Legion condor 1936-39: the luftwaffe learns blitzkrieg in the spanish civil war 1st edition james s.
Legion Condor 1936-39: The Luftwaffe Learns Blitzkrieg in the Spanish Civil War 1st Edition James S. Corum
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Norway 1940: The Luftwaffe's Scandinavian Blitzkrieg 1st Edition James S. Corum
The Luftwaffe develops Blitzkrieg in the Spanish Civil War
JAMES S. CORUM | ILLUSTRATED BY GRAHAM TURNER
AIR CAMPAIGN LEGION CONDOR 1936–39
The Luftwaffe develops Blitzkrieg in the Spanish Civil War
JAMES S. CORUM | ILLUSTRATED BY GRAHAM TURNER
ORIGINS
The trimotor Junkers Ju 52 came into service in 1932 as a civilian transport. The Ju 52 was easily modified into a bomber and, as it was already in production, it was used by the Luftwaffe as a bomber until purpose-built aircraft like the He 111 became available. The Ju 52 bomber carried the bombardier in a special pod that was lowered from the aircraft. The Ju 52 carried 1,500kg of bombs. (Author’s collection)
From the airlift to Madrid
By 1936 Spain had become divided into two nations. One of these was conservative, Catholic and Nationalist. This side included Spain’s small businessmen and landowners. There were large factions arguing for the return of the monarchy and these had formed militia forces, especially in the northern province of Navarre. The 1930s had also seen the rise of a large Fascist party, the Falange, modelled on Mussolini’s example in Italy. The other Spain was a coalition of forces that held the majority in the Spanish parliament. These included socialists, radical socialists, anarchists, progressives and assorted liberals who were supported strongly by the labour unions and the poor tenant farmers. Spain had a small but well-organized Communist party as well, and this faction was quickly winning adherents.
Since the defeat of an attempted right-wing coup d’état in 1932, the two Spains became ever more polarized. By summer of 1936 right-wing forces led by a coalition of army generals were deep in planning for a national uprising. The uprising itself was triggered on 13 July 1936 when Calvo Sotelo, the leader of right-wing opposition in the Spanish parliament, was arrested and then assassinated by the government police. A few days later, on 16–17 July 1936, much of the Spanish Army, backed by an assortment of monarchists, conservatives and Fascists, went into open revolt against the Republic. The Nationalist rebellion was led by a small junta of generals. General José Sanjurjo, who had led the attempted rightest coup in 1932 and was imprisoned and then amnestied by the government, lived in exile in Portugal and was the most senior of the coup plotters. Another senior officer was General Emilio Mola, a decorated veteran of the North African wars who had served as the governor-general and commandant in Pamplona, Navarre. Mola had developed excellent contacts with the large monarchist movement in northern Spain. The third senior leader of the Nationalist junta was General Francisco Franco, at 44 the youngest of the top leaders.
Franco was one of the best known and most successful generals in the Spanish Army. He had remained generally aloof from politics, and stayed away from earlier coup attempts and revolutionary activity, but had fallen under the suspicion of the Republic’s government
and been sent far away to the Canary Islands to serve as commander there. However, Franco was also an exceptionally capable officer and was the most highly decorated combat commander in the Spanish Army. He was a battlefield soldier known for his bravery and coolness under fire when he fought in the North African wars. He had been wounded several times and had, in turn, been the youngest captain, major, colonel and general in the Spanish Army. (He was promoted to general at age 33.) From 1923 to 1927 he had commanded the Spanish Foreign Legion during the Rif War in Morocco. When the coup began, Franco’s mission was to fly on the night of 16/17 July from the Canary Islands to North Africa to raise the garrison there to support the coup. Not only was Franco wellknown in North Africa, but gaining control of the Spanish Army of Africa was key to the Nationalists’ hopes of taking Spain.
The Spanish Peninsular Army was, for the most part, a poorly trained force with obsolete equipment and far too many ageing officers. In 1936 it consisted of about 100,000 men. The police forces of the Spanish Republic, which included the Civil Guards and the Assault Police, were another 60,000 men. The army on the Spanish mainland and Civil Guards were split in their sympathies, with about half of these forces going to each side. However, the Nationalists had an advantage in terms of securing Army support in that the vast majority of officers were supportive of the Nationalist coup, and in the area controlled by the government many of the officers either fled or were arrested. The small air force split with about 150 of the pilots staying loyal to the government and about 100 going over to the rebels. The Navy enlisted crewmen distrusted their officers, and when the coup began they arrested and executed officers suspected of Nationalist loyalties. Some warships did fall to the Nationalists, but the Spanish Navy’s most powerful units, including the battleship Jaime I, sided with the government.
General Francisco Franco. It was Franco who sent representatives to Germany and Italy to obtain support for the Nationalist cause. (Author’s collection)
The one really effective military force in Spain – well-trained, well-equipped, and possessing considerable combat experience – was the Army of Africa, a largely volunteer force honed by decades of hard colonial campaigns in Spanish Morocco. The Army of Africa consisted of 20,000 long-term volunteers recruited from the Moroccans and a few thousand professional soldiers of the Spanish Foreign Legion. Ten thousand troops of the Peninsular Army were also stationed in Spanish Morocco. These approximately 35,000 troops included many officers, NCOs and enlisted men who were veterans of the Rif War of the 1920s. If these forces could be won over to the coup and transported to mainland Spain, they would be far superior to any government force put in their way.
However, the plan in the first days of the coup was for the rebels to seize power in the major Spanish cities of Madrid and Barcelona. On the very first day of the coup, this was attempted by army and police units. But they were defeated when the government armed the
General der Flieger Helmuth Wilberg. Before his death in an air crash in 1941, Wilberg was one of the Luftwaffe’s most experienced General Staff officers. He organized and led Special Staff W in July 1936, serving as its chief until March 1938. Thanks to Special Staff W, logistics and support for the Condor Legion were managed effectively. (Author’s collection)
leftist unions and militias and forced the surrender of the rightist plotters, most of whom were then executed. Most of Spain, including the major industrial areas, remained in the hands of the Republic, as did Barcelona and the capital, Madrid. One of the coup leaders, General Mola, roused the efforts of the Nationalists in northern Spain and took over most of the north, with the exception of the Basque region and Asturias. In the south, General Queipo de Llano seized power in Seville and part of the south, including the port of Cadiz. In North Africa, the officers of the Army of Africa immediately joined the Nationalist coup and turned over command to General Franco.
After one week of essentially urban combat, the boundaries between Republican and Nationalist Spain were already set. The Nationalists were frustrated by their inability to bring this first-rate army in Morocco over to the Spanish mainland. If these 30,000 well trained, experienced troops could be brought to the mainland, they would clearly be superior to any other force available in Spain. But getting the army to the mainland over the short straits between Africa and Cadiz was an impossible task, as the Republic’s navy had full control of the sea. With destroyers and the battleship Jaime I the Republicans quickly blockaded the straits between Morocco and Spain. Unable to move by sea, General Franco turned to the idea of an airlift to fly the Army of Africa over the straits to Seville. But the Nationalists had only a handful of operational aircraft. Franco turned to Germany and Italy for help.
Germany decides for intervention: the airlift
With the Nationalist cause faltering after the initial rising, General Franco was approached by two German businessmen residing in Spanish Morocco. Adolf Langenheim and Johannes Bernhardt were members of the Nazi Party and supporters of the Spanish Nationalist cause. They believed that, with their Nazi Party connections in Germany, they could meet with Hitler and convince him to provide aircraft and support to Franco’s forces. Franco gave his blessing to the mission and Bernhardt and Langenheim flew to Berlin on 25 July in a civilian German Ju 52 passenger transport. The businessmen’s claim that their party connections could get them access proved true. They met with Rudolf Hess who quickly arranged for them to meet with Hitler, who that night was attending the Wagner Festival at Bayreuth. Hitler had already been briefed on the Spanish situation by his foreign ministry and both the foreign office and the military leadership wanted to avoid Spanish involvement, but Hitler agreed to meet with the businessmen. Bernhardt and Langenheim met with Hitler on the night of 25/26 July, and convinced him that some support from Germany in the form of aircraft and supplies would be to Germany’s advantage; it would tip the scales in favour of the Nationalists, who would be far more amenable to pursuing pro-German trade and foreign policies than the leftist Republic.
Hitler immediately agreed to provide aircraft and military equipment to Franco and told Hermann Göring, who was attending to Hitler in Bayreuth, to make the arrangements. Göring initially had no enthusiasm for the operation, but he could move with speed and determination
when it pleased the Führer. Göring got on the phone to the Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin and ordered the Air Staff to put together a plan to support the Spanish Nationalists immediately. The next morning, 26 July, although it was a Sunday, Generalleutnant Helmuth Wilberg of the Luftwaffe was ordered to form a special staff in order to organize assistance to the Spanish Nationalists. The next day ten aircraft were detached from Lufthansa and sent to Franco in North Africa to begin airlifting the Army of Africa. Italy agreed to allow transit of the planes and refuel them. Italy had also been approached by Franco and, like Hitler, Mussolini agreed to send immediate help – also in the form of aircraft and military equipment. Wilberg, a brilliant General Staff officer and one of Germany’s most experienced airmen, formed a staff from officers at Luftwaffe headquarters in Berlin. Special Staff W (W for Wilberg) was issuing plans and orders within two days and by 31 July a ship with additional German aircraft, aid and personnel were on their way from Germany to Spanish Morocco. Wilberg would remain chief of the Spanish operation until his retirement in March 1938.
The first volunteers for Spain were 85 well-trained pilots, NCOs and technical personnel (all unmarried at first) who were directed to report to Hamburg for a special mission. In Hamburg they were asked to volunteer for the special mission, to be kept highly secret, which would require that they be officially retired from the Luftwaffe and placed on reserve status. They would serve outside the country. Without knowing the exact nature of their duties (one suspects that many followed the news and understood they were going to Spain) the personnel sent by their units all volunteered. Late at night on 31 July the merchant ship Usaramo, loaded with 85 Luftwaffe volunteers, ten Ju 52 bombers, six Heinkel He 51 fighters, 20 anti-aircraft guns, and personnel to man both the aircraft and the guns, sailed from Hamburg for Spain. They all wore civilian clothes and any correspondence was sent to a post office box in Hamburg. The small detachment was the first of many shipments of materiel and personnel for Spain, which was at first called Operation Magic Fire.
Photo taken by one of the first Condor Legion members at the start of the German intervention. The Germans admired the Moroccans for their bravery and tactical competence. These troops enabled the Nationalists to connect the two Nationalist enclaves in northern and southern Spain and to begin an advance on Madrid. (Author’s collection)
Alexander von Scheele was a Schlachtflieger (close-attack pilot) in World War I. He was chosen to lead the operation because he was fluent in Spanish. (USAF Historical Research Agency)
The He 51 was the Luftwaffe’s main fighter in 1936. It had elegant lines and looked like a fine machine, but proved inferior to the Republic’s Soviet-built I-15 and I-16 fighters. It was relegated to ground-attack duties, which it performed very well. (Author’s collection)
The initial German directives did not include combat operations. The He 51 fighters and the flak guns were intended for self-defence only and the additional Ju 52s were intended to arm the Spanish Nationalists. Germans would train the Spaniards to fly the aircraft. General Wilberg selected an experienced Luftwaffe officer, Major Alexander von Scheele, to command the small German detachment sent to help Franco. Von Scheele was a decorated World War I Schlachtflieger – a pilot for an armoured and heavily armed two-seater close support aircraft. After the war and the disbanding of the Imperial Air Service, von Scheele went to South America where he was engaged in business. In the early 1930s he returned to Germany and joined the reborn Luftwaffe, where experienced pilots and former Imperial officers were needed and welcomed. Von Scheele was selected for his complete fluency in Spanish and he arrived in Spain and took command of the mission on 6 August when the Usaramao docked at the port of Cadiz.
