Comparative Fascism: Adolf Hitler and Donald Trump

COMPARATIVE FASCISM:

ADOLF HITLER AND DONALD TRUMP

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of California State University, Chico

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History by © Benjamin Robertson 202 1 Fall 2021

COMPARATIVE FASCISM:

ADOLF HITLER AND DONALD TRUMP

A Thesis by Benjamin Robertson

Fall 2021

APPROVED BY THE DEAN OF GRADUATE STUDIES:

Sharon Barrios , Ph.D.

APPROVED BY THE GRADUATE ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

Christine Goulding, Ph.D.

PUBLICATION RIGHTS

No portion of this thesis may be reprinted or reproduced in any manner unacceptable to the usual copyright restrictions without the written permission of the author.

Dedication

I dedicate this to Donavan and to my family, who have all made this project possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While there are many that I am grateful for in helping me complete this thesis, I would like to first thank Dr. Jason Nice. Dr. Nice’s feedback and editing throughout the writing of this project, combined with his taking over as Committee Chair made sure this thesis made it to the finish line. His support, advice, encouragement, and optimism made this project possible, even in the midst of a pandemic.

I would also like to thank Dr. Christine Goulding. Her support and enthusiasm for German education was a catalyst that pushed me to study German history. The education and encouragement I received from her made studying German exciting and rewarding. Without her help, I surely would not have been able to use original German sources in this research.

I am also thankful for Dr. Robert Tinkler’s support in this project, and I am especially grateful that he joined as an advisor when there were unexpected changes to this thesis committee.

Lastly, I would like to thank my boyfriend Donavan and my family. Their help and support throughout this thesis have helped me see this project through to its completion. Without their love and encouragement, this thesis would have been impossible.

ABSTRACT

COMPARATIVE FASCISM:

by

© Benjamin Robertson Master of Arts in History

California State University, Chico Fall 2021

Since Donald Trump began campaigning for United States president in 2015, scholars of fascism have debated whether Trump’s movement was fascist . The concept of an American regeneration inherent in Trump’s 2016 campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” fit with the palingenetic core of fascism, but many scholars have argued that this is not enough to claim Trump is a fascist. However, after Trump incited an insurrection that led to the storming of the United States Capitol, many scholars began to change their position a nd claimed that this moment of aggression defined him as a fascist leader. Some historians, like Roger Griffin, have viii

maintained that Trump is not a fascist. Still, many more scholars began defining Trump as a fascist after the January 6, 2021 insurrection.

This study argues that Trump is a fascist, and that he has been a fascist from the beginning of his 2016 presidential campaign . The 2021 insurrection was merely an extension and culmination of Trump’s ideology, and not the only moment that defines him a s fascist. In order to define Trump as a fascist and to analyze the way fascists gain and utilize power, this study applies comparative history and demonstrates the many similarities between Trump’s ideology and that of Adolf Hitler. Furthermore, this work is broken into two sections: the first compares and analyzes speeches from Trump and Hitler and demonstrates that Trump is a fascist leader. The second section compares Trump ’s and Hitler’s rise to power and the way they each governed once they had attained control of their governments. This work intends to contribute to the historical conversation o n fascism, while also utilizing comparative history to analyze contemporary events.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 2016, Donald Trump was elected the 45th president of the United States. On December 18, 2019, Trump was impeached by the House of Representatives on two counts, for abusing his power as president and for obstructing Congress.1

After his 2020 election loss and constant spreading of misinformation of election fraud, Trump’s January 6th speech culminated in a mob of insurrectionists storming the United States Capitol.2

The riot that followed Trump’s speech, made possible by his lies regarding the 2020 presidential election, injured over 100 policemen, and for the first time since the War of 1812, the White House Capitol had been breached by aggressors.3

The amount of damage Trump brought to America and American politics was impressive to say the least.

1 Nicholas Fandos, "Trump Impeached for Abuse of Power and Obstruction of Congress," The New York Times, December 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/18/us/politics/trump-impeached.html

2 Peter Baker and Sabrina Tavernise, "One Legacy of Impeachment: The Most Complete Account So Far of Jan. 6," The New York Times, February 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/capitol-riots-impeachment-trial.html

3 Lawrence B. A. Hatter, "Perspective: The Similarities to the Last Invasion of the Capitol Matter: So Do the Differences," The Washington Post, January 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/11/similarities-last-invasion-capitolmatter-so-do-differences/.

Since Donald Trump’s announcement of his candidacy for president, there has been debate among fascism specialists as to whether he should be categorized as a fascist leader.4

For some, like Robert Paxton, Trump’s incitement of an insurrection and attempted subversion of election results was enough to label Trump a fascist.5

However, Trump had done enough to be categorized as a fascist before the riot in the United States Capitol. While there are numerous ways one can go about proving Trump’s style of leadership is fascist, this work will utilize a comparative approach in order to do so. Specifically, this thesis proposes that the many commonalities between Adolf Hitler’s Nazi movement and Donald Trump’s movement, combined with their leadership styles once in power, demonstrate that Donald Trump and his movement are fascist.

Before proceeding, it is imperative to address the elephant in the room: this thesis compares a contemporary politician and Hitler, one of the most notorious men in modern history. However, this thesis by no means attempts to claim, assert, or even imply that Donald Trump is equivalent to Hitler. To do so would not only be a stretch and a massive anachronism, but it would also produce little-to-no value to the field of history. Instead, this work is interested in the similarities between the style and approach the two men had as politicians, both as outsider candidates and as eventual leaders.

Applying a comparative approach makes apparent that Donald Trump and Adolf Hitler exhibited many of the same political characteristics, strategies, and style in how they achieved

4 Paul Nicholas Jackson, "Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” Fascism 10, no. 1 (2021): 1-15, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-10010009.

5 Jackson, "Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” 1-15.

political power and in the way they governed. Furthermore, in using fascism as a mode of comparison, it is evident that Trump’s ideological and political ideals place him in the realm of modern fascist leaders. The goal of this work is to expand the understanding of how fascist leaders come to power, and it also aims to utilize comparative history as a means for understanding contemporary events. Furthermore, fascism does not present itself monolithically, so it is helpful for the field of fascism scholarship to draw comparisons when they are possible and applicable.6

But before we can point out the ways in which Trump is fascist, or use fascism as a comparative factor, we must define fascism.

This work will utilize Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism, as it is the clearest definition available in fascist studies. Griffin asserts that while fascism can present itself in variations in terms of style and in the level of commitment from its supporters, it will always maintain the same basic ideological core based on palingenesis and populist ultra-nationalist ideology.7

Palingenesis, according to Griffin, is a mythic ideology that focuses on the rebirth of a nation (palin means again/new, genesis, means creation/rebirth).8

A fascist party uses a nostalgic golden era as an example of when their country was at their peak, and they then compare it to the current decline of their country in the present. Therefore, the fascist party attempts to use this nostalgic support to produce a rebirth of their once great nation.

However, claiming that fascist ideologies contain a palingenetic core is not specific enough. Yes, it would apply to fascism, but it would also relate to many other political

6 Sven Reichardt, “Violence and Consensus in Fascism,” Fascism (Leiden) 1, no. 1 (2012): 59.

7 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 26-27.

8 Ibid., 32.

ideologies as well. The second part of Griffin’s definition, his claim that fascism is populist and ultra-nationalist, is key in defining fascism as its own political ideology. Griffin defines populist ultra-nationalism as being populist in the sense of relying on the power of the people for legitimacy (at least initially). He goes on further to claim that the ultra-nationalist aspect of the ideology is anti-liberal and a rejection of Enlightenment ideals.9

A Short Historiography of Comparative History

History is inherently comparative. Even the terms historians often use convey comparative connotations. When we employ words like “depression” to signify an economic collapse, we naturally and innately compare that moment with a period of economic stability. When historians use terms like fascism or bolshevism, we often make comparisons between other ideologies as well.11

9 Ibid., 37. But again, this definition on its own can also describe several other movements and ideologies. In combining palingenesis with populist ultra-nationalism, we get a clearer and more precise concept that limits the scope of what fascism is and what it is not. Fascism has the palingenetic goal of the rebirth of the nation (often with a racist undertone, or sometimes explicitly racist messages) that follows a supposed state of decline or decadence, combined with populist ultra-nationalist ideals of antiEnlightenment and emotional appeal.10

10 Ibid., 44.

11 Benjamin Z. Kedar, Explorations in Comparative History (Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press, 2009), 50. If a historian claims one country is a great power, we compare it to

the other nations we believe are great powers or contrast it to countries that may be deemed lesser powers.12

Considering the concept that history is comparative, it is interesting how few historians today apply the comparative method to their research. Even though historians have discussed and practiced the comparative approach since at least the end of the nineteenth century, there are few scholars today who use this approach. There are many benefits to comparative history, but the field is not thriving today for various reasons. However, the historians who have taken on the challenge of writing comparative histories have produced exciting works in recent years.

Prominent French historian Charles-Victor Langlois claimed in 1890 that the comparative method of history allowed historians to establish crucial links between historical events. He believed that we can better understand the outcome of historical events after comparing two similar nations.13

After World War One, historians began to view the possibilities and weight of history in a new light. The huge loss of life in European countries made several prominent historians

12 Peter Kolchin, “Comparing American History,” Reviews in American History 10, no. 4 (1982): 65.

13 Kedar, Explorations in Comparative History, 1. Langlois also urged historians to only compare contemporary nations that were geographically close to one another. An example he believed would be appropriate for comparison was Medieval France and England.14

14 Ibid., 2. In 1907 Gustave Glotz, another prominent French historian, went even further by claiming comparisons should be limited to countries who had reached a similar level of development.15

15 Ibid., 3.

examine the methodologies typically used in their profession. Henrie Pirenne, a Belgian war hero and historian, believed that comparative history could help mitigate the issues of hypernationalism. He argued that the key was to compare different nations, instead of just focusing on one’s home nation. He held that one of the best qualities of the comparative method is that it illustrates similarities between different nations. Pirenne hoped that the comparative method could help dispel the nationalistic sentimentalities that became so prevalent in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century by showing similarities between nations.

In the interwar period, Marc Bloch became very influential in the field of comparative history. A prominent founder of the Annales School of History, in 1928 Bloch outlined different methods for conducting comparative history.16

In his framework, he discussed the differences between parallel and cross comparisons. A historian uses cross comparison when comparing two different nations. On the other hand, a parallel comparison is when one studies and compares events that occurred in only one nation. He claimed that parallel versions of comparison were superior to cross-national forms of comparison and argued that parallel comparisons typically offered more reliable results. However, he did not rule out the possible benefits of cross comparisons altogether.17

As World War Two ended, historians again looked at the way they crafted their research and also at the capabilities of their field. Many historians began to look for ways to discuss race and persecution after the appalling losses suffered in the Holocaust, the Siege of Leningrad, the

16 Ibid., 7.

17 William H. Sewell, "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History," History and Theory 6, no. 2 (1967): 212.

dropping of the atomic bombs, and soldier casualties. Toward the end of 1945, American historian Carlton J.H. Hayes posited that comparative history would be very important in the future. He argued that the method could help minimize racial, religious, and political persecution, and claimed that showing the similarities between different cultures and nations could help ease global tensions.18

18 Ibid., 15. The comparative field of history continued to develop, albeit slowly after World War Two. In 1958 a new journal, Comparative Studies in Society was established and is still operating today. The founders of the journal claimed that a historian who only studies his or her own nation is limited, and therefore cannot understand that nation’s uniqueness.19

19 Kedar, Explorations in Comparative History, 15. They also fought against the idea that comparative history has the potential to be too superficial.

By the 1980s, comparative historians passionately debated the best methods for comparing nations. John H. Elliot and Marcel Detienne debated whether historical comparisons should be made in terms of differences or similarities. Detienne believed that it was pertinent to look at similarities rather than differences when comparing two societies. On the other hand, Elliot argued for applying both similarities and differences when using the comparative method. Elliot claimed that studying the similarities of two nations can help pull out their differences, and that differences can illuminate similarities as well.20

20 Ibid, 20-23. He described the comparative method as playing the accordion; pushing the two sides together through similarities helps the historian

pull out the differences.21

From the 1990s forward, Jürgen Kocka would be an extremely important historian in the comparative field. One component of Kocka’s work gave a much more solid and complete framework for comparative historians to follow.

Kocka narrowed the categories of comparative history into two basic types, generalizing and contrasting. The contrasting form focuses on differences between the entities being compared in the historian’s work and is helpful in gaining a sharper focus of individual cases. In order to provide a better understanding of how the contrasting style works in comparative history, Kocka uses the German workers’ movement as an example. Germany experienced an earlier workers’ rights movement than most other European countries. By comparing the workers movements in multiple countries, Kocka illustrates the importance of the Bildungsbürgertum (educated middle class) in establishing the workers’ movement in Germany.22

The generalizing type concentrates on similarities between the two societies under comparison. This method, Kocka claimed, is effective for revealing trends that may be prevalent in both nations. An example of the generalizing style of comparison that Kocka proposes comes from Marc Bloch’s study of the enclosure movement in England beginning in the sixteenth century. Bloch theorized that France would have likely experienced a similar movement of enclosure at roughly the same time; he postulated that agricultural issues that were prevalent

21 Sylvia L. Thrupp, “Editorial,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 1, no. 1 (1958): 3.

22 Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jurgen Kocka, Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 3.

in both countries would be solved in the same manner. Bloch’s theory was correct.23

Arguments Against Comparative History

Like most types of historical research, the comparative approach does not come without pitfalls. Despite the optimism Henri Pirenne expressed in the early twentieth century, some critics believe that the comparative method actually fuels nationalism. They argue that the practice is done primarily in order to establish a natural hierarchy of states in which the historian’s nation is naturally on the top.24

This is not necessarily a fair judgement of comparative history. First of all, this is one of the many reasons for academic peer reviews, so that poor scholarship will be dismissed. Nationalistic works in the comparative field are sparse and do not reflect the discipline as a whole.25

23 Haupt and Kocka, Comparative and Transnational History, 3. Kocka argues that Bloch may not have been able to come to this evidence had he not used the generalizing type of the comparative method.

24 Philippa Levine, "Is Comparative History Possible?" History and Theory 53, no. 3 (2014): 333.

25 Ibid., 334. When managed effectively, as noted earlier, comparative history can operate in a way that diminishes nationalism. This may be achieved by illustrating similarities between two nations.

Other critics, such as Donald Kelley, suggest that comparative works often lead to presentism. He argues that comparative historians search for present wisdom in the variations of historical events. Kelley’s argument focuses on the work of comparative historian François Guizot. Guizot’s research compared the development of Western European governments and

their respective paths toward representative governments. Kelley is correct in pointing out that Guizot’s research provides us with an example of presentism in comparative history. Guizot claimed it was impossible to truly study the past without the influence of the present, and the developments of the Western European governments should therefore be viewed by the historians of today approvingly.26

Kelley’s argument against comparative history as an entire field is lacking, however. He chose to point out the flaws of only one historian who produced his work in 1820. Presentism today is noticeable in but a small number of comparative histories.

Comparisons in history have also been made in the study of law, social insurance, and the subjectivity of memory. It is unlikely that these comparisons are also examples of presentism.27

Some have also argued that comparative histories can exhibit signs of exceptionalism. This is definitely the case in Niall Ferguson’s work. Ferguson used the comparative method to show differences between British imperialism and the forms of imperialism imposed by other countries. He attempted to show that the British form of imperialism was much gentler than the others, which is indeed a flimsy claim.28

26 Donald R. Kelley, “Grounds of Comparison,” Storia Della Storiografia 39 (2001), 4-6.

27 Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible,” 334.

28 Kelley, “Grounds of Comparison,” 342. Works like Ferguson’s in the comparative field are few and far between. Robert Gregg and George M. Fredrickson have separately studied race relations in South Africa and the United States. In both cases, the historians managed to produce a fair and unbiased history. The two refrained from producing histories that claim American exceptionalism, and their works offer a fair and balanced view of both of the

nations.29

Other comparative historians have attempted to draw comparisons that aim to villainize or demonize their enemies. A classic case is comparing a leader with Hitler or a nation to the Third Reich.30

This does not imply that a historian cannot draw useful comparisons to the Nazi regime. However, if one is to construct a comparison between a well-known villain like Hitler and another leader, it is imperative that the historian has concrete evidence to establish a sound argument.

Another issue that can arise from comparative studies is imposing one’s views onto the nations one is studying. Although this is not a concern that resides solely in the field of comparative history, it can be especially problematic in comparative studies. One example of projecting one’s world views into a comparative history could be comparing Eastern and Western cultures through a Western lens. It is important for comparative historians to refrain from Orientalizing in these studies.31

However, this claim does not intend to imply that comparisons between the West and East cannot be made whatsoever. What is crucial is that the historian is cautious in the way they construct their histories and understands that there are naturally cultural differences between the two.

The Case for Using Comparative History

Clearly, comparative history can be misused if not approached carefully and handled objectively. However, there are many benefits that come from employing the comparative

29 Ibid., 343.

30 Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible,” 343.

31 Ibid., 332-33.

method. The growth and establishment of history as a field in the nineteenth century coincided with the emergence of nation-sates, and it was thus used by many historians to promote and defend nationalism. Governments sought ways to prove that their nation was indeed the best, and this included historians as well. However, comparative histories can help mitigate nationalism. Cross-national comparisons force the historian beyond the scholarship of their nation, and it helps mitigate the amount of nationalistic work in the field.32

On top of the benefits listed above, comparative histories also make historians wellrounded scholars. Kocka argues that in order to properly compare two different nations, one is often forced to work within a field of scholarship less familiar to the historian.33

Comparative historians often have to rely on secondary sources as well, either due to a language barrier or because of the sheer quantity of work involved in the comparison. This also has the added benefit of scholars receiving attention outside of their own field.34

Comparative history often requires the historian to reach out of their comfort zone.

Another advantage in using the comparative method is that it can diminish exceptionalism inherent in certain countries and disciplines of history. American history, according to Carl Degler, is a field that could greatly benefit from the comparative approach.35

George M. Fredrickson goes even further when discussing the need for comparative history in America by claiming that followers of Fredrick Jackson Turner’s “Frontier Thesis” especially

32 Ibid., 332.

33 Kedar, Explorations in Comparative History, 31.

34 Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," History and Theory 42, no. 1 (2003): 41.

35 Carl Deger, “Comparative History: An Essay Review,” The Journal of Southern History 34, no. 3 (1968): 425.

need to use the comparative approach. He argues that the only way to prove the uniqueness of the frontier experience in forming the American style of democracy is to relate it with experiences of other nations. He proposes that Canada would be ideal for a study in frontier experiences.36

Only after comparison would we truly know if the frontier experience in America is totally unique.

Although comparative history has been a method of historical research since 1890, few historians practice it today. However, a few historians are putting forth great work in the comparative field. Impressive pieces have been produced by Jürgen Kocka, George M. Fredrickson, and Benjamin Z. Kedar. Also, interdisciplinary scholars such as Susan Neiman and Jared Diamond have released exciting books in the field as well.

Kocka’s work, Civil Society and Dictatorship in Modern German History examines the similarities between the dictatorships of the Third Reich and the East German GDR. He uses the generalizing style of comparative history in this book by focusing primarily on similarities between the two states. As noted earlier, this type of comparative work can show common themes between two entities. By using the comparative method, Kocka shows commonalities between the GDR and the Third Reich that might have been difficult to otherwise ascertain. Benjamin Kedar has also been highly influential in his comparative work. He focuses typically on the Crusades, but he has also written essays that focus on comparative methodology. He also

36 Michael G. Kammen, The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1980), 471.

edited the book Explorations in Comparative History, upon which my own work has relied heavily.

Jared Diamond’s book Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed also offers an example of exciting and promising comparative history. Diamond’s work focuses on the ways in which societies either collapse or survive a myriad of issues, including environmental degradation, hostile or friendly neighbors, and cultural hindrances.37

37 Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Penguin Publishing, 2005), 10-15. His book shows similarities and differences between comparable societies that fail or succeed after facing similar hardships. Diamond looks closely at the different “inputs” societies implement that either stabilize or deteriorate their society, and he then examines the “outputs” of either survival or collapse.

38

38 Ibid., 18. He shows that relating the inputs and outputs of multiple similar societies makes it possible to build relations between the inputs that societies used and whether or not the society collapsed. The book contains many interesting findings, which Diamond argues would not have been possible without implementing the comparative method.39

39 Ibid., 19. One of his most interesting findings is the reason for the collapse of Easter Island. By comparing Easter Island with other similar islands, Diamond came to the conclusion that the population plummeted due to environmental degradation that stemmed from the building of the famous Easter Island

statues.40

Susan Neiman’s recent release of Learning from the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil, is another great example of recent comparative history. Her book serves as an example of cross-national comparative history by focusing on the similarities and differences between Germany and America. Although Neiman typically stays in her original field of philosophy, she branches out with this book by writing a comparative history.

Neiman’s book compares the way the Germans have faced their Nazi past with the way Americans have faced their past of slavery and is a successful piece of comparative history for a multitude of reasons. One aspect of the book that makes her argument effective is that she is clear about the terms she is using and how she will be using them. Her book focuses heavily on the idea of Vergangenheitsaufarbeitung (working off one’s past) 42

As discussed earlier, it is imperative when creating a comparative history that the historian clearly defines important terms. This is even more crucial in Neiman’s case, as she uses a German term as a means of comparing America and Germany. Having the word clearly defined in the first chapter of the book allows the reader to firmly grasp the historian’s comparisons. Another important method discussed earlier that Neiman applies to her work is clearly stating from the beginning of the book why she is attempting this comparison. In her chapter that discusses the benefits of the

40 Ibid., 108-111. He also showed that the island had a unique environment compared to other islands, and its uniqueness made it extremely fragile and susceptible to environmental degradation.41

41 Ibid., 118.

42 Susan Neiman, Learning from the Germans: Race and the Memory of Evil (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2019), 8.

comparative method, Neiman claims that similarities between the two cultures can teach us about “guilt and atonement, memory and oblivion.”43

Another issue that is apparent in the field of comparative history is that few historians are solely comparativists. Although some historians dabble in the field from time to time, few pursue it as their primary focus. One issue that stems from this is that few classes are taught that focus on the comparative approach, making it difficult to find new students interested in the method.45

Even in doing my own research for this project, I noticed how rarely the term “comparative history” surfaces as a category. Works by Kocka and Fredrickson typically had other signifiers before the term “comparative history” surfaced, such as American history, German history, etc. In fact, when viewing the types of subjects covered in Susan Neiman’s book, comparative history is not even indicated as a Library of Congress subject for this book.

43 Ibid., 37. Her book goes on to uncover the effect racist pasts had on collective memory and acceptance of guilt in both America and Germany. Although Neiman’s work, as well as the works of Fredrickson, Kedar, Kocka, and Diamond display the potential of comparative history, there is still a lack of a strong comparative academy. There are many reasons for this. As discussed earlier, the comparative approach typically requires a longer writing process than typical modes of history. Having to pour over a multitude of sources between two or more nations requires a vast amount of time.44

44 Kedar, Explorations in Comparative History, 51.

45 George M. Fredrickson, "From Exceptionalism to Variability: Recent Developments in CrossNational Comparative History," The Journal of American History 82, no. 2 (1995): 587.

