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The concept of egocentrism in the context of Piaget’s theory
Article in New Ideas in Psychology · December 2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.008
2 authors:
Kesselring
Ulrich Mueller
NewIdeasinPsychology29(2011)327–345
Contentslistsavailableat ScienceDirect
journalhomepage:www.elsevier.com/locate/ newideapsych
UniversityofBerne,DepartmentofPhilosophy,Länggassstrasse49a,3012Berne,Switzerland UniversityofVictoria,DepartmentofPsychology,BritishColumbia,Canada
abstract
Keywords:
Cognitivedevelopment
Social-emotionaldevelopment
Egocentrism
Centration
Equilibration
Inthispaper,wetracetheoriginanddevelopmentoftheconcept ofegocentrisminPiaget’swork.Weevaluateanumberofcriticismsthathavebeenleveledagainsttheconceptofegocentrism. Basedonourevaluation,weproposeareconceptualizationofthe conceptofegocentrismasadecenteringprocesswithdifferent phasesthatisrecapitulatedatdifferentstagesofdevelopment.We provideexamplesofthedecenteringprocessforthesensorimotor, preoperational,concrete-operational,andformaloperational stages.
Piagetintroducedtheconceptofegocentrisminhisearlywritingsinthe1920stodescribegeneralcharacteristicsofthe preschoolchild.Sinceitsintroduction,theconceptofegocentrism hasreceivedconsiderabletheoreticalandempiricalattentionand hasdrawnnumerouscriticisms.Piagetattributedthesecriticisms toseriousmisunderstandingsoftheconceptofegocentrism. Indeed, Piaget(1945/1962,p.285,fn) admittedthatthechoiceof thetermegocentrismwas “unfortunate”,andheapologized (Piaget&Inhelder,1948/1967,p.220)forhavingdweltonthis expressionforthelasttwenty-fiveyears.
Inthispaper,wetracetheoriginsoftheconceptofegocentrism inPiaget’swritingsandexaminethesubsequentchangestothis concept.Weexaminesomeofthecriticismsleveledagainstthe conceptofegocentrismandconcludethattheconceptofegocentrismremainedambiguousinPiaget’swritings.Finally,wesuggest arevisionoftheconceptofegocentrismthataddressesthese ambiguities.
2010ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved.
* Correspondingauthor.UniversityofBerne,DepartmentofPhilosophy,Länggassstrasse49a,3012Berne,Switzerland. E-mailaddress: Thomas.kesselring@philo.unibe.ch (T.Kesselring).
0732-118X/$ – seefrontmatter 2010ElsevierLtd.Allrightsreserved. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2010.03.008
T.Kesselring,U.Müller/NewIdeasinPsychology29(2011)327–345
1.ThedevelopmentoftheconceptofegocentrisminthecontextofPiaget’swork
TherootsoftheconceptofegocentrismcanbetracedbacktoFreud’sinfluenceonPiaget.Whilehe wasinZurich(1918–1919)andParis(1919–1921),Piagetstudiedvariousschoolsofpsychoanalysis (Freud,Jung,Adler).BasedonFreud’sconceptsofprimaryprocess(i.e.,themodeoffunctioningin serviceoftheimmediategratificationofneeds)andsecondaryprocess(i.e.,theregulationandcontrol ofneedstoattendtothedemandsofreality), Piaget(1920) initiallydistinguishedbetweenautisticand logical,scientificthought,andin1922heintroducedtheconceptofegocentrismasanintermediary levelbetweenthesemodesofthought.1 However,PiagetsoondistancedhimselffromFreud’sconcept ofprimaryprocess,andthemeticulousstudyofhisowninfantsledtoathoroughgoingrevisionofthe conceptofegocentrism.Fromthemid-1930son,egocentrismwasconceptualizedasaphenomenon thatreoccursatthebeginningofdifferentdevelopmentalstages.
DuringhisstayinParis,PiagetwasaskedtolecturetotheAlfredBinetSocietyonthetopicof psychoanalysis(Harris,1997;Kesselring,1999).Inhislecture, Piaget(1920) discussedbasicconceptsof threedifferentpsychoanalyticapproaches,namely,thetheoriesofFreud,Adler,andtheZurichSchool ofpsychoanalysis(i.e.,Jung,Pfister).FollowingFreud, Piaget(1920,p.23) distinguishedbetweentwo differentmodesofthinking:autisticorsymbolicthinking,ononehand,andscientificorlogical thinkingontheother.TheconceptsofautisticandlogicalthinkingaremodeledonFreud’sideasof primaryandsecondaryprocess.Autisticthinkingobeysthepleasureprincipleandis “personal, incommunicable, confused,undirected,indifferenttotruth,richinvisualandsymbolicschemas,and aboveall,unconsciousofitselfandbytheaffectivefactorsbywhichitwasguided” (1924/1972,pp. 204–205).Itischaracteristicof “thechild,theneuroticperson,thedreamer,theartist,andthemystic” (Piaget,1920,p.23,ourtranslation).Intheconclusionofhisdiscussionofthedifferentpsychoanalytic approaches, Piaget(1920,p.57) suggestedthatanimportanttaskofpsychologyistostudyindividual differencesintherelationsbetweenautisticthoughtandrationalthought:
Autisticthinkingthatformspersonalsymbolsremainswithusthroughoutourlives.However,its rolechangeswithage.Inthechild,autismiseverything.Later,reasondevelopsattheexpenseof autismbutcanreasonevercompletelysheditselfofautisticthinking?Itdoesnotappearthis way.Thetaskisthereforetocreate apsychologyinordertodetermineineachindividualthe exactrelationsbetweenthelevelofintelligenceandthelevelofautisticorunconsciouslife(our translation).
TherelationsbetweenautisticandlogicalthinkingweretakenupagainbyPiagetinaconference presentationattheInternationalPsychoanalyticConferenceinBerlin1922(Piaget,1923).However,he nowapproachedtheissuefromadevelopmentalandnotanindividual-differenceperspective(Harris, 1997).Itisinthiscontextthat Piaget(1923,p.284),forthe firsttime,usedtheconceptofegocentrism: Piagetarguedthategocentrismisanintermediateortransitionalstagebetweenautisticthoughtand socializedlogicalthinking.Piagetbasedthisargumentonseveralfunctionalanalogiesbetweenautistic andegocentricthought.Egocentricthoughtdisplaysthethreecorefeaturesofautisticthought:itlacks anyformofdirectedlogicalsequence,itisnotconsciousofitsownprocesses,anditisdominatedby imageryratherthanconcepts(Piaget,1923,p.279).Asfurthercommonalitiesbetweenautisticand egocentricthoughtPiagetmentioned,amongothers,thatbothareindividualandnotcommunicable, andlackclearboundariesbetweenegoandalteregoaswellasbetweenegoandexternalworld.To explainthecommonalitiesbetweenautisticandegocentricthought,Piagetreferredtofunctionaland
1 Piaget(1920) alsousedtheterm “symbolicthought” torefertothecharacteristicsofautisticthought.Asweexplainbelow, Piaget’snotionofautisticthoughtisderivedfromBleuler,andisnotsynonymouswiththecontemporaryuseofthistermas adesignatorofaparticulardevelopmentaldisorder.
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structuralfactors.Functionally,bothtypesofthoughtareplayfulanddominatedbythepleasure principle,theadaptationofrealitytoone’swishes(Piaget,1923,p.303).Structurally,bothtypesof thoughtarecharacterizedbyalowerdegreeoftensionandcomplexity(i.e.,therearefewerdimensions inthe fieldofconsciousness)(Piaget,1923,pp.303–304).
Piaget’sbookson LanguageandThoughtoftheChild (1923/1926), JudgmentandReasoningoftheChild (1924/1972), TheChild’sConceptionoftheWorld (1926/1929),and TheChild’sConceptionofPhysical Causality (1927/1930) presentindetailmanyfeaturesofegocentricthinking.Piagetplacedthe egocentricstagebetweentheautisticstage(lastingfrombirthto2–3years)andthestageoflogical thought(7–8yearsonward,see Piaget,1927/1930,pp.302–305; 1928/1995,pp.199–200).Thestageof autismremainedtobemodeledafterFreud’sconceptsofprimaryprocessandpleasureprinciple becauseinautisticthinking, “toeverydesirecorrespondsimmediatelyanimageorillusionwhich transformsthisdesireintoreality,thankstoasortofpseudo-hallucinationorplay” (Piaget,1927/1930, p.302).
Egocentrismmanifestsitselfinontologicalandlogicalforms(Piaget,1926/1929,pp.167–168). Ontologicalegocentrismisduetofuzzyego-boundariesandthefailuretoclearlydemarcatethe subjectivefromtheobjective(Piaget,1927/1930,p.242).Thisfailureresultsinthetreatmentofmental phenomenaasiftheywereobjectsinthephysicalworld(realism)andtheascriptionofmental attributestoexternalphenomena(animism,artificialism;see Piaget,1926/1929,1927/1930,pp.242–244). Piaget(1927/1930,p.255) expressedthismindsetsuccinctlyasfollows: “Thechildvivifiesthe externalworldandmaterialisestheinternaluniverse.” Realism,animismandartificialismgradually disappearasthechildbecomesawareofherownsubjectivity,which,inturn,Piagetconceptualized, following Baldwin(1897),asasocialprocess(e.g., Piaget,1923,p.287, 1926/1929,p.245, 1927/1930,p. 246,302).
