1 Copyright acknowledgement
Where relevant, information about the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 is reproduced from the following sources:
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2023) The NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.29.pdf
And from the NIST website at https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework
Please see https://www.nist.gov/nist-research-library/nist-publications for more information about NIST copyright in Technical Series Publications.
2 Introduction
This concise guide takes you through the process of implementing the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 using the CertiKit NIST CSF2 Toolkit. This version of the toolkit uses as its reference the final version of CSF 2.0 published by NIST on February 26th 2024 It provides a recommended route to framework implementation starting from a position where very little is in place. Of course, every organization is different and there are many valid ways to embed the disciplines of information security. The best way for you may well depend upon factors including:
• The size of your organization
• The country or countries in which you operate
• The culture your organization has adopted
• The industry you operate within
• The resources you have at your disposal
• Your legal, regulatory and contractual environment
View this guide simply as a pointer to where you could start and a broad indication of the order you could do things in. There is no single “right way” to improve information security; the important thing is that you end up with an information security framework that is relevant and appropriate for your specific organization’s needs.
2.1 Introducing the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a US government agency founded in 1901 by Congress (originally as the National Bureau of Standards), and forms part of the United States Department of Commerce. Initially focused on standardizing physical weights and measures, NIST’s role has expanded over time to cover many aspects of technology and its use and included the investigation into the collapse of the World Trade Center as a result of the September 11th attacks. Some aspects of NIST’s role are explicitly laid out in US legislation and in 2013 an Executive Order from President Obama (EO 13636“Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity”) mandated the creation of a Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), with the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 placing further emphasis on NIST’s role in cybersecurity. The first version of the Framework was published in 2014 and it was updated in April 2018 with CSF 1.1.
The use of the Cybersecurity Framework was made compulsory for federal agencies by President Trump in an Executive Order (EO 13800 – “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure”) in 2017. A strong aspect of the legislation dealing with the CSF is the need for it to stay up to date, to drive improvement and to encourage close cooperation between the private and public sectors. To this end, NIST embarked on the journey to CSF 2.0 with a comprehensive program of consultation, including a series of well-attended workshops and invitations for comment.
Other significant changes include:
• Informative references will now be provided online, to provide for easier and more frequent updating
• Implementation examples will be provided to help with interpretation of the subcategories
• The use of tiers has been clarified
• Revised guidance on how to create and use framework profiles
• Clearer emphasis on improvement, with the creation of an Improvement category within the Identify function
2.3 The Main Principles of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework
The NIST CSF 2.0 consists of a number of building blocks which, when used together, allow an organization to put in place a risk-based framework tailored to their specific environment. This section explains briefly what those building blocks are.
2.3.1
Functions
Functions provide an overall structure for the framework and group together related categories as shown in Table 1. In many respects, it may help to view the first three functions as “proactive”, as they deal with the process of assessing and treating risk ahead of time, and the latter three functions as “reactive”, as they cover the more real-time process of detecting and dealing with cybersecurity incidents.
However, NIST is clear that this is not intended to be a process model, so activities may be taking place within all of the functions at the same time.
The functions are usually color-coded to provide a degree of familiarity when working with the framework.
2.3.2
Categories
Categories provide the next level of detail below functions, as shown in Table 1. Again, they are not necessarily intended to be done in the order in which they appear but are a way of grouping together the sub-categories below them which give more detail about specific activities that can be done to improve cybersecurity.
FUNCTION
CATEGORY
IDENTIFIER CATEGORY
Govern (GV) GV.OC Organizational Context
GV.RM Risk Management Strategy
GV.RR Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities
GV.PO Policy
GV.OV Oversight
GV.SC Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management
Identify (ID) ID.AM Asset Management
ID.RA Risk Assessment
ID.IM Improvement
Protect (PR) PR.AA
Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control
PR.AT Awareness and Training
PR.DS Data Security
PR.PS Platform Security
PR.IR Technology Infrastructure Resilience
Detect (DE) DE.CM Continuous Monitoring
DE.AE Adverse Event Analysis
Respond (RS) RS.MA Incident Management
RS.AN Incident Analysis
RS.CO Incident Response Reporting and Communication
RS.MI Incident Mitigation
Recover (RC) RC.RP Incident Recovery Plan Execution
RC.CO Incident Recovery Communication
2.3.3 Subcategories
Subcategories are where we get into the detail of the outcomes that we are looking to achieve. Table 2 shows the subcategories for the Organizational Context (GV.OC) category, which is within the Govern (GV) function.
