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Philosophy of Systems Biology Perspectives from Scientists and Philosophers 1st Edition Sara Green (Eds.)
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Chapter 10 Other Models of
Science
List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Blackbody radiation. Red, green, and blue lines are the radiation based on Wien’s approximation for 3000K, 4000K, and 5000K, respectively. The black solid line is given by the Rayleigh–Jeans law. The dashed black line is the formula proposed by Max Planck that bridges Wien’s approximation and Rayleigh–Jeans law. The mathematic expression for each model is given. 20
Figure 4.1. Deductive logic involving three terms. There are multiple possible relationships between A, B, and C. 84
Figure 4.2. Deductive logic form if____ then____. The first label of a pair of labels separated with a slash is the “if condition” and the second label is the “then conclusion”. A label with (without) underline is a true (not true) statement. For example, P/Q is for if P is true, then Q is true, and Q/P is for if Q is true, then P is true. Underlined P/Q represents if P is not true, then Q is not true. Underlined Q/P represents if Q is not true, then P is not true. Black (red) labels and circles indicate valid (invalid) deduction. 85
Figure 4.3. Raven paradox. Circle A represent all black things, and everything beyond the circle A is non-black things. Circle C represents ravens. Overlapping area B of circles A and C represents black ravens. 96
Figure 9.1. Illustration of the Theory of Scientific Reasoning. The plane describes human cognition with two phenomena or groups of related observations on the upper left and the lower right of each panel. The vertical reasoning flow is deductive, such as mathematics, which is forward in causal relation. The horizontal reasoning flow is inductive, such as a result from a correlative analysis between two observations/variables, which cannot determine the causal relation. Two reasonings/ understandings/conceptualizations are shown as green and brown lines in the right panel. At each connecting point, dialectical reasoning, indicated by red dots on the right panel, is used to eliminate alternatives. 235
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Different Perspectives in Philosophy of Science
Just as there are philosophers who love science, there are scientists who love philosophy. However, their contributions to the field of philosophy of science are unequal. Over the past hundred years, the central questions and mainstream theories of philosophy of science have been framed by philosophers, linguists, and historians with little input from scientists. One exception is Thomas Kuhn, who, although not a scientist, had rigorous entry-level training in science and made significant contributions to the field of philosophy of science. On the other hand, there are several scientists who have contributed to some peripheral or specialized subtopics in philosophy of science. By studying the conventional theories of philosophy of science and the scientific method, it is clear to me that philosophers and scientists have very different perspectives on philosophy of science. Some of these differences are due to differences in training and experiences, but other differences are more fundamental in philosophy!
The difference starts from fundamental questions of what science is and what scientists do. On the one hand, to a philosopher, “science is just the attempt to understand, explain, and predict the world we live in” using “particular methods that scientists use to investigate the world” (Okasha, 2016). Accordingly, the objective of philosophy of science is to find these “particular methods”, which they call “scientific methods”, for
scientists to follow in their scientific pursuits. To scientists, on the philosophical level, science is a process of developing new knowledge, and scientists are to invent new knowledge while filtering out false knowledge. The difficulty in this process is that the newly invented knowledge could be wrong, and the knowledge filtered out could be correct! One of the critical questions to a scientist is the following: How can we prevent these mistakes from happening?
Most existing theories of philosophy of science are natural extensions of epistemology in philosophy. However, epistemology concerns knowledge in general. Science, instead, is mostly about inventing and developing new knowledge and less about the nature and scope of knowledge that is defined by their profession. The questions for philosophy of science should be a set of focused ones in epistemology. Over centuries, scientists have developed, but not well theorized, a system to handle special situations in science. This system defies the standard theories of epistemology and, unfortunately, is mostly unknown to philosophers of science. This book aims to theorize and present this system, i.e., a new theory of science in philosophy of science, although not yet a complete theory of philosophy of science.
Many people think that science, in a nutshell, inquires into the “root of the matter”. While this may be true and sounds very inspiring to curious minds, it is only a small part of what scientists do. Philosophers ask deep questions, some of which can be so deep that no one can answer them. In addition to asking questions, scientists have to find answers to practical questions. To answer a question, an immediate new question is whether the answer is correct or not.
The conventional idea of philosophy of science tells us that scientists need to be rational by proving an idea with evidence. Theories of philosophy of science cite many historical stories centuries after the events like commentators that tell the general public who did something right or something wrong for precisely what reasons. They explain why science has successfully invented new knowledge that other investigative disciplines should emulate. According to these theories, if a story of science development is not rational, we have got it wrong. Conventional theories of philosophy of science offer their help to make a “rational reconstruction” of the history of science in order to ensure our theories, information,
logic, and critical reasoning are correct. To most people, especially science enthusiasts, rationality and evidence should lead us to the truth, although some may have reservations to “reconstruct history”.
On the other hand, scientists invent new knowledge and ideas. To them, it is often not so clear what is right or wrong at the time of an event. This is because they predominantly deal with other scientists who are also investigating the same problem. At the philosophical level, if all scientists are rational and prove their ideas with justified evidence, one may think they should all come to the same answer or solution to a problem, just like finding the same solution to an equation in mathematics. But then, one finds that scientists have different ideas or answers and debate among themselves. If they debate heatedly, some rationalizations must be wrong or evidence incomplete or ambiguous. Therefore, an essential task for a scientist is to find out which rationalization and evidence are more likely to be correct. What makes it so challenging to figure out the correctness of a rationalization? Shouldn’t evidence be an indisputable hard fact, a curious mind may ask? In reality, unfortunately, the evidence is rarely a hard fact itself and often depends on the interpretation of information or facts based on a plausible rationalization or idea. It is often that different rationalizations/ideas interpret the same information or observation as evidence that supports opposite theories!
The history of science has shown that science can eventually pick the right idea and rationalize it accordingly. But this is usually done long after the dust has settled; however, each of us has only a blinkingly short life in the long history of civilization. Each scientist has to decide when a question is still being debated versus learning about accepted information and knowledge from, e.g., a textbook. No scientists want to waste their talents by working on a wrong idea. Everyone wants to make a correct decision to either invent new ideas that will positively contribute to and benefit our society or follow and further develop a new idea that is later proven right. This decision is difficult because, at the time of an event, our knowledge and information are incomplete or partial, in contrast to the 20/20 vision viewed from a rearview mirror by historians and philosophers in philosophy of science. The questions and problems that scientists have to face lead them to different perspectives from that of historians and philosophers, as I will discuss in this book.
This book is written for scientists, students, and teachers of science and engineering, and readers who are interested in philosophy and philosophy of science. In this book, I outline a new theory of science that is fundamentally different from the existing theories. The new theory is built upon over three decades of my experience in deliberating the fundamental questions in space physics. I started developing my understanding of the system of science and my theory of science 36 years ago during my graduate program under the guidance of Dr. Christopher T. Russell. He provided many insights that formed the core of my working knowledge of philosophy of science and my understanding of the structure of science.
In 1994, Dr. Eugene Parker called for a paradigm change in space physics, which will be described in Section 6.5. I have been very fortunate to work with Dr. Vytenis Vasyliūnas since 2001 on this paradigm change project. While the project involves much physics and mathematics, I found that the two of us have spent much more time discussing questions such as how to get it right and how to know we are not wrong, the central questions of philosophy of science discussed in this book. For scientists, these questions become essential when they can competently handle all technical aspects of an issue and when the research aims at challenging existing paradigms or theories. The experience in this process has strongly influenced the theory developed in this book.