The works of Neiman, Diamond, Fredrickson, Kocka, Kedar, and others show that this field has potential. Although I agree that this type of history can be strenuous, I believe it is well worth the extra work. At the very least, we should not be afraid of a methodology of history just because it might require more time and effort from us. I hope that more influential scholars will begin to apply the comparative approach to their studies. If more historians begin to use the comparative method, perhaps we will be able to make the field a well-established school of history. The comparative approach’s unique ability to quell nationalism and broaden one’s historical knowledge makes it a field worth investing time and resources into.

How this Work is Structured and Sourced

This study argues that Trump is a fascist, and he had been a fascist leader from the beginning of his 2016 presidential campaign. It also intends to contribute to the historical conversation on fascism, while also utilizing comparative history to analyze contemporary events. The thesis consists of four chapters and a conclusion, which all feature applications of comparative history. The first two chapters compare Hitler and Trump’s rhetoric, which establishes Trump’s ideology as fascist. These chapters heavily emphasize the use of primary sources, as they dissect speech transcripts from Trump and Hitler. The third chapter compares the rise of Hitler and Trump and their ascension to power, which illustrates how fascist movements come into power. The fourth chapter discusses the style of leadership Trump and Hitler exhibited once in power. This chapter elucidates the commonalities that can occur when fascists have power over their government. The third and fourth chapter rely more heavily on secondary sources, as the goal is to provide a comparison using narratives. While this work uses

Roger Griffin’s definition of fascism as a guiding source, it also applies the work of other historians. The works of fascism historians like Walter Laqueur, John Milfull, Stanley G. Payne, Noël O’Sullivan, and others will be consulted to produce a well-rounded piece of history.

CHAPTER TWO

MAGA AND PALINGENESIS

This chapter compares the rhetoric of Hitler and Trump to illustrate the similarities between the two leaders. Fascism relies on a charismatic style of leadership or a cult of personality to inspire loyalty and maintain order, and fascist governments or movements typically lack a concrete platform.

1

1 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 37. Therefore, analyzing a leader’s rhetoric and promises to his or her movement’s base is crucial in defining leaders or movements as fascist.

To analyze the rhetoric of Donald Trump and Adolf Hitler, this work relies primarily on direct quotes from the two men. This research examines Trump’s campaign speeches and Twitter account alongside Hitler’s direct quotes and speeches. Original German will be used for the most part, but in some cases I was only able to locate English translatio ns of the speeches; the German will be quoted directly when it is used in this chapter, and I translate the German in the footnotes. The categories of analysis applied in this chapter are not all essential to each fascist movement, but they are typical com ponents.

Glorious Past/MAGA

According to Roger Griffin, when historians combine the terms populist ultranationalism and palingenesis to create a parameter for fascist movements, it alludes to movements that aim to bring a rebirth of their nation follow ing years of decline (or what is perceived to be decline).2

2 Ibid., 38. Hitler and the Nazi party perceived a distinct and tangible decline in German quality-of-life due to the global effects of the Great Depression. In 1932 the unemployment rate of insured German wo rkers was up to a staggering 40 percent.3

3 Benjamin Carter Hett, The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power (London: William Heinemann, 2019), 123. The deterioration of German life and the effects of the Great Depression on unemployment levels made it easier for Hitler to claim that Germany was in a state of decline and therefore needed to be reborn. The state of Germany in the 1930s also made it easy for Hitler to paint the Left and the SPD as the enemies of the German people. If they had not been in power, perhaps the Great Depression would have been handled better, and the German citizens would have received the aid they so desperately needed.

Trump, on the other hand, could not cite a poor economy (at least not legitimately) to claim America needed a rebirth. When Trump campaigned from 2015 to 2016, the American economy had mostly rebounded from the reces sion that began under George W. Bush’s administration. Although Trump would continue to tout his administration’s economic achievements as being a stark contrast to the economy under President Obama, the growth of the economy was nearly identical for both presidencies. Trump did carry a low unemployment

rate during his presidency (3.5 percent), but Obama added more jobs to the marketplace. Therefore, there Donald Trump could not make a substantial argument for a poor American economy under Barack Obama, at least not factually.4

Therefore, unlike Hitler, if Trump was going to argue that America needed a rebirth or needed to return to a glorious past, he would not be able to cite the American economy like Hitler could the German economy.

Instead, Trump would have to focus his attack on cultural changes in America. With the Trump campaign’s slogan Make America Great Again (MAGA), he pushed Americans to think back to a fictitious “simpler time.” According to fascist historian Mattias Gardell, Trump’s “MAGA campaign positioned the key fascist vision of national rebirth at the center of political attention.” 5

4 Reality Check Team, “US 2020 Election: The Economy under Trump in Six Charts, ” BBC News, November 03, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45827430.

5 Mattias Gardell, “Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” edited by Paul Nicholas Jackson, Fascism 10, 1 (2021): https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-10010009, 3.

Gardell goes on further to claim that one of the driving factors of MAGA was a politicized nostalgia. 6 6 Ibid. He urged Americans to yearn for an America like the 1950s, with the picturesque white-picket fence, but also with the patriarchy firmly in place and minorities being held in check. 7

7 Mike Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!” (Toronto, Ontario: ECW Press, 2018), 2. MAGA was used by the Trump campaign to signal that America was no longer great, as the “again” in the slogan implie s. If voters wanted a rebirth that would revert America to (or maintain it as) a country ruled by the white patriarchy, they would have to vote for Donald Trump.

Trump’s attacks on those who advocated for the removal of Confederate statues were often used in order to attract his base to the ideas of rebirth and America’s great past. Trump argued that the Confederate monuments were nothing but symbols of America’s history, and the removal of them would be an afront on America as a nation. In referring to t he removal of Confederate monuments, Trump claimed that it was “sad to see the history and culture of our great country being ripped apart.” 8

Many, including sociologist Dr. Wanda Rushing, view the fight to preserve Confederate monuments as a contemporary dog whistle. In response to the argument that the statues should be preserved as a part of American history, Rushing notes that most statues were built and erected decades after the Civil War. The fund -raising for the monuments took place during the Recon struction era of American history, when white Americans feared losing status due to the freedoms black citizens gained after the Civil War.9

The statues were therefore raised not to record history, but to enshrine white superiority in the American South.

Defining the argument for the preservation of Confederate Statues as a racist dog whistle carries implications for Trump’s vehement defense of their value to American society. Without explicitly saying it, Trump implied that these statues are valuable because of the connotations of white supremacy they convey. Not only do the monuments imply that white Americans should be on the top of society, but they also suggest that the patriarchy of America society should be held intact. As Rushing points out, the statues are almost entirely male

8 Ibid., 154.

9 Wanda Rushing, “Setting the Record Straight on Confederate Statues,” Contexts 17, no. 1 (2018): 18.

figures, and there is often an element in the statue showing their mastery over someone or something, whether it be a general’s superiority over his soldiers or a rider’s mastery of his horse.10

Therefore, when Trump rushed to the aid of these monuments, he showed that he condones the perseverance of white patriarchy. At the very least, he did not condemn the racist and patriarchal symbolism that the statues convey.

Hitler maintained a similar disposition to Trump in propag ating Germany’s glorious past and in passing on to the youth only the stories of German heroism. In describing the education system that would be put in place under Nazi leadership, Hitler was passionate about how the youth should be taught about the Germa n past. In March of 1933, Hitler claimed “Dieser Entschluss verpflichtet zur dankbaren Bewunderung unserer großen Vergangenheit. Auf allen Gebieten unseres geschichtlichen und kulturellen Lebens muss die Brücke von dieser Vergangenheit zur Zukunft geschlag en werden.”11

He went on further in this speech to argue that it was crucial for the German education system to instill into the German citizens the myth of the heroic German soldier from a young age. Hitler argued that “Die Ehrfurcht vor den großen Männern muss der deutschen Jugend wieder als heiliges Vermächtnis eingeprägt werden.”12

10 Ibid., 19.

11 Translation: “This decision obligates us to gratefully admir e our great past. In all areas of our historical and cultural life, the bridge from past to future must be built.” Adolf Hitler and Max Domarus, Reden und Proklamationen, 1932 -1945 vol.1 (München: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965) , 232.

12 Translation: “Reverence for the great men must be instilled once again as a sacred legacy for German youth.” Ibid.

Hitler’s attachment to a mythic and heroic German past is evident in other speeches as well. In his first radio address, Hitler maintained a similar disposition. He claimed, “Sie [NSDAP] will die Ehrfurcht vor unserer großen Vergangenheit, den Stolz auf un sere alten Traditionen zur Grundlage machen fur die Erziehung der deutschen Jugend.” 13

Trump maintained a similar emphasis of American education as Hitler , in how Hitler emphasized that German educators and society as a whole should only teach the German y outh the positive aspects of their history. In an address given in September 2020, Trump argued that “o ur mission is to defend the legacy of America’s founding, the virtue of America’s heroes, and the nobility of the American character. We must clear away the twisted web of lies in our schools and classrooms and teach our children the magnificent truth about our country. We want our sons and daughters to know that they are the citizens of the most exceptional nation in the history of the world. ” 14

Trump’s and Hitler’s insistence on teaching the glorious pasts of their respective countries is a component of the palingenetic core of their movements, which is a key to fascist movements. A persistence on a glorious past from both Hitler and Trump insist ed upon their supporters and voters that there was something great from the past that could be brought back and instilled into the youth of their generation; that there is something that their countries can return to, if only in part.

13 Translation: “It [ the National Government] wishes to make reverence of our great past and pride in our traditions the foundation for the education of German youth. ” Ibid., 192.

14 National Archives and Records Administration, September 17, 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-whitehouse-conference-american-history/.

Outsiders of a Broken System

According to fascism historian Walter Laquer, fascism is often more palatable to people when the country is in a state of chaos or decline. He states that fascist sympathizers are “ready to support a movement that, unlike other parties, professed not to pursue narrow partisan or class interests but, rather, announced that it stood for the values of the whole community, that it strove for unity and order, and that this was the only way to save the country from chaos.”

15

15 Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 28-29. Typically, fascist leaders must be able to separate themselves from the machinery of the government, as the people view it as an extension of the issues they and their country are experiencing.16

16 Ibid. Therefore, one who can claim the status of an “outsider” to the government has more appeal to fa scist supporters.

One of the reasons Trump’s base found him to be an appealing candidate in the 2016 presidential election was his ability to place himself outside of the system of politicians and American bureaucracy. From the start of his presidential r un in 2015, he positioned himself as an outsider of a government that was broken and corrupt; it was a government that, according to Trump, could only be fixed by an untainted outsider. In a 2015 speech announcing his bid for United States President, Trump argued that “they [politicians] will never make America great again. They don’t even have a chance. They’re controlled fully – they’re controlled fully by the lobbyists, by the donors, and by the special interests, fully.” 17

17 Time Staff, “Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech, ” Time, June 16, 2015, https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/. He went further in the speech to

claim that his status as a billionaire enabled him to remain free from corruption, as he would not need their money in order to fund his campaign. On the issue of free trade policies for America, Trump argued that these could never function properly unless he was president because America has “people that are controlled by special interests.” He further claimed that “if it’s not me in the position, it’s one of these politicians that we’re running against, you know… I don’t need anybody’s money.” 18

Trump’s attack on the American government as a corrupt system that is controlled by special interests and lobbyists did not end with his speech announcing his candidacy. In his speech on immigration in 2016, Trump further enshrined himself as an outsider t hat could fix the broken system of American government. One of Trump’s strategies in his speeches was to not only declare himself free from corruption, but to count himself as someone who is not even a politician. He claimed that “because I am proudly not a politician, because I am not [beholden] to any special interest, I’ve spent a lot of money on my campaign, I’ll tell you. I write those checks. Nobody owns Trump.” 19

Trump’s attempt to place himself outside of the dirty world of politics continued in his other campaign speeches. In a speech he gave in Wisconsin in 2016, he claimed that “I’m not part of the corrupt system. In fact, the corrupt system is trying to stop me. I’ve been paying my own way. The voters in the Republican Party this year defied the donors, the consultants, the power brokers, and [chose] a nominee from outside our failed

18 Ibid.

19 “Transcript of Donald Trump's Immigration Speech, ” The New York Times , September 01, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html.

Before the downfall of the Weimar Republic in 1933, Adolf Hitler’s speeches often focused on, what he deemed, was a broken political system.21

Although Trump often used his speeches to claim that he alone was an outsider and would therefore be a strong leader, Hitler typically claimed that the entire Nazi Party were outsiders and systematically oppressed by the German government. Hitler used the SPD’s (Social Democratic Party of Germany) opposition to the Nazi Party to valorize his movement while placing the blame for the dire state of 1930s Germany on his rivals , as well as the signing of the Versailles Treaty after World War One . He also claimed that through the resistance and f ortitude of the Nazi Party, they were able to come to power and save the German people, even with the oppression they faced for years.

Hitler argued that “Angefangen von Plünderungen, Brandstiftungen, Eisenbahnschlägen, Attentaten und so fort, erhält alles in der kommunistischen Idee seine moralische Sanktion. Allein die Methode des individuellen Massenterrors hat die nationalsozialistische Bewegung im Laufe weniger Jahre uber 350 Tote und Zehntausende von Verletzten gekostet.” 22

and corrupt and broken system.” 20 20 Ibid. Clearly, it was important to Trump that his party and his base would view him as a candidate that owed nobody anything and would the refore be free from outside influence as the President of the United States.

21 Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (New Jersey: Castle Books, 2003), 56.

22 Translation: “Starting with looting, arson, railroad attacks, assassinations and so forth, everything is morally sanctioned by the Communist ideals. The method of individuals terrorizing the masses has by itself, in the course of the last few years, led to the deaths of 350 National Socialists and tens of thousands injured .” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, vol.1 , 230. Not only

does he claim here that the Nazi Party was being attacked and killed by the opposition, but he implies that Communist beliefs are diametrically opposed to Nazi beliefs .

Hitler claimed multiple times that his party and its members had been attacked by other political parties and by the government itself due to their status as outsiders. When arguing with the SPD in 1933, Hitler claimed: “Ich glaube, es sind wenige nur unter uns hier, die nicht die Verfolgungen von Ihrer Seite im Gefängnis bußen mussten.” 23

Here again we see Hitler attempt to place himself and the Nazi movement as being forced to defend themselves, while also establishing that the party in power is the aggressor. Hitler further attempts to distance his party from the leading German Socialist Party, by attackin g the honor of the SPD. In responding to the SPD’s rebuttal for passing the Enabling Act, Hitler claimed “unsere Bewegung war dank der Unterdrückung durch Ihre Partei jahrelang wehrlos gemacht worden, ehrlos ist sie nie gewesen.”24

In this claim, Hitler attempts to valorize the Nazi Party while placing them in polar opposition to the SPD. His argument that the National Socialists never lost their honor is intended to show the fortitude of Hitler’s party, but it is also meant to underhandedly argue that the SPD was without honor.

Similarly, Donald Trump often insinuated the opposition party’s moral failings while positioning himself as a natural alternative. In the Wisconsin speech from August 2016, Trump went on to argue that “the other party – the Democratic Party – nominated the personification

23 Translation: “I believe that there are only a few among us here, that have not been persecuted and imprisoned by you.” Ibid., 243.

24 Translation: “Our movement was defenseless thanks to its suppression by your party, but it has never been without honor.” Ibid., 242.

of special interest and corruption. The Democratic Party rigged the nomination to give it to Hillary Clinton, thus giving the soul of their party this year to the special interests.” 25

Similar to Hitler’s speeches, Trump to claimed that the system is corrupt and that he is free from its shackles. He further claimed that his opponent is not only a part of the system, but also a stark example of its corruptive failings. Trump is his own man, while his opponent Hillary Clinton must answer to the lobbyists and special interests. In his September 2016 speech on immigration, Trump continued this argument, as it became a key piece to his campaign’s strategy. In describing Hillary Clinton’s tenure in American government, he claimed that “she is going to do nothing. And just look at the past. She’s done nothing. She’s been there for 35 years. She’s done nothing. And I say what do you have to lose? Choose me.” 26

The ending of Trump’s statement from his September 2016 speech on immigration is another key to both his and Hitler’s push for power. “What do you have to lose? Choose me.”

One component of being an outsider to the current system is that giving either of them an opportunity meant, or at least so they impl ied, that voters would be voting for a major change in politics. Another component similar to the “give us a chance” mentality was Trump’s allusion that only he could fix America’s issues. There are multiple examples of Trump claiming that

25 Politico staff and Shane Goldmacher, “Full Text: Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin,” Politico , August 17, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/full-textdonald-trumps-speech-on-227095.

26 “Trump’s Immigration Speech,” The New York Times . Trump was able to make Clinton’s long political career, an accolad e that could have been seen as a benefit by the voters, a reason to not elect her.

there was no pos sible replacement if America’s issues were to be fixed. In his speech announcing his candidacy, Trump claimed that “sadly, the American dream is dead. But if I get elected president, I will bring back bigger and better and stronger than ever before, and we will make America great again.”

27

27 “Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech .” Times. In the same speech he also claimed that “you need somebody, because politicians are all talk, no action. They will not bring us – believe me – to the promised land. They will not.” 28

28 Ibid. These quotes illustrate that Trump was not only placing himself outside of the broken system, but if the American people did not vote for him these issues could never be addressed and would repeat endlessly. In another speech he places himself even more squarely as the only person who can save America from itself. He claimed, “I am your voice.” “I will be a champion – your champion.” “Nobody knows the system better than me, which is why I alone can fix it.”29

29 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!,” 1. Trump strove to enshrine himself as both the voice of the people and as the only person who can fix America’s broken system. In Trump’s understanding, America would be doomed to perpetuate its corruption.

Before Hitler became the German Chancellor in 19 33 and shortly thereafter, he often echoed sentiments similar to Trump’s “what do you have to lose” mentality. In Hitler’s first radio address in February of 1933, just days after he became Chancellor, he stated “die Parteien des Marxismus und seiner Mitlä ufer haben Vierzehn Jahre lang Zeit gehabt, ihr Können zu beweisen. Das Ergebnis ist ein Trümmerfeld. Nun, deutsches Volk, gib uns die Zeit von vier

Jahren, und dann urteile und richte uns!” 30

Hitler utilizes this plea to the German people to allude that the Left has led the German people to ruin. On the other hand, Hitler implies that if the German citizens just give the Nazi party a chance, perhaps they can fix the mess they inherited from the SPD.

Being able to claim outsider status was crucial for bot h Hitler and Trump. It afforded them both the opportunity to attack their systems of government while remaining unscathed and above the fray. They both argued that not only were they outsiders, but their opponents and those currently in power were symptoms and agents of government corruption. By placing themselves in direct opposition to a broken system and putting themselves entirely outside of it, they were able to delegitimize their opponents while still providing voters a potential alternative to the sy stem.

Anti-Press

According to Tamas Ziegler, the anti -Enlightenment ideals inherent in fascism and the emphasis the ideology places on action drive fascist movements to attack the free press. Furthermore, fascist leaders often disregard and rebuff the n eed for analysis, which is a main

30 Translation: “The parties of Marx and their followers have had fourteen long years to prove themselves. The result is a field of rubble. Now, German people, give us four years, and then judge us!” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1, 194.

component of the media. 31

This often leads to media that is critical of fascist movements being labeled as “fake news” by fascist leaders.

Adolf Hitler and Donald Trump were staunchly anti-press in their quests for power. Trump came out early against the press, and as his campaign and eventually his presidency continued, he only continued to question the legitimacy of America’s media. Hitler’s attacks on the press took a somewhat different turn, because the Nazi party took over the news outlets once in power. Therefore, after 1933 there is a shift in Hitler’s critique of the way reporters covered German news. After Hitler became German Chancellor and the Nazi party effectively controlled the German press, Hitler focused his rage on the international media. 32

From the beginning of Trump’s campaign, he attempted (rather success fully) to sow distrust of the free press within his base. Although his initial attacks on media coverage were not as brazen and aggressive as the attacks he would make as President, his anti -press platform

31 Tamas Dezso Ziegler, “The Anti -Enlightenment Tradition as a Common Framework of Fascism and the Contemporary Far Right,” Fascism 10, no. 1 (2021): https://doi.org/10.1163/2211625710010001, 19.

32 Hitler’s speeches from the start of his campaigning until 1933 contain attacks on the press as a whole. Following his takeover in 1933, they shift toward attacking negative international coverage. See Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1: 192, 232, and 243 for attacks on German press. See Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 2 : 1048-49 and 1055-56 for attacks on the international press. However, common to between both men is a propensity to discount any negative news about them as being a lie, or as Trump would call it, “fake news.” 33

33 Manuel Roig-Franzia and Sarah Ellison, “A History of the Trump War on Media: The Obsession Not Even Coronavirus Could Stop,” The Washington Post, March 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/a-history-of-the-trump-war-on-media theobsession-not-even-coronavirus-could-stop/2020/03/28/71bb21d0-f433-11e9-8cf04cc99f74d127_story.html.

began at the start of his campaign. In Trump’s cam paign announcement speech, he claimed that “our real unemployment is anywhere from 18 - 20 percent. Don’t believe the 5.6. Don’t believe it.”34

This claim is not an aggressive attack on the press, but it is nevertheless a critique of their unemployment repor ts. This shows that from the start of his presidential campaign, Trump was open to discrediting the American press whenever it would suit his needs.

Hitler’s initial attacks on the press were twofold: he attacked the German system for not printing what the Nazi newspaper was printing, and he claimed the liberal German press was lying. In Mein Kampf, Hitler harangues against the evils of the German press and argues that it aided in the deterioration of German society. Hitler questions:

Was the press not instrumental in bringing in a state of moral degradation among our people? Did the press not oppose with all its might every movement to give the state that which belongs to the state, and by means of constant criticism, inure the reputation of the army, sa botage general conscription and demand refusal of military credits, etc., until the success of this campaign was assured?35

It is evident that Hitler places the German press alongside the SPD as enemies of the German people and the Nazi movement. Hitler had every intention to either dismantle the press when he assumed power, or to take it over and publish only censored pieces.

Hitler did not attack the German press solely for what they wrote, but he also attacked them for what they, according to Hitler, withheld. In Hitler’s rebuttal against the SPD’s speech in 1933, Hitler argued that the Nazi press and their reports were being suppressed by the

34 “Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,” Times.

35 Adolf Hitler and James Vincent Murphy, Mein Kampf Unexpurgated ed . (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1981), 139.

German government. He argued : “Damals sind Ihnen diese Zitate noch nicht zu Gesicht gekommen, sondern damals hat man unsere Presse verboten und verboten und wieder verboten.”36

Hitler insisted that not only did the German press cover the Nazi party unfairly, but they also suppressed the stories that the Nazi party attempted to release. This illustrates Hitler’s attack on the German press while also furthering the previous argument that Hitler situated himself and his party as being both outsiders and oppressed.

Furthermore, Hitler attached his anti -Semitic worldview to his attacks on the free press. He argued that the press was a mechanism for spreading disinformation, and it was the Jewish people who ran the media. Hitler states in Mein Kampf (1925) that he “now began to examine my beloved ‘world press’ from this point of view,” that European Jews created “artistic trash and ran the press. And the deeper I probed the more the object of my former admiration shriveled. The objectivity of expositi on now seemed to me more akin to lies than honest truth; and the writers were – Jews.”37

37 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 58. He further argues that the Jewish press published foreign accounts and was hostile to Germanism by nature. 38

Similarly, Donald Trump attacked the media not only for its coverage, but also for what they purportedly did not cover. In his 2016 speech on immigration, Trump attacked the media

36 Translation: “At the time you did not read the quotes, but at the time our press was forbidden and forbidden, and again forbidden.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol.1, 243.