Logicalegocentrismisondisplayinavarietyofdifferentphenomena(Piaget,1924/1972).First, egocentricspeechisamanifestationoflogicalegocentrism(Piaget,1923/1926). Egocentricspeech referstothephenomenonthatalargeproportionofchildren’sspeechconsistsofcollectivemonologues(i.e.,childrenaretalkingwithoutlisteningtoeachother),echolalia,andmonologues.Second, logicalegocentrismislinkedtothefailuretoproperlyunderstandrelationalconceptssuchas “brother” (Piaget,1924/1972,pp.89–107)orforeigner(Piaget&Weil,1951/1995),aswellasspatialrelational termssuchasleftandright(Piaget,1924/1972,p.113).Forexample,theconceptofbrotherrequiresthe awarenessofatleasttwodifferentpointsofviewbecauseinthesamewaythat,say,Peterisabrother tome,IamabrothertoPeter.Third,childrendonotfeeltheneedtosupplyproofsfortheirstatements andarenotawareofcontradictions(e.g., Piaget,1924/1972,pp.163–169).Finally,egocentricthinkingis characterizedbysyncretism(i.e.,thetendencytothinkinwholeswithouttakingthepartsintoaccount, Piaget,1924/1972,p.228),juxtaposition(i.e.,thetendencytolinkthoughtstogetherinanassociative manner,withoutsubordinatingonethoughttoanother, Piaget,1924/1972,p.221),andtransductive reasoning(i.e.,reasoningfromoneparticulartoanotherparticularas,forexample,inthestatement, “I haven’thadmynapyetsoitisn’tafternoon” , Piaget,1945/1962,Obs.112b).AccordingtoPiaget,logical egocentrismisduetothefactthat “thechildseeseverythingfromhisownpointofview,itisbecause hebelievesalltheworldtothinklikehimself.Hehasnotyetdiscoveredthemultiplicityofpossible perspectivesandremainsblindtoallbuthisownasifthatweretheonlyonepossible” (Piaget,1926/ 1929,p.167).
Thus,bothontologicalandlogicalegocentrismareduetolackofdifferentiation,eitherbetweenthe subjectiveandtheexternalworld(ontologicalegocentrism),orbetweenegoandalterego(logical egocentrism;see Piaget,1926/1929,pp.167–168).Socialinteractionandthebecomingawareoftheself leadtoamediationofthechild’sownpointofviewbyotherperspectivesand,asaconsequence, auniverseofrelationsgraduallyreplacestheuniverseofabsolutesubstances(Piaget,1927/1930,p. 250).
Thus,inPiaget’searlyworkegocentrismreferstoadevelopmentalstagethatischaracterizedbythe unconsciousnessoftheselfandthelackofdifferentiationbetween,ontheonehand,egoandworld, andegoandalterego,ontheotherhand.Thestageofegocentrismfollows,andsharesseveralfunctionalfeatureswith,thestageofautism,whichinturn,ismodeledonFreud’sconceptofprimary process.Interestingly,eventhough Piaget(1951/1995,p.284) calledhimselfapupilofBleulerand acknowledgedtakingtheconceptofautismfromBleuler(Piaget,1920,1951/1995,p.284),his
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descriptionofautismdeviatesinimportantrespectsfromthatofBleuler. Bleuler(1912/1951,p.420) contrastedautisticandrealisticthinking:
Realisticthinkingrepresentsreality;autisticthinkingimagineswhatcorrespondstoanaffect whichisasarulepleasant.Thepurposeofrealisticthinkingistoreachacorrectunderstanding oftheenvironment,to findthetruth.Autisticfunctionsaimtoevokeideas[ofsimilar]affecttone(mostlypleasure-toned)andtosuppressthoseofacontraryaffect.Therealisticmechanismsregulateourrelationshipwiththeoutsideworldandsubservesurvival,nourishment, attack,anddefense;theautisticonescreatedirectpleasurebyelicitingpleasure-tonedideasand suppressdispleasurebyblockingrelatedideas.Thusthereareautisticaswellasrealisticneedgratifications .Whenaffectshavetheupperhand,eithermomentarily,orasamatterof disposition,logicalthinkingissuppressedandautisticallyfalsified(p.420).
However,incontrasttoPiaget, Bleuler(1912/1951,p.404,1922/1951,p.435) thoughtthatautistic thinkingisdirected,notbylogicalrulesbutbyaffectiveneeds; Piaget(1923,pp.279–280) waveredon thispoint.
AseconddifferencetoPiaget’sconceptualizationisthatforBleuler,autismcannotbethestarting pointofdevelopment.Rather,itpresupposeslowerformsoftherealityfunction: “Icannot find acreature,orevenconceiveofonecapableofsurvival,whodoesnotreact firstofalltorealityandwho doesnotact. [A]nimalpsychology(exceptingafewobservationsonhigheranimals)knowsonlythe reality-function” (Bleuler,1912/1951,p.427).Bleuler’sargumentthattherealityfunctionis(phylo-and ontogenetically)primaryandautismissecondaryconstitutesthecoreideabehind Vygotsky’s(1934/ 1986,pp.20–25) criticismofPiaget’stheoryofegocentricspeech.
1.2.Piaget’srevisedtheoryofegocentrism
Bythemid-1930s,Piagethadfundamentallyrevisedhisconceptofegocentrism.Thisrevision emergedslowlyinPiaget’swork.Itencompassestwodifferentaspects.First,theconceptof “imitation” (used,forexample,in Piaget,1924/1972)wasreplacedwiththatof “accommodation.” Second,Piaget nolongerconsideredegocentrismastageintermediatebetweenautismandlogicalthoughtbutas aphenomenonthatreoccursatdifferentstagesindevelopment.Thischangeintheconceptof egocentrismresultedfromPiaget’sworkoninfantdevelopment.
WhenPiagetobservedthedevelopmentofhisownchildrenduringtheir first18monthshe acknowledgedthatadecentrationprocesssimilartothatdescribedinhisbooksbetween1923and 1927occursalreadyduringthe first18months.Thisinspiredboth,thereconceptualizationoftheinitial stageofpsychologicaldevelopmentandhisegocentrism(decentration)concept.Bothchanges inspired,inturn,thereconceptualizationoftheinitialstageofpsychologicaldevelopment,the final versionofwhichappearedinhis firsttwovolumesoninfancyinthemid-1930s(Piaget,1936/1952, 1937/1954).
Inapaperonthedevelopmentofcausalityinthe firstyearoflife – apaperthatwasbasedonthe observationofhisdaughterLucienne(born1925) – beforetheBritishPsychologicalSocietyin1927, Piaget(1927–1928/1977,p.203) acknowledgedtheadaptivefunctionofaccommodation,buthe comparedassimilationtotheactivityofdreamsthat “deformthingsinordertosatisfyitsdesire.” The clashbetweenassimilationandaccommodationresultsinaparadox: “Babiesthinkingismadeupof asetofmovementsofaccommodationadaptedtotheworldoutside.Yetinotherrespects,thethinking alsoresemblesasortofperpetualwakingdream,withallthecharacteristicsofunadulteratedautism” (Piaget,1927–1928/1977,p.200).Piagetalsoponderedtheimportanceofbasingpsychological developmentonbiologicaldataanddiscussedwhethertheinitiallackofdifferentiationbetweenego, alterego,andexternalworldisnotdueto “anunconsciousprocessofassimilation” (Piaget,1926/1929, p.36).Atthesametime,hestartedtodistancehimselffromFreud’sviewbycriticizinghisnotionof narcissism:
Infact,it[Freudiantheory]givestotheinfantnarcissistthequalitiesofanadultinlovewith himselfandawareofit,asiftheinfantcouldclearlydistinguishhisselffromothers.. Ifheisin lovewithhimself,itisnotbecauseheknowshisself,butbecauseheignoresallthatisoutsidehis
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dreamandhisdesires.Narcissism,thatistosay,absoluteegocentricity,certainlygivesriseto magicalconviction,butonlyinsofarasitimpliesabsenceofconsciousnessofself(Piaget,1926/ 1929,pp.151–152;later,PiagetformulatedamoreextensivecritiqueofFreud,see Piaget,1945/ 1962,pp.182–193).
In OriginsofIntelligence(1936/1952),Piagetdepictedtheinitialstageofdevelopment – the sensorimotorstage – asacontinuationofthebiologicalprocessoforganizationandadaptation.Infact, thesamefunctionalinvariants – organization,adaptation,assimilation,andaccommodation – characterizebiologicalandpsychologicalfunctioning(Piaget,1936/1952,pp.6–8):Ateverylevel, “intellectualfunctioninginvolvesanelementofassimilation,thatisofstructuringthroughincorporationof externalrealityintoformsduetothesubject’sactivity” (Piaget,1936/1952,p.6).Atthesametime,the incorporationofnewelementsleadstoamodificationofthestructure,duetotheaccommodatory aspectofactivity.Finally,intellectualadaptationconsistsof “puttinganassimilatorymechanismand acomplementaryaccommodationintoprogressiveequilibrium” (Piaget,1936/1952,p.7).Assimilation isthusnolongerconceptualizedasdistorting.Instead,Piagetmoreclearlyworkedouttheorganizing functionofassimilationandemphasizedthatorganizationoccurscorrelativeto,andintheserviceof, adaptation.
Second,Piaget’s firstbookoninfancy(1936/1952)alsosignalsaradicalchangeinhisperspectiveon egocentrism. Piaget(1970/1972) claimedthatinfantsstarttheirlifeequippedwithdiffuse,isolated,and globalmovementpatterns.Asaconsequence,infantscannotconstructmeaningfulrelationsbetween isolatedmovementpatterns,andsubjectandobjectremainundifferentiated: “theinfantrelates everythingtohisbody,asifitwerethecentreoftheuniverse – butacentrethatisunawareofitself solongaseachactionstillformsasmallisolablewhole,theirsolecommonandconstantreferencecan onlybethebodyitself,sothatthereisanautomaticcentringonit,althoughitisneithervoluntarynor conscious” (Piaget,1970/1972,p.21).Following Baldwin(1906),Piaget(1950a,p.266, 1950b,p.283, 1970/1972,p.20; Piaget&Inhelder,1966/1969,p.22)characterizedtheinitiallackofdifferentiation betweensubjectandobjectininfancyasadualism.Adualismisovercomethroughtheuseofschemes indifferentsituations,theirsubsequentaccommodation,andreciprocalassimilation,whichleadsto theincreasingdifferentiationandcoordinationofschemes.Thus,thedifferentiationandcoordination ofsensorimotorschemesresultinbreakinguptheimmediacythatcharacterizestherelationsbetween selfandworldduringthe firstfewmonthsofthechild’slife(Piaget,1937/1954).