There are significant differences in the interests and concerns between the targeted audience and philosophers. First, philosophers require their terminology to be linguistically consistent with all aspects of their meanings used in histories and dictionaries. In science, a term means what it means in common sense and is defined in the context of a publication. Our discussion is irrelevant to politics, religion, and metaphysics, where ambiguities in interpreting some terms may occur. Some examples of social sciences are used for demonstrative purposes of a theory, but in scientific discussions, political correctness is not a measure to judge the theory’s correctness.
Second, the interpretation of many historical events, e.g., the event around Copernicus’s theory, discussed in Section 1.4, could be quite different by a scientist. As you will find out by reading this book, scientists allow many other possibilities if they are self-consistent and consistent
with significant undebatable facts and any applicable governing scientific principles and laws. Many possibilities presented in this book may not necessarily be consistent with the popular interpretation of a fact discussed in the conventional theories of philosophy of science. As stated above, evidence often depends on interpreting an observation based on a particular rationalization or theory. Taking an interpretation of a fact, i.e., evidence, as the fact itself is often a starting point of bias or flaw in science or other types of investigation, such as philosophy of science.
Third, in conventional philosophy of science, a theory is often required to be general and universal primarily because of the guiding idea required by deductive logic, which will be discussed in Section 4.2 and Chapters 7 and 9. In this case, any counterexample is fatal to the theory. However, science comprises many disciplines of various natures and states of development. Some are more quantitative where possible interpretations of a fact are greatly limited by a quantitative comparison of the prediction with observation. However, many disciplines are still mostly descriptive, where the fact or observation may still be subject to multiple interpretations. In principle, it is easier to propose a qualitative theory or model, but the uncertainty and ambiguity of the theory or model can also be huge. One can easily find either supporting examples or counterexamples for a descriptive theory. Even if a theory can explain major observations and facts with evidence that is based on an interpretation of the observations, one may be able to find something in detail to argue against the theory based on a different interpretation. It is impossible to find a universally true theory of science in philosophy based solely on deductive logic and without allowing exceptions. We hence focus on major observations and allow exceptions to exist, in principle, when we develop the theory of science. As we will see, this notion is against Karl Popper’s idea of falsification in philosophy of science.
Because the objective of this book is to improve our understanding of science, it is more important to understand why a theory, especially a widely accepted one, does not work than why it works. Therefore, one will find in this book more negative comments than positive comments concerning a theory. One may feel uncomfortable, but this is the essential spirit of science: scientists spend much more time in falsifying an idea, mostly one’s own idea.
1.2 Starting Questions
Often a scientist starts an investigation with probing or thought-provoking questions, but many conventional theories of philosophy of science tell us that science begins with a hypothesis or conjecture. Therefore, we differ from the beginning. So, let us start with a few questions as a scientist does and see where these questions lead us.
How do we know that the Earth is not flat but a sphere?
The responses can be as simple as the following: I learned it when I was a child; I have a globe of the Earth; my teacher told me; I saw a photo of the Earth taken from space…
If you respond in this way, you have understood this as a question of knowledge — things many people believe true, a concept of philosophy of science to be more carefully defined and discussed in Chapter 3 — or specifically referred to in philosophy of science as knowledge-that — literally, something many people know about and believe to be true. In philosophy of science, however, one may question whether what they have been told or have learned is true or not. The answer to this question with evidence and reasoning is referred to as knowledge-understanding — literally, things many people not only know about but also understand — in philosophy of science. Obviously, in our everyday life experience, the Earth appears to be flat! One may argue that they were once on a beach (or a cruise ship) and saw a curved ocean horizon across the viewing direction with a distant ship emerging into view. This demonstrates that the ocean surface is curved both in and across the viewing direction. Indeed, this can be considered a very convincing piece of evidence. However, for those who have lived inland, for example, as in a mountainous area and have never seen an ocean, the horizon is rugged. Shouldn’t they conclude the Earth to be mostly flat with some mountains and valleys which may be filled with water to become lakes and rivers? At least the water surface of a lake seems unambiguously flat. Doesn’t it?
On the other hand, to be a scientist, you are interested in finding new knowledge. Anything that is already known is not interesting unless it is used to discover or invent something else new, or you find that the knowledge itself is potentially flawed. In this regard, you should imagine
yourself in a time before people knew that the Earth is a sphere or when two groups of people were newly debating about whether the Earth was flat or spherical. With the information and knowledge available at that time, which side would you take in this debate and how could you prove that the Earth is a sphere? If you were a strong proponent of a flat Earth and staked your name on trying to prove that, you would have no problem guessing how people would talk about your findings now. Ancient people, based on the very limited ability to observe with scientific reasoning, actually proved that the Earth is a sphere around the 5th century B.C. How did they do this? I will discuss this in Chapter 4.
What is knowledge?
After considering the last question, you should have noted that “knowledge” is something very useful. If someone proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Earth is spherical, you do not need to repeat the process of showing evidence and reasoning for it — it is now common knowledge that the Earth is spherical. But there is a problem: Could knowledge be wrong? I recall that people believed that the Earth was flat before someone convincingly showed them that it was a sphere. Furthermore, we have proven that many things previously considered common knowledge are wrong. How do we know if today’s common knowledge is not flawed, or if it will hold for a long time, such as our lifetimes, and extend into future generations? I will discuss this problem more in Chapter 3.
What is science? How do we know that science, as people often assume, will bring us correct answers?
The term “science” is derived from the Latin word Scientia, meaning the result of logical demonstration, i.e., something that reveals a general and necessary truth. This definition only touches a small part of today’s real science. Science is a process to invent new knowledge and filter out false knowledge, as will be discussed in this book. There are tremendous confusing and widespread misconceptions about science in the general public, in addition to the philosophy of science community. Often in public discussions, such as reports, speeches, and debates, if something is mentioned as scientific, it is taken as the truth without the need for further
discussion or debate, although there is also an undercurrent against science which thinks “scientific” to mean not human. Why is science so powerful, and should it be this powerful? Can a scientific result be wrong? As discussed earlier, many people consider science powerful because it is rational and based on evidence. This reasoning seems very convincing until we realize that there are different ideas and rationalizations. Furthermore, in science, evidence is not always a fact or direct observation; instead, it is an interpretation of that fact or observation, as discussed in Section 1.1. For example, a murder weapon with fingerprints of the murderer on it may seem to be clear evidence that no one can argue about or deny. But a simple fact or observation may be interpreted in multiple possible ways, each of which could be based on a particular theory or rationalization.1 Which interpretation is correct or more reliable? These questions will be discussed in depth throughout this book, especially in Chapter 9.
Is there a scientific method?
“Of course”, most people would answer, “Yes!” because scientific methods have been taught in high school or even earlier. Many of us could elaborate on several methods, such as the famous hypothetico-deductive (H-D) model. With the H-D model, one starts with a hypothesis and collects evidence to deductively prove that the evidence supports the hypothesis. Done. But as stated at the beginning of this section, scientists start with questions and not hypotheses. Newton did not begin his study with a hypothesis of gravity that needed to be proven, but instead, he questioned, as the legend goes, “Why do apples fall towards the Earth?”.