At this point it should be noted that the Nationalist junta had not formally created a state. So, the agreement the Germans and Italians had with the Nationalists was not with any provisional government, but merely a personal agreement with Franco. Although Franco was initially the junior partner in the Nationalist leadership due to his age and lower level of visibility in right-wing circles, he was catapulted to the top spot by events. General Sanjurjo, who saw himself as the senior Nationalist leader, was killed on 20 July when his plane, flying from Portugal, crashed just after take-off. General Mola controlled the key regions of northern Spain and had good connections to the monarchists and rightists in the northern provinces but did not have command of the elite Spanish Army of Africa that would be the key card of the Nationalists. It was Franco who took the initiative to seek, and win, support from Germany and Italy. And it was this support and the Army of Africa that would determine whether the Nationalist rebellion would succeed.
Upon arriving in Spain, von Scheele met with Franco and set up an arrangement to provide a legal cover for the German aid to the Nationalists. A front company, the Spanish German Transport Company Limited, operating under the Spanish acronym HISMA, was
created to manage the aid and financial credits to the Nationalists. Franco, for his part, was willing to commit to providing Germany with privileged access to Spain’s mineral resources, an important consideration since Germany was rearming and looking for reliable sources of raw materials.
The first Luftwaffe force to be committed to the Nationalist cause was a group of ten Ju 52 transports taken from Lufthansa, which were deployed by flying them from Germany, refuelling in Italy, and then flying them on to Spanish Morocco. Before the end of July, a full airlift was underway with German transports flying from Tétouan Airfield in Morocco to Seville, an hour’s flight. Normally a passenger load for a Ju 52 was 17 passengers, but as many as 40 Moroccan soldiers were often crammed aboard the transports for the short flight. Before long the Germans were flying 1,200 troops a week from Africa to mainland Spain. By the week of 10–16 August 1936, the Luftwaffe transports were able to airlift 2,853 soldiers along with 7,985kg of equipment. During colonial conflicts the British and French
Bombing the battleship Jaime I, 13 August 1936
Ju 52 carrying Spanish Moroccan troops from Tétouan to Seville, summer 1936. The airlift of the Spanish Army of Africa, along with 200m tonnes of equipment, saved the Nationalist cause in the first weeks of the Spanish Civil War. (Author’s collection)
When the civil war began most of the Spanish Navy remained in Republican hands, including Spain’s one operational battleship. The Jaime I was slow and obsolescent, carrying eight 12in guns, but it and its supporting destroyers effectively blocked all sea traffic between Nationalist-held Morocco and the Spanish mainland. Not only did the Jaime I control the seas, but its batteries of Vickers 1.9in and twin 25mm Hotchkiss anti-aircraft guns made it a threat to the German transports ferrying Nationalist troops and supplies from Morocco to the mainland.
Two weeks into the airlift von Scheele decided the battleship had to be neutralized. He ordered two of the Ju 52 transports to be converted into bombers to seek out and bomb the Jaime I. Learning that the battleship was moored at Malaga, the two hastily converted Ju 52s set out at 0400hrs on 13 August to attack. The first plane, piloted by Captain Baron von Moreau, got lost in the heavy morning cloud cover and returned to base. The second Ju 52, piloted by Captain Alfred Henke, with a Spanish naval officer as an observer, dropped down low through the clouds to 1,200ft and located the Jaime I at dawn anchored far out in the bay (likely moored away from the port for fear of an air attack).
Henke attacked at 1,200ft and dropped three 250kg bombs. Two struck the Jaime I in front of the bridge, causing massive damage and killing about 50 naval crew. The Jaime I was disabled and had to be towed up the coast to Cartagena and never again became operational. Captain Henke’s successful attack was a major blow to the Republican Navy and was the first step in breaking the Republican blockade of the straits.
Condor Legion signallers just arrived in Seville, August or September 1936. Here the German signallers are enjoying a drink with Spanish troops. The first Germans in Spain arrived without uniforms and were ordered to avoid combat. That would soon change. (Author’s collection)
had flown troops and supplies to far-flung outposts, but nothing on the scale of the Spanish airlift had ever been seen in warfare.
The airlift of the Nationalist forces to mainland Spain from 27 July to 11 October was a clear triumph. The German transports were joined by the Italians and the Nationalists also operated some transports, but the main effort and credit for the success belonged to the Germans, who had also managed the airfield operations. The airlift ended in October when the Nationalists won control of the sea lanes and could send men and material to Africa by ship. In two-and-a-half months, more than 20,000 Nationalist soldiers had been airlifted into Spain. Of this total over two-thirds, more than 13,000 troops, had been airlifted by the Luftwaffe along with a total of 270,199kg of equipment including machine guns, and more than 30 artillery pieces with their ammunition. The entire operation was carried out under arduous conditions with the loss of only one aircraft.
In the very first days of the German intervention in Spain, the German effort consisted of scarcely more than 20 Ju 52s and the initial six Heinkel He 51 fighters, which landed at Cadiz on 6 August. Major von Scheele organized the first hundred or so German personnel into small teams. Captain von Moreau was made commander of the Ju 52 transports and was responsible for the airlift aircraft and airfield operations. Another team was responsible for assembling the He 51 fighters and training the Spanish pilots. Another team was detailed to train the Spanish in the use of flak guns. An air depot and logistics centre were set up to oversee the assembly of aircraft and their maintenance. It soon became clear that the Nationalists needed more help so more German equipment and personnel began arriving through August.
The airlift of the Army of Africa allowed the unit’s very talented soldier, Colonel José Yagüe, to form the Moroccan battalions into task forces in early August, and to move north from Seville along the Portuguese border, and finally to link up with General Mola’s northern Nationalist enclave. On 14 August Yagüe’s forces took the city of Badajoz on
the Portuguese border, and not only linked up the two halves of Nationalist Spain but opened the Portuguese border to the Nationalists. As the Portuguese leader Salazar was sympathetic to the Nationalists, military equipment and supplies could now be brought in through Portugal. Franco, who had transferred his headquarters to Seville in early August, was ready to take command of the southern army and, along with Mola, move northeast to take Madrid.
The Germans enter combat
The great step in the conflict was taken in August 1936 when Major von Scheele authorized a German bomber attack on the battleship Jaime I. Republican naval superiority in the straits between Africa and mainland Spain was a nuisance to the Nationalists. The Jaime I’s anti-aircraft artillery batteries targeted the German transports flying overhead, forcing them to fly at high altitude. The Jaime I had bombarded and blockaded Cadiz, the one major port in southern Spain that belonged to the Nationalists. Putting the Jaime I out of action would be the first step in gaining Nationalist control of the sea lanes. Von Scheele ordered two of the Ju 52s to be modified as bombers with kits that had been included with the first shipment of equipment. Receiving intelligence on 12 August that the Jaime I was in the Bay of Malaga, von Scheele ordered a strike the next day with two converted Ju 52s, to be flown by Captain von Moreau and Captain Henke. The Ju 52 piloted by von Moreau failed to find the Jaime I in the low cloud, but the second Ju 52 did and its bombs hit the battleship, badly damaging it and taking it out of action. This highly successful mission helped turn the tide for the Nationalists in securing their hold in southern Spain. The Germans began flying combat missions in support of the Nationalist columns moving towards Madrid. Captain von Moreau redeemed his reputation as a
The Alcázar of Toledo as seen from a German aircraft. The Alcázar was a complex of buildings housing the Spanish Army Infantry Officers’ School. A force of 1,300 Nationalist soldiers, police, and militia defended the Alcázar from July to October 1936. Condor Legion Captain Rudolf Freiherr von Moreau airdropped supplies into the courtyard of the main building. The spirited defence of the Alcázar in July and August 1936 provided considerable propaganda value for the Nationalists. Franco diverted the Nationalist Army’s advance on Madrid to relieve the besieged forces at the Alcázar. (Author’s collection)
navigator and pilot on 21 August when, under heavy ground fire, he was able to resupply the besieged Nationalist garrison at Toledo’s Alcázar by dropping food canisters into the small courtyard of the Military School.
As soon as the airlift operations were functioning smoothly it was decided that some of the Ju 52 transports could be converted into bombers and used to support the Nationalist forces, which were then engaged in desperate fighting on their way to relieve the garrison of the Alcázar in Toledo and then advance to Madrid. In late August 1936 German airmen began flying small-scale bombing missions, usually in the form of harassment raids against enemy airfields. By September more Luftwaffe personnel had arrived and by the end of September a total of the 20 Ju 52 transport/bombers, 24 He 51 fighters and 29 He 46 reconnaissance aircraft/light bombers had arrived. Half of the He 51s were turned over to the Nationalists to form a fighter squadron. As the airlift wound down some of the Ju 52s were also turned over to the Nationalists to form a bomber squadron. The Nationalist Air Force was also receiving aircraft and training from the Italian Air Force, but training the Spanish crews on the new equipment would take some time.
The Nationalists form a state
By October 1936, the German presence in Spain had expanded to approximately 600 personnel, as Spain was seen as an ideal testing ground for the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. A variety of aircraft arrived, including 20 Heinkel He 46s for reconnaissance and light bombing; two He 70s to serve as light bombers and reconnaissance aircraft; two He 60 naval seaplanes; one He 50 dive bomber and two Henschel Hs 123 dive bombers. Four 88mm guns and 28 20mm flak guns had arrived to serve as airfield protection for the German forces.
On 1 October, the political relationship of the German intervention in Spain changed when the informal Nationalist junta created a proper government and named General Francisco Franco as the Head of the Spanish State. The German intervention had worked very much in Franco’s favour, because the initial support of the Germans was not to any Nationalist state, which did not exist, but came as a personal commitment to him. General Mola, who had not taken the initiative (like Franco) to send emissaries to Germany and Italy, had been manoeuvred out of the lead role in the Nationalist insurgency and would now play a subordinate role to Franco as the commander of the Army of the North. In the first weeks of the insurgency, a considerable amount of political machination went on, with General Alfredo Kindelan, a former commander of the Spanish Air Force, playing a central role in rounding up Spanish officer support for Franco as head of the Nationalist state rather than Mola. Kindelan was a staunch Nationalist who had resigned from the service in 1931 rather than serve a Republic, and saw that Franco was the best chance to restore a Spanish monarchy.
With the new Spanish state established, the Germans granted formal recognition to the Nationalists as the government of Spain and sent an ambassador. With the civil war progressing in the Nationalists’ favour, the Germans were ready to increase their commitment to Franco. By the end of October, intelligence was received that the Soviet Union was sending significant aid to the Republic, and that Russian military advisors were already arriving in Spain. So, Berlin made the decision to reorganize the German force already in Spain and to increase support to the Nationalists.
Re-evaluating the mission
Colonel Walter Warlimont, not an airman but an Army General Staff officer with a reputation for strategic acumen, was sent to Spain by the Wehrmacht staff in late August to take command of the mission, and also to evaluate the strategic situation and report to Berlin. Warlimont was a good choice to send to Spain as von Scheele, while a good air
unit commander, was out of his depth in dealing with strategic issues. Warlimont could count on the Wehrmacht staff to listen to his evaluation. To the relief of the German army commanders, Warlimont recommended against any large army force being sent to Spain. Committing a large military force would disrupt Germany’s rearmament programme and also push Germany towards open confrontation with the other European powers, a confrontation that Hitler wanted to avoid in 1936. Warlimont argued for increasing the force that was already present to an air task force of 100-plus aircraft and 5,000 personnel. The German force in Spain would be renamed the Legion Condor. The army would contribute a small tank battalion for testing, small teams to train the Spanish officers, and specialist units. Surplus equipment would be made available for the Nationalist army. The force would not only aid the Nationalists, but also gain some valuable combat experience for the Luftwaffe and allow the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht to test equipment– not just aircraft but radios, vehicles, munitions and tanks.