Thediscoveryofegocentrismatthesensorimotorstageraisesthequestionofhowinfantile egocentrismisrelatedtotheegocentrismdisplayedbypreschoolers,aquestionwithwhich Piaget (1927–1928/1977) initiallystruggled. Piaget’s(1937/1954,pp.357–380) answeristhatthesame processisrecapitulatedatqualitativelydifferentlevelsofdevelopment – aphenomenonthatlateron hetermedverticaldecalage(Piaget,1947/1976,pp.147–148).Therecapitulationisnecessarybecause conceptsthathavebeenacquiredatonedevelopmentalstagecannotbesimplytransferredtothenext stagebutmustbereconstructedeffortfullyatthenewdevelopmentalplanetomeetthedemandsof thenewleveloffunctioning(Inhelder&Piaget,1955/1958,p.343).
Thus,boththesensorimotorandthepreoperationalstageinitiallyarecharacterizedbyalackof differentiationandasubsequentdecentrationprocess(Piaget,1945/1962,pp.241–242).Duringthe sensorimotorstage,theinfantdoesnotdistinguishclearlybetween “theworldoutside” andher perspectiveonit.Duringthepreoperationalstage,sheignoresherownperspectiveonanobjector amaterialsituation.Inbothinstances,thereare,insomerespects,difficultiesindistinguishing betweenoneselfandanotherperson.Inhislaterwork,togetherwithInhelder,Piaget “discovered” athirdformofegocentrismatthestageofformaloperations(Inhelder&Piaget,1955/1958,pp.338–350).Inthisstagethereisagainboth – anunconsciousnessofone’sownperspectiveon “theworld outside” andalackofdistinctionbetweeninterpersonalperspectives(pp.342–343).Evidently, adolescentegocentrismmanifestsitselfonlyinspecificcontexts,suchaswhentacklingnewexistential situations,learningtoknow “new” cultures,andparticipatingininterculturalcommunicationin general.
Piaget(1954/1981) claimedthatthedecentrationprocessinvolvedcognitiveandaffective components,andheelaboratedthisclaimfortheemergenceofmeans-endsbehaviourandthewill. Means-endsbehavioremergesinthesecondpartofthe firstyearoflifewheninfantsstartto
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coordinatetwoindependentschemes,withoneschemeassigninganendtotheaction(e.g.,grasping thematchbox)andtheotherschemeusedasameans(e.g.,hittingthehandtolowerit).For Piaget (1936/1952,p.154),thedifferentiationofmeansandendsand,thus,thesettingofgoalsinadvance arethecriteriaforascribingintentionality.Atthesametime,thedifferentiationbetweenmeansand endsalsoleadstothedifferentiationbetweenvalueandideal:
Assoonasthereisintention,ineffect,thereisagoaltoreachandmeanstouse,consequentlythe influenceofconsciousnessofvalues(thevalueortheinterestoftheintermediaryactsservingas means issubordinatedtothatofthegoal)andoftheideal(theacttobeaccomplishedispartof anidealtotalityor goal,inrelationtotherealtotalityoftheactsalreadyorganized)(Piaget,1936/ 1952,p.149,emphasisinoriginal).
Means-endsbehaviourreflectscognitivedecentrationbecauseitinvolvesthedifferentiation betweenmeansandgoalandthe flexiblecoordinationofmeansandgoaltoachieveagoaldetermined beforehand(Piaget,1954/1981,p.26).
Butmeans-endsbehaviouralsoreflectsaffectivedecentration(i.e.,thedifferentiationofdifferent valuesandthecoordinationbetweenthem)becausecertainobjectswithoutinterestinthemselves takeonaninterestinrelationtootherobjectsthatarevalued: “[T]hevalueofthemeansisdetermined inrelationtothevalueofaparticulargoal,andlabilehierarchiesofvaluesarisefromactivityofthis sort” (Piaget,1954/1981,p.26).
Affectivedecentrationisalsocentraltoexercisingone’swill.For Piaget(1954/1981,1962),thewill becomesoperativewheneverweneedtoweakenastrongbehavioraltendencyandstrengthenan initiallyweakertendency.Thewillthusinvolveschangingperspectivesinsuchawaythat “relationshipsappearthatwerenotgivenatthestart” (Piaget,1954/1981,p.64).Piagetcomparesactsofwillto children’ssuccessinconservationtasksbecauseinthelatterchildrenalsoneedtodecentertoovercomeaperceptuallysalientstimulusconfiguration(e.g.,theheightofliquidinconservationof continuousquantity).Inthecaseofconservation,decentrationisaccomplishedbyincorporatingthe perceptuallysalientconfigurationintoasystemofoperationsthatlinktheactualconfigurationto previousandpotentialfutureconfigurations(Piaget,1962,p.142).Inasimilarvein,weovercome astrongtemptationbyconfrontingitwithcommitmentsthatissuefromthepastandwiththefuture satisfactionpromisedbycompletionofthetaskwecurrentlyarenotstronglymotivatedtodo(Piaget, 1962,p.143).Eventhoughcognitiveandaffectivedecentrationinvolvesimilarprocesses,affective decentrationcannotbereducedtocognitivedecentration: “Todecentrateinthedomainofthewillis nottoinvokememoriesthroughtheintelligence,buttorevivepermanentvalues,thatistosay,to reanimatepermanentvalues,tofeelthem,whichmeansthatitisanaffectiveoperationandnotan intellectualone” (Piaget,1962,p.144;see Piaget&Weil,1951/1995,forafurtherexampleofaffective decentration).
Tosummarize,withhisworkoninfantdevelopment,Piaget’sconceptualizationofegocentrism underwentsignificantchanges.Ratherthanastageintermediatebetweenautisticandlogicalthinking, egocentrismbecameaphenomenonthatreoccursseveraltimes,atthebeginningofthesensorimotor stage,atthebeginningofthepreoperationalstageofdevelopmentand,as Inhelder&Piaget(1955/ 1958) discoveredlateron,atthebeginningoftheformal-operationalstage.Ateachofthesestages, theexpansionofthecognitive field opensupanewperspectiveontheworld,whichistakentobe absolute.Ateachofthesestages,developmentinvolvesacognitiveandaffectiveprocessofdecentrationorrelativization.Becausetheprocessofdecentrationreoccursatdifferentstages,development isnotasimpleadditiveorlinearprocess(see Kesselring,1981,2009):
Thecentralidea,then,thatIhavetriedtoexpressbymeansofthetermintellectualegocentrism (nodoubtabadchoice)isthatprogressinknowledgeoccursneitherassimpleadditionnoras additivestratification,asifricherknowledgecamealongmerelytoaugmentweakerknowledge, butthatthisprogressrestsequallyonthecontinualrecastingandcorrectionofearlierpointsof viewthroughaprocesswhichisasretroactiveasitisadditive.Thisprocessconsistsinthe endlesscorrectionofearlier “systematicerrors” orthosewhicharisealongtheway.Nowthis processofcorrectionseemstoobeyawell-definedlawofevolution,whichisthelawof decentration(Piaget,1962/2000,p.244).
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1.3.CriticismofPiaget’segocentrismconcept
NumerouscriticismshavebeenleveledagainstPiaget’sconceptofegocentrism,bothfroman empiricalandatheoreticalperspective.TheempiricalcriticismhasfocusedonPiaget’sresearchon perspectivetaking(Piaget&Inhelder,1948/1967).Specifically,ithasbeenarguedthatPiagetconsiderablyunderestimatedpreschoolchildren’sperspectivetakingskillsand,that,ifperspectivetaking tasksarestrippedofextraneousprocessingrequirements,childrenmuchyoungerthanexpected accordingtoPiagetiantheorydemonstrateperspectivetakingskills(Flavell,1992).Weaddressthe empiricalcriticismintheconclusion,andfocusinthissectionontheoreticallymotivatedcritiques.
Onecommoncriticismisbasedontheinterpretationofegocentrismasself-centeredness(e.g.,see Isaacs,1930,p.74; Merleau-Ponty,1960/1964,p.119).However,as Piaget(1962/2000,p.244) emphasized,theconceptofegocentrismhas:
[N]orelationatalltowhatinordinarylanguageiscalledegocentrism(hypertrophyofselfconsciousness).Cognitiveegocentrism,asIhavetriedtomakeclear,stemsfromnondifferentiationbetweenone’sownandotherpossiblepointsofviewandinnowayatallfrom anindividualismwhichprecedesrelationswithotherpeople.
AsecondcriticismarguesthatPiagetendorsesaCartesianviewofmind(Wimmer&Hartl,1991,p. 126)becausetheconceptofegocentrismsharestheCartesianassumption “thatthemindistransparent toitselfviaintrospection.” Thisinterpretationisatoddswith Piaget’s(1945/1962,p.285,fn,1962/ 2000,p.244) statementthategocentrismreferstoalackofdifferentiationbetweenselfandother andthattheselfisnotconsciousofthiscentration.For Piaget(e.g.,1954/1981,p.28,41,1962/2000,p. 244),consciousnessofselfisbynomeansprimarybutisconstructedcorrelativelywiththe consciousnessofotherpeople.Inthiscontext,PiagetcriticizesFreud’sconceptofnarcissismbecauseit presupposesaconsciousnessoftheself.Accordingto Piaget(1954/1981,p.38),however,the “infant’s primarynarcissismisanarcissismwithoutaNarcissus.”
