Kant on emotions: critical essays in the contemporary context (new studies in the history and histor by Ebook Home

Kant

Emotions:

Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context (New Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy Book 8) 1st Edition

Mariannina Failla

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New Studies in the History and Historiography of Philosophy

Edited by Gerald Hartung and Sebastian Luft

Volume 8

Kant on Emotions

Critical Essays in the Contemporary Context

Edited by Mariannina Failla and Nuria Sánchez Madrid

ISBN 978-3-11-072071-6

e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-072073-0

e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-072074-7

ISSN 2364-3161

Library of Congress Control Number: 2021938842

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.

Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck

www.degruyter.com

Listofabbreviations

Works by ImmanuelKantcited withpaginationof Kants GesammelteSchriften. KöniglichPreussischenAkademiederWissenschaften(Ed.).Berlin:DeGruyter.

Anth AnthropologieinpragmatischerHinsicht

BDG DereizigmöglicheBeweisgrundzueinerDemonstrationdesDaseins Gottes

Di Mediationumquarundamdeignesuccinctadelienatio

EEKU ErsteEinleitungindieKritikderUrteilskraft

FBZE FortgesetzteBetrachtungderseiteiniger ZeitwahrgenommenenErderschütterungen

GMSGrundlegungzur MetaphysikderSitten

GSEBeobachtungenüberdasGefühldesSchönenundErhabenen

IaG IdeezueinerallgemeinenGeschichteinweltbürgerlicherAbsicht

KpV Kritikderpraktischen Vernunft

KrV KritikderreinenVernunft

KU KritikderUrteilskraft

Log Logik

MAM MutmaßlicherAnfangderMenschengeschichte

MS (RL/TL)DieMetaphysikderSitten

MSIDemundisensibilisatqueintelligibilisformaetprincipiis

Op OpusPostumum

PG PhysischeGeographie

PND Principiorumprimorumcognitionismetaphysicaenovadilucidatio

Refl Reflexion

RGV DieReligioninnerhalbderGrenzenderreinen Vernunft

TG TräumeeinesGeistersehers,erläutertdurchdie TräumederMetaphysik VAZefVorarbeitenzuZumewigenFrieden

V-Anth/Mron VorlesungenWintersemester1784/1785Mrongovius

V-Met-K3/Arnoldt VorlesungenWintersemester1794/1795MetaphysikArnoldt(K3)

V-Met/Dohna VorlesungenWintersemester1792/1793MetaphysikDohna

V-Met/Mron VolresungenWintersemester1782/1783MetaphysikMrongovius

V-Met-L1/PölitzKantMetaphysik L1 (Pölitz)(Mitte1770er)

V-Met-L2/PölitzKantMetaphysikL2(Pölitz,Original)(1790/91?)

V-Mo/Collins VorlesungenWintersemester1784/1785Moralphilosophie Collins

V-Mo/MronMoralMrongovius(Grundl.:1774/75 bzw. 76/77)

V-MS/Vigil VorlesungenWintersemester1793/1794DieMetaphysikderSittenVigilantius

V-PP/HerderPraktischePhilosophieHerder(1763/64 bzw.64/65)

VNAEF VerkündigungdesnahenAbschlüsseseines TractatszumewigenFrieden inderPhilosophie

VUE VondenUrsachenderErderschütterungenbeiGelegenheitdesUnglücks, welchesdiewestlicheLänderinEuropagegendasEndedesvorigen Jahresbetroffenhat.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-001

WDO Washeißt:SichinDenkenorientiren ZeFZum ewigenFrieden

NuriaSánchezMadrid Introduction

TuningtheHumanMind:The Contemporaneityof Kant’s AccountofEmotions

Kant’slong-neglectedaccountofemotionshasonlyrecentlybeguntoreceive the attentionitdeserves,inviewofthelightitshedsonthe manifoldfeaturesof transcendentalphilosophy. This volumeaimstofurnish acontemporaryoverviewofthe Kantiantreatmentofemotions,yielding asystematicanalysisof thecapacityofaffective phenomenato guidethecriticalenquiryofreason andtheprocessthat Kantcallsthe “hellofself-cognition” (MS 6: 441).Inthis vein,allofthechaptersinthis volumedealwiththeissuesraisedby Kant’s well-knownremarkin “WhatDoesitMeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?” , whereheassertsthatreasonitselfdoesnotfeel,but ratherthatitproducesfeelingsthroughinnerdrivesasa “subjective need” [Bedürfnis](WDO08:139 – 140). Usingthistextas acommonjumpingoffpoint,thevarious authorsinthis volumeaddresshowreasonitselfencouragesthehumanbeingtofeeloreliminate emotions,needsandpassionsthateitherenhanceorhinderthepurposesofthe differentfacultiesofthemind.Thus,thefollowingchaptersfocusnotonlyonthe rolethatemotionsplayinthefacultyofdesire,butalsoaddresstheirfunction withinthecritiqueofthefacultiesofknowledge andjudgment. Theeditorsof this volumehave tried to balanceclassicalcriticalreadingsof Kant’saccount ofemotions (SánchezMadrid,González, Falcato, Failla, Borges)withapproaches thatengageKant’sphilosophyina dialoguewithcontemporaryphenomenology andaesthetics (Cvejic, Feloj,Angelucci),aswellaswithnovellinesofresearch relatedtophilosophyofmindandneuroscience(Teruel,Mendonça,Ros).Inassemblingthisdiversegroupofappraisals,theeditorsaimtoprovidethoseinterestedindeveloping Kantianapproaches to rationalitywith abroadperspective ontheattentionthat Kantdevotestotheaffective componentsofthehuman mind.Thisvolumeaimstoargueforthecontemporaneityof Kant’saccountof emotions, agoalthatexplainsthechapters’ focusonthesupportthatemotions furnishtomoralagencyandalsoonitsfurthercontemporaryreceptionanddevelopmentinbothcontinentalandanalyticallinesofresearch.Thus,the volume attemptstoovercometheusualgapbetweenbothofthesephilosophicaltraditions,insofarastheyshow adeepdebtto Kant’sapproach to emotionandfeeling.

NuriaSánchezMadrid, Univ.ComplutenseofMadrid,Spain

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-002

The volumerepresents acollectionofcontributionsbybothestablishedand emergingEuropeanresearchersfromfive countries Brazil, Italy, Serbia,Portugaland Spain whohave previouslydiscussedpapersininternationalworkshops¹ andcollaboratedonpublications,² asthefrequentcross-referencesappearinginmostofthechaptersconfirm.Thegroupofcontributorschosen reflects astrongcommitmentto genderequalityandaims to fosteracademicacknowledgementandincreasedvisibilityofwomenphilosophersin globalscholarshipof Kant.Allofthe authorshave demonstratedexpertisein Kantandthe historyoftheEuropeanEnlightenment,andarespecializedinclassicalEuropeanphilosophy. Asshowninthetableofcontents,the volumeisdividedinthree mainsections Mind,MoralAgencyandEmotionalNormativity, CriticalEmotions: On Kant’sAftermath,and Kant’sEmotionsand ContemporaryPhilosophyofMind whichareintended to furnish acomprehensive overviewofKant’saccountof affective states.

Takenasa whole,the volumeclaimstheexistenceofanemotionalnormativityin Kant’sphilosophyandarguesthatthismodelof rationalityshowsthat, in Kant’sview,thehumanbeing willbeable to meettheendsofreasononlywith thesupportoftheemotions.Aspreviouslystated,whilehistoricalappraisalisa chiefconcernofallthechapters,mostaddressthecapacityof Kant’sphilosophy toinspirecontemporaryresearchonmoralagencyandhumanemotions.The principaltopicsexaminedinthecollectedessaysrelatetotheobstaclesand tasksthathumannatureencountersin Kant’sphilosophyasitattempts to 1) makesenseofworldlyphenomena, 2) abidebymorallaw, 3)experiencebeauty andnaturalpurposiveness,and4)findorientationinpragmaticlife.Inallof theseendeavours,emotionsdonot representhindrancestothepursuitof truth,beautyandvirtue.Onthecontrary, thesevaluesappearclearlyembedded into aspecificnormativity,whichenlargestheunderstandingofthesubjective dynamicsofreason.

 We mightmention,forinstance,the VthCongressoftheBrazilian KantSociety (SKB),heldat theUFSC(Florianópolis,Brazil)inMay2013,theworkshops EmotionalCultureandIdentity and Feelingsand Reflexivity,organizedbytheProjectCEMIDandheldinMarchandNovember 2015 attheInstituteCultureandSocietyoftheUniversityofNavarra(Spain)withAnaMartaGonzález andAlejandroVigoasconvenors,the workshop Leggerela KritikderUrteilskraft di I. Kant,held from10 to 12 April 2017 attheDepartmentofPhilosophy, CommunicationandSpectacleofRoma TreUniversity(Italy),andthe workshop Rules,Normativityand Values.Revisitingthe KantianPerspectiveandItsCritics,heldon 14 May2018atthe FacultyofPhilosophyoftheNewUniversityof Lisbon(Portugal).

 See Faggionetal.(2016)andKrasnoffetal.(2018).

Thefirstsection Mind,MoralAgencyandEmotionalNormativity begins withanoverviewoftheimageofhumanepistemicandpractical agencywithin thecontextof Kant’sreflexionson reason,aesthetics,and morals, referencing certainoutstandingstudiesrepresentative ofthe “emotionalturn” that Kantian studieshave undergonein recentdecades.In “Kant’sEmotionalNormativity andtheEmbodimentofReason:Interests,ReflectionandMoral Feelings” , NuriaSánchezMadrid(UniversityComplutenseofMadrid,Spain)arguesthat theinterestsofreason guidethesubjecttoadoptfeelingsthatdonot guarantee theachievementofhisownhappiness,but rathertheaccomplishmentoftheoretical goalswhicharetheproductofepistemology. Moreover,SánchezMadrid highlightsthatthe reflexiononthepowerof judgment makesthesubjectacquainted withanemotionalstatethathelpsherdisavowherownegoisticinclinationsandconsequentlyattuneherviewsand reasoning with auniversalepistemicpattern.Thischapteralsoexaminesthefactthat,inaccordancewith Kant’spracticalphilosophy, certainfeelingsshouldbecultivatedas away ofattainingmoralstrengthandcontroloverone’saffective states,andinthis way combathumanfrailtyofwill.