38 Ibid., 59. Hitler’s anti-Semitism, combined with his attachment of Jews to the free press, made the media an enemy to the Nazi movement long before they took power in 1933.

multiple times for the stories that he believed were not being properly covered by reporters. Trump argued that “the truth is our immigration system is worse than anybody has ever realized. But the facts aren’t known because the media won’t report them. The politicians won’t talk about them, and the special interests spend a lot of money trying to cover them up because they are making an absolute fortune.” 39

Similar to Hitler’s attack on the SPD’s management of the German press, Trump argues here that the American media hides the real stories from the American citizens. In the same speech, Trump continues his discussion on illegal immigration by claiming that the true number of illegal immigrants “are never reported. Instead, the media and my opponent discuss one thing and one thing only, the needs of people living here illegally.”40

When Hitler and Trump took power of their respective governments, there was a pronounced shift in how they addressed the press . The two leaders went in somewhat different directions in how they handled the media once they were in power, but they still maintained an unfriendly disposition toward reporters. As noted earlier, Hitler and the Nazi party took over the German press, so there was no longer a need to attack the domestic media. Instead, Hitler

39 “Trump’s Immigration Speech,” The New York Times.

40 Ibid. Here again we see Trump handle the media in a similar way to Hitler. Not only does Trump claim that the media is covering up the truth, but he also ties them to Hil lary Clinton, and therefore to the “system.” It is not enough that the media is lying. Atta ching the media to his opponent further solidifies his argument that the system is broken and that only an outsider can fix it.

began to shift his anti-press rhetoric against the international media, which fit well with his isolationist approach, anti-Semitism, and anti-Marxist stance. Trump, on the other hand , amplified his attacks against the domestic media. Although he had already made his anti -press stance clear before he took office in 2017, his critiques of the media would only become louder once he became president.

Hitler’s shift in attacking the forei gn press can be observed in a 1939 Reichstag speech. The speech included multiple attacks on the foreign press, as he attempted to paint Germany as the victim of false and slanderous stories. Hitler’s handling of the international media often claimed that they were falsifying what had really happened. Towards the beginning of his 1939 speech, he argued that not only was Czechoslovakia at fault for the way the takeover was managed, but also the press should be blamed for the way they covered the incident. Hitler began by arguing:

The fictitious report of a German mobilization allegedly forcing Czechoslovakia to mobilize its armed forces was maintained and propagated, despite an official declaration twice conveyed at my bidding to the Czech State President Benes, stating that Germany had not mobilized even a single soldier, and in spite of identical assertions to representatives of foreign powers. Insistent demands called for Germany to countermand the fictitious mobilization order and to renounce its pretenses. Benes labored to spread the rumor that the determined nature of the steps he had taken had forced the German Reich back within its appropriate borders. Since the Reich had neither mobilized its forces nor entertained any intentions of attacking Czechoslovakia, this situation entailed without a doubt a serious loss of prestige for the Reich. 41

41 “Hitler Speech January 30, 1939 - Complete Text,” World Future Fund, http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Articles/Hitler/hitler1939.html.

Hitler attempted to discredit the Czech president and the reports that came out of Czechoslovakia, claiming that the German mobilization was misrepresented. Hitler goes on to further claim: “Für die Auseinandersetzung mit Herrn Benes s… Wenn gewisse Zeitungen und Politiker der übrigen Welt nun behaupten, dass damit Deutschland durch militärische

Erpressungen andere Völker bedroht habe, so beruht dies auf einer groben Verdrehung der Tataschen.” 42

It is here that Hitler truly attempts to discredit any foreign coverage of the German annexation of Czechoslovakia. Although he ties foreign politicians into the mix as well, he is more acutely focused on the foreign press’ co verage of the news. He argues that any attempt to paint the Germans and their military as aggressors in this instance is just a “gross distortion of the facts.”

In the same speech, Hitler continued to attack the international media for their coverage of Germany. Hitler later argued that National Socialist Germany held no ill-intentions against the rest of the world; if there were any reports alluding to an aggressive Germany, they were a lie. He claimed:

Die Völker werden in kurzer Zeit erkennen, dass das nationalsozialistische Deutschland keine Feindschaft mit anderen Völkern will, dass alle die Behauptungen über Angriffsabsichten unseres Volkes auf fremde Völker entweder aus krankhafter Hysterie ge borene oder aus der persönlichen Selbsterhaltungssucht einzelner Politiker entstandene Lügen sind, dass diese Lügen aber in gewissen Staaten gewissenlosen Geschäftemachern zur Rettung ihrer Finanzen dienen sollen, dass vor allem das internationale Judentum damit eine Befriedigung seiner Rachsucht und Profitgier erreichen zu hoffen mag, dass

42 Translation: “For the confrontation with Mr. Beness… I f certain newspapers and politicians around the world now claim that through military blackmail Germany has threatened other peoples, this is based on a gross distortion of the facts.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 2, 1049.

sie aber die ungeheuerlichste Verleumdung darstellen, die man einem großen und friedliebenden Volk antun kann. 43

Here again we see Hitler’s attempt to discredit the cr edibility of the international press.

Although he uses anti-Semitism to attack the media, attacking Jews was not the sole purpose of his claims. In this example, it is equally important to Hitler to attack the partiality and bias of the international press , which Hitler claims are affected by Jews. Again, we see Hitler attempt to argue that the German people and the German army are peaceful and hold no hostilities toward other nations, and that it is only the international press that paints them out to be a threat to world peace.

Whereas Hitler, following his appointment to German Chancellor by President Hindenburg, took a more international approach to his continued aggressive anti -press rhetoric, Trump continued to focus most of his attacks on the Americ an press. However, after Trump became president, his tirades were more pronounced and aggressive. Only a month after taking office, Trump used his Twitter account to attack any media outlets he viewed as “ fake news.” In all capitalized letters, Trump tweeted “FAKE NEWS,” and followed that by claiming that The New York Times, NBC News, ABC News, CBS News, and CNN were all “enemies of the American

43 Translation: “In a short time , the people will recognize that the National Socialist Germany has no hostilities toward other people s, that all of the allegations about our intent to attack other peoples are lies either born of a sick hysteria or of the personal drive for self -preservation on the part of certain politicians, but that these lies are meant to save the finances of unscrupulous profiteers in certain countries, that above all the international Jewry can hope to achieve satisfaction of their vindictiveness and greed for profit, but that they represent the most monstrous slander that can be done to a great and peace -loving people.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol.2, 1055-56.

people.” 44

His attack against the press was not necessarily new, but this was more focused than his usual claims, as he not only called them an enemy of the people but also specifically named multiple outlets. While the claim brought criticism and shock from the media and his opponents, Trump’s base followed his lead and distrusted the media. It further solidified the growing belief among Trump’s base that the majority of news networks leaned too far left and could not be trusted.45

44 Donald Trump, President Trump’s Tweets, 2017: A Historical Archive of President Trump’s Tweets, collected by Anthony T. Michalisko (San Bernadino: 2020), February 17, 2017.

45 Ibid. Trump’s staff and his eventual 2020 campaign were well aware that Trump used his attacks on the media to rile up his already enthusiasti c base. Tim Murtaugh, Trump’s communications director in 2020, claimed that “the hostility of the mainstream media towards the president is something that gets the president’s supporters fired up.” 46

46 Ibid. Trump’s original press secretary Sean Spicer echoed similar sentiments when he claimed that although he did not “think it is good for democracy that we’re branding an entire industry as an enemy” it was nevertheless effective.47

47 Ibid. Trump made an enemy of the press not only to discredit any negative claims that may be said about Trump or his administration, but also to rouse enthusiasm and passion from his base.

45 Roig-Franzia “A History of the Trump War on Media: The Obsession Not Even Coronavirus Could Stop,” The Washington Post, March 29, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/media/a-history-of-the-trump-war-on-media theobsession-not-even-coronavirus-could-stop/2020/03/28/71bb21d0-f433-11e9-8cf04cc99f74d127_story.html.

Trump’s and Hitler’s insistence that a free press was always an imminent threat to both their movements and for the dissemination of truth did more than g ive themselves an alibi for bad press. Their insistence that the press was a public enemy aided them by perpetuating the myth that there was a constant lurking enemy. For fascist movements, this is paramount.

According to Roger Griffin, the fascist core’s reliance on the desire to replace an old broken system with something new and better leads to a key issue: fascist states are always in strong opposition to something. Therefore, for fascist movements to maintain their momentum and to avoid spinning out of control, they require a constant crisis or enemy that the leaders can point their people towards. Another way to think about this , is that fascist movements experience a “permanent revolution.”

48 If there is nothing for the party to rail against, then the base expects of what the revolution promised to deliver. Maintaining a constant crisis allows the base to stay enthusiastic and engaged while putting off the deliverance (which will never come) of the completed revolution.

Although there were other foes for both Hitler and Trump, the press was always an adversary to their movements. The media’s omnipresence was something that both men could point to in their speeches as an enemy to their bases, and they could therefore maintain a permanent mode of crisis. Even though the two leaders took somewhat different approaches in their diatribes against the free press, the anti-media rhetoric remained a focal point of their speeches throughout their time in power.

48 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 40.

Racism, Xenophobia, and Isolationism

Racism is found in all generic forms of fascism, whether it is pronounced as it was in the Nazi movement, or less pronounced as in Italian fascism. Still, racism is common in all fascism.

As Ruth Wodak notes, fascism typically separates the fascist base from others with either explicit racism or through racist undertones. 49

In Roger Griffin’s analysis and framework of fascism, he clearly defines the racist characteristics of fascist movements:

The attempts to generate a sense of the uniqueness and common destiny of this community means that fascism is essentially racist ... An important rider to this is that fascism does not necessarily invoke the myth of a pure race or go beyond vague cultural and historical notions of nationhood to conceive it in biological and genetic terms. As such, varieties of it can well remain within the bounds of the common or garden racism which was so pervasive in European societies, ‘liberal’ or otherwise, at the turn of the twentieth century, and it is not intrinsic to fascism that particular groups (for example Jews, Slavs, Asians) should be picked out for persecution, let alone for systematic genocide. 50

Although fascism naturally carries a racist component, that does not mean that every fascist movement leads to the outright persecution or attempted annihilation of a group of people.

Just because a movement did not attempt to destroy a group of people does not mean that the movement cannot be defined as fascist.

Both Donald Trump and Adolf Hitler have proclaimed racist theories. This is not groundbreaking news in the coverage of Hitler’s theories, but in comparing him and Trump it is worth reinvestigating Hitler’s claims. Racism was a central component to Hitler’s rhetoric, and some comments he made are similar to the way Donald Trump has described illegal immigrants

49 Ruth Wodak, “Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” edited by Paul Nicholas Jackson, Fascism 10, no. 1 (2021): https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-10010009, 6.

50 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 48.

in America. A common thread between Trump and Hitler’s racist and xenophobic rhetoric is the idea that only the worst immigrants come across the borders. For Trump, this type of sentiment began at the start of his 2016 campaign. Trump argued that, “they’re [Mexico] sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with them. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume are good people.” 51

Although Trump backtracks at the end of his xenophobic comments, claiming that perhaps some immigrants are good people, his entire statement suggested that primarily problematic immigrants are coming into the country.

Even when Trump did not make explicit comments that illegal immigrants are rapists and murderers, he still tried to show that immigration was hampering American society. In his speech that focused on South American immigration into America , he argued that “most illegal immigrants are lower ski lled workers with less education, who compete directly against vulnerable American workers, and that these illegal workers draw much more out from the system than they can ever possibly pay back.”52

Hitler made similar comments regarding the German Jewish population by alluding to the notion that only the worst of th em stayed in the country . Hitler’s infamous 1939

51 “Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,” Times.

52 “Trump’s Immigration Speech,” The New York Times. Trump’s argument here is less explicitly racist, but his claim still attempts to foster xenophobia and racism in his base. Like the way Trump fashioned the press as an enemy, he attempts to make illegal immigrants and the immigration system an enemy of America

Nuremburg speech focused on why Jewish people did not fit in to German society and to the issues they were purportedly creating. He claimed that “Deutschland war allerdings

jahrhundertelang gut genug, diese Elemente aufzunehmen, obwohl sie außer ansteckenden politischen und sanitären Krankheiten nichts besaßen. Was dieses Volk heute besitzt, hat es sich auf Kosten des nicht so gerissenen d eutschen Volkes durch die übelsten Manipulationen erworben.” 53

He argued that even though Germany was for some time able to successfully absorb Jewish elements into German society, they were nevertheless providing a negative input for the country. Similar to Trump’s xenophobic comments, Hitler argued that German society would only be improved if the Jewish population were removed from the country . Clearly, the way that the two went about their prejudices is entirely different, but it is still worth noting t he xenophobia and racism that was key to both of their movements. Hitler’s xenophobic and racist rhetoric was not only effective in riling up his base, but it was also timely. The Nazi’s isolationist and anti-globalization stance fit well with the German atmosphere following the First World War. The instability of German borders following World War One fed hyper nationalism, as there became a fear of what would happen to the original German citizens. This hyper nationalism and xenophobia was exasperated by the unemployment crisis in the early 1930s. As noted earlier, approximately 40 percent of Germans were out of work in 1932, leading many to become hostile towards immigrants. 54

53 Translation: “Germany was good enough for centuries to absorb these elements, even though they had nothing except contagious political and sanitary diseases. What this people has today, it has acquired through the expense of the manipulations of the not so cunning German people through the worst manipulations.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol.2, 1056.

54 Hett, Death of Democracy, 106-123.

Another common component of Trump and Hitler’s rhetoric, which runs in a simil ar vein as xenophobia, is they both expressed isolationist ideals. Trump’s goal and campaign slogan of “America first” is naturally isolationist. When Trump’s promise of putting “America first” is read alongside other Trump quotes, we begin to see a theme of isolationist politics. In one speech, Trump says “are you ready for leadership that puts you, the American people, first? That puts your country first? That puts your family first?”55

55 “Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin," Politico. This promise is not totally out of the ordinary for a president or le ader to give to voters. It is reasonable that voters would want their needs prioritized ahead of the needs of other country’s citizens. However we can see a trend. In Trump’s speech on immigration, he attempts to paint a picture of how new citizens would function in American society. He argues that “we also have to be honest about the fact that not everyone who seeks to join our country will be able to successfully assimilate.” 56

56 “Trump’s Immigr ation Speech,” The New York Times. Later on in the same speech, Trump argues that if Hilary Clinton and t he Democratic Party were in power, they would “open the borders and let everybody come in and destroy our country.” 57

57 Ibid. Donald sought in his speeches to show that America is best when it has as few immigrants as possible. Hitler and the Nazi Party’s anti -Marxist ideology made it easy for them to maintain an isolationist stance. Since Hitler’s party opposed Marxism, it followed that they were opposed to the goals of international communism. Therefore, Hitler often attacked the leftist parties for their goals of international diplomacy. In his response to the SPD following the Enabling Act,

Hitler claimed: “wer aber eine Internationale anbetet, der kann uns nicht kritisieren .”58

Similar to Trump’s slogan of “America first,” Hitler expressed isolationist ideals. According to Hitler, it was natural that Germany should want to guide its own policies with little international interference.

One last common aspect of Trump and Hitler’s racist, xenophobic, and isolationist rhetoric is that both men often used exaggerat ed fear mongering to persuade their base that isolation was the best strategy. Trump relied on scare tactics from the beginning of his presidential campaigning. As noted earlier, Trump referred to Mexican immigrants as drug peddlers, rapists, and criminals. 60

This alarmist rhetoric was used right at the beginning of his presidential campaign, and he would rely on the tactic throughout 2015 and 2016. In his September 2016 speech on immigration, Trump fear-mongered when discussing the loss of

58 Translation: “But whoever worships the International cannot criticize us.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1, 243. His attack shows that not only do the leftist German parties focus too much on an i nternational agenda, but that the Nazi party would be taking a starkly different approach. In another speech, Hitler gave a similar isolationist plea, although in perhaps a less aggressive way. In discussing the League of Nations and international diplomac y, Hitler argued: “das deutsche Volk wunscht nicht, dass seine Belange von einem fremden Volk bestimmt und regiert werden. Frankreich den Franzosen, England den Engländern, Amerika den Amerikanern und Deutschland den Deutschen!”59

59 Translation: “The German people do not wish for their interests to be decided and govern ed by a foreign people. France for the French, England for the English, America for the Americans, and Germany for the Germans!” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 2, 1057.

60 “Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech,” Times.

American lives due to illegal immigration. He claimed that “countless American lives have been stolen because our politicians have failed in their duty to secure our borders and enforce our laws like they have to be enforced.”61

In the same speech, he used references to Greek mythology to both rile up and scare his base. He argue d that not only does America have a problem with illegal immigrants coming over in large numbers, “we have no idea who these people [illegal immigrants] are, where they come from. I always say Trojan horse. Watch what’s going to happen, folks. It’s not going to be pretty.” 62

Trump did not end with the proposition of Trojan -horse tactics from illegal immigrants

By the end of the speech, he used much more direct language to alarm his voters and base. In continuing to argue that illegal immigration will bring desolation to American society, Trump argued that “the result [of Hillary Clinton’s election as president ] will be millions more illegal immigrants; thousands of more violent, horrible crimes; and total chaos and lawlessness. That’s what’s going to happen, as sure as you’re standing here.” 63

61 “Trump’s Immigration Speech,” The New York Times.

62 Ibid. Trump apparently attempts to allude to the idea that not only will there be a large number of immigrants coming into America, but they will also be planning to attack us from within. If Trump understands the story of the Trojan horse and is referring to i t honestly, then he implies here that the immigrants that are coming into America illegally are doing so with violent intentions.

63 Ibid. Here, Trump abandons the metaphorical approach he used earlier in his speech and instead reverts to a direc t alarmist style of rhetoric. He tells his voters that not only will millions of illegal immigrants pour into

America following Hil lary Clinton’s election, but they will bring chaos and destruction with them as well.

Hitler also used isolationist-themed scare tactics as a mean to stir up support and enthusiasm from his base. During his 1924 trial that followed the attempted Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler claimed that, in the Versailles Treaty, “they talked of the right of self -determination for every nation, of the League of Nations, of self -government by the people. And what did we get? World peace, but world peace in exchange for the demise of our nation. Disarmament, but only the disarmament of Germany so that it could be plundered.” While this rhetoric is fea r rousing enough on its own, he finished his attack on the treaty by questioning “what are our organs of government today other than the means by which foreign power s tyrannize us?”64

64 “Hitler Speech at Munich Trial 1924 Excerpts,” World Future Fund, http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/reading/hitler speeches/Trial/hitletrial.htm). Hitler argued that Germany’s destitution was not caused by Germany alone, but by international diplomacy. Hitler insinuated that if Germany could find a way to run its state without international interference, then it would be free from tyranny.

Like Trump’s fearmongering, Hitler’s rhetoric also rested on racist ideals. In his 1939 speech to the Reichstag , Hitler uses alarmist tactics to stir an anti -Semitic resonance from his base. He introduced the topic by claiming that he believed it was time to addre ss the “Jewish Question.” He went on to claim: “Ich will heute wieder ein Prophet sein: Wenn es dem internationalen Finanzjudentum in und außerhalb Europas gelingen sollte, die Völker noch einmal in einen Weltkrieg zu stürzen, dann wird das Ergebnis nicht die Bolschewisierung der

Erde und damit der Sieg des Judentums sein, sondern die Vernichtung der jüdischen Rasse in Europa.” 65

Hitler sought to alarm German citizens about what would take place if the “Jewish Question” were not solved. He argue d that if another war befell Europe and possibly the rest of the world, it would certainly be the Jewish people’s fault. For most German citizens who were alive during World War One, this prospect would be terrifying. Not only did the war result in a catastrophic number of deaths, but it also led to multiple issues on the home front, from the British blockade to domestic riots. It is important to also point out that Hitler’s alarming claim also came with a solution to the problem: if the Jewish population attempted to Bolshevize the world, then their race would be destroyed. So not only does his “prophecy” regarding European Jews come with a harrowing future for Germany, but he also points his base toward the same anti-Semitic beliefs he had been purporting for years. 66

Trump and Hitler’s rhetoric often relied on racism, xenophobia, and consequently isolationist ideals. Sometimes their claims were less overtly racist, like Trump’s goal to put “America first.” But often, their arguments relied heavily on tapping into rac ist ideals that would otherwise make their arguments futile. Trump relied on American racism and exceptionalism, which places the status of Americans far above the status of illegal immigrants. Hitler relied on attacking Marxist ideals of the International , to which he also tied European Jews. Through their racist fearmongering and alarmist tactics, they were able to draw rousing

65 Translation: “I want to be a prophet today. If the international finance -Jewry in and outside Europe should succeed at plunging the people into another world war, then the result will not be the Bolshevization of the world and therefore the victory of the Jews, but rather the destruction of the Jewish Race!” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 2, 1058.

66 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 150-152.

support from their bases, and they were also able to create another enemy that their movements could focus on.

The rhetoric of Adolf Hitler and Donald Trump focused on multiple similar aspects, many of which are outlined by fascist scholars as being key to fascist movements. Both leaders relied on speeches that positioned themselves as outsiders, and as outsiders only they could fix a broken government. They also offered a vision of rebirth for their countries, which Griffin names palingenesis and identifies as key to fascist movements. Hitler and Trump also used their speeches to discredit the press. For Hitler, it started as an attack on domestic press and moved to the international press. Trump’s anti -press rhetoric, however, primarily railed against the domestic news outlets. Trump and Hitler’s rhetoric also displayed racist and xenophobic ide als, which Griffin claims is essential to fascist movements. Although Trump’s racism, or at least the consequences of his racism, did not reach the same levels as Hitler’s, not all fascist movements contain explosions of racist violence.

CHAPTER THREE

APPEAL TO EMOTION

In many aspects, this chapter will serve as a continuation to the previous chapter. This section will again focus on the rhetoric of Trump and Hitler and will use their speeches as a means of comparison. This chapter focuses on the aspects of Trump’s and Hitler’s speeches that attempted to appeal to the emotion of their bases.

Law & Order/Fear of the Left

Although fearmongering can stir up a fascist’ s base, it is not nearly as useful if the movement cannot propose a solution. As Walter L aqueur notes, fascist movements are overtly militaristic in how they respond to crises. 1

Hitler and Trump both offered aggressive answers to the alarms they were rais ing. First, and most important, putting them in power, as opposed to the leftist parties, was vital if the citizens wanted to remain safe. The second component both Trump and Hitler offered to their citizens as a solution to the impending doom (that they insisted was coming) was to boost the power of the military and domestic law enforcement and then limit their regulations and oversight. This also meant that they had to draw on their bases’

1 Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 15.

affinity for law enforcement and the military. Finally, not only s hould the voters trust the leaders (Trump and Hitler in this case) to keep them safe, but they should also no longer trust the leftist parties; according to Hitler and Trump, if power is given to the Left, it could only lead to destruction for the nation. But it was important for them to not only paint the Left as the problem, but to allude to their movements being the solution. This disdain for and attack on leftist parties also encouraged more fearmongering from the two leaders, which further provided more enemies for their bases to rail against.