The limited commitment of the Legion Condor was one that the Luftwaffe, now expanding very rapidly, could readily support. Special Staff W under General Wilberg in Berlin had the pick of Luftwaffe personnel to call upon, since Luftwaffe units were initially told to ask their best-trained and qualified personnel to volunteer; these men were then told that they would be volunteered for an interesting mission, that their work would be secret, and that they would officially have to resign from the Luftwaffe. Their new status would be as Luftwaffe reservists and ‘volunteers’ for the Spanish Nationalists. There seem to have been few complaints and most Legion Condor airmen seem to have considered the Spanish War an adventure.
Units sent not only their best qualified personnel, but also made sure to send younger unmarried men. As word of the German involvement went through the Luftwaffe, career officers and NCOs also applied for service as volunteers with the Legion Condor. Officers, enlisted men and technicians commonly served for 6–12 months before being rotated back to Germany. With a highly trained and carefully selected group of Luftwaffe personnel, mostly NCOs and specialists, there were few discipline problems. Indeed, the Legion Condor constituted a unique organization within the Germany military. Upon returning from Spain, the Legion Condor veterans were normally promoted and sent to serve in units throughout the Luftwaffe.
A new commander
On 1 November Luftwaffe Generalmajor Hugo Sperrle arrived in Spain to take command of what would soon be a greatly enlarged force. Sperrle was soon followed by Oberstleutnant Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, who was initially slated to command the experimental aircraft squadron but, upon his arrival in Spain, was named chief of staff of the Legion Condor. The two would prove to be a highly effective leadership team. Sperrle was a preWorld War I aviator who commanded aviation for the 7th Army during World War I and served on the
Hugo Sperrle was one of Germany’s most experienced air officers, having joined the Air Service as a general staff officer before World War I. Sperrle transformed the Condor Legion from an improvised intervention force into a formidable fighting corps. A genial Bavarian by nature, Sperrle had a fearsome appearance due to facial scars from a World War I air crash. Upon his return to Germany in late 1937, Sperrle initiated major changes in Luftwaffe training and tactics based on the Spanish war experience. (Author’s collection)
First Nationalist movements 8. July 1936. Nationalist rebel military units successfully seize control in major cities in northern Spain. A northern Nationalist Army is created by General Mola.
9. August 1936. The northern Nationalist Army advances south to link up with General Franco’s forces in southern Spain. In late August the combined Nationalist forces, now under Franco’s overall command, turn east to advance on Toledo and Madrid.
Major battles around Madrid 10. November 1936. Nationalist forces advance on Madrid from the west, supported by the Condor Legion, Italian air units and the Nationalist Air Force. Nationalists halted by effective Republican defence in Madrid’s western suburbs. Condor Legion faces a strong Republican Air Force equipped with superior fighters flown by Soviet pilots. 11. February 1937. Nationalist offensive against Madrid from the east at the Jarama river. The Condor Legion supports the Nationalist Army in a gruelling three-week battle, but the Republican defence is successful. 12. March 1937. The Italian Legion ground forces advance on Madrid from Guadalajara. Republicans defeat the Italians with the Republican Air Force driving the Italians back and inflicting heavy casualties. The Madrid front is now a stalemate and will remain so until 1939.
1. Airlift of Nationalist Army of Africa to mainland Spain. From 27 July to 11 October 1936 more than 20,000 soldiers and 270 tonnes of arms and ammunition transported by air from Spanish Morocco to Spain. Two-thirds of the transport effort is made by German aircraft. 2. First combat of the Germans in Spain. On 13 August German Ju 52s converted to bombers strike the Republican battleship Jaime I in Malaga Bay, knocking the ship out of action 3. On 14 August the North African units transported by the Germans link up with Nationalist Northern Army at Badajoz, thus creating a unified zone of Nationalist control.
4. Toledo, 21 August. German Ju 52 transports successfully airdrop supplies to the besieged Nationalist garrison at the Alcazar. 5. 23 August. German Ju 52 bombers strike major Republican airfield at Getafe. 6. September 1936. German bombers and fighters support General Yagües’s advance to Talavera 7. October–November 1936. Condor Legion units bomb Madrid
OPPOSITE SPAIN IN 1936 AND THE SPANISH AIRLIFT
General Staff after the war. From 1927–29, Sperrle served as the Army’s shadow Luftwaffe commander. He was commanding Air District V when he was called upon to serve in Spain. Sperrle was a physically imposing man, standing over 6ft tall and weighing close to 300lb. He had a fearsome appearance, mainly due to his badly scarred face – the result of a World War I aircraft crash. In fact, he had a humorous side and a reputation for enjoying good living. He was known as impatient and demanding of subordinates, but also had a reputation in the Luftwaffe’s officer corps as a highly competent commander.
Generalmajor Hugo Sperrle and his chief of staff, von Richthofen, made a highly effective command team in Spain. The two of them set policies that remained in place for the whole existence of the Legion Condor. Sperrle, as senior German officer in Spain, dealt directly with Franco and his government and staff at the strategic level. Von Richthofen ran the dayto-day operations of the Legion and oversaw the operational war planning. Both Sperrle and von Richthofen were professional soldiers and neither could be said to have had a diplomatic personality.
Wolfram von Richthofen was younger than Sperrle and had served in World War I, first as a cavalry officer, and later as a fighter pilot, flying in Jagdgeschwader 1, led by his famous cousin Manfred. Like Sperrle, von Richthofen had a reputation for being a good troop leader and also tough on his subordinates. But von Richthofen had a reputation for being not just smart but brilliant. Possessing an exceptional technical mind, von Richthofen had earned an engineering degree after the world war and returned to join the Army General Staff. He then earned a PhD in engineering, with a thesis on the best means to organize mass production of heavy aircraft. From 1933 to 1936 he had worked as deputy to Colonel Wilhelm Wimmer, who oversaw the testing and procurement of the Luftwaffe’s first two generations of aircraft. Von Richthofen’s brilliance and operational competence was combined with a strong streak of ruthlessness and an intolerance for slowness. Those characteristics would be needed in leading combat operations where rapid decision-making and efficient staff work made the difference between victory and defeat.
From the start the Germans had an effective, if sometimes rocky relationship with General Franco. The Legion Condor commander and chief of staff had immediate and direct access to Franco, and several times they had some strong disputes with Franco, objecting to his slow and methodical approach to fighting the war. But Franco was also a professional soldier and the German and Spanish leaders respected each other on that basis. Franco does not seem to have personally liked the Germans, but he certainly respected their professional competence. And the Germans respected Franco as a talented leader and strategist, even if they did not always agree with him. Essentially, the Germans were there to help Nationalist Spain win the war and Germany’s limited interest in Spain reassured Franco. Von Richthofen sized up the situation when he arrived in Spain and recommended that Berlin did not commit too much aid to the Nationalists: ‘The Spanish have to win this war for themselves.’ Franco mainly agreed.
Franco and the German commanders had an understanding. They could dispute strategic issues with Franco, but once a decision was made then the Legion Condor would loyally work closely with the Spanish to get the job done. The Germans kept Franco informed of everything the Legion Condor was doing and the relationship between the German leaders and Franco was based on trust.
Yet there was certainly some friction between the Legion Condor commanders and some of the Spanish generals. Although most of the professional officers of the Spanish armed forces had gone over to the Nationalists, many in the Spanish officer corps were ageing, tired, lazy
Luftwaffe signallers in Spain laying telephone wire, summer 1936. Spain was a poor country with limited modern communications infrastructure. The first Germans sent to Spain had to set up the basic operational infrastructure at their assigned bases. (Author’s collection)
and possessed little serious professional knowledge. From the performance on both sides it seems that many of the Spanish officer corps had joined the army to find a sinecure and were not up to the rigorous demands of modern warfare. Only a few officers had Franco’s long record of combat leadership. Some generals, such as Mola, had to be given senior positions due to their political following. General Alfredo Kindelan, chief of the Nationalist Air Force, had played a key role in drumming up support for Franco among the officer corps. In von Richthofen’s assessment, carefully recorded in his diaries and reports, many of Spain’s generals were useless.
One of the primary problems with the Nationalist high command was the low level of military skills and knowledge possessed by so many of its senior military officers. For example, von Richthofen found General Kindelan to be an ‘old used-up fellow’. Yet Sperrle
and von Richthofen had an eye for talent and found many of the Spanish commanders and staff officers to be quite capable. The Germans would then work through the competent officers, regardless of their rank. Major Sierra of General Kindelan’s staff was regarded as being especially effective and von Richthofen noted, ‘I’d work with him anytime’ – a comment which would have been about the highest praise von Richthofen would have given a German officer.
The Germans worked in support of General Yagüe’s corps on several occasions and found him to be a first-rate commander. The Germans worked well with General Davila, commander of the Army of the North in 1937 and 1938. The Germans’ favourite Spanish officer was Colonel (later General) Juan Suero diaz Vigón. Vigón was capable, intelligent and energetic and a first-rate general staff officer. Vigón and the Germans served together for much of the war. Vigón was General Mola’s chief of staff for the Northern Campaign of 1937, and from July 1938 onward he served as Franco’s chief of staff. Vigón was very friendly with the Germans and developed a close personal relationship with the German senior officers. Vigón had a tough and ruthless streak that the German commanders appreciated. As Mola’s chief of staff in the Basque campaign, when brigade commanders did not move quickly enough or lead their troops effectively, they were quickly relieved. Early in the war a lot of incompetent commanders had to be weeded out and Vigón was a man to do it.
Some of the Spanish generals resented the special access to Franco that the Germans had. For his part, General Kindelan would have preferred to fight the war without the Germans telling him how to best run air operations. But Franco found the German advice to be invariably sound and, as long as the Germans did not get involved in internal Spanish politics, their advice was welcome. The German senior officers met with the Nationalist high command and the staff of the field army regularly, and worked with army and corps staffs on a daily basis. The two groups quickly developed a cordial relationship. Von Richthofen had served as Germany’s first air attaché to Italy in 1929–32. He spoke Italian fluently and quickly learned Spanish, although at first he had to communicate in a strange kind of Italian/ Spanish military vocabulary which the Spanish found amusing – although they understood it and appreciated von Richthofen’s efforts.
Early German operations
While Nationalists and Republicans were waging an often-merciless ground war, combat air operations were kept at a small scale for the first four months of the war due to the small size and obsolescence of the two Spanish air forces. When the Nationalist revolt began the Spanish Air Force and Navy had about 300 aircraft of all types (including trainers) on the books, but virtually all were obsolescent and many in poor repair. The Spanish Air Force had possessed a large variety of aircraft in 1936, the most common being the 90 Bréguet 19 two-seaters, capable of short-range reconnaissance or light bombing. The Bréguet 19 had first flown in 1921. The air force had some Nieuport 52 fighters, another 1920s design, and five De Havilland Dragon bombers and some Dornier Wal bombers. The Republic had some lumbering twin-engine French Potez 54 bombers and their best fighters were a few Dewoitine D.372s. By the start of August, the Republicans had about 200 aircraft and the Nationalists about 100. There were about 200 aircraft in the country that belonged to the national airline or to private owners and both sides commandeered civilian aircraft for their air forces. Spain had a small aircraft industry, CASA, that licence-built foreign designs. The largest aircraft factory at Getafe, near Madrid, fell to the Republic and another assembly plant at Cadiz fell to the Nationalists. Unless foreign aid came, the Nationalist and Republican air forces could do little more than fly reconnaissance missions and nuisance raids.