Each subcategory has a reference (for example GV.OC-01) which allows it to be uniquely identified within the framework.
Please Note: With CSF 2.0 NIST has decided not to re-use Subcategory identifiers that have been removed from CSF V1.1. This means that the Subcategory identifiers in CSF 2.0 are not always sequential. For example, the Category Data Security (PR.DS) consists of four subcategories: PR.DS01, PR.DS-02, PR.DS-10 and PR.DS-11, that is numbers PR.DS-03 to 09 are not used.
The subcategories are written as statements of fact (for example “The organizational mission is understood…”) and the aim of the organization in implementing the framework is to be able to agree with each relevant statement.
Table 1 - CSF 2.0 Functions and Categories
CATEGORY
Organizational Context (GV.OC): The circumstances mission, stakeholder expectations, dependencies, and legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements surrounding the organization’s cybersecurity risk management decisions are understood
SUBCATEGORY
GV.OC-01: The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management.
GV.OC-02: Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered.
GV.OC-03: Legal, regulatory, and contractual requirements regarding cybersecurity including privacy and civil liberties obligations are understood and managed
GV.OC-04: Critical objectives, capabilities, and services that stakeholders depend on or expect from the organization are understood and communicated
GV.OC-05: Outcomes, capabilities, and services that the organization depends on are understood and communicated
Table 2 - Example Category and Sub-categories
2.3.4 Implementation examples
New with CSF 2.0 is the use of implementation examples. These are intended to be illustrative rather than definitive and are used to give a better idea of the kinds of tasks that should be performed to achieve the goal stated in the sub-category. They may not all apply to a particular organization and so should be used as guidelines only. Table 3 shows some typical implementation examples.
SUBCATEGORY
GV.OC-01: The organizational mission is understood and informs cybersecurity risk management
GV.OC-02: Internal and external stakeholders are understood, and their needs and expectations regarding cybersecurity risk management are understood and considered
IMPLEMENTATION EXAMPLES
Ex1: Share the organization’s mission (e.g., through vision and mission statements, marketing, and service strategies) to provide a basis for identifying risks that may impede that mission.
Ex1: Identify relevant internal stakeholders and their cybersecurity-related expectations (e.g., performance and risk expectations of officers, directors, and advisors; cultural expectations of employees)
Ex2: Identify relevant external stakeholders and their cybersecurity-related expectations (e.g., privacy expectations of customers, business expectations of partnerships, compliance expectations of regulators, ethics expectations of society). Table 3 - Implementation Examples
2.3.5 Informative references
One of the intentions of the CSF is to be able to leverage the content of other standards and it does this through the use of informative references. For each subcategory a list of specific references to other standards is given. References are commonly taken from the following:
• Center for Internet Security – Critical Security Controls
• ISO/IEC 27001 international standard for information security
• COBIT 5 – Control Objectives for Information Technologies
• NIST SP 800-53 Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations
• ISA 62443 – International Society of Automation standards
Whereas these were listed directly in the main CSF document previously, the intention with 2.0 is to maintain these separately in a Reference Tool accessible via the NIST website.
2.3.6 Tiers
Four levels of rigor are defined within the CSF to judge an organization’s practices within two areas (previously three):
• Cybersecurity risk governance
• Cybersecurity risk management
The four levels used are:
• Tier 1 – Partial
• Tier 2 – Risk informed
• Tier 3 – Repeatable
• Tier 4 – Adaptive
In effect, the tiers are similar to levels of maturity used in other frameworks, but NIST is keen to point out that not every organization needs to be at Tier 4 for both of the areas. The additional effort required to reach a higher tier needs to be cost-justified.