At the beginning of his 2016 presidential campaign, Trump’s advocacy for stronger law and order was mostly focused on the military. Trump argued that the United States military had become less potent and needed s trengthening. He advocated for a more aggressive military by claiming that it was vital that the United States be able to defend itself. He claimed, “I love the military, and I want to have the strongest military that we’ve ever had, and we need it now more than ever.”2

Trump not only glorified the United States military, but he also insinuated that the United States needs vigilant protection. In the same speech, he further implied that the United States military had been weakened and was being intimidated on a global scale. He promised that if he became president he would “find the guy that’s going to take [our] military and make it really work. Nobody, nobody will be pushing us around.” 3

2 Time Staff, “Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech,” Time, June 16, 2015, https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.

3 Ibid. Here again we see Trump imply that not only is the military in need of a revamping, but also that the United States armed forces are being embarrassed globally.

Hitler was also keen on improving and growing Germany’s military strength, although the situation in 1930s Germany was far different than 2016 America. After Wor ld War One, Germany was forced to disarm their military, leaving them with a small army of 100,000 men. 4

4 William Carr, A History of Germany: 1815 -1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 261. The disarmament clause in the Versailles Treaty hurt the pride of German nationalists, as they saw the German military as a sign of Prussian and Germa n greatness. Hitler, who fought in the First World War, was especially keen on rebuilding the military once he took power. He often used alarmist rhetoric to argue that Germany’s rearmament was necessary. He claimed : “So groß unsere Liebe zu unseren Heeren als Träger unserer Waffen und Symbol unserer großen Vergangenheit ist, so wären wir doch beglückt, wenn die Welt durch eine Beschränkung ihrer Rüstungen eine Vermehrung unserer eigenen Waffen niemals mehr erforderlich machen wurde.” 5

Hitler not only advocated for Germany to rearm, but he also blamed the international dynamics as the reason it was necessary for Germany to do so. He placed Germany as the victim in this scenario and implied that other countries were the aggressors. Hitler also insisted that the German military needed to be improved upon in order to protect the German economy. He argued : “Letzten Endes steht und fällt die Wirtschaft des heutigen Reiches mit der außenpolitischen Sicherheit. Es ist besser, dies beizeiten, als zu spät einzusehen. Ich betrachte es daher als die höchste Aufgabe der nationalsozialistischen Staatsführung, auf dem Gebiet der Stärkung unserer Wehrkraft alles zu tun, was überhaupt

5 Translation: “So great is our love for our army as the bearer of our weapons and as a symbol of our great past, we would still be happy if the world would restrict its armaments and make unnecessary any increase in our own weapons.” Adolf Hitler and Max Domarus, Reden und Proklamationen, 1932-1945 vol.1 (München: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965) , 193.

menschenmöglich ist.” 6

Even though Hitler’s claim that the economy would be in trouble without a strong military differs from his previous comment that Germany only needed to rearm because the other countries are so aggressive, his overall goal remained the same. Hitler wanted to build up the army as much as he could, and he used fearmongering as a reason for making this happen. So even though 1930s Germany and 2016 America were in starkly different situations both domestically and globally, Donald Trump and Adolf Hitler used alarmist language as an argument for building a stronger military force.

For both Hitler and Trump, it was not enough to have a strong international force; firm control of the domestic space was needed as well. Trump’s efforts to make the United States police forces stronger came mostly from speeches and his deployment of t he National Guard, and less so from actual policies. Trump showed his affinity for strong law enforcement, or as he often said “law and order,” by arguing that police needed less regulations. In 2017, he argued that “in the good old days, law enforcement a cted a lot quicker… in the good old days, they’d rip him [a protestor at a Trump rally] out of that seat so fast.” 7

7 Fabiola Cineas, "Donald Trump Is the Accelerant," Vox, October 09, 2020, https://www.vox.com/21506029/trump-violence-tweets-racist-hate-speech). He went on to argue that the police were too afraid to move quickly due to their fear of legal consequences . Trump claimed that “I love the police, they’re the greatest ,” but they were “afraid to move” for fear of losing

6 Translation: “Ultimately , the economy of today’s empire stands and falls with its foreign policy security. It is better to realize this earlier than later. I therefore consider it the highest work of the National Socialist state leadership, to do whatever is humanly possible to make our military stronger.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen, vol. 2, 1054.

their jobs or pensions. He concluded by stating that “we are really becoming a frightened country and it’s very, very sad. ”8

As his presidency proceeded, his dem and for police to be held less accountable became louder. In 2020, Trump often praised the police and attacked protestors. In September 2020, Trump applauded the Washington State Police for killing an antifa supporter. He claimed that “this guy was a viole nt criminal, and [they] killed him. And I'll tell you something that's the way it has to be. There has to be retribution." 9

Trump made this remark almost immediately after the man was killed by police, and before there was any investigation into the ki lling. Although law enforcement claimed that the antifa supporter raised and pointed a firearm at them, other eyewitnesses rebuked the statement. For Trump, it was more important to back law enforcement and shun police regulations than to wait until the st ory was thoroughly investigated.

It was not enough for Trump to position himself as a defender of the United States police forces. On top of that, he often depicted the L eft as being anti-police and pro-criminal, which he hoped would stoke enthusiasm from his base. There are multiple occasions that illustrate Trump’s insistence that he and the Republican party backed United States police

8 Ashley Parker, “In Good Old Days, Donald Trump Says, Campaign Protesters Got More Than Just an Escort Out,” The New York Times , February 27, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2016/02/27/in-good-old-days-donald-trumpsays-campaign-protesters-got-more-than-just-an-escort-out/.

9 Aaron Rupar, “‘There Has to Be Retribution’”: Trump's Chilling Comments about Extrajudicial Killings, Briefly Explained," Vox, September 14, 2020, https://www.vox.com/2020/9/14/21436216/trump-michael-reinoehl-protests-portlandshooting.

forces , while Hillary Clinton and the Democratic party were against them. In a speech Trump gave in Wisconsin in 2016, h e claimed that “just like Hillary Clinton is against the miners, she is against the police. You know it, and I know it.” 10

In the same speech, he went on to claim that “my opponent [Hillary Clinton] would rather protect the offender than the victim.” 11

It was also crucial to Hitler that Germany would have a strong police force once he took over as Chancellor. Before he took power in 1933, he relied on his para-military force, the Sturmabteilung (SA), to provide muscle. Once Chancellor Franz von Papen lifted the official ban on the SA in 1932, Hitler used them to attack left-wing opponents. 12

By some estimates, over seven hundred men and women were killed by the

10 Politico Staff and Shane Goldmacher, “Full Text: Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin,” Politico , August 17, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/full-textdonald-trumps-speech-on-227095.

11 Ibid. Trump not only claimed that he was an advocate for law enforcement, but that the Left and his opponent were against the police.

12 Carr, A History of Germany, 304. Before Hitler became Chancellor, the SA helped the Nazi party gain control of the streets, and historian William Carr argues that without their force Hitler would not have been able to maintain his movement and take power.13

When the SA, led by Ernst Röhm, became unwieldy and a threat to Hitler’s power, Hitler acted. On June 30th, Hitler ordered the execution of Röhm and his immediate subordinates, in what is now known as the “Night of the Long Knives.” There was also a purge of other Nazi members who Hitler and his closest advisors viewed as problematic to the party’s longevity.14

13 Ibid., 314.

14 Ibid., 316.

Schutzstaffel (SS), and Hitler claimed responsibility for the killings as the “supreme judge of Germany.” He also claimed that the murders were committed by the SS to thwart a coup from the SA.15

After the elimination of Röhm and the taming of the SA, the SS rose in power, giving Hitler a firmer control over Germany’s police system. Just two months after the Night of the Long Knives, the police and army swore allegiance to Hitler as the Leader of the German Reich, as opposed to swearing loyalty to the country. 16

Similar to earlier discussions regarding leftist parties in 2016 America and 1930s Germany, a key component for Hitler and Trump in promising they would maintain law was stoking fear in the chaos and lawlessness t hat would accompany rule from the Left. Trump’s attacks were typically much more direct than Hitler’s, as he primarily focused on his opponent in the 2016 election, Hil lary Clinton. When discussing Clinton, Trump argued that “Hil lary Clinton-backed policies are responsible for the problems in the inner cities today, and a vote for her is a vote for another generation of poverty, high crime, and lost opportunities.” 17

15 Ibid., 317.

16 Ibid., 318.

17 “Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin," Politico. Most important to this discussion, Trump implied that maintaining Democratic Party power wo uld lead to or perpetuate higher crime in American cities. In contrast, Trump claimed that “we will accomplish all of the steps outlined above [Trump’s proposed immigration policy that aimed to reduce illegal immigration] . And, when we do, peace and law and justice and prosperity will prevail. Crime will go down. Border crossings will plummet. Gangs will disappear.” 18

18 “Transcript of Donald Trump's Immigration Speech,” The New York Times , September 01, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/us/politics/transcript-trump-immigration-speech.html. Trump tied

Hillary Clinton to the establishment that brought America to so -called ruin. Only by voting for Trump could the American people be protected from the perils of crime, gangs, and illegal immigrants.

Hitler also attacked the Left in a way that offered Germans a bleak future for their country should the SPD or Communist Party take or remain in power. In Hitler’s first radio address, he argued:

Drohend künden die Erscheinungen um uns den Vollzug dieses Verfalls. In einem unerhörten Willen – und Gewaltansturm versucht die kommunistische Methode des Wahnsinns das in seinem Innersten erschütterte und entwurzelte Volk endgültig zu vergiften und zu zersetzen, um es einer Zeit entgegenzutreiben, die sich zu den Versprechungen der kommunistischen Wortführer von heute noch schlimmer verhalten würde als die Zeit hinter uns zu den Versprechungen derselben Apostel im November 1918. 19

According to Hitler, Communist methods would return Germany to a chaos worse than that of the years that immediately followed the conclusion of World War One. If it were not for Hitler and the Nazi party, Germany would fall into lawless chaos. Again, similar to Trump, Hitler alludes to he and his movement as being the opposite of the leftist parties that would bring ruin to Germany. The Left would bring only insanity to Germany, while Hitler and the Nazi party would bring its salvation.

19 Translation: “The apparitions all around us foreshadowing this breakdown. In an unprecedented surge of will and violence, the Communist method of insanity is trying as a last resort to poison and undermine an inwardly shaken and uprooted people, in order to drive them towards a time in which the promises of the communist spokesmen of today would be even worse than the time that resulted from the promises of the same emissaries in November 1918.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1, 192.

It was important to both Hitler and Trump that they promised their respective bases that they would bring law and order into their countries. They asserted the need for a stronger and larger military, which they both argued was a defensive rather than an offensive measure. According to the two leaders, stronger militaries were only necessary due to global conflict. The two men also believed and argued that a stronger domestic force was vital in maintaining order. Trump defended shoot-now-ask-questions-later policing methods and advocated for a police force with less regulations. Hitler used his paramilitary to fight against the Communist party in Germany, and later consolidated his forces into an all -loyal police force. Lastly, they alluded to a world of chaos that would ensue if power wa s given to the opposition parties. Law and order was vital, but in their worldviews, it could only happen in America if Trump was president; and it could only happen in Germany if Hitler and the Nazis were in power.

Strength, Violence, and an Appeal to E motion

According to Roger Griffin, a key component of fascism is its promise to replace an old, tired, and broken system with one that is based on heroism, strength, action, youthfulness, and national pride. A caveat to this is that the fulfillment of these promises is not necessarily important to the movement, but rather the myth itself is what is vital.

20

Furthermore, the youth and virility with which the movements define themselves are not embodied solely in ideology. Stanley Payne furthers this claim i n his research and argues that fascists “made a perpetual fetish of the virility of their movement and its program and style, stemming no doubt from the

20 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 26.

fascist militarization of politics and need for constant struggle.”21

The energy often stems from and is displayed in rallies, symbols, and uniforms as well. 22

Trump’s rhetoric attempted to display strength through the threat or promise of violence and by placing himself opposite of what he deemed weak. Hitler’s rhetoric attempted to show his ideals of German strength by emphas izing the need for action and nationalistic heroism. Like Trump, he also tried to place himself and his movement as the antithesis of weakness. The stages in which the two men gave their speeches and hosted their political rallies can also be seen as an ex tension of the strength, youthfulness, and action that both movements sought to portray. As Stanley Payne notes, fascist movements place an “emphasis on aesthetic structure of meetings, symbols, and political liturgy, stressing emotional and mystical aspects.”24

Trump’s speeches often focused on the strength of him and his movement, either by pointing out the virility and power of his own movement or by citing the weakness of his opponents. His incessant quest to prove his manliness and the masculinity inherent in his movement validates Griffin’s claim about the misogyny inherent in fascist movements. Griffin

21 Stanley G. Payne, A Histo ry of Fascism: 1914-1945 (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 13.

22 Ibid., 39. Additionally, fascist rhetoric is most effective when delivering messages that focus on irrational drives and myths. Therefore, fascist speakers utilize their base’s susceptibility to emotional pleas as opposed to appeals to reason. 23

23 Ibid., 26.

24 Ibid., 7. Trump’s and Hitler’s speeches were constructed in a way that would appeal to their respective audience’s emotions instead of their rationality.

claims that the fascist’s reality is a “radical misogyny or flight from the feminine, manifesting itself in a pathological fear of being engulfed in external reality associated with softness, with dissolution, or the uncontrollable.” 25

Trump’s most utilized method of displaying strength to his base was through appeals to violence. Through his Twitter account and during his 2016 campaign speeches, Trump often condoned and encouraged violence. When protestors interrupted a Trump rally in 2015, he argued if the issue persisted, he would “be a little more violent.” 26

Trump often positioned himself and his movement as strong by claiming weakness of the opposing party. In his campaign announcement speech, he argued that due to the leadership of Barack Obama and the Democratic Party, our country was becoming “weaker and weaker.” 28

According to Trump, the vulnerability of the country stemmed from the f eebleness of those in charge. Trump argued there would be no weakness from the presidency if he were elected. Trump also pounced on any perceived moments of weakness (or at least what he could argue was weakness) from opposing campaigns. When Hil lary Clinton suffered from pneumonia and

25 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, 198.

26 Cineas, “Donald Trump Is the Accelerant. ” The threat was met with applause from his viewers and the cheering was only amplified when the protestors were dragged out of the event by security. At another rally in 2016, Trump was forced to deal with yet another protestor. This time, he told his crowd that he wished he could assault the man, and if it were like the “good ole days,” it would be totally acceptable. 27

27 Ibid.

28 Time Staff, “Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech.”

was recorded by reporters struggling to get into her car, the Trump administration mocked her, claiming that she was too weak and feeble to be president. They continuously questioned the state of her health, and in one Trump ad, the narrator claims “Hillary Clinton doesn't have the fortitude, strength or stamina to lead in our world .” 29

Similarly, the Trump campaign also attacked Bernie Sanders for moments they argued showed Sanders’ weakness. After Bernie Sanders had his micr ophone taken by Black Lives Matter protestors in 2015, Trump argued that this showed Sanders’ limitations. He argued that not only did this moment show the weakness of his potential opponent, but that it “will never happen with me. I don’t know if I’ll do the fighting myself or if other people will. But that was a disgrace… I felt badly for him, but it showed he’s weak.” 30

The similarities in how he attacked the Clinton campaign and the Sanders campaign show that he placed strength as a hallmark of his movement.

Trump did more than promise his own acts of violence in order to show his strength; he condoned and encouraged his base to act violently as well. At a rally in 2016, Trump told the crowd that his security team had warned him that a protestor might t hrow tomatoes during his speech. He told them that if they witnessed someone aiming to throw a tomato, they should “knock the crap out of them.” 31

29 David Weigel, “New Trump Ad Revives - and Mainstreams - 'Sick Hillary' Attack, ” The Washington Post , April 28, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2016/10/11/new-trump-ad-revives-and-mainstreams-sick-hillary-attack/.

30 Cineas, “Donald Trump is the Accelerant . ”

31 Ibid. He even offered to pay the legal fees if the aggressor should be taken to court. And of course, there is the example of January 6, 2021. After years of condoning

violence from his base, the military, and United States police, Trump pleaded for the Republican party and his base to help in overthrowing the 2020 election results. He warned them that they would “never take back our country with weakness.” 32

Hitler’s speeches also endeavored to show the str ength of himself and the Nazis by claiming his party defended and furthered German heroism, by arguing that his party was youthful and courageous, and by describing his enemies as unheroic weaklings. From the beginning of Hitler’s rise to power, he attempt ed to connect his party to the heroism of German soldiers. Following his attempted putsch in 1923, he argued that the SPD “had the impertinence to put German heroes on trial, to parade them in chains, men whose only crime was that they fought for their fat herland, and who were made the object of the scorn of the entire world.” 34

He cites the heroism of German soldiers, while placing his opposition as the antithesis of heroic Germans.

Hitler also tried to display the strength of his movement by arguing that his movement was youthful and heroic. In describing a potential opposition to the Nazi party, Hitler claimed : “Ich habe kein Verständnis für das Bestreben absterbender Gesellschaftsschichten Wenn man

32 Ibid. After his encouragement, and due to his encouragement, Trump’s supporters stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to overturn the results of the election. 33

33 Peter Baker and Sabrina Tavernise, “One Legacy of Impeachment: The Most Complete Account So Far of Jan. 6,” The New York Times , February 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/capitol-riots-impeachment-trial.html.

34 “Hitler Speech at Munich Trial 1924 Excerpts,” World Future Fund , http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/reading/hitler speeches/Trial/hitletrial.htm.

aber damit dem fortschreitenden Leben eine Barriere vo rlegen will, dann wird der Sturm einer vorwärtsbrausenden Jugend dieses alte Gestrupp kurzerhand beseitigen.” 35

Hitler argued that due to the youth, energy, and strength of his movement, the weak opposition could do nothing to stop their progress. In anoth er instance, he uses the example of the Japanese military to show that the Nazi party favors and allies with only strength and heroism. He claimed that “Das japanische Volk, das uns in diesen zwei letzten Jahren so viele Beispiele eines glänzenden

Heldentums gegeben hat, ist an einem Ende der Welt ohne Zweifel ein Fechter im Dienste der menschlichen Zivilisation.” 36

By citing the heroism of the Japanese military, Hitler attaches his movement to these ideals.

Similar to Trump, Hitler often attacked opposing parties as weak in order to show that he and his party were strong. A common tactic Hitler used in claiming his opponents were feeble was to argue that they favored rationality over passion, courage, and strength. In describing the importance of placing c ourage and action above knowledge, Hitler claimed: “Denn uberall dort, wo gefuhrt werden muss, entscheidet nicht das abstrakte Wissen, sondern die angeborene Befähigung zum Führen und mithin ein hohes Maß von Verantwortungsfreudigkeit und damit von Entschl ossenheit, Mut und Beharrlichkeit.” 37

35 Translation: “I have no understanding f or the dying social classes. But if one therefore wants to make a barrier against moving ahead life, then a storm of forward rushing youth will remove the old undergrowth.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 2, 1051.

36 Translation: “The Japanese nation, that in the last two years has given so many examples of brilliant heroism, is without a doubt a fencer at the end of the world in service of human civilization.” Ibid., 1064.

37 Translation: “Because wherever there is a need to lead, it is not abstract knowledge that decides, but rather the natural ability to lead and also a high degree of responsibility and determination, courage and perseverance.” Ibid., 1051.

According to Hitler, the leftist parties could not effectively lead because of their over reliance on weak intellectualism. In the same speech, Hitler argued that “Grundsätzlich muss die

Erkenntnis gelten, dass der Mangel an Verantwortungsfreude niemals aufgewogen werden kann durch eine angenommene erstklassige, durch Zeugnisse belegte wissenschaftliche Bildung.” 38

Again, Hitler furthers the notion that he and his party do not solely rely on book knowledge, but they are also strong and heroic. In another example, Hitler argued that Germany’s loss in World War One taught him to value strength, passion, and heroism above knowledge. He claimed

Wenn ich dieses vor Ihnen, meine Abgeordneten, ausspreche, dann tue ich es unter dem Eindruck des einen Jahres deutscher Geschichte, das mich mehr als mein ganzes bisheriges Leben darüber belehrt hat, wie wichtig und unersetzbar gerade diese Tugenden sind und wie in den kritischen Stunden ein einziger tatkräftiger Mann immer mehr wiegt als 1000 geistreiche Schwächlinge! 39

According to Hitler, men who are strong and passionate are the ones who can and will prevail for Germany in its most dire times. If Germany were to rely on the feeble o pposition and their ideals it would succumb to the same weakness that forced them to lose World War One.

In dissecting the rhetoric of Trump and Hitler, it is worth investigating not only the words they used but also the style in which they delivered them. Both Hitler and Trump held their political rallies in starkly different manners than their opponents. Trump’s rallies were

38 Translation: “Basically, it must be recognized that the sense of a lack of responsibility can never be offset by a supposed first-class education with good grades .” Ibid., 1051.

39 Translation: “When I say this to you, my Members of Parliament, I do so under the influence of one year in German history that to me has taught me more than in the whole rest of my life, how important and irreplaceable these virtues are, and how in the critical hours a single energetic man weighs more than 1000 witty weaklings!” Ibid.

distinct from those of his Republican competitors when he started his campaign in 2015. As his campaign proceeded and as Hillary Clinton became his only opponent, the rallies became livelier, and the crowd was more directly involved. By July 2016, Trump’s events often incorporated a passionate and emotionally stimulating call-and-response between Trump and his base. Whenever Donald Trump would introduce Hillary Clinton’s name into his speeches, the crowd would respond with a chant of “lock her up!” 40

The passion and excitement Trump drew from his base at political rallies can also be seen in other forms of engagement. Trump’s events were much more interactive than typical political speeches given by presidential candidates. His crowd was highly reactive and responsive to his appeals to emotion. There were often drawn-out applauses, cheers, and boos throughout the entirety of his speeches.41

Attendees of Trump’s rallies could also be riled up by witnessing the spectacle of Trump’s security detail removing protestors. During a political rally on February 23, 2016, Trump witnessed the removal of a protestor and asserted, “I’d like to pun ch him in the face.”42

The crowd was only further enthralled by Trump’s remarks towards the protestor, who remained peaceful as he was escorted by security. In other rallies, Trump assured his base that it would be acceptable for them to attack any protest ors as well.43

40 Cineas, “Donald Trump is the Accelerant . ”

41 Martin Montgomery, “Populism in Performance?: Trump on the Stump and His Audience,” Journal of Language and Politics 19, no. 5 (2020): 746.

42 Cineas, “Donald Trump is the Accelerant . ”

43 Ibid. The dynamics between Trump, the crowd, and potential protestors only made the rallies more exciting for his base, and his followers often gave way to emotional fervor.