After the attack on the Jaime I the Germans readied their small He 51 squadron for combat and moved the unit to Salamanca to support the Nationalist air units. On 23 August the German He 51s escorted the Nationalist Ju 52 bombers on a mission to attack Getafe airfield near Madrid. With Mussolini also committed to helping Franco, some Italian aircraft also arrived for the Nationalists, the most important of which was the Fiat CR.32 biplane fighter, one of the top fighters of the era. As the Nationalist Air Force grew in capability with German and Italian aircraft and training, the Germans continued to provide assistance. German He 51s supported General Yagüe’s column in its successful drive on Talavera in September, the main role of the He 51s being bomber escort. By the end of September, the German He 51 squadron had shot down 19 Republican aircraft (seven Bréguets, four Nieuport 52s, seven Potez 54s, and one Vickers Vildebeest). However, the Germans were also finding out that their sleek He 51, which they believed was a fine machine, was not superior to a Hawker Fury or a Dewoitine D.372 fighter. Still, as the Nationalists drove slowly on Madrid more aircraft arrived to reinforce the Nationalist coalition, including He 59Es, He 60s, a single He 50 dive bomber and two Hs 123s, designed as dive bombers. The German fighter squadron was expanded as well.
Legion Condor officially formed
At the end of October, as the Nationalists were approaching the suburbs of Madrid, the announcement of the expanded German commitment to Spain was made. This expanded force in Spain would be called the Legion Condor and, as it was envisioned, it would consist of a staff, a bomber group of three to four squadrons, a fighter group of three to four squadrons, a reconnaissance group of two squadrons, a seaplane squadron, a communications battalion, a logistics supply battalion, a medical detachment, and an extra-large flak battalion that would have eight batteries (five batteries of 88mm guns, two batteries of light 20mm and 37mm anti-aircraft guns, one battery for training Spanish personnel).The Legion Condor would also attach small flights of prototype aircraft for combat testing with the reconnaissance, fighter or bomber groups, including the latest pre-production models of German aircraft. The army would provide a small tank battalion and a small detachment of military advisors to run training schools for the Nationalist officers and army units.
In the meantime, the Soviet Union was also sending military forces and hardware to Spain and, as the Nationalist cause had been saved by the timely German airlift, now the Republic would be saved, at least for a time, by the arrival of Soviet help. In September Joseph Stalin ordered his armed forces to support the Spanish Republic and to send not only equipment, but a corps of Soviet pilots, armour specialists and military advisors. In October aircraft, tanks, artillery and Soviet military personnel arrived in Spain, and air units equipped with some of the most modern aircraft in the world were being assembled.
In October the Nationalists began bombing Madrid in preparation for an advance into the city. On 30 October Getafe airfield was hit hard by a Nationalist air attack and by 6 November the two armies were fighting in the suburbs. On 4 November the Nationalist coalition met its first Soviet fighters in the air, and it was a severe shock. The Soviets had sent a contingent of experienced pilots to Spain and had assembled two squadrons of Polikarpov I-15 fighters. The Germans found the Russian biplane fighter was far faster and better armed than the He 51 and outclassed it in every respect. The only thing that prevented the Nationalist coalition from being driven from the Madrid skies was the Fiat CR.32 fighters that had arrived with the Italian Air Force units, some of which had been given to the Nationalists. The CR.32 was a fast and nimble aircraft and roughly equal to the I-15. However, when the I-16 monoplane fighter was committed to the battle around Madrid in
November, it quickly proved to be the best fighter in Spain. On 29 October, a strong force of Soviet T-26 tanks appeared in Madrid; similarly, this was an armoured force that outclassed anything the Nationalists had on the battlefield. Soviet SB-2 bombers, one of the best light bombers in the world at the time, also appeared over the Madrid front. The SB-2s were far superior to the Germans’ improvised Ju 52 bombers. The Soviet-supplied and -piloted (there were at least 300 Russian pilots in Spain by this time) squadrons began a campaign against the Nationalist airfields.
The Soviet fighters drove away daytime bombing raids and shot down several German, Italian and Spanish aircraft. With the arrival of Soviet tanks and artillery, as well as thousands of enthusiastic foreign volunteers (mostly members of the Communist parties of various countries and organized into the International Brigades), the Nationalist advance was stopped cold. The Republic had won air superiority in the Madrid sector. The He 51 had proven so ineffective against the I-15 and I-16 that it was withdrawn from fighter duties and was to serve as a ground attack aircraft instead. Inadvertently, it was a benefit for the Nationalists as the He 51 turned out to be very effective in that role.
Winter would mostly be a time for building up the new Legion Condor and absorbing the new equipment being sent from Germany. The Nationalists would try again in January, February and March to break into Madrid from other directions, each time being stopped by Republican counter-attacks after making minor gains. The Legion Condor played a useful role in supporting the Nationalists on the river Jarama east of Madrid in February, but the advantage in the air still belonged to the Republic.
In an attempt to break the stalemate on the Madrid front, the German, Italian, and Nationalist air units began a bombing campaign against Madrid between 18 and 22 November. This was not the first attempt to bring strategic bombing into the conflict in Spain. In the early months of the war both sides had carried out some relatively minor raids on each other’s cities. However, the raids against Madrid in 1936 were the most significant example of strategic bombing in Spain to date. On 30 November the Nationalist bombing of Madrid inflicted a total of 244 civilian dead and 875 wounded. Still, although the bombing raids on Madrid had little effect on the war or on the morale of either side, they gained the attention of the world’s press, with dozens of international journalists covering the war from Madrid.
The bombing of Madrid was soon called off, partly because night bombing was inaccurate and day bombing was far too dangerous for the Nationalist bombers in the face of Republican/Soviet air superiority. By December 1936 on the Madrid front, the Nationalists found themselves unable to fly except in large formations and under heavy fighter escort.
The Republican Air Force, now well-equipped with its modern aircraft and Soviet pilots, provided a demonstration of the decisive effect that air power could have on the modern battlefield. In March 1937, the Republicans counter-attacked a motorized corps of Italian troops at Guadalajara north of Madrid. The Italian air units were grounded by weather and the Republican Air Force threw 125 new fighter aircraft, mostly Soviet-piloted, against the rear of the large Italian column strung along the roads. A corps of 50,000 troops was quickly routed – largely by the effects of Republican air power. The Italian Army lost 500 killed, 2,000 wounded and 500 taken prisoner, with an estimated 1,000 vehicles and 25 artillery pieces destroyed, mainly by air attack. The impressive Republican victory at Guadalajara was one of the most dramatic examples of the era of what air power could accomplish on the battlefield. The Italians were, for a time, completely discredited by their poor performance at Guadalajara.
General Sperrle and Franco photographed in early 1937. Sperrle set a precedent providing strategic direction for the Condor Legion and working directly with Franco and his general staff. This allowed his chief of staff von Richthofen to run the operational planning and direction. Sperrle was no diplomat, but he worked well with Franco and the Spanish leaders. (Author’s collection)
CHRONOLOGY
1931
Spanish monarchy ends. King Alfonso XIII forced into exile. Republic is proclaimed. A left-wing majority elected to the Cortes. For the next five years Spain will be torn by constant violence between extremes of left and far-right.
1932
A coup by some army generals is suppressed.
1933
Lawyer José Antonio Primo de Rivera establishes a quasiFascist, rightist political party, the Falange.
1934
October A rightist coalition wins the election. The government brutally crushes a miners’ strike in Asturias using the army. Out of power, the Socialist Party becomes increasingly revolutionary.
1936
January–June General strikes and insurrections spread. A group of army generals under the leadership of General Mola prepare plans to seize power.
February Elections are held. Spain is fairly evenly divided between extremes of right and left, with little in the middle. The Left Coalition won the elections with 4.2 million, to the rightist National Front’s 3.8 million, and only 680,000 voters voted for the centre parties.
13 July Republican assault police arrest and murder the leader of the Monarchists in the Cortez. This provides the Spanish Rightists with their justification to start the coup.
17 July A junta of army officers, including Generals José Sanjurjo, Emilio Mola, and Francisco Franco, call for the army to revolt and seize power throughout Spain. General Franco flies to Morocco and takes command of the colony and Spain’s Army of Africa in the name of the junta. In Madrid and Barcelona, military garrisons rise against the government but are defeated when the government arms unions and militia forces.
23 July Days into the revolt, Spain is divided into enclaves, with most of central Spain and Catalonia remaining in government hands along with Asturias and
the Basque region. In the north, the coup was largely successful, with Galicia, Old Castile, León and Navarre all falling into rebel hands. In southern Spain, there is an enclave around Cadiz and Seville where the Nationalist coup was successful, and in North Africa and Spanish Morocco the Nationalists take control.
25 July General Franco sends two German businessmen, Adolf Langenheim and Johannes Bernhardt, as his personal representatives to ask for aid from Hitler’s government. Langenheim and Bernhardt meet with Hitler in the evening of 25/26 July, presenting their request for German support. Hitler orders the Luftwaffe to prepare to support Franco’s army.
26 July Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief Hermann Göring orders General Helmuth Wilberg to organize a staff and begin sending aid to Franco’s Nationalists.
27 July Ten Ju 52 transports are flown through Italy to Spanish Morocco to start ferrying Franco’s Army of Africa to Seville. The airlift will last until October and is the first major airlift operation in history. From late July through October, more than 1,200 soldiers a week are flown from Morocco to Seville via German transports. German transports also bring equipment and weapons.
Early August The first Army of Africa troops flown to Seville are organized into a column to strike west and north to clear Republican forces away from the Portuguese border, and to unite the Nationalist southern enclave and army with the northern enclave and army.
31 July The freighter Usaramo, with ten Ju 52s, six He 51 fighters, and 85 Luftwaffe personnel, mostly officers and technicians, departs for Spain. The Usaramo arrives at Cadiz on 8 August.
14 August Spanish North African troops under General Yagüe take Badajoz on the Portuguese border. Now the Nationalist enclaves in northern Spain and in southern Spain are united. With more reinforcements arriving from Africa in late August, the Nationalist forces reorganize and turn east and start advancing towards Toledo and Madrid.
August and September German weapons, supplies, and aircraft as well as a small military staff are dispatched on more than 20 freighters to Spanish Morocco and southern Spain, to bolster the Nationalist cause. By the end of September, the German forces in Spain will number more than 600 troops. Since the beginning of August, the German forces commited to supporting Franco have been under the command of Major Alexander Scheele.
September Joseph Stalin decides to support the Spanish Republic’s government and authorizes the immediate dispatch of Soviet aircraft, tanks, war materiel and advisors to the Republic. By late September, the first Soviet advisors have arrived. By October, Soviet aircraft, tanks and artillery have landed in Republican harbours and are rushed to the defence of Madrid.
September–October Thousands of international volunteers, mostly organized by national Communist parties, arrive in Spain and are organized into International Brigades to fight for the Spanish Republic.
1 October The Nationalist junta becomes a Nationalist state, with a government organized and proclaimed in Burgos, with Francisco Franco as Head of State.
October Nationalist forces advancing with German air support take Toledo, and several Nationalist columns begin moving on Madrid from the west. By late October, Nationalist forces have reached the outskirts and the battle for Madrid begins. German and Spanish Nationalist bombers bomb Madrid.
