This book investigates several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions.
NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime and littoral theater, where NATO directly borders Russia’s Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory, which is the location of some of Russia’s most potent air, sea, and land power capabilities. While military tensions on the northern flank had been relatively low for years, the Ukraine war and increased great-power rivalry have altered that dynamic, with heightened geopolitical tensions. This has increased the focus on military-strategic competition in this northernmost region of the alliance. This book presents new assessments of several aspects of military power and security in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions. With an analysis of the security and political climate in the High North and of developments in Western military strategies, capabilities, doctrines, and operational concepts, the volume seeks to bring together an holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic states and NATO in this dynamic area of responsibility for the alliance. In doing this, the book provides key insights into the role of branch-specific and joint approaches to power projection and operations in the High North, which also include selected country case studies.
This book will be of much interest to students of NATO, military studies, security studies, and International Relations.
Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the US Marine Corps Command and Staff College.
Njord Wegge is a professor of Political Science at the Norwegian Defence University College/Norwegian Military Academy.
Contemporary Security Studies
Series Editors: James Gow and Rachel Kerr
King’s College London
This series focuses on new research across the spectrum of international peace and security, in an era where each year throws up multiple examples of conflicts that present new security challenges in the world around them.
Drones and Global Order
Implications of Remote Warfare for International Society
Edited by Paul Lushenko, Srinjoy Bose, and William Maley
The right of Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Title: Defending NATO’s northern flank : power projection and military operations / edited by Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge.
Description: London ; New York, NY : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2024. | Series: Contemporary security studies | Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2023026085 (print) | LCCN 2023026086 (ebook) | ISBN 9781032381930 (hardback) | ISBN 9781032381947 (paperback) | ISBN 9781003343905 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: North Atlantic Treaty Organization Scandinavia. | Scandinavia Military relations United States | United States Military relations Scandinavia. | National security Scandinavia. | Scandinavia Strategic aspects. | Scandinavia Foreign relations.
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026085
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023026086
ISBN: 978-1-032-38193-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-38194-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-34390-5 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003343905
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1 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank: An introduction 1
LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE
I Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank 13
2 The strategic challenge of expeditionary warfare and the defense of NATO’s northern flank 15 LON STRAUSS AND NJORD WEGGE
3 A defense dilemma and a possible security dilemma: Norway, the United States, and the defense of Northern Norway, 1960–1980 32
STIAN BONES
4 The Russian way of regular warfare and the Arctic 50 AMUND OSFLATEN
5 National security interests of Russia’s Northern Sea Route: Additional elements of domestic and international importance
TROY J. BOUFFARD
NATO, doctrines, and the Arctic
PALLE YDSTEBØ
7 Norwegian problems of confidence building: Geopolitical exposure and military vulnerabilities in the High North 103
TORMOD HEIER
II
interests and the Arctic
8 US national strategy in the Arctic
DAVID AUERSWALD
9 Integrated naval deterrence in the Arctic: Deterring Russian aggression through US-Norwegian cooperation
WALTER BERBRICK AND LARS SAUNES
10 Operationalizing joint force capabilities and priorities for growing problem sets in the Arctic region 167
RYAN BURKE AND JAHARA MATISEK
11 Special operations forces in the Arctic: From heroes to zeroes? 183
MARIUS KRISTIANSEN, NJÅL HOEM, AND LEO BLANKEN
III Nato’s northern flank states
12 Norway’s strategic role and interests at NATO’s northern flank: Finding a new balance?
JOACHIM BENTZEN
13 Finnish and Swedish NATO membership: What does it hold for the Arctic?
HANNA OJANEN AND ARTO VÄISÄNEN
14 A kingdom divided against itself: The Kingdom of Denmark and the rise of Arctic security dynamics
LISELOTTE ODGAARD
Acknowledgments
This project had not been possible without various sources of support. We would especially like to thank the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, the Norwegian Defence University College, the Marine Corps University, and the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare. We would also like to thank our chapter contributors as well as our patient and supporting families!
Contributors
David Auerswald is a professor of Security Studies at the US National War College as well as a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. He has published extensively on a variety of national security and foreign policy topics, most recently on the geopolitics of the Arctic, as well as on civilian oversight of the military in democracies. Dr. Auerswald has worked as a congressional staff member on three separate occasions. He received his PhD and MA degrees in political science from the University of California, San Diego, and undergraduate degrees in political science and English literature from Brown University.
Joachim Bentzen works as a senior advisor on security policy with the Norwegian Armed Forces. At the time of writing, he was a guest researcher at the Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies (IFS) working under the Norwegian security policy in strategic perspective research program.
Walter Berbrick is an associate professor in the War Gaming Department, founding director of the Arctic Studies Group, and co-lead scholar of the Newport Arctic Scholars Initiative. He served as the senior arctic policy advisor to the secretary of the Navy and special representative for the Arctic Region at the US State Department. Berbrick is an International Affairs Fellow and member of the Council on Foreign Relations, holds a doctorate degree from Northeastern University, and served 10 years in the US Navy.
Leo Blanken is an associate professor in the Defense Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is the academic lead for the “Applied Design for Innovation” graduate curriculum. He has authored work on military innovation, great power competition, defense economics, and metrics/assessment. He is the author of Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion (University of Chicago Press) and is co-editor of Assessing War: The Challenge of Measuring Success and Failure (Georgetown University Press). Leo collects and DJs rare soul and funk records from the 1960s.
Stian Bones (b. 1972) is a professor of Modern History at UiT—The Arctic University of Norway. He has written extensively on political, security, and diplomatic topics related to Norway and the European Far North during the Second World War and the Cold War. Among his latest publications is The Struggle for Freedom He is the editor of The Second World War in the High North published in 2022. The subject of his doctoral thesis (2007) was North Norway during the Cold War. Bones has also worked on the history of Norway’s relations to the United States, Norwegian-Russian relations, and the history of Norway’s polar politics.
Troy J. Bouffard is the director of the Center for Arctic Security and Resilience (CASR) at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, where he has been full-time faculty member since 2014. He retired from the US Army in 2010 after 22 years of service worldwide. He continues to conduct research and work with USNORTHCOM, NATO StratCom CoE, the North American and Arctic Security and Defence Network, 11th Airborne Division (Arctic), various national labs, the Arctic Council EPPR Working Group, Geneva Center for Security Policy, and many others. Additionally, he co-leads the Arctic eTalks with USNORTHCOM. His current research involves Russian NSR nexus of defense and international law.
Dr. Danita Catherine Burke is a research fellow at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark, and a Northern Scholars Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. Dr. Burke’s research addresses topics including Arctic diplomacy and security, environmental and animal rights activism legacies, stigma, and cultural violence. She is the author of International Disputes and Cultural Ideas in the Canadian Arctic (Palgrave Macmillian), Diplomacy and the Arctic Council (McGill-Queens University Press), WWF and Arctic Environmentalism (Manchester University Press), and Cultural Violence, Stigma and the Legacy of the Anti-Sealing Movement (Routledge).
Dr. Ryan Burke is a professor in the Department of Military and Strategic Studies (MSS) at the US Air Force Academy (USAFA), research director of USAFA and USNORTHCOM’s Homeland Defense Institute, co-director of Project 6633 at the Modern War Institute (MWI) at West Point, and an affiliate professor with the University of Alaska—Fairbanks (UAF) Center for Arctic Security and Resilience. Ryan holds graduate degrees from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the University of Delaware’s Joseph R. Biden School of Public Policy and Administration, and Saint Joseph’s University. He is also a veteran Marine Corps officer.
Tormod Heier is a professor of military strategy and operations at the Norwegian Defence University College/Command Staff College, Oslo. He has served 32 years as an army officer with tenure in the Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Intelligence Service, Afghanistan, and Brigade North.
Heier has published extensively on security- and defense-related issues related to Norwegian and allied strategies in out-of-area operations and in the Arctic. He received the Army’s Medal of Merit in 2023 and Norwegian PEN’s Ossietzky Price in 2017.