Tiers are an optional part of the framework and they are intended to be used at a number of different levels as appropriate, from a high level aspiration of “becoming a Tier 3 organization” to a more specific goal of “improving the Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management category from Tier 2 to Tier 3”.
2.3.7 Profiles
Within the context of the CSF, a profile is a description of parts of the framework that are either in place already (a current profile) or that the organization aspires to meet (a target profile). In common terms this comparison between current state and desired state is often called a gap assessment, although this is not a term used by NIST. There is no standard way to create a profile, and it may be done at a number of different levels; for example at the highest level by function and at the lowest by subcategory. A further level of granularity can be introduced by the use of tiers (as described above).
The key output of the use of profiles is an action plan to move the organization’s cybersecurity from where it is now to where it is desired to be.
2.4 Guidance available from NIST
In line with its mandate from the US Government, NIST provides a variety of information to help organizations implement the CSF, most of which is available via its website at https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework. This includes:
• The core framework document
• NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) 2.0 Reference Tool
• Quick Start Guides
• Online Learning
• Examples of Framework Profiles
• Informative Reference Catalog
• Videos, blogs, news and FAQs
We recommend you make use of these resources in addition to the CertiKit toolkit to smooth your journey to implementing the Cybersecurity Framework 2.0.
5 The Functions and Categories of the Cybersecurity Framework
5.1 Govern (GV)
The addition of the Govern function is one of the main events with Version 2.0 of the framework. The idea is to establish a set of processes that provide context for the other functions within the core, and so this function is shown in diagrams of the CSF as an internal ring which touches all of the other functions.
5.1.1 Organizational Context (GV.OC)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• InfoSec Context, Reqts and Scope
• Legal, Regulatory and Contractual Requirements Procedure
• Legal, Regulatory and Contractual Requirements
• Schedule of Confidentiality Agreements
• Non-Disclosure Agreement
• Business Impact Analysis Process
• Business Impact Analysis Report
• Business Impact Analysis Tool
Before we can manage our cybersecurity, we have to have a clear understanding of what it is we’re trying to achieve. At the highest level, this comes down to the core mission of the organization; its very reason for existence in its present form. We then need to establish who has a stake in the organization’s success (interested parties, or stakeholders) and what they need our cybersecurity program to deliver. This will help us later to identify risks that relate to any inabilities to meet those important requirements.
No organization operates in a vacuum, and there will be requirements and constraints put upon it in the form of legal obligations, possibly the needs of a regulatory body, and from contractual arrangements with third parties. All of these dictate what it is we need to achieve from our cybersecurity framework. To inform this thought process, we also need to understand the processes of the organization and their relative importance in ensuring its success. This is achieved by conducting a business impact assessment which models what would happen if each of the business processes were partially or completely disabled.
5.1.2 Risk Management Strategy (GV.RM)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• InfoSec Objectives and Plan
• Cybersecurity Risk Management Policy
• Risk Assessment and Treatment Process
• Opportunity Assessment Tool
There are various decisions that need to be made before we can start conducting risk assessments, including how will we know if risk management is working appropriately, how much risk is acceptable to us, how cybersecurity risk management fits in with risk management in other areas, and which of the many available methods we’re going to use to assess risk.
Not all risk is bad, and we need to ensure we consider how we would capitalize on events going our way, that is, on opportunities.
5.1.3 Roles, Responsibilities, and Authorities (GV.RR)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• InfoSec Roles Responsibilities and Authorities
• Executive Support Letter
• HR Security Policy
• Employee Screening Procedure
• Guidelines for Inclusion in Employment Contracts
• Employee Disciplinary Process
• Employee Screening Checklist
• Employee Termination and Change of Employment Checklist
• Leavers Letter
As well as the leadership of the organization showing that they are serious about cybersecurity (partly by allocating resources to it), there needs to be clear definition of relevant roles and their associated responsibilities and authorities, so that no-one is in any doubt about the part they play in protecting the organization.
Human resources practices need to embrace information security at each stage of employment and reduce the insider threat from deliberate or accidental actions.