In “UnpackingMoral Feeling:KantianClues to aMapoftheMoralWorld” , AnaMartaGonzález(Universityof.Navarra, Spain)focusesontheanalogybetweenpracticalreasonandmoralfeelingoutlinedbyKant.Gonzálezseekstounraveltextssuchasthefollowingexcerptfrom WhatDoesitMeantoOrientOneselfin Thinking?,inwhich Kantclaimsthatmoralfeeling “doesnotcauseany morallaw, forthisariseswhollyfrom reason; rather,itiscausedoreffected bymorallaws,hencebyreason,becausetheactiveyetfreewillneedsdeterminategrounds” (WDO 8: 139 – 140).Thischapteraimstounpackthistextand showthepivotal roleofmoralfeelingas ahelpfulmeansofstrengtheningthe principiumexecutionis ofmorallaw.

Mariannina Failla(Roma TreUniversity,Italy),in “EdenicAnimality, SelfSustenance,LovingandDying:CorporealBiologicalNeedsandEmotionsin Kant”,takes agenealogicalapproachto Kant’saccountofemotions, with aparticularfocusonhisreflectionregardingthebeginningofhistory.Byaddressing thescopeofconjectureandtheepistemicvalueitfulfilsinthe genesisofhistory, Faillaanalysestheclosetiesbetweeninstincts,emotions(Rührungen),sentiments(Gefühle)andhumanmoralaction.Shearguesthat Kant’santhropological interpretationoftheHolyScripturesdisplays apsycho-corporeal genealogyof human moralagency. Infact,asKantdepictstheprogressive emancipation fromEdenicinstinct,affective states loss,love,fear,hope appearasessential stepsforgiving shapetomoralconscience.

ThecontributionbyAnaCristina Falcato(IFILNOVA/UNL,Portugal)—“Kant andthe ‘TrueShameInstinct’:Notesonthe Futureofthe Human Species”

shares agenealogicalapproachto Kant’swritingsonshame,takingissuewith claimsendorsedbycontemporary moralphilosophers. Falcatobasesherclaims onpreviouslyignoredtextualsources,particularlyonremarksfrom Kant’s Lectureson Anthropology fromthe 1760s,whichanticipatefuturecriticaldevelopments regardingthepotentiallypositive consequencesoftheso-calledshame-instinct.Thischaptercriticizesthetraditionalappraisalof KantianethicsbyAngloAmericanphilosophy, whilealsoaddressingsomeentangledparadoxesinKant’s reasoningaboutthetopicofshame.

Thesectionendswith acontributionbyMariaBorges(FederalUniversityof SantaCaterina,Brazil)—“PassionsandEvilin Kant’sPhilosophy”—whichfocusesonthelinksbetweenpassionsandevilin Kant’sphilosophy. Thechapterbeginsbyexplaining thedifferencebetweenaffectsandpassionsin Anthropology from aPragmaticPointofView,inwhich Kantarguesthatbothareillnessesof the mind,giventhatboththreatenthesovereigntyofreason. Borgesclaims that,inKant’sview,passionsaremuchmoredangerous to moralitythanemotions,due to thefactthat,from amoralpointofview,passionsdistortthereflective judgmentofthesubject, thusthwartinganymoralagency.The authoralso examinesaffectsandpassionswith regardtotheirvaryingdegreesofpropensity toevilinthe Religionschrift,analysingtheethicalcommunityas anecessarydevicetoovercomeevil,beyondthescopeattainedbyanyofthepoliticalandanthropologicalsolutionsproposedby Kant.

Thesecondsectionofthe volume CriticalEmotions: On Kant’sAftermath focusesonstudiesof Kant’semotionaltreatmentfromthepointofviewofcontemporaryaccountsofintentionalityandaestheticnormativity.Inthis vein,in “Intentionality SuiGeneris of PleasureinMereReflection”,IgorCvejić (University of Belgrade,Serbia)claimsthatfeelingsinKant’sphilosophy, particularlypleasureinmerereflection,oughttobeunderstoodasintentionalstates,positing, moreover,a feeling-intentionality sui generis. Thischapterexamines Kant’sunderstandingoffeelingsandengagescritically withsomeconclusionsofthereadingsoftheintentionalityofaffective statesbyPaulGuyerandRachel Zuckert. The authorarguesthatoutlining afeeling-intentionality sui generis mayhelp solve someparadoxesoftheinterpretationofthisissueof Kant’saesthetics.

In “ExemplaryEmotions: ADiscussionofNormativityin Kant’sAesthetic Judgment”,Serena Feloj(UniversityofPavia, Italy)claimsthatthesentimentalist elementsof Kant’saccountnecessitateanewinterpretationofsubjective universalism specificallyanappraisaldevelopedfromthestandpointof regulativity. As,accordingtoKant’saestheticaljudgment,novalueisattributedtoanobject, ratheritis afeelingthatisexpressed,Felojponderswhetherandunderwhich conditions afeelingcanbenormative,whilealsoaddressing Kant’sarguments forassuminga normativity withoutrules,normsandstandards.Thechapter

mainlyaims to discussthenormative characterofaestheticemotionsin Kant’s CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment bytakingintoaccountcontemporarytheories ofaestheticsandfocusingonnotionssuchasregulativityandexemplarity.

Thefinalchapterofthissectionaimstoshowhow Kantianthought, andin particulartheconceptofthesublime, reappearsinDeleuze’sworksoncinema notsomuchinthefirst volume(TheMovement-Image),whereitisexplicitly mentioned but ratheras asortofantecedentoftheappearanceoftimeitself, thekeytopicofthesecond volume(TheTime-Image).In “‘AnEmotionThat Seems to Be No Play’:Deleuzeon Kantian Sublime”,DanielaAngelucci(Roma TreUniversity, Italy)claimsthatKantmightbeconsidered aprecursorofthe crystal-image,thatis,the geneticmomentofthetime-imageaccordingtoDeleuze,oneofthemostpowerfulconceptsspawnedbythisthinker.

Thethirdsection Kant’sEmotionsand Contemporary PhilosophyofMind concentratesonapproaches to Kant’saccountofemotionsdrawnfromcontemporarylinesofresearchinphilosophyofmindandneuroscience.In “The Ambiguityof KantianEmotions: Philosophical,BiologicalandNeuroscientificImplications”,PedroJesús Teruel(Universityof Valencia, Spain)suggestsexploring thefunctionofemotionsthroughtheGermannotionof Erregung,itsGermanLatincounterpart Motion,anditssemanticfield. Teruelarguesthatthereisa linkbetweentheembodiedaspectofemotionsandtheclassicaltreatmentof pathos,especiallyregardingtheentwinedmoralphenomenonof akrasia andthe stateof ataraxia inStoicthought,oneofthemainsourcesof Kant’smoraltheory. The authoralsodrawsneuroscientificimplicationsfrom Kant’sapproachtoaffective phenomenabyarguingthatweaknessofwillcanbeunderstood within the Kantianframeof rationalitywiththehelpof anaturalizedmodelofcausation.

Afurtherexplorationof Kantianinfluenceincontemporaryphilosophyof mindcanbefoundin “CalibrationHypothesis:Rethinking Kant’sPlaceforEmotionandtheBrain’sRestingState”.Inthischapter,DinaMendonça(IFILNOVA/ UNL,Portugal)addresseshowthepredictive mind hypothesiscanbeseenas rootedin Kant’smodelof rationality. Thischapteralsoconducts arenewedexaminationofthe roleofemotionsin Kantianethics,andclaimsthatKantian emotionalimagerydisplays amediatecontroloveremotionalstatesbyintegratingtheexperiencesofthesubjectandcalibratingher generalemotionalstructure to betterdealwithfutureexperiences.

In “Kantian Lange Weile WithintheContemporaryPsychologyofBoredom” , JosefaRos(HarvardUniversity/UniversityComplutenseofMadrid,Spain)focuses onboththeancientandmodernphenomenonofboredombyengagingKant’s accountofthisemotionalstatein afruitfuldialoguewithcontemporarypsychologistsandpsychiatrists,cognitive neuroscientists,andexpertsinfMRItechnol-

ogy. Withthisapproach,the authorgivesanaccountofthestudyofboredom withinthecontemporarypsychologicalandpsychiatricmainstream,andcomparesthiswiththe Kantiananthropologicaltreatmentofboredom.Rosargues that Kant’sviewsofboredomdisavowunderstandingthisaffective phenomenon as amentalpathology, and rather,encouragesanalysingitwithintheframework ofthesocio-economicstructuresofmodernity.

Thisbookhasbeenconceivedasanassemblageofground-breakingEuropean researchinthefieldof KantianStudies,focusingonanaspectof Kant’sphilosophyofparticularrelevancetobothcontemporaryneuronalandsocialsciences.Wehopetohave assembled adiversecollectionofstudies,whichanalyse importantissueswhileprovidingformulasforrevaluatingneglectedfeatures ofthe Kantianmodelofhuman rationality. Theeditorsespeciallythank Victoria MallorgaHernándezandMarshall Weissforproofreadingthe volume.

Bibliography

Faggion,Andrea,Pinzani,AlessandroandSánchezMadrid,Nuria(Eds.)(2016): Kantand SocialPolicies. London:PalgraveMacmillan.

Krasnoff,Larry, SánchezMadrid,NuriaandSatne,Paula(Eds.)(2018): Kant’sDoctrineof Rightinthe21stCentury. Cardiff:Universityof WalesPress.

NuriaSánchezMadrid

Kant’sEmotionalNormativityandthe Embodimentof Reason:Interests, Reflectionand Feelings

Abstract: Thiscontributionaimstoprovideanoverviewoftheimageofhuman epistemicandpractical agencydrawnbyreason,aestheticreflection,andmoral feeling,especiallywithinthecontextofthe “emotionalturn” thatresearchon Kant’sphilosophyhasundergoneinrecentdecades.Thischapterwillfirst pointoutthatreasondoesnotleadthesubjecttoadoptfeelingsthatfoster theirownhappiness,but rather,motivatestheindividualtoseek atheoretical groundinginepistemology.Second, Ishallhighlightthatthereflexiononjudgmentacquaintsthesubjectwithanemotionalstatethatallowshertodisregard herownegoisticinclinationsandattuneherviewsandjudgmentswiththoseof others.Finally, Iwillanalyzethefactthat,inKant’sview,certainfeelingsshould becultivatedas away ofattainingmoralstrengthandthusbecomingbetterable tobothcontroltemporarymentaldisorderswhilealsoprogressively overcoming humanfrailtyofwill.