Njål Hoem is an active-duty Norwegian army officer. He currently serves at the Norwegian Special Operations Command. He holds a BA degree in Military Leadership and Land Warfare from the Norwegian Military Academy, has studied Leadership and Organizational Psychology at BI Norwegian Business School, and holds an M.Litt. degree in War Studies from the University of Glasgow. He is one of the founding members of the editorial staff of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem
Marius Kristiansen is an active-duty Norwegian army officer whose military service began in the Norwegian Navy. He currently serves as the Norwegian exchange officer of USSOCOM J3-International Division. Kristiansen holds a PhD degree in Political Science and Strategy, an MSc degree in Defence Analysis—Irregular Warfare, a BA degree in Land Warfare and Military Leadership, and an Advanced Certificate in Terrorism Studies. He was a 2022 non-resident fellow with the Irregular Warfare Initiative, is a 2023 non-resident fellow at the Joint Special Operations University, and is one of the founding members of the editorial staff of the Norwegian electronic journal Stratagem.
US Air Force Lt. Col. Jahara Matisek PhD, is a military professor in the National Security Affairs Department at the US Naval War College and is a command pilot with over 3,700 hours in the C-17, E-11 BACN, T-6, and T-53. He most recently served at the US Air Force Academy as an associate professor in the Military and Strategic Studies Department, the research director for the Strategy and Warfare Center, and a senior fellow for the Homeland Defense Institute. He has published over 90 articles on strategy and warfare in peer-reviewed journals and policy-relevant outlets.
Liselotte Odgaard is a professor at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies in Oslo and a non-resident senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. Her work focuses on US-China-Europe relations, including NATO-China relations; Chinese foreign, security, and defense policy; Indo-Pacific security; and the geopolitics of the Arctic region. Dr. Odgaard has been a visiting scholar at institutions such as Harvard University, Woodrow Wilson Center, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute. She is the author of numerous monographs, books, peer-reviewed articles, and research papers on Chinese and Asia-Pacific security, and is a frequent commentator on these issues in the media.
Dr. Hanna Ojanen is the research director at Tampere University, where she leads the STRAX research consortium on the change of strategic culture, and an adjunct professor at the Department of Warfare, Finnish National Defence
University. She holds a doctorate degree in Political and Social Sciences from the European University Institute. Her research focuses on European security and defense, EU-NATO relations, and Nordic countries’ security policies. Her publications include “The EU’s engagement with international organisations. NATO’s impact on the making of EU security policy,” in Roberta N. Haar et al. (eds.) The Making of European Security Policy. Between Institutional Dynamics and Global Challenges (Routledge 2021).
Amund Osflaten is an officer in the Norwegian Army and a tutor/researcher at the Norwegian Military Academy/Norwegian Defence University College. His fields of expertise are strategic culture, war studies, and, in particular, Russian military theory and conventional warfare. Previous education includes a BA degree in Military Studies, a BA degree in International Studies, and an MA degree in Peace and Conflict Studies. Currently, he is conducting a PhD at King’s College London in which he looks at “The Russian Way of Regular Land Warfare after the Cold War.”
RADM(R) Lars Saunes is a professor and a Distinguished International Fellow at the US Naval War College. As Chief of the Royal Norwegian Navy from 2014, he changed the Navy’s course toward high readiness, renewed its aim on warfighting skills, and strengthened the allied team on the northern flank of NATO. During his 37 years of military career, he has held the highest positions in submarine service, naval operations, and coast guard operations. He has held flag positions as Commandant of the Norwegian Coast Guard and Chief of Royal Norwegian Navy. His role as professor includes co-leading The Newport Arctic Scholar Initiative, teaching and lecturing on strategy and leadership, mentoring students, and facilitating international cooperation and friendship.
Dr. Lon Strauss is an associate professor of Military History at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. His work focuses on US Arctic security, the First World War, and military intelligence’s homefront surveillance in the early 20th century. He co-authored War: Contemporary Perspectives on Armed Conflicts Around the World, was an editor for 1914–1918 Online, and has published several articles and book chapters.
Arto Väisänen is a PhD fellow at the ARENA Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo and a former researcher at Tampere University and the ENGAGE project. He has previous work experience at the European Institute of Peace and the European Parliament and received degrees from the College of Europe, Bruges, and Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. His research focuses on European foreign, security, and defense policy as well as small states, EU climate policy, climate security, and the Arctic region.
Njord Wegge is a professor in Political Science at the Norwegian Defence University College/Norwegian Military Academy, where he leads several
Contributors xiii
research projects related to security and military power in the Arctic. Wegge has earlier been “Chair of Arctic Security” at the Marine Corps University, he has been a visiting scholar at UC Berkeley, and he has worked as a Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) as well as at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI). Wegge finished his PhD on International Relations in the Arctic in 2013 at the University of Tromsø, the Arctic University of Norway.
Palle Ydstebø is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the Norwegian Army and holds a PhD degree in War Studies from the University of Glasgow. His main field of interest is the emergence and development of military strategy and operational art, and Soviet and Russian military operations. Ydstebø has served in the Norwegian Corps of Engineers, Army Headquarters, Norwegian Intelligence Service, and the Norwegian Defence Command and Staff College before his current position at the Military Academy. He has had field and staff assignments in Afghanistan, Germany, and South Sudan, and he edited the two recent editions of the Norwegian Joint Operational Doctrine.
1 Security and defense of NATO’s northern flank
An introduction
Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
NATO’s northern flank is a large maritime theater, often understood as the region stretching from Greenland in the west to Norway and the Barents Sea in the east, confined by the Arctic Ocean in the north, and with the Greenland-Iceland-UK (GIUK) gap making a natural borderline in the south. At this northern flank, NATO directly borders Russia and its “Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory,” which hosts some of Russia’s most potent air, sea, and land power capabilities, including the main bulk of that great power’s strategic submarines (Kjellén, 2022, p. 43; Wall and Wegge, 2023). Thus, it is easy to imagine a threat to this part of NATO’s territory coming from the northeast.
During the Cold War, NATO’s command for its northernmost flank area was the “Allied Forces Northern Europe” (AFNORTH), which was located at Kolsås outside Oslo. It was responsible for allied operations in Denmark and Norway (with the exception of Svalbard, Jan Mayen, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) and the northern parts of West Germany and their adjacent seas and oceans (Berdal, 1994, pp. 39, 79; Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17). However, with the end of the Cold War, AFNORTH and the other regional commands were disbanded (Solvang and Wegge, 2023, p. 17). Yet, with the increased tension in Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO decided to open Joint Force Command Norfolk (JFC Norfolk). As JFC Norfolk is designated to focus on the protection of the North Atlantic sea area and the “trans-Atlantic link,” as well as “the Arctic,” JFC Norfolk today stands out as a key NATO operational command, responsible for protecting this part of the alliance, including what can be labeled its northern flank (see Figure 1.1) (JFC Norfolk, 2023).
NATO’s northern flank has several unique features, both with respect to its rather remote northern location, where climatic and logistical challenges tend to complicate military operations, and also in its strategic location close to one of Russia’s most important (if not the most important) military-strategic complexes, located on the Kola Peninsula (Wegge and Halsne, 2022, p. 32). In a political context, the Arctic is usually defined as all areas north of the Arctic Circle, that is, north of the 66°33′ latitude. NATO’s northern flank
2 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
Source: Created for the Editors by Julie Nord.
overlaps substantially with the European parts of the Arctic region (Andrysiak and Newton, 2022, p. 24).
NATO’s border with Russia in the north
The Russian defense concept for its Northern Fleet and its joint forces’ strategic assets in the Kola Peninsula is often referred to as the “bastion defense.”
The bastion defense (see Figure 1.2) is a multilayered anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) defense system covering the Kola Peninsula with its surrounding seas, coastal areas, and islands, including access to the North Atlantic, the Barents Sea, parts of the Arctic Ocean, and the Norwegian Sea as far south as the GIUK gap (Nordenman, 2019, pp. 128–155; Kjellén, 2022, p. 40). In this area, Russia is assumed to have an ambition of sea denial or sea control in the area closest to its home bases (Expert Commission, 2015).
For NATO, the northern flank stands out as a remote, cold, littoral area where, for substantial parts of the year, it is difficult to operate due to harsh climatic conditions and other challenges, such as limited daylight during the winter season. Hence, the flank represents a unique challenge to NATO with respect to the need for cold-weather tactical and operational skills, including cold-weather-adapted gear, in order to project power and operate successfully in this region over time. In addition, the proximity to some of the most capable Russian forces and their A2/AD capabilities, in combination with long logistical lines back to the population centers and industrial hubs in Western Europe and the United States of America, make sustaining forces
Figure 1.1 NATO’s northern flank.
the bastion indicates the patrolling area of the Russian strategic submarines inner defenceambition of control outer defenceambition of denial
Figure 1.2 The Russian bastion and the reach of the bastion defense.