5.1.4
Policy (GV.PO)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Information Security Policy
• Social Media Policy
• Information Security Whistleblowing Policy
• Internet Access Policy
• Electronic Messaging Policy
• Online Collaboration Policy
• Cloud Services Policy
• IP and Copyright Compliance Policy
• Privacy and Personal Data Protection Policy
• Remote Working Policy
• Mobile Device Policy
• BYOD Policy
• Information Deletion Policy
• Data Masking Policy
• Data Leakage Prevention Policy
It’s important that management’s intentions with regard to cybersecurity are clearly stated and communicated, and this often means creating an appropriate set of policies, processes and procedures for people to work from. Once in place, these need to be managed so that they stay up to date and that changes to them are properly reflected and recommunicated to all those that need to know about them.
5.1.5 Oversight (GV.OV)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Process for Monitoring, Measurement, Analysis and Evaluation
• Procedure for Management Reviews
• Management Review Meeting Agenda
There needs to be a clear method for checking that your cybersecurity framework is working as intended and this will likely involve a combination of key performance indicators and regular reviews by management to identify and tweak any areas that are not delivering. This is done with varying frequencies at each of the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
5.1.6 Cybersecurity Supply Chain Risk Management (GV.SC)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Cybersecurity Supply Chain Policy
• Supplier Information Security Agreement
• Supplier Due Diligence Assessment Procedure
• Supplier Information Security Evaluation Process
• Supplier Evaluation Covering Letter
• Supplier Due Diligence Assessment
• Supplier Evaluation Questionnaire
Cybersecurity supply chain risk management is a whole subject in itself, driven partly by recent breaches at major suppliers that have had dire consequences for their customers. A comprehensive program is called for, that dovetails with related risk management efforts within the organization. As well as ensuring that due diligence is carried out when suppliers are selected, there needs to be an ongoing approach that manages the risks from suppliers and encourages their adoption of effective controls.
5.2 Identify (ID)
The Identify function is about gathering together all the relevant information about hardware, software, services and data to act as a base for assessing risk within your organization. Risks are then formally assessed in the context of the threats to them, and the vulnerabilities they possess, to produce an actionable plan to take steps to reduce the overall level of risk to within acceptable bounds.
5.2.1 Asset Management (ID.AM)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Asset Management Policy
• Asset Inventory
• Acceptable Use Policy
• Asset Handling Procedure
• Procedure for Managing Lost or Stolen Devices
• Procedure for Taking Assets Offsite
• Procedure for the Management of Removable Media
• Physical Media Transfer Procedure
• Acceptable Use Confirmation Form
This category is about understanding the assets your organization has that need to be protected, including hardware, software, internal services, external services and data. It is likely that much of this information will be held within configuration management-related systems that automatically collect inventories of the hardware you have, the software that is installed on it, and their configuration, so making a manual list of these things is unlikely to be the best approach. It will more likely be a case of finding out where this information already exists. Services and information can be more difficult to define, so you may need to put some effort into identifying the services (internal and external) you operate and how data flows within and outside of your organization’s boundaries. Some will be more important than others, so having an idea of criticality will be useful, informed by the business impact assessment you did in the Organizational Context (GV.OC) category.
5.2.2 Risk Assessment (ID.RA)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Risk Assessment Report
• Risk Treatment Plan
• Threat Intelligence Policy
• Threat Intelligence Process
• Threat Intelligence Report
• Technical Vulnerability Management Policy
• Technical Vulnerability Assessment Procedure
• Change Management Process
• Asset-Based Risk Tool
• Scenario-Based Risk Tool
Based on the asset information you collected in the previous category, we now need to understand the vulnerabilities associated with those assets (particularly software) and the threats that are out there before starting our risk assessment. This will result in a risk treatment plan which will be one of your main tools in driving risk reduction and general improvement within your organization. Addressing issues such as the effective management of change is also covered within this category.
5.2.3 Improvement (ID.IM)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Procedure for Continual Service Improvement
• Service Improvement Plan
• Procedure for the Mgt of Nonconformity
• Nonconformity and Corrective Action Log
• Incident Lessons Learned Report
Improvement is a cross-cutting category that applies to most of the other functions and categories within the CSF. Encouraging the identification and communication of improvements from all areas is key, so you’ll need to be clear who should be notified and how they will be logged and actioned, so that improvement becomes a relentless machine for the benefit of the organization.
