Ramada&Williams_worshop_NOV 2021_presentation_S1-1 by OECD

Can unregulated Professional Business Services markets deliver effective competition?

OECD workshop on Regulatory Barriers to Competition in Professional Services Dr Paula Ramada and Rhys Williams London Economics, 18th November 2021

Agenda Context and objectives

Main components of the theoretical framework

‘Necessary’ conditions for competition Specificities of professional services markets and their interaction with conditions for effective competition Effects on competition and market outcomes

The role of market-based solutions

Final remarks and next steps 2

Context and objectives 

Context: on-going project for EC DG GROW

“Competition and its economic outcomes in selected business services professions in the EU: a refined methodology and a comprehensive empirical assessment” Develop a comprehensive framework for an assessment and benchmarking of competition and its economic outcomes in professional business services markets

Today's presentation is on this component of the project

Conduct a comprehensive empirical analysis of market competition and its economic outcomes Produce empirical evidence on whether and to what extent professional regulation restrictions interact with market competition and market outcomes

All views expressed are those of the named authors only and do not constitute the views of DG GROW

Context and objectives Objectives of the theoretical framework 1)

To develop a framework for a competition analysis applicable to the professional services markets, taking into account their specific characteristics

▫ The focus is on the link between specificities of professional services markets and ineffective competition and/or undesirable market outcomes ▫ As such, we abstract from any role currently played by regulation (in other words, we are looking for the problems that regulation, among other approaches, might be used to solve) 2)

To assess the extent to which effective competition can be expected in such markets

▫ We ask whether some such specificities are problematic and, if so, in what way 3)

To consider the role of solutions or interventions such as market-based mechanisms and regulation

Main components of the theoretical framework

Necessary or desirable conditions for effective competition  Customer-side – Customers react to value for money (VFM)  They can make themselves aware about the array of relevant choices the market offers  They are able to assess and compare these choices in terms of VFM  They act upon this knowledge and are motivated to switch to higher VFM suppliers

 Supplier-side – sellers must be incentivised to offer VFM, to compete and be rivalrous  Better VFM suppliers gain more customers than low VFM suppliers  Market share gains achieved by offering better VFM are profitable  Suppliers have an incentive to innovate to improve VFM of their services  There are low entry costs/low entry barriers so that suppliers offering poor VFM can expect new entrants to enter and steal customers  Low VFM sellers are not protected by market segmentation

Features of some professional services markets that may hinder effective competition (1)

Possible features Informational asymmetries  Customers can’t make an ex-ante assessment of the quality of the professional  Customers can’t assess the ‘effort’ input by the supplier  Customers can't make an ex-post assessment of the quality of the service  Customers are unable to gauge their own service requirements



Significant relationship-specific investments required by both customers and suppliers

How they hinder effective competition  Customers are not aware of the array of relevant choices the market offers  Customers unable to assess and compare these choices in terms of VFM  Customers may not switch / may select low VFM supplier, thereby reducing suppliers’ incentive to offer high VFM  Suppliers that offer fair services and service levels do not gain more customers

 High customer switching costs;  Suppliers not incentivised to gain new customers

Features of some professional services markets that may hinder effective competition (2)

Possible features



VFM and service quality are highly multi-dimensional and subjective, with differing customer preferences across the various dimensions

Services purchased infrequently

How they hinder effective competition  It is difficult for customers to gain information about available choices and to compare across these  this may inhibit switching behaviour  Markets may become narrowly segmented  High supplier costs with new customers  Suppliers not incentivised to compete fiercely

 Customers unable to reward good VFM suppliers or punish poor VFM suppliers  No supplier-disciplining effect from switching

Features of some professional services markets that may hinder effective competition (3)

Possible features

Buyers may not be price-sensitive/ VFMsensitive  Misalignment between the preferences of the purchaser and the end-user

 Better VFM suppliers do not gain more customers  No supplier-disciplining effect from switching

Poor service can have very serious impacts on users  There may be negative externalities beyond the costs on direct users

 Customers very risk averse; focus on avoiding negative outcomes rather than attaining VFM; do not try new suppliers; do not switch  Customers may select suppliers and services that are sub-optimal from a societal perspective



How they hinder effective competition

Effects on competition and market outcomes Possible negative effects: Competition outcomes  Customers are not aware of the array of relevant choices the market offers  Customers unable to assess and compare these choices in terms of VFM  Customers may not switch / may select low VFM supplier, thereby reducing suppliers’ incentive to offer high VFM  Suppliers that offer fair services and service levels do not gain more customers  

High customer switching costs; Suppliers not incentivised to gain new customers

 It is difficult for customers to gain information about available choices and to compare across these  this may inhibit switching behaviour  Markets may become narrowly segmented  High supplier costs with new customers  Suppliers not incentivised to compete fiercely

 Customers unable to reward good VFM suppliers or punish poor VFM suppliers  No supplier-disciplining effect from switching  

Better VFM suppliers do not gain more customers No supplier-disciplining effect from switching