30 October The Legion Condor is officially proclaimed. In October 1936 the German government decides to commit a larger, but still limited German force to Spain. The answer is the Legion Condor, with approximately 100 aircraft and 5,000 personnel to support the Spanish Nationalist cause. Generalmajor Hugo Sperrle is named Commander of the Legion Condor. Oberstleutnant Wolfram von Richthofen becomes the Legion Condor chief of staff. On 23 November, because of the strong Republican resistance, supported by Soviet tanks and Soviet aircraft as well as international brigades, the Nationalists stop their offensive on Madrid.
6 November Germans encounter Republican aircraft supplied by the Soviet Union and flown by Soviet pilots. These I-15 and I-16 fighters are far superior to the
Germans’ He 51 fighters, and the Nationalists soon gain air superiority over the battle front around Madrid. The battle of Madrid continues with violent fighting into the suburbs, but the Nationalist advance is halted by the end of November.
December Nationalists conduct offensives northwest of Madrid and in the south to expand their territory. Italian troops land at Cadiz. The Italian government under Mussolini expands its support to the Nationalists.
1937
6–27 January Nationalists conduct an offensive on the Jarama river, southeast of Madrid. After small advances, the Nationalists are stopped.
March The Republicans win a major victory in defeating the Nationalist Italian attack on Guadalajara. The Republican Air Force’s Soviet pilots rout the Italian divisions near Guadalajara with massed air attacks, sending them into retreat. It is one of the first examples of the effective use of airpower for battlefield interdiction.
March With stalemate in the Madrid area the Legion Condor, now reinforced with new aircraft, will be committed to an offensive in northern Spain to first destroy the Basque enclave. The Legion Condor will support General Mola’s Army of the North and redeploys its headquarters to Vitoria Airfield in northern Spain.
30 March The Nationalist Army of the North begins its advance into the Basque country towards Bilbao.
4 April The Legion Condor demonstrates the extremely effective use of airpower at Ochandiando where German He 51s and bombers prove very effective in breaking Basque defences. In April 1937 the advance continues through the Basque region towards Bilbao.
26 April The Legion Condor bombs the Basque town of Guernica, drops 32 tons of bombs, destroys part of the town but not the Renteria Bridge that was the main target. The Legion Condor considers the attack successful, with the important crossroads of Guernica closed to the retreating Basque forces for 24 hours. However, Mola’s Nationalist Army fails to advance quickly enough. Guernica falls only on 30 April.
May The advance continues, now towards the heavily fortified lines around Bilbao.
11 June The Nationalist Army, with the Legion Condor commanding the Nationalist air units, begins its attack to break through the strong fortifications called the ‘Iron Belt’ around Bilbao. Heavy air attacks precede Nationalist breakthrough forces.
14 June A breach in the Iron Belt is widened, and some Legion Condor squadrons fly up to seven sorties a day as Basque resistance is broken.
19 June Bilbao, one of Spain’s most important industrial cities, falls to the Nationalists. The Legion Condor prepares to continue the campaign to the west to eliminate the Republic’s enclave at Asturias.
7 July Republicans initiate a massive offensive at Brunete, west of Madrid. After the initial advance is first slowed, and then halted by the Nationalist forces, the Legion Condor reorients and is moved south to the Madrid area, where it takes command of German and Italian air units to fight the Republican offensive at Brunete. The Legion Condor will command over 200 Nationalist aircraft. Initially the Republicans win air superiority, but after a few days the tide turns. Legion Condor flak guns play an important part in stopping Republican tanks. The Nationalists turn to a counter-offensive, and the Legion Condor now wrests air control over the front from the Republican aircraft, partly thanks to the employment of its Bf 109 squadron, which proves superior to the best Republican fighter, the I-16. Legion Condor attacks on Republican logistics and supplies prove especially effective.
24/25 July The Brunete campaign ends with Nationalists having driven back the Republican offensive. The Republicans suffer heavy losses at Brunete.
August The Legion Condor again moves north, with their target now being Santander. In mid-August the offensive against Santander begins and on 26 August, Santander falls.
September–October The Legion Condor works with Nationalist and Italian forces in a successful offence.
21 October The last Republican stronghold in northern Spain at Gijon falls.
Late October The Legion Condor is reoriented to move to the Madrid area. At the end of October, General Sperrle returns to Germany and General Volkmann becomes Legion Condor commander. Von Richthofen stays until early February 1938 to support Volkmann in the transition.
December The Republicans launch a major offensive against the Nationalists at Teruel and Aragon. The Legion Condor supports the Nationalist defence at Teruel, and then the counter-attack. From December until the end of February, the Legion Condor will fly missions in the Teruel campaign. With poor weather, heavy snow, and cold temperatures, the Legion Condor has to cope with very difficult conditions and does so successfully.
1938
22 March From Aragon the Nationalists launch a major offensive east and south with four corps towards the Mediterranean coast, intending to cut off Catalonia from the rest of the Republic. The advance continues rapidly once the Republican lines are broken. The Republicans are exhausted by the Teruel campaign and the Nationalists make major gains. The Nationalists reach the Mediterranean at Vinaroz on 15 April and divide the Spanish Republic.
April Volkmann recommends that Franco drive north and take advantage of the disorganized state of the Republican forces in Catalonia. This good advice is rejected. Franco decides to drive south towards Valencia.
April The Legion Condor is reoriented to strike south towards Valencia, the Republic’s capital, which is the new focus of Nationalist efforts.
April–late July The Legion Condor supports the Nationalist Army’s drive on Valencia. The Republicans mass their best forces and conduct a highly effective defence. Despite good air support from the Legion Condor, the Nationalists make only moderate advances with heavy casualties. This is one campaign that resulted in failure for the Nationalists and the Legion Condor. At this point, upset with the slow pace of the war and the impending international crises, Volkmann requests that the Legion Condor be withdrawn from Spain.
25 July Having received new aid, aircraft, tanks, and equipment from the Soviet Union, the Republican
Army in Catalonia has reorganized and with 120,000 men, but little air support, launches a major offensive by two army corps across the Ebro river to take Gandesa and then advance to Zaragoza. At the very least, the Republican Army of the North expects to force the end of the Nationalist offensive against Valencia. In the first two days of the offensive, some Republican units advance 25 miles, but by 6 August, the Republicans are forced onto the defensive. The Legion Condor is redeployed to support the Nationalists’ campaign in the battle of the Ebro, which becomes one of the decisive battles of the war.
August–16 November The Nationalists will carry out a series of offensives, eventually pushing the Republicans back across the Ebro river. In three-and-a-half months of fighting, the Legion Condor plays a key role in the close air support of Nationalist forces, and also in interdicting Republican communications and transport. Major targets of the Legion Condor are the Republican Army bridges and ferries across the Ebro river. By midNovember both sides have taken heavy losses, about 40,000 men each. However, the Republican Air Force suffers very heavy casualties in the campaign, casualties that cannot be replaced.
1 November General Volkmann returns to Germany and Wolfram von Richthofen, now promoted to majorgeneral, takes command of the Legion Condor. After a period of reorganization and refitting, the Legion Condor is ready to support the last major Nationalist offensive of the war, which begins on 23 December from Aragon, east and north into Catalonia.
1939
January With effective support from the Legion Condor attacking Republican airfields and interdicting Republican movements, the Nationalists capture Tarragona on 7 January and enter Barcelona on the 27th.
February Nationalist forces reach the French frontier on 9 February and Republican Spain is now reduced to the enclave around Valencia and Madrid to the south. The Legion Condor moves south to support a final offensive on Madrid.
March Republican leaders initiate peace negotiations with the Nationalist government. Republican resistance is quickly collapsing.
27 March The Legion Condor conducts its last mission, bombing Republican troops near Madrid.
28 March Nationalist troops enter Madrid.
1 April Nationalist troops enter the Republican capital of Valencia. Franco declares the end of the war.
April–May The Legion Condor is redeployed to Germany. In July 1939 the Legion Condor has a grand parade and review in Berlin, where the Legion Condor veterans march in their Spanish uniforms and are recognized for their achievements by Hitler.
ATTACKERS’ CAPABILITIES
The Luftwaffe, Legion Condor and Nationalist Air Forces
The Heinkel He 70 was developed in the early 1930s as a civilian fastmail and light passenger plane. The Luftwaffe acquired the He 70 and modified it as a light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft. It performed adequately in those roles. (USAF Historical Research Agency)
When the Spanish Civil War began, the Luftwaffe had been in official existence for only 15 months, having been announced to the world as a new arm of the military in May 1935. Germany after World War I had been forbidden to have an air force, as it had been forbidden to have tanks or modern weaponry, and was limited to an army of only 100,000 men and 4,000 officers. However, one of the key lessons of World War I was that a modern air force was necessary to succeed in modern warfare. By 1918, Germany, like all the major powers, had developed a large air force capable of conducting a wide variety of missions including strategic bombing, air superiority, and army support. This experience was not lost as the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty pushed the German Army to create a secret air force staff and training programme so that when the hated Treaty was eventually renounced, and Germany allowed to rearm, it would have a solid foundation ready to build an air force.
From 1920 until Hitler’s accession to power in 1933 the German Army General Staff had developed training programmes for German military airmen, which used civilian flight schools and civilian air companies. The German government’s Civil Aviation Office was led and manned by former Imperial Air Service officers who worked closely and secretly with the General Staff to develop civil aviation and German air companies – like Lufthansa –as a secret reserve for the German military. Within the General Staff, an Air Section was developed, and a group of highly talented airmen from World War I were retained by the Army and served as a shadow air force. Germany developed secret training programmes in Russia, with full Russian cooperation, and it also had secret programmes to develop prototype fighters and bombers. Thus, when Hitler came to power, the German Army and Navy had several hundred highly trained and experienced airmen ready to supply the initial air staff and a training cadre for an air force. The Army had even created secret fighter and reconnaissance squadrons by 1932. The prototype fighters and bombers were ready to be put into production and these were equal to the aircraft of the other major air forces in terms of performance. When Hitler came to power in January 1933, it was not a matter of creating an
air force from scratch. A solid foundation already existed as well as plans for rapid expansion. It was only a matter of providing the orders and the funds to allow rearmament to proceed – which it did, very quickly.
One of Hitler’s first acts as chancellor was to create an Air Ministry, which became a de facto air staff. The army commander-in-chief, General Werner von Blomberg, believed that military success required a strong air force as well as an army, so he directed the General Staff to transfer some of its best officers on the Luftwaffe’s general staff. One of the officers transferred was Albert Kesselring, who would win fame as a brilliant Luftwaffe commander in World War II. Another was a man considered the likely future chief of staff of the army, General Walter Wever, who would serve as de facto chief of staff of the nascent Luftwaffe from late 1933 to his death in the summer of 1936 in an unfortunate flying accident.
Along with a group of outstanding general staff officers, the army and navy transferred to the Air Ministry a cadre of several hundred aviation officers and technical specialists that had been retained during the inter-war period. The new Air Ministry also acquired many members of civil aviation who had served in the old Imperial Air Service. With sound leadership at the top, the Air Ministry initiated a large-scale rearmament programme to build a Luftwaffe very quickly. In December 1934 German aircraft factories delivered 160 aircraft a month. Within a year the German air industry would average 265 aircraft a month. In 1936 this increased to 426, and in 1937, 467. A first generation of aircraft had been designed and approved by the Army’s shadow Luftwaffe staff in the late 1920s and early 1930s. These included the Heinkel He 51, a standard biplane fighter design for the period, which was of metal frame-and-fabric construction and carried two machine guns. The Germans also had the prototype Dornier Do 11 bomber ready for production, an all-metal monoplane with retractable landing gear.