Having an internal audit program is a useful way to keep everyone on their toes and check that everything is being done as it should.
5.3 Protect (PR)
Having put our overall framework in place, identified our assets and then conducted a risk assessment against them, the Protect function is where we implement the relevant treatment actions to actually start reducing the risk to our organization.
5.3.1 Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AA)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Access Control Policy
• User Access Management Process
• Dynamic Access Control Policy
• Segregation of Duties Guidelines
• Physical Security Policy
• Physical Security Design Standards
• Data Centre Access Procedure
• Procedure for Working in Secure Areas
This category is about ensuring that only authorized users get access to our assets, both electronic and physical. This involves having clear policies, procedures and controls for identifying users correctly and controlling what they have access to, with additional attention given to issues such as password strength and multifactor authentication.
5.3.2
Awareness and Training (PR.AT)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Awareness Training Presentation
• InfoSec Competence Development Procedure
• InfoSec Competence Development Report
• Information Security Summary Card
It’s important that users are aware of their information security responsibilities, and that they are educated in the methods that might be used to try to trick them into allowing someone else access (such as phishing and social engineering). As well as the wider user population, there will be a need for more specialized training for people with larger roles to play in the cybersecurity framework of the organization, such as system administrators, auditors and managers.
5.3.3 Data Security (PR.DS)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Cryptographic Policy
• Records Retention and Protection Policy
• Information Classification Procedure
• Information Labelling Procedure
• Clear Desk and Clear Screen Policy
• Procedure for the Disposal of Media
• Backup Policy
• Privileged Utility Program Register
The Data Security category concerns itself with the lifecycle of the organization’s data, ensuring that it is encrypted where possible, backed up appropriately and destroyed effectively when no longer needed. It is useful to adopt a classification scheme so that resources may be focused on the most sensitive data, and to only retain them for as long as necessary. Obviously applicable data protection legislation will be relevant in this area, and the measures used must ensure compliance with these laws.
5.3.4 Platform Security (PR.PS)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Configuration Management Policy
• Configuration Management Process
• Configuration Standard Template
• Logging and Monitoring Policy
• Software Policy
• Secure Development Policy
• Secure Coding Policy
• Secure Development Environment Guidelines
Having dealt with the security of the data in the previous category, Platform Security covers the hardware and software that hosts that data, ensuring that it is configured and maintained correctly, that it’s monitored for suspicious events, and that bespoke code is written and implemented in a secure way. The specifics of this category will depend a lot on the platforms used (for example Microsoft, Google, AWS) and, if applicable, the development approach taken for bespoke code. Software tools will play a significant part in this area, including log management and monitoring, anti-malware and integrated development environments.
5.3.5
Technology Infrastructure Resilience (PR.IR)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Network Security Policy
• ICT Continuity Incident Response Procedure
• ICT Continuity Plan
• ICT Continuity Exercising and Testing Schedule
• ICT Continuity Test Plan
• ICT Continuity Test Report
• Capacity Plan
• Availability Management Policy
Further to the data and the platforms, the technology infrastructure supporting them also needs to be managed, particularly in terms of its availability. As well as designing the various components for resilience, there needs to be a documented approach to reacting to unforeseen events such as fire, flood and other environmental threats. Consideration of the current and future capacity of the infrastructure also needs to be made so that problems are not encountered due to lack of resources.
5.4 Detect (DE)
Having created our cybersecurity framework (Govern), identified the things that must be protected (Identify), assessed the risks to them and implemented a set of controls to reduce those risks (Protect), we can now sit back and wait for something to happen. The Detect function aims to raise the alarm when an event is recognized as a deliberate (or sometimes accidental) attempt to circumvent our defences and inflict some form of harm on our organization.
5.4.1
Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Monitoring Policy
• Anti-Malware Policy
• Web Filtering Policy
• CCTV Policy
In general, the activities of this category will largely be carried out by software, ideally aided by artificial intelligence, to recognize what a normal situation looks like, and raise a flag when this normality appears to be deviated from. Services such as intrusion detection (and prevention) systems, anti-malware, log analyzers and file integrity monitors can be used to keep a close eye on the IT environment and raise a possible incident according to set rules.
