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Religious Zionism and the Six Day War From Realism to Messianism Avi Sagi
Operation Focus and the 12 hours that changed the Middle East
SHLOMO ALONI ILLUSTRATED BY ADAM TOOBY
INTRODUCTION
Israel’s gateway to the Red Sea, Eilat, was the symbol of the Israeli buffer between Egypt and Arab nations in the Levant. In 1955 – when this photo was taken – Egypt announced that any ship intending to sail via the Straits of Tiran must give 72 hours’ notice and gain Egyptian permission, effectively blocking the Straits. Israel decided against military action then, but in 1956 seized the chance to secure freedom of navigation, which lasted until May 1967. (ILGP/PO)
Four years after the Arab world’s first attempt to annihilate Israel, Egypt – the leader of Arab nations and Israel’s prime opponent at the time – became a republic on July 23, 1952. Gamal Abdel Nasser, its new socialist, pan-Arabist leader, pursued a policy of seeking unification with ideologically like-minded Arab states, chiefly Syria. The United States, fearing Soviet influence in the Middle East, launched an initiative – codenamed Alpha – to support Egypt politically, economically and militarily, conditional upon a peace agreement with Israel.
In June 1955, Nasser attempted to break the linkage between US aid and peace with Israel. Nasser spoke of his discouragement over the previous three years that military equipment could be obtained from the US. He had concluded that he should accept Russia’s offer of military equipment.
On September 21, 1955, Nasser notified the US that the arms deal between Czechoslovakia and Egypt for Soviet weapons was to go ahead. Two days later, the US indicated that the deal included 200 jet aircraft, of which 100 – comprising 37 medium jet bombers and the remainder MiG-15s – were to be delivered by December 1955, with first shipment already on its way to Egypt.
Nasser stated that the Czechoslovak arms deal was a turning point in Egyptian history. Israel reasoned that, given Nasser’s intentions of Arab unity and Egypt’s new capability of offensive bombers, Egypt was seeking a second-round war to eliminate the disgrace of defeat in the 1948 war, as well as to remove the geographical buffer that Israel represented between Egypt in Africa and the majority of Arab nations in Asia.
Then, on July 26, 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. France and Britain combined forces to repossess the Suez Canal, and Israel joined the coalition. The resulting 1956 war ended in mixed results for all four participants. France and UK defeated Egypt militarily, but did not repossess the Suez Canal and were forced to retreat by political pressure. Egypt was beaten, but scored a diplomatic victory and Nasser’s regime survived. Israel destroyed Egypt’s war machine, yet was forced to retreat from Sinai – but only after securing American
assurances over freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran. A few days prior to their withdrawal, Israel’s Foreign Minister in the UN General Assembly and the Prime Minister in the Israeli Parliament both stated solemnly that any interference with Israel’s freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran would be regarded as an attack, entitling Israel to exercise its right to self-defense.
Egypt rehabilitated its armed forces and reinstated the policy of Arab unity more intensely than ever before. Egypt and Syria became the United Arab Republic on February 22, 1958, with tiny Israel forming a buffer between the south and north of the gargantuan
Israeli troops examine Egyptian coastal artillery –most likely disabled by the Egyptian crew through double-loading it and then firing it prior to the Egyptian retreat from Ras Nasrani in November 1956 – in early 1957, with the Straits of Tiran in the background. (ILGP/PO)
Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levy Eshkol, center, examining, on April 8, 1967, Syrian artillery bombardment damage to housing at Gadot, with IDF Chief of Staff Isaac Rabin, left, and Command North Commander David Elazar, right. (ILGP/PO)
All six former IDF Chiefs inspected the two IDF decisive forces – air force and armor corps – on May 16, 1967. This visit had been arranged before the start of the crisis, which was then not seen as exceptional. Here, left to right, are: Jacob Dori, IDF Chief 1948–49; IAF Commander Moti Hod; Khatsor Wing 4 Commander Beni Peled; Squadron 101 Commander Amos Lapidot; IDF Chief Isaac Rabin; and Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister from June 2, 1967. (AC)
conglomeration. The United Arab Republic dissolved on September 28, 1961, but almost exactly a year later, on September 26, 1962, Nasser embarked upon another Arab unity venture with an Egyptian-sponsored rebellion in Yemen.
On June 10, 1964, Israel’s inauguration of the National Pipeline that streamed water from the Sea of Galilee to irrigate the Negev Desert was a major milestone in a dispute concerning regional resources of water that evolved into the Water War: a series of occasional armed clashes, mostly between Israel and Syria.
The clashes between Israel and Syria tested Nasser’s rhetoric concerning Arab solidarity at a time when Egypt was deeply involved in Yemen and not yet ready, militarily, to confront Israel. In the wake of a major clash between Israel and Syria on April 7, 1967, tension along the Israeli-Syrian border remained high, but the IDF did not evaluate the situation as volatile. American analysis of the situation in the Middle East also seemed to rule out the potential for full-scale war. A memo of May 1, 1967 from the American Undersecretary of State to the President stated:
Israel has a safe margin of superiority over any combination of Arab forces likely to attack it and can be expected to maintain that position for at least the next five years. Arab numerical
force superiority is more than matched by Israel’s superiority in training, leadership, military doctrine and maintenance of equipment. Moreover, the Arab states have made little progress in military coordination among themselves. Recent border clashes have demonstrated that short of general hostilities, or Israeli occupation of Arab territory, the Arab states will not rush to one another’s assistance.
The IDF General Staff Branch Chief, Ezer Weizman, addressed the Israeli public on May 4, 1967, prior to Israel’s Independence Day, to explain the IDF’s evaluation that no major war between Israel and an Arab nation was expected during the following year, though more border clashes with Syria seemed likely.
A series of small-scale terrorist attacks against Israeli infrastructure, traffic, and settlements started on May 5, 1967, and Israel held Syria responsible. A reprisal operation seemed inevitable. Syria responded to the accusations with claims that Israel was planning a largescale attack and plotting to overthrow the Syrian government. Although the IDF believed that Arab solidarity was shaky, Syria claimed that the Egypt-Syria mutual defense treaty, signed on November 4, 1966, would be implemented if Israel attacked. Possibly in an attempt to assess Israeli preparedness for an attack, a Syrian reconnaissance mission was flown over northern Israel, west of the Israeli-Syrian border, on May 14, 1967. Regardless of the evolving crisis, Israel resolved to stage its Independence Day military parade in Jerusalem planned for the next day.
Apparently in response to the war of words, and possibly as a result of the Syrian reconnaissance flight, the Egyptian Army started to roll forward, into Sinai, towards the Egyptian-Israeli border. Was it merely coincidence that the Israeli Prime Minister was notified that the Egyptian armed forces were marching across the Suez Canal into the Sinai Peninsula while he was in Jerusalem reviewing the IDF’s Independence Day parade? The IDF’s belief that Arab solidarity was shaky had been shattered, and its evaluation that war against an Arab nation should not be expected in the coming year was being tested.
Did Nasser consider war when he ordered his forces to advance into Sinai? Israel viewed Egypt’s deployment of forces to Sinai as a dramatic act aimed at deterring Israel from attacking
The IAF mobilized a total of 10,983 reservists from May 18 to 26, 1967. Photographed at Khatsor during the Waiting Period, Squadron 105 reservists play backgammon, massage, and read. Their Super Mystère, parked at a dispersal point because the IAF ran out of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) owing to the constant improvements in serviceability during the crisis, is armed and ready to fight. (AC)
Israeli Prime Minister Levy Eshkol addressing the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, on May 22, 1967, with David BenGurion first from left in the second row and Moshe Dayan – who is not yet a minister and therefore not sitting in the first row – to his left. (ILGP/PO)
Syria. But since Israel had no immediate intention to do so, the crisis initially looked like an ostentatious Egyptian show of force, primarily aimed at reviving the pan-Arab solidarity that the IDF had evaluated only weeks before as practically nonexistent.
Then Nasser began a series of acts that changed the course of events. Egypt demanded the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), a buffer force of observers deployed between Egypt and Israel in Sinai; their withdrawal was confirmed on May 17, 1967. The situation no longer looked like an empty act of Arab solidarity in a war of words between Israel and Syria, but as a real danger. The IAF suspended training on May 18, mobilized reserves and was ready for war from May 19.
In an attempt to cool down the regional heat, the Israeli Prime Minister stated on May 22:
From this stand I would like to repeat and say to Arab nations, including Egypt and Syria that we are not heading for attack. We have no interest to interfere with their security, territory or legitimate rights. We will not interfere in their internal affairs, in their regimes, in their regional and international relationships. We claim, in line with the principle of mutuality, to apply the same principles towards us.
During the first days of the Egyptian armed forces deployment in Sinai, there were nations that viewed this deployment as a demonstrative action without military implications. Others can accept such interpretations but since this deployment is close to our border, it is our opinion that we must take all precautionary steps against any possible development. Due to Egyptian deployment along the border and the withdrawal of UNEF, I ordered a limited mobilization of reserve forces that had already been completed.
After completion of limited mobilization of reserves, I visited the IDF. The magnificent quality of our armed forces that was fostered and perfected over many years has reached a high standard. The IDF can now face any test with the same devotion and talent that it had demonstrated in the past and even more.
To end with, I call on the region’s nations for mutual respect of sovereignty, entirety, and international rights of every nation. Israel, fully confident in its power and spirit, is expressing its willingness to take part in an effort to bring quiet and peace to our region.
The Egyptian President’s fiery response to this speech followed after midnight, May 23, when Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. In his speech, Nasser claimed that he ordered, on May 14, the deployment of Egyptian forces to Sinai in light of information that Israel was amassing 13 brigades along the Israeli-Syrian border,1 and stated that, “[The coming] war will be an opportunity for Israel to realize that whatever was written about [Israel’s] occupation of Sinai in 1956 was fabricated.” Adding insult to injury, Nasser, laughing and mocking with Egyptian Air Force (EAF) fighter pilots, made an immortal statement: “They [Israel] threaten war and we tell them ‘Ahalan VaSahalan’ (welcome).”
Israel turned to the United States to enforce its 1957 guarantee of freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran, but to no avail. For all practical purposes, Nasser’s speech, as broadcast on May 23, made war in the Middle East inevitable.
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser during his visit to an EAF base on May 22, 1967. (AC)
1 The IDF regular order of battle was much smaller than 13 brigades, and even with full mobilization of reserves the IDF’s front-line force numbered nine armored brigades, four infantry brigades and three para brigades for a total of 16 brigades, so it would have been unlikely for the IDF to deploy 13 brigades for a Command North action against Syria with a balance of only three brigades for Command Center to face Jordan, Command South to face Egypt and the IDF reserve to face unexpected eventualities; in any case, there was no large-scale mobilization of IDF reserves at that time, so even such a remote scenario was impossible at the time and points to poor practice by Egyptian intelligence or deliberate inflation on the part of Egypt’s President.