The first generation of German aircraft had average performance for the time. This did not bother the Air Ministry staff, as even obsolescent planes would serve to train the force in fighter and bomber techniques and provide a means of building up the German aircraft industry, which had languished during the Depression. The first large military aircraft contracts also helped German industry to gain experience in mass production of new models. This approach worked well, as the second generation of Luftwaffe aircraft quickly followed the first and were at the cutting edge of technology: at least equal, and often superior, to any aircraft in the world. The second generation of Luftwaffe aircraft was entering production in 1936 and early 1937 – just as the Luftwaffe was going to war.
The Luftwaffe’s training programme
Before the Spanish Civil War began the Luftwaffe was already in a mode of rapid expansion. It had grown from a force of 18,000 personnel in March 1935 to over 70,000 by the summer of 1936. Rearmament proceeded apace in terms of both receiving aircraft and graduating trained personnel. Thanks to careful planning before Hitler’s accession to power, the Luftwaffe was able to quickly expand and still maintain a high quality of personnel. From its start as an independent service, the Luftwaffe had a two-to-three-year officer training programme built on rigorous intellectual and physical standards, and equal to air officer training programmes of the major powers. General Wever, a product of the rigorous army General Staff course, also insisted on creating a full array of higher officer courses for the Luftwaffe. The Luftwaffe
Walther Wever, Luftwaffe chief of staff 1934–36. Wever’s leadership of the Luftwaffe ensured that when the Germans were committed to Spain, they were well-trained and had a sound doctrine for modern war. (USAF Historical Research Agency)
An 88mm flak gun being towed to a forward position by half-track. All units of the Condor Legion were motorized, allowing flak, signals and logistics units to deploy rapidly to different fronts. (Author’s collection)
began a three-year General Staff course in 1935 and developed an innovative programme that combined military history and academic study of airpower with the study of aviation engineering and technology. Like the Army General Staff course, the Luftwaffe General Staff programme included extensive operational exercises and wargames. However, the General Staff course was a programme for a small group of elite officers who would move on to high command. To have an effective air force one needed a course for all mid-ranking officers that ensured that squadron, group and wing commanders and staffs understood and were well-practised in operational doctrine and in planning and executing air missions. In 1935 the Luftwaffe opened the Luftkreisschule (Air District School) in Berlin for mid-ranking officers, mainly captains and majors, who underwent an intensive four-month course that emphasized doctrine and operational command and planning. Officers from the three main branches of the Luftwaffe – Flying officers, Signal officers and Flak officers – trained together and worked as teams in the many exercises and wargames the Luftkreisschule required. With up to three iterations a year, hundreds of officers were run through the school every year. The graduates would then be moved on to command squadrons and groups and serve on operational staffs.
The director of the school was Generalleutnant Helmuth Wilberg, a General Staff officer who had commanded large air forces in World War I and in the 1920s had served as the commander of the shadow Luftwaffe on the army staff. Having learned to fly in 1910 and holding Imperial Pilot’s Licence number 26, there were few officers in the world with more knowledge of air warfare. Under Wilberg’s direction, all the officers of the Luftwaffe received a thorough grounding in doctrine. Wilberg, a consummate staff officer, would play a central role in the success of the Legion Condor.
The rangefinder for the 88mm heavy flak gun. The Luftwaffe sent some of its newest equipment to Spain for testing under field conditions. (Author’s collection)
Luftwaffe doctrine for modern operations
The Luftwaffe published a comprehensive doctrine of air warfare in 1935. The doctrine was developed under the direction of General Wever, who wanted the whole Luftwaffe to be imbued with a common concept of aerial warfare. Luftwaffe Regulation 16 Luftkriegführung (Conduct of the Air War) was the development of German air war thinking since the 1920s. At its core was a doctrine for continental air war where the air force would carry out both independent strategic missions and also conduct joint operations with the army and navy. Strategic bombing was recognized as a core mission, and the doctrine mandated a strong capability to strike vital industrial and military targets deep in the enemy homeland. However, the other core mission of the air force was what the Germans called ‘the operational air war', in which the air force would operate alongside the army in the context of a grand operational plan. In war the first job of the air force was to win air superiority by attacking the enemy airfields and driving the enemy fighters out of the sky. Once air superiority was achieved the air force would seek out key operational targets behind the enemy lines, especially logistics and transport systems, in order to cripple the enemy’s movement of troops and supplies. Finally, the air force was to operate in close proximity to the front, attacking key military targets. In offensive operations the air force was to be used in mass and at the decisive point that both the army and air force leaders agreed upon. The doctrine mandated close coordination of the air force with the army. The air force was to be commanded and controlled by airmen but would act with the army in the context of achieving joint objectives. Ensuring effective joint operations was an important theme for General Wever. In 1935 and 1936 he directed the Luftwaffe to carry out extensive manoeuvres with the army employing the concepts of the new doctrine. A top priority set by Wever was air liaison officers who would be detached to army units, usually division and corps headquarters, with the task of maintaining close communication with the operational air headquarters. Air divisions and corps normally set up headquarters alongside the army corps and armies they were supporting. This allowed the commanders and staffs to coordinate operations and planning and to react immediately to any developments at the front. General Wilberg, who during the previous world war had used the armoured German ground attack planes in mass against key objectives with considerable success, insisted that supporting the army was one of the primary missions of an air force. Wever’s long service on the army staff gave him an appreciation for joint operations. With its command emphasis on army–air force cooperation, as well as the routine training of Luftwaffe and army units together on manoeuvres, the Luftwaffe’s doctrine was far ahead of other air forces in terms of combined-arms thinking. Thanks to a thorough officer training programme, the Luftwaffe’s officers had a better understanding of joint operations than any other air force in the world in 1936. This would make a key difference in the Spanish Civil War.
As the Luftwaffe was expanding very rapidly in 1936, providing moderate support to the Spanish Nationalists in the form of an elite air unit with 5,000 personnel and a few hundred aircraft (many considered obsolete and being replaced with more modern models) was not an undue burden. From over 70,000
This Rheinmetall 20mm rapid-fire light flak gun was used by the Condor Legion in the defence of its airfields and also in direct support of ground troops. It was effective in both roles. (Author’s collection)
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in good condition for their government owner—His “discovery” that the states, political entities, made the Constitution of America, the nation of men—Story of America (from May 29, 1787, to July, 1917) being a sealed book to him, he does not know that our Constitution is both federal and national— Supreme Court, in early days and in 1907, and Webster and Lincoln tell him his mistake—Not knowing the decision of Gettysburg, recorded at Appomattox, he chooses between Lord North of 1775 and Calhoun and summons the latter to prove that the American people did not make their Constitution and its grant of enumerated power to interfere with their individual freedom—Jefferson, Pendleton, Webster and many other Americans correct Sheppard’s error of fact—As the American people of 1776 accomplished their successful Revolution against government, may it not be the thought of Sheppard and other Tories that the Eighteenth Amendment has been established by a successful revolution of government against the people—Marshall again tells us of the American day when the legal necessity “was felt and acknowledged by all,” that every power to interfere with human liberty must be derived from the people in their “conventions”—Acting on the Congress proposal of 1917, governments of state citizens command the American citizen and create a new government power to interfere with his individual liberty—But no statesman has yet told us how or when, prior to 1917, we became “subjects.”
XIX. A W C ?
Page 298
Hamilton thinks it a prodigy that Americans, in “conventions,” voluntarily constitute the enumerated First Article government powers to interfere with their individual liberty—Marshall, in Supreme Court, declares “conventions” to be the only manner in which they can act “safely, wisely and effectively” in constituting government of themselves, by making such grants—When proposed 1917 first new grant of that kind is supposedly made, American people and their “conventions” are completely ignored —The proposers have a Fifth Article which does not mention “conventions”—The proposers have the old Tory concept, that
the people are the assets of the state and that government is the state—Still trying to find out how and when we became “subjects,” we expect to get information from the litigations of 1920—We expect great counsel, on one side, to urge the facts we know—We fear that other great counsel will urge, in reply, some fact or facts which we have not been able to ascertain— We are certain that there is no Eighteenth Amendment, if the facts we have learned are all the facts—That we may listen intelligently to all the great counsel, we review some of the facts we have learned.
XX. L W F
Page 307
“The important distinction so well understood in America, between a constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government and a law established by the government and alterable by the government”—Our first glance at briefs of 1920 gives us hope that some modern leaders have acquired the knowledge of Hamilton and his generation—We find, in one brief, in Marshall’s words, the Supreme Court statement of the fact that “conventions” of the people, not states or their governments, made the Constitution with its First Article grants of power to interfere with human liberty—But this brief, to our amazement, is that of the foremost champion of the only other grant of that kind, the Eighteenth Amendment, a grant made entirely by government to government—In 1920, seven litigations argued and reported under the one title “The National Prohibition Cases”—Distinguished counsel appear for many clients, for the claimed omnipotent Parliament of America, for the American government which we used to know as our supreme government, for a few state governments who did not wish to be part of the omnipotent Parliament, for those engaged in the lawful business of manufacturing, etc., the commodities named in the Eighteenth Amendment—Like the human right to breathe, such manufacture, etc., was not the privilege of a citizen—Both rights are among the human rights men have before they create nations and give governments power to interfere with some or all of their human rights—Citizens of
America, giving their only American government its enumerated powers, gave it no power to interfere with the human right mentioned in the new Amendment—Human rights never are privileges of citizens—Citizens establish government to protect existing human rights—Only “subjects” get any rights or privileges from government—All early Americans knew these primal truths—Neither the French aristocrats, before French Revolution, nor Tories of 1776 in England or America knew them —Eighteenth Amendment Tories do not know them—Madison (in 1789) and Supreme Court (in 1890) knew that commodities named in new Amendment are among those in which a human right “of traffic exists”—In litigations of 1920, no counsel appear on behalf of the human rights of American citizens—But we know that no decision of our own Supreme Court, established to secure our human rights, although the decision may settle disputes between other litigants, can change us from “citizens” into “subjects.”
XXI. B I A C
Page 325
No counsel knows all are discussing whether Americans, twelve years after 1776, voluntarily became “subjects”—Common concept of all that Fifth Article a “grant” of power to state governments (of state citizens) making them attorneys-in-fact for citizens of America—Discussion entirely as to extent of power “granted”—Eighteenth Amendment concept that Fifth Article “grant” made some governments of state citizens a supreme American Parliament, unrestrained master of every human right of all American citizens—Opposing concept that the Fifth Article “grant” made those state governments a Parliament whose one limit is that it cannot interfere with the sovereignty of any political entity which is a state—Both concepts ignore supremacy of nation of men over federation of states—Both ignore dual nature of “one national and federal Constitution”—Both ignore “conventions” in Seventh and Fifth Articles as the citizens of the American nation—Both ignore that each state “legislature” is attorney-in-fact for the citizens of its own state and that no
legislatures are (except Congress in enumerated matters) attorneys-in-fact for the citizens of America in any matter—Our facts, brought from our education with the early Americans, all ignored by all counsel in the litigations—The Virginia Convention itself and Lee, Pinckney, Hamilton, Madison, Wilson, Iredell and others state what all counsel of 1920 entirely ignore.