That is not to say that humans don’t play a part too; monitoring of the physical environment is likely to involve a combination of technology, for example CCTV, and people, such as security guards and security-aware employees.
5.4.2 Adverse Event Analysis (DE.AE)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Information Security Event Reporting Procedure
• Information Security Event Assessment Procedure
One of the challenges with continuous monitoring is to avoid false positives, where the alarm is being raised too often for events that are actually normal. Each alarm needs to be evaluated to assess whether it represents a genuine incident that must be reacted to, or whether it is simply noise. Again, software helps in this, with a security information and event management (SIEM) system now being a common addition to an organization’s toolset. A SIEM system can allow various events across the infrastructure to be correlated to establish whether the set of individual clues represents an incident, or whether an event is an isolated anomaly. Cyber threat intelligence can play a part in this too, if known indicators of compromise (IoCs), which are the signature of a specific type of attack, are found at the same time.
If all the signs point to an incident, then the next function of the CSF is triggered; Respond.
5.5 Respond (RS)
In contrast to many of the proactive risk reduction activities performed in the other functions of the CSF, Respond is much more of a real-time function, where speed and coordination can pay dividends. Having a well-trained team available that has immediate access to the right tools is essential if damage to the organization is to be minimized.
5.5.1 Incident Management (RS.MA)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Information Security Incident Response Procedure
It’s important to have a well-defined plan available that everyone is familiar with, and systems and procedures that can cope with more than one ongoing incident at a time. Third parties, including your cyber-insurance provider and the additional resources they can give access to, should be involved where appropriate.
5.5.2
Incident Analysis (RS.AN)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Preservation of Evidence Guidelines
• Incident Impact Information Log
• Plan Activation Log
This category is about working out what’s happened, when and in what order. A balance needs to be struck between the urgency of reaching conclusions about points of entry and other vulnerabilities, and the need to preserve evidence for later analysis and possibly use in a prosecution.
5.5.3
Incident Response Reporting and Communication (RS.CO)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Personal Data Breach Notification Procedure
• InfoSec Communication Program
• Authorities Contacts
• Special Interest Group Contacts
• Personal Data Breach Notification Form
• Breach Notification Letter to Data Subjects
How you keep stakeholders informed about incidents is key to how it is perceived and limiting the resulting reputational damage. For breaches involving personally identifiable information (PII), there may be timescales for notification laid out in relevant legislation. Communication is a two-way process, where others may be able to provide you with details such as indicators of compromise to look for.
5.5.4
Incident Mitigation (RS.MI)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Incident Response Plan Ransomware
• Incident Response Plan Denial of Service
• Incident Response Plan Data Breach
This category is where an incident is firstly contained and then eradicated. This may be automated via software, or it may be a manual process involving isolation of affected infrastructure, followed by further investigation and restoration from backups.
5.6 Recover (RC)
Having eradicated the cause of the incident, this function deals with the process of getting things back to normal as quickly as possible, whilst ensuring that the risk of further compromise is minimized. During this process, it’s important that appropriate communications are made with those affected by the incident.
5.6.1 Incident Recovery Plan Execution (RC.RP)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Information Security Incident Response Procedure
Once the cause of the incident has been eradicated, the required actions must be undertaken to bring the situation back to a business as usual footing. This may involve the restoration of full or partial backups, re-initialization of hardware and software and user participation in confirming the correct operation of the systems affected. This is normally done in a prioritized order, with the most business-critical resources being addressed first. Care must also be taken that the backups used have not been compromised, as is sometimes the case with an attack such as ransomware.
5.6.2 Incident Recovery Communication (RC.CO)
Relevant Toolkit documents:
• Draft Public Update on Incident Recovery
Keeping internal and external stakeholders, such as management, customers, users and in some cases the general public, informed of what is happening is key to the post-incident perception that will exist after the situation has been resolved – that is, whether the incident was handled well, or poorly. Communication needs to be handled carefully so that it is both timely and accurate and sets expectations appropriately.