTrumpadministration,the UShasclearlyproventobeanunreliable partnerforthePacificIslands,subjecting thesenationstounnecessaryfinancialperil andanincreasedriskofclimatedisaster Whatwasonceastrongalliancebetweenthe UnitedStatesandthePacificIslandsisnow momentsfromdemise.

InthewakeofthisAmerican tragedy,Chinahashadthechancetostepin andassertitselfasanalignedandreliable partnertothePacificIslands.Chinahas alreadyinitiatedeffortstofilltheUnited States’placeinthePacific.Shortlyafter “LiberationDay,”China’sambassadorsto PapuaNewGuineaandFijireinforcedtheir commitmenttoenhancingtradewiththese nationsinlightofAmerican“economic bullying.”13

ItseemsasthoughChinahasalso takenthewheelwhenitcomestoclimate actioninthePacificIslands.ThispastMay,

theChina-PacificIslandCountriesForeign Ministers’Meetinghostedseniorofficials fromelevenPacificIslandcountries.Atthis meeting,China,asignatoryoftheParis ClimateTreaty,announcedplansforovera hundredclimate-relatedprojectsinthe PacificIslands.13

“PhotographofthethirdChina-PacificIslandCountriesForeign Ministers’MeetinginXiamen,ChinaonMay28,2025 (Image credit:TheStrategist TheAustralianStrategicPolicyInstitute Blog)”

AstheUnitedStates’current administrationhasdramaticallyscaledback ESG(environmental,social,and governance)asanationalpriority,Chinahas donetheopposite,positioningitmore favourablyintheeyesofthe climate-consciousPacificIslands.18 IfChina continuestofosterpartnershipswiththe PacificIslands,itcouldbecomeamaritime superpowerandcriticallyenhanceits intelligenceofAmericandefenceoperations.

China’sstrategicadvancementsin thePacificIslandsarejustoneindicatorof thehistorichegemonicshifthappening beforeoureyes.Astheconsequencesof

18 Davidson,P,etal (2022) China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific https://wwwusiporg/sites/default/files/2022-09/ssg-c hina-influence-on-freely-associated-states-of-norther n pacificpdf

Trump’santagonistictradestrategyunfold, UStradepartnersareturningtoemerging powerslikeChinatoactasthereliable globalleadertheUnitedStatesonceclaimed tobe.

CountertoTrump’sintentions,rather than“MakingAmericaGreatAgain”his volatileglobaltradestrategymayinfactbe MakingChinaGreaterThanEver.

References

ABCPacific.(2025,April4). How do

Donald Trump’s tariffs hit the Pacific? Fiji, Vanuatu and Nauru among hardest hit.ABCPacific.

https://www.abc.net.au/pacific/donal d-trump-us-tariffs-on-pacific-fiji-van uatu-nauru/105138028

Basic Statistics 2024.AsianDevelopment Bank.(2025).

https://www.adb.org/mobile/basic-sta tistics-2024/

CambridgeUniversityPress.(2024).New CompactofFreeAssociation agreementswithMicronesia,the MarshallIslands,andPalau approvedbyCongress. American Journal of International Law, 118(3), 544–549.

https://doi.org/10.1017/ajil.2024.40

Davidson,P.,etal.(2022). China’s Influence on the Freely Associated States of the Northern Pacific

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/fil es/2022-09/ssg-china-influence-on-fr

eely-associated-states-of-northern_pa cific.pdf

Edel,C.,Paik,K.,&Augé,J.(2025).

Shifting Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown.Centerfor StrategicandInternationalStudies (CSIS).

http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep715 41

Harithas,B.,Meng,K.,Brown,E.,& Mouradian,C.(2025,April3).

“Liberation Day” Tariffs Explained CenterforStrategicandInternational Studies.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/liberati on-day-tariffs-explained

Hunt,E.(2023,April11). The New Battle for the Compact States.Foreign PolicyInFocus.

https://fpif.org/the-new-battle-for-the -compact-states/#:~:text=As%20logi stics%20hubs%2C%20the%20island s,(R%2DMO)%20explained

Lum,T.(2024,April25). The compacts of free association | congress.gov | Library of Congress.Libraryof Congress.

https://www.congress.gov/crs-produc t/IF12194

Minsberg,T.(2025,August7). A Timeline of Trump’s On-Again, Off-Again Tariffs. TheNewYorkTimes.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/1

3/business/economy/trump-tariff-tim eline.html

Needham,K.(2022,September20). Pacific Islands a key U.S. military buffer to China’s ambitions, report says | Reuters.Reuters.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asiapacific/pacific-islands-key-us-militar y-buffer-chinas-ambitions-report-202 2-09-20/

Prasad,S.(2025,April7). Do U.S tariffs signal an end to business as usual for Pacific? IslandsBusiness.

https://islandsbusiness.com/opinion/ do-u-s-tariffs-signal-an-end-to-busin ess-as-usual-for-pacific/

Shalal,A.(2025,August7). Trump may look like he’s winning the trade war, but hurdles remain | reuters.Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/aut os-transportation/trump-may-look-lik e-hes-winning-trade-war-hurdles-re main-2025-08-07/

United States Imports by Country.Trading Economics.(2024).

https://tradingeconomics.com/unitedstates/imports-by-country

US tariffs: Some Pacific Nations get relief, others face increase.RadioNew Zealand.(2025,August3).

https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/5 68912/us-tariffs-some-pacific-nation s-get-relief-others-face-increase

Wong,E.(2016,November18). Trump Has Called Climate Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says It Is Anything But. TheNewYorkTimes. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/1 9/world/asia/china-trump-climate-ch ange.html

BRICSExpansion:GlobalSouth SolidarityorChina’sStrategic

Influence?