Keywords: emotionalnormativity,interest,reflection,feeling,desire,inclination

Thischapterfocusesonanissuestillsomewhatneglectedwithin Kantianscholarship:theemotionalfeaturesofthetranscendentalmodelof reason.Themain goalof my accountshallbetocastsomelightonthewaythat Kant’smapofthe facultiesshowshumanbeingsasinhabitedbyegoisticinterests,whilealsodrawingsomeconclusionsaboutthenotionofhumanitythatresultsfromthisview. Evenif Kantsystematicallydespisestheimageofhumandignitydrawnfrom

Acknowledgement: Thisarticlehasbeenwrittenwiththesupportofthefollowinggrantedresearchprojects: Precariedadlaboral,cuerpo yvidadañada.Unainvestigacióndefilosofíasocial (PID2019 – 105803GB-I0),funded by theSpanishMinisteryofResearchandInnovation, Filosofía ypobreza.Unahistoriaculturaldelaexclusiónsocial (PR87/19 – 22633),fundedbythe UCM-BancoSantander,andtheUCM2017Innovative TeachingProjectn.º178 Precarity,ExclusionandDisability.LogicsandSubjectiveEffectsofContemporarySocialSuffering,fundedby theUniversity ComplutenseofMadrid.Thischapter wasalsosupported by the Communityof MadridandtheEuropeanSocialFund,throughgrantnumberH2019/HUM-5699(ONTRUSTCM): ResearchProgramon CultureofLawfulness.

NuriaSánchezMadrid,Univ.ComplutenseofMadrid,Spain

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110720730-003

humaninclinationsandinstincts,healsoholdsthatthepurposeofeverytheoreticalendeavouris to applytherigorous tenetsofpurepracticalreasontoeven thethorniestedgesofthehumanagent(thiscanbeseen,forexample,in awellknownexcerptfrom TheMetaphysicsofMorals).¹ Mychapter willthusmainly tackle Kant’scommitment to categorisingtheorderofemotionsas away of guaranteeinganenduringdominanceof reasonoverdesiresandinclinations,² which inturnrequiresanunbiasedinquiryintotheaffective drivesofthehumanmind. Naturally, Kantwasnotacquaintedwiththefindingsofthepsychoanalyticalapproachestothehumanmindofthetwentiethcentury.Yetthe Kantianaccountof emotionsdisplays akeen awarenessofthefactthatmosthumanemotionsbelong to therealmofunconsciousrepresentationsandstatesofmind,thusclearing apromisingpathfor adialoguebetween Kant’sphilosophyandcontemporaryresearchinneuroscienceandphilosophyofmind bothfieldsofstudy thatarethefocusofsomechaptersinthis volume.

My readingwillfurnishanoverviewoftheimageofhumanepistemicand practicalagencydrawnbyreason,aestheticreflectionandmoralfeeling,especiallywithinthecontextofthe “emotionalturn” thatresearchon Kant’sphilosophyhasundergonein recentdecades. AccordingtoKant’susualcritical method,anyattempttoanalyzetheemotionalaspectsofreasonshouldfirst acknowledge thedifficultyof merelyestablishingthemeaningoftheterm ‘emotion’,whoseprecisedefinitionisfuzzyatbest.AsAlixCohenhasstated, “Kant’s conceptionoftheemotionsencompasses awidearray ofaffectivestates,includingdesires,inclinations,affects,andpassions,whichdifferfromeachotherina numberofimportantways” (Cohen 2014,p.4). Forthis reason,accordingto Kant,thescholarofemotionsshouldaccurately rank,insofarasispossible, theentire rangeofaffectivestatesbytheirrespective motivationsand goals. Myaccountis awareoftheneed to rankthis “wholesetofaffective states” , whilealso goingbeyondthemererecognitionoftheexistenceofa manifold

 SeeMS 6: 217: “Thecounterpartofthemetaphysicsofmorals,theothermemberofthedivisionofpracticalphilosophyasa whole,wouldbemoralanthropology,which,however,would dealonlywiththesubjectiveconditionsthathindermenorhelpthemin fulfilling thelawsofa metaphysicsofmorals. It woulddealwiththedevelopment,spreading,andstrengtheningof moralprinciples(ineducationinschoolsandinpopularinstruction),andwithothersimilar teachingsandpreceptsbasedonexperience. It cannotbedispensedwith,butitmustnotprecede ametaphysicsofmoralsorbemixedwithit”.AlltranslationsofKant’stextsarefromthe volumesof TheCambridgeEditionofthe WorksofImmanuel Kant mentionedinthebibliography ofthischapter.

 SeeMS 6: 408: “Sincevirtueisbiasedoninnerfreedomitcontains apositive commandtoa humanbeing,namelytobringallhiscapacitiesandinclinationsunderhisreason’scontroland so to ruleoverhimself” .

mapofemotionsin Kant’spracticalthought,soastoilluminatethefactthatthey donotdisplaythesametraits,giventhatemotionsmayensuefromtheinterests ofreason,thereflectionofjudgment,ortheaffective moralsupportsofthesubject.Itisa curiousfeatureof Kant’sappraisalofemotionsandchangesinemotionalstates,thatheproposesthreecasesinwhichthesechangesmaybethe effectsofdrivesthatthesubjectisnotalwaysconsciouslyawareof.Putdifferently, in Kant’sphilosophy, emotionalstatesareoftentheresultofdynamics ofthemindthatdonotentirelyoverlapwiththeconsciousagencyofthesubject. Evenifthehumanbeingandagent remainstheuniquereceiveroftheemergence ofanemotionin Kant’santhropologicalapproach,noteveryemotionisa result of ahumanactivity,atleastifweunderstandthisaspurposefulactivity.Inthis sense,wecanseethat,inKant’sview,emotionsarenotseenassimplehuman reactionstoworldlyphenomena,butonthecontrary,areusedtosupporthigher facultiesofmindintheirability to improveandfullydevelopthemoralperformanceofthehumanagent.

Inrecent years,theexplosionofpapersregardingKant’s “impureethics”—to borrowthisfelicitousexpressionfromRobertB.Louden have emphasizedthe functionfulfilledbydifferentsortsoffeelings,butfocusedontheseemotions asresponsestoreason.Here,instead, Ifirstsuggestthattheinterestsofreason leadthesubjecttoadoptfeelingsnotas ameanstowardachievinghappiness, but ratheraimedat reachingfirmepistemologicalground.Second, Ishallhighlightthefactthatthereflexiononjudgmentacquaintsthesubjectwithanemotionalstatethatallowshertoforgetherownegoisticinclinationsandtoattune herviewsand judgmentswiththoseofothers.Finally, Iwillanalyzethefact that,accordingtoKant,certainfeelingsshouldbecultivatedas away ofattainingmoralstrength,andthusimprovingone’sability to controltemporarymental disorderandprogressivelyovercomehumanfrailtyofwill.

1ExpandedHorizons:Emotional Aspectsof

Reason

Asiswellknown, Kantgrants aheuristicvalue to theideasofreason,andthus setsthe goalofscientificenquiryasthegreatestpossibleunityofreason(KrVA 679). To thisend,thetwosectionsofthe “Appendixtothe TranscendentalDialectic” ofthefirst Critique provide guidancetotheoretical reasoninitspursuitof thecontinuousprogressofknowledge,which Kantillustratesthroughtheuseof ahypotheticalobjectthatmeetsthedemandsof rationalends. Kantpointsoutat variouspointswithinthissectionoftheKrV,thatunderthe requirementofsys-

tematicity,reasonneitherdiscoversanynewnoumenalobjectnor goesbeyond theboundariesofexperienceofthisepistemicidealfocus.Undertheinfluence ofthedrive to unityandwholeness,thisaiminsteadembodiesthe “conative characterofreason”,asformulatedby P. Kleingeld(1998),yieldingmaxims, i.e.subjective principlesstemmingfrom “reason’sfeelingofitsownneed [Bedürfnis]” (WDO 8: 136;Kant1996b,p.136).Mostcommentatorsassumethis sentimentallifeofreasonwas ametaphoricalapproachintendedtohelpthe readerbettergrasptheinner dynamicsofthisfaculty,whoseaims go farbeyond theempiricalepistemicpurposeofthehumanunderstanding.Thus,asthedemandsofreasonsurpassthehumancapacitytoobeytheminpractice,the first Critique suggeststhatanidealworldwhererationalpurposesappearas completelyfulfilledwouldencouragehumanunderstandingtoovercomeevery possiblematerialhindranceorsubjective misgiving andlead to anall-encompassinghegemonyofreasonthroughoutthe “landoftruth” (KrV B294).Yet, in arecentpaper,theaforementionedscholarA.Cohenseekstochallengethis notion,assheproposesanunderstandingof rationalfeelings “inthefullnonmetaphoricalsenseoftheterm” (Cohen 2018,p.12),thatis,asdrivesguiding thetranscendentalagencyoftheepistemicsubject.Inmyview,thekeypoint in acorrectassessmentof Kant’sviewofreasonasarising inthehumanmind shoulddisregardthedebatebetweenthe metaphoricalornonmetaphorical scopeofthesestatesofmind.Instead, Iclaimthatthefeelingsproducedbysatisfyingtheinterestsofreasondraw anidealportraitof ahumanbeingthatis fullycongruentwith rationaldemandsandneeds.Thus, thisemotional dynamic triggeredbyreasonhas anormative effect,insofarasitimprovestheepistemic performanceoftheunderstandingandgivesthesubjectaspecificconfidencefor attainingher goalsinthefieldofknowledge.Furthermore,theepistemicimprovementofthe rationalideasofthesubjectdoesnot resultfromanyempirical emotionoraffect,but ratherfromthesubject’sreceptivitytothe guidanceprovidedbyreason,whichevery rationalbeing cannothelpbutfeelcommitted to. Inthiscontext,Kantchooses vocabularythathighlightsthesubjective needthat thesubjectwishes to seemetbyobjective realityandbytheprogressofhismain facultyofknowledge,i.e.theunderstanding.Thus,asoccursinthefieldof geometricalenquiry,theunderstandingrequirescorollariesandpostulatestoobtain afullydeterminedpictureofitspurposes, whichcanalsobeexpectedtohavean immenselypositive impactontheepistemicperformanceofeachsubject.Anexcerptfrom “WhatDoesitMeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?” hintsattheway thatreason’smaximofachievingthemostsystematicknowledge byconsidering allpossibleepistemicoutcomesofthehumanspeciesservesasanidealfocusfor thehumanunderstanding:

This guidingthread[i.e.theprincipleofsystematicity]isnotanobjective principleofreason, aprincipleofinsight,but amerely subjective oneoftheonlyuseofreasonallowedby itslimits – acorollaryofitsneed.(WDO8:140;Kant1996b,p. 140)

Boththe “Appendixtothe TranscendentalDialectic” intheKrVaswellas “What DoesitMeantoOrientOneselfinThinking?” displayanarray oftextualevidence forthe roleofemotionsasprovidingsubjective supporttoreasonin Kant’stranscendentalaccountofthisfaculty.Infact,aspreviouslymentioned,reasondoes not requireanysupport,giventhatitisabletoencouragetheaccomplishmentof itsowngoals.Thissupport,anditsemotionalfeatures,onlybecome anecessary elementas Kantfocusesontheshortcomingsthatthehumanunderstanding mightfacewhenconfrontingtheimpossiblyoverwhelminggoalofthecreation of asystemofallpossibleknowledge.Putdifferently, Kantexhibitsa pronouncedconcernforthenegative effectsthatthesefrustratingsituations mightcausefortheseekerofknowledge,whilealsoclaimingthatusefulideals mayhelpthehumanunderstandingdeludeitselfandthusovercomeitslackof confidenceinitsownagency.Thistextestablishes aserious tone,tothepoint that Kantdepicts alandscapewherehumanemotionssuchasfearandlaziness vicesdisavowedbytheclaimsofEnlightenment arebanned,freeingup spacefor more hopefulandassertive feelingsbetterabletoassisttheunderstanding inthecompletionofitspurposes. It isimportanttohighlight Kant’s confidenceinideal rationalobjects,andtheimprovementofthe resilienceof theunderstanding,asopposedtoconcernaboutthe hypotheticaldelusionsregardingitsowncognitive potentialthatmaystemfrom afeelingofitsownnecessitybrought aboutby reason. Kantseemstoadoptthismoreoptimisticpositionasheviewsreasonasdestinedtotakeintoaccountbothhumanfrailtyand theepistemicflawsderivedfromtheinescapableconditionofhumanfinitude. Thewaythatreasonheedstheboundariesofunderstandingoffersaninteresting pointthatI wishtohighlightinthisaccountoftheinteractionoffacultiesin Kant’sphilosophyanditsemotionalovertones. Acentralquestionariseshere: is Kantinterestedingivinga “humanface” toreason,insofarasthisfacultyis abletorescue afrailunderstandingfromtheanxietyoffailure? Furthermore,assumingthevalidityofthiscontention,istherenotthen areversalofemotional statusbetween reasonandtheunderstanding,suchthatanemotionlikecourage,forexample,couldshiftfromthespaceofreason to theoneofcontingent epistemic agency?Thefollowingaccountshallsuggestananswertobothqueries.

Thepreviousremarksallowus to draw thepreliminaryconclusionthatthe epistemic guidanceofferedby rationalprinciplessets acleardistinctionbetween theneedsofinclination versustheneedsofpurereason.Onlythelatterdisplay

thenormativityofreasonandallowthehumanmind to meetitsowndemands byproviding amechanismforovercomingtheeffectsofemotionsthatcancloud trueepistemology.Kant’streatmentofaestheticnormativityallowsustofurther ouraccountoftheepistemicvalueof rationalemotions,asthetiesbetweenepistemicprogressand adistinctive feeling ofpleasureconfirmthattheattainment ofthe goalssetby reasonregardingtheknowledge ofnaturecoincides withan innate yearningofhumannature.Asthepublished “Introduction” of KU points out,

wearealsodelighted(strictlyspeaking,relievedof aneed)whenweencountersuch asystematicunityamongmerely empiricallaws,justasifit were ahappyaccidentwhichhappenedtofavourouraim,eventhough we necessarilyhadtoassumethatthereissucha unity,yetwithouthavingbeen abletogaininsightintoitand to prove it.(KU5: 184; Kant 2000,p.184)

Iconsiderthatnootherexcerptof Kantissoeffective inillustratingthesubtle tiesbetweenepistemicprogressandtheemotionalreflexthatallowfortheunhinderedsubordinationofworldlymaterialdiversityundercommonlogical laws. Yetmypointinthiscontextisnot to highlight, forinstance,thedifferences between arationalfeelingsuchasmoralrespectandthepleasurethatthesubjectexperiencesuponaccomplishingherepistemic goals.Evenifthehuman mindshowsreceptivity to thesystematichorizonsofreason, Kantdistinguishes betweenroutine,mundanesourcesofpleasure,andthehigherpleasure generatedbythecognitive activityofhumanunderstanding.Inthefirstcase,ourinclinationsdeterminethepositive feelingsweexperience,whileinthesecond, reasonitselfactsasa transcendental guardianofhumanknowledge.Thus,emotionalnormativityalsoappears withintheboundariesoftheoreticalknowledge as anecessarysupplementforhelpingthehumanbeing overcomehiscognitive flaws.Asthesubjectandhiscognitiveagencymayrelyonthe guidancefurnishedby rationalideas,healsoreceivesexternalinputsthatconfirmthatreasonis nolonger asourceofarealcognitive content,but asAlixCohenputsit afacultythat “enable[s]cognitiveactivity” (Cohen 2018,p. 23).In my view,thispictureofcooperationbetweenhumancognitive resourcesand reasonprovidesa clearerimageofhumanunderstanding.Ina nutshell,reasonallowsusto grasp awiderlogicalhorizon,andthusenlargesandenrichestheimagewe have ofourownepistemiccapabilities.

At thispoint,itisclearthatthelogicalhorizonthataccompaniesallourempiricalconceptsdoesnotproceedfromemotionalneedsanddesires,but rather thatitistheeffectofhigherneedsrootedin reason,which,enigmatically, harbour agenuinecomprehensionfortheflawsthatthehuman mindmighthave. However,itwillbeusefultorecall,inthiscontext,a celebratedstatementof

WDO,i.e.: “Reasondoesnotfeel;ithasinsightintoitslackandthrough the drive forcognition iteffectsthefeelingofaneed[Bedürfnis]” (WDO 8: 139n.; Kant, 1996b,p.139n).Thisquote allowsmetoreturntothetwoquestions Ihave thusfarleftunanswered.In my view,reason’sdrive forcognition radicallytransformshumancognitive agency,insofarasitprovidesitwith akindofecho, whichsteadilyremindsthesubjectoftheexistenceofa gapbetweenthelogical demandsof reasonandtheempiricaloutcomesthatthehumanunderstandingis abletodeliver. AccordingtoKantitisnotpossible to breachthischasm. Yetemotionsthatonlyreasoncouldbring aboutareintended to sustainprogressandto guaranteethecohesionofhumancognition,thusprotectingthehumanmind fromitsownepistemicfears.Cohenhassuggestedanimmanentviewoftheepistemic guidancethat rationalmaximsprovideforthesubject:

[B]yrelyingonreason’sregulative functiononthebasisofthefeelingofreason’sneed, whatwearecommitted to isneitherthepresuppositionofnature’ssystematicunitynor thedutytoseekthisunity;rather,wearecommittedtotheactivityofcognizing,andultimately, to rational agencyandtheimprovementofitscondition. (Cohen 2018,p. 23)

Iwholeheartedlyagreewiththisimmanentassumptionoftheregulative valueof rationalideas,asitistheonlyway toreconcilethese with Kant’stheoreticalnormativity.Yet my accountaimstoshedlightonthefactthatthisimmanentuseof rationalideasfulfilsitspurposeasthesubjectfeelsthedemands raisedbya non-human, rationalfaculty.This voiceofreasonseemstorenounceacomplete displayoftheexhaustivesystematicityofknowledge,andthusservestounfailingly inspiretheepistemiclabourthatthehumanunderstandingmustexecute.

2Pleasuresof Reflexion,Pleasuresof Community?

Inthissection Ishalldiscussthefactthat,accordingtoKant,thefeelingsuniversallyconveyedbythejudgmentoftasteblurtheboundariesbetweensubjective,egoisticclaims,andthosethatcanbeapplieduniversallyamonghumanbeings.Putslightlydifferently, thephenomenonofbeauty,aswellastheduties impliedbythe sensuscommunis,donotcontributetotheisolationofthesubject, but ratherencouragehertoseekoutthepointofviewofothers.Therefore,by broadeningthepowerofjudgmentaccordingtotheaestheticrulesoftaste, Kantupholdsthathumanbeingswillbecomemoresensitivetosocialintercourseandalsohavemoreopportunities to cultivatetheirhumanityastheybecomemoreacquaintedwith auniversalstandpoint.Throughthistrainingthat

acquaintsthesubjectwiththeconditionsofcommunity,Kantpromotes atransformationofthehumanbeinginto arationalandsensibleagentable to meetthe challengesofliving togetherwithothersunder asharednormativity.AsAngelica Nuzzohaspointedout,reflective judgmenthelpsus “tuneintotheresonanceof theuniversal voiceandspeakonitsbehalf ” (Nuzzo 2014,p.99),puttingthesubjectincontactwith aspecificemotionthatattuneshertohermaximumpotential as ahuman.Thus,thestandpointweadoptwhenmakinga judgmentoftaste sharpensthehumancapacitytodiscerntheuniversalunderwhich aparticular casemightbeinscribed.Inthisway asSchillersawlaterwithacuity theaestheticcontemplationoftheworldandofhumanartisticcreationsdeeplytransformsourmind,insofarasitmakesusbetterabletocometoidealagreements withothersubjectswithoutneglectingourconstitutive contingency.Infact,the phenomenonoftasteisintendedtopreparethesubject to suitablyreact to social realitywithoutbetrayingherdutiesas amoralbeing.Anotherremarkof Nuzzo’s willbehelpfulinshedding more lightonthispoint:

Aestheticexperienceistheexperienceofcontingency. Suchexperienceandthesearchfor meaningfulnessthatconstitutesitisthecipherofourhumanity.[…]Ouremotionalresponse to contingencyisthesubjective alternative tothecontrolledactoflegislationwherebyunderstandingandreasoninstitutetheobjective necessityoftheirlaws.Transcendentally,theemotionsaresubjective waysoflendingsensetocontingency; reflectively,theyare waysof voicingthe awarenessofourowncontingency. (Nuzzo 2014,p.102)