Accordingtoathirdcriticism,theconceptofegocentrismimpliesthattheinfantisinitiallyan asocialbeing(e.g., Bühler,1928,p.180, 1935,p.76; Meltzoff,2007;Meltzoff&Brooks,2001,p.172).This interpretationconflictswith Piaget’s(1951/1995,p.278) statementthattheinfantlivesinandis affectedbythesocialworldfrombirth.Asamatteroffact, Piaget(1954/1981,p.38,40) referredtothe initiallyundifferentiatedself-otherrelationshipassymbiosis(forsimilarcharacterizations,see Merleau-Ponty,1960/1964,p.119; Vygotsky,1998,p.233; Werner&Kaplan,1963,p.42).Asymbiotic relationshipimpliesthatthereisnodistancebetweentheinfantandotherpeople,andthattheinfant resonateswiththeexpressionsofotherpeople,whichmaybeessentialforearlysocialandcommunicativedevelopment.
Animportantversionofthethirdcriticismhasbeenraisedby Borke(1978).Borkearguedthatgiven thatfromage2to3onchildrenshowempathytoeachotherandcomfortaplaymatewhohashurt herself,childrenatthisagecannotbeegocentric.ItiscertainlytruethatPiagetdidnotpayattentionto thechildren’sempathicbehavior.However,as Hoffman(2000,p.67–71) hasshown,empathyitself followsadecentrationprocess,passingthroughegocentricandquasi-egocentricphases.Furthermore, Borke’scriticismfailstonoticethategocentrismcanreoccuratdifferentstages.Itispossiblethatthe emergenceofempathicbehavioristiedtoovercomingtheegocentrismofthesensorimotorstage.
Fourth,inhisfamousandinfluentialcriticism Vygotsky(1934/1986) argued,following Bleuler (1912/1951),thatautismandthepleasureprinciplecannotcharacterizethebeginningofdevelopment.Byplacingtheautisticstageatthebeginningofdevelopmentandderivingthestageof egocentrismfromit,Piagetmisconstruesthestartingpointaswellasthefurtherpathofdevelopment. However,aswehaveshown,Piagetchangedhisviewofthebeginningofdevelopmentbythemid1930,andsohecouldagreewithVygotsky’scriticism,while,atthesametime,pointingout,thatit didnotapplytohislatertheory:
ThemainproblemraisedbyVygotskyisbasicallythatoftheadaptiveandfunctionalnatureof theactivitiesofthechildandofeveryhumanbeing.OnthispointIcertainlyagreewithhimin themain;allIhavewritten(aftermy first fivebooks)ontheOriginsofIntelligenceasthe sensory-motorlevelandonthegenesisoflogico-mathematicaloperationsthroughactions
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makesiteasyformetodaytolocatethebeginningsofthinkinginacontextofadaptationwhich hasamoreandmorebiologicalsense(Piaget,1962/2000,p.242;seealso Piaget,1951/1995,p. 284).
However,theconceptofautismneverentirelydisappearedfromPiaget’swork.Heacknowledged that “acertainamountofautismisnormalforallpeople” (Piaget,1962/2000,p.244),whichisreminiscentof Bleuler’s(1922/1951,pp.446–447) statementthateverydaythinkingisamixtureofautistic andrealisticthinking,withautismbeingthesourceofimagination.Furthermore,thenotionofautism alsolingeredoninPiaget’stheoryofsymbolicrepresentation,whichemerges firstintheformof individualandpersonalimages(Piaget,1945/1962,pp.68–72;foracriticalevaluationsee Gillett,1987; Müller,Sokol,&Overton,1998).Moreover,theideathatassimilationdistortsrealitysurvivedinthe viewthatassimilationdominatesoveraccommodationinplay(e.g., Piaget,1945/1962,p.280;see Kesselring,1981,foracriticalevaluation).Infact, Piagetattimes(1945/1962,p.290) evencontinuedto defineegocentrismasaprimacyofassimilationoveraccommodation,whichisnotthesamethingas alackofdifferentiationbetweenego,alterego,andworld.However,bothcanbereconciledifthethesis thatassimilationhasmoreorlessprimacyoveraccommodationisreplacedbytheideathatthe assimilationprocesscanbeaccompaniedbymoreorlessaccommodation.Improvingtheaccommodationofacognitiveassimilatoryprocessimpliesimprovingthedifferentiationbetweenperspectives (Piaget,1970/1983,p.729).
Fifth,thenotionofegocentriclanguagewascriticizedforanumberofreasons(seee.g., McCarthy, 1954,562–570; Schachter,Marquis,Ganger,&McCaffery,1977). Piaget(1962/2000,p.247) himself acknowledgedthattherearemethodologicalissuesinassessingegocentricspeech.Atthesametime, hecomplainedthattheconceptofegocentricspeechwasnotwellunderstood(Piaget,1962/2000,p. 246):
But,andthisat firstsightwassurprisingthoughnowandwithhindsightexplicable,allthe opponents(andtheyarelegion!)ofthenotionofegocentrismchose(almost)exclusivelyto attackthe firstchapter[of Piaget,1923/1926]withoutseeingtheconnectionwiththeothertwo andtherefore,asIhaveincreasinglycometobelieve,withoutunderstandingthemeaningofthis notion!Onecritic,whosetouttoshowthatIwaswrong,wentsofarastotakeforacriterionof egocentriclanguagethenumberofpropositionsinwhichthechildtalksabouthimself,asifone couldnottalkaboutoneselfinawaythatisnotegocentric.
Piaget(1962/2000,p.248) approvedofVygotsky’sproposalthategocentricspeechmarksthe transitiontoinnerspeechandthategocentricspeechhasafunctionforchildrenandisnotan accompanimentofbehavior,asPiagethimselfhadarguedinhisearlierwritings.Piagetalsoagreed withVygotskythategocentricspeechhasaglobalcommunicativefunction,buthepointedoutthat egocentricandcommunicativespeecharenotsocialtothesameextentbecauseeventhoughthe intentionunderlyingegocentricspeechissocial,itseffectisnot(Piaget,1962/2000,pp.248–249;see Sevastyanov,1989).
ThecriticismsdiscussedtothispointprimarilyconcernPiaget’searlyconceptofegocentrism(i.e., egocentrismasastagebetweenautisticandrationalthought)andfailtotakeintoaccountthefurther developmentofthisconceptinPiaget’swriting. Kesselring(1981,1993),however,raisedthreecriticismsthatdidtakeintoaccountPiaget’slatermodificationsoftheconcept.
First, InhelderandPiaget(1955/1958,p.353) suggestedthategocentrismisaphenomenonthat reoccursatthebeginningofeachstagebecauseofproblemsthatariseduetotheenlargementofthe cognitive fieldthatcomeswitheachnewstage.Eventhoughaninitialphaseofegocentrismwas identifiedforthesensorimotorstage,thepreoperationalstage,andtheformaloperationalstage,there wasnostageofegocentrismspecifiedforthestageofconcreteoperations.Piagetneverprovidedan explanationofwhytherewasnoinitialphaseofegocentrismatthestageofconcreteoperations(see Kesselring,1981,p.168).
Second,egocentrismisdefinedasanadualisticattitudeoralackofdifferentiationbetweenan objectandthesubject’sperspectiveonit,butanadualisticcognitivestructuredoesnotnecessarily havetobeegocentric.Thisisbecauseachildwithanadualisticattitudetendseithertoattributethe featuresofobjectstoherownactionsortoprojectthestructure(schemes)ofhermentalactivityinto
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externalobjects.Thus,anadualisticattitudeoftenresembleswhat Piaget(1926/1929) called “realism” , namelythecognitiveattitudeofattributingone’sownmentalactivitytoobjectivereality(i.e.,the physicalworld).Consequently,whenacognitivestructureisadualistic,weshouldnotalwaysattribute anegocentricattitudetoit.Piagethimselfsometimesspeaksof “realism” (1926/1929,pp.33–168),and, inthesocialdomain,moralrealism(1932/1965,pp.109–196).Otherrelevantconceptsinthiscontext are “phenomenism” or “magic-phenomenistic” attitude(ofthebabieswhothinkthattheycaninduce directlyadesiredphenomenon:see Piaget,1937/1954,pp.229–256)and “animism”– theattributionof mentalandemotionalcapacitiestolifelessthings(Piaget,1926/1929,pp.169–251).
Furthermore,Piagethimselfexpandedtheegocentrism-conceptinthe1940sand1950sbyintroducingconceptssuchas “sociocentrism” torefertoanattitudethatisbiasedbytheideologyofagroup (Piaget,1951/1995)andcentrationofperception,action,and/orattentiontooneaspectorpointof atask(Piaget,1946/1969,pp.129–130; 1957,p.52,63–90; 1975/1985,pp.84–100; Piaget&Inhelder, 1966/1969,pp.43–50;seealso Montada,1968,p.68).
ThethirdofKesselring’scriticismsinvolvesPiaget’s (Piaget&Inhelder,1948/1967,pp.209–246)use ofthetermegocentrismintwodifferentsenses.The firstmeaningisthatofinitialadualism:An egocentricchilddoesnotclearlydistinguishbetweendifferentpointsofviewandisunabletodealwith spatial,temporal,quantitative,socialetc.relations.Thesecondmeaningistheinabilitytocoordinate one’sownpointofview(insocial,spatialetc.respects)withthoseofotherpeople.Piagetdidnot elucidatethedifferencebetweenthesetwomeanings.Ofcourse,achildwhotakeshisownpointof viewasabsoluteis afortiori unabletocoordinatehisperspectivewiththoseofotherpeople.Butachild whofailstocoordinateperspectivesdoesnotnecessarilyfailtodifferentiatebetweenperspectives. Egocentrisminthe firstsense(i.e.,failuretodifferentiateperspectives)isapparentlymorepervasive than egocentrisminthesecondsense(i.e.,failuretocoordinateperspectives).Thisisevidentinthe threemountainsexperimentof Aebli,Montada,andSchneider(1968).Whilesittinginfrontofamodel scenerydisplayingthreemountains,manychildrenadmittedthatadollsittingattheoppositesideof themodelwouldhaveadifferentperspective.Thesechildrenapparentlyhadovercomeabsolute egocentrism.Butinsteadofpointingatthephotographwhichcorrespondedtothedoll’spointofview, thesechildrenpointedatthephotographwhichcorrespondedtotheirownview.Piaget(Piaget& Inhelder,1948/1967)consideredthesechildrenasstillbeingegocentric,althoughtheywereableto differentiateperspectives.