CHRONOLOGY
1967
March 16 IAF AIR3 distributes Operation Plan 67/11 Focus with an objective to accomplish air superiority through suppression of enemy airfields and destruction of enemy aircraft.
April 7 Israel and Syria clash in the air; Israel claims the downing of six Syrian MiG-21s while Syria indirectly admitted the loss of at least four MiG-21s.
April 10 EAF Commander visits Syria, probably to learn lessons from the April 7 clash and to evaluate the situation.
April 10 IAF Commander Moti Hod promoted from colonel to major general.
April 15 Syria issues plan for Operation Nasser with an objective to invade Israel and occupy a sector of Galilee; the plan for the Syrian Air Force (SAF)’s Division 3 and Division 7 is to support the Syrian Army’s Division 12 and Division 35.
April 17 Syrian President states that Syria will continue to support Palestinian actions against Israel.
April 18 Egyptian Prime Minister begins a visit to Syria; prior to his arrival, his Syrian counterpart states that an Israeli offensive against Syria is imminent.
April 30 IAF Squadron 110 Vautours photograph inside Syria, east of the Israeli-Syrian border.
May 4 IDF General Staff Branch Chief Ezer Weizman –formerly IAF Commander from 1958 to 1966 – indicates IDF evaluation that no major war between Israel and an Arab nation is expected during the following year, though more border clashes with Syria seem a likely possibility.
May 9 Israeli Foreign Minister warns Syria that Israel will not tolerate Syrian-sponsored terror attacks without reaction.
May 11–13 EAF bomb inside Saudi Arabia in retaliation for Saudi sponsorship of Royalist rebels in Yemen.
May 13 Israeli Prime Minister warns Syria that Israel will react against terrorist attacks and against nations that host terrorists.
May 14 SAF conducts a mission – possibly visual reconnaissance – over Israel, west of the Israeli-Syrian border, probably to examine if Israel is amassing forces in order to attack Syria.
May 14 Egyptian President orders land forces to deploy forward into Sinai Peninsula, possibly in order to deter Israel from attacking Syria.
May 15 Israel’s Independence Day military march in Jerusalem coincides with reports about the deployment of Egyptian forces into Sinai.
May 16, 0905hrs IDF activates Plan Rogel, the contingency plan for the defense of Israel, in response to Egypt’s actions.
May 16, 1905hrs IDF authorizes mobilization of Brigade 520 as a precautionary step in light of the Egyptian deployment in Sinai.
May 17, 0600hrs Egypt orders UNEF to withdraw from Sinai; the head of Egypt’s armed forces states that they have been ordered to prepare for action against Israel should Israel attack any Arab state, while the armed forces of Jordan and Syria step up readiness.
IAF Mirages and SAF MiG-21s clashed in four air combats on April 7. The IAF claimed six air-to-air kills and released six Mirage gunsight films to back this claim; the black wedges at top left indicate if the trigger was pressed at the time. Syria admitted to losing four MiGs; if true, the IAF over-claim was 150 percent, which compares well with the Syrian “infinite over-claim” of four kills against true IAF losses of nil. (AC)
The IAF’s contribution to the IDF military march in Jerusalem during Israel Independence Day on May 15, 1967, was limited to a few AAA guns as the parade was austere and modest – and did not include an IAF flyover – so that Israel would comply with armistice limitations. Three days later, the reserve bulk of the IAF’s AAA force was mobilized to defend IAF bases from a potential Egyptian offensive. (ILGP/PO)
May 17, 1600hrs EAF MiG-21s – flying fast and high –conduct a mission of unknown nature (IAF evaluates that EAF MiG-21s are not fit for photography under such flight parameters and Egypt never releases photos) across the Negev, flying from Jordan to Egypt including over Dimona.
May 17, 1730hrs – in light of the two escalating Egyptian actions earlier that day – IAF orders suspension of training and step-up of readiness, with Squadron 119 deploying Mirages to Khatserim and IDF mobilizing Brigade 200.
May 17, 2330hrs IDF orders Readiness Level C; the highest readiness state.
May 18 EAF issues Battle Order 67/3 with the objective to support an Egyptian offensive aimed at occupation of the Negev’s southern sector.
May 18 IAF initiates mobilization of reserves, at first to bolster defense and from May 20 to enable an offensive option while also starting to implement deployment in line with prior planning for war, including relocation of Squadron 107 from Ramat David to Lod on May 19.
May 19 EAF issues Battle Order 67/2 with the objective to strike IAF bases in order to accomplish air superiority. The order defines a turnaround timeframe of 175 minutes.
May 20 Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister arrives in Egypt in order to evaluate how Iraq can militarily support Egypt.
May 23, 0345hrs IDF Intelligence informs the IDF Chief that Egypt has blocked the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Earlier that night, Egypt radio broadcasts a recorded speech in which Egyptian President announces the blockade and states that Israel is threatening war, but tells them “Ahalan VaSahalan” (welcome).
May 23, 1320hrs IDF General Staff convenes to discuss the new situation and authorizes mobilization of eight brigades.
May 23, 1630hrs IDF General Staff convenes for presentation of Operation Focus plan.
May 24, 1030hrs IDF General Staff convenes for discussion of Operation Red Tongue, a deception plan
Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levy Eshkol – left, wearing a beret – visited IDF Command South on May 25, two days after Israel began mobilizing the bulk of IDF reserves. Alongside Eshkol are, right to left: Deputy Prime Minister Yigael Alon (who was, in 1948, IDF Front D Commander, the forerunner of IDF Command South); IDF Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin; and IDF Command South Chief Isaiah Gavish. (ILGP/PO)
aimed at luring Egypt into believing that the IDF is preparing for an offensive against Sharm El Sheikh at the southern tip of Sinai in order to open the Straits of Tiran. Later that day, IAF Vautours fly a reconnaissance mission over Sharm El Sheikh in line with Red Tongue.
May 24, 1730hrs IDF General Staff presents to Israeli Prime Minister the two preferred plans: IAF Operation Focus, aimed at destruction of the EAF, and IDF Operation Axe 2, aimed at destruction of the Egyptian Army in northern Sinai.
May 26 EAF MiG-21s again fly over Dimona, this time flying east from Sinai, turning around Dimona and returning west to Sinai. IAF Mirages are scrambled but are unable to catch the trespassers. The objective of the flight is again unknown, as IAF evaluation is that EAF MiG-21s are not fit for photography from high altitude at high speed.
May 30 President Nasser and King Hussein signed – in Cairo, on May 30, 1967 – a mutual defense treaty that tightened the ring round Israel, placed Jordanian armed forces under Egyptian command, and enabled Egypt to deploy forces to Jordan.
June 1 A new Israeli Government is formed and enters office the following day, with Moshe Dayan taking over from Prime Minister Levy Eshkol as Defense Minister. Stalemate plays into Arab hands because of the negative
impact of IDF mobilization of reserves upon the Israeli economy. The new harder-line Israeli Government is a signal to the world that Israel will not tolerate the situation for much longer.
June 3 Israel concludes, from letter by USA President to Israeli Prime Minister, that diplomatic efforts to force Egypt to withdraw forces from Sinai and lift the blockade at the Straits of Tiran have practically failed. Certain conducts in USA diplomatic messages to Israel could be interpreted as a green light for Israel to attack Egypt.
June 4 Iraq joins the Egyptian-Jordanian mutual defense treaty, with Iraqi troops deployed to Egypt and Jordan, while the Iraqi delegation that signed the treaty in Cairo is due to visit Jordan on its way back from Egypt to Iraq on June 5. Nasser states that an international initiative to lift the maritime blockade at the Straits of Tiran will be viewed by Egypt as an intervention in internal affairs and an act of war against Egypt. Egyptian President again welcomes Israel to attack Egypt so that the whole world will witness the military might of Egypt, unlike in 1956 when Israel waged war against Egypt under the patronage of France and UK.
June 4, 0830hrs the Israeli Government convenes and subsequently authorizes the IDF to attack Egypt in order to suppress the EAF, destroy the Egyptian Army in Sinai and lift the Egyptian blockade at the Straits of Tiran.
By the spring of 1967, IAF combat aircraft squadrons operated from HAS, plus a quick-reaction alert (QRA) complex closer to the squadron headquarters and the runway threshold. This was a sun shelter with four cells for two QRA pairs, while a spare aircraft was parked beside the sun shelter, as in this view of the Squadron 101 QRA complex at Khatsor in April 1967. (AC)
ATTACKER’S CAPABILITIES 197 JETS THAT CHANGED THE MIDDLE EAST
Air superiority has been a cornerstone of Israel’s defense doctrine ever since the IAF’s inception. The IAF’s first-ever fighter operation plan was to strike the EAF’s El Arish air base with five Avia S-199s, the Czechoslovak version of the German Messerschmitt Bf 109 and the IAF’s first fighter type. This debut fighter operation had to be canceled after Egyptian forces were spotted south of Tel Aviv, and the four available S-199s were scrambled to strike them instead. However, the IAF’s desire for air superiority was quickly engraved in its heritage. On July 29, 1948, Israel’s first Prime Minister and Defense Minister David Ben Gurion defined the IAF’s missions, with air superiority officially graded as the IAF’s priority:
1. The main mission is the complete destruction of the enemy’s air power in the air or on the ground
2. Tactical support of ground and naval forces
3. Destruction of strategic targets
Ten years later, on July 25, 1958, Ezer Weizman entered office as IAF Commander. By then the IAF had been preparing for an air superiority campaign for almost a decade, and had actually witnessed such a campaign in 1956 when Anglo-French forces attacked Egypt. Although the EAF was successfully suppressed, the Anglo-French operational concept –suppress enemy airfields during nighttime with strategic bombers and destroy enemy aircraft during daytime with tactical fighters – was not one the IAF was equipped to adopt.