Iagree withtheoverviewprovidedbythisexcerpt regardingthe roleofemotions in Kant’sphilosophyandespeciallywiththeprincipalconsequencethat Nuzzo drawsfromit,i.e.thefactthatanunderstandingofthecontingentbondsthat linkus withtheformsoftheworldiscloselyrelatedtoourabilitytoattune ouremotionalstatestothepleasuresconsideredcharacteristicofhumanity.Indeed,thepleasurederivedfromtasteexpandsthehumancapacitytocultivatea senseofrespectandjusticewithregardtohisfellowhumanbeings,whichotherwisemayremainconcealedbythepassionscharacteristicofthesocialsphere. At thispointwearrive at aquestionanalogoustoourearlierinvestigation regardingtheideasof reason:doestheaestheticdutytoachievea stateof Ein-and Zusammenstimmung withotherindividualjudgmentscorrespondtothenatural psychologyofthehumanmind,ordoesit ratherhintatanelevated,ideal imageofthesubject? Doesthis goalrepresentthefulfilmentof aduty,orisit morerelatedtosocialcustom?The §22ofthe CritiqueofthePowerofJudgment focusesonpreciselythispoint:

Thisindeterminatenormof acommonsenseisreallypresupposedbyus:ourpresumption inmakingjudgmentsoftasteprovesthat.Whetherthereisinfactsuch acommonsense,as

aconstitutive principleofthepossibilityofexperience,orwhether ayethigherprincipleof reasononlymakesitinto aregulative principleforus first to produce acommonsensein ourselvesforhigherends,thus whethertasteisanoriginalandnaturalfaculty,oronlythe ideaofonethatis yettobeacquiredandisartificial,sothat ajudgmentoftaste,withits expectationof auniversalassent,isinfactonlya demandofreasontoproducesuch aunanimityinthemannerofsensing,andwhetherthe ‘‘should”,i.e.,theobjective necessityof theconfluenceofthefeelingofeveryonewiththatofeach,signifiesonlythepossibilityof coming toagreement aboutthis,andthejudgmentoftasteonlyprovidesanexampleofthe applicationofthisprinciple – thiswe wouldnotandcannot yetinvestigatehere;fornow wehave onlytoresolve thefacultyoftasteintoitselementsandtounitethemultimatelyin theideaof acommonsense.(KU5:240;Kant 2000,p.124)

Asinthecaseoftheheuristicsupportthatrationalideasprovidetothesubject ofknowledge,inKant’sthirdCritique,aestheticnormativityimplies anotionof humanitythatreliesonthesuccessofeducation,which,atthesametime,holds thepromiseofthefutureadvancementofthespecies.Moreover,thepromiseofa socialcontractas aconsequenceofaestheticagreementorientstheconstruction of acommunity yettocomeforhumanity, ascanbeseeninthepreviousexcerpt. Infact,the sensuscommunis hintsat acommonpurposetobeconstructed throughthecommunicative effortsofthehumanspeciesthatwill renderclashes motivatedbyreligious,culturalandclassdifferences athingofthepast.One mayask:isthisfeatureofcommunityinspiredbyoursociallife?Theanswer liesinthefactthatKant’saestheticcommunityoriginatesas anormative demandthataims to meetthehighermoralrequirementsordainedbypractical reason. It confirmsthat,for Kant,thecommunityoftasteisnotsomethingthatexistsforitsownsake,but rathermirrorstheemergenceof apossiblemoral community.Inmyview,this relationofdependenceoftheaestheticcommunity onthemoralcommunityshedssomelightonthefunctionthatemotionsfulfil withintherealmoftaste. Justastheemotionalcomponentof reasonhighlighted insection 1embodiedimpersonaltraitswhichencouragedthesubjectofcognitiontoaccomplishhigherepistemicactions,aestheticfeelingsasthepleasure that sensuscommunis yieldsareviewedas “theeffectofthefreeplayofourcognitive powers” (KU5:238;Kant 2000,p.122) andallowonetoput “oneselfinto thepositionofeveryoneelse” (KU5:294;Kant 2000,p.174).This, inturn,triggers ashiftthattransformsthehuman tendencytowardsegoismbyenlargingthe fieldinwhichthesubjectisabletofeelthepleasuresof reflection.Rather thanprioritisethewitor ingenium ofanindividualsubject,aestheticexperience providesanopportunitytoaffirmthesharedconditionsthatgivesupport to the knowledge abletobeproducedbythecommunityofhumansubjects. Kantrepeatedlyholdsthatwhenoneutters ajudgmentoftaste, “everyoneshould

agreewithit” (KU5:239;Kant 2000,p.123),i.e.everybodyisexpected to give theirassenttotheclaimcontainedinthejudgment.

Kant’sclaimisexplicitaboutthefactthattheaestheticdemandforconstructinganaestheticcommunityis atask to befulfilledinordertocomply withtherequirementsanddutiesentailedbytheconceptionofhumansasa moralspecies. Yetnoaestheticpleasurecouldpossiblybeschematizedorcategorizedin Kant’sview(asinthecaseofmoralobjectsand goals),giventhatthe formerreliesonfreelyattuning awidevarietyofdifferentjudgmentsanddiverse voicesthatoughttoinspiretheconstructionofthemodernrepublicanstate. Furthermore,inthiscase,anelementexternaltothesubjectintervenestobringout theforemosthumancapacities thesamecapacitiesoftenendangeredinthesocialsphere.Thisconfirmsthattheremustbemediationbetweentheinterestsof thetheoreticalandpracticaluseofreason,abletodeploy abridgebetweenthese two rationalspheres.³ Thus,toholdourjudgments “uptohumanreasonasa whole” (KU5:294;Kant 2000,p.173)exemplifiesthecollective effortsthathumanityisabletoundertake,evenifthehumanempiricalsubjectmaybeledastray bytheirownself-interest.Inthisway, theemotionalfeaturesoftaste,in Kant’saccount,conveytothesubjectherpotential to fulfilthepurposesof bothdomainsofreason,almostasifsheshouldfaketheaccomplishmentof epistemicandmoraldutiesuntilshewillbeable to effectively performthem.⁴ Ultimately, though,themostenigmaticpointofthefunctionoftasteisthefact thataesthetictraininghelpsthesubjectrenouncehisegoisticinclinationsand desiresandimprovehiscapacity to abidebymoralduties,andthustoconstruct amoralcommunity governedbyreason.

 OnthisissueseeSweet(2018,p. 146): “Thepleasurewetakeinthebeautiful[…]ishomologouswiththetheoreticalsphereinsofarasitannounces ageneralagreementofourfaculties withthingsinthe world. It ishomologouswiththepracticalsphereinsofarasitannounces thecommunityofallhumanbeings.Whilecognitionandmoral goodnessbothlegislateand thusaccomplishsomething – thedeterminationof arepresentation,thebringingaboutofa community – thepleasureinthejudgmentoftaste,initshomologywitheachdomain,suggests thepossibilityofsuccessineachdomain.And,insofarasitishomologouswitheachdomain,it canallowforspaceinwhichtheyarejoined together,thoughnotunified”.Seetheaccountof Borges(2019,pp.139 – 151),whichconcernsthecontributionsofthe Anthropology inrefiningthe propaedeutic to moralsin Kant’sphilosophy.

 Cohen(2015)hasfocusedonthiseffectof Kant’sappraisaloftheacquisitionofvirtue.

3AnEmotionalBasis ofMorality?

Aswesawabove,theroleoftasteinencouragingthetransitionofhumanitytowards amoralcommunityshedsnewlightonthefunctionthattranscendental philosophyassignstotheemotions thatis,ashelpingtools to easethetransformationofthehumanbeinginto arationalmoralbeing.Inmyview,theconceptionof moralfeelingsassupportstomoralprogresscanbeunderstoodwithintheoverallimpactofaffective statesonthemoraldevelopmentofthesubject. Inthis vein, Kant’sLecturesonAnthropologyandEthicsyieldmanyexamplesof emotionsthatcanbeexpectedtoincreasemoralstrength,andthusimprovethe capacityofthesubject to lookbeyondherownparticularself-interestandthink intermsofthehighervalueofthecommon good. Kantianscholarshave often highlightedthefactthat Kant’spracticalphilosophyextollstheclassicalstoic virtueof apathy,viewedas atoolforresistingthepoweroffeelingsandinclinationsoverthehumanmindandforcultivatingself-mastery.Inthe Doctrineof Virtue Kantclaimsthat

virtuenecessarilypresupposesapathy; itforbid[s]himtolethimselfbe governedbyhis feelingsandinclinations(thedutyof apathy);forunlessreasonholdthereinsofgovernmentinitsownhands,hisfeelingsandinclinationsplaythemasteroverhim.(MS 6: 408)

Despite theadmirationthat Kantshowsforemotionssuchasstoicapathy, my accountwillinsteadfocuson Kant’sattempts to prove,inhismoralandanthropologicalwritings,thathumanfeelingscanbetransformedthrough acomplex trainingprocess guidedbypracticalreason.Whilestoicapathycanbeseenas ausefultoolforcontrollinghumanaffectsandbreakingtheholdofthepassions, thisvirtueistoorigidtobeoftruevaluewithin Kant’sviewofthedevelopment of afirmmoralcharacter.I wouldliketohighlight, atthispoint,thatprogress andcontinuoustransformationarethetermsmostoftenusedbyKanttodescribe thehumanefforttoachievetruemorality:

Virtueisalwaysinprogressand yetalwaysstarts fromthebeginning. It isalwaysinprogress because,consideredobjectively,while yetinconstant approximationtoitisaduty.Thatit alwaysstartsfromthebeginninghas asubjective basisinhumannature,whichisaffected byinclinationsbecauseof whichvirtuecanneversettledowninpeaceandquietwithits maximsadoptedonceandforallbut,ifitisnotrising,isunavoidablysinking.(MS 6: 409)

Thepreviouslycitedexcerptfromthe DoctrineofVirtue depictshumanprogress intherealmofvirtueasanemotionalexperienceofinnertransformation.This makestheagentmoreconfidentintheconsequencesofhisownbehaviour, whilealsoenablingthemto avoidfallingpreytothearrogancethatthreatens

tospoilthecharacterofthesubjectand generatea “dishonesty” thatKantcalls the “foulstainofourspecies” (RGV6:38).Thus, Kantconsidersthatself-examinationoftheemotionsthatcontributetothemoralstruggleof arationalhuman agentbetweenher moraldutyandherownsubjective,egoisticinclinationscan helplaya solidfoundationforachievingthemoraldestinyofhumanity.The DoctrineofVirtue alsourgestheagent to adoptsimilarapproachestoachieve moral progress withinherself:

Moralcognitionofoneself,whichseekstopenetrateintothedepths(theabyss)ofone’s heart whicharequitedifficulttofathom,isthebeginningofallhumanwisdom, whichconsistsinharmonyofa humanbeing’swillwithitsfinalend,requireshimfirsttoremovethe obstaclewithin(canevilactuallypresentinhim)andthen to developtheoriginalpredispositionto agoodwillwithhim,whichcanneverbelost.(Onlythedescentintothehellof self-cognitioncanpave thewaytogodliness).(MS 6: 441)

Kantdepicts,inthistext,thetaskofmoralself-cognitionas aprocesscapableof sparkinganemotionaltransformationofthehumanbeing as awhole,enabling himtobetterattunehisinternalpredispositionwith amorallygoodwill.Pablo Muchnikhasclaimedthatthesearchforthe Gesinnung rootedinhumanchoices andactionsthat Kantencouragesinhiswritingsonmoralityoverlaps,onmany importantpoints,withthetaskofcultivatinggoodcharacter,whichisintended tomitigatethehumanpropensitytowardsevilandconsequentlytogrounda “heart” thatshallshelterthe “innercitadel” fromexternalandinternalthreats. Iagreewiththisaccount,asitplacestheemotionaldevelopmentofthe agentat thecentreof moralagency:

The “heart” dissolvesthe tensionbetween Kant’sapparentlycontradictorycommitments to theuniversalityofthepropensityandthefreedomoftheindividual. It doessobymediating,atthelevelofindividualmorality,betweenthe apriori principlesthatconstitutean agent’scharacterandtheirphenomenalexpressionintypicalmoralemotions – amediationthatinturnmakesthoseemotionssusceptibletoanthropological generalization.If thisreadingiscorrect, the “heart” isthelinchpinof Kant’smoralanthropology – itisessentialtounderstandhisviewsinReligion about radicalevilandmoralregeneration,for theheartistheepicentreofanagent’smoralstruggle.(Muchnik 2014,p.241)

AsMuchnikcorrectlypointsout,inmyview, Kantidentifiesthemoraleffortundertakenbythe rationalhumanagentwiththeconstructionof agood “heart” , whichplaystheroleofaninner guardianprotectingthehumansubjectin theirnever-endingstrugglefortruemorality.Because agingcanweaken humanfacultiesandcapacities,Kantsuggeststhattheagentmustcultivate hisownmoralitybyinvestinggreateffortandperseverancethroughouthisentire life.

In keepingwiththisprojecttoredeemtheemotionalorderofthehuman mind,itmightbeuseful to enlargethescopeofouraccountsoastoshed lightonsomecircumstancesthaturge theuseofemotionsasembodiedsupports thatimprovehumanmoralvirtue.Asexpected, Kant rejectsthatanorderingor categorizationoftheemotionscanprovidethekey to theattainmentofvirtue. Onthecontrary,hisapproachtoethicsclearlydisavowsthat acombinationof humanfeelingsandmechanicalskillscouldleadtovirtue,asvirtue ratherrefinesthesourcesofpleasureandactsas acheckontheemotionsthatarisein themind.⁵ Apassagefromthe DoctrineofVirtue neatlyhighlightsthis gapbetweentheessentialmoral goodandcontingenthumanemotions:

Consideredinitscompleteperfection,virtueisthereforerepresentednotasif ahuman beingpossesseshim;forintheformercaseit wouldlookasifhestillhad achoice(for whichhe wouldneed yetanothervirtueinorder to selectvirtuebeforeany oftheother waresonoffer).(MS 6: 406)

Accordingtothistext,practical reasonisexpectedtochangethewholescaleof emotionsthathumanbeingsareabletofeel,inculcating thesubjectwith afirm willingness to constantlystruggleagainsttheirbaseinclinations,whichultimately resultsinthedevelopmentofmoralcharacter.⁶ Inthiscontext,cultivatinglove andsympathytowardsvulnerablepeople,⁷ orloveofhonouras ameanstoself-

 Preciselybecause Kantdoesnotconsiderthatvirtuemightbereduced to theacquisitionofa skill, Icannot agreewiththereadingthatMerrittproposes,seeMerritt(2018,p. 203): “The strengthofvirtueisacquiredthrougheffort,andthisiscontinuallyengaged.On my view, Kantsaysthattheholywillshouldhave thesamestrengthbecausethisstrengthisessentially cognitive:itisthereadinessofone’scommitment to morality,andthecontentofthiscommitmentcanbespelledputthroughthemorallaw. So,thereis asense, again,in whichthecontent ofthecommitmentisthesameifitisregardedsimplyobjectively,according to itsinternalprinciple.But aholywilldoesnotgraduallyacquire askill; aholydoesnot – itseems – have to learn”.Inmyview,Merrittshedslightontheacquisitionprocessofvirtueasif whichmay alsoexplainitshumanembodiment. YetI considerthattheprocessofembodimentofmoral rulesalsoimpactstheassumptionofthemorallawbythehumanwill.

 N. Shermanwasoneofthefirst Kantscholars whoopenlyfocusedonthedependencethat Kant’sfoundationofmoralityhadwithregardtoemotions.SeeSherman(2014, p.30): “Theregulative proceduregivenbythemorallawinthepuremetaphysicsofmoralscannotitselfsuffice to setobligatoryendswithouttheadditionofempiricalfacts” .

 SeeMS 6: 457: “Butwhileitisnotinitself adutytosharethesufferings(as wellthejoys)of others,itisa duty to sympathizeactively intheirfate;andtothisenditisthereforeanindirect duty to cultivatethecompassionatenatural(aesthetic)feelinginus, and to makeuseofthemas somanymeans to sympathybasedonmoralprinciplesandthefeelingappropriatetothem. It is therefore adutynot to avoidtheplaces wherethepoorwholackthemostbasicnecessitiesareto befoundbut rathertoseekthemout,andnottoshunsickroomsordebtors’ prisonsandsoforth

esteem,arementionedby Kantasexamplesofreliable,concrete guides towards moral duty.Thus,trainingourmind to overcomecomplexfeelingssuchassadnessandjoyexemplifiesthematuredevelopmentofthesubject,incontrastto thecommon reactionstopleasureandpainasimmediate reactionstotheexternalenvironment.Therefore, Kantextollstheefforttokeepaffective statesunder controlas akeydimensionintheeducationofhumannature,giventhatemotionsarethemaininformationuponwhichthe rationalagentmakesherdecisions.Infact,humaninclinationssuchasloveofhonourconveythatan agentconsidersherself amoralbeing,disposedtoabideby amoraldutygroundedintherespectofone’sownperson.⁸ The DoctrineofVirtue pointsoutthatthe feelingofself-esteemcorrespondstothefeaturesof “thehumanbeing’sfeeling forhissublime vocation” (MS 6: 437),whichinvolves akindofprideforthedignityofhumanityaswellas afearofbehavingin away inconsistentwithrespect forhumanity. Aswe read intheLecturesonEthics Vigilantius:

Aloverofhonourfindsinhimselfnoneed to beknown[ ]hedoesnotrequiretobehighly esteemedbyothers,yethismoralconductissuch,thatifitweretobeknown,hewouldbe acknowledgedasonewhoisworthyofthe[goodopinion]ofothers.(V-Mo/Vigil 27:665)

Asthistextconfirms, Kant’streatmentofaffectsandemotionsis arigorousanalysisoftheeffectofthevaluesofethicalconsistency,integrity,anddignityon humanbehaviour. In Kant’sview,moraldispositionssuchaslove ofhonour canbeconsideredasembodimentsofvirtuethathelpcontributetotheachievementofmoralvirtue. Yetembodiedvirtuedoesnothave to dowiththeimpact thatfickleemotionsmay possessonmoraljudgment,but ratherattheinfluence thataninternallyrootedmoralityoughttoshowoverouraffective states.Thus, virtueisexpectedtoshapethefeelingsanddesiresofthehumanbeing,deeply transformingthesourcesofpleasureanddispleasureandencouragingthepracticalself-determinationto guideone’sactionsbasedonthepromiseof amore moralfuture.AsKantclaimsinReflection 7199(Refl19:272): “Thefirstand mostimportantobservationthata humanbeing makesabouthimselfisthat,determinedthrough nature,heistobethe authorofhishappinessandevenofhis

inorder to avoidsharingpainfulfeelingsonemaynotbe abletoresist.Forthisisstilloneofthe impulsesthatnaturehasimplantedinustodowhattherepresentationofdutyalonemightnot accomplish”.Ontherolethat Mitleid fulfilsin Kantdoctrineofvirtue,see Wehofsits(2017).

 See L. DenisinCohen(2014, p.199): “Love ofhonourconstitutes amoral aptitudeforthefulfilmentof acrucialsubsetofdutiestooneself:thosethatconcernone’smaxims’ consistency withone’sprerogative as amoralbeing,one’sinnerfreedom,whichisanessentialcondition ofcharacter.Love ofhonourcohereswith afundamentalcommitmenttomorality.Itispart of themoralperfectionof ahumanbeing” .

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"But look here," protested the Scarecrow, waving his hat to attract his Majesty's attention, "you can't do this. We are important subjects of Ozma of Oz and when we fail to return she will come here with her army and destroy you."

"She can't fight shadows," answered the King calmly. "Fetch the blue ray, Ozeerus."

Backing along the wall, the blue shade thus addressed left the cavern, returning presently with a flaming blue torch. As the weird blue light danced all over the ceiling and walls, Trot seized her two friends by the hands.

"Run!" panted Trot frantically. But at their first step, the same invisible force that had swept them into the King's presence, thrust them back against the left wall of the cave.

"This ray," explained the King, smiling icily, "will destroy those clumsy bodies of yours and transform you into fine, useful shades. Quick, best sides out."

"Am I to become a shadow before I become a man?" groaned Benny, glancing about desperately.

"Will I be the shadow of myself?" moaned the Scarecrow, putting both hands before his face and crouching back against the wall.

"Never mind," comforted Trot. "Maybe it won't hurt much and we won't have to be shadows long, for Ozma will soon miss us and then this silly old King will be sorry as well as silly."

"Who is to be first?" inquired the monarch, giving no heed to Trot's remarks. Benny glanced from the blazing blue torch to Trot and then quickly stepped forward.

"I will be first," announced Benny, "but beware, when I become a shadow, I'll toss you off the throne, I'll hammer you to shadow bits, I'll —" Benny got no further, for at this juncture, Ozeerus turned the blue torch full upon him. There was a sparkle and flash as the blue flame sprayed against the wall and then such a roar and grind that the Scarecrow toppled over like a ten-pin and Trot clapped both hands to her ears.