Itisworthnotingthatfromtheearly1960sonthenotionsof egocentrism and decentration become rareinPiaget’swork – probablyasaconsequenceofthefactthatin1962Piagetbecameacquainted with Vygotsky’s(1934/1986) severecriticismofhisearlywork(see Piaget,1962/2000).Inthe1960s, anothertheoreticalconceptbecamepredominantinPiaget’swork – the autoregulation concept(Piaget 1967/1971).Inthe1970s,whenPiagetcombinedtheautoregulationconceptwithhisearly equilibrium theory(1918,1957),thesynthesisofbothresultedinhis equilibration theory(1975/1985),which remainedthefundamentaltheoreticalapproachinhislastpublications.Inthisnewtheory,the differentdecentrationphasesreappearedasdifferentphasesintheprocessofequilibration.Inthe following,weshowthatthesephasesremaintightlyconnectedwithdecentrationmechanism.
Inthissection,wereconceptualizetheconceptofegocentrismasasubstageorphaseofastagespecificdecentrationprocessinthecontextof Piaget’s(1975/1985) theoryofequilibration.We reconstructegocentrismintermofthreephases,(a)aphaseofstrictegocentrism,inwhichthechild doesnotconsiderdifferentperspectivesorrelationswhatsoever;(b)asecondphaseofegocentrismin thebroadersense,whichimpliesbothadistinctionbetweenperspectivesandaconsiderationof relations,yetwithouttheircoordination,and(c)athirdphaseofcompletedecentrationthatismarked bythecoordinationofperspectives.Wethenwilloutlinehowthedecentrationprocessmanifestsitself atthefourdifferentdevelopmentalstages(sensorimotor,preoperational,concrete-operational,formal operational),usingexamplesfromthedomainsoflogical,physical,andsocialcognitiontoillustrate thisprocess.Thedifferentillustrationsarenotintendedtobeunderstoodasimplyingthatthereis aglobaldecentrationprocesswiththeimplicationthatchildren’sperformanceishomogeneousacross differentareasoffunctioning.Rather,dependingonchildren’sexperience,decentrationprocessesmay
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followdifferenttimetablesindifferentdomains(see Kesselring,1981,1993,2009,foramoredetailed treatment).
Howdothesedifferentphasesofegocentrismrelatetotheprocessofequilibration?Inhisbookon equilibration, Piaget(1975/1985,pp.53–60) distinguishesbetweenthreetypesofreactions,whichhe termed a, b, g,towardnewchallengesandperturbations.Type a reactionsarecharacterizedby ignoring,repressing,orrefusingnewchallengesandperturbations.Thisstrategyisrationalaslongas thechildisunabletoovercomethechallengesinquestion.Inthe decentrationprocess, differences, particularlydifferencesbetweenperspectives,arethemainsourcesofconflict.Thus,thephase a inthe decentrationprocessrepresentsanattitudewhichismarkedbyatendencytocompletelyignoreother perspectivesandanydifferencesboundtotheseperspectives.
Type b reactionsrefertoasubject’sattemptstorespondtothechallengesthatheconfronts.The subjectstartstopayattentiontodifferencesandtorelatethingstoeachother,buthedoesnotyetput therelationsthemselvesintorelationwitheachother.Asaconsequence,theattemptsofconfronting challengesareneithersystematicnorcompletelysuccessful.Inthedecentrationprocess,type b reactionscorrespondtotheabilitytoconsiderelementarydifferences – differencesbetweencognitionand realityontheonehand,andbetweendifferentperspectivesontheother – andtothefailureto coordinateperspectives.
Finally,type g reactionsarecharacterizedbythecoordinationofdifferencesandbytheirintegration intothecognitivesystem,i.e.,thesubjectputsrelationsintorelationwitheachother.Inthedecentrationprocess,thiscorrespondstotheabilitytocoordinateperspectivesandintegratethemintothe givencognitivesystem.
Thisintegrationisduetotwocorrespondingprocesses:theconstructionofanewsystemof cognitiveschemes,which,accordingtoPiaget,relieson reflectingabstraction (Piaget,1977/2001)onthe onehand,and equilibration – theintegration,orcoordinationbetweennewlybuiltupstructuresand formerlyconstructedstructures,ontheotherhand.Reflectingabstractionisanelaborativeprocessby meansofwhichthesubjectdiscoversthestructuralaspectsofhercognitiveactivity.Forinstance, puttingmarbles,oneaftertheother,inareceptacleisanactionwithseveralstructuralaspects,oneof whichisbasedonthecreationofaserialorder,andanotheronthecreationofasetwithagrowing numberofelements. Piaget(1961/1966) himselfstatedthatunderstandingthecardinalandordinal aspectsofnaturalnumbersisduetoreflectiveabstractionontheactionsinvolvedinbuildingaset. Reflectiveabstractionleadstoareversalofthedirectionofconsciousness(Piaget,1936/1952,p.155, 1950b,p.78, 1967,p.1257, 1975/1985,p.72;see Kesselring,1981,pp.69–73,164),whichreferstothe factthattheformerperspectivehasbeenrelativizedandintegratedintoanewsystemofinterpersonal, social,spatialandlogicalrelations,whichopensupanewandwiderperspective.Thisnewperspective, however,isinitially,asitwere,onceagaintakentobeabsolute.
Piaget(1936/1952) termedthedevelopmentalperiodduringthe first18monthsoflifesensorimotorintelligence.Sensorimotorintelligenceisapracticalintelligenceonthebasisofwhichinfants interactwiththeworldthroughperception–actioncycles.Infantsemployactionschemeslikesucking, pushing,hitting,andgraspingtoexploreandmanipulatetheworld. Piaget(1962/2000,p.243,1970/ 1972,p.21) characterizedthedevelopmentalchangesthatoccurduringthe first18monthsas aCopernicanRevolution.Thenewbornhasnoself-consciousnessandnoclearawarenessofwhat effectssheherselfproducesthroughactionsontheworld,andwhateffectsoccurindependentlyofher actions.Bycoordinatingheractionsamongeachotherand,inthesocialdomain,withothers,theinfant graduallylearnstodistinguishbetweenego,alterego,andworld.Atthecompletionofthesensorimotorstage,fortheinfant,hisownactionisnolongerthewholeofrealityandinsteadnowbecomes “oneobjectamongothersinaspacecontainingthemall;andactionsarerelatedtogetherthrough beingcoordinatedbyasubjectwhobeginstobeawareofhimselfasthesourceofactions” (Piaget, 1970/1972,pp.22–23).Thecompletionofthesensorimotorstageleadsthechilduptoareflective level,which,inturn,istiedtorepresentationalactivity(imagery).
Initially,inphase a,thenewborndifferentiatesneitherbetweenselfandworld,norbetweenself andotherpersons.Forexample,theobservationthatinfantsdonottrackobjectsthatleavetheirvisual
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field(Piaget,1937/1954,Obs.2,5)indicatesthattheydonotunderstandthatobjectsmovealong trajectoriesthatareindependentofthemselves.
The b-phaseemergesbetween8and12monthswiththedifferentiationbetweenmeansandends, whichleadstotheconstructionofrelationsbetweentwoobjectssimultaneously(Piaget,1936/1952,p. 233).Theelaborationofobjectpermanence(i.e.,theunderstandingthatobjectsarelocatedinastable universethatisindependentoftheself)makesconsiderablestridesduringthisphase.Forexample, infantsareabletoretrieveentirelyhiddenobjects(Piaget,1937/1954,Obs.34–38).Butobjectsarenot yetcompletelyindependentoftheself,andtheirlocationsarenotyetrelativetoeachother.Thisis evidentintheA-not-Berror:Infantssearchforanobjectatalocationwheretheypreviouslyfoundit andnotatthelocationwheretheysawtheobjectdisappear(Piaget,1937/1954,Obs.39–45). “The objectscreenisthereforenotconsideredbythechildassomethingwithwhichthehiddenobjectisin relationship:thescreenisstillperceivedasrelativetothesubjectandnotasrelativetotheobject” (Piaget,1937/1954,p.192).
Inphase b,infantsalsobegintocoordinatedifferentappearancesofanobject.Whereasinphase a theobjectissomethingthatcanbetouched,smelled,heardandlookedat,thereisnosystematic coordinationbetweentheappearancesoftheobject.Asaresult,infantswillnotunderstandthatthey areconfrontedwiththesameobjectwhentheobjectisrotatedinfrontoftheireyessuchthatonlyits reversesideisvisible.Forexample,when,attheageof7-to8-months,Piaget’ssonLaurentwas presentedwithhisbottlesuchthatthenippleofthebottlewasinvisible,hedidnotrecognizeit(Piaget, 1937/1954,Obs.78).Inordertoassignthedifferentappearancestooneobject,infantsmustnoticethat changesofappearancescanbemanipulated,ononehand,butnotinacompletelyarbitraryway,onthe otherhand,becausethereis “something” whichpartiallyregulatestheorderofdifferentappearances. Forinstance,theappearanceofthebottle’snipplecanbemadetocompletelydisappearbyturningthe bottlearound.Bymanipulatingthepositionsofthebottle,theinfantdiscoverstheregularitiesorlaws underlyingthewaysinwhichtheappearancesofthebottlechange.Theunderstandingthatthereverse sideofthebottleappearswhenitisrotatedby180 isjustonepartofthisdiscovery.Bysystematic explorations,infantslearntodifferentiatebetweenanobjectandthestateintowhichitischanged(i.e., thenewappearance).Asaresult,infantsrealizethatanobjectisindependentofitsstatesor appearances.Theobjectisnotitselfoneofthoseappearances,buttheinvariantaccordingtowhichits appearancesarerelated.Usingmathematicalterminology,amaterialobjectcanbeexplainedas afunctionbymeansofwhichoneappearancecanbetransformedintoanotherone.Infantsstartto understandtheobjectasaninvariantaround9monthsofage(Piaget,1937/1954,Obs.78,78a),butthis bynomeanssignalsthattheconstructionoftheobjecthasbeencompleted.Rather,itisnotuntilthe secondyearoflifethatinfantsovercometheA-not-Berror,andtheydonotsucceedinobject permanencetasksinwhichtheobjectisinvisiblydisplaceduntilthesecondhalfoftheirsecondyearof life(Piaget,1937/1954).