By: Téa Breedon

BRICSisexpanding,butsoisits potentialforinternaldivisions.TheJuly 2025BRICSsummitinRioDeJaneiro reinforcedthebloc’scommitmentto multilateralismamongGlobalSouth countries(Darnaletal.,2025).WithBRICS’ 11membersnowrepresenting40%ofthe globaleconomy,theG7facesthreatstoits dominance(“TheGuardianviewonBRICS growingup,”2025).Despitethis,BRICS’ expansionwelcomesopportunitiesfor disunityasinternaldivisionsworsenover competinginterests.Thecentraltensionis thusclear:canBRICSovercomeitsinternal fragmentation,orwillhistoricalgrievances anddifferentialprioritiesleadittoreproduce theveryglobalhierarchyitaimsto dismantle?Inabroaderglobalcontext,the debateaskswhetherexpansionstrengthens cohesionorexacerbatesdivisionsasChina leveragesthebloctocounterU.S.influence. Assuch,inthecontextofpowerimbalances, competinginterests,andhistorical grievances,thispaperarguesthatBRICS’ capacitytobalanceinternaldivisionsagainst externalexpansionwilldeterminewhetherit trulyembracesamultilateralworldorderor simplyreproducesanewunipolarhierarchy.

BRICS’distrustofWestern-centred financialinstitutionslargelystemsfroma post-WorldWarIIorderwhichestablished U.S.dominanceintrade,finance,and development.Bycreatinginstitutionssuch

astheInternationalMonetaryFund(IMF) andWorldBank,whichroutinelyoffered unmanageablebailoutstotheGlobalSouth, theU.S.becameaneconomicpowerhouse (Meng,1988,p.264).Moreover,asaresult ofthe1973oilembargo,oil-richcountriesin theMiddleEastbeganplacingsurplus revenuesinAmericanbanks(Shadlen,2006, p.8).Floodedwithcapital,theU.S.then recycledthesefundsintohigh-interestloans totheGlobalSouthforprofit(Mazower, 2012,pp.343–377).Theresultantsurgein foreignindebtednessisbestillustratedby Brazil,whichsufferedadebtcrisisinthe 1980safteraccumulatinglargedebtsfrom theU.S.andbeingforcedtoturntoIMF bailouts(GalanoIII,1994,p.329).These bailoutswereconditional,tiedtostringent austeritymandatesthatgavetheIMF economicinfluenceoverBrazil’sdomestic policies(Cardoso&Fishlow,1990,pp. 281–290).Thesecyclesofdebtthus entrenchedthehistoricalgrievancesthat spurthebloc’saversiontoWesternfinancial institutionsanditscommitmentto multilateralism.Today,the2025summit servesasareminderofthegrievancesfaced bytheGlobalSouth.ForBrazilandSouth Africa,asvictimsofthedebtcrisis,the distrustinAmericanfinancialsystemsfuels theirambitionstoescapeWestern dominance.

Despiteitsrise,internaldivisions underminethebloc’sunity.Forinstance,the blocdivergesinopiniononenergy,with Russiaaimingtopreserveitsrichfossilfuel revenueandBrazilfavouringashiftaway fromunsustainablesources(Bris,2025). Thisdivergenceisexacerbatedbyhistorical

grievancesasBrazilandSouth Africa—shapedbyexperiencesof indebtednessresultingfromtheoil embargo—arewaryoftheinfluence affordedbyoilwealth.Secondly,BRICS suffersanimbalanceofinfluenceamongits members;beyonditsinfluenceasthebloc’s largesteconomy,Chinagarners disproportionatepowerthroughstrategy. Beijing’ssupportforexpansionrevealsits strategicinterests;byexpandingBRICS, Chinabenefitsfrommorepartnersthatitcan integrateintoitseconomicstrategy(Sarpong &Sibiri,2024).ThroughtheBeltandRoad Initiative(BRI),Chinaframescollaboration asadvancingtheindustrialdevelopmentof partnercountries,whileinpracticelooping statesintoitslargerstrategyofsecuring resourcesandstimulatingtrade(McBrideet al.,2023).Expansionthereforethreatens cohesionasChinaleveragesBRICStoadopt newpartnershipsandstrengthenits influence.

Brazil’sPresidentLuizInacioLuladaSilvaspeaksduringthe BRICSSummit,attheMuseumofModernArtinRiodeJaneiro, Brazil,onJuly6,2025 (ImageCredit: Ricardo Moraes | Reuters)

Inawiderglobalcontext,BRICS’ expansionraisesthequestionofwhether multilateralismissustainableorif self-interestandpowerimbalanceswill simplyreproduceunipolardominanceina newform.InresponsetoBRICS’growing

influence,theIMFhasawarded disproportionatedecision-makingpowerto theG7,grantingtheU.S.nearly17%ofthe board’svotesdespiteconstitutingonly4% oftheglobalpopulation(“TheGlobalNorth HasNineTimesMoreVotingPoweratthe IMFthantheGlobalSouth,”2025).In prioritizingU.S.influence,theIMFmay exacerbateChina-U.S.tensionsbypushing Beijingtoactoutofself-interestand challengeU.S.prominenceinexisting institutions,therebycreatingafeedbackloop ofcompetition.TensionsbetweenBRICS andtheG7maythusbeunderstoodby analyzingthevolatilityofChina-U.S. dynamics,whichrevealsthatreshaping globalgovernancehingesonBRICS’ capacitytopreventChinafromleveraging itsdominanceinBRICSinitsownpursuit againstU.S.influence.Moreover,with BRICS’expansionfurtherconsolidating China’sdominanceinthebloc,the organizationmaydevolveintointer-member rivalryasmembersbecomewaryofChina’s growinginfluence.Insum,the2025summit may,atsurfacelevel,reinforceBRICS’ commitmenttoembracingmultipolarity,but China’sgrowinginfluencerevealsthat unilateralismmayinfecttheblocfrom within.