In this book, I will question the very notion that there is a so-called scientific method in science. If you follow the popular scientific method rigorously, unfortunately, you likely reach a wrong conclusion or find
1 In the O. J. Simpson murder case, there was a famous golf glove that was found behind OJ’s house and seemed to be his size. OJ was known to be a good golfer. The glove was once soaked with blood but was dry when presented in the courtroom. The DNA samples from the glove were consistent with that of OJ and the murder victims. Could it be used as evidence for OJ being the murderer? In the most dramatic moment of the whole trial, the prosecutor asked OJ to try it on. OJ did, but it did not fit. What conclusion can you draw?
yourselves on the wrong side of a debate, as discussed in an example in Section 1.4. Different methods and reasoning, that may or may not be scientific, will be discussed in Chapter 7. In contrast, scientists derive and present conclusions following scientific reasoning, which is the language that all scientists speak to communicate with each other, both consciously and subconsciously. Although they may disagree on specific scientific points within a debate, they all follow the same set of scientific reasoning. If you want to be a scientist, it is essential to learn about scientific reasoning, which will be discussed in Chapter 9.
How do I get it right? How do I know that I am not wrong?
These two questions are closely related, but the second one is much more difficult to answer. According to the ancient definition of science, a “logical demonstration” can get things right. Therefore, how to “get it right” — how to justifiably prove that something is correct — has been a central question for epistemologists and philosophers of science. However, if everyone knows how to get it right, they should derive the same result, shouldn’t they? They should, IF they have complete information. But in science, the information is most likely incomplete; there may be many different possible logical demonstrations for the same reason as to why there are multiple sets of solutions when the number of unknowns is greater than the number of equations. How do I decide which logical demonstration is right? Or maybe worse, the problem may involve something too complicated to sort out (perhaps, I cannot pinpoint how many unknowns and how many equations) or some mathematics that is too complex to solve. How can I get it right? I will discuss the problem more extensively in Chapter 9.
If I am lucky enough to have obtained a result with a method or reasoning I think is correct, can I be wrong? How do I know I am not? In other words, how do I know the method and (or) reasoning I am using are correct and flawless? If my answer to these questions is that I am using exactly the same method everyone else is using, can I still be wrong? This problem is undeniable when opposite results are recognized and presented by two scientists on a subject. Shouldn’t one of the two be wrong? Or, are both of them right, or both wrong? How do I know that I am not the person with the wrong result? These questions are crucially vital for one’s
scientific career! How can one be so confident and, at the same time, overcome personal biases? A good scientist cannot make a major mistake, or their scientific credibility would be seriously compromised. How to avoid the latter from happening will be discussed in Chapter 11.
What is a Ph.D?
A Ph.D. stands for “Doctor of Philosophy” and is a desirable degree for many academics and professionals, you may respond. But why ask? This is a curious question, you may wonder. There are many different types of Doctoral degrees in addition to a Ph.D., such as a Medical Doctorate (M.D.) or a Doctor of Engineering (Eng. D.). What is unique about a Doctor of Philosophy, and why is it more challenging to get? Why is philosophy so important?
Historically, Ph.D. degrees were designed for those who wanted to become teachers (in churches). But why are teachers so special, needing this particular degree program? What separates them from other doctoral degrees? When answering this last question, many recognize that a teacher is knowledgeable about the subject and can teach it. Teachers must have well-organized thoughts when preparing a curriculum and leading others; they are good at and do not fear public speaking, and can understandably explain complex concepts with simple, clear, and concise language, you may add. Don’t forget that teachers are the ones who give you homework assignments and exams! “So what? This is a privilege and not an ability”, you may respond. But teachers have the answers to all the questions in homework and exams! “Then so what? They are supposed to know”, you may still disagree. What if the teacher gave a wrong answer causing you to fail your test? Wouldn’t you challenge the teacher? To avoid this, the teacher has to know how to get the answers right and know why the answers are not wrong, the two questions in the last topic. After graduation, you no longer have a teacher to tell you what answer is correct and what is wrong. You are on your own to figure out right or wrong. What sets a Doctor of Philosophy apart, no matter their area of expertise, is their ability to find the right answers and make correct decisions. Of course, one can gain this ability through practice and not necessarily through a Ph.D. program. Even if you choose to be a leader within a business or industrial field, rather than in academia, your subordinates
will look to you for guidance. Are you able to lead them to success? I will discuss this problem more throughout the book.
In the following three sections, I discuss three examples that are repeatedly used in debates in conventional theories of philosophy of science.
1.3 Raven Paradox
First proposed by Carl Hempel in 1945, this is one of the most famous paradoxes in philosophy of science. As it is described below, you may disagree with the logic, but the purpose, for now, is about what causes the paradox rather than how to resolve it.
Let us assume that we have observed many black ravens, and no raven of other colors has been found. According to our typical way of thinking, we guess that all ravens are black. This must be true because this is what we have observed — we observed without wearing sunglasses during sunny days, and we checked that the black color was not painted on. With this information, we may then make a (scientific) hypothesis that “all ravens are black”. The scientific method tells us we should start our scientific pursuit to prove it. We could simply find more black ravens and reduce the chance of the hypothesis being wrong. However, we could “deductively” justify this hypothesis according to the hypotheticodeductive method we learned, where the deduction is a formal logic to be discussed in Section 4.2. We reason that because all ravens are black, a non-black thing is non-raven. We then go out looking for supporting evidence for our hypothesis, and when doing so, we find a white swan. Because this swan is non-black and non-raven, our hypothesis holds well. We may also find many other things around us, such as a red coat and a blue pan, that are non-black and non-raven. These items can all be used as evidence to support our hypothesis that “all ravens are black”. Therefore, we declare that we have found a large amount of supporting evidence for our hypothesis and that our hypothesis is justified. Because we are good scientists, we go further by searching for all black things and finding ravens among them. This confirms our hypothesis.
So far, every step of reasoning is rigorous deductive logic. We are now ready to announce to the world that our hypothesis of “all ravens are
black” is justified or proved. But one thing happens: There are non-black ravens that have been found (due to albinism). Now the question is as follows: Where is the flaw in our proof? We have followed everything we were told about science as faithfully as possible, yet our hypothesis can be disputed, or falsified. Hence, this example is a paradox because its hypothesis is both justifiable and disputable. It shows that the H-D scientific method is fallible in this case. You may go to the internet to find various modifications of this method that are supposed to avoid the fallacy. But aren’t they fallible too? A fallacy such as this is not allowed in science. If you start questioning the scientific method you have learned, how do scientists avoid the problem? Is the problem specific to this particular case, or is the method fundamentally flawed? We will address this question and discuss the paradox of the ravens in more detail in Chapters 4 and 7.
1.4 Geocentric Versus Heliocentric Theory of Planetary Motions
The paradox of ravens may be a demonstrative example by philosophers of the usefulness of philosophy of science. Copernicus’s heliocentric theory may be used to illustrate the difficulty scientists face every day in their research. This is one of the most famous stories widely known by the general public and discussed in philosophy of science; you may have heard about it before. However, the version you heard about has likely been distorted based on conventional theories of philosophy of science. Because it is critically important to understand philosophy of science from the perspectives of scientists, I will give a detailed description of this example in this section. It will be discussed and cited frequently in later chapters. You may find it necessary to reread it as needed. According to the geocentric theory of the motion of heavenly bodies, the Earth is at the center of the universe, and all celestial bodies circle the Earth. This may be intuitively correct since one sees sunrise and sunset and moonrise and moonset every day. This theory is believed to be developed by Claudius Ptolemy (100–170 AD), an astronomer in Roman Egypt. With various modifications and improvements, this theory held for an extended period without serious challenges until 1543 AD when
Nicolaus Copernicus proposed a heliocentric theory in which all planets, including the Earth, circle the Sun. In philosophy of science, this event marks the start of a scientific revolution because the heliocentric theory is more scientific and has surpassed the geocentric theory. This overall assessment and reasoning, unfortunately, is incorrect or at least questionable to a scientist.