Anotheraspectofthe b-phaseconcernstheinfants’ understandingofspace.Infants’ actionsare organizedinsimplereversiblegroupssuchashidinganobjectunderascreenandretrievingit(Piaget, 1937/1954,Obs.85).However,thespatialgroupsatthislevelremainmidwaybetweensubjectiveand objectivegroupsbecauseinfantscannotyetunderstandrelationsthatarecompletelyindependentof theiractions.Theinfant “doesnotyetrecognizepositionsanddisplacementsasbeingrelativetoone another,butonlyasrelativetohimself” (Piaget,1937/1954,p.183).
Withrespecttosocialdevelopment,thetransitionfromthe a-tothe b-phaseisillustratedby infants’ understandingthatthebodyofanotherpersonisanindependentsourceofcausalactivity.As aconsequence,infantsactonsomeoneelse’sbody,notasaninertmatterthatismerelyextendingtheir ownactionbutbyreleasingtheactivityoftheotherbodythroughadiscreetpressure(e.g.,amere touch, Piaget,1937/1954,p.262).Atthesametime,anumberofdifferentjointattentionbehaviors emerge.Jointattentionbehavioursinvolvethecoordinationofattentionbetweentheinfant,another person,andanobject.Forexample,followingthepointinggestureordirectionofgazeofanother personrequiresthattheinfantcoordinatesherownattentionwiththatofanotherpersontowardthe world(Hobson,2002; Tomasello,1999).Jointattentionbehaviourrequiresthatinfantsconstruct relationsbetweenthemselvesandanotherobjectthatispartiallyindependentoftheirowndirectedness.Forexample,inordertounderstandthatanotherperson’spointinggesturesinglesoutan objectoreventintheworld,theinfantneedstograspthattheotherpersonisdirectedtowardthe
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worldinawaythatispartlyindependentoftheinfant’sowndirectedness.Indeed,8-month-oldinfants seemtofailtograspthisbecausetheyremainfocusedontheoutstretchedpointing fingeroftheother personanddonotdisplacetheirgazetothetargetobject(Morissette,Ricard,&Décarie,1995).Buteven aftertheemergenceofjointattentionbehaviours,thereareinitiallystillindicationsthattheunderstandingofthedirectednessofanotherpersonretainsasubjectivequality.Forexample,twelvemonth-oldinfantsarenotabletofollowthegazeofanotherpersonifthetargetoftheother person’sattentionisnotthe firstobjectalongtheirscanpath(Morissetteetal.,1995).
Finally,attheendofthesensorimotorstage,infantsstarttotakeanexternalperspectiveon themselves,whichisintegraltothe g-phase.Theabilitytotakeanexternalperspectiveontheselfis manifestinmirrorself-recognition(see Case,1991;Hoffman,2000;Lewis,1992).Inordertorecognize herselfinthemirror,theinfantmustrelateherownembodied,activecentertotheexternal,visually displayedbodyinthemirror.Inotherwords,infant’sactive,immediatestancetowardtheworldis brokenand “reflected” byanexternalperspective.Asaconsequence,theinfantisabletounderstand herselfsimultaneouslyasagent(looking)andasrecipient(beinglookedat).
Theabilitytotakeanexternalperspectiveononeselfalsomanifestsitselfindifferenttypesofnew behavior.First,theinfantshowsempathicbehavior,whichempiricallyiscloselyrelatedtoselfrecognitioninthemirror(e.g., Bischof-Köhler,1989,1991;Zahn-Waxler,Radke-Yarrow,Wagner,& Chapman,1992).Empathicbehaviorpresupposesthatchildrendonotimmediatelyreacttotheother butrathertaketheattitudeoftheotherandactaccordingly:Theyconsidertheirownbehavior, reflectedbytheattitudeoftheother,andareabletocomforttheotherpersonifsheishurt.Second,the infantiscapableoftakinganexternalperspectivetowardtheselfandshowingreciprocalcollaborative activitiesthatdevelopattheendofthesecondandinthethirdyearoflife.Forexample,2-year-oldsare abletomasterjointproblemsolvingtasksbycoordinatingcomplementaryrolesbothspatiallyand temporally(e.g., Brownell&Carriger,1990).Whereasincollaborativeimitationtheagent–recipient rolescanbesequentiallycoordinated(“Igive,youtake” andthen “yougive,Itake”),injointproblem solvingtasksbothpartnershavedifferentandcomplementaryroles(e.g., “Myactionxisafunctionof youractiony,asyouractionyisafunctionofmyactionx”)whichleadstoadifferentiationand coordinationofagent–recipientrolesforselfandother.The flexiblecoordinationofagent-recipient relationslikelyunderliestheemergenceofbasicvisualperspectivetakingabilities(e.g., Lempers, Flavell,&Flavell,1977).Forexample,atwo-year-oldwhoislookingatapicturebookandasks anotherperson, “What’sthat?” whilepointingtoapicture,mayunderstandthattheotherpersonwho isseatedinsuchawaythathervisualaccesstothepicturebookisobstructed,maynotseethepicture. Equippedwiththeserudimentaryvisualperspectivetakingabilities,thetwoyear-oldmaygetupand showthepicturetotheotherperson(eventhoughnotnecessarilyinthecorrectspatialorientation).
Theemergenceoftheschemeofthepermanentobjectprovidesevidencethatanewcognitive functionhasemerged,namelythesemioticfunction.Thesemioticfunctionconsistsofdifferentiated signifier–signifiedsystems,which,inturn,areaprerequisiteforsymbolicrepresentation.Thesemiotic functionunderlieschildren’sabilitiestoengageinanumberofdifferentactivities,suchasdeferred imitation(i.e.,imitationintheabsenceofthemodel),pretendplay,drawing,psychologicalfunctions basedonmentalimages(e.g.,recallmemory),andlanguage.Theseactivitiesarepracticedandrefined duringthelevelofpreconceptualthought(approximately2–4yearsofage)(Piaget,1945/1962,pp. 221–244).
Thesemioticfunctionadvancescognitioninanumberofrespects.Owingtothesemioticfunction, cognition(a)transcendstheimmediatehereandnow,(b)becomescapableofreferringtoabsent objectsand/orstatesofaffair,(c)becomesabletousewords,symbols(e.g.,inpretendplay, Piaget, 1945/1962)andexternalrepresentations(e.g.,pictures,photographs; DeLoache,2004),(d)becomes concernedwithtruth,andnolongerjustwithpracticalsuccess – however,anexplicitconceptoftruth ariseslater,atthestageofconcreteoperations – and(e)becomessubjecttotheinfluenceofsocial factorsinaqualitativelynewway(Piaget,1937/1954,pp.361–364; 1945/1962,pp.238–240; 1947/ 1976,pp.120–122).
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Atthesametime,preoperationalthoughtischaracterizedbyprofoundcognitivelimitations.These limitationsarepartlyduetothefactthatthedevelopmentofthesemioticfunctionrequiresthatthe practicalconceptsofobject,space,causality,andtimethathadbeenconstructedandonlypractically understoodatthesensorimotorstagebereconstructedonanewsymbolic–representationalplane.
Atthelevelofpreoperationalthinking,theinitial a -phaseischaracterizedbyanewkindofadualisminthelogical,numericalandsocialdomain:Forinstance,achildinthe a -phasemightsay, “Mary issmallandJohnistall”,butdoesnotyetstate, “MaryissmallerthanJohn” or “JohnistallerthanMary” (Piaget&Inhelder,1966/1969,pp.89–90).Thechildalsolackstheabilitytograspthedifference betweenindividualandgeneralconcepts.Forexample,whenPiaget’sdaughterJacquelinewas31 monthsold,shecried,uponseeingaslug, “Thereitis!” Whenshesawanotherslugafewyardsfurther shesaid, “There’stheslugagain” (Piaget,1945/1962,Obs.107).Conceptsthusremainmidwaybetween thegeneralityoftheconceptandtheindividualityofelementscomposingit.Similarly,whenthechild happenstoobserveasunriseabroad,withaskylinesheisnotacquaintedwith,sheisnotsurewhether thesunisthesameassheknowsfromhome(Piaget,1945/1962,Obs.130).
Inthesocialdomain,thechilddifferentiatesbetweenwhatsheandanotherpersonseesand understandsthatanotherperson’sattentionaldirectednessmaybedifferentthanhers,butshedoes notdifferentiatebetweenhowshefeelsaboutorseesthings,andhowanotherpersonfeelsaboutand seesthings.Thus,onceagain,thechildlackscoordinationofdifferentperspectives.Theconsequences ofthislimitationcanbenoticedinmanydifferentcontexts.Forexample,whenatwo-year-old observedaplaymatehurtinghimself,shecomfortedhimbyofferinghimherowndollorbygetting herownmother,eventhoughtheplaymatehadhisowndoll,andeventhoughhismotherwaspresent (Hoffman,2000,p.70).