WhileBRICSisexpanding,itmay beoutgrowingitsunity.Inmyview,BRICS’ coherenceishinderedbyhistorical grievances,internaldivisions,andpower imbalances.Historicaldifferencesreveal diverginginterestsinthebloc,heightening theriskofChinaleveragingBRICSto furtheritsownagenda.Additionally,by pitchingtheBRIasadevelopmentproject,

China’stacticmirrorsthatemployedbythe IMFduringtheloansurgeofthe1970s. Undertheguiseofextendingrescuebailouts toGlobalSouthcountriestoliftthemoutof debt,theIMFexpandeditsinfluenceby imposingstrictausteritymandateson borrowercountries.Similarly,Chinauses theBRItoexpanditsinternationalreachby embeddingpartnercountriesinitstrade network.Therefore,liketheIMF strengtheneditsinfluenceinborrower countriesthroughconditionalloans,China leveragesBRICS’expansiontobringnew partnersintotheBRI.Whenanalyzed side-by-side,itbecomesclearthatChina’s strategymayreproducepatternsof dependencyreminiscentofthose characterizingthe1970saspartnersbecome indebtedtoChinaanditsfacadeofmutual development.

Insummary,theanalysisofBRICS’ historicalgrievancesandinstitutional contextuncoverstheinherenttensions betweenitsdriveformultipolarityandthe realitiesofitsinternalstruggles.Thispaper drewonhistoricalbackgroundsto understandcontemporarydynamicsbetween BRICSmembers,illustratinghow competingprioritiesandpowerimbalances riskthereproductionofunipolardominance characterizingthecurrentglobalorder. Moreover,myanalysissituatedthese tensionsinawiderglobalcontext,paying attentiontotheroleofexternalrivalriesin exacerbatingpowerimbalanceswithinthe blocandunderminingitscredibilityasa cohesivebloc.Thus,toconclude,thedebate surroundingtheimplicationsofBRICS’ expansionevincedwhyitspursuitof

multipolaritymayresultinthereplicationof theveryhierarchyitseekstodismantle.

References

Bris,A.(2025,July5). BRICS leaders meet under pressure from tariffs, oil shocks and climate rifts. The NationalNews. https://www.thenationalnews.com/bu siness/economy/2025/07/0 5/brics-leaders-meet-under-pressurefrom-tariffs-oil-shocks-and-climate-r ifts/#:~:text=While%20the%20EU% 20continues%20to,a%20key%20sour ce%20of%20tension

Cardoso,E.&Fishlow,A.(1990). Adjustmenttothefirstoilshock: Fromimportsubstitutionto macroeconomicrestraint.InJ.D. Sachs(Eds.), Developing country debt and economic performance, volume 2: The country studies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico (pp.281–90).UniversityofChicago Press.

https://www.nber.org/system/files/ch apters/c8945/c8945.pdf

Darnal,A.etal.(2025,August4). 2025 BRICS summit: Takeaways and projections.StimsonCenter. https://www. stimson.org/2025/2025-brics-summit -takeaways-and-projections/

GalanoIII,A.(1994)International MonetaryFundresponsetothe Braziliandebtcrisis:Whetherthe

effectsofconditionalityhave underminedBrazil’snational sovereignty?. Pace International Law Review, 6(2),323–51. https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/ viewconten t.cgi?article=1142&context=pilr

Mazower,M.(2012).Therealnew internationalorder.In Governing the world: The history of an idea, 1815 to the present (pp.343–377). PenguinBooks.

McBride,J.,Berman,N.,&Chatzky,A. (2023,February2). China’s massive Belt and Road Initiative Councilon ForeignRelations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ch inas-massiv e-belt-and-road-initiative

Meng,W.(1988).ConditionalityofIMFand WorldBankloans:Tutelageover sovereignstates? Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 21(3),263–77.https://www.jstor.org/ stable/43110959

Sarpong,E.F.,&Sibiri,H.(2024, December19). Building a bloc from BRICS: Assessing China’s strategic interests and influence.AfricaPolicy ResearchInstitute.https://afripoli. org/building-a-bloc-from-brics-asses sing-chi nas-strategic-interests-and-influence

Shadlen,K.(2006).Debt,finance,andthe IMF:Threedecadesofdebtcrisesin

LatinAmerica. ResearchGate. https://www.researchgate.net/publica tion/30528595_Debt_finance_and_th e_IMF_t hree_decades_of_debt_crises_in_Lat in_America

The Global North has nine times more voting power at the IMF than the Global South: The tenth newsletter (2025). (2025,March6). TriContinental. https://thetricontinental.org/newslette rissue/global-north-imf-inequality/#: ~:text=Since%20the%20IMF%27s% 20Articles%20of,the%20decisions% 20of%20the%20IMF

The Guardian view on BRICS growing up: A new bloc seeks autonomy - and eyes a post-western order (2025,July 13).TheGuardian. https://www.theguardian.com/comm entisfree/2025/ jul/13/the-guardian-view-on-brics-gr owing-up-a-new-bloc-seeks-autonom y-and-eyes-a-post-western-order

TrumpTariffFanaticism:The PlungeofDominanceintheWorld Economy

By: Spencer Starosta

AsaverageU.S.tariffssharply increasefrom3%to30%,andotherfree tradepartnersretaliateaccordingly, Americanconsumersandproducersnavigate economicinstabilitybyreducingpurchasing power,diminishingGDPpercapita,and decreasingmarketproductivity(McKibben, Noland,Shuetrim&ThePetersonInstitute forInternationalEconomics,2025). Moreover,belligerentprotectionismhas joltedU.S.markets;investorsarestartingto withdrawcapitalfromvariousU.S.assets whilebolsteringinternationalcompetitors. Yet,PresidentTrumpbelievesthat enhancingprotectionisttradepoliciesisa strengtheningagentfortheAmericanpeople andtheU.S.economy.Nevertheless,from juxtaposingU.S.labourandcapital projections,itbecomesclearthatPresident Trump's'LiberationDay'tariffsarearecipe foreconomicself-sabotagemasqueradingas

performativeeconomicnationalism,and Americancitizensarepayingforit. Whilehisprotectionistfanaticismis seeminglyunhinged,the'LiberationDay' tariffsarehislatestattempt.In2018,his precedingplangenerated$1.4billionof deadweightlossandapproximately$3 billionpermonthinadditionaltaxeswhile limitingconsumerchoiceonaninternational scale(Amiti,Redding,&Weinstein,2019).