Source: Expert Commission, 2015, p. 21.
there extremely challenging, particularly during conflict. These factors explain why NATO has historically considered its northern flank one of the most difficult to defend against Russian attacks (Berdal, 1994; Nordenman, 2019).
As Russia in recent years has conducted significant rearmament programs in its Arctic region, including introducing brand-new high-tech weapons such as the Kinzhal and Zircon hypersonic missiles, the region also houses new, complicated defensive problems for NATO (Boulègue, 2019; Lavikainen, 2021; Arctic Today, 2022). Russia has refurbished many of the Soviet era’s old Cold War bases in the Russian Arctic. According to a CSIS report from 2020, the number of reopened bases or facilities is assumed to be around 50: “Russia’s military posture in the Arctic emphasizes air and maritime early warning and defense […]. This includes the refurbishment of 13 air bases, 10 radar stations, 20 border outposts, and 10 integrated emergency rescue stations” (Conley et al., 2020, p. 6).
However, Russia’s war in Ukraine has substantially affected its force posture and priorities in the Arctic, specifically with respect to its land power components, which today are being depleted in the Northern Fleet Military Administrative Territory. As the majority of the Northern Fleet’s naval
BASTION
BASTION DEFENCE
RUSSIA
SWEDEN
ICELAND
4 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
infantry and land forces appear to have been transferred south to the battlefields in Ukraine, where they are incurring significant casualties, Russia’s ability to make a surprise intrusion over land into NATO’s northern flank has been weakened (Norwegian Intelligence Service, 2023; Wall and Wegge, 2023). Yet, while the war has changed Russia’s land power military dispositions, the Northern Fleet appears to retain operational control of their main strategic weapon systems, which are typically bound to naval and airborne platforms.
The future of NATO in the north
In the western part of the Arctic as well, there is a renewed focus on military security and the ability to operate and project power. Increased interest in NATO’s northern flank is not least exemplified by Finland and Sweden gaining NATO membership, an expansion of NATO that has dramatically increased the alliance’s border with Russia. Particularly, with Finland, the expansion opened up new Arctic territories in near proximity to the Kola Peninsula. Inclusion of the two Nordic states also creates significant new logistical opportunities for the defense of NATO’s northern flank (Wegge, 2022). However, this expansion also raises new questions on how NATO should plan to defend this enlarged northern area of responsibility.
While the dominant perception has been that military tensions on the northern flank have been relatively low for quite some time, e.g. when compared to the Baltic Sea region or NATO’s eastern flank, heightened geopolitical tensions and the war in Ukraine have changed the political and strategic situation in this part of the world in recent years (Wegge and Halsne, 2022, p. 32). When assessing to what degree there is still a cooperative political climate in the Arctic, the Arctic Council—the region’s premier intergovernmental forum, which is comprised of the eight Arctic states, several indigenous peoples organizations, as well as state and non-state observers—is of particular interest. While the Arctic Council has been a success story in inter-state cooperation in the Arctic since the end of the Cold War, and even to some extent was able to remain an open forum for discussion and collaboration after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, this is not the case anymore. The manner in which the work of the Council was put on hold, with the seven democratic states (A7) deciding to “resume work together on some of the forum’s projects, but without Russia,” is also illustrative of the general political situation in the Arctic (US Department of State, 2022; Barents Observer, 2022). This unusual circumstance is particularly telling given the fact that Russia represents about 50% of the Arctic region, measured in both landmass and oceanic area. Russia has similarly denounced any plans for future cooperation with the west in the Arctic Council, prioritizing her own national interest and removing references to cooperation within the Arctic Council from its newest Arctic strategy (High North News, 2023).
Thus, the idea of an “Arctic exceptionalism” with respect to lower geopolitical tension, which sometimes persisted in academic forums, is no longer fitting (Pezard et al., 2017, pp. 7–25; Henninen, 2019, p. 231; Käpylä and Mikkola, 2019). In general, there is uncertainty over where international relations in this strategically important part of the world are heading. For example, General Wayne Eyre, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, characterizes the Arctic as being “at an inflection point” after Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine (High North News, 2022). Also, in the 2023 threat assessment from the US intelligence community, one finds concerns over what might follow after the split between Russia and the A7: “Contested economic and military activities in the Arctic have the potential to increase the risk of miscalculation, particularly while there are military tensions between Russia and the other seven Arctic countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2023, p. 22).
In this uncertainty, one finds Arctic scholars like Professor Timo Koivurova at the University of Lapland warning against an unnecessary securitization of “everything” in the Arctic, pointing to the likelihood of a new version of the Cold War in the region (Koivurova, 2022). While Koivurova makes a timely remark, one could also argue that the situation in the Arctic region simply reflects the overall geostrategic landscape in Europe following the Kremlin’s aggressive and unprovoked war against Ukraine.
Strategic challenges and opportunities facing the North Atlantic states and NATO
In a statement to the US House Armed Services Committee on 8 March 2023, General Glen D. VanHerck, Commander of US Northern Command (NORTHCOM), stated the following on key concerns and priorities pertaining to the Arctic:
The ability of the joint force to operate and campaign in the Arctic remains a pressing concern for USNORTHCOM and NORAD. The PRC and Russia continue to invest in Arctic capabilities as both seek to increase presence and influence in the region while shifting the rules-based international order to their advantage. More than 50 percent of USNORTHCOM’s area of operations is in the Arctic, and USNORTHCOM and NORAD’s priorities in the region continue to focus on increased presence, campaigning through joint training and exercises, and close collaboration with allies and partners.
(VanHerck, 2023)
By analyzing the security-political situation in the High North, combined with assessments of developments in western military strategy, capabilities, and operational concepts fitted for NATO’s northern flank, this book will seek to bring together a holistic understanding of the strategic challenges and
opportunities facing the alliance in this northern part of its area of responsibility. In this respect, questions on how the alliance and its member states should train and develop capabilities and concepts, enabling them to operate and effectively project power in this dynamic area of responsibility for the alliance, will be scrutinized. This context will inform an investigation of identified problems related to a lack of domain awareness and resilience in infrastructure affecting NATO and the joint force’s ability to project power, which also includes the role of bilateral defense relationships.
With Finland’s NATO membership and Sweden’s, the consequences of this expansion will be addressed. One element of this likely future evolution of NATO potential is changes to the role and status of allied presence in the northern parts of Fennoscandia. While today there are no traditional allied bases on NATO’s northern flank to ensure permanent American or other non-local allied stand-in forces operating within the “Weapon Engagement Zone” of Russia’s military complex in the Kola Peninsula, change is likely to be underway (Behrmann et al., 2022). One such development is found through the recently signed ten-year contract ensuring a training camp for Royal Marines Commandos in Inner Troms (Joint-forces.com, 2023). However, the future Finnish and Swedish policies on the issue of foreign bases remain to be seen.
This book will contribute to the discussion with an updated and uniquely composed research-based investigation of the strategic situation on NATO’s northern flank. It will focus on both the political-strategic as well as the military-operational levels, investigating to what degree national forces and NATO are prepared to project power and operate in this region. In this context, the book will assess to what degree current security strategies, as well as changes in operational concepts, are developed to fit both the technological and military-strategic challenges, hence ensuring that the North Atlantic states and NATO have the ability to operate and project power throughout the competition spectrum, from peace to crises and war on its northern flank.
The structure and research tasks of this book
This book will be divided into three sections. In the first section—I: Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank—scholars address some important topics related to overall security and defense on this northernmost flank of the alliance, also including insight into Russian strategic thinking. The section starts out with Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge analyzing the security environment in the Arctic, giving an overall assessment of NATO’s ability to defend its northern flank. In this assessment, challenges to expeditionary warfare in a multi-domain operational setting will be discussed. Following this, Stian Bones presents important aspects of the historical background of the United States and its Arctic operational and strategic planning, including defense cooperation with Norway. In this chapter, security
dilemmas from the height of the Cold War, particularly from the time period 1960–1980, will be addressed.