Let us first ignore the question of which theory is right or wrong. When discussing a historical event in philosophy of science, as a scientist, we have to imagine ourselves living during the time of the event and not knowing current beliefs. This is because for the scientific investigations and debates we are conducting, we may not know in our lifetime which theory will eventually be right centuries later. Many popular theories of philosophy of science have been developed based on the knowledge of the future evolution of science, which was unknown at the time of the event. If one follows the theories and uses the evidence available at the time, they will only find themselves to be wrong centuries later. Being scientists at Copernicus’s time, without the luxury of knowing the future, we each have to make our own judgment on whether the geocentric theory is (more possible to be) right or the heliocentric theory is. We all want to make correct judgments so that our contributions can be recognized in future research or history. If I make a wrong judgment, on the other hand, especially if the judgment is proven wrong before my retirement, my scientific career and credibility would be fundamentally affected. I can use the best, no matter how incomplete, knowledge and information I have at the time. But the best knowledge and information at the time could be inaccurate or even incorrect. This is the fundamentally different perspective a scientist has from a philosopher who has often based their theories on the information available centuries later.
Now, we examine the event around Copernicus’s theory using the scientific method. We have two hypotheses in front of us: geocentrism and heliocentrism. Although we might lean toward one, as a scientist, we must be neutral when we start examining the two options. But remaining neutral is difficult. This is a good time to discuss personal biases that may impact our scientific judgment. If someone makes a big statement, it is quite natural for everyone else to question: “Who is this person?” “Why should we believe him at all?” To answer these questions, we need to
know Copernicus better. Copernicus was a church and government official and a physician to some dignitaries. According to today’s standards, he was only an amateur astronomer because he did not teach astronomy nor did he have a full-time job observing the positions of heavenly bodies, though he made observations of a few planets’ positions using his homemade devices. These facts should not affect one’s scientific judgment, but people tend to be affected by them especially when the claim is against conventional beliefs. If the theory of an amateur goes against the theory of a Nobel Prize winner or a famous scientist from a prestigious university, would you believe the amateur? If you held a professional astronomer position at the time, would you believe or simply discard Copernicus’s new theory? Why should you trust Copernicus and his theory while leading astronomers that you know or have worked with have all told you something different?2
We will next learn what led Copernicus to his idea. The heliocentric theory originated in ancient Greece; Copernicus did not invent it. Instead, he cited this old idea to show that he was not totally off the mark. Nevertheless, this idea did not draw much serious attention before him. According to Calendars through the Ages, Copernicus started circulating an outline of his theory in 1514. Historical records indicated that, in 1533, his theory was well received by church officials, including Pope Clement VII and Catholic cardinals. Although the situation might have changed, as speculated by historians, after Pope Paul III succeeded Pope Clement VII in 1534, Copernicus was still invited in 1536 by Cardinal Nikolaus von Schönberg to communicate his discovery. Copernicus published his theory in his book De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium (On the Revolutions of the Celestial Spheres), before his death in 1543. These details were significant because some historians and philosophers of science misrepresented the book as found in his will, making an impression that Copernicus
2 A similar example is that of Gregor Mendel (Moore, 2001), who was also not a scientist but a priest and taught physics in his abbey. He conducted experiments on plant hybridization in the garden of his monastery. Less lucky than Copernicus, his results (1865–1866) were ignored by the scientific community at the time because he was not a scientist. Long after his passing in 1884, his results were rediscovered in 1900 by three independent duplications that confirmed his results, which became the foundation for modern genetics. Mendel is now known as the father of modern genetics.
expected a “revolution” due to the publication of his book. Incidentally, Copernicus used the word “revolution” in the title of his book to mean “moving around” and not to mean reversing social orders. His theory became controversial only some 70 years later when Kepler’s and Galileo’s works became available, during a period of religious conservatism influenced by the Protestant Reformation and Catholic CounterReformation. Therefore, the controversy more likely resulted from political and/or religious changes than a scientific revolution. The controversy surrounding the theory might not be a purely scientific problem or even a philosophy of science problem.
Now the question is as follows: If you were a scientist living during that time, what would you do? You might conduct research and give public lectures to either support or be against Copernicus’s theory. Copernicus’s theory was proposed after the global voyages of Christopher Columbus to the west (1493–1503) and Ferdinand Magellan-Juan Elcano’s circumnavigation (1519–1522). During these two voyages, astronomical observations had been used as a fundamental navigation method because the geomagnetic field direction had been unknown at the time in large areas of oceans. Therefore, the positions and motions of the Sun, Earth, Moon, and some planets were tested during these voyages. It would have been noted if the geocentric model had been entirely wrong. At the time, you might assume the geocentric theory could make adequate predictions, as it was tested and verified extensively during these and other voyages. Therefore, at the time, you may conclude that there was not much observational evidence for Copernicus to propose a new idea against geocentrism.
Why did Copernicus think that the commonly accepted idea was wrong? What was his evidence? Were the predictions of geocentrism wrong? Or were heliocentrism’s predictions more accurate? Let us examine his reason. In the preface of his book, the basis for his new theory was not about geocentric predictions being inaccurate — there was no evidence for it as I explained above — nor heliocentric predictions being more accurate. Instead, he questioned the “modifications” used to improve the predictions of geocentrism. This may not sound like a strong reason for challenging the fundamentals of a long-established theory because it is a common practice in science to modify a model in order to improve its
theoretical predictions with observations. For example, when someone proposes a model, others may find it interesting and use it to make additional predictions. If the model’s predictions are not very accurate, others may find ways or mechanisms to improve its predictions. After a few modifications, the predictions may become very good. Then, people will conclude that this original model (with these improving modifications) must be fundamentally correct, i.e., it describes the reality. This was the situation that Copernicus faced. He questioned the modifications introduced over time for various reasons, although all improved the geocentric model’s predictions. Copernicus argued that the reasoning for some of the modifications conflicted with one another, i.e., in Copernicus’s view, these modifications were not consistent. Describing these different assumptions, he famously stated, “A monster rather than a man would be put together from them” because the hands, feet, arms, and legs were put together in random ways. One may be puzzled by this argument as the basis of a scientific proposal because there are plenty of useful models that have been developed this way, especially in scientific applications or engineering. This is simply how science moves forward; some may argue against Copernicus. Shouldn’t Copernicus have based his theory on scientific evidence, for example, reduced errors or improved predictions?
Nevertheless, he argued that one should base a theory on a single set of assumptions to predict the motions of all five planets known at his time. We will learn later in this book that this is a correct requirement for science. However, he thought that these basic assumptions should be as follows: (1) The observation of the planets should use a homocentric method instead of using eccentrics or epicycles, and (2) the planets obey the principle of uniform motion. Today, we know that both assumptions are incorrect because all planets move in ellipses and the orbital speed changes in different parts of each orbit as described by Kepler’s laws. He based his theory on seven specific assumptions (although it is a single set of assumptions, seven is not a small number). He conducted detailed analyses of locations for a list of stars, a few planets, the Sun, the Moon, and some astronomical phenomena. I note that Newton’s laws of motion did not exist yet.
Given so much information, it is your turn to make your judgment on which theory, geocentrism or heliocentrism, could result in you being on the right side of the unknown history of the future.