Hitler also used his speeches to appeal to the emotions of his audience . Hitler had argued since 1924 that audiences were far more receptive to emotional appeals than rational ones, and he crafted and delivered his speeches with this in mind. 44

Another witness to Hitler’s speeches claimed that it seemed like Hitler had a psychic connection with his audience and was able to focus on and pinpoint the audience’s fears or hatred with perfection. 47

44 Frederic Spotts, Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics (New York: Overlook Press, 2003), 43 -44. He often focused little on delivering answers for concrete issues, but instead focused on how to rouse and captivate his audience. 45

45 Ibid., 46. Hitler appealed to his audience’s emotion, and he was quite successful at it. One man claimed that when witnessing Hitler speak his “critical faculty was swept away… I experienced an exaltation that could only be likened to religious conversion. I had found myself, my leader, and my cause.” 46

The settings in which Hitler gave his speeches play ed a key role in how he appealed to his base emotionally. Hitler was a man who was captivated by art and opera, and to whom Wagner was a personal hero. He understood well that speeches alone were not enough to sway his audience’s passions, but the settings in which they were delivered and the speaking style he utilized also mattered greatly. When Hitler would deliver a speech, he would often make his audience wait an extremely long time, building up the excitement and tension. He was also careful to book rooms or venues which he knew would be too small, making the event seem like it was in huge demand. When he finally gave his speeches, he would begin in a quiet tone,

46 Ibid., 44.

47 Ibid., 45.

almost too quiet for the audience to hear. As the speech bore on, he would crescendo louder and louder, until he spoke and shouted in an almost screeching pitch. And, although Hitler’s speeches are often depicted by popular media as maintaining a constant fever pitch, his speeches were much more systematic. Like a Wagnerian opera, Hitler wanted the speech to have ups and downs, believing that this would further captivate his audience. 48

Hitler drew his audience into his speeches with other aesthetic manipulations as well. Hitler took great care to involve himself in all aspects of Nazi artistry, as he understood the emotions that uniforms and flags could stimulate. Although he often borrowed or nearly copied pictures and artwork from the past for the use of his movement, he knew how to manipulate them in order to provide a greater emotional response from his base. He slightly altered the swastika and chose the colors in which it would be displayed at Nazi rallies, and many felt that the swastika banners displayed at rallies produced an effect like a burning torch.

49

The rhetoric of Hitler and Trump illustrate that they believed it was vital to their paths to power that strength was a main feature in their platform. Trump and Hitler advertised the strength of their movements in somewhat different ways. From the beginning of Hitler’s

48 Ibid., 46-47.

49 Ibid., 50-51. When Hitler applied his oratory tools and symbolism to nighttime rallies, it had an even greater effect on the senses. Historian Frederic Spotts claims that “the flickering of torches, the rolling of drums and the fanfares of trumpets drew the participants into a mystical realm in which the individual surrendered entirely.”50

50 Ibid., 52-53.

campaigning, he attached the Nazi movement to the heroism of German soldiers who fought in World War One. He also preached the need for Germans to be strong and passionate, and that these qualities were preferable to intelligence alone. Trump attempted to display his movement’s strength through the advocacy and glorification of violence. He insinuated, and even promised that he would respond violently to adverse situations. On top of that, he also beckoned his followers to act violently against his opponents. Although they both touted the strengths of their parties in somewhat different manners, Hitler and Trump both attacked the opposition as weak in an effort to show their own movement’s strength. Fu rthermore, the two leaders used their rallies to appeal to the emotions of their followers. Hitler did so by using symbolism, oratory style, and building anticipation among his viewers. Trump appealed to the emotions of his base by making his speeches interactive and engaging with the audience. His crowds responded often throughout Trump’s speeches, and this was encouraged by the speaker.

Misinformation

According to Griffin’s framework, fascism’s “affective power is rooted in irrational drives and mythical assumptions.” 51

51 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 26. Due to fascism’s reliance on irrationality, lies are naturally permitted by its followers and are therefore often used as a tool by fascist leaders.

Furthermore, Walter Laqueur notes that fascism typically relies on a profusion of propag anda,

which repeats the same lies continuously to the fascist base. 52

So long as the energy of the movement and the myth perpetuated by the leaders persists, lies are typically tolerated and accepted by fascist movements. On top of this, fascism places a charismatic leader at the center of its movement. The leader portrays himself as infallible, and this is reinforced by the leader’s charismatic qualities. Therefore, the lies of a fascist leader are rarely if ever questioned by the base of the movement.53

Trump and Hitler’s movements both relied heavily on the use of misinformation. Both leaders lied essentially from the beginning of their movements, and their anti -press position made the lies more palatable to their bases. Any bad press was a lie from outs ide agitators, according to Trump and Hitler. Trump lied at a steady rate at the beginning of his 2016 campaign, but his lies increased in frequency as his presidency went on. Hitler’s misinformation also flowed steadily from the beginning of his campaigni ng. Both men utilized certain deceptions repeatedly, making them more and more believable to their base. Furthermore, their lies were a continuation of their appeals to emotion, as the misinformation was often used by both men to rile up their followers an d to foment hate.

Trump used disinformation from the beginning of his campaigning, and as soon as he took office in 2017, he perpetuated the lie that he had in fact won the popular vote. 54

Whatever his reason may have been, Trump persisted in lying about the election results, even

52 Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, and Future, 57.

53 Francis L. Carsten, “Interpretations of Fascism,” found in Fascism, A Reader’s Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography edited by Walter Laqueur ( Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 424-425.

54 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!,” 27.

though he was the winner. Although he often lied in his press conferences or in speeches, he also used his Twitter feed to spread misinformation to his base. In March of 2017, just two months after entering the White House, Trump falsely claimed on Twitter that President Obama had spied on Trump and his campaign during the 2016 presidential election. Trump tweeted “Terrible! Just found out that Obama had my ‘wires tapped’ in Trump Tower just before the victory. Nothing found. This is McCarthyism!”55

Later that same night, Trump continued to tweet lies about Obama by claiming that Obama’s actions were on a level similar to Nixon’s Watergate scandal. According to Trump, “a good lawyer could make a great case out of the fact that Pres ident Obama was tapping my phones in October, just prior to Election!” 56

However, the FBI and NSA both confirmed that these rumors were absolutely false; but Trump never revoked his lies.57

Daniel Dale, a reporter for CNN, began monitoring Trump’s misinfo rmation from September 2016 and continued throughout Trump’s presidency. According to Dale, Trump’s lies occurred far less frequently at the beginning of his campaigning and at the beginning of his presidency than they did towards the end of his term. He c laims that Trump averaged about 2.9 lies a day in 2017, but by 2018 the lies were already up to 8.3 a day. 58

Perhaps more interesting,

55 Donald Trump, President Trump’s Tweets, 2017: A Historical Archive of President Trump’s Tweets, collected by Anthony T. Michalisko ( San Bernadino: 2020), tweeted March 4, 2017.

56 Ibid.

57 Matthew Nussbaum, "Justice Department: No Evidence Obama Wiretapped Trump Tower," Politico, September 02, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/02/obama-trumptower-wiretap-no-evidence-242284.

58 Daniel Dale, “Dale: Reflections on Four Weird Years Fact Checking Every Word from Donald Trump,” CNN, January 19, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/19/politics/fact-check-danieldale-reflections-fact-checking-trump/index.html.

however, is that in 2018 Trump’s misinformation went from an ad -lib style to more scripted and targeted. According to Dale, scripted lies became a key strategy for Trump in the 2018 midterm elections, for defending his actions in his first impeachment, and for misleading the public during his COVID-19 briefings.59

Although Trump began to have a “greatest hits” of lies by t he end of his presidency, I would like to focus directly on the lies he touted during the COVID-19 pandemic. The misinformation Trump spread throughout the pandemic was not only repeated often by the president, but he even held briefings so he could spread the lies daily. One of the deceptions that Trump repeated often during the COVID briefings was that America was doing better than other countries in keeping its citizens healthy and alive. 60

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid. When Trump claimed in October 2020 that America was better off than Europe in terms of COVID cases, this was entirely false. America had more cases and deaths in proportion to its population than all of Europe except just Spain and Belgium.61

61 Ibid. Trump continued to lie about the state of the pandemic during his 2020 campai gn. As noted earlier, by 2020 Trump was lying far more often and was repeating the same lies over and over. One falsehood that Trump relied on throughout his 2020 campaign was that the only reason there were so many COVID cases in America was because Ameri ca was performing so many tests. Although it is true that America was performing many COVID tests late in 2020, the increase in hospitalizations shows that the test results were accurate in depicting the severity

of the pandemic in America. 62

Trump also repeated the lie that scientists claimed 2.2 million Americans were projected to die from COVID, and therefore his administration was handling the pandemic admirably. Trump used this study to make it seem as though the 2.2 million deaths was a given, but this is inaccurate. The estimation was intended to show the number of Americans that would die if the Trump administration took absolutely no restrictive and preventative measures. In other words, 2.2 million American deaths was the absolute worstcase scenario.63

Hitler relied on misinformation from the beginning of his campaigning until the end of his life. As German historian Benjamin Carter Hett puts it, “Hitler lied all the time.” 64

Hitler’s Mein Kampf, released in 1925, argue d that international Jewry instigated the munitions strike in 1918. He further claim ed that this strike was the beginning of Germany’s

62 Daniel Dale, "Fact-checking Trump's Massively Dishonest Weekend: The President Made at Least 66 False or Misleading Claims in Three Days," CNN, October 21, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/19/politics/fact-check-trump-dishonest-weekend-floridamichigan-georgia-wisconsin/index.html).

63 Ibid.

64 Hett, The Death of Democracy, 38. Although Trump and Hitler both relied on disinformation throughout their political careers, Hitler used targeted and repeated lies from the beginning of his political career. A lie that Hitler propagated from 1918 throughout the rest of his life is the idea that the German military lost the First World War only because of diss ent from within the army and on the home front by liberals and Jews.

downfall in the First World War, as it deteriorated the morale of the German soldiers. 65

When Hitler cited the guilt of the “November Criminals” in 1933, he had a more defined

65 Adolf Hitler and James Vincent Murphy, Mein Kampf Unexpurgated ed . (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1981), 290. He also argued that the German soldiers who fought in the war were courageous heroes, who willingly volunteered to fight on the front lines. On the other hand, Jews, according to Hitler, would shirk any possibility of open combat, as their desire for self-preservation outweighed their nationalism. 66

66 Ibid., 288-289. Hitler believed that these factors led to the German military’s demise in World War One. The “stab in the back” theory, which was first spread by Paul von Hindenburg, became key misinformation for Hitler. 67

67 Hett, The Death of Democracy , 38. This lie touched on many aspects that proved advantageous to the Nazi movement. It fomented German hatred of the Left and of German Jews, and it fueled the belief that Germany should have won the war. It supported Hitler’s argument that leftist parties should have no position in the ruling of Germany.

As Hitler continued his political career following his imprisonment and wri ting of Mein Kampf, he continued to claim that the “November Criminals” were to be blamed for Germany’s loss of the war. He claimed : “Im November 1918 rissen marxistische Organisationen durch eine Revolution die vollziehende Gewalt an sich… Die moralische Legitimierung suchten sie in der Behauptung, Deutschland bzw. seine Regierung trugen die Schuld am Ausbruch des Krieges.” 68

68 Translation: “In November 1918 the Marxist organizations took over through a revolution and seized the executive power. They sought moral justification in the assertion that Germany and its government carried the guilt for the outbreak of the war.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1, 229.

concept of what their crimes were than he did in 1924. He claimed that they not only s owed discontent and destroyed soldier morale by striking in 1918, but they also were traitors due to the treaty they signed to end the war.

Both Hitler’s and Trump’s use of misinformation is part of their targeted appeals to emotions. Their lies, whether it be Trump’s claims that Obama had spied on his campaign, or Hitler’s attacks on the “November Criminals,” often intended to produce hatred of the opposition. Furthermore, lies had always been an intentional compon ent of Hitler’s campaigning, and he said so from the beginning. Hitler claimed that people were more easily persuaded by appeals to emotion rather than to their intellect, and this made it even more appealing to sensationalize stories or to outright lie.

69

Although there is no record of Trump making similar claims about lying as a strong campaign strategy, it appears that by 2020 he strongly believed this to be true. His lies flowed

69 Hett, The Death of Democracy, 40. He even argued that if one were to lie, they should tell a large lie. Hitler argued in Mein Kampf that “in the primitive simplicity of their minds, they more readily fall victim to the big lie than the small lie, since they themselves sometimes lie about small things but would be too ashamed of lies that were too big.” 70

70 Hitler, Mein Kampf, 231. On top of this, Hitler used the “big lies” to provoke anger and hatred from his base towards his opponents. Hitler argued that ideological platforms and concepts were not the way to build a movement. He asserted “comprehension is a shaky platform for the masses. The only stable emotion is hate.” 71

71 Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London: Longman, 1991), 51.

profusely by the end of his campaign, and the manner in which he repeated th e same lies again and again alludes to his belief that lying could lead to his reelection. Furthermore, his misinformation continued to sow discontent and anger among his base, which is evidenced in their storming of the United States Capitol on January 6, 2021. Trump may not have come out and directly stated that lies were key to his campaigning, but it is clear that this is so.

With the number of lies told by both Hitler and Trump, it leads one to question: why did their base believe the lies? Or, even, did their followers actually believe the misinformation?

Trump fact-checker Daniel Dale argues that his interviews with Trump’s base in 2017 were extremely telling. Dale claims that when he pointed out Trump’s lies to his supporters and questioned if they knew Trump had been lying, some said they did not realize he had not been truthful. However, what is more interesting is Dale’s statement that many of them were aware of his reliance on misinformation but seemed not to care. According to Dale, they asserte d that they “liked the lying because it was agitating Washington insiders.” 72

Dale also notes that it was quite telling that the Trump administration never attempted to rebuff his fact checks, which were claiming that the President had been incessantly lying for years. Dale claims that the only action the Trump administration took against him was to block him on Twitter. This alludes to two key factors when it comes to Trump’s misinformation tactics: the Trump administration was clearly not ashamed of his lying nor were they overtly concerned with being caught in his lies; and perhaps more important for understanding the effect of Trump’s lying to his base, it means that Dale’s corrections of the President were either

72 Dale, “Dale: Reflections on Four Weird Years .”

not reaching Trump’s base or they just did not care about the lies. Trump’s misinformation largely went unchallenged and were amplified by social media platforms and right-wing news outlets, and Dale’s fact checking of the President went largely unnoticed by Trump’s base. Hitler’s lies were often accepted by his followers because he relied on the emotional state of Germany following their loss in the First World War, and he strategically deployed hateful lies in repetition.73

73 Hett, The Death of Democracy, 40. Furthermore, following the First World War, there was a much greater reception to the ideas from a cult of irrationality. While philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and psychologist Sigmund Freud helped fuel ideas of human irrationality through their works, World War One had a profound effect on making these ideas palatable to 1920s and 1930s Germans. 74

74 Ibid., 195. The massive number of casualties was extremely difficult for Germans to swallow, and it was challenging for many to make sense of the Great War.75

Both Trump and Hitler relied on lies and misinformation throughout their campaigns and throughout their time in power. Hitler’s claims were targeted and precise, and he used the same repeated lies, such as his attack on the “November Criminals,” throughout his political

75 Ibid., 195-96. The acceptability of concepts of irrationality by Germans combined with Hit ler’s acting proficiency, oratory skills, and inclination for lying made it much easier for Germans to willingly accept the misinformation that Hitler and the Nazi propaganda machine spread. So even though Hitler’s lies were often plainly false and could be easily debunked, his claims stuck in the minds of many Germans. 76

76 Ibid., 198-99.

career. Trump’s lies, conversely, began in an ad -libbed fashion. As his presidency continued, he began to rely on the repetition of certain lies and hoped that they would deliver him wins in the midterm elections, during COVID-19 briefings, and during his two impeachments. Although the lies of both men could be easily exposed, this was not of grave importance to either Trump or Hitler’s movements. Fascist ideology’s cult of i rrationality enabled them to utilize deception more often and effectively than a liberal politician could. 77

Some of Trump’s base did not know he was lying, but many did and were not overly concerned about the misinformation.

Furthermore, the work done by fact checkers like Daniel Dale often landed on deaf ears, as the right-wing news outlets did little to stop the propagation of Trump’s deceit. The power in the cult of irrationality in 1920s and 1930s Germany was strong enough to make Hitler’s lying more acceptable to German citizens. He utilized his great acting and speaking skills to spread hateful lies, and his base devoured them.

Populism and Anti-Intellectualism

Roger Griffin’s framework of fascism claims that the core of fascism is populist ultranationalism. 78

To define a movement as fascist, there must be a populist component present. 79

77 Griffin, Nature of Fascism, 26.

78 Ibid., 37.

79 This work focuses on the fascist style of populism, but it is worth noting that populism has many variations. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser point out that populism consists of three main concepts : the people, the elites, and the general will. This gives the ideology a malleability that makes it suitable to both right -wing and left-wing politics.

See Elena Negrea-Busuioc, “Populism: A Very Short Introduction ,” Central European Journal of Communication 12, no. 2 (March 2, 2019): 264– 66.

There are appeals to populist id eals in both Hitler’s and Trump’s rhetoric which both of their bases found appealing. Similar to his comments about the broken system discussed above,

Trump’s populist message often focused on “draining the swamp” of the elite politicians and replacing them with leaders who cared about the plight of the common man. Furthermore, Trump steered away from overly intellectual speeches and maintained a folksy approach in how he spoke to his audience.

Hitler also relied on a populist message, and the bulk of his populism focused on the anger many Germans felt from the loss of World War One and due to the economic crises in the 1920s and 1930s. Hitler also focused many of his speeches on the need to strengthen the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community), which was clearly a populist message. Also, the racist and xenophobic rhetoric of both Hitler and Trump can be seen as populist in spirit. To Hitler, German and non-German Jews were somehow both the Jewish financiers who hurt the everyday German farmer, and they were also the Bolshevists that were going to bring Germany to its demise. For Trump, “illegal” immigrants were leeching off the American taxpayers and were taking jobs from hard-working Americans. For both Hitler and Trump, the populist message was key to gaining support and mobilization from the masses.

Trump’s attack on the “System” was a populist message to his base, and it was a message that they found to be engaging. As discussed earlier, Trump argued that he was not a part of the broken system of America n government, which gave him the best opportunity to fix its issues. Furthermore, not only was he outside of the broken system, but his opponent was a key and longtime cog in the machine. The component of this argument from Trump that makes

it a strong populist message to his base was that he was offering to dismantle elitist politics in order to help the common American citizen. He often remarked, especially when discussing Hillary Clinton, that it was “time for rule by the people, not by the special inter ests.”80

80 “Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin," Politico. His populist message relied on the notion that the American people had lost their power and say to the elitist politicians and lobbyists. He further argued that “we are going to make this government of the people once again. This is our chance to take back power from all the people who’ve taken it from you.”81

81 Ibid. Trump would also use the proclaimed elitism of his opponent to argue that she was against the common working American, while Trump of course supported them. He would often make these comments in short jabs, like his previously mentioned claim that “just like Hillary Clinton is against the miners, she is against the police.” 82

82 Ibid. According to Trump, Clinton and her elitist position kept her from supporting the workers, whereas Trump’s position outside of the system made him answerable to only the American people.

The way Trump spoke to his base can also be seen as an effort to maintain a populist movement. Trump was careful to present his speeches in a way that was not overly intellectual or elitist. He often kept his messages short and simple and would repeat short phrases multiple times for effect. When he would claim something that was self -evident, such as “winners are winners,” he would still list those who he believed to be winners. As Martin Montgomery puts it, his short and repetitive sentence structure relied on a sort of “vernacular folksiness.” 83

83 Martin Montgomery, 2020, “Populism in Performance?: Trump on the Stump and His Audience,” Journal of Language & Politics 19 (5): 748.

Hitler’s speeches often focused on the need for Germany to move towards a community-driven country, which would focus more on the needs of everyday Germans instead of the elite. Similar to Trump, Hitler’s outsider status was key for his argument that the system was not beneficial to the working class. Often, Hitler kept his points about preserving the Volksgemeinschaft simple and straightforward. He would argue that “Unser Rechtwesen muss in erste Linie der Erhaltung dieser Volksgemeinschaft dienen. ” 84

Hitler argued that not only would he and the Nazi party shape laws to be community driven, but that the laws of the Weimar Republic were not helpful to the German citizen. In other claims, he was more direct about the need of the economy to help the German citizen instead of the elitists. He claimed that “all action shall be governed by one law: the Volk does not live for the economy, and the economy does not exist for capital, but capital serves the economy , and the economy serves the Volk! 85

He made a similar argument during his 1924 trial for his attempted putsch, claiming that “the state, however, is not an economic organization. It is a ‘volkic’ organization.” 86

Trump and Hitler propagated another similar populist message, and it harnessed the racism and xenophobia within their bases. From the beginning of Trump’s campaigning in 2015,

84 Translation: “Our laws must primarily serve in the preservation of the national community.” Hitler, Reden und Proklamationen vol. 1, 237.

85 “Hitler Speech on Enabling Act , ” World Future Fund, http://www.worldfuturefund.org/Reports2013/hitlerenablingact.h tm

86 “Hitler Speech at Munich Trial 1924 Excerpts,” World Future Fund . The populist message that Hitler wished to present to his base was put the Nazi party in charge of Germany, and they will shape the laws and economy in a way that is beneficial to the workers, not the elite.

he used fearmongering to argue that other countries were coming after America. But there was also a populist element in his racist claims. Although Trump often focused on the crime that would accompany illegal immigrants, he also argued that immigration was hurting America by taking valuable jobs away from working -class America. As noted above, Trump argued “most illegal immigrants are lower skilled workers with less education, who compete directly against vulnerable American workers, and that these illegal workers draw much more out from the system than they can ever possibly pay back.”87

Trump argues that not only are illegal immigrants making it difficult for Americans to find work, but they are also leeching off the American taxpayer through welfare programs. Both claims offer a populist message, with a racist element, which argues that the structure of American society places the common American worker’s status below illegal immigrants.

Hitler was especially proficient at reaching toward the anger felt by the German working class and giving it a focused message.88

There were multiple paths Hitler could take, and did take, to prey on the frustration of the German people. Germans were angry about losing the war and were disenchanted with politicians, they were fearful and weary of a potential Bolshevik uprising, and they were affected by the multiple economic crises that occurred in Germany from the 1920s through the 1930s. 89

Due to working -class disenchantment of German politicians, anti-elitist messaging became more engaging to Germans following the First World War. The Nazis were the party most apt at recruiting the populist Germans for several reasons.

87 “Trump’s Immigration Speech,” The New York Times.