Amund Osflaten comes next with a chapter discussing Russian defense thinking and how this relates to the Arctic region. In a situation with soaring tensions between Russia and NATO, the Russian way of regular warfare, combined with the strategic realities of the Russian Arctic, indicates a strong Russian inclination to strike preemptively if war is seen as imminent or highly likely. As the Northern Strategic Bastion on the Kola Peninsula is central to the Russian second-strike capability and thus is perceived as central to state survival, an assessment of the likelihood of pre-emptive attack in order to thwart a NATO buildup is discussed. The Norwegian strategic predicament lies in avoiding inadvertently triggering a pre-emptive strike, while still being able to mount an adequate defense of Norwegian territory. This strategic dilemma is important to understand for Norwegian and NATO decisionmakers before a crisis develops. Then, Troy J. Bouffard examines additional components that help define the overall national security priority that is Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR). The chapter provides insights into how the Kremlin has developed powerful justification regarding the NSR’s strategic importance through four exploratory themes, including a brief history of the NSR and its importance in international law, the role of Article 234 of UNCLOS, efforts and tensions involving maritime tonnage goals, and impacts concerning freedom of navigation. As the NSR remains a top national priority for Moscow—in general and especially in the Arctic—an increased understanding of all relevant factors will help analysts, decision-makers, and enthusiasts consider the complex circumstances more effectively as NSR-related geopolitical and maritime competition inevitably increases.
In Palle Ydstebø’s chapter, a discussion on NATO’s doctrinal development pertaining to the Arctic is conducted. The chapter focuses on the different roles and function of doctrine in light of joint operational experiences in the European Arctic. Finally, for this section, Tormod Heier points out challenges to East-West relationships and confidence building, particularly after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In the years before the Ukraine War, Norway’s geostrategic exposure and its military vulnerability reinforced each other. This was because US-Russian rivalry intensified and thus coincided with grave operative deficiencies inside Norway’s force structure. As Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in 2022, Norwegian confidence-building efforts have therefore been exposed to a dual pressure: externally, from two assertive powers characterizing each other as strategic rivals outside the coast of Norway; and internally, from military vulnerabilities originating from a feeble force unable to sustain a credible national presence in its own areas of operations.
In the second section of the book—II: Strategic interests and the Arctic—focus will be put on some key dimensions of the strategic role of the Arctic for the US and its key allied partners of relevance to the northern flank, also including investigation of specific services. In this section, David Auerswald
8 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
starts out by exploring the evolution of US policy toward the Arctic. By structuring the investigation into three periods: the early Cold War, the postCold War era, and the recent rise of great power competition, the chapter investigates the evolution of US policy regarding Arctic cooperation and collaboration, resource extraction, power-projection capabilities, and preparation for Arctic combat. In Chapter 9, Walter Berbrick and Lars Saunes analyze the contribution of United States and Norwegian naval power to deterring Russian military aggression and malign influence in the Arctic. While there is broad agreement that Norway and the United States should form the foundation of allied efforts to deter Russian high-end military threats in the Arctic, it is unclear what this looks like operationally. The chapter also discusses how the United States and Norway can strengthen cooperation through denial, resilience, and cost-imposition actions.
In Chapter 10, Ryan Burke and Jahara Matisek outline the time and processes to achieve US policy coherence in the Arctic and the steps taken for each military branch in outlining strategies and objectives in the region. While they identify the role of the US Air and Space Force in the Arctic, the lack of dedicated resources and the perceived threat have translated into a joint force solution in the Arctic. Most notably, they describe how Joint All-Domain Operations and Joint-All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) are being developed to fit the realities of the Arctic, because the future of US and allied space power is dependent on access to the region and the support of multi-domain awareness through JADC2. This chapter is followed by an investigation by Marius Kristiansen, Njål Hoem, and Leo Blanken suggesting that special operation forces (SOF) have a key role in the utilization of military means in the Arctic. However, mentally bound by a generation of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, the authors discuss how new cognitive models are necessary to understand their role in the Arctic, giving SOF a potential as strategic enablers in the Arctic.
In the book’s third and final section—III: NATO’s northern flank states—chapters from key states on NATO’s northern flank are presented. The section starts out with a Norwegian perspective by Joachim Bentzen. This chapter highlights elements of both continuity and change in Norway’s strategic position on NATO’s northern flank after the Cold War. Three external drivers of change make Norway’s strategic position now different from that of the latter half of the past century: shifting great power dynamics, a transformed theater of operations, and a forthcoming geostrategic shift due to an expanding NATO. Importantly, the chapter also demonstrates how Norway finds itself having a different strategic role and interests due to changes within the country itself. Norway’s small but potent military capabilities, its economic muscle, and, not least, its energy supplies give the country an ability to “punch above its weight.” Combined, these developments call for novel strategic thinking for the small state on the alliance’s northern flank.
In the following chapter, Hanna Ojanen and Arto Väisänen investigate Finland and Sweden. Their chapter both discusses how these northern states
increase NATO’s Arctic territory and bring a longer land border with Russia, and how they also bring strong new contributions to NATO’s defense. The link between the Baltic Sea and the Arctic also becomes clearer. The chapter argues that inclusion of all five Nordic countries in NATO increases contributions to NATO’s thinking around Arctic strategy and wider resilience.
In Chapter 14, Liselotte Odgaard shows that although minor differences exist between Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands on issues such as trade relations due to different export dependencies, disagreements on Arctic security mainly arise from differences on decision-making influence rather than substantial differences on the role of NATO, China, and Russia in security and defense policies. In the final chapter, Danita Catherine Burke provides an overview of the UK approach to Arctic/northern security, arguing that there are two fundamental reasons why the UK is interested in and willing to be a regional security leader: (1) the position affords it status in global politics as a major power player; and (2) as a self-described nearest Arctic neighbor, the UK government views security issues in the Arctic as national security issues with a risk of impact on the UK. The chapter presents the UK’s two-pronged approach to structuring its Arctic/northern defense engagement: (1) participation in NATO-focused Arctic defense and other multilateral northern-focused security arrangements such as the UK-led Northern European Joint Expeditionary Force; and (2) forging bilateral Arctic-specific military/security alliances with Arctic states such as Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Iceland. Furthermore, this chapter introduces the leading role that the Royal Navy plays in the UK’s ability to be a global security leader in the Arctic/north and the challenges that the Scottish independence movement poses to the UK’s capacity and position in Arctic defense.
References
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Boulègue, M. (2019) Russia’s Military Posture in the Arctic: Managing Hard Power in a ‘Low Tension’ Environment Chatham House Research Paper. Security and defense of
10 Lon Strauss and Njord Wegge
Conley, H., M. Melino and J. B. Alterman (2020) “The Ice Curtain: Russia’s Arctic Military Presence.” CSIS report. Available from: https://www.csis.org/analysis/ ice-curtain-russias-arctic-military-presence [Accessed 27 March 2023].
Expert Commission (2015) “Unified Effort” Expert Commission on Norwegian Security and Defence Policy Norwegian MoD.
High North News (2022) “Arctic Chiefs of Defence Meet to Discuss New Security Situation in the Region.” 9 August 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews. com/en/arctic-chiefs-defence-meet-discuss-new-security-situation-region [Accessed 27 March 2023].
High North News (2023) “Russia Amends Arctic Policy Prioritizing ‘National Interest’ and Removing Cooperation within Arctic Council.” Available from: https://www. highnorthnews.com/en/russia-amends-arctic-policy-prioritizing-national-interest-andremoving-cooperation-within-arctic [Accessed 27 March 2023].
JFC Norfolk (2023) “About us. Joint Force Command Norfolk.” Available from: https://jfcnorfolk.nato.int/about-us [Accessed 27 March 2023].
Joint-forces.com (2023) “New UK Commandos Arctic Operations Base.” Available from: https://www.joint-forces.com/uk-news/62479-new-uk-commandos-arcticoperations-base [Accessed 27 March 2023].
Käpylä, J. and H. Mikkola (2019) “Contemporary Arctic Meets World Politics: Rethink in Arctic Exceptionalism in the Age of Uncertainty.” In: Finger, Matthian and Heninen, Lassi (eds.), The Global Arctic Handbook. Cham: Springer.
Kjellén, J. (2022) “The Russian Northern Fleet and the (Re)militarisation of the Arctic.” Arctic Review on Law and Politics 13(2022): pp. 34–52.