1960s operational concepts
The IAF’s ingenious counter-concept, one better suited to its fleet of fighter and attack aircraft, was to combine suppression with destruction. The raiders would first bomb runways and then turn back to strafe the immobile aircraft. A single four-ship formation, flying one bombing run and three strafing passes, could, potentially, suppress one runway or two intersecting runways as well as destroying up to 12 enemy aircraft. Lacking a sufficient order
The IAF fighter force consisted entirely of French aircraft. Here, in July 1965, a Vautour leads an Ouragan and a Fouga armed trainer, with a Super Mystère, Mirage, and Mystère behind. After 1967, it sought a new light attack aircraft (A-4 Skyhawk) and a heavy attack aircraft (F-4 Phantom) to complement the modern Mirage air-toair combat aircraft. (AC)
Ezer Weizman was one of the five pilots assigned to the IAF’s first planned fighter raid on El Arish in May 1948. An RAFtrained fighter pilot, Weizman would become IAF Commander from 1958 until 1966, when this photo was taken in the cockpit of his famous Black Spitfire. In many ways he was the architect of the IAF’s air superiority concept of June 1967. (AC)
of battle for a textbook relative-strength offensive, the IAF introduced fast turnarounds in order to tip the numerical scales in its favor.
This campaign concept was tested during Exercise Lance, from July 21 to 23, 1959. The exercise encompassed eight fighter squadrons with 121 aircraft and 110 pilots. Turnaround speed was emphasized as the key objective to allow a smaller force to perform more missions per day than a larger force. Total output of the eight squadrons was 1,020 sorties, an average of 42 sorties per squadron per day. Two-thirds of the pilots flew three to five missions per day. Turnaround timeframes were monitored in the two spearhead squadrons – Squadron 105 (Super Mystère) and Squadron 110 (Vautour) – and the average was 130 minutes.
ABOVE: STRAFING: THE 270 STRIKE PATTERN
The IAF did not dictate strike pattern. Bases, wings, and squadrons mostly preferred and practiced one of the three possible patterns. All three patterns were initiated with a bombing run along the axis of the targeted runway. The two pairs flew in trail about 2,000m apart. The pop-up maneuver took Mirages up to 6,000ft above ground level (AGL), and slower aircraft climbed to a slightly lower altitude in order to minimize exposure time to antiaircraft fire. The leading pair dived to bomb the farthest aiming point along the runway, while the trailing pair dived to bomb the nearest aiming point along the runway. The strikers exited the dive-bombing at an altitude of 1,000ft and were then to fly three strafing passes. It was then that the three strike patterns differed.
In the 270 strike pattern, the leading pair flew onwards for 15 seconds at 550 knots, turned left 270 degrees, lined abreast with each pilot picking a target and firing a one-second burst – roughly 20 rounds per gun – from 850 to 550m. The trailing pair flew past the farthest edge of the attacked runway, turned right 45 degrees, turned left 45 degrees, and then turned left 270 degrees to initiate the first strafing pass at a time when the first pair was turning towards the second strafing pass, and so on repeatedly with a phase of time and direction.
Five ranges were utilized, including three – Khalutsa, Matred, and Ovda – that simulated enemy air bases complete with runways, facilities, and aircraft. Range teams surveyed the targets after every raid. The two Mystère squadrons averaged a 17 percent gunnery score, having fired 8,513 rounds of which 1,437 hit the targets. A one-second burst from the Mystère’s two guns expended some 40 rounds. During Lance, the two Mystère squadrons engaged up to about 200 targets and were expected to hit every target with at least six rounds, more than enough punch for the destruction of a parked aircraft.
Exercise Sting, from July 26 to 27, 1960, honed the IAF’s air superiority skills. The six participating squadrons flew five missions per pilot per day, bombed runways, napalmed shelters, rocketed pens, and strafed aircraft. The IAF concluded that bombing accuracy assured suppression of runways until the arrival of the follow-up strike wave; the timeframe of a
ABOVE: STRAFING: THE 180 TURN BACK STRIKE PATTERN
After the bombing run, the leading pair turned left 270 degrees for the first strafing pass and then two 180-degree turns for the second and third strafing passes. After the bombing run, the trailing pair turned right 45 degrees and then turned 180 degrees for the first strafing pass, followed by two more 180-degree turns for the second and third strafing passes. The 180 Turn Back strike pattern minimized time over target but narrowed the approach segments of the attackers, therefore potentially easing up on the defending antiaircraft gunners.
turnaround had been cut shorter in comparison with Lance, but for planning purposes was defined as two hours. Gunnery also yielded exceptional results. Out of 61 aircraft targets at Matred, 39 had been destroyed and 17 had been damaged. At Ovda, all 50 aircraft targets had been destroyed. The IAF was obviously aware that in the real world, targets would fire back, but even with some compensation for the worst, the Sting statistics were impressive and promising.
Six years prior to the Six-Day War, the IAF was fully ready to implement an air superiority campaign. The concept of small formations combining suppression and destruction, with fast turnaround to continue the offensive and accomplish objectives, had been forged. The following years would witness the IAF improving every conceivable aspect of the air superiority concept to the point of perfection at the right moment.
The IAF’s order-of-battle aspirations were therefore derived from this air superiority campaign planning. Lessons from exercises indicated that a ratio of one fighter pilot per combat aircraft was insufficient. By April 1, 1962, the IAF had 181 fighter pilots, while the order of battle included 32 Super Mystères, 23 Vautours, 43 Mystères, 18 Ouragans, 16 Meteors, and 38 armed Fouga trainers for a total of 170 combat aircraft in eight squadrons. Seven days later, the IAF’s strength was boosted when the first two Mirages were accepted. Within three years, its inventory had improved to 267 combat aircraft and armed trainers – 67 Mirages, 29 Super Mystères, 21 Vautours, 36 Mystères, 54 Ouragans, and 60 Fougas – in nine squadrons.
Exercise Power tested the IAF’s air superiority concept – by then codenamed Focus – with an improvement: a continuous high tempo of missions instead of waves. The nine fighter
ABOVE: STRAFING: THE 180 TURN INSIDE STRIKE PATTERN
The simplest and most straightforward of the three SEAB patterns. In the 180 Turn Inside pattern, after the bombing run, the leading pair turned left 270 degrees for the first strafing pass, then turned right 180 degrees for the second strafing pass, and then turned left 180 degrees for the third strafing pass. Meanwhile, the trailing pair – at the end of the bombing run – turned right 180 degrees for the first strafing pass, then turned left 180 degrees for the second strafing pass, and finally turned right 180 degrees again for the third strafing pass.
On top of the strengths and weaknesses of the 180 Turn Back pattern, the 180 Turn Inside pattern added even more simplicity but demanded much more coordination.
squadrons fielded 182 aircraft and 205 pilots, flew 1,031 sorties and averaged five sorties per pilot per day. Bombing accuracy averaged 77 percent and gunnery accuracy 16 percent.
Moti Hod succeeded Ezer Weizman as IAF Commander on April 27, 1966. Preparations for Focus continued, with Hod emphasizing simplicity. Focus planning had been growing in complexity, so the IAF command handover was timely and many observers later remarked that it was fortunate for the IAF that Weizman was in charge during preparations for Focus while Hod was in command during execution of Focus
Aircraft
Around this time, the IAF sealed two major acquisition contracts for 48 A-4 Skyhawks and 50 Mirage 5s, with deliveries of both types scheduled to start in late 1967. Until that time, the IAF did not expect significant order of battle changes, except for the division of its Ouragan force into two squadrons, a move that was accomplished during the summer of 1966 as more fighter pilots became available. This set the IAF order of battle at nine fighter squadrons –three Mirages, two Mystères, two Ouragans, one Super Mystère, and one Vautour – plus a squadron of Fouga armed jet trainers.
Israeli Prime Minister and Defense Minister Levy Eshkol – first from right –attending an IDF General Staff meeting on February 27, 1967, with IDF Chief of Staff Isaac Rabin to his right, IDF G Branch Chief Ezer Weizman fourth from left, IAF Commander Moti Hod third from left, and Command North Chief David Elazar second from left. (AC)
OPPOSITE: AIR BASES OF ISRAEL, AND STRENGTHS, JUNE 5, 1967
Clashes along Israel’s borders with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria intensified. Mirage pilots were credited with five air-to-air kills between July and November 1966: two Egyptian MiG-19s, two Syrian MiG-21s, and one Jordanian Hawker Hunter. Still, Israel did not expect a war in 1967.
The IDF plan for 1967 was presented in an IDF General Staff meeting on February 27, 1967. The IDF Intelligence Chief indicated that Arab solidarity was in a shambles and that Egypt was not intent on war. The IDF’s concept was that the two principal indicators for a potential war were Egyptian military preparedness and Arab political solidarity. Egyptian military preparedness was considered insufficient, given the IDF’s strength on one hand and Egypt’s military involvement in Yemen on the other. Arab political solidarity was also considered too weak to support a war against Israel.
Nevertheless, the IDF prepared contingency plans for war. These emphasized the importance of air superiority for three reasons:
• The main IDF force consisted of reserve units, and enemy air strikes were viewed as a major threat to the swift mobilization of these reserves.
• Egypt’s bomber force – some 60 Il-28s and Tu-16s – was viewed as a major threat to Israeli cities; in November 1963, the IDF had evaluated that Egypt’s ability to attack Israel in a single bombing wave was 330 tons of bombs, and that by 1965 this potential would increase to 1,400 tons of bombs per 24 hours. On October 1, 1966, IDF Intelligence evaluated the potential at 315 tons per wave, based upon a serviceability of 65 percent, which corresponded with a maximum potential of 485 tons per wave.
ISRAEL
WEST BANK
SYRIA
GOLAN
JORDAN
1 WING RAMAT DAVID:
Squadron 109, Mystere inventory 16; serviceable 15, including 8 deployed to Ekron.
Squadron 110, Vautour inventory 19; serviceable 18 including 8 deployed to Ekron.
Squadron 100, inventory 69, mostly Pipers; serviceable 62 including deployments to Megiddo and Teman Field as well as aircraft assigned to bases and wings.
A Squadron 116 Mystère and Squadron 119 Mirage inside a HAS at Ekron in March 1967. Having planned to win any air war by striking airfields, the IAF was aware that the enemy could do the same. But since HAS were costly, the IAF built only enough to protect a certain percentage of the inventory, given that some aircraft were always being serviced. (ARC)
• IAF support to the IDF in an environment of air superiority was viewed as vital for Israel’s defense doctrine: fighting on enemy soil a short war with unambiguous outcome.
It was then, on March 16, 1967, that IAF AIR3 issued Operation Plan 67/11 Operation Focus. The objective of Focus was the accomplishment of air superiority through the destruction of the EAF, as well as other Arab air forces as needed. The contingency plan covered four eventualities:
• Focus A against Egypt.
• Focus B against Syria.
• Focus C against Egypt and Syria, or against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan.
• Focus D against Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq.
The four Focus eventualities differed primarily in the task assignment program of the first wave; all other building blocks of the plan were similar. The concept’s cornerstone was fourship formations attacking enemy air bases at 15-minute intervals, with bombing to suppress runways and strafing to destroy aircraft.