Economistslabelledhisforemost attemptaspainful,yettheycharacterizehis latestapproachasfarworseandrecklesson amonumentalscale.AccordingtotheYale BudgetLab(2025),theaveragehousehold willforgo$3800annuallyinpurchasing power,whiletheincomeburdenisroughly 2.5timeshigherforthelowestincome decilethanthehighestincomedeciledueto priceincreasesforvariousnecessities. Furthermore,recentdatacorrelatesa1% increaseinanadditionaltariffburdenwith anapproximate0.3percentagepointrisein relativeinflation(TheEconomist Newspaper,2025).Thus,justfromprice increases,it'snotfeasibletocommunicate widespreadgrowthwhenthebottom90% encounterimmensenetcostsduringTrump's presidency.

NotonlyareAmericansseeingprice increasesduetoU.S.marketvolatility,but thereisalsoariskofhigherunemployment. TheYaleBudgetLab(2025)estimates long-rununemploymentwillincreaseby 0.7%bytheendof2026,simplyfromthe tariffplanaffectinghiringspeedandlayoff increases.TheFederalBankofSan Franciscohasalreadyacknowledgedthese economicimplicationsofthetariff

increases,withalong-rundeclinein cumulativepercentagechangein employment(Considine&Foerster,2025c). Sincehistariffplanhasfacilitated detrimentallong-runchangesinthelabour market,itbecomesscrupulousbecauseof thelackofworkersinvariousindustriesthat PresidentTrumpwantstogrow.Therefore, theU.S.mottoforthelandofopportunity fortheworkingclasswillbecome tantamounttosayingaking-sizedHershey’s MilkChocolatebarisahealthfood;it's completelyfalse.

Americancitizensarenotonly payingforTrump'srashbehaviouronthe labourside,butthetariffsarealsoimpeding capitalgrowthintheU.S.economy The PennWhartonBudgetModelestimatesthat Trump'stariffswillreducelong-runGDPby approximately6%,potentiallyresultingina 5%reductioninrealwages(Model,2025). Inresponse,U.S.factoriesareseeing productioncostincreasesrangingbetween 2%and4.5%duetotariffsongoodsand materials(Boak&Wiseman,2025).Clearly, PresidentTrumpismorethanwillingto sacrificeparadigmaticlivingstandardsfor theaverageAmerican,justtoslowly increaseproductioninsectorsthattheU.S. hasthrivedonbeforethetariffs.Seeingthis development,investorswithdrew$8.9 billionofU.S.assetswhiledepositing$7.8 billioninEuropeanandJapanesemarkets, directlyaffectingAmericans'401(k)s,IRAs, andpensionfundswhileweakening consumerconfidenceforalongtime (FederalReserveBoard,2025).

Nevertheless,theU.S.still dominatestheservicesexportsector,

amountingto$993.8billion.However, competingglobalactorsareincorporating newtechnologyintotheirexportsectors, closingthegap.TheEUwastheworld's largesttraderofservicesin2023,while constructinginternationaldigitaltrade agreementssuchastheEU-Singaporedeal (Blenkinsop,2025).China'sservicesgrewto approximately$1.5trillionin2024from rapidAIexpansionandchipdevelopment (Yu,2025). Lastly,Indiaisexpectedto increaseitstechnologyexportmarketby 12%bytheendof2025,primarilyduetoits ITindustry(Chakraborty,2025).Tariff jingoismdoesnotmakeAmericagreat;it passesthetorchofeconomicleadershipto itscompetitorswhileweakeningtheUS economyintheprocess.

Ultimately,itbecomesclearthat Trump'splanforeconomicdominance causestheoppositeeffect.Variouspowerful countriesarecatchinguptotheU.S.in termsofeconomichegemonywhile Americansareundergoingrisingpricesand anunstablelabourmarketduringhis presidency.Theperformativenationalism willonlycontinuehurtingtheAmerican people,sabotagingthepeoplehesworeto protect.It’shardtosaywhethertheworld orderwillremainorradicallychangeinthe yearstocome.However,it’sincrediblyeasy tosaythattheworldisnothappywith PresidentTrump’spersonaandthepolicies thatheimplementsusingthatpersona;for theworldtotaketheU.S.seriously, PresidentTrumpneedstostopthetariffs.

References

Amiti,M.,Redding,S.J.,&Weinstein,D. E.(2019).TheImpactofthe2018 TariffsonPricesandWelfare.

Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4), 187-210.https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/ pdfplus/10.1257/jep.33.4.187 Blenkinsop,P.(2024,July25). EU and Singapore agree digital trade deal | Reuters.Reuters.

https://www.reuters.com/markets/eusingapore-agree-digital-trade-deal-20 24-07-25/

Boak,J.,&Wiseman,P (2025,July29).