Koivurova, T. (2022) “Hard Security Focus May Once Again Come to Dominate the Arctic, Researcher Fears.” High North News, 29 March 2022. Available from: https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/hard-security-focus-may-once-again-comedominate-arctic-researcher-fears [Accessed 27 March 2023].
Lavikainen, J. (2021) “Strengthening Russia’s Nuclear Forces in the Arctic: The Case of the Kinzhal Missile. Report CSIS.” Available from: https://www.csis.org/ analysis/strengthening-russias-nuclear-forces-arctic-case-kinzhal-missile [Accessed 27 March 2023].
Nordenman, M. (2019) The New Battle for the Atlantic Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
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Solvang, Ø. and N. Wegge (2023) “«Hvordan skal Nord-Norge forsvares? En analyse av landmakten på NATOs nordflanke» [How Should Northern Norway Be Defended? An Analysis of the Land Power on NATO’s Northern Flank].” In: Wegge, Njord (ed.), Sikkerhetspolitikk og militærmakt i Arktis [Security Policy and Military Power in the Arctic]. Oslo: Cappelen Damm Akademisk.
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Section I Security, power projection, and operations on NATO’s northern flank
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efforts have been made to solve this question. The estimate of the Bureau of Statistics of Massachusetts is $754.[234] The Charity Organization Society of Buffalo regards $634 a year as the “lowest tolerable budget which will allow the bare decencies of life for a family of five.”[235] A special committee of the New York State Conference of Charities and Corrections in 1907 made the following estimates as to the income necessary for a family of five persons in New York City.
“$600–$700 is wholly inadequate to maintain a proper standard of living, and no self-respecting family should be asked or expected to live on such an income.”
“With an income of between $700–$800 a family can barely support itself, provided it is subject to no extraordinary expenditures by reason of sickness, death, or other untoward circumstances. Such a family can live without charitable assistance through exceptional management and in the absence of emergencies.”
“$825 is sufficient for the average family of five individuals, comprising the father, mother, and three children under 14 years of age to maintain a fairly proper standard of living in the Borough of Manhattan.”
Mr. Streightoff summarizes the evidence in the following words: “It is, then, conservative to set $650 as the extreme low limit of the Living Wage in cities of the North, East, and West. Probably $600 is high enough for the cities of the South. At this wage there can be no saving, and a minimum of pleasure.”[236]
The close correspondence of these various estimates gives them a high degree of credibility. If we fix these standards in mind, and then look back over the wage scales given on the foregoing pages, we are struck with the utter inadequacy of the annual incomes of the foreign-born to meet even these minimum requirements of decency. It is obvious that an enormous number of immigrant families, if dependent solely on the earnings of the head of the family, would fall far below any of these standards, and that many of them, even when adding to their resources by the labors of wife and children, and the contributions of boarders, cannot possibly bring the total income up to the minimum limit. Even the average income in many occupations is far below this minimum, and it must be considered that while an
average indicates that there are some above, there must also be many below, the line. What must be the condition of those below! The average family income of the foreign-born studied in the Immigration Commission’s investigation of the manufacturing and mining industries was $704. Mr. Frederic Almy states that 96 per cent of the Poles under investigation in Buffalo earn less by $110 than the $634 per year which was set as the “lowest tolerable budget.”[237]
A vast amount of information covering a number of miscellaneous aspects of human life, which fall under the general head of the standard of living, is furnished by the Immigration Commission, in its report on the manufacturing and mining industries. Some of the most important of these facts are summarized in the following tables. First, as to the situation of young children in the homes of immigrants.
PER CENT OF CHILDREN 6 AND UNDER 16 YEARS OF AGE[238]
237. The Survey, Feb. 4, 1911, p. 767.
238. Rept. Imm. Com., Imms. in Mfg. and Min., Abs., pp. 194–195.
Among the following races the following per cent of foreign-born male children of the specified age were at work: German, 13.9; south Italian, 13.3; Lithuanian, 14.3; Portuguese, 15.7; Ruthenian, 14.6; Scotch, 19.0; Syrian, 22.6.
The following table, showing the per cent of literacy of the employees studied in these industries, is based on information for 500,329 employees, and hence has a remarkable trustworthiness:
LITERACY OF EMPLOYEES IN MINING AND MANUFACTURING[239]
Read Read and Write Read Read and Write
239. Ibid., pp. 162–165.
Foreign-born male employees of the following races have the following literacy, as shown by the per cent who can read and write: south Italian, 67.6; Macedonian, 67.1; Portuguese, 46.1; Ruthenian, 63.6; Servian, 69.5; Turkish, 54.1.
From the foregoing table it appears that in respect to literacy the native-born employees of foreign fathers are superior to the nativeborn whites of native fathers, and that the foreign-born females are superior to the foreign-born males.
The important matter of ability to speak English is forcibly portrayed in the following table:
240. Rept. Imm. Com., Imms. in Mfg. and Min., Abs., p. 198.
It is thus apparent how large a proportion of our foreign-born laborers have not even taken the first essential step toward assimilation. This evil is, of course, practically overcome in the second generation. Almost all of the native-born persons of foreign fathers, six years of age or over, speak English, though some races show from 6 to 8 per cent who do not.
The percentage who can speak English naturally increases with the length of residence in the United States, until a percentage of 83.1 is
reached for all foreign-born employees who have been in the United States ten years or more. But even in this group a very low percentage is found among the Cuban and Spanish cigar makers, of whom almost three fifths are unable to speak the English language.
The age of the immigrant at the time of arriving in the United States has a great deal to do with the ability to speak English. The percentage of those who were under fourteen when they arrived who can speak English is nearly twice as large as that of those who were fourteen or over. The reasons for this are the greater adaptability of the younger immigrants, and their greater opportunities of going to school. The relatively poor showing of the females is probably due to their greater segregation, which prevents them from coming in touch with Americans or older immigrants of other races.
One of the special reports of the Immigration Commission deals with the children of immigrants in schools and brings out some very significant facts. Practically all of the information was secured in December, 1908. Naturally this investigation involved a study of the children of native-born fathers also. A general investigation was made in the public schools of thirty cities, including the first twenty cities in point of population, as shown by the census of 1900, with the exception of Washington, D.C., Louisville, Ky., and Jersey City, N.J. An investigation was also carried on in regard to parochial schools in twenty-four cities, and an investigation of the students in seventy-seven institutions of higher learning. In addition to this general investigation, an intensive investigation was made in twelve cities, including seven cities not in the previous list, making a total of thirty-seven cities in which public schools were studied. The total number of public school pupils for whom information was secured was 1,815,217. Thus the investigation was a very inclusive one, and the results may be taken as representative of educational conditions in the cities of the entire country.
Of the total number of public school children studied in the thirtyseven cities, 766,727 were of native-born fathers, and 1,048,490 of foreign-born fathers. The children of native-born white fathers constituted 39.5 per cent of the total, while among the children of foreign-born fathers there were the following percentages of the total number: Hebrews, 17.6; Germans, 11.6; Italians (north and south),
6.4; total, native-born father, 42.2 per cent; total, foreign-born father, 57.8 per cent.
The different cities show a marked difference in the proportion of children who come from foreign-born fathers, as the following table will show:
PER CENT OF PUPILS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF FOREIGN-BORN FATHERS IN SPECIFIED CITIES
“In only 7 of the 37 cities is the proportion of pupils who are children of native-born white fathers as high as 60 per cent.” Four cities have less than 30 per cent. The children of German foreign-born fathers are most numerous in Milwaukee, Detroit, Buffalo, Cleveland, Meriden, Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. Louis; those of foreign-born Russian Hebrew fathers in Chelsea, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Newark, and Baltimore, those of foreign-born south Italian fathers in Providence, Newark, New York, Yonkers, Buffalo, and Boston.
A smaller proportion of the total number of children of foreignborn fathers are in the higher grades of the public schools than of the children of native-born white fathers, as the following table shows:
The Slovaks, south Italians, and Magyars have the largest percentages in the kindergartens, and the Portuguese, Lithuanians, Slovaks, south Italians, and Polish the largest percentages in the primary grades. In the high schools, the Canadians, other than French, the Scotch, the native-born white, the Welsh, Germans, Hebrews, and English stand highest. This is due to two main facts, the longer residence of these latter races in the United States, and their greater desire for a high education for their children, coupled with a greater ability to give it to them. Especially in the case of the kindergartens are the newer immigrating races very eager to have their young children looked after so that the mother can be free to work, or otherwise occupy herself.