Targets in Egypt were divided into four groups:
• Sinai air bases: Bir Gafgafa, Bir Tamada, El Arish, and Jabel Libni.
• Suez Canal air bases: Abu Sueir, Fayid, and Kabrit.
• Cairo and River Nile Delta air bases: Cairo West and Inchas.
• Upper Egypt air bases: Beni Suef, Luxor, Minya, and Ras Banas.
The less-capable combat aircraft, Ouragans and Mystères, were tasked to attack air bases in Sinai and the Suez Canal area. Super Mystères were tasked to raid air bases up to the Nile Delta, while Mirages and Vautours were tasked to strike air bases up to Upper Egypt.
Weapons
Over the enemy airfields, destruction would be meted out by bombs and guns. Only the Ouragans were armed with T-10 rockets in addition to bombs and guns. Every bomb was equipped with two detonators, one in the nose and one in the tail. The standard fit was the impact detonator in the nose and a 7–15-second delay detonator in the tail. Pilots had to select the delay detonator when attacking runways so that the bomb would explode after penetrating the surface, creating a deeper and larger crater that would take longer to repair. If a pilot wanted to bomb a target other than a runway – i.e. parked aircraft – then the nose impact detonator would be selected. Formations tasked to bomb concrete runways had the nose impact detonator replaced by a 0.1-second short delay detonator. At the time of the issue of Operations Order 67/11, the IAF possessed a small stock of light runway-piercing bombs and only Mystères and Super Mystères had been qualified to utilize the light runway-piercing bombs, so in the original Focus A task assignment program only six out of 38 formations were tasked to strike with light runway-piercing bombs.
The strike pattern was a single bombing run along the runway axis. Only the Ouragans were authorized to fly two runs against runways, with bombing in the first run and rocketry in the second; only the Vautours armed with eight 70kg bombs could fly two bombing runs, dropping four bombs in each run. Up to four strafing passes were then to be flown. The decision on how many strafing passes to fly – considering antiaircraft fire and fuel state – was delegated to formation leaders, with a single constraint: to clear the target area prior to the time-over-target of the follow-up formation.
Formations would fly to the targets, at least initially, at low altitude to avoid radar detection and then pop up to the minimum altitude that would allow a 35-degree dive-bombing attack. The aircraft would then glue to the deck and return for strafing, during which the guideline was to fly no higher than 1,500ft above ground level in order to minimize the efficiency of radar-guided antiaircraft artillery (AAA). Disengagement would be at low altitude until out of the areas defended by SA-2 missiles, whereupon a climb to economic cruise altitude and a flight straight back to base were the AIR3 recommendations.
The plans
The whole of the IAF’s combat aircraft inventory was to be committed to the Focus first wave, except for 12 Mirages tasked to maintain quick reaction alert; each of the three Mirage squadrons fielding one pair on immediate readiness and a second pair to take over immediate alert if the first pair was scrambled.
Right from the start of Focus, the Fouga armed trainers squadron would be available to support the IDF, as would IAF transports, helicopters, and light spotting aircraft. Mirage and Vautour reconnaissance aircraft would photograph the enemy air bases towards the end of the first wave, while AIR4 would collect reports from formation leaders, at first over the radio while airborne after the attack, and then a fuller post-landing debrief via secured communication lines from bases to headquarters. AIR4 would then analyze the data and deliver the analyzed data to AIR3 for planning of the second wave. If no new Mission Order had been issued to a formation leader returning from a first-wave mission, then the Focus guideline was to repeat the first-wave mission during the second wave, and so on until the end of the day.
The original Focus A task assignment program included 38 formations tasked to attack enemy air bases with a total of only 154 aircraft. This was a conservative initial planning, well below the maximum IAF order of battle, in order to allow for aircraft to be grounded for reasons of normal serviceability and deep maintenance; the IAF Mission Order system
Five days after Nasser ordered his army to march into Sinai, the first of Israel’s Mirage 5 strike aircraft first flew in France. Three days earlier, four IAF pilots had traveled to the USA for an A-4 Skyhawk conversion course. The 48 A-4 Skyhawks and 50 Mirage 5s were scheduled to enter the IAF from autumn 1967, perhaps adding a motivation for Nasser to initiate the crisis in the summer. (BIAF)
AIR4 circulated among IAF fighter pilots spot-thedifference games in order to encourage awareness of the SEAB mission; in this one there are ten differences between the two images of Kabrit. (AC)
at that time was squadron/counter, with the counter zeroed at midnight so that Mission Order 107/1 was the first mission order that AIR3 issued to Squadron 107 on a certain date:
Focus A task assignment program March 16, 1967
Target H-Hour H+5 H+15 H+20 H+30 H+45 H+90
El Arish 107/11 – 107/21
Jabel Libni 109/12
Bir Gafgafa 113/11 – 109/33
Bir Tamada 116/12
116/33
Kabrit 119/56 – 117/26
Fayid 116/22
113/21
Abu Sueir 117/16 – 105/28
Inchas
105/17
Cairo West – 101/16
Beni Suef
Minya
Notes:
109/42
113/41
116/43 113/61
113/51 113/71
101/46 119/76
110/14 110/25
110/34 110/45
1 Four Ouragans with two 250kg bombs and eight T-10 rockets per aircraft
2 Four Mystères with two 250kg bombs per aircraft
3 Four Mystères with six light runway-piercing bombs per aircraft
4 Four Vautours with eight 70kg bombs per aircraft
5 Five Vautours with eight 70kg bombs per aircraft
6 Four Mirages with two 500kg bombs per aircraft
7 Four Super Mystères with two 250kg bombs per aircraft
8 Four Super Mystères with six light runway-piercing bombs per aircraft
AIR3 stressed three scenarios for activation of Focus:
• 72 hours’ notice for Focus combined with a parallel IDF ground offensive.
• 24 hours’ notice for Focus as a stand-alone operation without a parallel IDF offensive.
• Immediate activation of Focus to counter an enemy surprise strike.
The Focus activation order would be ‘Activate Focus D-Day H-Hour’, with follow-up orders concerning readiness level, reserves’ mobilization, units’ deployments, and updates of the Focus task assignment program. Squadrons were to prepare detailed briefings and maps for each Focus Mission Order, while all pilots – all pilots! – were ordered to learn their formation’s mission, target, and enemy, as well as those of other squadrons.
DEFENDERS’ CAPABILITIES
NASSER’S SOVIET AIR ARMADA
The Suez campaign had given the EAF experience of being the target of an air superiority campaign. Beginning at H-Hour, 2015hrs on October 31, 1956, Anglo-French air forces raided Egyptian air bases with devastating impact. The Anglo-French air superiority concept required nighttime bombings to suppress runways and daytime strikes to destroy aircraft. The planners expected to achieve air superiority within 48 hours. Prior to H-Hour, the AngloFrench forces had flown 11 photographic reconnaissance sorties over Egypt to establish the EAF order of battle. Processed photographs revealed that the EAF’s inventory at the start of the campaign included 110 MiG-15s, 48 Il-28s, 44 Vampires, and 14 Meteors. Obviously, aircraft parked or stored inside hangars could not have been detected through aerial photography, but such aircraft were likely to be unserviceable and therefore irrelevant to the actual order of battle. Similarly, Anglo-French forces flew post-strike reconnaissance missions in order to analyze the impact by counting destroyed aircraft. Royal Air Force battle damage assessment concluded that Anglo-French forces had destroyed on the ground 91 MiG-15s, 26 Il-28s, 30 Vampires, and 11 Meteors – 73 percent of the EAF order of battle at the start of the campaign. Given that a unit is usually defined as ‘destroyed’ with more than 50 percent losses, the EAF was virtually wiped out and the Anglo-French forces accomplished air superiority.
Ten years later, the EAF fielded more aircraft, but their air base infrastructure was generally similar to 1956, with intersecting runways and no hardened shelters for aircraft. Over the same timeframe, the IAF had completed the hardening of its air bases to provide a hardened aircraft shelter for most combat aircraft. However, although the IAF’s construction of hardened aircraft shelters was sufficient for normal aircraft serviceability percentages, over the three weeks of crisis that preceded the war, serviceability increased to almost 100 percent; there were more serviceable combat aircraft than available hardened aircraft shelters. The EAF, on the other hand, does not seem to have improved serviceability during the period of the crisis, and in any case had no hardened aircraft shelters. Its only available shelters
French battle damage assessment images of Luxor from November 4, 1956, with interpreters pinpointing 17 destroyed Il-28s marked in circles, some still smoking, plus one – in a rectangle –seemingly intact. Still, the EAF did not attempt to harden bases in the wake of the 1956 war, and by 1967 there were still no HAS in Egypt. (AC)
OPPOSITE: AIR BASES OF EGYPT, SYRIA, JORDAN, IRAQ AND LEBANON, AND STRENGTHS, JUNE 5, 1967
were open pens with concrete walls that had been built in the bomber bases and in the forward fields.
IAF AIR4 evaluation of EAF deployment of combat aircraft in April 19651
Base Squadron Type Notes
El Arish 18 MiG-17 Small squadron with an inventory of ten to 12 aircraft and a cadre of ten to 12 pilots.
Jabel Libni – – Empty except for six retired MiG-15s positioned as dummies.
Bir Gafgafa – – Empty owing to runway renovation work.
Kabrit 16 and 25 MiG-17
Kabrit 24 and 31 MiG15/17 Conversion units.
Fayid 20 and 27 MiG-19
Abu Sueir 40 MiG-21 New squadron activated in March 1965.
Abu Sueir 73, 85, and 92 Il-28 Plus Flight 74 for maritime strike; about a dozen aircraft deployed to Yemen.
Inchas 17 MiG-17 Inactive.
Inchas 19 and 45 MiG-21
Cairo West – MiG-21 Conversion unit.
Cairo West 88 Tu-16 Including a two-aircraft deployment to Yemen since December 1964.
Notes:
1 At that time AIR4 evaluated that the EAF order of battle included 95 MiG-15/17s, 18 MiG-19s, 60 MiG-21s, 25 Il-28s, and 16 Tu-16s
EAF bases had not changed much since 1956. The most profound change had been substantial lengthening of some runways to enable operations by supersonic fighters and heavy bombers – but the EAF had many airfields and most of these were quite far from Israel. Complacently, the EAF seems to have believed that the smaller and shorter-legged IAF would not be able to conduct an air superiority campaign as the Anglo-French forces had done a decade before. The EAF deployment had merits and drawbacks for both sides. For the Israelis, the distance made a campaign against the bases more difficult, but for the Egyptians, having a large number of distant bases obviously posed command and control issues. Except for bombers, the EAF’s combat aircraft also mostly lacked the range to operate effectively against Israel unless deployed to forward airfields.