Trump’s tariffs could squeeze us factories and boost costs by up to 4.5%, a new analysis finds | AP News APNews.

https://apnews.com/article/trump-tari ffs-factory-costs-manufacturing-4c92 8842b57c7f36db9d5ca26a84108b Chakraborty,S.(2025,August7).Itsexports climb12.5%to$224billionin

FY25: Meity. The Economic Times. https://economictimes.indiatimes.co m/tech/technology/it-exportsclimb-1 2-5-to-224-billion-in-fy25-meity/arti cleshow/123150339.cms

TheEconomistNewspaper.(2025,August 14). Tracking the cost of Donald Trump’s tariffs. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/interacti ve/trump-tariff-costs-tracker TheFederalReserveBoardofGovernors. (2025,August15). Board of governors of the Federal Reserve System.FederalReserveBoardAssetsandLiabilitiesofCommercial BanksintheUnitedStates-H.8August15,2025.

https://www.federalreserve.gov/relea ses/h8/current/h8.pdf

McKibbin,W.J.,J.,Noland,M.,Shuetrim, G.,&ThePetersonInstitutefor InternationalEconomics.(2025). The global economic effects of Trump’s 2025 tariffs. https://www.piie.com/sites/default/fil es/2025-06/wp25-13.pdf

Considine,S.,&Foerster,A.(2025c).The changingdisparityinpricesacross states.In FederalReserveBankofSan Francisco, FRBSF Economic Letter [Journal-article].

https://www.frbsf.org/wpcontent/upl oads/el2025-08.pdf

Model,P.W.B.(2025,April22). The economic effects of President Trump’s tariffs Penn Wharton Budget model PennWhartonBudget Model.

https://budgetmodel.wharton.upenn.e du/issues/2025/4/10/economic-effect s-of-president-trumps-tariffs Xinhua.(2025,February3). China’s annual trade in services exceeds 1 trillion USD, boasting significant potential https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202 502/1327773.shtml

YaleBudgetLab.(2025,April2). Where we stand: The fiscal, economic, and distributional effects of all U.S. tariffs enacted in 2025 through April 2 The BudgetLabatYale. https://budgetlab.yale.edu/research/wh ere-we-stand-fiscal-economic-and-dist ributionaleffects-all-us-tariffs-enacted2025-through-april

HumanitarianReckoning(Live StreamedDestruction):HowGaza isRedefiningWesternDiplomacy

By: Alex Borgert

OnOctober7,2023,thenationof Israelsuffereditsworstattackindecades whenthe terroristgroupHamaslaunched asurpriseattackbyland,air,andsea, resultinginthedeathsofover1200Israelis, theinjuryof7500,andtheabductionof251 hostages(LibraryofCongress,2025).Inthe hoursthatfollowed,IsraeliPrimeMinister BenjaminNetanyahuissuedastatementin whichhevowedtotakeswiftanddecisive retaliationagainstHamas,whichhadsince retreatedintothe365km/25-mile-longGaza Strip(Sharp,2025).Inthefollowingdays, theleadersofmanyWesternnations includingtheUnitedStates,United Kingdom,andCanadawidelycondemned theattackandreaffirmedtheirunwavering supportforIsraelandthestate’srightto defenditself(2025).

PriortoOctober7,Israelreceivedan annual$3billionofaidfromtheUnited Statesalonetosupportdefense.Sincethe outsetoftheconflict,theUnitedStateshas providedIsraelwith$22billionofaid, includingsupplementalmilitary appropriationsformissiledefensesystems liketheIronDomeandadvancedweapons platformssuchasF-15fighterjets(Masters &Merrow,2024).U.S.aidmakesupnearly 15%ofIsrael’smilitarydefensebudget (2024).Israelhasbeendesignateda“major non-NATOally”bytheUnitedStates, grantingIsraelaccesstotop-tierdefense

systemsandjointdevelopmentprograms (2024).Asimilardynamiccanbeobserved withrespecttootheralliesofIsraelsuchas GermanyandtheUnitedKingdom. Germanyhassuppliednearly30%ofIsrael’s conventionalweapons;overthepastdecade, theUnitedKingdomhasapprovedhundreds ofmillionsinarmsexportlicenses(Bello, 2025).

Yetdespiteallthis,thereisstrong reasontobelievethatthesealliancesare undersignificantstrainandriskoffracture. Nearlytwoyearsaftertheattack,there existsmountingevidencethatasignificant tonalshifttowardsIsrael,evenfromits traditionalandstaunchestalliesistaking place.Concernsaboutthehumanitarian crisisinGazabeganasearlyasOctober 2023,withEgyptianPresidentAbdulEl-Sisi statingthatIsrael’sbombardmentofGaza had“exceededitsrighttoself-defense"and amountedtocollectivepunishment(Al JazeeraStaff,2023).Throughout2024,Arab nationsaswellasmanyworldwide continuedtoraisealarmaboutthe deterioratingconditionsinGaza.Atthe “CallForAction:UrgentHumanitarian ResponseforGaza”conferenceco-hosted byEgypt,Jordan,andtheUnitedNationsin June,El-Sisialsodescribedthesituationas “catastrophic”,expressingthatfaminewas imminentandaccesstofood,water,and medicinewasnearlynon-existent(Ministry ofForeignAffairsJordan,2024)

Further,ajointdeclarationissuedin Julyby28nationsincludingNATOallies assertedthatthefamineinGazahadreached “newdepths”anddemandedIsrael “immediatelyliftrestrictions”onaidand

allowhumanitarianorganizationstooperate unencumbered(Staff&Freiberg,2025).The statementalsocriticizedIsraelforitsmodel ofaiddeliveryasdangerousandinhumane, andfortheshootingofover800Palestinian menwomanandchildrenseekingfoodand water(someinthehead)(2025).Australia,a steadfastallyofIsrael,alsoannouncedit wouldrecognizeaformalPalestinianstateat thenextUnitedNationsGeneralAssembly (Albanese&Wong,2025).PrimeMinister AnthonyAlbanesecitedtheNetanyahu government’sexpansionofillegal settlementsandrejectionofatwo-state solution,expressingthat“theworldcanno longerwait”forpeacetobenegotiatedon Israel’sterms(2025).Canadahasalso announceditsintentiontorecognizea PalestinianstateattheupcomingUN GeneralAssembly PrimeMinisterMark Carneyexpressedthatthemovewas necessarytosafeguardthepossibilityofa two-statesolution,whichwasbeing“eroded beforeourveryeyes”duetotheworsening famineinGaza(Roley,2025).German ChancellorFriedrichMerzhashaltedall militaryexportsthatcouldbeusedinGaza (Höller,2025).Merzalsocharacterizedthe Israelicabinet’sdecisiontoexpandmilitary operationsinGazaasa“redline”and assertedthatthesufferingofciviliansin Gazahasbecome“unbearable”(2025).The EuropeanUnion,ofwhichGermanyisa leadingmember,condemnedthekillingof fourAl-Jazeerajournalists,includingthe prominentAnasal-SharifduringanIsraeli airstrike,callingita“gravebreachof humanitarianlaw”anddemanded accountability(AlJazeeraStaff,2025).