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“The advantages to be ultimately reaped from a perseverance in the line of conduct which Great Britain has adopted for the last four years appear to my mind to be infallible and of infinite magnitude; the profitable consequences of a state of hostility, small and uncertain I have been pleasing my imagination with looking forward to the distant spectacle of all the northern continent of America covered with friendly though not subject States, consuming our manufactures, speaking our language, proud of their parent State, attached to her prosperity War must bring with it extensive damage to our navigation, the probable loss of Canada, and the world behind it, the propagation of enmity and prejudices which it may be impossible to eradicate. The system of the American government does not strike me, with the near view I have of it, as being in so perilous a situation as is imagined in Europe. I am willing to avoid political prophecies, but I confess I think it will get on well enough if the country remains in peace; and if they go to war, the fabric may acquire strength. God forbid that it should be to our detriment, and to the triumph of our enemies!”
CHAPTER XV.
F 4, 1801, one month before the inauguration of President Jefferson, Pitt suddenly retired from office, and was succeeded by a weak ministry, in which Mr. Addington, afterward Lord Sidmouth, took the post vacated by Pitt. No event could have been happier for the prospects of President Jefferson, who might fairly count upon Addington’s weakness to prevent his interference in American affairs.
Knowing himself to be universally regarded as the friend and admirer of France, Jefferson was the more anxious not to be classed by the British government among the enemies of England. Even before he was inaugurated, he took occasion to request Edward Thornton, the British chargé,—
“With great earnestness, to assure his Majesty’s government that it should experience during his administration as cordial and sincere acts of friendship as had ever been received under that of his predecessors. I am aware,” said the President elect, “that I have been represented as hostile to Great Britain; but this has been done only for electioneering purposes, and I hope henceforward such language will be used no longer I can appeal to all my past conduct that in everything in which I have been engaged relatively to England, I have always been guided by a liberal policy I wish to be at the head of affairs no longer than while I am influenced by such sentiments of equal liberality toward all nations There is nothing to which I have a greater repugnance than to establish distinctions in favor of one nation against another.”
The day after his inauguration he returned to the subject:—
“There is nothing I have more, or I may say so much, at heart as to adjust happily all differences between us, and to cultivate the most cordial harmony and good understanding. The English government is too just, I am persuaded, to regard newspaper trash, and the assertions contained in them that I am a creature of France and an enemy of Great Britain For republican France I may have felt some interest; but that is long over; and there is assuredly nothing in the present government of that country which could naturally incline me to
show the smallest undue partiality to it at the expense of Great Britain, or indeed of any other country ”[240]
Thornton felt no great confidence in the new President’s protests, and thought it possible that Jefferson had “on this, as he seems to have done on many late public occasions, taxed his imagination to supply the deficiency of his feelings.” All Englishmen were attached to the Federalist and New England interest; they could not understand that Virginia should be a safer friend than Massachusetts. Yet in truth Jefferson never was more serious than when he made these professions. The Southern republicans had nothing to gain from a quarrel with England; they neither wished for Canada, nor aspired to create shipping or manufactures: their chief antagonist was not England, but Spain. The only Power which could seriously injure them was Great Britain; and the only injury they could inflict in return was by conquering Canada for the benefit of Northern influence, or by building up manufactures which they disliked, or by cutting off their own markets for tobacco and cotton. Nothing warranted a belief that men like Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin would ever seek a quarrel with England.
The British Ministry soon laid aside any doubts they might have felt on the subject. Lord Grenville, who retired with Pitt, was succeeded as Foreign Secretary by Lord Hawkesbury, afterward better known as Lord Liverpool. The new Ministry negotiated for peace with Bonaparte. Oct. 1, 1801, the preliminaries were signed, and the world found itself again in a sort of repose, broken only by the bloody doings at St. Domingo and Guadeloupe. England returned, like France and Spain, to the rigor of the colonial system. The customs entries of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia rapidly diminished in number; American shipping declined; but Madison was relieved from the burden of belligerent disputes, which had been the chief anxiety of his predecessors in the State Department.
Yet peace did not put an end to all difficulties. Rufus King continued to negotiate in London in regard to the outstanding British debts, twice recognized by treaty, yet still unpaid by the United States; in regard to the boundary of Maine and that of the extreme northwest territory at the source of the Mississippi; and finally, in
regard to impressments; while Edward Thornton at Washington complained that, in spite of peace and the decline of American shipping, encouragement was still offered to the desertion of British seamen in every port of the United States,—in fact that this means was systematically used to prevent British shipping from entering American ports in competition with the shipping of America. When Madison alleged that the national government had no share in such unfriendly conduct, Thornton thrust under his eyes the law of Virginia,—a law enacted by President Jefferson’s political friends in his political interests,—which forbade, under penalty of death, any magistrate of Virginia to be instrumental in surrendering deserters or criminals, even in cases where they were bound by treaty to do so. Madison could not deny that this legislation was contrary to a treaty right which the United States government was bound to enforce. He admitted that American shipmasters and consuls in British ports habitually asked the benefit of the British law, and received it; but he could hold out only a remote hope that mutual legislation might solve the difficulty by applying the merchant-seamen laws of the two countries reciprocally. In conversation with Thornton he lamented, with every appearance of sincerity and candor, the deficiency of the existing laws, and did not dispute that Great Britain could hardly be blamed for refusing the surrender of seamen on her side; but when Thornton asked him to order the return of a man who under aggravated circumstances had deserted from the British ship-of-war “Andromache” in the port of Norfolk, and had been immediately engaged on the United States revenue cutter there, Madison replied in a note coldly reiterating the fact, with which both parties were already acquainted, that neither the law of nations nor the provisions of any treaty enjoined the mutual restitution of seamen. This recognized formula, under which governments commonly express a refusal to act, was understood by Thornton as equivalent to an avowal that the new Administration, controlled by Virginians, would not venture, even in the future emergency of a demand for extradition under treaty, to risk the displeasure of Virginia.[241] Desertion, therefore, received no discouragement from the United States government; on the contrary, deserters, known to be such, were received at once into the national service, and their surrender
refused. Under such circumstances the British government was not likely to be more accommodating than the American.
As the summer of 1802 approached, President Jefferson drew into closer and more confidential relations with Thornton. During the Federalist rule the two countries were never on more affectionate terms. At London Rufus King and Christopher Gore received courteous attention from Lord Hawkesbury. At Washington, Thornton’s intimacy at the White House roused the jealousy and alarm of Pichon. As Bonaparte’s projects against Louisiana disclosed themselves, and as Leclerc’s first successes at St. Domingo opened the French path to New Orleans, Jefferson began to pay sudden and almost eager court to Thornton, who was a little embarrassed by the freedom with which the President denounced the First Consul. The preliminary articles of peace between France and England had been signed Oct. 1, 1801; but the treaty of Amiens, which made these articles definitive, was signed only March 25, 1802. Addington was naturally anxious that the peace should be maintained; indeed, no one could doubt that the existence of his Ministry depended on maintaining it. Thornton had no instructions which warranted him in intriguing against the First Consul, or in making preparations for a new war; and yet hardly was the treaty of Amiens made public, when President Jefferson began to talk as though England were still at war, and it were only a question of time when the United States must become her ally. The Louisiana question excited him. In April he wrote his letters to Dupont and Livingston. At about the same time he took Thornton into his confidence.
“I have had many occasions since it was first started,” wrote Thornton,[242] “of conversing freely with Mr Jefferson on this topic, which is indeed peculiarly interesting to him, and his reflections on which he utters with perhaps too little caution to persons who are not disposed to think very favorably of any change of sentiments with respect to France. He not only regards the cession of Louisiana and New Orleans as a certain cause of future war between the two countries, but makes no scruple to say that if the force of the United States should be unable to expel the French from those settlements, they must have recourse to the assistance of other Powers, meaning
unquestionably Great Britain. With regard to France and the person who is at the head of its government, whether in consequence of the projected cession of Louisiana or of the little account which seems to be made of the United States as well at Paris as by French officers in other parts of the world, Mr Jefferson speaks in very unqualified terms of the usurpation of Bonaparte, of the arbitrary nature and spirit of his government, of his love of flattery and vain pomp, features, according to Mr Jefferson, which indicate the frivolous character of his mind rather than a condescension to the taste of the French people The presses in America devoted to the President’s Administration make use of the same language; and without pretending to say that this party is cured of its bitterness against Great Britain, I can safely venture to assure your Lordship that its predilection for France scarcely exists even in name.”