 Low levels of switching  Strong customer-supplier relationships  Competition over signals rather than value for money  High barriers to entry  Collusive behaviour or tacit collusion  High market concentration  Segmented markets

Possible negative effects: Market outcomes  High prices / low quality / poor VFM  Quality dimensions not tailored to customer needs  Low availability of services  Possible breakdown of some market segments  Low innovation

Market-based solutions  Some of the challenges for effective competition in professional services markets are common to multiple other markets  Certain market-based mechanisms have developed to address them Reputation Contractual guarantees Service testing Liability Standardisation Separation of diagnosis and treatment Complex payment schedules Digitalisation 11

Market-based approaches to improve outcomes Effect on ‘necessary’ conditions for effective competition high VFM Customers Customers suppliers Customers informed motivated gain able to about and able to customers/ compare relevant react to low VFM alternatives alternatives VFM lose customers

Low VFM suppliers sellers not incentivised Low barriers protected to gain to entry by market customers segmentatio n

Market-based solution

Reputation Contractual guarantees Service testing Liability Standardisation Separation of diagnosis and treatment Complex payment schedules Digitalisation 12

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Example: application to civil engineering Features in civil engineering market and resulting problem(s) for effective competition

Feature relevant?

Info asymmetry: quality unknown ex-ante (both quality of service and quality of professional) → combined with rare purchasing, competition does not drive low quality services out of the market; seller has limited incentives to invest in their own quality

relevant

Info asymmetry: quality unknown ex-post → competition does not drive poor quality off the market, even with repeat purchasing

relevant

Info asymmetry: supplier effort unknown → competition does not incentivise adequate effort; repeated purchasing could help Info asymmetry about service requirements → competition does not lead to adequate services and service levels Buyers and/or sellers make relationship specific investments, resulting in buyer switch costs and in seller cost advantage to serve repeat customers → increases switching costs and barriers to entry; little incentive for sellers to aggressively compete and to try to steal customers from other sellers / barriers to entry Purchases are rare but poor service can have very serious impacts on users → poor service is not punished by loss of custom, risk aversion makes buyers less likely to switch, buyers may choose higher price suppliers as a 'safer bet'; softens price competition between suppliers Buyers are not price sensitive → softens price competition between suppliers Buyers’ relative valuations across quality dimensions may differ from those of other users and from the societal optimum → suppliers not incentivised to offer quality dimensions with highest societal value

Can restore Marketeffective Analysis / comments based competition solutions ?

Reputation is a relevant market-based mechanism that can reduce customers' lack of information about professionals; reputation rewards good quality service with customers beyond repeat customers; mechanisms that assist in spreading information about the quality Reputation of professionals and their services are helpful; in markets where reputation is highly relied Contractual to a large on, however, reputation is also a barrier to entry. Examples: customers rely on reputation; guarantees extent customers ask for quotes from several potential suppliers with a careful design of the Service testing procurement process; customers adopt complex payment schedules that reward appropriate Liability achievements and milestones; customers engage in service testing; on-going professional development requirements; professional insurance; professional liability for damages associated with poor service Reputation as a market-based mechanism is less effective when the quality of service is exReputation post unknown; professionals may attempt to create a good 'reputation' based on signals Contractual other than actual service performance (some potentially wasteful such as law firms investing to some extent guarantees in art collections in lieu of advertising); contractual guarantees and liability are less effective Liability mechanisms if the harm from poor service may occur a long time into the future as the service provider may put little weight on future liability costs

less relevant less relevant

less relevant

relevant

relevant in some market segments relevant in some market segments

Reputation Contractual guarantees Liability Complex payment schedules

Reputation is an effective supplier disciplining mechanism even in the case of rare purchases, so mechanisms that spread truthful and appropriate information about professionals are important; access to digital databases which record such information is helpful; however, to some extent when the cost of poor service is very high, risk aversion from contracting authorities may result in excessive reliance on reputation and repeat purchasing; this causes barriers to entry and softens competition.

none

n.a.

Ultimate users of the service to monitor buyer (e.g. in public procurement situations)

none

n.a.

Ultimate users of the service to monitor buyer (e.g. in public procurement situations)

Final remarks, and next steps 

We have discussed the conditions required for effective competition; the features prevalent in some professional services markets; how they interfere with the development of effective competition; and how they might affect competition and market outcomes



We have explored the potential for market-based solutions to restore the conditions for effective competition to develop ▫ Next steps will seek to further understand and evaluate the extent to which market-based solutions can and cannot address professional services market problems



This will involve:

▫ Measuring features to predict the level of achievable competition ▫ Measuring outcomes to assess deviations from the above benchmark



This will also provide a framework in which to consider the role for regulation in these markets



Next stage in the study is to apply this framework to specific professional services markets to evaluate further the relationship between market specificities, market-based solutions, regulation, competition and market outcomes

Thank you for your time – any questions? Dr Paula Ramada, Partner pramada@londecon.co.uk Rhys Williams, Senior Economic Consultant rwilliams@londecon.co.uk