Thishasnotbeenthefirstinstance ofIsraelkillingjournalistswithout accountability.TheprominentPalestinian AmericanjournalistShireenAbuAklehwas murderedin2022whilereportinginthe WestBankdespitewearingabluepressvest (AlJazeeraStaff,2023).Despite internationalpressurethatincluded investigationsbyUNCHR,USDeptofState aswellaseparateinvestigationbytheU.S DepartmentofJustice,thestateofIsrael condemnedthemovesthatthesebodies madewithoutpursuingproperaccountability forthevictim,despiteherbeingan Americancitizen.(2023).

Whattheseexamplesdemonstrateis notonlyagrowingcriticismofIsraelfrom itstraditionalallies,butalsoanunraveling ofapost-ColdWarconsensus.Fordecades, theUnitedStatesanditsWesternallies maintainedarelativelyuniformforeign policystance,especiallywhenitcametothe MiddleEast,wheresupportforIsraelacted asacornerstonefortheirstrategic alignment.However,therecentdivergence inpositionssuchasAustraliaandCanada’s planstoformallyrecognizeaPalestinian state,Germany’ssuspensionofarms exports,andaformalcondemnationfrom theEUregardingIsrael’sactions,signifiesa fragmentationofthelongstandingunity towardsIsrael.

ThistonalshiftwithrespecttoIsraeli foreignpolicyinGazaisrepresentativeofa broaderdeclineinWesternhegemonic influence.Asglobalpowerbecomesmore multi-polar,traditionalWesternpowersare increasinglytieddownbydomestic

pressures,shiftingpublicopinion,andthe riseofalternativegeopoliticalblocs.The faminetakingplaceinGaza,andthe ongoingpressureofwatchingthisgross humanrightsviolationhasgalvanizedcivil societywithinEurope,NorthAmerica, Australia,andelsewhere,pressuring governmentstorecalibratetheirforeign policyinresponsetogrowingdemandsof accountabilityandhumanrights.

Further,theerosionofconsensuson Israelunderscoresalargercrisisof legitimacyforWesternleadership.The inabilitytoenforceinternationallaw,the selectiveapplicationofhumanrights standards,andtheperceivedhypocrisyin globaldiplomacyhaveunderminedthe moralauthorityofWesterninstitutions. Politiciansondifferentsidesoftheworld areusingthereallivesofpeopleinGazaas bargainingchipstopursuewargames. Despitedifferentlevelsofhostage negotiation,PMNetanyahuisusingthiswar topursuetotalannihilationoftheGaza Strip,tothescreamsfromnotonlytheworld buthisowncitizenrywhohavebeen rpotestingsincebeforeoct7th,andhave maderepeateddemonstrationsinTelAvivto demonstratethecrueltyoftheNetanyahu administrationsliestothebereavedhostage families.Oneofthestrongestvoicesto emergehasbeenEinavZ

Whenviewedinthiscontext,the criticismofIsraelisnotsimplyaboutGaza, butaboutthelimitsofWesternpowerin shapingglobalnormsandtheemergenceof amorecontestedinternationalorder.As leadingpoliticalscientistJohnMearsheimer

hasconfirmed,theWestincludingCanadais undoubtedlycomplicitinIsrael’sdestruction andgenocideofthePalestinianpeople (Mearshimer,2025).

TheshiftintonetowardsIsraelfrom itstraditionalalliessinceitsfoundingmarks muchmorethanadiplomaticrift–itreflects atrueworldintransition.Ashumanitarian concernsarebeginningtooverrideold loyaltiesandWesternunityisfracturing undertheweightofglobalcrises,theonce stableanddominantpillarsofthe internationalorderarebeginningtosway Israel’snewfoundisolationisnotjust aregionalstory;itisasymptomofabroader worldwidereckoningofpower,principle, andthefutureofgloballeadership.

References

AlJazeeraStaff.(2023a,May11). Shireen Abu Akleh, Al Jazeera Reporter and daughter of Palestine.AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/features/l ongform/2023/5/11/shireen-abu-akle h-al-jazeera-reporter-and-daughter-of -palestine

AlJazeeraStaff.(2023,October16). Egypt’s tricky calculation as Israel’s assault on Gaza continues.AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/202 3/10/16/egypts-tricky-calculation-asisraels-assault-on-gaza-continues

AlJazeeraStaff.(2025,August12).

“targeted assassination”: Israel’s killing of Al Jazeera staff condemned AlJazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/

8/11/tributes-condemnation-pour-in-fo r-slain-al-jazeera-journalists-in-gaza

Albanese,A.,&Wong,P.(2025,August 11). Australia to recognise Palestinian state.PrimeMinisterofAustralia.

https://www.pm.gov.au/media/australi a-recognise-palestinian-state

Bello,A.R.(2025,June29). The real power behind Israel’s western alliances Bayt Magazine.

https://baytmagazine.com/the-real-po wer-behind-israels-western-alliances/ Höller,L.(2025,August8). Germany, Israel’s no. 2 arms dealer, halts exports over Gaza concerns.Defense News.

https://www.defensenews.com/global/ europe/2025/08/08/germany-israels-no -2-arms-dealer-halts-exports-over-gaza -concerns/

Levush,R.(2025,January27). Israel: Legislation criminalizes denial of the October 7 attacks TheLibraryof Congress.

https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legalmonitor/2025-01-27/israel-legislationcriminalizes-denial-of-the-october-7-at tacks/