Extensive assets defended Egypt in general, and EAF bases in particular, from air strikes. Radar stations controlled most of Egypt’s airspace. SA-2 surface-to-air missile batteries’ overlapping arcs of engagement covered the whole of Egypt’s heartland, plus specific strategic sites such as the Aswan Dam. Egypt also fielded hundreds of AAA weapons. However, the radar stations were unable to detect aircraft flying at very low level and the SA-2 batteries could not engage aircraft flying at low level. The AAA was organized in two independent AAA divisions, while each armored division had six AAA battalions and each infantry division had five. Batteries from the two independent AAA divisions were deployed to defend EAF bases.
The IAF had been monitoring the EAF’s training for years and concluded that, in the event of hostilities, the EAF would divide available units into the following order of battle:
EGYPT
El Arish: 7 MiG-17s
Jabel Libni: 2 MiG-15/17s
Bir Gafgafa: 14 MiG-21
Bir Tamada: 14 MiG-17s
Abu Sueir: 27 Il-28s, 19 MiG-21s.
Fayid: 14 MiG-19s, 14 MiG-21s, 14 Su-7s.
Kabrit: 29 MiG-15s, 22 MiG-17s.
Inchas: 32 MiG-21s.
Cairo West: 22 MiG-15/17s, 15 MiG-21s, 15 Tu-16s.
Beni Suef: 15 Tu-16s.
Hurghada: 14 MiG-19s, 8 MiG-21s.
Almaza: 55 Il-14s, 20 Mi-4s, 12 Mi-6s.
Cairo International: 25 An-12s.
Dekheila: 3 Il-14s, 5 Mi-4s.
Bilbeis: EGAF Academy flying school base, AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
Mansura: AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
Helwan: Egypt aerospace industry airfield, AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
Minya: AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
Luxor: AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
Ras Banas: AIR4 did not specify based aircraft on the morning of 5 June 1967.
IRAQ (NOT SHOWN) H-3: 12 Hunters.
Habbaniya: 36 Hunters, 10 Tu-16s. Rashid: 32 MiG-21s, 23 airlifters including 8 An-12s and 2 Tu-124s, 20 Wessexes, 8 Mi-4s.
AIR4 evaluated that the Egyptian SA-2 engagement envelope covered the Nile Delta and the Suez Canal Zone, plus Alexandria’s port and the Aswan dam; IAF formation leaders were advised to remain as low as possible during ingress as well as while attacking, and to climb to cruise only after leaving the envelope of the SA-2s. This was deemed protection enough, and the IAF did not plan preliminary strikes on radar stations or SA-2 batteries. (AC)
• For air defense and escort: six MiG-21 squadrons.
• To strike the IAF’s airfields: half a squadron of Tu-16s, one and a half squadrons of Il-28s, two MiG-19 squadrons, and two MiG-15/17 squadrons.
• For air support: one flight of Il-28s and two MiG-15/17 squadrons.
• For bombing of cities and strategic targets: half a squadron of Tu-16s and one squadron of Il-28s.
During offensive operations, the fighters were expected to operate in large formations –not less than four and usually eight – while the bombers were expected to operate in cells of three, six, or nine aircraft.
For defense, MiG-21s would be on immediate alert, ready to scramble from six bases. The evaluated timeframes for dispatch of offensive operations – from order to departure – was two hours for fighters and three to four hours for bombers.
EAF Command East issued Operation Order 67/7 on May 27, 1967, as an amendment to Operation Order 67/2 from May 21. The objective was to raid IAF bases in order to achieve air superiority; this confirmed, after the event, IAF AIR4’s evaluation of how the EAF would operate offensively: Squadron 18 was tasked to raid Ekron with 12 MiG-17s at H-Hour; Brigade 65 was tasked to bomb Khatsor at H-Hour with six Tu-16s.
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES
SECURING AIR SUPERIORITY
The Focus task assignment program was updated on April 10, 1967, in the wake of a major clash between Israel and Syria three days before. Yet, for a while, the IDF evaluation that Arab solidarity was too weak for war held on, and the volatile situation was expected to calm down. Then something happened. Amazingly – and almost without precedent in history – it is not clear what exactly happened. The most common explanation is that on May 13 the USSR fed its Arab allies with false information that Israel had amassed 13 brigades opposite the IsraeliSyrian border. The following day, the SAF flew a reconnaissance mission over northern Israel, slightly west of the Israeli-Syrian border. Whatever the outcome of the SAF reconnaissance mission, the next day Egypt initiated a massive and public deployment of forces to the Sinai Peninsula, opposite the Egyptian-Israeli border. Postwar, IAF Commander Moti Hod recalled:
I received the message [of Egypt’s deployment] on the stage in the stadium. It was one of the few Independence Days that I viewed from the ground. I usually flew [during Israel Independence Day’s flyovers] but that year there was no flyover [of] Jerusalem, only a meager parade in line with the Armistice Agreements.
The truth is that at first I did not take it seriously… Marching forces through Cairo looked like a psychological exercise and I accepted [the] IDF Intelligence evaluation – which at that time was shared by almost the whole of Israel – that for as long as Nasser was messed up with 90,000 soldiers in Yemen he would not decide to start a war so simply.
The deployment smashed the IDF’s assessment that war was not expected in 1967. Still, the IDF evaluation that Egypt’s armed forces were not up to the task was correct, and the American CIA issued similar evaluations during the crisis. Therefore, the puzzling figure in the crisis was Nasser, who had initiated the situation on May 14–15, escalated the crisis on May 23, and had failed to realize when the time was right to back off from the Israeli border and to lift the Red Sea maritime blockade.
IAF Commander Moti Hod presents a Mirage with a Syrian kill marking to Post Minister Israel Isaiah on May 10, 1967, at the ceremony that marked the issue of three stamps depicting IAF aircraft from the 1948 war (an Auster), the 1956 war (a Mystère), and from 1967 (a Mirage). Within a month, the Mirage would become the iconic jet of the 1967 war. (ILGP/ PO and AC)
OPPOSITE: TYPICAL EAF BASE LAYOUTS
Abu Sueir and Bir Tamada were on the opposite ends of the scale of EAF bases. For IAF pilots, the concept of attacking Abu Sueir and Bir Tamada was similar: suppress runways (at aiming points 1, 2, 3), destroy aircraft, and ignore facilities. Abu Sueir was a large main air base that had been in existence for dozens of years, with extensive facilities that supported at least three resident squadrons of Il-28 bombers and MiG-21 interceptors (Il-28s at point 4; MiG-21s at 5). Bir Tamada was a small forward airfield that was nearly new – IDF Intelligence indicated only on October 1, 1966, that the airfield had been opened – but with rudimentary facilities that supported the deployment of a single MiG-17 squadron (resident MiG-17s at 4; the visiting Il-14 transports at 5, and Mi-4 and Mi-6 helicopters at 6, 7). Bir Tamada was typical of the newer-concept airfields with a single runway. Obviously, all air bases positioned facilities around a runway or runways in order to enable operation of aircraft. Without aircraft, air bases are expensive, useless real estate; Focus therefore targeted aircraft. Bombing runways was not in order to destroy them but only to suppress them, to ease the destruction of aircraft. Facilities were initially ignored and were only strafed in subsequent strikes once pilots were unable to find intact aircraft. Once the destruction of aircraft had been completed – destruction of a military unit is usually defined as destruction of at least 50 percent of the unit’s fighting assets – there was no point attacking the base further.
Egypt’s blockade of the Straits of Tiran was an unambiguous casus belli, yet Israel was determined to exhaust diplomacy, a determination that at the time was wrongly presented as weakness. It was actually this seeming hesitation that enabled Israel to mobilize reserves easily, to hone the skills of the reserves in hasty training, and to exploit resources fully, up to almost 100 percent serviceability, a level of readiness and serviceability that was probably without precedent, that has possibly not been accomplished since, and which can be directly attributed to the crisis management skills of Egypt and Israel.
The IAF entered the crisis with 147 serviceable combat aircraft and the IDF fielded 954 serviceable tanks. By June 2, Israel concluded that diplomacy had been exhausted. The Israeli plan for war was offense against Egypt and defense against Jordan and Syria. The objective of the IAF was to destroy EAF aircraft in order to win air superiority, while the IDF’s objective was to destroy the Egyptian armor in Sinai in order to eliminate the Egyptian threat to the existence of Israel and lift the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran. At the end of the slide to war, the IAF fielded 197 serviceable combat aircraft and the IDF had 1,093 serviceable tanks.
Orders of battle
Israel faced a coalition of at least four Arab nations: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. The IAF-presented nominal relative strength was 203 Israeli combat aircraft versus 602 Egyptian, Iraqi, Jordanian, Lebanese, and Syrian.
IAF fighter force order of battle, June 5, 19671
Base/Wing Squadron Type Inventory Serviceable Pilots
1 Ramat David 109 Mystère 16 15 22 including 7 reservists
110 Vautour 19 18 25 including 7 reservists
117 Mirage 24 24 29 including 4 reservists
4 Khatsor 101 Mirage 22 21 28 including 3 reservists
105 Super Mystère 35 35 37 including 10 reservists
113 Ouragan 35 33 34 including 14 reservists
6 Khatserim 147 Fouga 44 44 42 including 29 reservists
8 Ekron 116 Mystère 17 17 22 including 5 reservists
119 Mirage 192 19 193
27 Lod 1074 Ouragan 16 15 19 including 3 reservists
BIR TAMADA
ABU SUEIR
Another random document with no related content on Scribd:
a house is often constructed. Upon arrival at the mountain, the construction is very rapid; this house could be occupied for a long time without trouble. This house thatched with banana leaves is famous for this story: Pumaia was the man, Kamakakehau was the woman. While living together [as husband and wife] they went up to the mountain to hew timber; Pumaia was deserted by the wife; she became Koae’s, a man from another place. Pumaia was killed by Koae; the house was called pumaia (banana tree); but because Pumaia was killed, this house was named laumaia (banana leaves). Pumaia was the chief of a district. The explanation concerning this famous story is lengthy, but it is proper that I should shorten [it].
