The Doctrine of Creatio Ex Nihilo in the Thought of Søren Kierkegaard1 Matt Frawley
A number of commentators have made reference to the doctrine of cre ation in Kierkegaard s works. Scholars such as Michael Plekon and Kresten Nordentoft point to its relevance while Louis Dupre makes note of Kierkegaard s belief that because God created us, there is a certain »given ness« to human nature that we cannot manipulate.2 More extensive treat ments are given by Arnold Come and Valter Lindstrom, both of whom show the pervasiveness of the doctrine of creation in Kierkegaard s writ ings. While Come argues that Kierkegaard s use of creation has only a pos itive role in establishing the goodness and uniqueness of each individual, Lindstrom takes a more »traditional« approach in his attempt to disclaim the arguments of William Anz and others that Kierkegaard was indifferent or antagonistic towards »creation-centered faith.«3 Lindstrom, like Gregor Malantschuk, emphasizes Kierkegaards belief that Gods creation of the world from nothing establishes Gods authority and our consequent »bond service« (WL 115; SV1 9 ,112).4 Nevertheless, Come, Lindstrom and Malantschuk fail to examine, or even notice, how Kierkegaard incorporates the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo in his anthropology. Kierkegaard argues that we, unlike the rest of creation, actually have an awareness of Gods creation of us from nothing through our moment by moment choices. Each choice or leap we make is an actu alization of a possibility and this process »repeats« Gods creation of us from the »nothingness« of possibility. So as we engage our own possibilities of choice we sense our own nothingness and contingency. Because we are self-relational creatures whose deepest longing is for eternal blessedness, we use our wills to shield ourselves from this reality instead of yielding our wills to God in unconditional obedience. According to Kierkegaard, how ever, this trust in our own wills is actually »presumption« [Formastelse]