Anotherexampleinvolvesthehide-andseekgame.A3-year-oldchildmaynotunderstandthelogic ofthegameofhideandseek.Toillustrate,takethecaseofthe3-yearoldsonTheoofthedevelopmentalpsychologistHeinzWimmer:
Heinzishidinginthepantry.AftersomesearchingTheo findshim.Heinzasks, “Howdidyou knowIwasinhere?” towhichTheoanswers, “BecauseIopenedthedoor.” ThenitisTheo’sturn tohide.RightinfrontofHeinz(!)he “hides” inthepantry.Heinzplaysalongandcallsout, “Whereareyou?” Theogigglesandanswers, “inthepantry.” (Perner,1991,p.153)
Similarly,preschoolchildrendonotunderstandtheconceptsofsecretorsurprise.Forexample,a3year-oldmaysay, “Mum,toyouranniversaryIhaveasurpriseforyou,youknow,it’sanembroidered napkin!” (see Peskin&Ardino,2003).
Inphase b,childrenareabletohandledistinctions(Piaget,1937/1954,p.373, 1945/1962,Obs.107, 108),butfailtocoordinatethem.Thus,theymayholdthatMaryis smaller thanJohn,buttheyconfound tallnesswithageanddonotunderstandthatonepersonmaybetallerbutneverthelessyoungerthan theother(Piaget,1946/1969,pp.219–250).Childrenfailtomaketransitiveinferences:Providedwith anumberofcolouredsticks,theymayascertainthat “thegreenoneisshorterthantheredone”,and thereafter,that “theblueoneisshorterthanthegreenone”,buttheyareunabletoconcludethattheblue oneisshorterthantheredone,too.Moreover,theydonotsucceedinordering12woodenstickswhich differslightlyinlength:Theyarrangeasmallgroupofthreeorfoursticksaccordingtolength,but remainunabletoorderthewholesetofsticksaccordingtolength(Piaget,1941/1952,pp.122–157).
Inthesocialdomain,childreninthe b-phasewillmakeadistinctionbetweenhowtheyseean object(aturtleupside-down)andhowanotherperson,positioneddirectlyoppositetothechild,will seethesameobject(rightsideup; Flavell,1992);thus,thechildwillnowtakesimplespatialorientationsintoaccount(seealso Hobson,1980).Thechildnowwillalsodifferentiatebetweenherownand anotherperson’sunderstandingofasituation(i.e.,thechildwilldemonstratefalsebeliefunderstanding).Forexample,thechildwillcorrectlypredictthatanotherperson,whosawanobjectbeing placedatlocationA,andwhoisignoranttothesubsequenttransferalofthisobjecttolocationB,will searchfortheobjectatlocationA,eventhoughthechildherselfknowsthattheobjectisatlocationB (Wimmer&Perner,1983).
Intheseperspectivetakingtasks – currentlyoftenreferredtoas “TheoryofMind” tasks – thechild differentiatesbetweenherownandanotherperson’sperspectivebyconstructingspatialrelations betweentheotherpersonandanobject(turtletask)ortemporalrelationsbetweenanotherpersonand
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differentcontexts(falsebelieftask).Intheturtletask,thechildneedstorealizethattheinternal featuresoftheobject(itstopandbottom)appearreversedtoanotherpersonseatedoppositetoherself. Inthefalsebelieftask,thechildneedstounderstandthattheotherperson’sknowledgeoftheobject’s whereaboutsislimitedtothepreviouslocation(i.e.,beforethetransferoftheobject)anddoesnot incorporateinformationaboutthecurrentlocationoftheobject.Piagethimself(1932/1965,pp.29–50) describedasimilarfailuretointegrateperspectivesinthecontextofpreschoolers’ gameswithrules. Preschoolersholdtherulesofthegamesforsacrosanct,buttheydonotunderstandtheirpurpose,for thiswouldpresupposetheintegrationoftheperspectivesofthedifferentplayers.Asaconsequence, preschoolersthinkthat,oncethegameisover,everybodywon,asifwinningandenjoyingoneselfwere synonymous.
Childreninthe b-phasealsofailtounderstandtherulesthatapplytospatialreferencesystems.This difficultyismanifestinpreoperationalchildren’scoordinationofleft-rightorientations.A4-to5-yearoldwhoissittinginfrontofanotherpersonmaybeperfectlyabletoimaginewhatitisliketositatthat person’splace,butsheisnotyetabletocoordinateleftandrightinasystemofspatialrelations involvingtwopersons,onesittingoppositetotheother(Piaget,1924/1972,pp.98–101; Piaget& Inhelder,1948/1967;seealso Cox,1978).Toovercomethisdifficulty,shehastoimaginethewhole situationfromanoverarchingperspectivebyconstructingrelations(left-rightwithrespecttoone’s ownbody)betweenrelations(left-rightwithrespecttoanotherperson’sbody).Thisabilityaswellas themoredifficultabilitiestocoordinatetwospatial,social,orlogicalrelationsingeneral,presupposes asecondorderrepresentation,therealizationofwhichmarkstheonsetofphase g (see Kesselring, 1993,2009).
Theconstructionofspatialreferencesystemsisevenmorecomplexifthesystemdoesnot containjustoneobjectbutseveralobjectswhichcanberegardedfromdifferentperspectives(orin differentpositions).Thisisbecausespatialreferencesystemsnotonlyrequirethecoordinationof relationsbetweentheobjectanditsobserver(s);rather,inaddition,theyrequirethecoordinationof therelationsbetweenrelationsthatholdbetweendifferentobjects.Anexampleofthecomplex demandsinvolvedhereisthereproductionofthehorizontalandverticallinesinadrawing.When a5-year-oldisshownatiltedbottle,half filledwithwater,andaskedtomarkthewatersurfacein adrawingofthetiltedbottle,shewillnotbeabletodoitcorrectly.Manychildrendrawthewater surfaceright-angledtothewallsofthebottle.Similarly,achimneyonanobliqueroofandtreeson amountainslopearedrawnrectangulartotherooformountainslope(Piaget&Inhelder1948/1967, pp.375 –418).
A finalexamplethatillustratestheabilitytoputrelationsintorelationswitheachothercomesfrom thedomainofsocialunderstanding.Specifically,around7-yearsofagechildrenacquirewhathasbeen termedaninterpretiveunderstandingofmind,whichbecomesmanifestintheunderstandingthattwo peoplemaycometodifferentconclusionsaboutthemeaningofanabstractpainting(Carpendale& Chandler,1996;Chandler&Lalonde,1996).Theinterpretiveunderstandingofmindgoesbeyond simplefalsebeliefunderstanding.Whereasfalsebeliefunderstandingrequirestheunderstandingthat differencesintheamountofinformationarelinkedtodifferentactions,theinterpretiveunderstanding ofmindrequiresthatdifferentbeliefsaboutasituationcanresultbetweenpartiesthatareprivytothe same information(Carpendale&Chandler,1996).Thus,thedifferentinterpretationsmustbesubsumed tothesameconfigurationandmustberelatedtoeachotherasequallyvalidwithrespectofthe informationsuppliedinthissituation.Thistaskrequiresthecoordinationofbothinterpretations withinanoverarchingsystemthatcomprisesthemboth.
Themainfeatureofconcreteoperationsishigherlevelconceptualandoperationalthinking.It emergesatage7to8andbeginstobeoverlaidbyformaloperationalthinkingbyage11to12.Whereas inpreoperationalthinkingsignsreferonlytomaterialobjects,actsandevents(orimaginedones),at thelevelofconcreteoperationstheyrefertonotions,mentalentities(likesetsandnaturalnumbers) andtooperationalschemes.
Piagetdidnotobserveanybehaviourindicativeofaninitialegocentrismatthebeginningofthe concrete-operationallevel.Quitetothecontrary,accordingto Piaget(1923/1926,1924/1972) theonset
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ofconcrete-operationssignalsthatthethinkingandreasoningofthechildbecomelogicalandsocial.In thesocialdomain,playinggamesaccordingtorulespromotesthedevelopmentofperspectivetaking (Piaget,1932/1965,pp.84–100),theacquisitionoftheattitudeofmutualrespect,andtheunderstandingofthe GoldenRule (“Don’tdotootherswhatyoudon’twantthattheothersdotoyou”;see Piaget,1932/1965,pp.395–406).
MovingbeyondPiaget,weproposethatakindofcentrationoccursalsoatthelevelofconcrete operations(see Kesselring,2009).Thisegocentrismmanifestsitselfinthecognitivedomainasacentrationon giventhings (naturalnumbersinsteadofnegativeand/orrationalnumbers),andinthesocial andmoraldomaininthechild’sfocusonthesmallgroupofpersonsheliveswith.Weusethe developmentofnumber(Piaget,1941/1952)andtime(Piaget,1946/1969)toillustratethecognitive centrations(see Kesselring,1993).
Whenachildentersprimaryschool,heorshemasterscountingandknowswhatanumberis, butconfoundsnumbersandsetsofobjects.Thebasictypeofnumberiscallednaturalnumber becauseitcanberepresentedbyasetofmaterial( “natural ”)objects.Operatingwithnatural numbersopensupanewdomainwithitsowntypesofrelations.Theseneedtobeconstructedand thencoordinatedwitheachother.Themostelementarytypesofnumericalrelationsare differences (thedifferencebetween5and3is2)and ratios (theratiobetween12and3is4).Theconceptof difference canbeexplainedbyaddition(whenn þ 4 ¼ m,then4isthe difference betweenmandn), andthe ratio conceptcanbeexplainedbymultiplication(if4 n ¼ m,then4isthe ratio betweenm andn).