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In its construction this house is similar to the house thatched with ti-leaves or banana leaves, but its thatch is the bark of the
laumaia, o kona mea i kaulana ai, o Pumaia ke kane a o Kamakakehau ka wahine, i ka wa o ko laua noho pu ana ua pii laua i ke kuahiwi i ke kua laau; ua haalele ia o Pumaia e ka wahine, ua lilo oia ia Koae, he kanaka ia no kekahi wahi mai, ua pepehi ia o Pumaia e Koae a make; a he pumaia ka inoa o ka hale; a no ka make ana o Pumaia, nolaila, kapa ia ai ka inoa o keia hale he laumaia. A o Pumaia nohoi, he kanaka aimoku ia no kekahi aina; he loihi aku no ka wehewehe ana o keia mea kaulana, aka, he pono nae ia’u e hoopokole.
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O ke ano o keia hale, ua like no ia me ka hale la-i a me ka hale laumaia ke ano o ke kukulu ana, aka, o ke pili o keia hale, he
koa tree. The bark of the koa is peeled and then thatched. This house is also constructed for mountain residence during the process of hewing a canoe, and for other purposes. Any kind of timber is used in its construction. Because it is covered with the bark of the koa, therefore it is called hale ilikoa. 213 [654]
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The house thatched with ama’u has no real post, no battens, no ridge; but in its construction, simply break the ama’u midrib and all, and stick them in the ground on that side and this side, leaving a place in between for occupation, then bring the tops [of the leaves] together, and lash them with cords. In the construction of some, posts, rafters and battens are used, similar to the construction of a grass thatched house, and after the frame work is up, the ama’u is thatched and fastened with cords.
ilikoa; ua akaakaa ia ka ili o ke koa a uhi mai mawaho. Ua hana
ia no keia hale no ka pii ana iuka i ke kalai waa a no na hana e ae
no hoi; a he pono laau no ko keia hale. No ka uhi ana ia i ka ilikoa, nolaila ua kapaia he hale ilikoa. [655]
’ .
O ka hale ama’u, aohe ona pou
laau maoli, aohe hoi he o-a, aohe kaupoku, aka, o kona ano, he uhaki mai no i ka ama’u me ka iwi a hou ma kela aoao keia aoao, me ka hookaawale nohoi ia waena i wahi e noho ai, a e hoopio ae nohoi ia luna a e hakii iho no me ke kaula.
O kekahi ua kukulu maoli ia no ka pou ke o-a a me na aho, e like me ko ka hale pili hana ana alaila papai aku ke ama’u mawaho me ka omau ia i ke kaula.
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This house is constructed in any way which the house builder desires, at the same time providing all the material necessary. It is covered outside with cane leaves bent around the battens; at the four corners of the house, ama’u is used; also the ridge. Because this house is covered with cane leaves, it is called a hale ha-ko (cane leaf house).
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This house is constructed when a person goes to the mountain to get olona, and he desires to stay awhile. He erects some timber [for posts] with some battens which are covered with ape leaves; it is named hale ape (ape leaf house).
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- .
O keia hale, aia no i ke ano hale a ka mea makemake hana hale e hana ai me ka hoomakaukau no hoi i na mea apau o ka hale. O kona uhi mawaho, he ha-ko; ua pelupelu ia ka ha-ko i ka aho a ma na kihi eha o ka hale, he ama’u ka mea e hana ai, a pela nohoi ma kaupoku. No ka uhi ana ia o keia hale i ka ha-ko, ua kapaia kana inoa, he hale ha-ko.
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Ua kukulu ia keia hale no ka pii ana i uka i ke kahi olona, a makemake ke kanaka e moe iuka, kukulu ae no ia i na laau, me ka hoaho ana a uhi mai ka lau o ka ape mawaho; ua kapa ia kona inoa, he hale ape.
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This house will last as the house thatched with ti-leaves; it lasts for two years or more. This painiu does not grow on the ground; it grows on the ohia or other trees. Its thatching is like the ha-ko, the leaves being bent around the battens; and because the house is covered with painiu it is called a “painiu house.”
Ua like no ka paa o keia hale me ka hale la-i; ua paa no ia no na makahiki elua a oi ae. O keia painiu aole ia e ulu ma ka honua, aia kona wahi e ulu ai maluna o ka ohia, a laau e ae no hoi. O kona hana ana, ua like me ka ha-ko ka pelupelu ia o ka lau i ka aho; a no kona uhi ia ana i ke painiu ua kapaia kona inoa, he hale painiu.
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The posts of the house are erected and the battens are placed in position; then covered with banana leaves, on top of which set lumps of dirt, so the dirt would not fall into [the house]. Because it is covered with dirt it is called “he hale lepo.”
.214
The construction of this house is similar to that of the house thatched with ti-leaves; the
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Ua kukulu ia na laau o ka hale, a ua hoaho ia, alaila, e uhi iho maluna i ka laumaia, alaila, hoouhi mai ka eka lepo maluna iho o ka laumaia i ole e komo ka lepo iloko. No kona uhi ia ana i ka lepo ua kapa ia oia, he hale lepo.
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O ke ano o ka hana ana i keia hale, ua like me ka hana ana i ka hale la-i, he pelupelu mai, alaila,
leaves are bent over and placed on the battens; this [kind of] house is often seen in cultivated places in the wilderness.
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Its construction is similar to that of the house thatched with grass. Thatch cane leaves or uki grass first, and on that place kalamalo. This kind of a house is called “he hale kalamalo” (a kalamalo house). This kalamalo is somewhat like the scented [656]plant growing at Mr. Bishop’s place, which is perhaps called wailukini215 (a species of lucerne).
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The posts and the rafters of this house are erected, but the covering of this is pandanus leaves. Soak the lauhala in water until it is supple, then scrape off
hoopaa ia maloko o ka aho, ua ike nui ia keia hale ma na wahi mahiai iloko o na ulu laau.
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Ua like no kona kukulu ana me ke hale pili. O ka ha-ko maloko a i ole ia, he [657]uki, alaila, mawaho mai ke kalamalo. Ua kapaia keia hale, he hale kalamalo. Ua ano like keia kalamalo me ka mea ala ma kahi o Bishop, he wailukini paha kona inoa.
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Ua kukulu ia no na pou o keia hale a me na o-a aka, o ka uhi o keia mawaho he lauhala. Ho-u ia ka lauhala i ka wai a ma-u, alaila, koekoe aku ke kokala, a
the sharp thorns and thatch. This is done like the ti-leaves; the pandanus leaves are bent around the battens and fastened with strings.
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The new leaf of the loulu216 is used for covering the house; not the leaf-bud, however, but the new leaf which has opened up. This loulu is like the coconut. The tools which the ancients used in hewing house timber were sharp, hard rocks which had been brought to an edge.
Perhaps there are other kinds of houses, but because I am out of paper, I herewith cease.
J W .
pau ke kokala, alaila, papai aku; ua like ke pai ana me ko ka la-i, ho-o-o maloko o ka aho i ka lauhala, me ka hoopaa ia i ke kaula.
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O ka mu-o o ke loulu, oia ka mea e uhi ai mawaho o ka hale; aole nae o ka mu-o i mohala ole, aka, o ka mu-o i mohala. O ke ano o keia loulu, ua ano like no ia me ka niu. O na mea paahana a ka poe kahiko e oki ai i na laau kukulu hale, he mau pahoa oioi i hanaia a oi loa.
He mau hale aku no paha koe, aka, no ka pau e o kuu pepa, ke oki nei au maanei.
J W .
STORY OF THE LAUHALA. MOOLELO NO KA LAUHALA.
The name of the lauhala217 was Ohiohikupua; it sprouted from the bottom of the ocean, and grew above the surface of the sea until it proudly stood like the sharp-pointed clouds which appear in the heavens. Some time after it had grown to quite a height, Pele set forth on her journey here to Hawaii, thinking she would soon arrive here, but it proved otherwise. On her way she struck the place where this pandanus tree grew and she was strangled by the sharp thorns of this lauhala, with us human beings, it seemed, helping from this side; Pele struggled by using her divine powers, but she could not extricate herself. Soon after, her brother, Paao by name, appeared, with a gourd of seawater. Said Pele, “I am in trouble indeed, brother.” Then he climbed up and from on top poured out the sea-water; the young leaves wilted and Pele was freed. Because she was full of anger Pele climbed on top and pulling out the leaf-buds, threw them hither and thither Some
O ka inoa o ka lauhala o Ohiohikupua; mai lalo mai o ke kai kona wahi i kupu mai ai, kupu ae la ia a hala maluna o ke kai, a ku kilakila iho la ia me he ao opua la i ka nana aku, a mahope iho o kona ulu ana ae a kiekie a he manawa loihi iki mahope iho. Hoomaka o Pele e hele i Hawaii nei, me kona manao e puka koke ana ia i Hawaii nei, eia ka aole; i kona hele ana mai ua kupono i kahi i ulu ai ua kumu hala nei, paa iho la ia i ka umiki ia e ke kokala o ua lauhala nei, o kakou aku ka hoi o kanaka ma keia aoao; hooke mai la o ua o Pele i ka mana ona a aole hemo, a mahope iki iho hiki mai ke kaikunane, o Paao kona inoa, me ka ipukai kai. I aku la o Pele: “Pilikia au la e ke kaikunane,” ia manawa pii ae la kela a maluna nini iho la i ke kai; mae iho ka muo alaila, hemo ae la o Pele. No ka nui o kona ukiuki, pii aela ia maluna huhuki i ka muo kiola ma kela wahi keia wahi. Kau mai la kekahi muo i Hawaii nei, oia ke kumu i ulu ai i Hawaii nei; o kahi i ulu mua ai, ma Kohala i
landed here on Hawaii. That is the reason it grows here on Hawaii. The place of its first growth was Kohala, Hawaii; therefore Pele was the one who brought it here to Hawaii.
Also, at that time we did not have mats, but because it occurred to a high prophetess at that time, whose name was Lauhiki, to convert this lauhala into mats by having women braid it, it was so done. The first woman who did the braiding was this same Lauhiki, and from her all other women learned.
Here is another use of the lauhala: it was used as sail for canoes in the olden [658]times; it originated from a man named Lonoauhi. The ones who braided it were this Lauhiki and her younger sister Haumea and their five daughters Kamehaikaua, Meahanipaoa, Lohea, Kahuihuimalanai and Kahoanohookaohu (that was the sail of the canoe of Kamehameha I). These persons were goddesses. The shape of the sail was round like the sun;
Hawaii; nolaila, o Pele ka mea nana i lawe mai i Hawaii nei.
Ina manawa no hoi aole o kakou moena, aka, mamuli o ka noonoo ana o kekahi alii kaulana oia wa, o Lauhiki kona inoa, e hoolilo i keia lauhala i moena mamuli o ka ulana ana o na wahine, a lilo i moena, o ka wahine mua no nana i ulana o Lauhiki no, no laila ike na wahine a pau.