Another interesting set of figures is that referring to the amount of retardation among the pupils of different nativities. By “retardation” is meant that a pupil is above the “normal” age for the grade in which he is. In this respect the children of foreign-born fathers of the newer immigration are decidedly inferior to those of the older immigration. The latter, in fact, are on the whole superior to the children of nativeborn white fathers. Of the total number of children of foreign-born fathers for whom this information was secured, 77.2 per cent were born in the United States, and 28.8 per cent were born abroad. There is a considerably larger proportion of retardation for those children eight years of age or over who were born abroad than among those born in the United States. The proportion retarded increases as the age at the time of arrival in the United States advances. The proportion of retardation is greater among those children whose fathers cannot speak English than among those who can, and greater
among those whose fathers have not taken out naturalization papers than among those who have.
When we turn to the institutions of higher learning, we find a comparatively small number of foreign-born students, as might be expected.[241] The percentages for a total of 32,887 students are as follows:
Native-born white of native father
Native-born of foreign father
The Hebrews stand foremost among the foreign-born.
Of the 221,159 pupils included in the parochial school investigation, 36.5 per cent are children of native-born fathers (36.3 per cent of native-born white fathers), and 63.5 per cent of foreignborn fathers. Children of foreign-born Irish fathers number 26.9 per cent of the total number of pupils, foreign-born German fathers, 9.7 per cent, Polish, 7.1 per cent, and Italian, 7 per cent. In the twentyfour cities in which information was secured for both public and parochial schools, there were 1,322,053 pupils in the public schools, and 221,159 pupils in the parochial schools. In Philadelphia nearly one fourth of the pupils were in parochial schools.
Information was also secured for teachers in the kindergartens and elementary grades of the public schools in thirty cities, including 49,067 individuals. Of these, 49.8 per cent were native-born of native white fathers, and 42.8 per cent native-born of foreign fathers, and 5.8 per cent foreign-born. Of the foreign-born, only six races were represented by as many as one hundred teachers each, viz. Hebrew, English, Irish, German, Canadian (other than French), and Scotch.
CHAPTER XIV
THE EXPLOITATION OF IMMIGRANTS. RELIGION.
BIRTHS, MARRIAGES, AND DEATHS. RECREATION
There is a group of peculiar economic institutions which have been developed by the immigrants in this country, and which are especially characteristic of the new immigration. This group includes the padrone system, the contract labor system, the immigrant bank, and two or three similar institutions, particularly the sweating system, which is now practically dependent on immigrants.
The word “padrone” is adopted from the Italian, and signifies master or “boss.” In its application to American conditions, it refers to a system of practical slavery, introduced into this country by the Italians, and subsequently utilized by a number of other southeastern European races. When immigration from Italy began to assume considerable proportions, there were already in the United States a few Italians who had been here some time, and had acquired a certain familiarity with the language and customs of the land. They were thereby especially fitted to be of assistance to their newly arrived fellow-countrymen, and also, unfortunately, to exploit them. In fact, they did both of these things. By way of assistance, they put the green immigrants in touch with employers of labor, helped them to find lodgings, and, in brief, acted as the go-between in every case of contact between the immigrant and the life of the people around him. On the other hand, the padrone charged the newcomer well for every service rendered, and in too many cases subjected him to various forms of extortion, which his ignorance kept him from either recognizing or preventing. As certain of the newer immigrants became familiar with the speech and customs of their new home, they in turn became padrones, and extended their operations over the ever increasing numbers of new arrivals. Thus the system spread.
There are certain businesses or occupations which are particularly adapted to the application of this system, such as railroad labor, peddling, boot-blacking, etc. The Italians developed it primarily in respect to the first of these. This race has now practically abandoned this system in this country, but it has been taken up by others, and is at present practiced by the Bulgarians, Turks, Macedonians, Greeks, and Mexicans, and in some cases among Austrians and Italians.[242]
A more concrete idea of the workings of this system may be gained by an examination of its operation in a single industry, as, for instance, the shoe-shining industry among the Greeks. This business, in a marked degree, combines the necessary elements for the successful application of the system,—small capital, cheap unskilled labor, close supervision, etc., and this race is well adapted to apply it to its extreme extent, partly from natural aptitude, and partly from custom and training. For the system, in its main outlines, has long been familiar in Greece, though some of the most unfortunate aspects do not develop there.
The padrone is a Greek who has been in this country for some time, and knows the ways of the land. He decides to engage in the boot-blacking trade, and to secure his necessary helpers contracts for a number of boys from his native land to come over and work for him for a certain length of time, for a specified sum. The arrangement is sometimes made with the boys, sometimes with the parents, but almost always with the parents’ consent. When these boys arrive, they are taken to a room or set of rooms, which the padrone has engaged and which thenceforth are their “home.” They are at once put to work in the shop of the boss, and kept at work continuously thereafter, with practically no time off which they can call their own, except the meager allowance made for sleep. The hours are long twelve, fourteen, or even more hours per day. The boss furnishes board and lodging, and pays a small sum in cash, perhaps $200 per year. The rooms are frightfully overcrowded, miserably ventilated, and wholly unhygienic. The boys do their own cooking, usually in relays of two, and the noon meal is eaten hurriedly in a room in the rear of the shop. The boys are prevented from attending night school, and are forbidden to talk to patrons. In every way the padrone tries to discourage their acquiring knowledge of American ways, for the system rests on ignorance. In a majority of cases the padrone takes
all the tips given to the boys, and the boys excuse him on the grounds that wages are high and expenses great.
It is obvious that the boys are wholly at the mercy of their boss, a mercy the quality of which is sadly strained. And when a boy does manage to get a grasp of the English language, and acquire a little independence, instead of turning traitor to the system, he sets up as a padrone himself. All investigators, and a number of the better class of Greeks in this country, agree that this system is a disgrace to the Greek race, or to any other race that practices it.[243]
The contract labor system is next of kin to the padrone system. The main differences are that the control of the boss, outside of working hours, is not so complete, and the relationship is likely to be of shorter duration. This system arises from the necessity of the capitalistic employer of labor getting in touch with the alien workman. Differences of language, ignorance of the sources and the means of communication, and a variety of other perfectly comprehensible reasons, prevent the employer from enlisting his workers directly, and the laborer from applying for work in his own person. The natural and inevitable intermediary is the immigrant who has been in this country long enough to know the language and have some influence and acquaintance among employers. Given this starting point, the process of bringing the immigrants and the employer together goes along wholly natural channels, with only minor modifications in the details. In some cases the employer pays the agent certain specified wages for each laborer furnished, and the agent pays whatever is necessary below that figure to secure the workers; sometimes the employer pays fixed wages to the laborers, and allows the agent a stated commission for each worker secured. This is much the more desirable system of the two. In many cases the agent is retained as overseer in charge of the men he has secured. The degree of definiteness in these arrangements varies all the way from cases where agents go over to foreign countries, definitely charged with securing laborers for some employer, to those where the employer simply lets it be known among his employees that there will be work for all their friends or relatives who wish to come, and leaves the leaven to work. It is becoming more rare for agents in this country to go abroad in person; the tendency is for them to work in connection with agents established on the other side.
The possibilities of abuse in this system are manifestly great. The agent customarily advances the passage money of those brought from abroad, taking a mortgage far in excess of his actual expense on whatever property the immigrant has to offer. Rates of interest are exorbitant, and the terms of the contract all in favor of the importer. [244] Sometimes the immigrant agrees to work for him seven or eight months, in return for an initial outlay of not over $100 or $125. In extreme cases, when an importer has taken mortgages far in excess of his actual expenditure, he will discharge an entire set of men, in order to make room for a new lot brought over on similar terms. The debts of the original group are still binding, and it is astonishing to note the faithfulness with which these poor unfortunates, thus thrown on their own resources, will labor on to pay off these obligations.