XXII. N C T C
Page 335
Eighteenth Amendment rests on imaginary Fifth Article “grant” making the state governments of state citizens attorneys-in-fact for the citizens of America, empowered to give away all human rights of the citizens of America—“Grant” assumed in every brief —No brief recognizes that one supposed “grantee” is supposed “grantor”—Or that each of two supposed “grantees” was a competent maker of Articles (as proposed Articles were respectively federal or national) before and when the “conventions” made the Fifth Article—Or that Philadelphia Convention knew and held “conventions” existing ability competent to make any Article and state legislatures, existing ability incompetent ever to make Articles like First Article or Eighteenth Amendment—Or that Tenth Amendment declares no power given to state “legislatures,” while all ability to make national Articles “reserved” to “conventions” of “the people” of America—No brief challenges sheer assumption of Fifth Article “grant” or supports assumption by any fact—Every brief, for or against Amendment, is based on the sheer assumption—No brief knows that enumerated powers of only American government to interfere with human freedom can be changed by no one save the citizens of America themselves in their “conventions”—Madison’s tribute to these “conventions” in which “free inhabitants” constitute new government power over themselves—Hamilton explains great danger to human liberty if “legislatures” or permanent government bodies could create such new government power—That knowledge of his generation confirmed by story of government-made supposed Eighteenth Amendment—Our gratitude to that generation of men who
(1776) made it and (1788) left it impossible that governments could create new government power to interfere with American human liberty—Our regret that modern leaders have not known this great and immutable protection to American liberty.
XXIII. T C T F
Page 350
Supreme Court wisely writes no opinion in “National Prohibition Cases”—In each of four numbered paragraphs, Court states its own negation of one challenge made to new Amendment—All four challenges are negatived in seventeen lines of statement— First two challenges trifling and purely technical—Third challenge based on rights of the citizens of some particular state —Fourth challenge to “extent” of Fifth Article “grant” of power by “conventions” to “conventions” and “legislatures”—This challenge asserts “grant” which advocates of Eighteenth Amendment must and cannot prove—Court negative amazingly accurate—All counsel have argued incessantly about “extent” of power “granted” by Fifth Article—Court negatives in statement which speaks of power “reserved” in Fifth Article—Concept of “grant” disappears—Court knows what “conventions” knew, when they made Fifth Article, when they insisted on Tenth Amendment Declaration expressly stating the distinct reservees of the two existing powers “reserved” in Fifth Article—Supreme Court of Marshall’s day knows it and Supreme Court of 1907 knows it—“Citizen or Subject?”—Eighteenth Amendment answers “Subject”—Real Constitution answers “Citizen”—“Conventions” insisted on plain statement of correct answer—Counsel of 1920 do not know it—Their four challenges make plain that fact—All challenges based on error that governments of state citizens are attorneys-in-fact for citizens of America—In Virginia Convention and in Supreme Court, Marshall explains that powers of state governments “proceed not from the people of America” but from the citizens of each respective state—No counsel of 1920 knows this important fact.
XXIV. G C A S
Page 371
Patrick Henry, opposing Constitution in the “conventions,” knows
that it takes power from the state legislatures and gives them no power—All modern leaders “know” that it gives those legislatures great power as attorneys-in-fact for the citizens of America—Many modern leaders “know” that it makes those legislatures an omnipotent Parliament over the citizens of America—No modern leaders remember 1781 and 1787 existing ability of the state legislatures to make federal Articles or Articles not creating government power to interfere with human liberty—Common modern concept that Fifth Article is “grant” to these “legislatures” and to the very “conventions” which made the Fifth Article—Leading brief, against Amendment, more than fifty times admits or asserts this imaginary and remarkable “grant”—Some extraordinary concepts of our American institutions in briefs—In a famous opinion, Marshall explains a fact and on it bases the entire decision of the Supreme Court—The fact itself is that the Constitution granted no power of any kind to the state legislatures—No brief knows or urges this fact or any of the facts we learned in the “conventions,” the facts on which we base our challenge to the Eighteenth Amendment concept that we are “subjects”—Briefs for the Amendment examined to find out why we are supposed to be “subjects”—Amazing claim that, when governments alone change the national part of the Constitution, Supreme Court has no power even to consider whether governments in America can make a change in the enumerated powers given to their own government by the citizens of America —Remarkable Tory concept that the number of Senators from each state is the only thing in America immune from government invasion, if enough governments combine—Indignation of American citizen changes to mirth when he realizes this concept to be only basis of thought that he is a “subject” or that there is an Eighteenth Amendment—American citizen, seeking to find (in the briefs for the Amendment) what happened, between 1907 and 1917, to make him a “subject,” startled to hear the answer, “Nothing”—Citizen’s amusement increased on learning, in same briefs, that whole American people, in Constitution which expressly declares it gives no power to state governments,
made those governments of state citizens irrevocable and omnipotent attorneys-in-fact for the citizens of America— Amusement increased by finding that main champion of Tory concept quotes Marshall’s Supreme Court story of the making of the Constitution, but omits, from the quotation, the paragraph in which Marshall points out that everyone knew why the “legislatures” could not make and only the “conventions” could make the national First Article, with its grant of enumerated power to interfere with human liberty—Curiosity added to mirth on finding this brief echo Madison’s own knowledge that his Fifth Article contains nothing but “procedural provisions,” while brief bases its entire contention on mere assertion that Fifth Article is greatest grant of power ever made by free men to government.
XXV. C “E
A ”?
Page 397
Congress is only legislature with any power of attorney from the citizens of America—At very beginning and very end of original Constitution, citizens of America expressly so state—All briefs of 1920 based on asserted assumption denying those two statements and insisting Fifth Article is “grant” to governments of state citizens—Briefs for new Amendment assert “grant” made governments of state citizens omnipotent master of everything in America (including all human rights) save number of Senators from each state—On this Tory concept depends entirely existence of Eighteenth Amendment—Tory concept being absolute myth, Amendment disappears—Amusing to find Tory briefs for Amendment with American citations and quotations which annihilate Tory concept—Unconscious humor of Wheeler surpasses “Comic Blackstone”—Tory legions, fighting under crescent of Mohammet, claim to be American and Christian crusaders—Americans would have remained “subjects” if Parliament, passing the Stamp Act, had said: “You subjects must obey this command we make but, making it, we do not legislate”—“Statement” that citizens of America universally demanded this sole Amendment which attempts to change the First Article enumerated powers—“Proof” that 4742 Tory
members of governments of state citizens said “Yes” to the change—Jefferson and Madison tell us that concentration of all power in legislatures “is precisely the definition of despotic government,” that 173 “despots would surely be as oppressive as one,” and that “an elective despotism was not the government we fought for”—Calhoun contended one state might defy supreme will of citizens of America—Tories for Amendment go far beyond doctrine finally repudiated by Gettysburg—On Tory concept that we are “subjects” of omnipotent government, assert that some governments of state citizens may dictate, in all matters of human right, what the citizens of America may and may not do—Echo from “conventions” which made Fifth Article, “How comes it, sir, that these state governments dictate to their superiors, to the majesty of the people?”
XXVI. T A C W R
Page 416
Supreme Court holds American people, “for most important purposes,” chose to be one nation, with only one government of the First Article enumerated powers to interfere with human liberty—America, the nation of men, and United States, the subordinate federation of states—Tories for new Amendment must prove that American people, as one “important” purpose, meant that governments of state citizens could interfere with every human right of American citizens—Reserved rights and powers of American citizens are entirely at their own direct disposal, for exercise or grant, “despite their legislatures, whether representing the states or the federal government”— American citizen must know this of his own knowledge or his human freedom will disappear—Emmett and Webster and their generation knew it—Madison writes Fifth Article and states exactly what it is to the “conventions” which made it—Hughes unable to begin his Tory argument for new Amendment without adding to that Madison statement what Madison pointedly did not say—Senate now about to repeat 1917 blunder that governments of state citizens have aught to do with altering the national part of the American Constitution, which part is within the exclusive control of the citizens of America themselves
—“Conventions” are the people—“Legislatures” are governments—“Citizen or Subject?”—Supreme Court answer certain—Court’s history and traditions show American concept of Hamilton that this Court bulwark of American citizen against government usurpation of power to interfere with human liberty —Webster forecast Court decision on new and Tory Amendment, answering “Citizen or Subject?”—All Americans once knew same correct answer to same question by Pendleton in Virginia Convention of 1788, “Who but the people can delegate power? What have the state governments to do with it?”
APPENDICES
I. T O C
U S
II. T R W P
C
C P
A
III. T F S A
C
IV. T A E
A
V. T N A
Page 445
Page 458
Page 460
Page 465
Page 466
CITIZEN OR SUBJECT?
CHAPTER I SUBJECTS BECOME CITIZENS
The average American of this generation does not understand what it means to be a citizen of America. He does not know the relation of such a citizen to all governments in America. He does not know the relations of those governments to one another. If this ignorance should continue, the citizen of America would disappear. The American would become again a subject, as he was when the year 1776 opened.
The supposed Eighteenth Amendment is not in the Constitution unless the American already is a subject.
It is vital to every individual interest of the average American that he should know these things which he does not know. Happily for him, his ignorance is not as that of the public leaders of his generation. Their concept of the American and his relation to governments in America is one which contradicts the most definitely settled and clearly stated American law. On the other hand, the average American merely has a mind which is a blank page in these matters. As a result, it is the greatest danger to his individual interest that their concept largely guides his attitude in public affairs of the utmost moment to him.
The Americans of an earlier generation, who created the American nation of men and all governments in America, accurately knew the status of the American citizen and his relation to all governments. Their accurate knowledge was an insistent thing which guided their every act as a people in the period between 1775 and 1790, in which latter year the last of the Americans became citizens of America. Their knowledge came to them from their own personal experience in those fifteen years. They were a people, born subjects of government, who died citizens of a great nation and whose every
government, in America, was their servant. This great miracle they themselves had wrought in the fifteen years between 1775 and 1790. Their greatest achievement, as the discerning mind has always realized, is what they did in the last four of those momentous years. They brought to its doing their valuable experience and training of the previous eleven years. That is why they succeeded, so far as human effort can secure human liberty by means of written constitutions of government, in securing to themselves and their posterity the utmost measure of protected enjoyment of human life and happiness That we, their posterity, may keep their legacy intact and transmit it to the generations to come, it is necessary that we, the average Americans, should share somewhat with them their amazingly accurate knowledge of the simple but vital facts which enabled them to create a nation and, by its American Constitution, to secure to themselves, its citizens, protected enjoyment of life, liberty and happiness.
When they were actually engaged in this work of creation, it was truthfully said of them that “The American people are better acquainted with the science of government than any other people in the world.” For over a hundred years the history of America attested the truth of that statement. As they were a simple people, their knowledge of the science of government was derived from their accurate understanding of a few simple facts. It is a certainty that we can keep their legacy by learning those same facts. Let us quickly learn them. The accurate knowledge of them may best be acquired by briefly living again, with those simple Americans of an earlier generation, through their days from 1775 to 1790.
The individual Americans of that generation were all born subjects of the British government. We do not understand the meaning of that statement until we accurately grasp the vital distinction between a “subject” of a government and a “citizen” of a nation.
It is hardly necessary to point out, but it is amazingly important to remember, that a “subject,” as well as a “citizen,” is first of all a human being, created by an omnipotent Creator and endowed with human rights. All would be well with the world, if each human being always accurately knew the difference between right and wrong and
if his accurate knowledge invariably controlled his exercise of his human freedom of will. In that case, no human government would be needed to prescribe and to enforce rules of personal conduct for the individual. As such is not the case, human government must exist. Its sole reason for existence, therefore, is that it may prescribe and enforce rules for those whom it can compel to obey its commands and that it may thus secure the utmost measure of protected enjoyment of human rights for those human beings whose government it is.
Time does not permit and necessity does not require that we dwell upon the various types of government which have existed or which have been created supposedly to meet this human need. It is sufficient to grasp the simple and important fact that government ability to say what men may or may not do, in any matter which is exercise of human freedom, is the very essence of government. Where a government has no ability of that kind, except what the men of its nation grant to it, where those men limit and determine the extent of that ability in their government, the men themselves are citizens. Where a government claims or exercises any ability of that kind, and has not received the grant of it directly from the men of the nation, where a government claims or exercises any ability of that kind, without any grant of it, or by grant from government to government, the men of that nation are subjects.