88 Kershaw, Hitler, 50.

89 Hett, The Death of Democracy, 104-105.

While it seems the SPD’s message could pull in the anti-elitist working class, their ties to Bolshevism, although often exaggerated by the right, made them less appealing to populist Germans. The German Nationalist party was able to absorb some of the populist voters initially, but their elitist makeup made it difficult to maintain their support. 90

90 Ibid., 104. The Nazis, however, were able to absorb and hold onto the populist working-class Germans. They were able to do so because many Nazis fought in the war, they were anti-Bolshevist, and most Nazi leaders came from a moderate background, which made them more appealing to the anti-elite voters.91

Hitler steered an angry population toward anti-Semitism. One component that made racism such a powerful tool in Hitler’s populist messaging was how he made anti-Semitism malleable. According to Hitler, Jews could somehow be both the symbol of international finance and of Bolshevism. Therefore, Hitler could argue that the Jewish population in Germany was hurting both the everyday farmer by owning the banks and, they could also bring an end to Germany through a Bolshevist uprising. 92

91 Ibid., 104-105.

92 Ibid., 72. Furthermore, Hitler’s racist messaging became so profuse and was absorbed by such a strong component of the German right that anti-Semitic dog whistles were often a component of his speeches. He could claim that international financiers were an enemy to the German people, and Hitler’s base understood that he was referring to German Jews. 93

93 Ibid., 73.

One crucial caveat to both Hitler and Trump’s populist messaging is that neither leader followed through on their promises . Trump’s tax cut, which was one of the few major policy moves of his administration, was a corporate tax break that helped the rich and did little for poor and working-class Americans.94

Hitler was also elitist at heart, even if he offered a populist message to his base. By the time he was Chancellor, he had secured millionaire status thanks to the sales of Mein Kampf. After the death of Hindenburg, Hitler lived an especially lavish life that was a direct contradictory to his anti-elitist rhetoric. He had magnificent apartments, traveled via a private train with eleven coaches for his entire entourage, and had no qualms about using public funds to support his new lifestyle. 95

Donald Trump and Adolf Hitler effectively used populist rhetoric to build and fortify their bases. Both men relied on populism that attacked an elite system, claimi ng that elitist politicians would never take care of the working class. Furthermore, both Hitler and Trump also relied on rhetoric that fueled racism and xenophobia in a populist style. Trump used racist dog

94 Scott Horsley, “After 2 Years, Trump Tax Cuts Have Failed to Deliver on GOP's Promises, ” NPR, December 20, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/12/20/789540931/2-years-later-trumptax-cuts-have-failed-to-deliver-on-gops-promises).

95 Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-19 36 Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 536 - 37.

But, according to Stanley G. Payne, offering a populist message while remaining el itist at heart is a typical component of fascism. Payne’s description of fascism shows that because the movement’s leadership requires a cult of personality, fascist is populist solely in rhetoric and elitist at heart. 96 96 Payne, A History of Fascism, 14. Therefore, we can make sense of both Trump and Hitler’s elitist lifestyles, even though they both preached populist messages.

whistles of illegal immigrants stealing American jobs to grow his number of followers, while Hitler relied on a malleable form of anti-Semitism to fortify his base. Even though Trump and Hitler both remained elitist at heart, their populist message was key in securing a strong and energetic base, who fe lt like they had been disregarded by their respective governments. Hitler and Trump also relied on rhetoric that argued people needed protection from leftist policies, and that law and order was key in maintaining a proper society. The rhet oric of both leaders also relied on the argument that their movements were stronger than those of their weak counterparts. Trump’s speeches attempted to show strength through threatening and condoning violence, while Hitler’s showed strength by connecting his movement to the glory of German soldiers. Furthermore, both movements appealed to the emotion of their bases in the way they crafted their speeches. This reliance on proving the virility of their movements is another typical component of fascism, accor ding to Griffin. Hitler and Trump also lied profusely to their bases. Trump’s lies began as an ad -libbed component to his speeches but became directed and predictable toward the end of his term in 2020. Hitler’s misinformation was direct from the beginning , which is evidenced by his reliance on the “stab in the back” myth. Finally, both Hitler and Trump relied on populist rhetoric in their speeches. Their populism stemmed from anti-elitist rhetoric, which was used to steer the people away from current politicians and towards their own movements. The racism both leaders relied on was also inherently populist. Both Hitler and Trump claimed that outsiders were hurting the working class, and that their governments had forgotten them .

CHAPTER FOUR

HOW FASCISTS GAIN POWER

This chapter will be investigating the paths Adolf Hitler and Donald Trump took to seize power over their respective governments, beginning with a brief discussion that examines the differences between the Weimar Republic and the Ameri can government. Following this examination, the chapter will assess key similarities and differences in how Trump and Hitler both achieved power. This section aims to illustrate the ways fascist leaders can take control of their government and the ways bot h politicians and voters can play a role in relinquishing power to fascist movements. Furthermore, this chapter primarily utilizes secondary sources to describe the way Trump and Hitler came to power.

The dissimilarities examined in this chapter will include discussions on how the Weimar Republic’s parliamentary style of democracy provided fringe groups far too much power in the legislative Reichstag , while the American style of politics has become dependent on a two-party system of presidential elections. Another difference that will be discussed is the disparity in age of the two governments: when Hitler took power, the Weimar Republic was only fifteen years old; when Trump took office, the American democracy had already survived for well over 200 years. While the age of each republic is important, the cynicism Germans felt created a very different political landscape in 1920s and 1930s Germany than in 2016 America. On top of the

disparities listed abov e, this chapter will also consider the economy of the Weimar Republic versus the American economy before Trump became president.

Although there were multiple dissimilarities in the structure of the Weimar Republic versus the American government, there ar e nevertheless parallels in how Trump and Hitler came to power. A key component of their rise to command was the willingness of the establishment political right to join or at the least not obstruct their movements. Another crucial component in their paths to power was conservatives’ fear of leftist politics. This angst was felt by both conservative politicians and voters alike. Furthermore, both Trump and Hitler benefited from a division within the leftist parties in their respective governments. For Hitle r, this division was more prominent. For Trump, the divide was smaller, but nevertheless played a key role in his election. Although the differences in government structures show that fascists come to power through multiple styles of government, the simil arities suggest that fascists gain control through similar methods.

The Weimar Republic: Basic Structure

The Weimar Republic began on November 9th, 1918, when Phillip Schiedemann declared the end of the monarchy and the beginning of a German republic. 1

After deliberation among the German statesmen, the German leaders decided that the Weimar Republic would consist of a president that was elected every seven years by the German people, a Chancellor who would

1 William Carr, A History of Germany: 1815 -1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 240.

be installed by the President, and two represen tative legislative branches, the Reichstag and the less powerful Reichsrat. 2

Both Weimar Germany and the United States had systems with democratically elected presidencies and representative legislative bodies . However, the role of Chancellor in the Weimar Republic is one crucial difference. The Chancellor oversaw the legislative branches and was also directly installed by the president of the Weimar Republic. Typically, the Chancellor was chosen from the leading party in the Reichstag, but this was not always the case and was not necessary. Franz von Papen, a member of the Center party, was appointed Chancellor even though his party only made up about 10 percent of the legislative body. 3

Another critical difference between the Weimar Republic and the Ame rican government is the inclusion of Article 48 in the Weimar constitution. The infamous article gave the president emergency powers which could be used to gain dictatorial control over the German government. The article was intended to be a safeguard agai nst legislative deadlock but was instead overused and abused by the presidency towards the end of the Weimar Republic. 4

While it is easy to question this article with the benefit of hindsight, there was a good deal of sense behind the idea. Germany had ju st recently lost World War One, and the discontent on the home front was extremely high. Multiple riots and attempted coups occurred following the war, and the framers of the constitution feared that a slow -moving legislative body would not

2 Ibid., 254-255.

3 Ibid., 290.

4 Benjamin Carter Hett, The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power (London: William Heinemann, 2019), 26.

be able to address emergency situations effectively and efficiently. However, Article 48 facilitated undemocratic tendencies within the Weimar Republic, and would be essential in Hitler’s takeover.5

Willingness from the Establishment Conservatives

While it is true that both Hitler and Trump came to power in free elections, they did not achieve it on their own. Both men required support from the conservative political establishment that already existed, even though in both cases it took time for them to garner aid from their fellow politicians. Nevertheless, both Hitler and Trump eventually received help from right-wing politicians. According to Stanley G. Payne, fascist movements almost always require aid from establishment conservatives to gain power. 6

Francis L. Carsten echoes this sentiment in their research by claiming that “National Socialism, like other fascist movements, could only reach power in alliance with the traditional Right.” 7

In Gerany, a small handful of powerful politicians with access to the President’s ear helped install Hitler as Chancellor, believing that they would be able to manipulate him and gain his party’s support. For Trump, leaders of the Republican Party decided it was bet ter that Trump win as a Republican than for

5 Ibid. Article 48 is a critical difference between the Weimar Republic and the American democracy, as there is no dictatorial clause similar in the American constitution.

6 Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 201.

7 Francis L. Carsten, “Interpretations of Fascism,” found in Fascism, A Reader’s Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography , edited by Walter Laqueur (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 427.

Hillary Clinton, a Democrat, to become president. They viewed Trump as a means to an end in appointing justices to federal positions, and they maintained that any bad opinions about Trump should be held privately. The support of the political right for these men, or even the lack of opposition, proved to be key to Trump’s and Hitler’s victories.

Hitler and the Nazi Party were very unlike the established right -wing politicians and President von Hindenburg. The ma jority of the Nazis came from the middle or lower classes, while the conservative establishment in the German Nationalist People’s Party (German Nationalists, or DNVP) consisted mostly of citizens from the higher echelon. Furthermore, Hindenburg was a national war hero, who many viewed as a unifying factor in German society. 8

On top of this, the established right -wing of German politicians viewed the Nazis, and especially Hitler, with contempt. Hindenburg often referred to Hitler as the “Bohemian Corporal, ” and jeered at his lower ranking during the First World War. 9

Even though the DNVP distrusted and disliked Hitler, it became evident that they would need the Nazi party to form a functioning government. As the Nazi Party’s representation in the Reichstag grew in 1932, multiple leaders began viewing Hitler as a potential political piece, and one they could hopefully manipulate. Chancellors Kurt von Schleicher, Franz von Papen, and German Nationalist leader Alfred Hugenburg all viewed Hitler as a tool that could acquire more

8 Hett, Death of Democracy, 11-12.

9 Bert Hoppe, "Von Schleicher zu Hitler. Dokumente zum Konflikt zwischen dem Reichslandbund und der Regierung Schleicher in den Letzten Wochen der Weimarer Republik," Vierteljahrs hefte für Zeitgeschichte 45, no. 4 (1997): 642.

support for their own parties. 10

However, Hitler maintained an all-or-nothing approach to politics, and he claimed that he would only form a coalition with the German Nationalists if he were appointed Chancellor. Vice Chancellor was absolutely off the table.

11

Gaining the support of President von Hindenburg was not simple for Hitler, as the German president was not particularly fond of him. Political insider Franz von Papen and the president’s son Oskar von Hindenburg played key roles in pushing the president to support the installment of Hitler as German Chancellor. Papen, who wanted revenge against Schleicher for taking the position of Chancellor away from him, convinced President Hindenburg that he should install Hitler as Chancellor with Papen as his Vice Chancellor. Oskar von Hindeburg aided Papen in this, as he believed that Papen and a mostly non-Nazi cabinet would be able to control Hitler.12

11 Hett, Death of Democracy, 116. Therefore, in order to form a coalition with the German Nationalists , Hitler required the approval of President von Hindenburg.

12 Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 112. Papen even foolishly claimed that “in a few months, we’ll have pushed him [Hitler] so far into the corner that he will squeak.” 13

13 Hett, Death of Democracy, 5. Papen and Oskar von Hindenburg further argued that any positive outcomes from a Hitler-led government could be attributed to Hindenburg while any negative outcomes could be blamed on Hitler and the Nazis. 14

14 Ibid., 4. Once Papen had finally convinced President Hindenburg to give Hitler a more powerful position in the government,

10 Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (New Jersey: Castle Books, 2003), 68-69.

Hindenburg appointed Hitler as the German Chancellor in January 1933 15

It is worth noting that the highest number of votes the Nazi Party earned in a free election was 37 percent in July 1932. While this was the greatest number of seats given in that election, it was still not enough for a simple majority of the Reichstag. The Nazi Party’s popularity was also affected by the German economy, as German citizens were more receptive to extremist ideals when they were suffering economic hardships. 17

Therefore, as the 1932 economy slowly rebounded from the effects of the Great Depression, the Nazi Party actually lost seats between July and November, going from 37 percent to 33 percent. 18

15 Ibid., 208. Papen, President Hindenburg, and Oskar von Hindenburg had all grossly underestimated Hitler. Less than two months after becoming Chancellor, Hitler and the German Nationalists passed the Enabling Act, essentially giving Hitler dictatorial control over Germany. 16

16 Ibid., 201.

17 Carr, A History of Germany, 270-271.

18 Ibid., 302. Their vote total had decreased by nearly 2,000,000 in just four months. The economy played a massive role in the Nazi Party’s electorate, and the economy would continue to bounce bac k throughout 1933.

Although it is speculative, it can be argued that if right -wing politicians like Papen and President von Hindenburg had not installed Hitler as Chancellor in January 1933, then the Nazi Party may have continued hemorrhaging votes. Withou t the support of the German Nationalists and Hindenburg, Hitler would never have been able to take control of the Weimar Republic. The Nazi Party never had the majority, and as the economy was rebounding, they were running out

of time to seize power. Had t he right wing resisted Hitler longer, it is plausible that Hitler and the Nazi Party would have run out of steam.

For Trump to be elected as the 45 th United States President, he also required the backing of established right-wing politicians. Initially, many establishment Republicans attacked Donald Trump vehemently, arguing that he would lead to the demise of the Republican Party. Eventual Trump confidant Lindsey Graham stood proudly against Trump before it was clear that he would win his party’s nominati on. When Graham was still campaigning for president in 2015, he called Trump a “race -baiting, xenophobic, religious bigot.” 19

But even though Graham had his qualms about Trump, he still refused to entertain the idea of endorsing or supporting Hillary Clinton, the only person with a realistic chance of beating Trump in the 2016 election. In February of 2016, he admitted that if Trump won the party’s nomination, he would be forced to support him. He claimed “I’ve got a ticket on the Titanic. So, I am like on the team that bought a ticket on the Titanic . This is what happens if you nominate Trump.” 20

Graham believed that party loyalty was more important than protecting the future of the country.

Graham was not the only prominent Republican who put party over c ountry. As the news of Russian interference in the 2016 election began to surface, Republicans fervently denied the claim and argued that it was no more than a Democratic political stunt. 2016

19 Dana Bash, “Lindsey Graham Won’t Vote for Trump or Clinton in 2016,” CNN, May 6, 2016, https://www.cnn.com/2016/05/06/politics/lindsey-graham-donald-trump-hillary-clinton-notvote/index.html.

20 Paul Kane, “Peak Lindsey Graham: Trump Is a 'nut Job,' 'loser as a Person' and 'ill-suited' to Be President,” The Washington Post , April 29, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/02/25/peak-lindsey-grahamtrump-is-a-nut-job-loser-as-a-person-and-ill-suited-to-be-president/.

Speaker of the House Paul Ryan warned his fellow conservatives that it was imperative that any conversations regarding Russian interference be kept “in the family , ” as he did not want any political fallout for the Republican Party. 21

21 Timothy Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America (New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2018), 257. Ryan also received aid from Senate Republicans in defending Trump against claims of Russian interference. Senate leader Mitch McConnell argued that any correspondence that claimed Russia was involving itself in United States elections was merely a political ploy from the Democratic party. 22

22 Ibid., 258. Even after McConnell was briefed by the CIA that Russians were absolutely interfering with the presidential election, he continued to publicly express his doubts, fearing that his acceptance of Russian interference would aid the Clinton campaign. The cyberattacks from Russia increased in frequency after McConnell’s denial, as the hyper partisanship in American politics left the country susceptible to misinformation. 23

Similar to how Franz von Papen and Paul von Hindenburg viewed Hitler as a potential political tool, establishment Republicans like Paul Rya n and Mitch McConnell saw Trump as a means to an end. Even if they did not approve of him, or even if they downright did not like him, a Trump presidency combined with a Republican House and Senate meant that Republicans could push their agenda for the fir st time in eight years. Paul Rya n was candid about his excitement to dismantle Obamacare, which required a Republican in the White House in order to do so. He claimed that “t his is a monumental, exciting conservative reform. I’ve

23 Ibid.

been working on this for t wenty years. This is exciting. This is what we’ve been dreaming about doing. ” 24

A Republican in the White House, no matter who it was, was vital to Ryan’s agenda. McConnell also understood that the only path to achieving his goals was with a Republican president. When Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia died in 2016, McConnell made it clear to Obama and the Democratic Party that he was willing to bar Obama from fulfilling his presidential duties in order to keep the position vacated for the next president. McConnell’s move was atypical, but he understood that it was useless if a Democrat won the presidency in 2016. Therefore, he was also willing to back Trump in the 2016 elections. 25

Trump, like Hitler, needed the support of established conservatives to wi n the White House. 2016 conservatives prioritized the Republican P arty over the state of their country, as they saw a Republican president as their only opportunity at pursuing their agenda.

Furthermore, while some were openly against Donald Trump at the beginning of his candidacy, once it became clear to them that he would be the frontrunner they b ack peddled their comments and supported him instead. Similar to the eventual support for Hitler from Papen and Hindenburg, senators like Lindsey Graham and Mitch McConnell eventually supported Donald Trump’s candidacy, even if it was half -hearted. The Republican Party also backed Donald Trump with hyper partisanship through what they did not say: Russian bots were interfering with the 2016 election. On top of this, many American conservatives held the same

24 John Kenneth White, “Donald Trump and the Republican Party: The Making of a Faustian Bargain,” Red Fame: Studies in Media and Communication 5, no. 2 (December 2017), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/228084351.pdf: 14-15.

25 Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, 257.

notion that Papen did in 1932 and hoped that they would be able to control Trump once he was in office. Many Republican leaders echoed former Texas governor Rick Perry ’s sentiment, who believed that Trump was “not a perfect man. But what I do believe is that he loves this country, and he will surround himself with capable, experienced people and he will listen to them . ” 26

Like Papen, Perry and his fellow conservatives believed that establishment Republicans would be able to control and guide a Trump Presidency. Like Papen, they were wrong.

Fear/Hatred of the Left

While it is true that both Hitler and Trump benefited from the willingness of conservative politicians to relinquish power to them, they also profited from a fear of their countries moving too far to the left. According to Francis L. Carsten, the support Trump and Hitler gained through their willingness to attack the Left is a common factor in how fascists typically gain power.

For Germany, the fear of the Left was due to the recent Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, just one year before the end o f World War One. Hitler and the Nazi Party benefited from this, as many saw them as a preferrable alternative to the German Communist Party (KPD) , and even a possible communist deterrent. Trump benefited from a fear that stemmed mostly from white Americans , that if the presidency was in the hands of the Democratic Party for another four years, the so -called “American way of life” might be forever lost. The fear that German citizens felt of the communists and that American conservatives felt

26 Bash, “Lindsey Graham Won’t Vote for Trump or Clinton in 2016. ”

27 Carsten, “Interpretations of Fascism,” 427.

for a potential Hillary Clinton administration helped Hitler and Trump seize control of their governments.

When the Bolshevik Revolution occurred in October 1917, the reverberations were felt throughout Europe, as many leaders feared a revolution could occur in their own country. Moreover, after the loss of the First World War and due to its proximity to Russia, Germany was especially vulnerable to communist dogma. Furthermore, the economic crises that Germany sustained from the beginning of the 1920s throughout the early 1930s often led to fringe votes, both for the Nazis and also for the German Communist Party. So, the fear that many conservative and elite politicians felt of a possible communist revolution in Germany was not necessarily unfounded.28

The increase of German Communist Party representation in the Reichstag following the 1932 elections only fueled Germans’ fear of Bolshevism. The anxiety felt by some German citizens and politicians alike only helped the Nazi Party, as they were seen as the natural counter of the KPD. The established politicians were so weary of a potential uprising, that in 1932 Chancellor Franz von Papen lifted the ban on the Sturmabteilung (SA) , Hitler’s paramilitary. The lift was enacted by Papen as a defense against potential Communist uprisings, as the Nazis had no qualms with enacting violence against the Marxists.

29

The fear of a Communist revolution went further than allowing Hitler his paramilitary, which was already a dangerous move on its own. When Kurt von Schleicher was the Chancellor,

28 Hett, Death of Democracy, 167.

29 Dirk Blasius, Weimars Ende: Bürgerkrieg und Politik 1930 – 1933 (Göttingen Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005), 270.

he understood that the Nazi Party was losing steam after the November 1932 Reichstag elections. However, he still wanted to give them more representative power in the Reichstag because he feared if the Nazi Party crumbled than the newly politically homeless would migrate to the Communist Party. Schleicher viewed the Nazis as such a preferrable option to the German Communist Party that he was willing to give them power before they faltered.

Like Hitler, Trump also benefited from the fear conservatives felt for a potential continuation of a Democratic presidency. Many establishment Republicans were willing to back Trump and keep Hillary Clinton out of the White House, even if he did not have the same agenda as them. The fear establishment Republicans had of a potential Clinton administration outweighed their many policy differences with Trump.31

While some conservative voters were publicly against Trump before he won the Republican nomination, and many Republicans were against Trump before he was the clear front-runner for their party, they eventually came to support him. When Trump gave a speech that preached for economic nationalism and against free-trade deals like NAFTA, his ideals were contrary to the Republican dogma that had existed since Reagan was president.

32

But Trump did not only receive applause from the voters in the audience. Speaker of the House Paul Ryan also cheered for Trump following his remarks. 33

30 Hett, Death of Democracy, 167.

31 Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, 257.

32 White, "Donald Trump and the Republican Party ,” 10.

33 Ibid., 12. The ease in which Ryan moved from a policy that had been a Republican cornerstone for years to

accepting Trump’s economic nationalism shows that the party was willing to do whatever was necessary in order to keep Hil lary Clinton from the presidency.

American conservative voters felt a similar angst that made it easier for them to accept a Trump presidency, even if they did not appreciat e his style of politics from the beginning of the Republican primaries. Many felt that if they did not keep Hil lary Clinton out of the White House and the Democrats maintained control for what would have been twelve continuous years, the “American way of l ife” would come to an end.34

Conservative media only fueled this paranoia, with dubious fortune telling from the likes of Tucker Carlson and Sean Hannity. After a tirade of fearmongering, claiming that the Obama era had brought America to the brink of extinction, Hannity finished by claiming that “America lives or dies in thirty -nine days [2016 election day].”35

Conservative talk-show hosts that argued the “good ole days” of American life were coming to an end helped build enthusiasm for weary conservative voters to support Trump. With the way the conservative media framed it, it was either take a chance on Trump, or lose your country to Hillary Clinton and the Democrats. 36

While it is true that conservative leadership underestimated both Trump and Hitler and believed that they could control them, leading conservatives were also afraid of what a leftist government would achieve if they were in power. For Germany, the fear came in the form of a potential Communist uprising. The dread was so strong that German politicians were willing to

34 Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, 258-260.

35 Media Matters Staff, “Sean Hannity Unhinged: ‘America Lives or Dies In 39 Days,’” Media Matters for America , October 14, 2016, https://www.mediamatters.org/sean-hannity/seanhannity-unhinged-america-lives-or-dies-39-days.

36 Snyder, The Road to Unfreedom, 258-260.

grant Hitler the use of his paramilitary, the SA, as a deterrent for communists. Furthermore, politicians like Kurt von Schleicher believed the Nazis to be preferrable over communism to the point that he was willing to provide them with more power in the Reichstag. Trump benefited from a hyperbolic and fearmongering conservative media and a Republican Party that feared what would happen if they lost the White House for another four years. The media pushed conservatives to yearn for a time long past, and it also instilled in them concern that their country was falling apart. The fear of the Left garnering power was key to both Trump and Hitler’s success.

Split on the Left

Although Hitler and Trump benefited from conservative politicians and voters yielding power to them, they also benefited from issues within the leftist parties of their respective governments. Hitler and the Nazi Party profited from the German Socialist Party (SPD) and the German Communist Party’s (KPD) refusa l to work together and compromise. Trump profited from the split between a moderate Hillary Clinton and a much further left candidate in Bernie Sanders. Furthermore, the work of Russian hackers interfering in the 2016 election served to further the divide between Sanders’ camp and Clinton’s supporters. 37

37 Ibid., 258. In both Trump’s and Hitler’s cases, the split between the leftist parties proved vital in their ascension to power.