Not all of the laborers employed under this system are secured directly from abroad. Many of the more recent immigrants, who have been in this country for some time, are almost equally dependent on the contractor with the absolute “ greeners. ” Chicago is a great clearing house for the labor market of the western railroads, and labor agencies, often connected with a restaurant, or some similar place of business, abound in the foreign sections.[245]
A great deal of business of this general nature is carried on by aliens who are not real agents. It is very frequent for an immigrant to tell a newcomer that if he will pay him a certain sum of money he will secure him a position in the establishment where he is himself employed. All that he really does is to take the newcomer around and introduce him to the foreman, who gives him work, if there is any. But the new arrival considers himself much in the debt of his “friend,” and more than that, thereafter regards the job as his own because he has paid for it, and resents discharge for any reason as an injustice. Conscientious employers naturally do all they can to discourage such practices, but are powerless to prevent them. In fact, the eagerness of earlier immigrants to exploit their newly arrived fellow-countrymen, not only in this way, but in any other that promises a profit, is one of the most disheartening features of the whole immigration situation.
It goes without saying that all of these operations, which involve bringing immigrants into the country under agreement to labor, are
in direct violation of law. The contract labor clause of the immigration law, if strictly interpreted and enforced, would exclude practically every immigrant who had the slightest assurance of employment awaiting him. In fact, however, as has been shown above (page 154), the courts have so interpreted the act as to include under contract laborers only those who have a definite contract, or those who come in response to a specific offer or promise of employment.[246] This kind of a promise or offer is relatively rare. Nothing so definite is required to induce unskilled laborers to emigrate. Broad and general assurances of employment awaiting them are sufficient. The wide discrepancy between the letter and the interpretation of the law is unfortunate. This section of the law is the one upon which immigrants are coached more thoroughly than on any other, and in addition to the large number of immigrants who violate the most lenient interpretation, there must be many others whom the courts would not hold guilty, who nevertheless believe themselves so and suffer a corresponding degradation of character. A third element in the situation, which complicates it still further, is the interpretation practically placed on the law by the immigration authorities, which is apparently more strict than that of the courts. The whole matter of contract labor needs to be thoroughly reconsidered.
In addition to the activities of labor agents and employers, state boards do a good deal to encourage immigration, sometimes keeping within the spirit of the law, and sometimes exceeding it.
Another member of this same nefarious family is the peonage system. For a general description of the system the reader is referred to Professor Commons, Races and Immigrants in America, chapter on Labor. It has been judicially defined in the following words: “Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master. The basic fact is indebtedness.”[247] The customary or typical case is where a laborer receives advances of some sort from his employer, and then leaves his service before the terms of his engagement have been fulfilled, certainly before he has repaid his employer for the advances. His employer then procures his arrest, either under a charge of obtaining money under false pretenses, or under the labor statutes of the various states. The employer makes a new agreement with the
laborer, that if he will return to his employment, and work out the balance of his indebtedness, the criminal procedure will be dropped.
This might seem, on the face of it, a thoroughly just proceeding. The trouble is that the employer has every advantage. The laborer is ignorant, and very often the conditions under which he is to work are grossly misrepresented to him. Lack of forethought, moreover, is one of the chief characteristics of ignorant and unintelligent men. The money or goods advanced to them occupy a very disproportionate place in their minds, compared to the work which they agree to perform in the future. The employer, on the other hand, knows all about the conditions, and just how much he can afford to pay, and is able to give himself the best of the bargain by a broad margin.
The Immigration Commission made a thorough investigation of this subject, and found evidences of peonage in every state in the Union, except Oklahoma and Connecticut. In the south, where peonage is supposed to be most rampant, it was discovered that most of the peons were supplied by labor agents in New York City, who seriously misrepresented the conditions under which they were to work, and in many cases sent out men wholly unfitted for the work which they were to do. In the south, however, in spite of the existence of many cases, it appears that the vigorous prosecutions, and the willingness of juries to convict, have pretty well broken up the tendency toward peonage in connection with aliens.
In the west and northwest, cases of technical peonage were found in the shoe-shining industry, and in some lumber and railroad camps. But there have been practically no attempts at prosecution for peonage in these states.
The most surprising fact established by the Commission in this respect is that probably the most complete system of peonage in the whole country has existed, not in the south, but in Maine. Here the employers of labor in the lumber camps have been obliged to secure their labor mostly from other states and in the main from immigrants. Boston is the great labor market for this industry. The immigrants are given very misleading accounts of the conditions of their labor, and are engaged to work for their employers for a specified time. They are then taken into the forests, sometimes having to walk sixty or seventy miles to their place of labor, and kept in the forest all winter.
When they learn the extent to which they have been deceived, many of them are inclined to run away. However, in February, 1907, a law was passed making it a criminal offense for a person to “enter into an agreement to labor for any lumbering operation or in driving logs and in consideration thereof receive any advances of goods, money, or transportation, and unreasonably and with intent to defraud, fail to enter into said employment as agreed and labor a sufficient length of time to reimburse his employer for said advances and expenses. ” The general interpretation of the courts has been to ignore the provision about intent to defraud, or at least to put the burden of proof on the defendant, though it is not specifically provided in the law that failure or refusal to fulfill the terms of the contract shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to defraud, as is the case in the contract labor law of Minnesota and other states. Employers in other branches of industry have sought to secure the same protection, but in vain, so that this law is iniquitous, not only from the point of view of peonage, but also because it is class legislation. A considerable amount of peonage has resulted from this law in Maine.[248]
The basis of all the evils which have just been discussed has been seen to lie in the ignorance and helplessness of the newly arrived immigrant. Knowing nothing of the language of the country, or of its methods of doing business, and having no connections with the industrial system of the country, he is forced to rely on some one who can supply these factors. Most naturally he turns to some one of his fellow-countrymen who has been in this country longer. From that time on, sometimes for many years, his career is dominated by the older immigrant to a remarkable degree. Out of this connection has grown up a peculiar set of institutions, commonly known as immigrant banks, which have the power for great good or evil to the immigrant, according to the character of the men who have them in charge. The origin and nature of these banks is as follows:
The foremost ambition of the average immigrant is the saving of money. The purposes of this saving are many—to guarantee his own future prosperity, to ease the lot of friends and relatives at home, to pay off mortgages and other debts, and, perhaps the most important of all, to provide the means whereby friends and relatives on the other side may join him in the new world. The prepaid ticket is the
final end of much of the saving of aliens. These accumulations naturally come in small amounts. Out of a month’s earnings, the immigrant may save $10 or $15 or even as high as $30. The living conditions of many of the immigrants make it unsafe for them to try to keep this money in their lodgings; they are unfamiliar with, and distrustful of, American banks. The disposition of their savings which seems to them the wisest and safest is to intrust them to a fellowcountryman who is familiar with the ways of the country and has some means of keeping them safe. This individual may be the padrone or boss, the lodging-house keeper, a saloon keeper or grocer, or the steamship agent from whom the immigrant expects eventually to purchase the prepaid ticket. In time, immigrants in these positions get into the habit of receiving small sums from their fellow-countrymen for safe keeping or on deposit against some future purchase. As these amounts accumulate, they become of considerable value to the holder, who may deposit them in a regular savings bank at interest, to his own profit, or may invest them in his business, or may make other speculative investments with them. To attract such deposits, and increase their amount, he adds the term “bank” to the name of his business, so that he now becomes a “Grocer and Banker,” a “Ticket Agent and Banker,” etc. This adds a dignity to his position and increases the confidence of the people in his integrity.
It has been intimated in the preceding paragraph that the immigrant “banker” makes no distinction between the funds deposited with him and his own property. This is generally the case. Occasionally the banker will keep the deposits in his safe, in the original wallets in which they were delivered to him,[249] or deposit them in a bank in his wife’s name,[250] but these are exceptional instances. Ordinarily all the money in the banker’s possession is lumped together, so that the assets of the “bank” are identical with the general resources of the proprietor. Furthermore, there is a great amount of laxity in the giving of receipts to depositors. Sometimes no written acknowledgment whatever is given; from this point the character of the receipt varies all the way up to a regular pass book, and a thorough system of bookkeeping.
From such a beginning as this, these banks have developed a variety of forms, varying in functions and in stability. They have been
classified by the Immigration Commission into three main groups, as follows:
“I. State and incorporated banks or highly organized private institutions thoroughly responsible and operated in a regular manner almost exclusively as a bank. There are comparatively few of these institutions.
“II. Privately owned steamship agencies, and real-estate offices which masquerade under the name of a bank, but which are not legally authorized as such. To this class should be added groceries and saloons in which the banking functions are clearly defined as apart from other business. The majority of the banks investigated are of this class.