After the stoppage of the entrepôt at New Orleans, when public opinion seemed intent on driving Jefferson into the war with France which he had predicted, Thornton found himself and his government in favor at Washington. The Republicans were even better disposed than the Federalists. Jefferson was willing to abolish between England and America the discriminating duties on shipping which the New England Federalists had imposed, and which they still wished to maintain for use in the disputed West Indian trade. He told Thornton that he could no doubt carry the repeal of these countervailing duties through Congress over the heads of the opposition,[243] “but he wished it to be adopted in consequence of their own conviction, rather than by a contrary conduct to afford them the least ground for asserting that the Southern States were carrying into execution their scheme of ruin against the navigation and commerce of their Eastern brethren.” Jefferson was rapidly becoming the friend and confidant of England. Thornton, naturally delighted with his own success, and with the mortifications and anxieties of Yrujo and Pichon, went so far as to urge his government to help the views of the United States against Louisiana:[244]
“I should hope, my Lord, that by having some share in the delivery of this Island of New Orleans to the United States, which it will be impossible to keep from them whenever they choose to employ force, his Majesty’s government may hereafter attach still more this country to our interests, and derive all the advantage possible from the
intercourse with that important part of the world. A very great change has gradually taken place in the opinions of all ranks in this government in favor of Great Britain, which has struck observers more likely to be impartial than myself A sense of a common interest has a great share in the change; but the conduct of France in all her relations has not failed to produce its full effect; and I find men, formerly the most vehement in their politics, asserting in the most unqualified terms the necessity of a union among all the members of the civilized world to check her encroachments and to assure the general tranquillity.”
A few days later the President nominated Monroe to act with Livingston and Pinckney in an attempt to purchase New Orleans. This step, which was openly avowed to be the alternative and perhaps the antecedent of war with France, brought Thornton into still more confidential relations with the Government. Finding that the Secretary of State was as cautious as the President was talkative, Thornton carried on an active intercourse with the latter. He first offered to detain the British government packet for Monroe’s use; but it was found that a month or two of delay would be necessary. Then, without instructions from his Government, Thornton took a bolder step:[245]—
“This state of things has naturally excited a sentiment of common interest, and has encouraged me to enter with more freedom into the subject, as well with the President as with Mr Madison, than I should otherwise have thought right, without being acquainted with the views of his Majesty’s government. Under this impression, I ventured, immediately after the nomination and before the first arrival of Mr. Monroe, to inquire of the President whether it was his intention to let him pass over to England, and hold any conversation with his Majesty’s ministers upon the general question of the free navigation of the Mississippi. The inquiry was somewhat premature, and I made it with some apology. Mr. Jefferson replied, however, unaffectedly, that at so early a stage of the business he had scarcely thought himself what it might be proper to do; ... that, on the whole, he thought it very probable that Mr. Monroe might cross the Channel.... Some time after Mr Monroe’s arrival, actuated by the same view, I mentioned to Mr Jefferson that it would give me pleasure to furnish the former with an introduction to his Majesty’s ambassador at Paris, as it would afford me the occasion of making Lord Whitworth acquainted with the nature of the object in dispute between this country, France, and Spain, and
would give to Mr. Monroe, if he were disposed of himself, or were instructed by his Government to seek it, a more ready pretext for opening himself to his Lordship, and of keeping him apprised of the progress and turn of the negotiation Mr Jefferson seemed pleased with this offer, and said he was sure Mr Monroe would accept it with great thankfulness ”
Madison talked less freely than his chief, and contented himself with explaining to the British representative that the views of the Government in sending Monroe to France were limited to the hope of inducing the First Consul by money, or other means of persuasion, to cede in Louisiana a place of deposit over which the United States might have absolute jurisdiction. He did not tell Thornton of the decision made by the Cabinet, and the instructions given to Monroe, April 18, 1803, to offer terms of alliance with England in case the First Consul should make war;[246] but the tone of cordiality in Government and people, both in public and private, in New York, Boston, and Philadelphia, as in the South and West, was gratifying to British pride, and would have been still more so had not the community somewhat too openly avowed the intention of leaving England, if possible, to fight alone. At the first news of the approaching rupture between France and England, this wish began to appear so plainly that Thornton was staggered by it. The Americans took no trouble to conceal the hope that England would have to fight their battles for them.[247]
“The manifest advantage that such a state of things is calculated to give to their negotiation with France, and which is already sensibly felt in the altered tone and conduct of the French government, ... will sufficiently account for their wishes and for this belief. But possessing the same opinion of the encroachments of France, and of the barrier which Great Britain alone places between her and the United States, and actuated, as I really believe they are, by sincere wishes for our success, I am afraid they begin to see more clearly that in a state of war we are effectually fighting their battles, without the necessity of their active interference; and they recur once more to the flattering prospect of peace and a lucrative neutrality ”
In this state of doubt President Jefferson continued his intimate relations with Thornton.
“He expressed himself very freely,” wrote Thornton, May 30, 1803, “on the contemptible and frivolous conduct, as he termed it, of a Government that could alter its language so entirely on the prospect of an approaching rupture with another nation, which he acknowledged instantly, on my mention of it, had been the case toward Mr Livingston ”
Jefferson attributed Bonaparte’s returning courtesy to fear rather than to foresight. Thornton himself began to feel the danger that Bonaparte, after all, might outwit him. He revised his opinion about Louisiana. England, he saw, had the strongest motives for wishing France to keep that province.
“The most desirable state of things,” he wrote, “seems to be that France should become mistress of Louisiana, because her influence in the United States would be by that event lost forever, and she could only be dispossessed by a concert between Great Britain and America in a common cause, which would produce an indissoluble bond of union and amity between the two countries.”
This cordiality between England and the United States lasted without interruption until midsummer. Pichon complained, as has been shown, of the attentions paid to Thornton by the President.[248] “I remarked at table that he redoubled his courtesies and attentions toward the British chargé.” The dinner was in the month of January; in the following June Pichon wrote that the President had begun to accept the idea of seeing the British at New Orleans:[249]
“Mr. Jefferson told me a few days ago that he was engaged in letting that Power know that her presence there would be seen with regret; but I perceive that, little by little, people are familiarizing themselves with this eventuality, as their fears increase in regard to us They are so convinced that England sees more and more her true interests in relation to the United States, and is resolved to conciliate them, that they have no doubt of her lending herself to some arrangement What they fear most is that, as the price of this accommodation, she may require the United States to take an active part in the indispensable war; and this is what they ardently wish to avoid ”
Until July 3, 1803, the relations between President Jefferson’s government and that of Great Britain were so cordial as to raise a doubt whether the United States could avoid becoming an ally of
England, and taking part in the war with France. Suddenly came the new convulsion of Europe.
“It was on the third of this month,” wrote Pichon July 7, 1803, “the eve of the anniversary of Independence, that we received two pieces of news of the deepest interest for this country, that of the rupture between France and England, proclaimed by the latter on May 16, and that of the cession of Louisiana and New Orleans, made by us on April 30.”[250]
The next day, when Pichon attended the usual reception at the White House, he found himself received in a manner very different from that to which he had been of late accustomed.