Coalitions in the Weimar Republic were difficult to create and even more difficult to maintain. Fundamental differences between the SPD and KPD made their relationship in the

Reichstag tenuous at best. One issue that made their relationship so difficult to maintain was the KPD’s adherence to Bolshevist dogma , and their refusal to compromise with the SPD made forming a coalition nearly impossible. By the time the SPD and KPD were willing to work together in order stop the Nazis, it was too late. 38

38 Carr, A History of Germany, 293. While it is true that the Nazi Party also had issues in forming a coalition, the willingness of es tablished politicians like Papen, Schleicher, and eventually Hindenburg meant that they still had a path to power. On the other hand, nobody was willing to work with the KPD.

Although the ideological split between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders was not as profound as the differences between the SPD and the KPD, the rift between them still helped Trump win the 2016 ele ction. After the 2016 presidential election, polls showed that roughly one in ten who voted for Sanders in the Democratic primary voted for Trump in the general

The split between the two parties was essential in giving Hitler and the Nazis time to build power and momentum. There were multiple elections where a coalition between the KPD and the SPD would have outnumbered the Nazi Party, even if the Nazis did form a coalition with the German Nationalists. 39 39 Ibid., 290. However, because the KPD and SPD ref used to work together for so long, the Nazi Party was able to build momentum and continue to increase their Reichstag representation. When the Nazis had finally found a party to form a coalition with them under the promise of appointing Hitler as Chancello r, it was too late for the SPD and KPD to join forces.

election. 40

While it is difficult to say exactly what the reason was that Sanders voters moved toward Trump in the general election, there is evidence that Trump’s immigration policies may have made an impact. Of the Sanders-Trump voters, most claimed in a poll that white Americans have no tangible advantages in American society. 41

Another key factor in building a divide between Sanders voters and Clinton voters was the interference from Russian hackers. Russian bots often spread misinformation that Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party were part of the “system,” and that they rigged the primary election so that Sanders could not win the nomination. 42

The goal of the Russian bots was to either decrease voter turnout as much as possible, keeping potential Clinton voters at home, or to push vulnerable Bernie Sanders voters toward Trump. Essentially, the hackers sought to divide the Democratic Party. Trump utilized the Russian attacks as a way to denounce Hillary as a part of the broken system and argued that Sanders had been cheated

41 Ibid. It seems that Trump’s racist rhetoric, as discussed in chapter one, played a large role in pushing over some of the Sanders voters.

42 Snyder, Road to Unfreedom, 258. Russian hackers urged Sanders supporters to support Trump, or at the very least not to vote for Clinton. 43

40 Danielle Kurtzleben, “Here's How Many Bernie Sanders Supporters Ultimately Voted for Trump,” NPR, August 24, 2017, https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1-in-10-sandersprimary-voters-ended-up-supporting-trump-survey-finds.

43 Michael Kranish, “Inside the Russian Effort to Target Sanders Supporters and Help Elect Trump,” The Washington Post , April 12, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/inside-the-russian-effort-to-target-sanderssupporters and-help-elect-trump/2019/04/11/741d7308-5576-11e9-8ef3fbd41a2ce4d5_story.html.

out of his primary.44

Trump and Hitler both benefited from divisions within the left wing of their political landscapes. For Hitler, the division came in the form of a KPD and SPD who refused to work with one another due to ideological differences. The division within the 2016 Democratic Party was due to both the ideological differences between Hil lary Clinton and Bernie Sanders and also the work of Russian hackers who widened the rift between the two campaigns. In both cases, a lack of a unified leftist party helped lead to the installation of Trump and Hitler as the leaders of their countries.

Parliamentary Representation: Gridlock

While the American political system quickly formed into a two -party system after George Washington’s presidency, the Weimar Republic contained mul tiple political parties in the legislative Reichstag . Typically, proportional party systems are more democratic, as there are more options for voters and therefore a more accurate representation of the people’s will. However, multiple fringe parties in a p arliamentary system like the Weimar Republic can lead to legislative gridlock and undemocratic trends. In the case of the Weimar Republic, not requiring

44 Ibid. The margin of victory for Trump in the swing states was so small, that the effect of Russian bots likely could have tilted the election just enough for Donald Trump to win the general election.45

45 “2016 Presidential Election Results,” The New York Times , https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president)

a minimum threshold of votes in order to gain representation gave fringe parties much more political clout than what should have been afforded to them. 46

46 Hett, Death of Democracy, 24. Moreover, the multiple party splits and ideological differences made it tenuous for leading parties to form coalitions. This gave fringe parties, like the German Communist Party and the Nazi Party, bargaining power that their initial lack of representation should not have allowed. 47

47 Ibid., 25. This legislative issue was noted by German leaders Franz von Papen, Kurt von Schleicher and Paul von Hindenburg, and following World War Two it became necessary for political parties to earn at least five percent of the vote to join the legislative branch. 48

48 Ibid. Although the American government is rarely described as having an efficient legislative body, it nevertheless does not suffer from the overrepresentation of fringe political parties. There are often fringe elements within the party, such as the Tea Party’s role in the Republican Party in recent American politics, but it is not a separate party entirely. Fringe groups can eventually gain influence, as the Tea Party did, but it typically takes time before their effect in the party is detectable.49

49 Landon Schnable, “When Fringe Goes Mainstream Again: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Tea Party Movement’s Contract from America and the Republican Party Platform,” Politics, Religion & Ideology 15, no. 4 (2014): 606. Therefore, the two leading parties, the Democrats and Republicans, typically maintain some sort of control over their platform. The typical stability of the two parties gives legislat ive elections less of a chance at suddenly pushing American politics toward fringe ideals.

Immediate Disillusionment

When comparing the American Republic and the Weimar Republic, one aspect that clearly stands out is the difference in timespan. The Weimar Republic lasted for just fifteen years, while America has persisted for over 200. Another critical difference between the two, and one that helped lead to a short-lived Weimar Republic, was the immediate disillusionment many German citizens felt regarding the new republic. Following their catastrophic losses in the First World War, Germans were desperate to make sense of how they lost the war. When Hindenburg helped spread the myth that the German military was “stabbed in the back” by socialists on the home front, many Germans not only accepted the lie but also viewed the new democracy and its representatives as traitors to the German country.

50

50 Hett, Death of Democracy, 48-49. Hindenburg argued that “the German army was stabbed in the back. No blame is to be attached to the sound core of the army. Its performances call like that of the officer corps for an equal admiration. It is perfectly plain on whom the blame rests.” 51

51 Carr, A History of Germany, 263. The nationalist wing of the German population accepted the “Stab in the Back” theory without question. The signing of the Versailles peace treaty by the German Socialists and the Centre Party became political fodder of the right, as nationalists deemed them the “November Criminals” for surrendering and ending the war. 52

The immediate discontent German nationalists felt for the Weimar Republic can be observed in the attempted Kapp Putsch of 1920. The leaders of the putsch, Wolfgang Kapp and Walther von Lüttwitz, attempted to undo the revolution that led to the establishment of the

52 Ibid., 258.

Weimar Republic. The government officials were forced to evacuate the Capitol as a result of the putsch, but it was nevertheless an unsuccessful attempt. Kapp and Lüttwitz were both inspired by the myth of the “November Criminals,” and believed they were serving their country dutifully. Although the putsch failed in design and in approach, it serves as a signifier of the right wing’s hostilities for the new republic. Right -wing nationalists were willing to raise arms against their government after only two years had passed since the republic’s fo unding. 53

Later national events continued to fuel the discontent of the nationalist Germans.

Following Adolf Hitler’s attempted Beer Hall Putsch of 1923, the German press gave his trial national attention. Similar to the Kapp Putsch, Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch was a failed coup d’état. Although the coup was unsuccessful, the national attention given to Hitler’s trial still proved to be consequential for spurring the downfall of the Weimar Republic. Having a public trial at all can be seen as a misstep, as it gave Hitler the opportunity to take control of the courtroom with his oratory skills.54

Furthermore, Hitler was aided by a conservative leaning judge who presided over the case. The judge took pity on Hitler and viewed him as a dejected nationalist and veteran. He therefore gave Hitler the opportunity to speak far longer than he deserved, and he used the opportunity to position himself as a patriotic hero to the onlookers of the trial. 55

53 Ibid., 263.

54 Harold J. Gordon Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 479.

55 Ibid., 480-482. After allowing Hitler a podium f rom which to attack the republic, the judge gave Hitler a short and comfortable sentence for what amounts to treasonous acts. During this imprisonment, Hitler

wrote Mein Kampf , which continued to make claims about the “November Criminals” as well as anti-Semitic attacks. 56

The Kapp Putsch, the Beer Hall Putsch, and the mishandling of Hitler’s trial show that the Weimar Republic was on shaky ground from its foundation. This is a huge difference compared to the America that Trump inherited from Barack Obama. The Weimar Republic was extremely fragile, both from its young age and from German nationalists who initially sought to restore a monarchical government. When Trump took office, America had survived and thrived for centuries. Conversely, the Weimar Republic had so many enemies from within, that by 1930 there were multiple parties within the Reichstag that were actively against the republic. The German Communist Party and the Nazi Party both ran on platforms that were vehemently antidemocratic and against the Weimar Republic.

57

Furthermore, the economic strife that the Weimar Republic inherited led to further disillusionment with the government, while the economy under Obama had mostly rebounded before Trump took office. 59

56 Hett, Death of Democracy, 97.

57 Ibid. In 2016 America, the level of trust in the American government had not faltered much since Obama had become president in 2008. 58

58 J. Sides, M. Tesler, & L. Va vreck, (2017), “The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won,” Journal of Democracy 28 (2), 35, doi:10.1353/jod.2017.0022.

59 Reality Check Team, “US 2020 Election: The Economy under Trump in Six Charts, ” BBC News, November 03, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45827430. It is also worth noting that not only was the economy strong towards the end of Obama’s two terms, but the voters also believed in the economy. Polls showed that more Americans believed they were more financially stable than they had been in

the past and were willing to make more big -ticket purchases than they would have in the previous year. The economy was on track for America, and most people felt it. 60

Economic Issues Lead to Fringe Votes

While the American economy was thriving when Trump took office in 2016, the German economy suffered many crises immediately before Hitler became Chancellor. Following the First World War, the Weimar Republic was immediately saddled with a multitude of economic issues. The new democracy had to pay debts from the costs of waging war and from the reparations that were stipulated in the Versailles Treaty. Furthermore, in 1923, just five years after the conclusion of World War One, Germany suffered from hyperinflation which led to further hardships for its citizens.61

Although the Dawes Plan helped Germany rebound from the hyperinflation crisis, the economy thrived for just five years before the global effects of the Great Depression reached Germany.62

One effect that can be observed from the multiple economic crises Germany experienced was that as the economy went down the votes for fringe parties went up. Struggling economies damaged the faith German citizens had in the sy stem of the young Weimar Republic and also in the centrist parties who ran it. Therefore, as German citizens became desperate to find an answer to their economic turmoil after the hyperinflation crisis,

60 Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, “The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won,” 36.

61 Carr, A History of Germany, 270-271.

62 Ibid., 280-281.

both the Nazi Party and the Communist Party received more representation in the Reichstag 63

During the economy’s rebound years, from 1924 -1929, the votes for these fringe parties decreased. From 1924 through 1928, the Nazi Party and the Communist Party progressively lost seats in the Reichstag: The Nazis lost 20 seats in those years, and the Communist Party lost nearly 20 seats as well.64

The trend for fringe parties to thrive in Germany under economic turmoil persisted throughout the 1929 depression. When German unemployment reached 40 percent in 1932, Germans were eager for solutions and felt that the current government was not meeting their needs.65

Germany’s frustration toward its government and the desperation of its citizens to end the economic crisis can be observed in the 1932 Reichstag elections, which saw massive success for both the Nazi Party and the Communist Party. When the effects of the Great Depression were at their most extreme in Germany, the Nazi Party polled the best they ever had and ever would (in a free election). The Nazi Party receiv ed roughly 37 percent of the vote in 1932, and analysis of unemployed voters shows that their votes came in large part from those who were out of work. 66

The Communist Party also increased their representation and held roughly fourteen percent of the Reichstag seats.

The struggling economy only aided the Nazi cause, as Germans sought a way out of their financial strife and were willing to take extreme measures in solving Germany’s problems.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., 290.

65 Hett, Death of Democracy, 123.

66 Bruno S. Frey and Hannelore Weck, “A Statistical Study of the Effect of the Great Depression on Elections: The Weimar Republic, 1930-1933,” Political Behavior 5, no. 4 (1983): 406.

When the economy prevailed, the fringe parties faltered. As the economy crashed however, the Nazis and Communists ascended. As noted earlier, a lagging economy cannot be considered a component of Trump’s surprising victory over Hil lary Clinton in the 2016 election. The economy was strong, and most Americans maintained faith in the trajectory of their finances. Therefore, there must have been another key issue that pushed voters toward Trump and away from the Democratic Party. After all, Barack Obama won his 2012 election in a landslide. Obama defeated Mitt Romney with 332 electoral votes to 206, and he won the popular vote by approximately five million votes. 67

Furthermore, Americans mostly approved of Obama’s presidency when he left office in 2016, as his approval rating was 58 percent.68

Race: A Key Factor in 2016 America and Germany

After eight years of America having its first ever Black president, there was a notable shift in the way white Americans voted. Many white voters shifted toward fringe politics due to the racial grievances they experienced during the Obama presidency. In 2007, polls showed that white Americans were just as likely to vote Democrat as Republican. However, by 2010 a notable shift can be observed. In 2010, just two years into Obama’s first term, white voters voted Republican at a rate of 51 percent, while only 39 percent of white voters leaned toward

67 “President: Live Election Results,” The New York Times , https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2012/results/president.html.

68 “Obama Leaves Office on High Note, But Public Has Mixed Views of Accomplishments, ” Pew Research Center: U.S. Politics & Policy , May 30, 2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2016/12/14/obama-leaves-office-on-high-note-butpublic-has-mixed-views-of-accomplishments/.

the Democratic Party. By 2016, this gap had widened considerably; white voters were fifteen points more likely to vote Republican than Democrat (54 percent to 39 percent). 69

The Trump team’s anti-immigrant message was timely in that it spoke to the frustrations of white Americans, and especially to white Americans without a college degree. 70

Furthermore, these white voters were key in Trump winning the swing states that enabled him to win the Electoral College while nevertheless losing the popular vote. 72

Race also played a factor in pushing Germans’ willingn ess to accept fringe politics.

69 Sides, Tesler, & Vavreck, “The 2016 U.S. Election: How Trump Lost and Won,” 38.

70 Ibid., 34. With Clinton’s campaign and Trump’s campaign broadly focusing their messaging on the identity of Americans, both in what it is and is not, Trump was able to appeal to white voters. 71

71 Ibid., 37.

72 Ibid., 34. Trump’s hardline platform against illegal immigration stirred passion from the base of the Republican Party, but it was also crucial in bringing over some of the white Americans that had voted for Obama in the previous two elections. Immigration was critical to the point that those who voted for Obama and supported immigration mostly voted for Hillary Clinton, while roughly one third of Obama voters who maintained negative views of immigration voted Republican. 73

Following World War One, anti -Semitic prejudice became much more pervasive in conservative rhetoric and beliefs. Anti-Semitism was present in German politics and also European politics before the First World War, but with much less influence than it would have after 1918. As Walter Laqueur states, “we cannot stress too often that it was only as a result of the war, the

73 Ibid., 40.

political unrest, and the economic crisis that these ideas – simplified and popularized – acquired a power that they had not possessed before.” 74

Essentially, the grievances Germans experienced after the First World War amplified anti-Semitism. Hitler took advantage of the anti-Semitism in Germany, and he continued to fuel the racism by arguing that the German Volk (national community) needed to be preserved at all costs.75

74 Walter Laqueur, Fascism: Past, Present, and Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) , 23.

75 Ibid., 24. His argument was palingenetic at heart, arguing that the Germans needed to return to a traditional society with a patriarchal hierarchy. 76

76 Ibid., 24. Hitler’s belief in preserving the Volk also had a racist component. Laqueur describes the racism inherent in the concept of the Volk thusly: according to Hitler and the Nazis, “the German people, though inherently superior to others, were in mortal danger of disintegration. Therefore, the purity of the blood had to be preserved, which meant, above all, the elimination of the Jewish influence.” 77

77 Ibid. Hitler’s desire to maintain “purity” in the German race also led him to his desire to increase the Lebensraum (living space) for Germans. He argued that if Germany conquered Eastern European land, then they would be able to create an autarkic (self-sufficient) German society.78

78 Ibid. According to Hitler, autarky was the only way to preserve the German race. Again, following the First World War, desperate Germans were far more receptive to these anti-Semitic worldviews than they had been prior. 79

79 Ibid., 23.

While both the economy and race were c ritical factors in pushing German citizens toward fringe parties, racial identity was a key factor in America. In Germany, the economic crises and the loss of the First World War made racist politics more acceptable for Germans. In America, the voters move d toward fringe politics due to the racial grievances of many white voters following the Obama presidency. After eight years of an Obama administration, many white Americans yearned for a return to the past. Identity -focused framing gave Trump the advantage he needed to win the electoral college by swinging enough white voters in key states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan to the Republican Party. Trump’s attack on illegal immigration proved helpful in garnering Republican enthusiasm, as many whit e Americans sought to protect their standing in America.

Although 2016 America and 1933 Weimar Republic have notable differences in the structure of their governments and their economic standings, Hitler and Trump came to power in remarkably similar ways. For both leaders, it was imperative that they received support from established conservative politicians who inevitably underestimated them, which is a typical component in the rise of fascism. Hitler and Trump also benefited from conservatives’ fear and hatred of leftist political parties, both from politicians and voters. The fear of a potential Bolshevist uprising pushed German conservatives to concede more power to the Nazis and to allow them the use of their paramilitary. Similarly, Americans feared that a Clinton presidency would lead to the destruction of the “American way of life,” and Trump reaped the benefits from this angst. Finally, Trump and Hitler profited from the divisive nature of the leftist parties

that they were running against. The SPD and KPD had unreconcilable differences that prevented them from forming a coalition. Likewise, the voters that supported the Sanders campaign but eventually moved toward Trump helped provide Trump the edge h e needed to win the Electoral College. Russian hackers further split the Clinton campaign and the Sanders campaign as well, and the division within the Democratic Party helped ensure Trump’s victory .

CHAPTER FIVE

FASCISM IN POWER

When Donald J. Trump became president in 2017, his governing style offered many similarities to the way that Hitler ran the Third Reich. Although noted multiple times, when Hitler and Trump began their roles as leaders of their nations, they benefited from an economy on an upward trajectory. As mentioned previously, the successful economies that Hitler and Trump maintained at the beginning of their terms helped give their leadership style a sense of legitimacy to many of their citizens. Another similarity between the two is their heavy emphasis on loyalty to the leader, which they placed at a priority above loyalty to the country. For both Trump and Hitler, absolute loyalty from their subordinates was imperative. Trump would spurn those who were not totally loyal to him by either s upporting the opposing candidates in primary elections of those who were disloyal, or by firing them outright, typically through Twitter. Disloyalty to Hitler came at a much higher cost; displeasing the Führer could lead to one’s death.

An additional parallel between the Trump administration and the Nazi Reich was their foreign policy positions: Trump and Hitler both maintained an isolationist approach in their rhetoric. Although all their promises did not come to fruition, both Trump and Hitler were antiglobalization in their approach to foreign policy. This can be seen in Trump’s disregard for long-

standing American treaties, such as NATO. For Hitler, this can be evidenced in his attacks on the Versailles Treaty, his disregard for other treaties, his w ithdrawal from the League of Nations, and also in his quest to expand the German borders.

Also, another similarity between Trump’s presidency and Hitler’s dictatorship is that both men warmed up to or coordinated with other fascists and authoritarians. T rump was propelled into office with the benefit of Russian interference into United States elections. Throughout his presidency, Trump constantly downplayed the effect of Russian intervention, and he often took the word of authoritarian Vladimir Putin over his own intelligence agency. He also normalized relations with North Korean authoritarian Kim Jong -Un. Unsurprisingly, Hitler also united with other fascist leaders. When the Spanish Civil War began in 1936, Hitler saw it as an opportunity to boost fascis t ideals while attacking Bolshevism, and he helped fund the fascist General Francisco Franco. Soon after the Spanish Civil War began, the German -JapaneseItalian axis was established, which solely included authoritarian nations.

Finally, both Hitler and Trump ran chaotic governments, and the Trump White House and the Third Reich operated under a mentality of political Social Darwinism. For the Third Reich, the “survival of the fittest” mentality is notable in the way that Nazi leaders would have to guess what Hitler wanted, or “work towards the Fuhrer,” and those with the most radical ideas often ascended the ranks. This mindset led to the collective radicalization of the Third Reich. Social Darwinism in Nazi Germany’s political structure is also detectab le in the way that Hitler would purposely allow departments to have overlapping duties, which fostered infighting in the Nazi Party. Political Social Darwinism in the Trump administration is evidenced in the way

Trump fired his White House staff, which for ced them to fight amongst themselves in order to earn his trust. Furthermore, the Trump administration operated under a similar mindset as “working towards the Fuhrer , ” due to his subordinates guessing as to what Trump wanted in terms of policy. The collective radicalization of the Trump administration can be seen in their policy of separating immigrant children from their families.

Through comparative analysis, this chapter intends to illustrate how fascism operates once the movement has gained power. A s fascism expert Stanley G. Payne notes, fascism does not always present itself the same way once the movements reach power, which is detectable in the differences in the Italian fascist regime and the Nazi regime. 1

So while we cannot expect Trump’s style of fascism and Hitler’s style of fascism to operate in the same manner once in power, it is nevertheless worth establishing the many similarities in their leadership style. Furthermore, the similarities between Trump and Hitler that have been established in prior chapters, combined with the parallels that will be discussed in this chapter, aim to establish Trump as a fascist leader. Although he did not establish the same dictatorial control over the American government as Hitler did over Germany, Trump’s i deological core and the way in which he deployed his power were fascist. Similar to the third chapter, this discussion will primarily utilize secondary sources to provide an overview of Trump’s and Hitler’s political styles.

1 Stanley G. Payne, Fascism: Comparison and Definition (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 178.

However, one consequence of Hi tler’s rule that will not be introduced in this chapter is the Holocaust. While it is the most horrifying aspect of Hitler’s reign and a warning of what may come from fascist dictators, it will not be discussed in this section, as there is no comparison to the Holocaust. However, Trump not having committed an atrocity like the Holocaust does not preclude him from being defined as a fascist leader. As noted earlier, fascism does not present itself monolithically once it has achieved power. Identifying Trump’s movement as not being fascist because there was not a genocidal component would be similar to claiming Mussolini’s regime was not fascist .

Taking Advantage of Upward Trends

As discussed earlier, Trump and Hitler benefited from economies that were main taining an upward trajectory. In the United States , the economy was thriving before Trump took office, and it continued to prosper under his Presidency. 2

In Germany, the potential of a strong economy was less noticeable to the German people, as they were still recovering from the economic crisis that stemmed from the Great Depression. However, there were signs that the economy was improving, and it continued to do so after Hitler became Chancellor in 1933. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, the flourishing economy at the outset of both Trump and Hitler’s reigns gave their political style a sense of legitimacy to their citizens. 3

2 Reality Check Team, “US 2020 Election: The Economy under Trump in Six Charts, ” BBC News, November 03, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-45827430).