“III. Banks which may or may not be known as such, but in which the functions of caring for deposits and receiving money for transmission abroad are extended more as an accommodation or as incidental to the main business of the concern. Saloon keepers, grocers, boarding houses, barbers, and men engaged in similar occupations usually conduct this class of banks. It has been claimed by some that every immigrant saloon keeper will be found doing a banking business of this character. This is the largest, as it also is the most irresponsible, class. It is undoubtedly the hardest class to regulate, as it is the one about which it is the most difficult to obtain accurate information.”[251]
The hold which these bankers have over their patrons is due in the first instance to the ignorance of the latter, and the feeling of security which they have in dealing with people of their own race. It is increased by the familiarity which the banker has with business methods in this country, and names, places, and methods in the old country. The immigrant banker assumes a decidedly paternalistic attitude toward his patrons, and renders them many services not ordinarily associated with a banking business, such as writing and translating letters, securing employment, giving legal advice, etc. The greater the hold thus secured, the wider are the opportunities for exploitation. In the absence of proper control, and of the ordinary safeguards of such businesses, the immigrant depositor is made to suffer extortion and loss in countless cases. In many cases this is due to the ignorance of the banker, and his total unfitness for the assumption of such responsibilities; in many others, it is due to
dishonesty, greed, and willful intent to defraud. In the panic year of 1907 large numbers of these banks failed, and sums of money were lost to immigrants, the importance of which is to be judged, not so much by the total amounts, as by the fact that they represented the savings of a large number of individuals in meager circumstances. In normal years, there is a steady loss, due to failures, defalcations, and abscondings on the part of bankers, and also to the continual petty frauds, habitually practiced by many of these men. The trustfulness of the immigrants towards men of this character is surprising. Instances are known where men have come into a community, advertised a bank, and in a few weeks accumulated large sums of money from the foreigners, with which they promptly decamped, leaving absolutely no means of redress to their creditors.
The primary functions of these banks are the safe keeping of money and the transmission of remittances abroad. Only in exceptional cases do the other banking functions play an important part. It is estimated that in 1907 approximately $137,500,000 in foreign remittances passed through the hands of immigrant bankers, in sums averaging about $35.[252]
These banks are mostly in the hands of the recently immigrating races. The reasons for their existence ignorance of language and customs, illiteracy, inconvenient hours kept by American banks, and their luxurious appearance and requirements of cleanliness appeal much less strongly to the immigrants from northwestern Europe.
Another functionary who exercises an extensive, and often baleful, influence over the immigrant is the notary public. The position of dignity and influence held by corresponding officials in foreign countries leads the immigrant to accord too much confidence and trust to such persons in the United States, who are often ignorant and in many cases dishonest men. The nature of the cases in which the immigrant has recourse to them gives them a large amount of power over the foreigner, and opens the way to many petty extortions.
All of these exploiting agencies become inextricably mingled in actual life. The functions of the padrone, the labor contractor, the employment agent, the steamship agent, the boarding boss, the saloon keeper, the grocer, the banker, the notary public any two or more of these may be combined in the person of a given individual,
who exercises a corresponding control over the destiny of those who are dependent on him. His hold over them rests upon the fact that they are not Americanized, and it is wholly to his interest to keep them so.[253]
The sweat shop is manifestly an institution of the same general character as those which have just been discussed, and while it may not owe its origin to the immigrants, it is now practically dependent on them for its existence. The main features of this system are familiar. Its distinctive characteristic is the giving out of work by manufacturers to contractors, in order that certain processes may be carried on in the homes of the workers. It finds its fullest development in the clothing trade, which at the present time is almost wholly in the hands of the Jews.
The chief evils of the system are the unsanitary conditions of labor, the long hours, the extensive employment of women and children, the difficulty of proper supervision, the low wages, and the complete subjection of the workers to the control of the boss. The contractor himself is often in a precarious financial situation, being himself a victim of the system. Like the foregoing institutions, it results from the ignorance and lack of connection of the workers. Its persistence and wide spread in this country are due to the constant accessions of low-grade workers, unassimilated to the conditions of the country, which immigration furnishes. These supply the raw material upon which the system feeds. By so doing they have blocked the efforts of the cities of the United States to control or abolish this evil.[254]
There is another class of institutions which rests upon the helplessness of the newly arrived immigrant, which is, however, an alleviating, rather than an exploiting agency, and which belongs to the social rather than to the economic life. This is the immigrant home or aid society. These institutions are numerous in the seaport cities where immigrants arrive; there are said to be not less than sixteen in operation in New York City.[255] They are for the most part benevolent or philanthropic organizations (at least nominally), and many of them are under the control of some religious organization. Many of them work primarily with a single race or people. Their functions are looking after newly arrived immigrants who are not met by friends, and forwarding them to their destinations, furnishing them board and lodging while in the port of arrival, helping them to
find work or to locate missing acquaintances, and in general safeguarding them while they are establishing a connection with some responsible party in this country.
Most of the immigrants who come to this country come to join relatives or friends, who generally meet them at the port of arrival, or send money or transportation to take them to their destination. But it frequently happens that the friends or relatives fail to put in an appearance. In that case the immigration authorities are unwilling to turn the immigrant adrift unprotected, especially in the case of unaccompanied women or girls. Consequently the government has allowed representatives of homes and aid societies to visit the immigrant stations, and offer their aid to the immigrants. At Ellis Island, immigrants whose relatives or friends fail to call for them are detained five days, and then given the choice of being sent back to Europe or of leaving the station in company with some representative of a home or aid society, often called a “missionary.” If the latter alternative is chosen, the immigrant is said to be “discharged” to the given person, who is thereupon held theoretically responsible that the immigrant shall not become a public charge. There are three general classes of immigrants who are thus discharged: (1) Immigrants whose friends or relatives fail to meet them, and whom the authorities do not deem it wise to land unless some one becomes responsible for them. (2) Immigrants who are without sufficient money to take them to their destination, and who must be cared for until the necessary funds are forthcoming. (3) Immigrants, particularly girls and women, who have no friends or relatives in this country, and need a home until they can secure employment. These homes and aid societies necessarily have something of the nature of employment agencies, and do a good deal of work of that kind.
The amount of work done by these organizations is very great. In the calendar year 1907, over 14,800 immigrants were discharged to such representatives at Ellis Island by the New York discharging division. This does not include the total number discharged, as the boards of special inquiry and the commissioners of immigration also discharge immigrants.[256] Six homes in New York City cared for a total of 48,275 immigrants in 1908.[257]
It will be seen at once that these homes and societies have great power over the immigrants, and are in positions of immense advantage and responsibility, inasmuch as the authorities give their representatives a semiofficial standing, and intrust immigrants to them without reserve. Unscrupulous and grasping persons, once admitted to the stations as missionaries, have large opportunities and every advantage to exploit the immigrants at will. This is especially true of the homes, where the immigrants can be charged— and over-charged—for every possible kind of service.
It might appear at first sight that the authorities would exercise every caution, not only in regard to the character of the representatives, but as to the character and conduct of the homes. The investigations of the Immigration Commission, however, revealed that this has not always been the case. Not only have many of the authorities used very little care or discretion in granting privileges to representatives in their stations, but they exercised practically no supervision over the homes themselves, and when the immigrant had once been discharged to the representative, they paid no more attention to him or his welfare. The Commission investigated carefully 102 immigrant homes and aid societies, in addition to twenty-five employment agencies, most of which had some connection with an immigrant home or aid society. A large amount of misconduct on the part of representatives was discovered, as well as undesirable conditions in the homes themselves. Many of the homes were found to be purely money-making institutions, where the immigrant was fleeced to the limit of his resources. The sanitary conditions in some of them were terrible. Some of the representatives seemed to care for nothing but to have as many immigrants as possible discharged to them, and were little more than runners for their respective homes. “It was the testimony of some of the leading officials at Ellis Island that the majority of missionaries and representatives there care only to secure the discharge of immigrants who have money and can pay for food and lodging.”[258]
Some of the representatives were instrumental in securing the admission of contract laborers. “About two thirds of the homes investigated were clean, comfortable, and sanitary, and about one third were overcrowded, badly ventilated, filthy and insanitary.”[259] Many of the homes where bad conditions were found were supported