In the year 1775, under the British law, the Parliament at Westminster claimed the unqualified right to determine in what matters and to what extent laws should be made which would interfere with individual freedom. From such decision of the legislative part of the British Government there was no appeal save by force or revolution. For this reason, that every human being under that Government must submit to any interference with individual freedom commanded by that Legislature, all British human beings were “subjects.” And, as all Americans were then under that British Government, all Americans were then “subjects.” Such was their legal status under the so-called British Constitution. Curiously enough, however, until a comparatively short time prior to 1775, such had not been the actual status of the Americans. In this sharp
contrast between their legal and their actual status, there will be found both the cause of their Revolution and the source of their great and accurate knowledge of the sound principles of republican government which they later made the fundamental law of America.
From the day their ancestors had first been British colonists in America their legal status had been that of subjects of the British Government. But, so long as they remained merely a few widely scattered sets of human beings in a new world, struggling to get a bare existence from day to day, they offered no temptation to the omnipotent British Government to oppress them, its subjects. They still had to show the signs of acquiring that community wealth which has always been the temptation of government to unjust exaction from the human beings it governs. For that reason, their legal government concerned itself very little about them or their welfare. It thus became their necessity to govern themselves for all the purposes for which they locally needed government as security to their individual welfare.
Only thirteen years after the first permanent English settlement in Virginia, “Sir George Yeardley, then the Governor of the colony, in 1619 called a general assembly, composed of representatives from the various plantations in the colony, and permitted them to assume and exercise the high functions of legislation. Thus was formed and established the first representative legislature that ever sat in America. And this example of a domestic parliament, to regulate all the internal concerns of the country, was never lost sight of, but was ever afterwards cherished [until 1917] throughout America, as the dearest birthright of freemen.” (1 Ell. Deb. 22.)
“On the 11th of November, 1620, those humble but fearless adventurers, the Plymouth colonists, before their landing, drew up and signed an original compact, in which, after acknowledging themselves subjects of the crown of England, they proceed to declare: ‘Having undertaken, for the glory of God, and the advancement of the Christian faith, and the honor of our king and country, a voyage to plant the first colony in the northern parts of Virginia, we do, by these presents, solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and of one another, covenant and combine
ourselves together into a civil body politic, for our better ordering and preservation, and furtherance of the ends aforesaid. And by virtue hereof do enact, constitute, and frame, such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and officers, from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony; unto which we promise all due submission and obedience.’ This is the whole of the compact, and it was signed by forty-one persons.
“It is, in its very essence, a pure democracy; and, in pursuance of it, the colonists proceeded soon afterwards to organize the colonial government, under the name of the Colony of New Plymouth, to appoint a Governor and other officers and to enact laws. The Governor was chosen annually by the freemen, and had at first one assistant to aid him in the discharge of his trust. Four others were soon afterwards added, and finally the number was increased to seven. The supreme legislative power resided in, and was exercised by, the whole body of the male inhabitants, every freeman, who was a member of the church, being admitted to vote in all public affairs. The number of settlements having increased, and being at a considerable distance from each other, a house of representatives was established in 1639, the members of which, as well as all other officers, were annually chosen.” (1 Ell. Deb. 25.)
These are two examples typical of the way in which the English colonists, for the first hundred years, largely governed themselves by legislators chosen from among themselves. In this manner, while legally “subjects” of their European government, these Americans were actually “citizens” of their respective communities, actually governed in their individual lives and liberties by governments which derived all their powers of government from these “citizens.” In this manner, through the best teacher in the world, personal experience, they learned the vital difference between the relation of “subject” and “citizen” to governments. Later, the echo of that education was heard from Lincoln when he pleaded that government of the people, by the people and for them should not perish from the earth.
As early as 1754 these Americans began to feel the first real burden of their legal status as “subjects.” Their community wealth
was beginning to attract the attention of the world. As a result, the legal Government awoke to the fact of their existence and of its own omnipotent ability to levy upon that wealth. The Americans, for more than a century educated in actual self-government, quickly showed the result of that education to the accurate knowledge that no government can have any just power except by the consent or grant of those to be governed by the exercise of such power. As far back as 1754, deputies of the various American colonies, where human beings had educated themselves to be free men, assembled at Albany in an endeavor to propose some compromise by which the American people would be enabled to preserve their human freedom against unjust interference by the Westminster Legislature. We are all familiar with the failure of that endeavor. We are all familiar with the successive steps of the continuing struggle between “subjects,” educated to be “citizens,” and an omnipotent government, unshaken in its purpose to make their actual status the same as their legal one.
When the year 1776 dawned, these Americans were still “subjects” under the law of the British Empire. They were, however, “subjects” in open rebellion against their government, justifying their rebellion on the basic American legal principle that every just power, even of a lawful government, must be derived from the consent or grant of the human beings themselves who are to be governed. On the memorable day in July of that year, despairing of any success in getting the British Government to recognize that basic principle, and asserting, for the first time in history, that they themselves were collectively the possessors of the supreme human will in and for America, they enacted the immortal Statute which we know as the Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration of Independence, which was the first political act of the American people in their independent sovereign capacity, lays the foundation of our national existence upon this broad proposition: “That all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” (Justice Bradley’s opinion in Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, at page 115.)
In this Statute, the American people clearly stated and definitely settled for all time the basic legal principle on which rests the validity of every constitutional article or statute law, which either directly interferes or vests ability in governments to interfere with an American in the exercise of his human freedom. There is nothing vague or ambiguous in their statement. The legal principle, so clearly stated and so definitely settled, is that no government in America can have any just power of direct interference with individual freedom unless such power be derived by direct grant from the Americans to be governed by the exercise of that power
That Statute has never been repealed. The Americans of that generation, throughout all the momentous political battles of the next thirteen years, when they were making and unmaking nations and creating a federation of nations, and later subordinating it to a union of human beings, never failed to obey that Statute and to act in strict conformity to its basic American principle.
From the moment when that Statute was enacted by the supreme will in America, every American ceased forever to be a “subject” of any government or governments in the world. It was not until 1917 that any government or governments dared to act as if the American were still a “subject.”
In that summer of 1776, as the Americans were engaged with their former Government in a bitter and protracted war, they had little time or thought to give, as one people, to the constitution of a government best designed to secure to themselves the utmost possible measure of protected enjoyment of individual human freedom. In their rebellion, they had delegated the management of their common interests to a committee of deputies from each former colony, which committee was called the Congress. By the declared supreme will of the whole American people, the Americans in each former colony now constituted an independent nation, whose human members were now the “citizens” of that nation. Under the declared basic American legal principle, it was imperative that any government should get its every valid power from its own citizens. Knowing this, the Congress, almost immediately after the Declaration of July, made the formal suggestion to the citizens in each nation that they
constitute a government for themselves and that they grant to such government ability to interfere with their own human freedom in such matters and to such extent as they deemed wise. The manner in which the citizens of each nation acted upon this suggestion should have stamped itself so irrevocably upon the mind of America as never to have been forgotten by any later generation of Americans. The citizens of those nations were of the “people who were better acquainted with the science of government than any other people in the world.” In each nation they were creating the very essence of security for a free people, namely, a government with limited ability to interfere with individual freedom, in some matters, so as to secure the greatest possible protected enjoyment of human liberty. They knew, as only human beings could know who were then offering their very lives to uphold the basic law of America, that such ability could never be validly given to any government by government itself, acting in any manner, but only by direct action and grant of those later to be governed by the exercise of that ability. What method did those citizens, so thoroughly educated in the basic principles of republican government, employ to secure the direct action of the human beings themselves in giving that ability of that kind to their respective governments? They acted upon the suggestion from the Congress of 1776, as Marshall later expressed it from the Bench of the Supreme Court, “in the only manner in which they can act safely, effectively and wisely on such a subject, by assembling in convention” in their respective states. Long before Marshall voiced judicial approval of this American method of direct action by the people themselves, in matters in which only the people themselves can validly act at all, Madison, in the famous Virginia convention of 1788, paid his tribute to these conventions of the people in each of the thirteen nations. This was the tribute of Madison: “Mr. Chairman, nothing has excited more admiration in the world than the manner in which free governments have been established in America; for it was the first instance, from the creation of the world to the American Revolution, that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such of their citizens as possessed their confidence, to determine upon and give effect to it.” (3 Ell. Deb. 616.)
Later herein there will be occasion to speak at greater length of this American method of direct action by the people themselves, through the deliberative conventions of deputies chosen by the people and from the people for that one purpose, giving to governments a limited ability to interfere with individual freedom. At this point, it is sufficient to say that, since 1789 and until 1917, no government in America ever claimed to have acquired ability of that kind except through the action of such a convention or conventions or through the direct voting of its citizens themselves for or against the grant of such ability
If we again turn our minds upon those later days of 1776, we find that the Americans, through the direct action of the people in each independent nation, had become respectively citizens of what we now know as their respective states, each of which was then a free nation. Those thirteen nations were then allied in war. There did not yet exist even that political entity, later created and known as a federation of those nations. At that time and until quite some years after the Revolution had ended, there was no such thing as a “citizen” of America, because the America we know, the organized human membership society which is the American nation, did not yet exist. At that time and until the American nation did actually exist, as a political entity, there was no government in the world and no collection of governments in the world, which, on any subject or to any extent, could interfere generally with the individual freedom of Americans, as Americans. In each of the thirteen American nations, the citizens of that nation had vested their own government with some ability of that kind.
At this point, it is well to digress for a moment in order that we may well understand that in none of these thirteen nations did its citizens vest in its government an unlimited ability to interfere with individual freedom. All the citizens of those respective nations were then battling with a mighty Government which claimed such unlimited ability over all of them, as subjects, and they were battling to establish forever in America the basic doctrine that no government of free men could ever have unlimited ability of that kind. In each of the thirteen nations, its citizens vested its government with ability of that
kind only to a limited extent. They did this in strict conformity to republican principles.
For the many who do not know, it is well to state clearly the distinction between a pure democracy and a republic. In both, the human beings constitute the nation or the state and are its citizens. In both, the citizens themselves limit the matters and the extent in which they shall be governed at all in restraint of their individual freedom. In both, therefore, it is accurate and truthful to state that the people govern themselves. The actual difference lies in one fact. In a democracy the people themselves assemble and themselves enact each specific rule of conduct or law interfering with individual freedom. In a republic, it is always possible that the citizens may assemble, as in a pure democracy, and enact any specific rule of conduct or law. But, in a republic, its citizens generally prefer to act, in such matters, through attorneys in fact or representatives, chosen by themselves for the special purpose of exercising a wise discretion in making such laws. In a true republic, however, where the citizens are to remain free men, they secure to themselves absolute control of their representative lawmakers through two most effective means. In the first place, they ordain that their attorneys in fact for the purpose of law-making, generally called their legislators, shall be selected by themselves from time to time, at comparatively short intervals. This precaution enables the people, through new attorneys in fact, quickly to repeal a law of which they do not approve. In the second place, the people, in constituting their government, limit the law-making ability of these temporary attorneys in fact or legislators. This is the most important fact in a free republic. Later herein there will be explained the marvelous and effective manner in which this particular security for human freedom was later achieved by the citizens of the Republic which we know as America, when they constituted their government. At present, there is to be mentioned the general method which the citizens of each of those thirteen nations, in 1776, employed to achieve this particular security.
In each nation the citizens constituted a legislature to be their only attorney in fact for the purpose of making valid laws. In this legislative department they did not vest enumerated powers to