The two events, thus coming together, were sure to affect seriously the attitude of the United States toward England. Not only did Jefferson no longer need British aid, but he found himself in a position where he could afford with comparative freedom to insist upon his own terms of neutrality. He had always felt that Great Britain did not sufficiently respect this neutrality; he never failed to speak of Jay’s treaty in terms of vehement dislike; and he freely avowed his intention of allowing all commercial treaties to expire. The relation between these treaties and the rights of neutrality was simple. Jefferson wanted no treaties which would prevent him from using commercial weapons against nations that violated American neutrality; and therefore he reserved to Congress the right to direct commerce in whatever paths the Government might prefer
“On the subject of treaties,” he wrote,[251] “our system is to have none with any nation, as far as can be avoided. The treaty with England has therefore not been renewed, and all overtures for treaty with other nations have been declined We believe that with nations, as with individuals, dealings may be carried on as advantageously, perhaps more so, while their continuance depends on a voluntary good treatment, as if fixed by a contract, which, when it becomes injurious to either, is made by forced constructions to mean what suits them, and becomes a cause of war instead of a bond of peace ”
Such a system was best suited to the strongest nations, and to those which could control their dealings to most advantage. The Administration believed that the United States stood in this position.
The President and Secretary Madison were inclined to assert authority in their relations with foreign Powers. Even so early as the preceding February, before Monroe sailed for Europe, Madison told Pichon of this intention.[252] “He added,” wrote Pichon to Talleyrand, “that if war should be renewed, as seemed probable, the United States would be disposed to take a higher tone than heretofore, that Europe had put their spirit of moderation to proofs that would be no longer endured.” Immediately after hearing of the Louisiana cession, Pichon wrote that the same spirit continued to animate the Government.[253] “It is certain that they propose to cause the neutrality of the United States to be more exactly respected by the belligerent Powers than in the last war. The Government has often shown its intentions in this respect, from the time when everything pointed to an infallible rupture between us and England.” President Jefferson, while avowing a pacific policy, explained that his hopes of peace were founded on his power to affect the interests of the belligerents. At the same moment when Pichon wrote thus to Talleyrand, the President wrote to the Earl of Buchan:[254]—
“My hope of preserving peace for our country is not founded in the Quaker principle of non-resistance under every wrong, but in the belief that a just and friendly conduct on our part will procure justice and friendship from others In the existing contest, each of the combatants will find an interest in our friendship ”
He was confident that he could control France and England:[255] “I do not believe we shall have as much to swallow from them as our predecessors had.”
The Louisiana question being settled, the field was clear for the United States to take high ground in behalf of neutral rights; and inevitably the first step must be taken against England. No one denied that thus far the administration of Addington had behaved well toward the United States. Rufus King brought to America at the same time with news of the Louisiana treaty, or had sent shortly before, two conventions by which long-standing differences were settled. One of these conventions disposed of the old subject of British debts,—the British government accepting a round sum of six hundred thousand pounds on behalf of the creditors.[256] The other
created two commissions for running the boundary line between Maine and Nova Scotia, and between the Lake of the Woods and the Mississippi River.[257] King went so far as to express the opinion that had he not been on the eve of his departure, he might have succeeded in making some arrangement about impressments; and he assured Gallatin that the actual Administration in England was the most favorable that had existed or could exist for the interests of the United States; its only misfortune was its weakness.[258] The conduct of the British government in regard to Louisiana proved the truth of King’s assertion. Not only did it offer no opposition to the sale, but it lent every possible assistance to the transfer; and under its eye, with its consent, Alexander Baring made the financial arrangements which were to furnish Bonaparte with ten million American dollars to pay the preliminary expenses of an invasion of England.
Nevertheless, if the United States government intended to take a high tone in regard to neutral rights, it must do so from the beginning of the war. Aware that success in regard to England, as in regard to Spain, depended on asserting at the outset, and maintaining with obstinacy, the principles intended to be established, the President and Secretary Madison lost no time in causing their attitude to be clearly understood. An opportunity of asserting this authoritative tone was given by the appearance of a new British minister at Washington; and thus it happened that at the time when the Secretary of State was preparing for his collision with the Marquis of Casa Yrujo and the Spanish empire, he took on his hands the more serious task of curbing the pretensions of Anthony Merry and the King of England.
CHAPTER XVI.
O of Addington’s friendly acts was the appointment of Anthony Merry as British minister to the United States. For this selection Rufus King was directly responsible. Two names were mentioned to him by the Foreign Office as those of the persons entitled to claim the place; one was that of Merry, the other was that of Francis James Jackson.
“As I have had the opportunity of knowing both these gentlemen during my residence here,” wrote Minister King to Secretary Madison, [259] “it was not without some regret that I heard of the intention to appoint Mr Jackson in lieu of Mr Merry From this information I have been led to make further inquiry concerning their reputations, and the result has proved rather to increase than to lessen my solicitude. Mr. Jackson is said to be positive, vain, and intolerant. He is moreover filled with English prejudices in respect to all other countries, and as far as his opinions concerning the United States are known, seems more likely to disserve than to benefit a liberal intercourse between them and his own country. On the other hand, Mr. Merry appears to be a plain, unassuming, and amiable man, who having lived for many years in Spain is in almost every point of character the reverse of Mr. Jackson, who were he to go to America would go for the sake of present employment and with the hope of leaving it as soon as he could receive a similar appointment in Europe; while Mr Merry wishes for the mission with the view of obtaining what he believes will prove to be an agreeable and permanent residence ”
In deference to Rufus King’s wishes or for some other reason Merry received the appointment. Doubtless he came to America in the hope of finding a “permanent residence,” as King remarked; but it could hardly be agreeable, as he hoped. He was a thorough Englishman, with a wife more English than himself. He was not prepared for the isolation of the so-called Federal City, and he did not expect to arrive at a moment when the United States government, pleased with having curbed Bonaparte, was preparing to chasten Spain and to discipline England.
Landing at Norfolk from a ship of war Nov 4, 1803, Merry was obliged to hire a vessel to carry himself and his belongings to Washington, where, after a tempestuous voyage, he at last arrived, November 26. Possibly Mr. and Mrs. Merry, like other travellers, would have grumbled even though Washington had supplied them with Aladdin’s palace and Aladdin’s lamp to furnish it; but the truth was not to be denied that the Federal City offered few conveniences, and was better suited for members of Congress, who lived without wives in boarding-houses, than for foreign ministers, with complaining wives, who were required to set up large establishments and to entertain on a European scale.
“I cannot describe to you,” wrote Merry privately,[260] “the difficulty and expense which I have to encounter in fixing myself in a habitation By dint of money I have just secured two small houses on the common which is meant to become in time the city of Washington They are mere shells of houses, with bare walls and without fixtures of any kind, even without a pump or well, all which I must provide at my own cost. Provisions of any kind, especially vegetables, are frequently hardly to be obtained at any price. So miserable is our situation.”