Eia hoi kekahi hana a ka lauhala, o ka lilo ana i pea waa no ka wa kahiko, mamuli [659]no hoi o ka noonoo ana o kekahi kanaka o Lonoauhi kona inoa, o ka mea no nana i ulana o Lauhiki no, a me kona kaikaina o Haumea a me ka laua mau kaikamahine elima, Kamehaikaua, Meahanipaoa, Lohea, Kahuihuimalanai, Kahoanohookaohu, oia no ka pea o ka waa o Kamehameha ekahi. O keia poe he poe akua no lakou. O ke ano o ka pea ua
while sailing on the ocean this was spread on the mast of the canoe when it would really appear like the sun.
Here is another use: the drupes of its fruit were strung into wreaths for people in the olden times. The women who first strung them were Kahuihuimalanai and Kahoanohookaohu, and from them the custom has spread to this time.
Here is another thing: when this wreath dries on the neck, then it is preserved until a troublesome illness appears, such as a stomachache, or other illness for which this medicine is properly used, then it is obtained and fed [to the patient]; if it be for life, he lives; if it be for death, he dies.
These are the fragments concerning the lauhala which I have obtained; but I tell you they were not freely acquired, but were secured through purchase from an old man, he having stated that if he were not paid,
like me ka poepoe o ka la; i ka wa e holo ai ma ka moana, uhi ia iho la maluna o ke kia o ka waa, i ka nana aku ka, ua like io no me ka la.
Eia kekahi hana o ka lilo ana o ka hua i mea lei no na kanaka o ka wa kahiko. O na wahine nana i hana mua, o Kahuihuimalanai a me Kahoanohookaohu, a mai a laua mai ka laha ana mai a hiki i keia wa.
Eia kekahi; aia maloo ua lei ala i ka a-i, alaila malama iho la a hiki mai ka mai pilikia, he nahu paha a me na mai e kupono ana ia laau, alaila kii ia aku la e hanai; ina no ke ola, ua ola, ina no ka make, ua make.
O ia iho la kahi hunahuna o ka lauhala i loaa ia’u, aka, e hai wau ia oukou, aole i loaa wale mai, aka ua loaa mai mamuli o ke kuai ia ana aku, i kekahi wahi elemakule kahiko, me koiala olelo mai, ina aole e uku aku,
then he would not divulge anything. Therefore I thought there was no other way for me to quickly obtain them; so I consented. My expenditure was a real half a dollar. If this is repeated, I will continually be in need, my friends.
alaila, aole e loaa mai. Nolaila, noonoo iho wau, aohe wahi e loaa koke mai ai ia’u, nolaila, ua ae aku au; o ku’u lilo he hapalua dala maoli. Ina pela hou aku mau maoli ka nele e na hoa.
SOME THINGS IN THE BIBLE SIMILAR TO SOME THINGS DONE HERE IN HAWAII IN THE OLDEN TIME.
O KEKAHI MAU MEA O KA BAIBALA I ANO LIKE ME KEKAHI MAU MEA I HANAIA MA HAWAII NEI I KA WA KAHIKO.
There were guides which pointed out to me some of the things done in Hawaii nei which were similar to those [mentioned] in the Bible. First: the book known as the Moolelo Hawaii (Hawaiian History). Second: From some old people who are still living. From these sources were obtained material for comparison.
Elua no hoike nana i hai mai ia’u no kekahi mau mea o Hawaii nei i ano like me ko ka Baibala.
Akahi: O ka buke i kapaia
Moolelo Hawaii. Elua: Mai kekahi poe kahiko mai e ola nei; mailoko mai o keia mau hoike e loaa’i na mea i hoohalikeia.
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We know that, according to the Bible, Adam was the first man; Gen. 1:27, and from him came all the peoples of the earth. According to the Hawaiian version, Kahiko was the first man, and he begat Wakea, and the rest of the people; and they have a genealogy of their ancestors, just like Adam’s.
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It is shown in the Bible that Elijah was the one who ascended into heaven by the power of God: 2 Kings 2:11; and Jesus Christ ascended because of his divine attributes. Thus is it stated in Hawaii’s history: Lonomuku218 ascended to heaven; she was a woman and because her husband cut off her legs, therefore she was halted at the moon. If her husband had not cut off her legs, she would have
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Ua ike kakou ma ka Baibala, o Adamu ke kanaka makamua; Kin. 1:27, a mai iaia mai i laha mai ai na kanaka a pau loa o ka honua. Ma ko Hawaii nei hoi, o Kahiko ke kanaka makamua, a nana mai o Wakea, a me na kanaka apau; a he mookuauhau no, elike me ko Adamu.
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Ua ike ia ma ka Baibala o Elia ka mea i pii aku i ka lani, ma ka mana o ke Akua; 2 Nalii, 2:11, a o Iesu Kristo, ua pii no ia ma kona ano Akua. Pela hoi, ua oleloia ma ko Hawaii nei moolelo, o Lonomuku ka mea i pii i ka lani; he wahine ia, a no ke oki e ana o kana kane i ka wawae, nolaila ua noho ma ka mahina. Ina ka aole i oki ke kane i ka wawae ina ua hiki loa aku oia i kahi o ka la. O kona wahi i
reached the locality [660]of the sun. Her place of ascent was at Hana, the place called Hana-ualani-haahaa.219 That was the reason for so naming the place, and there is more.
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Jonah was the man who lived in the belly of the fish, according to the Bible: Jonah 1:17. Kuikuipahu220 was Hawaii’s [celebrity] who lived in the belly of the shark. He was a chief of Kohala. Once he went surfing with a number of people; and while they were surfing, Kuikuipahu was taken by a shark. The place where he landed was Hana, at Kauiki hill; it was there he was discovered by some people. Eleio was the chief living at that time, and Kipola and Kipalalaia were the prophets; when Kuikuipahu was found, he was not dead; he was still alive.
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pii ai aia ma [661]Hana, ma kahi i kapa ia o Hana-ua-lani-haahaa, oia ka mea i kapaia’i oia wahi, a he mea e aku no kekahi.
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O Iona ke kanaka i noho iloko o ka opu o ka ia, wahi a ka Baibala; Iona 1:17, o Kuikuipahu hoi ko Hawaii nei iloko o ka opu o ka mano. He alii ia no Kohala; i kekahi manawa, hele oia i ka heenalu me na kanaka he lehulehu, a ia lakou e hee nalu ana, ua lilo aku la o Kuikuipahu i ke mano; a o kona wahi i pae ai ma Hana no, o ka puu o Kauiki, malaila kahi i ike ia’i e na kanaka. O Eleio ke alii ia manawa e noho ana; o Kipola hoi ame Kipalalaia, na kaula; i ka ike ia ana o Kuikuipahu aole i make, e ola ana no.
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Pharaoh and Herod were some of the cruel kings mentioned in the Bible; Exodus 1:8–22, Matt. 2:16, and there were also some others. Hakau221 was Hawaii’s cruel king. He was a chief of Waipio. This was the chief who proclaimed that the breasts of all females were to be cut off; and if he saw a man with well tattooed hands, or with good hair, or a woman with good hair, he immediately gave orders to have the hand or the head cut off. There were other cruel practices carried on by this chief. Owaia222 was another cruel chief. It is said that his time was a very bad period, full of debasing pleasures.
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When Jesus was being baptized by John, there was heard a voice crying out from heaven, saying, “Thou art my beloved son, in Thee I am well pleased.” Luke 3:22. And there were other
O Parao ame Herode kekahi o na alii hana ino i hoikeia ma ka Baibala; Puk. 1:8–22; Mat. 2:16, a me kekahi mau alii e aku nohoi. O Hakau hoi ko Hawaii nei alii hana ino. He alii ia no Waipio. O keia alii kai hoolaha ae e okiia ka waiu o na wahine apau loa, a ina e ike aku oia i ke kanaka lima kakau maikai, a me ka lauoho maikai ame ka wahine lauoho maikai, kauoha oia e okiia ke poo, ame ka lima. He mau mea ino e ae no kahi a keia alii i hana ai, Owaia hoi kekahi alii hana ino. Ua oleloia o ka manawa iaia he manawa ino loa piha i na lealea ino.
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I ko Iesu manawa i bapetisoia’i e Ioane, ua lohe ia he leo i pae mai la, mai ka lani mai, e olelo ana: “O oe no ka’u keiki punahele he oluolu loa ko’u ia oe;” Luk. 3:22, a he mau leo e
voices like this in the Bible. So it was here in Hawaii. There was a voice from the heaven enquiring, “Which of the chiefs down below lives righteously?” “It is Kahiko,”223 was the answer
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When Ahab was king of the Israelites, because of the many sins he committed, Elias, the prophet, said to him, “As the Lord God of the Israelites liveth, before whom I stand, there shall not be dew nor rain these years, but according to my word.” 1 Kings 17:1. Thus again: When Hua224 was king here on Maui, Luahoomoe was the [662]prophet at that time. Because Hua wanted to bake Luahoomoe in the oven, therefore he [Luahoomoe] told his sons where to go and live, because he was going to take away the rain (deprive the land of the rain).
Thus there were many other little things here in Hawaii which can
ae no kekahi e like me keia, ua loaa keia ma ka Baibala. Pela no hoi ma Hawaii nei, ua lohe ia no he leo mai ka lani mai e ninau ana: “Owai la ke alii o lalo i pono ka noho ana?” “O Kahiko,” wahi a ka haina.
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I ka manawa o Ahaba ke alii o ka Iseraela, no ka nui loa o kana hana ino, ua olelo aku ke kaula o Elia iaia: “Ma ke ola ana o Iehova ke Akua o ka Iseraela, imua ona e ku nei au, aole auanei he ua, aole hau i na makahiki ekolu, ma ka’u olelo wale no;” 1 Nalii 17:1. Pela no hoi. I ka wa o Hua ke alii o Maui nei o Luahoomoe, ke [663]kaula ia manawa, no ka manao ana o Hua e kalua ia o Luahoomoe i ka imu, nolaila, olelo kela i kana mau keiki, i kahi e noho ai, nokamea, e lawe ana ia i ka ua.
Pela hoi, he nui na mea liilii e ae o Hawaii nei i like me kekahi
be compared with some things in the Bible, but my illustrations thereon are sufficient.
February 15, 1872.
G. P .
THE DAYS AND THE MONTHS.
During the month of Ikuwa225 occurs the rain called Pohakoeleele;226 on the day called Hua227 at noon, a person goes to plant. These are the names of the stalks to be propagated: hualani, hokeo, lopa, likolehua and kawelo. 228
This is the method of planting: he takes three stalks, separating them one from the other with his fingers, and plants them. He leaves them until two months have passed; he goes to inspect them, and if he finds that they have grown well he says this:
mau mea o ka Baibala, aka, ua lawa ka’u hoike no keia.