CHAPTER 12

Escape from Cave City

The last thing Trot remembered was an ear splitting explosion, a terrible tumble through a dark tunnel, a terrific splash and the sudden shock of finding herself under water Choking and spluttering the little girl struck out valiantly. As she did, two wet arms clasped themselves 'round her waist and she felt herself being borne swiftly upward. Next instant the warm sun was shining on her face and, opening her eyes, Trot found herself on the surface of Lake Orizon. Supporting her with one arm, Orpah was swimming steadily toward a rocky beach. Blinking and gasping, for she had swallowed a dreadful dose of salt water, the little girl tried to look for her friends. But there was no sign of Benny or the Scarecrow, nor of the jeweled islands she had seen before the bird-man dropped her in Quiberon's cave.

Too exhausted to ask questions, Trot let the old mer-man tow her ashore. As it grew shallower, he lifted her in his arms and set her on a high rock out of the reach of the tide.

"Now, I must go back for the others," he wheezed hoarsely. "But we're free—free my girl—and all of our troubles are over!"

Trot smiled faintly, too wet and shaken to say a word and, with a joyous flirt of his tail, Orpah disappeared under the waves. But the warm sunshine and bracing breeze soon restored Trot to herself. Wringing out her dress and shaking back her hair she began to look eagerly for the return of Orpah. She wondered just how she had reached the bottom of the lake and whether Benny and the Scarecrow had been blown there with her. And before she had answered this question to her own satisfaction, the hard head of the stone man appeared suddenly above the water. At each step he rose higher and Orpah, swimming joyously at his side, waved gaily to Trot. Benny was carrying the Scarecrow in his arms, and when they reached the little girl's rock, the straw man gave a feeble cheer.

Benny had lost his high hat and umbrella and was covered with clinging sea weeds, but at sight of Trot, safe and sound upon the rocks, his stone lips parted in a broad smile.

"Well," rasped Benny jovially, "This is better than being shades, but let's go in where it's dryer."

"By all means," coughed the Scarecrow. "I feel like a sponge!" As Benny came opposite, Trot, standing on tip-toe, put her arms 'round his neck. Striding easily over the jagged rocks, the stone man carried both Trot and the Scarecrow far up on the beach. The mer-man had recovered his crutches by this time, and hobbled happily along behind them.

"I'm glad you're not a real man yet," muttered the Scarecrow, as Benny put him carefully down on the sand, "A real man could never have walked along the bottom of a lake, nor saved us from being shadows."

"Did I save you?" asked Benny, easing Trot down beside the Scarecrow.

"Of course you did!" Dragging himself up beside the others, Orpah beamed on the former statue. "When you refused to melt into a shadow, Ozeerus turned the blue ray higher and higher till it exploded and blew out the side of the cave and carried us all to the bottom of the lake."

"But where are the Ozure Isles?" questioned Trot, standing up and shading her eyes with one hand.

"Back there," explained Orpah, waving toward the west. "That blue ray blew us clear across the bottom of the lake to the mainland."

"I shall never be the same," the Scarecrow assured them sorrowfully. "I feel like an aquarium. Is my face washed off, Trot? And see what's got into my chest, will you?" Trot thrust her hand into the Scarecrow's stuffed shirt and, with a little grimace, brought forth a wriggling fish. There were several crabs and a turtle in the Scarecrow's pockets, but after they had shaken him well and restored the wiggling creatures to the lake, Trot and Orpah wrung out the poor straw man and stretched him in the sun to dry.

"You'll be all right soon," smiled Trot, giving him a little hug, "and when we reach the Emerald City, you can have yourself laundered and restuffed and I'll touch up your face with my new paints."

"But what are we going to do now?" asked Benny, surveying the little girl expectantly.

"Well," answered Trot, shaking back her wet hair, "I think we'd better get back to the Emerald City as soon as we can, so that Ozma can help find the Queen of the Ozure Isles, and keep Quiberon from doing any more mischief. Don't you think so, Orpah?"

"That's the best thing I've heard since I escaped from Cave City," smiled the mer-man, "and if you can spare me, I'll swim across right now and tell Cheeriobed the good news."

"Don't be too sure it will be good," sighed the Scarecrow, raising his head with a great effort. He still felt damp and depressed, but Trot shook the old mer-man heartily by the hand and promised to return with Ozma to the Ozure Isles.

"I'd like to see the Sapphire City again," finished Trot.

"If Trot comes, I'll come too," promised Benny, "but you may not know me, for I'll be a real person after I have seen the Wizard of Oz!"

"You're a real person now," chuckled Orpah, tapping Benny on the arm with his gold crutch, "and Cheeriobed will reward you well for your services."

"I hope they won't hang wreaths 'round my neck," worried Benny, as the mer-man dove into the lake. "I hate wreaths! When do we start on, Trot?"

"As soon as the Scarecrow dries off and I find something to eat," answered Trot. "Oh, Benny, I'm so hungry!"

"What's that?" inquired Benny, in surprise.

"It's the way she's made," explained the Scarecrow patiently, "and one of the inconveniences of being a real person. Real people, my dear Benny, must eat three times a day, at least. I'm glad I'm stuffed with straw and you may thank your hackers and hewers that you are made of stone!"

"But, what will she eat?" asked Benny, staring at Trot with a worried frown.

"Oh, I'll find something," laughed Trot, who was used to taking care of herself and picking up lunches in strange lands. Running to the top of a small sand dune, she looked carefully all around and soon found a big clump of beach plums. A toast tree grew nearby and between the two, Trot fared extremely well. The brisk breezes dried her clothes, while she ate and, feeling rested and refreshed, Trot skipped back to her companions, thinking how astonished Dorothy and Betsy would be when she told them about Cave City and the bird-man.

The Scarecrow was telling Benny something of life in the capital, and the more the Public Benefactor heard about this strange and marvelous city, the more anxious he was to be off. The Scarecrow himself could now walk without collapsing, so as soon as Trot appeared they both declared themselves ready to start.

"I know this country," declared the Scarecrow with a knowing wink. "We have but to walk east until we come to Jinjur's cottage, then proceed in a south westerly direction, till we reach the Emerald City itself."

"Who is Jinjur?" inquired Benny, tramping heavily through the tall grass.

"A young lady who gathered an army of girls and conquered the Emerald City when I was Emperor," answered the Scarecrow, with a merry glance at Trot.

"How unladylike!" mused the stone man. "Are you not afraid she will conquer you again?"

"Dear me, no!" laughed the Scarecrow. "That's all over and done with and Jinjur and I are the best of friends. I was tired of being Emperor, anyway," he finished carelessly. "It's more fun being yourself."

"Will I be myself when I'm a real man?" asked the statue soberly. "I'm beginning to feel happy the way I am."

"That's because you're helping everybody," exclaimed Trot, giving him a little pat.

"Is it?" Stroking his chin thoughtfully, the stone man stopped. "I don't even mind losing my hat and umbrella," he finished in surprise.

"We'll soon find you new ones," promised the Scarecrow. "As soon as we reach the Emerald City, and when we've helped find this lost Queen, you can settle down with us and be happy ever afterward."

"How long is that?" Benny eyed the straw man with deep interest.

"For as long as you live," announced Trot with a little skip.

"Then I hope I live always," sighed Benny. "I'd hate to stand still for fifty years like I did before. And if I'm ever called upon to be a statue again, I hope I'll be a sitting-down statue. You have no idea how tiresome it is standing up for yourself and somebody you have never seen, year after year."

The Scarecrow nodded sympathetically and, talking of this and that, but especially of the Ozure Isles, the three travelers crossed several

meadows and finally came to a narrow blue highway. It was so narrow they had to walk single file, but as the Scarecrow declared that any road was better than none, they proceeded along the highway until the strawman, who was in the lead, came to a full stop.

"What's the matter?" demanded Trot, who came next. The Scarecrow squeezed aside so the others could see ahead and, peering anxiously over his shoulder, Trot saw a curious blue turnstile.

"Shall we go on?" asked the Scarecrow uncertainly, "or shall we go back?"

Standing on tip-toes, Trot tried to see where the road beyond the turnstile went to.

"Let's go on," decided Trot, who could not help feeling curious. So the Scarecrow stepped through the turnstile and the others quickly followed him.

Round the first bend in the road hung a big circular sign.

"

ROUNDABOUT WAY"

"May-be the longest way 'round is the shortest way home," observed the Scarecrow, "and now that we are on it we may as well discover where this road goes." But it was impossible to see far. Bushy trees grew on each side of the blue pathway and it curved so that they could see only a few feet ahead.

"This makes me dizzy," confessed Trot, after they had gone around dozens and dozens of curves. "Do you suppose it leads anywhere at all?"

"Well, here's a round house!" exclaimed the Scarecrow. "Shall we go in?"

Coming 'round the last curve, Trot and Benny saw an enormous wooden dome, larger than ten circus tents rolled into one. There were round windows in the walls halfway up and in the side toward them a swiftly revolving door. Before the others had quite decided what to do, the Scarecrow stepped through the swinging door and disappeared.

"Now we'll have to go in," decided Trot, anxiously and, waiting her chance, she dashed after the Scarecrow and Benny stepped into the section immediately back of Trot.

CHAPTER 13 The Round-abouties

Stepping into the revolving door was one thing, stepping out, another. It whirled and spun so rapidly that poor Trot grew giddy and breathless, and when she did manage to escape she fell headlong. The Scarecrow and Benny, not being real persons, did not suffer from giddiness, but they too lost their balance when they stepped out and lay face down in the sawdust that covered the floor of the round house. The Scarecrow was first up, also first down again, for no sooner did they rise and try to walk forward before they were violently flung on their noses.

"Let's go back," said the Scarecrow, after his sixth tumble. "I can't stand this."

"I can't stand at all," complained Benny, rolling over and looking appealingly at Trot.

"Neither can I," confessed Trot, trying to wiggle backwards without getting up. But this proved impossible and, finding they could not move backward or forward, the three travelers sat up and looked blankly at one another.

"Why not try going 'round?" suggested a roguish voice in Trot's ear and, turning with a start, the little girl saw a perfectly round young man, smiling amiably down upon her. His head was round and covered with red ringlets, his legs and arms were short and round and his hands and feet were regular tennis balls.

"See!" cried the little man, bouncing easily to one side, "we go 'round in rings here. Won't you join our family circle?" he invited pleasantly.