Had these been the worst trials that awaited the new British minister, he might have been glad to meet them; for when once surmounted, they favored him by preventing social rivalry. Unfortunately he met more serious annoyances. Until his arrival, Yrujo was the only minister of full rank in the United States; and Yrujo’s intimate relations at the White House had given him family privileges. For this reason the Spanish minister made no struggle to maintain etiquette, but living mostly in Philadelphia disregarded the want of what he considered good manners at Washington, according to which he was placed on the same social footing with his own secretary of legation. Yet Yrujo, American in many respects, belonged to the school of Spanish diplomacy which had for centuries studied points of honor. He might well have made with his own mouth the celebrated retort which one of his predecessors made to Philip II., who reproached him with sacrificing an interest to a ceremony: “How a ceremony? Your Majesty’s self is but a ceremony!” Although Yrujo submitted to Jefferson, he quarrelled with Pichon on this point, for Pichon was only a secretary in charge of the
French legation. In November, 1803, Yrujo’s friendship for Jefferson was cooling, and he waited the arrival of Merry in the hope of finding a champion of diplomatic rights. Jefferson, on the other hand, waited Merry’s arrival in order to establish, once for all, a new social code; and that there might be no misunderstanding, he drafted with his own hand the rules which were to control Executive society,—rules intended to correct a tendency toward monarchical habits introduced by President Washington.
In 1801 on coming into power Jefferson announced that he would admit not the smallest distinction that might separate him from the mass of his fellow-citizens. He dispensed with the habit of setting apart certain days and hours for receiving visits of business or curiosity, announcing that he would on any day and at any hour receive in a friendly and hospitable manner those who should call upon him.[261] He evidently wished to place the White House on the footing of easy and generous hospitality which was the pride of every Virginia gentleman. No man should be turned away from its doors; its table, liberal and excellent, should be filled with equal guests, whose self-respect should be hurt by no artificial rules of precedence. Such hospitality cost both time and money; but Washington was a petty village, society was very small, and Jefferson was a poor economist. He entertained freely and handsomely.
“Yesterday I dined with the President,” wrote Senator Plumer of New Hampshire, Dec. 25, 1802.[262] “His rule is to have about ten members of Congress at a time. We sat down to the table at four, rose at six, and walked immediately into another room and drank coffee. We had a very good dinner, with a profusion of fruits and sweetmeats. The wine was the best I ever drank, particularly the champagne, which was indeed delicious. I wish his French politics were as good as his French wines.”
So long as this manner of life concerned only the few Americans who were then residents or visitors at Washington, Jefferson found no great difficulty in mixing his company and disregarding precedence. Guests accommodated themselves to the ways of the house, took care of their own comfort, went to table without special
request, and sat wherever they found a vacant chair; but foreigners could hardly be expected at first to understand what Jefferson called the rule of pell-mell. Thornton and Pichon, being only secretaries of legation, rather gained than lost by it; but Yrujo resented it in secret; and all eyes were turned to see how the new British minister would conduct himself in the scramble.
Either before or soon after Merry’s arrival the President wrote the rules, which he called “Canons of Etiquette to be observed by the Executive;”[263] and these canons ultimately received the approval of the Cabinet. Foreign ministers, he said, were to pay the first visit to the “ministers of the nation;” their wives were to receive the first visit from the wives of “national ministers.” No grades among diplomatic members were to give precedence; “all are perfectly equal, whether foreign or domestic, titled or untitled, in or out of office.” Finally, “to maintain the principle of equality, or of pêle-mêle, and prevent the growth of precedence out of courtesy, the members of the Executive will practise at their own houses, and recommend an adherence to, the ancient usage of the country,—of gentlemen in mass giving precedence to the ladies in mass in passing from one apartment where they are assembled into another.” Such, according to Rufus King, whose aid was invoked on this occasion, was the usage in London.
Merry duly arrived in Washington, and was told by Madison that the President would receive his letter of credence Nov. 29, according to the usual formality. At the appointed hour the British minister, in diplomatic uniform, as was required in the absence of any hint to the contrary, called upon Madison, and was taken to the White House, where he was received by the President. Jefferson’s manner of receiving guests was well known, although this was the first occasion on which he had given audience to a new foreign minister. Among several accounts of his appearance at such times, that of Senator Plumer was one of the best.
“In a few moments after our arrival,” said the senator, writing two years before Merry’s mishap,[264] “a tall, high-boned man came into the room He was dressed, or rather undressed, in an old brown coat, red waistcoat, old corduroy small-clothes much soiled, woollen hose,
and slippers without heels. I thought him a servant, when General Varnum surprised me by announcing that it was the President.”
The “Evening Post,” about a year later, described him as habitually appearing in public “dressed in long boots with tops turned down about the ankles like a Virginia buck; overalls of corduroy faded, by frequent immersions in soap suds, from yellow to a dull white; a red single-breasted waistcoat; a light brown coat with brass buttons, both coat and waistcoat quite threadbare; linen very considerably soiled; hair uncombed and beard unshaven.” In truth the Virginia republicans cared little for dress. “You know that the Virginians have some pride in appearing in simple habiliments,” wrote Joseph Story in regard to Jefferson, “and are willing to rest their claim to attention upon their force of mind and suavity of manners.” Indeed, “Virginia carelessness” was almost a proverb.[265]
On the occasion of Merry’s reception, the President’s chief offence in etiquette consisted in the slippers without heels. No law of the United States or treaty stipulation forbade Jefferson to receive Merry in heelless slippers, or for that matter in bare feet, if he thought proper to do so. Yet Virginia gentlemen did not intentionally mortify their guests; and perhaps Madison would have done better to relieve the President of such a suspicion by notifying Merry beforehand that he would not be expected to wear full dress. In that case the British minister might have complimented Jefferson by himself appearing in slippers without heels.
A card of invitation was next sent, asking Mr. and Mrs. Merry to dine at the White House, December 2. Such an invitation was in diplomatic usage equivalent to a command, and Merry at once accepted it. The new minister was then told that he must call on the heads of departments. He remonstrated, saying that Liston, his predecessor, had been required to make the first visit only to the Secretary of State; but he was told, in effect, that what had been done under the last Administration was no rule for the present one. Merry acquiesced, and made his calls. These pin-thrusts irritated him; but he was more seriously inconvenienced by the sudden withdrawal of diplomatic privileges by the Senate, although VicePresident Burr took occasion to explain that the Senate’s action was
quite unconnected with the President’s “canons of etiquette,” and was in truth due to some indiscretion of Yrujo in the House of Representatives.
Meanwhile the President took an unusual step. When two countries were at war, neutral governments commonly refrained from inviting the representative of one belligerent to meet the representative of the other, unless on formal occasions where the entire diplomatic body was invited, or in crowds where contact was not necessary. Still more rarely were such incongruous guests invited to an entertainment supposed to be given in honor of either individual. No one knew this rule better than Jefferson, who had been himself four years in diplomatic service at Paris, besides being three years Secretary of State to President Washington at Philadelphia. He knew that the last person whom Merry would care to meet was Pichon, the French chargé; yet he not only invited Pichon, but pressed him to attend. The Frenchman, aware that Merry was to be mortified by the etiquette of the dinner, and watching with delight the process by which Jefferson, day after day, took a higher tone toward England, wrote an account of the affair to Talleyrand.[266] He said:—
“I was invited to this dinner. I had learned from the President what was the matter (ce qui en était), when I went to tell him that I was going for some days to Baltimore, where I was called by the affairs of the frigate ‘La Poursuivante.’ The President was so obliging as to urge my return in order to be present with Mme. Pichon at the dinner (Le Président eut l’honnêteté de me presser de revenir pour être au diner). I came back here, although business required a longer stay at Baltimore. Apart from the reason of respect due to the President, I had that of witnessing what might happen (j’avais celle de connaître ce qui se passerait) ”
Pichon accordingly hurried back from Baltimore, especially at the President’s request, in order to have the pleasure of seeing Jefferson humiliate his own guest in his own house.
Pichon was gratified by the result. At four o’clock on the afternoon of Dec. 2, 1803, this curious party assembled at the White House,—Mr. and Mrs. Merry, the Marquis Yrujo and his American