Inphase a,anaturalnumberisconsideredtobean objectset.Thenumber12,forinstance,is exemplifiedbyadozenmarbles,orbythesetofthemonthsorapostles.Therefore,theinversionof numericaloperationsisnotyetwellunderstood.Ifweinvertanadditionoramultiplication,thenin somecaseswegetanaturalnumber(8–7 ¼ 1,and12:4 ¼ 3),buttherearemanyothercasesinwhich thisdoesnotoccur.Whatistheresultof7–8orof4:12?Achildinphase a isnotbotheredbythis question,forsheisnotyetinterestedininvertingnumericaloperations.Thischanges,however,in phase b,whenthechildentersthedomainsof(small)negativenumbersandfractions.Fromnowon, therelationalaspectofnumbersbecomesapparentandpredominant.Thatiswhyfromthenonthe number0andnegativenumbersareunderstoodasnumbers,too,butnumberswhichnolongerare exclusivelyboundtotheconcreteinstantiationinobjectsets(ortheir figurativerepresentation).The childbeginstoexplorerelationsbetweennumericalrelationsandthusdiscoversproportionality.Yet, proportionalityremainsanempiricalconceptbecausethechildisunabletogeneralizetherelations betweennumericalrelations.Asaresult,thechildisnotabletoexplaintheprincipleofproportionality:a/b ¼ c/d.Heunderstandsthat4/12 ¼ 1/3,butdoesnotalwayssucceedwhenaskedtoextrapolate:5/15,6/18,8/24,etc.Thus,thesocalled “schemeofproportionality” isstilllacking.Furthermore, childrenfailinhandlinglargenumbersanddonotunderstandwhatirrationalandinfinitenumbers are.
Finally,inphase g,childrensucceedincoordinatingnumericaldifferencesandrelations(ratios) whatsoeverandareabletohandletherelationbetweentwoquotientsv/xandy/z – arelationofthe seconddegree.Onlythendotheyreallygrasptheconceptofproportionality,whichrepresentsan elaboratedversionofinvariance,relatedtoseveralmodesofreversibility:Theequation a/b ¼ c/d canbe invertedinmanydifferentways; b/a ¼ d/c;or a/c ¼ b/d;or d/b ¼ c/a,etc.Ifinvariant,thisrelationstands for proportionality;ifitvaries,itrepresentsa (mathematical)function.
Theinabilityofchildreninphase a tohandleproportionalityinfluencestheircomprehensionofthe conceptoftime.Theyconfoundtheanglecoveredbythehandsoftheclockwiththedurationthese standfor,andtheythinkwe “see” thepassingoftimewhenwelookatthemovementofthehandsof aclock.Theydonotyetdistinguishclearlybetweenthespatialcharacterofthedial-plateandthenon spatialcharacteroftime.Inphase b,thisdistinctionbecomesclearer,andtimeisnolongerconfounded withmovementorwiththeanglecoveredbythehandsofawatch.Thisdifferentiationisanecessary conditionforelaboratingtheideaofproportionality.Theabsenceoftheproportionalityscheme explainswhythechilddoesnotrealizethatinmeasurementtheunderlyingunitmustbeinvariant.It alsoexplainswhythechildneitherhasagoodgraspoftemporalregularity,noranyunderstandingof theassumptionsunderlyingmeasurement.Instead,thechildbelievesthatifsheclapsherhands quickly,thentimewillrunfast,andifsheclapsherhandsslowly,thentimewillrunslowly(Piaget
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1946/1969,pp.129–130).Inaddition,thechildisnotabletocomparethevelocitiesofdifferentmoving objects(e.g.,acarandatrain),iftheseobjectsdonotmovesimultaneouslynorwiththesamevelocity. Theseproblemsarenotmastereduntilphase b,whenthechildlearnstointegratethetwomovements inthesametemporal-spatialreferencesystem,conservingthetemporalandspatialunits(Piaget,1946/ 1970,pp.225–252).Andwhenweaskachildtomake,onapieceofpaper,onedotpersecond(tothe beatofametronome)foradurationof30s,shebelievesthatthenumberofdotssheputsdown dependsontheinstrumentwithwhichtimeismeasured.Ifsheknowsthatshemakesthirtydots duringthe30-sintervalwhentheintervalismeasuredusingawatch,shedoesnotknowhowmany dotsshewillmakewhenthe30-sintervalismeasuredusingasandglass(Piaget,1946/1969,pp.200–205).
Piagetexplainedtheconstructionoftimeconceptinawaysimilartothatofnaturalnumbers.The seriesofnaturalnumbersisasynthesisofordering(first,second,third,etc.)andconstructingsetsof elements(cardinalaspectofthenumber).Similarly,timeisasynthesisoftwoaspects – sequenceof eventsandduration.Butincontrasttonaturalnumbers(orspatialextension),timecannotbeillustratedwiththehelpofobjectsets,andtimehasnoconstantnaturalunit.Whoguaranteesthatthe handsofaclockrunreallyregularly?Wesimply assume thatourmostpreciseclocksandwatches are regular.If,however,themovementofallregularclocksandallphysicalmovementswereacceleratedin thesameway,thenwewouldnotnoticeit(Piaget,1946/1969,p.76).Becausetheconceptoftimeis moreabstractthanthatofnaturalnumbers,childrenbegintounderstandtimemeasurementonlyin phase b andmasteritcompletelyonlyinphase g,whereastheysucceedinhandlingnaturalnumbers alreadyinphase a
Inthesocialandmoraldomain,theconcrete-operationalchildunderstandsthataruleisbasedon themutualexpectationsofthemembersofagroup.Thismentalattitude,however,canleadto acentrationonthegroupoffriendsorpeerswithwhomthechildlikestoplay,cooperate,and exchangeideas(Lickona,1983,chap.9).Wemayimagineamafiagroupthemembersofwhichrespect eachotherandcooperatesuccessfullybutcommitcrimesagainstpeoplewhodonotbelongtothe group.Suchbehaviourusuallycountsasbeingamoral.In Kohlberg’stheory(1981,1984),thedifference betweenagroupmoralityandamoralityrelatedtosocietyasawholeismanifestinhisdistinction betweenlevels3and4.Reflectiononhumanrightstakesplaceonlyonthepostconventionallevel(i.e., afterlevel4).Forestablishingcriteriaofamoralnormapplicabletothelargersociety,itisworthwhile toreferto humanrights.
Atthelevelofformaloperations,childrenexhibittheabilitytoreasoninahypothetico-deductive fashion,andthus,tosubordinaterealitytopossibility.Atphase a,adolescentsdonotsufficiently differentiatebetweenthelevelofhypothesesandtheleveloffact.Forexample,adolescentsmay generateallpossiblesolutionsforaproblem,buttheyarenotabletoworkouttheimplicationsofthese differentpossibilitiesforempiricaltesting(Müller,Sokol,&Overton,1999).Atphase b,adolescents starttoconfrontthehypotheseswithempiricaltests,buttheexperimentstheydesigntotestthe hypothesesarenotyetcompletelysystematic(Inhelder&Piaget,1955/1958,pp.73–75).Atphase g,the testingofhypothesesandsearchingfortherelevantcausalfactorsbecomesystematic(Inhelder& Piaget,1955/1958,pp.75–76).
Thelevelofformaloperationscoincideswiththeperiodduringwhichadolescentsentertheadult community.Atthebeginningofthislevel,theydonothaveanyrealisticplansfortheirownfuture. Whentheystartarrangingtheirrelationtoadultsociety,theytendtoovervaluetheirownsignificance (phase a).AsPiaget(Inhelder&Piaget,1955/1958,pp.340–341)observed,manyadolescentsbehave likemessianists,therebydisplayingabehaviourthatistypicalofanegocentricattitude.Thereafter, theyenthusiasticallypromotesociallyimportantgoals,suchasjustice,protectionoftheenvironment etc.Butatthesametime,theirbehaviorisofteninconsistentwiththesegoals(phase b).Forinstance, theyhelpcleaningabrook,butleavetheirownlitteratthebanksofthebrooks.Actinginadultsociety presupposesconsistencybetweenone’sthoughtsandactions – somethingwhichevenmostadultsdo nothaveattheirdisposal.
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Inthispaper,wetracedtheoriginandchangesinPiaget’sconceptofegocentrism.Weexamined anumberofcriticismsofthisconcept,and,inpart,inresponsetothesecriticisms,suggestedareconceptualizationoftheconceptofegocentrism.Specifically,wedistinguishedbetweentwotypesof egocentrismthatarepartofdecentrationprocessthatitselfconsistsofthreephasesandisrecapitulatedateachofthefourdifferentstages.
Wementionedthatpreviousempirically-groundedcriticismoftheconceptofegocentrismmostly focusedonpreschoolers’ perspectivetakingabilities.Accordingtothesecriticisms,Piagetunderestimatedtheseabilities(e.g., Light,1983;Newcombe&Huttenlocher,1992).However,basedonour reconceptualizationoftheconceptofegocentrismitisimportantthatfutureresearchonperspective takingtakesintoaccountthestagesandphasesofthedecentrationprocess.Theempiricallybased criticismsofPiaget’sconceptofegocentrismmostlyfailedtodothis(inadditiontosufferingfrom methodologicalproblems,see Waters&Tinsley,1985).Weacknowledgethattaskdemandsand information-processingrequirementsmayadditionallyimpactchildren’sperformanceonperspective takingtasks(Flavell,1992;Hobson,1980;Kesselring,1993).
Finally,Piaget’sconceptofegocentrismgoesbeyondsimplesocialperspectivetaking,towhichit latelyhasbeenreduced.Rather,egocentrismhascognitiveandaffectiveaspects.Inthispaper,wehave focusedonthecognitiveaspect;clearly,theaffectiveaspectneedstobefurtherelaborated.Furthermore,egocentrismreferstothelackofmakingdistinctionsandconstructingrelations.Thedecentrationprocess,therefore,isconstitutedbythesystematicconstructionoflogical,numeric,spacialand socialrelations – relationswhatsoever –,whichisconsistentwithPiaget’sclaimthat “Thelogicof relationsisimmanentinallintellectualactivity;everyperceptionandeveryconceptionarethemaking ofrelationships” (Piaget,1937/1954,p.209).
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