For the first time Trot became aware of a great clamor and confusion in the round house. A big ring of Round-abouties was revolving merrily, twenty yards off. Inside that, she could see still another circle moving in the opposite direction. The loud ringing voices of these pudgy little people made her ears ring and, while she was considering the Round-abouty's invitation, his head began to spin merrily upon his peg neck.

"Oh, look!" wailed Trot, seizing the Scarecrow's arm. "Whatever shall we do? Everything's going 'round, even their heads!"

"Your head will soon turn as easily as mine," promised the Roundabouty, leaning down to take Trot's hand in his own. "Come around this way please."

In a panic, Trot pulled the Scarecrow with her and he in turn took hold of Benny. Stepping rapidly to the right, they moved toward the first circle and were quickly drawn into the ring.

"Did you once say you wanted to dance?" chuckled the Scarecrow, looking up mischievously at Benny. "Well, now's your chance, old boulder, but don't step on my foot."

And dance they certainly did, 'round and 'round and 'round, till Trot really began to suspect that her head was turning too.

"Don't you ever stop?" panted the little girl, raising her voice above the shouts and yells of the Round-abouties, who seemed to be enjoying themselves tremendously.

"Nope!" Puffing out his cheeks, the little Round-abouty beamed upon Trot. "We never stop, we just keep on going 'round together. Isn't it fun?"

Trot shook her head violently and tried to break out of the circle, but the little fellows would not let go. After circling so many more times that she lost all count, a bell clanged out from the center of the ring. Immediately Trot and her friends were thrust into the second circle

which began revolving in the opposite direction. The second circle was a singing circle and as each Round-abouty was singing a different song you can imagine the awful discords. Trot groaned and would have put her fingers in her ears, but her hands were held so tightly that this was impossible. After discovering that there were two more circles and a merry-go-round in the exact center, Trot closed her eyes and skipped dizzily on.

"If anyone ever asks me to play a round game," reflected Trot grimly, "I'll, I'll hit them—yes, I will."

Benny and the Scarecrow did not mind so much, but even they grew tired of the continuous turning and the spinning heads of their strange comrades.

"We're close to the center," called the Scarecrow, as they were pushed into the third circle. "Maybe when we reach the middle, something will happen. I wouldn't mind riding on the merry-go-round."

"Well," rasped the stone man, skipping stiffly as he spoke. "I've never ridden on a merry-go-round yet, but if riding on one is part of being alive I suppose I shall have to try it."

"Whoops! Whoops! Of course you will! Wait till our ring leader sees you," chortled the Round-abouty next to him. Trot opened her eyes as they were propelled into the last circle. At any other time she might have enjoyed a merry-go-round ride, but as she went skipping giddily around the really splendid carrousel in the center of the round house, she wished herself safely outside or in any place where she could be still and quiet. When the bell sounded, the merry-go-round stopped. The Round-abouties who had been on it sidled off and the Roundabouties in Trot's circle climbed on. Pushed upward by two of the merry little men, Trot found herself seated on a zebra before she could say a word. The Scarecrow was already mounted on a tiger. It looked so much like the Hungry Tiger of Oz it made him quite homesick. Benny, after several unsuccessful attempts to mount a wooden elephant, stood stiffly beside Trot's zebra.

The merry-go-round was so immense that the 'round and 'round motion grew less and less noticeable and presently Trot, becoming less dizzy, began to be more interested in her surroundings. In the

hollow center of the merry-go-round stood a large round table and seated about was a whole company of Round-abouties. One had merry-go-round rings in both ears and one through his nose. He held a large silver bell and Trot immediately decided that he must be the ring leader of the riotous band. His head turned more slowly than the heads of his subjects, and as Trot passed, he smiled at her pleasantly Beside the round table, a round tower rose from the floor to the ceiling of the round house. Trot glanced at it curiously each time she went by and finally made out a round door with a black ring in the center at the bottom of the tower. She had just made this interesting discovery when the ring leader rang his bell. Taking Benny's hand and motioning for the Scarecrow to follow, Trot jumped off on the inside of the merry-go-round and politely approached the ring leader.

"Could you please show us the way out of your house?" asked Trot, bowing nervously.

"We're on an important mission," put in the Scarecrow, "and must reach the Emerald City to-night."

"Your mission from now on is to make me laugh," roared the ring leader, holding his head still with both hands so he could better observe the Scarecrow. "Ha, ha! You're enough to make a Kookaroo laugh."

"I don't care a cat's whisker for your opinion," exclaimed the Scarecrow indignantly, as all the other Round-abouties began to roar with their little round ruler.

"Shall I hit somebody?" asked Benny, stepping close to the round table and bringing his fist down with a thump that shook the house.

"Ring the bell! Ring the bell!" cried the Round-abouty next to the ring leader "Keep 'em going 'round, that's the way to keep them 'round here." As the leader lifted his arm to ring the silver bell, Trot broke away and, being careful to run sideways, rushed toward the door in the round tower. Seizing the ring, she jerked it open and plunged up the spiral stairway curling aloft. Almost instantly there was a thump behind her, and turning about, she saw that Benny and the Scarecrow were right at her heels. 'Round and 'round, up and up, tore

Trot, not daring to look back and growing more breathless at every step. She could hear the screams and shouts of the Round-abouties down below and the thud of their rubber soles on the stair. Frightened as she was and determined though she was to escape, at the one hundred and tenth step Trot's breath failed her Sinking down, she covered her face with her hands and waited for the mischievous little men to seize her Instead, two hard arms caught her up and Benny, who never grew tired nor lost his breath, pounded 'round and 'round, and up and up to the very top of the flight. Butting a trap door in the center of the tower open with his head, he ran up the last three steps of the spiral stairway, leaned down, dragged the Scarecrow through the opening, then slammed down the trap door and sat on it just as the first Round-abouty reached the top.

"That!" declared the Scarecrow solemnly, "was the funniest race I ever was in. And now that we're up here, how shall we get down?" The trap door was bumping up and down from the furious thumps of the Round-abouties and even Benny's great weight could not hold it down indefinitely.

"We'll have to slide to earth," muttered the Scarecrow, after an earnest glance all around. "Do you think you could stand sliding, my dear? I tell you!" as Trot looked uncertainly down the curving surface of the huge wooden roof. "Let me sit in Benny's lap and you, Trot, shall sit in mine, then altogether we'll slide. The splinters won't hurt Benny."

"Better hurry up," advised the stone man, blinking his round eyes furiously as the thumps on the trap door grew more and more determined. "Hurry up!"

"You mean hurry down, don't you?" smiled the Scarecrow, dropping into Benny's lap. Then Trot sat carefully on top, Benny clasped his arms around them both and shoved off. Next instant they were tobogganing down the round house roof, faster and faster and faster! When they reached the edge they had gained such speed and momentum that they shot over an entire forest before they came to a stop. Stunned by the terrific force of their landing, but thanks to the Scarecrow, quite unhurt, Trot sat up and looked inquiringly around.

"Well, we're still in the Munchkin Country," panted the little girl, pointing to a blue farm house not far away.

"And we certainly covered a lot of ground, I mean air," coughed the Scarecrow, making an unsuccessful effort to arise. "Shake me up Trot, I'm flat as a fritter. Are you all right, Benny, my boulder?"

"My coat tails are a bit chipped," answered the stone man calmly, "but that is a small price to pay for freedom. This is a curious country, my dear," he observed, turning to Trot. "Everyone wishes to make us into a being like himself."

"A fault you will find with people everywhere, even in your own world," puffed the Scarecrow, as Trot shook and pounded him into shape. "Everybody thinks his way is the right way."

"Let's take a straight road this time," interrupted Trot, who disliked long arguments and, giving the Scarecrow a final pat, pulled him expertly to his feet. "Have we lost our way, Scarecrow?" The straw man looked long and earnestly in every direction.

"There's a road," he called finally, waving toward the East, "and I'll wager it leads right to Jinjur's door."

"Come on then," rumbled Benny impatiently. "I should like to meet the girl who conquered a city."

CHAPTER 14 A Meeting of Celebrities

"Conquering a city is not so much," observed the Scarecrow, as they started across the blue field. "Trot conquered an island in the sky and has a whole book of history written about her adventures there."

"Did you really?" Staring down at the little girl with wonder and admiration, Benny begged her to tell the story So, as they hurried on to the blue cottage, Trot told how she and Button Bright and Cap'n Bill had flown on a magic umbrella to Sky Island, conquered the Pinks and Blues, and how she had been crowned Queen of the island. She was trying to explain to Benny why she preferred being a little girl in the Emerald City to a Queen in the sky, when the Scarecrow gave a sharp cry of alarm and sprang back from the road.

Thunderous hoof beats came pounding along the highway, and as Trot and Benny jumped out of the way a most astonishing steed galloped pell mell by them. It carried two riders, but as they were seated on a level with the tree tops they were almost invisible. About all Trot and her companions could see were High Boy's legs. For, of course, it was High Boy, and never having seen a high horse in the whole course of their lives the three travelers pressed back against the low wall, at the side of the road.

"Hey!" yelled the Scarecrow, torn between fright and curiosity.

"Where?" whinnied the high horse, stopping short and coming down so suddenly that Phil and the Medicine Man were nearly jolted out of the saddle. "Did you say hay?" he repeated gently, his head now on a level with the Scarecrow "Ah!" Leaning forward, he snatched several wisps out of the Scarecrow's shirt front and munched them up with great relish.

"Stop!" commanded Trot sharply, as the Scarecrow, clutching his shirt front together, began to climb over the wall. "You mustn't eat the Scarecrow; he's alive!"

"Oh, all right then!" sighed High Boy, looking curiously down at Trot, "but he started it, you know. I should never have lowered myself to speak to you at all if he had not hollered 'Hay!'"

"What I really meant was 'How—!!'" stuttered the Scarecrow, balancing himself on the top of the wall and ready to jump either way. "How do you do?" he finished, jerking off his hat nervously

"As I'm told sometimes, and as I please, others," sniffed High Boy, switching his tail impatiently. "But if it's how and not hay, I might as well get up and go on again."

"No, wait," directed Philador, greatly interested in the appearance of the three travelers. The Scarecrow he had recognized at once from a picture he had seen in a history at home. "This gentleman lives in the Emerald City, High Boy, and perhaps he will show us the way to the capital." At the little Prince's words, the Scarecrow quickly jumped down off the wall.

Kant on emotions: critical essays in the contemporary context (new studies in the history and histor