Masters,J.,&Merrow,W.(2024,November 13). U.S. aid to Israel in four charts. CouncilonForeignRelations.

https://www.cfr.org/article/us-aid-israe l-four-charts

Mearshimer,J.(2025,September15)

https://mearsheimer.substack.com/p/th e-israeli-threat-to-america

https://mearsheimer.substack.com/p/the-mor al-bankruptcy-of-the-west

MinistryofForeignAffairsJordan.(2024, June11). The “Call for Action: Urgent Humanitarian Response for Gaza” conference.The“CallforAction: UrgentHumanitarianResponsefor Gaza”Conference.

https://mfa.gov.jo/Gaza/index.html

Roley,G.(2025,August27). No change to Canada’s plans to recognize Palestinian statehood AFPFact Check.

https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com. 72J97TB

Sharp,J.(2025,May28). U.S. foreign aid to Israel: Overview and developments ... CongressionalResearchService. https://www.congress.gov/crs_external _products/RL/PDF/RL33222/RL3322 2.50.pdf

Staff,T.,&Freiberg,N.(2025,July22). 28 Western nations say Gaza War “must end now,” suffering has “reached new depths.” TheTimesofIsrael.

https://www.timesofisrael.com/25-wes tern-nations-call-for-end-to-gaza-war-s ay-suffering-has-reached-new-depths/

DoubleStandardsintheNuclear Age:A60-YearLongChronicle ofErodingCredibilityof Global ArmsControl

By: Jaya Kumar

Bytheearly1960s,nuclearweapon developmenthadbecomeincreasingly accessible,withthescienceof splittingand fusingatoms,firstdemonstratedonalarge scalebytheUnitedStatesunderthe Manhattan ProjectledbyJ.Robert OppenheimerduringWorldWarII,gaining admissiontopublicacademic literature.By 1964,thefiveglobalpowers,nowknownas theP5(theU.S.,SovietUnion,United Kingdom,France,andChina),hadacquired nuclearcapability,eitherduringtheSecond WorldWaror shortlyafter Incontrastto theseeconomicallyandindustrially dominantnations,manycountriesoflesser wealth,nowknownastheGlobalSouth, hadnotyetobtainednuclearcapability.¹By thelate1960s,a periodofinternational tensionknownasthe Cold War arms race hadcometoahead–fearsofnuclear warfareandmutuallyassureddestruction dominatedinternationalconcern.Atthat time,onlytheU.S.,its allyBritain,andits rivaltheSovietUnionhadcrediblenuclear strikecapability,andthusitwasthought thatadoctrineofdeterrencecouldbe reasonablymaintained.Yetthesedominant powersfearedthis balancewouldcollapse ifadditionalnations,particularlydeveloping stateswithvolatileborderdisputes, gained nuclearweapons,heighteningthelikelihood ofglobalwar.

Mountinginternationalconcernof unmitigatednuclearwarfare,drivenbythe notionofMutuallyAssured Destruction (M.A.D.),whichunderscoredthatany nuclearexchangewouldresultin catastrophicglobal consequences,ledto effortstorestrictthetransmissionofnuclear technology.In1961,Irelandproposeda banattheUNGeneralAssembly,andsoon after,U.S.negotiatorssoughttoprevent peripheralnations fromacquiringnuclear capability.Effectively,nationswithout nuclearweaponswereaskedtoabandon anyfutureintentionsofdevelopingthem, andaftertwoyearsofnegotiations,the nuclearpowersmade concessionsto persuademanynon-nuclearstates,thereby ratifyingtheNuclearNon-proliferation Treaty (NPT)intointernationallaw

TheNPTincludedseveralclauses limitingthespreadofnuclearweapons technology,includingabanon transferring eithernuclearweaponsornuclearweapons technologytoanyotherstate,andvowto not receive,developorotherwiseacquire nuclearweapons.¹Thetreatydidnot, however,explicitlyrequire theU.S.,the SovietUnion,oranyotherexistingnuclear statetodismantletheirnucleararsenals. While ArticleVIoftheNPTdoescallfor measuresforgradualnucleardisarmament, itdoesnotmandate completenuclear arsenaldestructionbyanyspecificstate.In theyearsfollowingtheratificationofthe NPT,theU.S.andtheSovietUnion (modernlyRussia)have,infact,reduced theirarsenalsthrough bilateralagreements suchasSTART,signedbybothnationsin 2011,whilemaintainingthousandsof warheadseach.Simultaneously,theyhave

insistedthatnon-nuclearstatescomply strictlywithnonproliferationrules, reinforcingasystemthatbynature,allows forextortioncapabilitiesbyexisting nuclearpowerswhileprohibitingtheability ofothers,oftenGlobalSouthnations lackingtheindustrialor economic foundationoftheU.S.andRussia,to developsimilarcapabilities.

TheopeningspeechtakesplaceDec 14,1957,atthe NATOSummittalksinParis,France (Reg Birkett/KeystoneviaGetty Images)

Inrecentyears,however, intensifyingrivalriesforhegemonic influencebetweentheU.S.,Russia,and Chinahaveexacerbatedtensionsamong theseglobalsuperpowers,introducingnew motivationsfor heighteneddefenceefforts. Thesetensionshaveresultedprimarilyfrom China’srapidmilitary modernization, growinginfluenceintheGlobalSouth,and assertivenessintheIndo-Pacific–posing significantlong-termchallengestoU.S. primacy,²aswellasRussia’swarinUkraine whichhasfurther deepeneddivisionswith theWest,asRussiacontinuestoresist NATOexpansionandundermineWestern influenceintheannexedterritory.³In parallel,ChinaandRussiahaveworkedto

weakenU.S.-led initiatives,establish technologicalandindustrialadvancement, andprojectnarrativesofAmerican decline. Theresurgenceofthisgreat-powerrivalry, markedbyarenewedframingofadversaries as existentialthreatsreminiscentofthe ColdWar,hasraisedthestakesbetween thesepowersandultimately alteredthe nuclearpoliciesofarmedstates.This escalationhasfueleddemandsforenhanced military actionanddefensestrategy, catalyzingsubstantialbudgetincreasesby globalpowersworldwide.Global military expenditurereached$2718billionin2024, thesteepestannualrisesincetheendofthe ColdWar U.S.spendinggrewby5.7%to $997billion,Chinaincreaseditsdefense budgetby7.0%to$314billion, and Russia’smilitaryoutlayssurgedby38%to $149billion.⁴