February 15, 1872.
G. P
NA LA A ME NA MALAMA.
Iloko o ka malama o Ikua, o Poha-koeleele ka ua; i ka la o Hua, a i ke awakea hele aku oia e kanu. Eia ka inoa o na lau e kanu ai: Hualani, hokeo, lopa, likolehua, kawelo. Penei ke kanu ana; lawe aku oia ekolu lau me ka hookakahaka ana i ka lau me kona lima; a kanu aku oia, waiho aku a hala na mahina elua, hele aku oia e nana: a ike ua ulu pono, eia kana olelo: “Ua ola ka hoi keia noho ana ae, ua maikai ka ulu ana.” Aka, ina hele aku oia ua make a ua ponalo, kaumaha loa ia no ka puka pono
“The future [living] is provided for, the growth is good.” But if when he arrives, they are dead or drying up, he would feel grieved because they did not do well. The farmers know there is a time when plants do not grow well; that is the winter season when rains are plentiful and the shoots will die. But if a planter waits until the month of Ikiiki,229 of misty rain, that is when the rain is light and is easily scattered by the wind, on the day of Mohalu230 in the month of Ikiiki, [that] is the month for him to plant in the manner described above. These are the names of the potatoes to be planted: waipalupalu, kokoakeawe, kuapai, heauau and haole. He waits until the months of Kaaona231 and Hinaiaeleele232 are past when he goes again to look, and he finds that some are dead and some are growing. This is what he says: “My wife and children are saved by the baldheaded one.” He waits for some time longer until the grass grows, then he weeds it; this [weeding] is sufficient until the time that the potato is ripe. After
ole. Ua maopopo no i ka poe mahiai he wa no ia e puka pono ole ai ka lau, oiai ke kau hooilo ia, nui ka ua a make ka lau. Aka, noho mai oia iloko o ka malama o Ikiiki o ka ihunahuna ka ua, oia hoi, ka ua liilii pulelehua i ka makani, i ka la o Mohalu i ka malama o Ikiiki kanu oia e like me ka mea i hai ia ae la maluna. Eia ka inoa o na uala e kanu ai: Waipalupalu, kokoakeawe a he kuapai, heauau, he haole. Noho oia a hala ka malama o Kaaona a me Hinaiaeleele, hele hou aku oia e nana, a ike ua make kekahi a ua ola. Eia kana olelo: “Ua ola ka’u wahine ame ka’u mau keiki i kahi Ohulu;” noho ua kanaka nei a loihi a ala ka mauu, kuehu aku oia i ka mauu; a pau ia o ke oo no ia o ka lau. Alaila, waiho aku a loihi na la, alaila, kii aku ke kanaka mahiai, hooili i ka lepo; a loaa ka uala maka hooili ana i ka lepo, o ia hoi ka hua i ka wa ame ka hua i ka lala hahai mai oia i ka uala mua. Hoi aku oia a hiki i ka hale, hoa ka imu a kalua a moa hoihoi mai a ka hale, noho oia ma ka puka, penei oia e kahea ai: “Kela ao nui eleele i ka maka o ka opua la olalo iho, e
weeding, leave it for many days; when the planter comes again and hills up the soil. If any potato is found while hilling up the dirt, that is, the fruit in between the plants growing on the vine, he breaks off the first potato. He returns, lights a fire in the imu, cooks the potato until done, and brings it to the house. He sits beside the doorway and prays thus: “Ye large black cloud hanging below the eye of the narrow pointed clouds, give shade, protecting shade; guard this our garden, O Keaonui;233 do thou cast shade over this our garden, O Keaonui; shade thou from that corner to this corner; shade thou from that side to this side; shade not another’s garden lest you be scolded for shutting out the sun and chilling the owner of that garden. O Keaonui, shade thou this our field; shade thou the hills, shade thou the leaves of our food, so that the plants would grow and the [664]hills be filled with potatoes. O ye Keaonui, shade our garden from the head to the bottom, from the upper to the
malu malu kiai, kiai ae i ko kaua waena nei la o Keaonui, malu oe i ko kaua waena nei la, e Keaonui, e malu oe mai kela kihi a i keia kihi, e malu oe mai kela iwi a keia iwi; mai malu oe i ko hai waena o huhu ia oe i ke pani i ka la, koekoe ka mea nona ia waena. E Keaonui e! e malu oe i ko kaua waena nei; malu oe i ka pue, malu oe i ka lau o ka kaua ai, i ulu, i piha ka pue i ka [665]uala. E Keaonui e! e malu i ko kaua waena mai uka a kai, mai nae a lalo, elieli kapu, ua noa.”
lower side; hallowed is the prayer; it is free.”
This prayer is the request of the gods to come and partake of the first fruit of their garden. He then waits until the first Mahoe234 is past, and during the second Mahoe on the day of Lono,235 he goes to get some potatoes for food, taking some of them to the heiau (temple). Because on that night the god returns to partake of the food of his planting devotee; thus the saying: “Lives he who has a god; dead is he who has none.” After these months during which the children and the parents have partaken of the food, these also being the last months of the rainy season, the summer again approaches. Let us drop the discussion about the winter season, and take up for consideration what is done during the summer.
;236 , .
O keia pule ana oia no ke kahea ana i ke akua e hoi e ai i ka hua mua o ka laua mea kanu. Noho aku oia a hala ka Mahoe mua, a komo aku iloko o ka Mahoe alua.
I ka po o Lono, kii aku oia e ai i ka uala, me ka lawe ana i ka uala i ka heiau; nokamea, oia ka po e hoi mai ai o ke akua, e ai i ka ai a kahi pulapula hooulu ai: “ola nohoi ka mea akua, make no hoi ka mea akua ole,” wahi a ka olelo. A hala keia mau malama o ka ai ana o na makua ame na keiki i ka ai, a o na malama hope no hoi keia o ka hooilo, o ka puka no ia iwaho o ke kau. Maanei kakou e waiho ai i ke kamailio ana no ka hooilo, e huli aku kakou e nana i na hana o ke kau.
: .
This is the method of cultivating Penei ka mahiai ana o ke kau.
during the summer: The farmer goes to select the mahakea, 237 that is a place where weeds grow in abundance; that is the best place for planting. This is how he knows: he cuts the weeds and leaves them on the ground, and rain falls, the leaves and the dirt become wet; that is why the stalks do not die when planted in the summer season, because the weeds cover the ground and retain the moisture in the soil. But when he cultivates, he does it during the days of Laaukukahi, Laaukulua, Laaupau, Olekukahi, Olekulua, Olepau, Kaloakukahi, Kaloakulua and Kaloapau;238 those are the best days during which to plant, a practice handed down by our ancestors.
After he has cut down the weeds he waits for the rain to fall; during the month of Welo,239 Pookole (short head) is the rain, that is the rain which we style a cloud-burst; then the farmer proceeds to crop off stalks. Here are the names of the different kinds of stalks which he gathers: pae, apo, kapapa, mohihi, uli
Hele aku aku ke kanaka mahiai e nana i kahi mahakea, oia hoi kahi nahelehele e ulu nui ana, oia kahi maikai i ka mahi ana. Penei e maopopo ai; i kona mahi ana i ka nahelehele a hina ilalo, a haule mai ka ua, a ma-u iho la ka lepo a me ka nahelehele, oia ke kumu e make ole ai ka lau ke puka iwaho o ke kau, nokamea, ua uhi iho ka nahelehele i ka ma-u o ka lepo. Aka, i ka mahiai ana o ua kanaka nei, iloko o na po o Laaukukahi, Laaukulua, Laaupau, ame Olekukahi, Olekulua, Olepau, ame Kaloakukahi, Kaloakulua, Kaloapau, oia na po maikai i ka mahiai ana, a he mau po no hoi i maa mai ko lakou kupuna mai.
I ka pau ana o ka mahiai ana, waiho aku ka mea mahiai o ka haule mai o ka ua; iloko o ka malama o Welo o pookole ka ua, oia ka ua, he ao ku ia kakou; alaila, hele aku ke kanaka mahiai e ako i ka lau. Eia na inoa o na lau ana e ako ai: he pae, he apo, he kapapa, he mohihi, he uli, a he paa. Oope
and paa. 240 He wraps these stalks in bundles and leaves them until the days when the Pleiades rise in the morning, when he proceeds to plant them. He plants them thus: he takes six stalks and keeps them separated as mentioned above; after planting, he waits for a number of days; then during the month of Nana,241 on the day of Kane,242 he goes to look at the potato field, and finds it is injured; that is, the stalks are all eaten by cutworms, some have come off and some are dead. During the month of Kaulua,243 on the day called Lono, in the evening, he goes to crop off some more stalks. These are the names of the stalks he gathers: hualani, poni, loepaa, awapuhi, uahiapele, pikonui and kupa. 244 He bundles these and sets them aside as described above. He waits until the month of Kaelo,245 on the day called Mauli246 in the evening when the moon sets; that [666]is the time to plant the stalks. He plants them in this way: he first distributes the stalks among the hills, eight to each hill; then he plants them. When
oia i keia mau lau a waiho aku, a hiki i na kakahiaka e puka mai ai na huihui, oia ka wa e kanu ai i na lau. Penei ke kanu ana: Lawe oia eono lau e kanu ai me ka hoohakahaka e like ma ka mea i hoike ia’e maluna; a pau kona kanu ana, noho oia a loihi kekahi mau la, hele aku oia i ka malama o Nana, i ka la o Kane, e nana i ka mala uala, ua nui ka poino; oia hoi ua pau i ka peeluamoeone a me ke kahuli a ua make wale iho no hoi kahi. I ka malama o Kaulua, i ka la o Lono, i ke ahiahi, hele aku oia e ako i na lau hou. Eia ka inoa o na lau e ako ai: hualani, poni loepaa, awapuhi, uahiapele, pikonui, kupa; oope oia a waiho aku e like me ka mea i hoike ia’e maluna, noho oia a hiki mai ka malama o Kaelo, i ka la o Mauli i ke ahiahi i ka wa e ili ai ka mahina, oia ka wa e kanu ai i ka lau. Penei ke kanu ana: Kiolaola mua keia i ka lau ma ka pue, ewalu nae lau o ka pue hookahi; kanu mai oia. A pau, noho aku oia a hala na malama ino, a loihi ka noho ana, a i ka malama o Kaaona hele oia e hooili i ka lepo i ka pue o ka uala, a