Evidencedbythesurgeinstrategic anddefensespending,thethreenations havebeendriventofurther expandand modernizetheirnucleararsenalsand technology,extendingbeyond conventionalforcesand intothenuclear domain,thereby defying thearms reductioncommitmentsenvisionedunder theoriginal NPTandsubsequentSTART agreements.Inthepastfiveyears,the majornuclear-armedstateshave instead movedtowardsexpandingwarhead stockpiles,diversifyingdeliverysystems, andupgrading nuclearcommand,control, andcommunication(NC3)infrastructure.⁵ TheU.S.ispursuinga comprehensive nuclearmodernizationprogram,replacing itstraditionalMinutemanIIImissileswith the newSentinelICBM,developingthe B-21Raiderstealthbombercapableof

carryingbothnuclearand conventional weapons,andbuildingtheColumbia-class submarines,designedtosustainsea-based nucleareffortsbyeliminatingtheneedfor frequentrefueling.⁶ Russia,meanwhile,has introducednextgenerationsystemssuchas theAvangardhypersonicglidevehicle, whichcantravelatextremespeedsto evadedefenses,andtheSarmatheavy ICBM,⁷ whileformallysuspending participationinNewSTART– thelast remainingbilateralarmscontroltreaty withtheU.S..Chinaisundergoingthe fastestnuclear expansionofanystate, withU.S.intelligenceestimatingthatits arsenalcoulddoublebytheearly2030s, byconstructinghundredsofnewmissile silosandexpandingitssea-andair-based deterrenttoachievea moresurvivable nucleartriad,⁸ theUnitedKingdomhas alsoreversedearlierreductionsbyraising its warheadceilingfrom180to260,while Franceisinvestinginthemodernization ofitssubmarine-based deterrent.⁹

Thesecollectivenuclear technologicaladvancementsbytheP5 powersunderscoreanunprecedentedshift awayfromrestraint,andtowardaneraof parallelnuclearaccumulation.However, theyalsoexposethe enduringdouble standardsatthecoreoftheexistingglobal non-proliferationregime.Sinceitsorigin, the NPThasobligednon-nuclearstates, predominantlyintheGlobalSouth,toforgo thedevelopmentor acquisitionofnuclear weapons.Meanwhile,thefewrecognized nuclearpowerscontinuetoexpandand modernizetheirownarsenals.AsGlobal Southstatesarepressuredintostrict compliancethrough safeguards,intrusive InternationalAtomicEnergyAgency (IAEA)inspections,¹⁰ andthethreatof sanctionsfrommajoreconomicpowers,the disparityinexpectationsbetweenrecognized nuclearweapon statesandnon-nuclear nationscontinuestowiden.Thisimbalance exacerbatesahierarchicalnuclear orderin whichafewpowersretainprivilegedstatus whilethemajorityremainconstrained.In thissystem, technologicaladvancement, andultimatelyglobalsecurity,are concentratedinthehandsofafewunder the guiseofdeterrenceandstrategicstability, whilethemajorityofstatesremainboundto permanent non-nucleardependenceand heightenedvulnerabilitytoexternalpressure andexploitation.

Theresultofthisshiftingnuclear policybytheP5nationsandthegrowing disparityinnuclear andglobaldefense capability,isamorefragmentedand unstablenuclearandworldorder Itisonein whichdeterrenceislesspredictable,crisis timelinesareshorter,andthecredibilityof

armscontrolnorms continuestoerode.In thisenvironmentoferodingcredibility, non-nuclearstatesmaybecome increasingly incentivizedtoreconsidertheir long-standingadherencetonon-proliferation expectations, weighingtheperceived securitybenefitsofnucleardevelopment againsttherisksofinternational persecution bymorepowerfulnations.Recently,in responsetothesechanges,regionalactors suchasSouthKoreaandJapan,both steadfastU.S.alliessincetheendofWorld WarII,whosesecurityhasbeen deeply shapedbydependenceonAmerican protection,havepubliclyreconsideredthe reliabilityof extendeddeterrence guarantees.Iranhasalsocontinuedto exploreambiguitieswithintheNPT framework inordertopreserveitspotential fornuclearcapability,frequentlyadvancing andthenlimitingitsuranium enrichment activities,asreflectedinrecentIAEA reportsandU.S.intelligenceassessments.¹¹ Additionally,NorthKorea’swithdrawal fromthetreatyin2003hasalreadyseta precedentfordefection,demonstratingthat thecostsofnon-compliancecan,infact,be offsetbythestrategicadvantagesofa nucleararsenal.Meanwhile,Indiaand Pakistan,bothNPTnon-signingnations, continuetomodernize theirarsenalswhile withstandingintermittentpunitiverhetoric andsanctionsfromtheWest,further exposingthehypocrisyofthecurrent deterrenceregime.Ifthenuclearpowersthat championedthenon-proliferationorder continuetoopenlyundermineitsprinciples, itisincreasingly likelythatnon-nuclear stateswillconcludethatrestraintisa strategicliabilityratherthananasset,

acceleratingtheriskofregionaldelugesof nuclearproliferation.

References

1. U.S.DepartmentofState–Officeof theHistorian.(n.d.). The Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), 1968 In Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations: 1961–1968. U.S. DepartmentofState.Retrieved August18,2025,from https://history.state.gov/milestones/ 1961-1968/npt

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