3 Henry Ashby Turner, Hitler's Thirty Days to Power: January 1933 (New Jersey: Castle Books, 2003), 29.

The German economy was an issue that hurt Hitler’s predecessors but aided him, both during his rise to power and after he became Chancellor. The weak economy was a strong critique Hitler could make against the leaders of the Weimar Republic, and it was a talking point that was well-received by German voters.4

As discussed in the first chapter, Germany’s economic issues led Germans to embrace fringe politics, and was therefore a key component to Hitler’s rise to power. However, when Hitler became Chancellor the German economy was rebounding from the Great Depression by 1933. This provided Hitler the benefit of claimin g that the improved economy was an effect of the new Nazi leadership. 5

However, many of the policies that were helping the German economy improve in 1933 had been put in place by the previous administration. An example of this is the job plan introduced b y Chancellor Kurt von Schleicher in 1932. His policy ensured two million Germans would gain employment within six months after its enactment. 6

The effect of the plan was not noticeable until 1933, when Hitler was Chancellor. Naturally, Hitler took credit for the program and won the political capital that came from returning unemployed Germans to work. German voters shunned the previous administration for their handling of the Great Depression, and they praised Hitler for the increase in German employment.

Similarly, when Trump took office in 2017, he also inherited an economy that was trending upward. As discussed earlier, the Obama administration had led the country out of an

4 William Carr, A History of Germany: 1815-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 270271.

5 Turner, Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power, 29.

6 Benjamin Carter Hett, The Death of Democracy: Hitler’s Rise to Power (London: William Heinemann, 2019), 180.

economic disaster.7

However, even though Trump mostly inherited the benefits of a strong economy from the Obama administration, he touted the accomplishments as if they were his own. He often claimed that the Trump economy was the strongest economy that the United States had ever experienced.8

The fact that many Trump voters cited their faith that Trump would produce a stronger economy than Biden illustrates how many believed his deception that he had produced the strongest economy in American history, or at the very least that he was the reason for the economy that thrived from 2017 to 2019. 10

7 Reality Check Team, “US 2020 Election: The Economy under Trump in Six Charts .”

8 Ibid. He also argued in 2020 that the American economy post-Covid would again be the strongest America ever had. While neither of Trump’s claims are true, many voters believed that they were. Furthermore, many Trump voters claimed that they believed that Trump would help the economy flourish more than a Joe Biden presidency would, and this was their justification for voting for him.9

9 Don Lee, “Trump vs. Obama: Who Has the Better Record on the U.S. Economy? ” Los Angeles Times, October 27, 2020, https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-10-27/trump-vsobama-who-really-did-better-on-the-economy.

10 Ibid. Many Republican voters bought into the image of Trump as the businessman who would manage America like a Trump company. 11

11 Ibid. Similar to the faith Germans had in Hitler due to the improved German economy , the belief Republican voters had in Trump’s handling of the American economy gave his presidency a sense of leg itimacy. It made it easier for longtime Republican voters to look past other aspects of Trump’s presidency they may have otherwise disagreed with. As evidenced by the polls of Republican voters who

claimed they were voting for him due to the economy, so long as he was able to maintain it, he could overcome other issues from his administration. 12

Loyalty to the Leader, not the Country

The leadership style of Trump and Hitler valued personal loyalty as a keystone, which is typical of fascist movements. As fascism scholar Jason Stanley describes it, fascist movements typically yearn for a return to traditional gender roles, where the patriarchy reigns supreme. This ideal of patriarchy is extended to the fascist leader, who presents himself as a father-figure with absolute authority, and one who expects absolute loyalty from his followers. 13

For Trump, his expectations of absolute loyalty can be seen in how he unsympathetically fired subordinates he deemed untrustworthy, often through Twitter. He would also sup port candidates running in Republican primary elections that were running against Congressional Republicans and did not fall in line behind Trump. Hitler’s demand for loyalty came with much more dire consequences to those who did not follow suit; the “Nigh t of the Long Knives,” in which over 80 of Hitler’s political enemies were killed, showed that disloyalty to the Fuhrer could lead to one’s execution. The devotion Hitler demanded from his subordinates was also paramount for keeping different factions with in the Nazis from tearing the Party apart.

12 Ibid.

13 Jason Stanley, How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them (New York: Random House, 2018), 6-7.

Once Hitler became the leader of the Nazi Party, and especially after his rise to dictator, he demanded absolute loyalty. Essentially, the Nazi Party was an extension of Hitler. 14

14 Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936: Hubris (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998), 538. At one point, Hitler even claimed that the “Fuhrer is the Party, and the Party is the Fuhrer.” 15 15 Ibid., 574. As Hitler placed himself in the center of the Nazi Party, he maintained that absolute loyalty to him from his subordinates was key to building and maintaining the power of the Party. The cul t of personality surrounding Hitler and the Party’s fixation on him were key to preventing the Party from tearing itself apart through factions, which are evidenced by Gregor Strasser’s defection from the Party and the SA’s occasional objections to the tra jectory of the Party. According to historian Ian Kershaw, “appeal to personal loyalty had been Hitler’s hallmark, especially in moments of crisis, since the early years of the Party.” 16

A moment of crisis that Kershaw references in the above quote is Greg or Strasser’s defection from the Nazi Party in 1932. Gregor Strasser, a Nazi Party organizer and one of the more respected members of the Nazi Party, left the Nazi Party in 1932, causing panic from Hitler and the other Party leaders. Nazi leaders were fear ful that Strasser might pull some within the Party towards other parties, like the German Nationalist Party. Immediately following his resignation, Hitler called for a meeting amongst the Party’s leadership. In a moment that could have derailed the progres s that the Nazis had made in 1932, Hitler warned his followers that if anyone else left the Party, he would be forced to kill himself. What started

16 Ian Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation (London: Edward Arnold, 1985), 73.

as a bleak moment for the Nazi Party became one that fortified the Nazis’ loyalty to Hitler, and the Party maintained its numbers. Following the poorly timed decision of Strasser to go on holiday after he left the Nazis, no prominent members followed him in his defection. 17

Another instance where Hitler demanded absolute loyalty from his Party was his dealing with the SA following his ascension to Chancellor, in what became known as the “Night of the Long Knives.” As noted previously, the SA (the Nazi paramilitary) had been a necessary component to Hitler’s rise to power, but they had nevertheless been difficult for Hitler to control. 18

The promise of eventual power for the Nazi Party was often all that kept them in line before Hitler became Chancellor in 1933. However, when Hitler became Chancellor, many within the SA felt that the same power structures were still in place. Leader of the SA, Ernst Röhm, also believed this, and he claimed that there was a second revolution still to come for Germany. Hitler, who was now in charge of Germany, saw this claim as an act of defiance against him and the Party. 19

When President Hindenburg’s health declined in 1934, Hitler had an opportunity to consolidate even more control over Germany. Therefore, Hitler, Hermann Göring, and Heinrich Himmler deployed the SS to wipe out the leaders of the SA and any other political adversa ries on June 30, 1934. SS men killed political enemies under the false pretenses of an impending coup from Röhm and the SA. 20

17 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 401-402.

18 Ian Kershaw, Hitler (London: Longman, 1991), 72.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., 73. The numbers are not clear, as many records have been

destroyed, but historians estimate that between 100-700 of those Hitler deemed untrustworthy died during the “Night of the Long Knives.” 21

21 Carr, A History of Germany, 317. Hitler’s weakening of the SA and the subsequent strengthening of the absolutely devoted SS meant that the loyalty to the Führer was further bolstered.22

One last example of the way Hitler both demanded loyalty and used it as a means to control the Nazi Party is the meeting he held in the Berlin Opera House in 1935. On January 3, 1935, Hitler gave a speech to the top leaders of the Wehrmacht (Nazi army). In the speech, he preached the need for restoring Germany’s faith in the armed forces, but with the caveat that it could only be achieved if the Wehrmacht maintained total faith and loyalty in the Führer. Hitler’s speech also attacked critiques of his enemies that claimed that he was against the German military. Similar to the way he handled the Strasser situation, Hitler claimed that he would kill himself if the Wehrmacht did not openly and fully support him. The ploy worked, and the Wehrmacht fell into line behind Hitler. 24

Although his demands were less lethal, Donald Trump also expected absolute obedience from his subordinates. One way Trump and his administration tested the allegiance of potential White House staffers was by screening their social media accounts. Any candi date who had publicly criticized Trump on a social media platform was immediately removed from the list of

22 Kershaw, Hitler, 73. Just weeks after the “Night of the Long Knives,” and following the death of President Hindenburg, the German army swore fealty to Hitler above Germany. 23

23 Ibid., 74.

24 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 545-546.

potential suitors. 25

Although it is not necessarily unbelievable that someone would want to employ staffers who had not publicly spoken against them , it served as a signal of the loyalty Trump expected from his staff.

Another way Trump would punish those he believed untrustworthy was to revoke their security clearances. This action effectively made it impossible for those who lost their clearance to perform their jobs in the White House, and it also made it less likely that they would be able to secure further employment in the government. Trump was especially keen on recalling the security clearances of those who publicly spoke out against him. When CIA Director John Brennan rebuked Trump for his handling of Russia’s election interference, Trump revoked his clearance and fired him.26

According to an aide within the White House, they claimed that Trump’s actions proved that “it’s not okay to disagree with me [Trump]. I [Trump] can remove you from this work and your career.” 27

Trump could also demonstrate to fellow Republicans the impo rtance of maintaining absolute loyalty to him by backing candidates against his enemies within the Republican Party during primary elections. Trump’s endorsement could mean the difference between winning and losing for potential candidates, whether they we re incumbents or not. By 2020, Trump’s endorsements won 109 out of 111 primary elections . Although many of these were candidates who ran unopposed, and many were incumbents with comfortable leads, there was still a

25 Mike Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!” (Toronto, Ontario: ECW Press, 2018), 18.

26 Ibid., 281.

27 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Gen ius!,” 285.

sizeable portion that won close contests thanks to Trump’s support. 28

An example of Trump’s influence on primary elections can be seen in the Alabama Senate race, when Jeff Sessions ran against Tommy Tuberville. Trump’s endorsement of Tuberville was a result of both Tuberville’s loyalty to Trump and also of the falling out of Trump and Trump’s former Attorney General Jeff Sessions.29

Before Trump’s involvement in the race, the two candidates were separated by only two points. After Tuberville earned Trump’s endorsement, Tuberville won the runoff e lection by a staggering 21 points. 30

The message became clear to Republican Congressional candidates; losing Trump’s endorsement could easily lead to losing one’s race.

Trump and strategist Steve Bannon were not bashful about the need to show loyalty to Trump in order to receive his endorsement. As Steve Bannon put it, merely supporting Trump “80-90 percent of the time… is not good enough.” 31

Trump displayed the importance he put on personal loyalty over loyalty to the nation when he publicly endorsed Alab ama Senate candidate Roy Moore. Before Trump endorsed Moore, many Congressional Republicans had rebuked Moore or at the very least were no longer endorsing his nomination. Congressional Republicans had become weary of outwardly supporting Moore in the Sena te race as numerous women’s allegations against Moore for sexual assault had been brought to light just before the

28 Meredith Conroy and Nathaniel Rakich, “Almost Everyone Trump Endorses Wins Their Primary ... But Is He Padding His Record? ” FiveThirtyEight, August 26, 2020, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/almost-everyone-trump-endorses-wins-their-primary-butis-he-padding-his-record/.

29 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!, ” 314.

30 Conroy and Rakich, “Almost Everyone Trump Endorses Wins Their Primary .”

31 Steve Bannon, interviewed by Richard Boyd, “Verbatim Transcript,” Alabama, December 6, 2017, Kindle Edition, location 68.

election. 32

But the allegations did not deter Trump’s ringing endorsement for candidate Roy Moore. In Steve Bannon’s interview with Richard B oyd, he made it clear why Trump still supported him: Moore was loyal to Trump. 33

It was Trump’s goal from the start of his presi dency to surround himself with as many yes-men as possible, as he wished to speak and not to hear. 35

However, at the beginning of Trump’s term there were still many establishment Republicans in the White House staff. As his presidency bore on, it became clear to those in the White House that he would eventually get rid of any politicians who stood in the way of him passing his agenda. Those who initially served as stoppers to Trump’s dangerous political whims were slowly replaced by yes -men sycophants.

Patrick Shanahan, Pat Cipollone, Bill Barr, and Mick Mulvaney replaced Jim Mattis, Don McGahn, Jeff Sessions, and John Kelley, men who initially inhibited Trump’s political impulses. 36

The new White House staff signaled to Republicans that any signs of disloya lty to Trump would certainly lead one to unemployment.

The loyalty Trump received from his new cast of White -House minions can be evidenced in the freedom he felt in pursuing illegal political ploys. Not long after Trump had replaced the establishment Republicans in the White House, the Ukraine scandal that led to his first

32 Richard Fausset, Alan Blinder, and Jonathan Martin, “Roy Moore Gets Trump Endorsement and R.N.C. Funding for Senate Race, ” The New York Times , December 04, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/04/us/politics/roy-moore-donald-trump.html.

33 Bannon, interviewed by Boyd, 56. According to Bannon, what he was looking for in Senate candidates was someone who would faithfully support the Trump agenda. 34

34 Ibid.

35 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!, ” 2.

36 Ibid., 355.

impeachment occurred. Trump sought aid from Ukrainian officials in providing him with dirt on his political enemy and soon-to-be campaign rival, Joe Biden. The scandal showed that Trump had become totally unrestrained in the White House, due in large part to the loyalty he had demanded from White House cabinet and staff. 37

Although, as previously noted, the lethality of Trump and Hitler’s demands for personal loyalty differed, they still ran their governments with the expectation that they would receive total subservience. Hitler ’s expectations for faithfulness were a hallmark from the moment he began leading the Nazi Party. He used the loyalty that he demanded from his subordinates to keep the Party together, and this kept the factions within the Nazis from destroying the Party from within. As his power became more secure, disloyalty was no longer an option for Germans, and the price for going against the Führer was death. As Roger Griffi n notes, “the most persistent nucleus of consensus for the regime resided in loyalty to Hitler as an inspired statesman, warlord, and the savior of Germany, a loyalty which outweighed and outlasted any commitment to the Party and its hierarchy.”38

The loyalty Trump commanded of his staff and the Republican Party is evidenced in the ways he would terminate any staff that created roadblocks for his agenda, like Jeff Sessions. Furthermore, he freely revoked the security clearances of those who publicly spoke against him, as he did to CIA Director John Brenn an. Congressional Republicans who did not back Trump’s agenda 100 percent of the time could also lose Trump’s endorsements in primary

37 Ibid., 415.

38 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 110.

elections, leading to a likely loss for reelection. Like Hitler, Trump pl aced loyalty above country, as he held no qualms about replacing highly respected and qualified civil servants for those he knew would strive to appease him.

Foreign Policy

There are many parallels in the ways that Trump and Hitler managed the foreign policy of their countries. Primarily, both countries asserted that anti-globalization and isolationism were the best policies when it came to foreign affairs. This is evidenced in Trump’s handling of and disregard for NATO, a long-standing treaty with multiple democratic countries. As noted in the previous chapters, Trump also touted the need for policies that maintained an approach of “America First,” which naturally promoted isolationist policies. 39

Hitler’s anti-globalization position is perhaps more obvi ous, as he had long been a critic of Western Democracy. Hitler also took every opportunity he could to subvert the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles. Furthermore, Hitler disdained the League of Nations, and withdrew from it as soon as he could. He also held treaties with little regard, as he saw them as being useful for only short periods of time. Finally, Hitler’s goal of German expansion was clearly anti -globalization and naturally put him at odds with the League of Nations.

Hitler had long been an antagonist to Western Democracy, but after Germany’s loss in World War One he became a louder one. A major component of his disdain for Western

39 Politico staff and Shane Goldmacher, “Full Text: Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin,” Politico , August 17, 2016, https://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/full-textdonald-trumps-speech-on-227095.

democracies was the role that they played in drafting the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler long argued that Germany was nothing more than a scapegoat for the First World War, and the leading democracies were unjustly attacking the German Reich. 40

His hatred of the treaty that ended World War One was part the Nazi Party’s platform, and he maintained this disposition throughout the rest of his life. Hitler also maintained no love for the League of Nations, which was formed following the end of the war. Hitler described the League of Nations as a bully that got its power from the democracies that only wished to weaken Germany. He argued that the League of Nations was a component of the foreign powers that worked as tyrants over Germany.41

Due to his disregard for the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, Hitler had no problem defying either of the two, so long as war could be avoided in the early years of his dictatorship. In 1935, Hitler openly defied the Treaty of Versailles by resuming German conscription for the armed forces. Hitler and Hermann Göring further disregarded the treaty later that year, when they publicly announced that Germany had an existing air-force, which was a direct violation of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler continued to flout the treaty in 1936, albeit in a bolder way, when Germany reoccupied the Rhineland. The Versailles Treaty stipulated that the area was to remain demilitarized after the war to ensure France’s safety. However, once

40 Adolf Hitler and Max Domarus, Reden und Proklamationen, 1932 -1945 vol. 1 (München: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965) , 229.

41 “Hitler Speech at Munich Trial 1924 Excerpts,” World Future Fund, http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/reading/hitler speeches/Trial/hitletrial.html.

Hitler believed he could reoccupy the area with no pushback from the Western democracies, he acted. 42

Hitler’s goal of increasing the Lebensraum (living space) of the German Reich positioned him against the League of Nation’s peace -keeping goals. The League’s goal of maintaining peace was clearly at odds with Germany’s drive to expand eastward. 43

The indifference Hitler maintained for his treaties can be noted in the non -aggression pacts he made with Poland (1934) and with the Soviet Union (1939). Hitler made both pact s with eyes on the near future, as it meant that Germany could avoid war while it was in the process of rearming. Furthermore, the pact with Russia meant that Germany could initially avoid a war on two fronts, a lesson that they had learned from the First World War. The pact with Poland was also beneficial to Germany in the short term, as it diplomatically isolated

42 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 542-549.

43 Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship , 115. However, the goal of extending Germany’s boundaries was the driving force behind both domestic and international policymaking. 44 44 Ibid. This is detectable in the callousness with which Hitler handled treaties with other nations. Treaties were only meant to serve Hitler and the Nazis in the short term, and Hitler did not hold them in high regard. Ian Kershaw states that for Hitler, “treaties were matters of expediency. They were to be held as long as they served their purpose.” 45

45 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 544. Clearly, making treaties with the intention of reneging on them in the future is not a habit that countries get into when they want to foster globalization.

France.46

As discussed earlier, Trump also believed that isolationism and anti -globalization policies would benefit American society. Trump often used his administration’s platform of putting “America First” as a justification for promoting isolationist policie s. He often used the slogan when defending his reasoning for anti -immigration policies or the anti -Muslim policies he pursued at the beginning of his term. 48

At one point, Trump’s advisors attempted to course correct Trump’s anti-globalization position and policies by meeting in the Pentagon’s Tank (a confidential briefing room) to discuss the need for international diplomacy with America’s allies. Trump’s “America First” ideals led him to be triggered by the attempted intervention, as General Mattis preached to Trump the importance of maintaining décor with American allies. Trump responded by attacking the NATO alliance and defining it as useless and unprofitable for America. At one point, Trump’s temper tantrum pushed him to label General Mattis and his staff as “dopes and babies.”49

The Tank intervention did not end Trump’s disregard for treaties and alliances like NATO. He also continued to speak out against trade deals with Mexico and Canada, often threatening trade wars that would most likely have hurt the American economy. 50

46 Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945: Nemesis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), 205. Hitler would eventually negate both pacts: Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, and they invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941 . 47

47 Ibid., 393.

48 “Full Text: Donald Trump Campaign Speech in Wisconsin,” Politico.

49 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!, ” 132-135.

50 Ibid., 260. Trump approached trade deals and alliances like business deals, and if they were not highly profitable

to the United States, he deemed them useless. Throughout his presidency, Trump had no qualms with publicly entertaining the idea of pulling out of peace-keeping treaties and trade agreements.51

The best example of Trump’s anti -globalization stance and disregard for peace-keeping treaties is the ongoing criticism he had for NATO and its members. Trump often publicly attacked Angela Merkel and her credibility, which is also significant because other members of NATO often cited her as a unifier and leader for the alliance. 52

Trump and Hitler both approached treaties and international diplomacy with a similar aloofness, coldness and overall disre gard. Hitler’s abhorrence for the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations put him at odds with international diplomacy from the start of his dictatorship, and his plans to increase the size of Lebensraum for Germans also contributed to his anti-globalization positions. Trump’s tirades against NATO and his disregard for wellestablished trade agreements with Mexico and Canada also put him in conflict with countries

51 Ibid.

52 Ibid., 270. In one NATO meeting, Trump warned the representatives that if they did not meet a higher defense spend ing target, America could potentially pull out of the international defense agreement. Trump’s tirade convinced multiple members within the White House staff that America had pulled out of NATO on a Trump whim. It ended up being a false alarm and America r emained in the alliance, but it showed the coldness Trump maintained for American alliances that he believed were not profitable. 53

53 Ibid., 270-272.

that promoted globalization policies. Hitler’s plans for German expansion and the war t hat came with it are clearly more detrimental than Trump’s isolationist approach, but both leaders still maintained a similar ethos when it came to their approach to international diplomacy and treaties.

Making Friends with Authoritarians

A component of Trump’s and Hitler’s foreign policy that runs in a similar vein as their anti-globalization positions was their friendship with authoritarians and fascists from other countries. After Russian interference in American elections helped Trump win the preside ncy in 2016, he continued to defend Russia and especially Vladimir Putin. He also defended North Korean authoritarian Kim Jong -Un multiple times and would often take the word of both Putin and Kim with little-to-no hesitation. Hitler’s relationships with other authoritarians are well documented: Hitler’s direct involvement with other fascists began in 1936, when he backed General Franco in the Spanish Civil War. Soon after Germany involved itself in the Spanish conflict, Hitler established alliances with It aly and Japan, which were both authoritarian states in the 1930s. Both Hitler and Trump showed a willingness to work with and normalize other authoritarians.

In July 1936, The Spanish Civil War gave Hitler and Germany an opportunity to take a stand against Bolshevism and to also back the rise of a fascist government in Spain. After the left-wing Popular Front narrowly won a democratic Spanish election in 1936, General Francisco Franco and the right wing refused to concede and coordinated a military coup. H itler made the

somewhat unpopular decision amongst his leaders to send aid to Franco from the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. Hitler’s involvement with the Spanish conflict shows that when given the opportunity, Hitler was ready to back a potential fascist government. Eventually Italy also sent aid to the fascist uprising in Spain, which further bolstered the relationship between fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.54

Soon after the beginning of the Spanish Civil War and after Germany and Italy backed Franco and the Spanish fascists, Hitler was able to settle previous hostilities with Mussolini regarding the independence of Austria, which Italy believed was crucial in maintaining their safety. Following the improved diplomatic relations between Italy and Germany, the GermanItalian-Japanese axis was soon established. For Hitler, it signified his recognition that Britain would not willingly allow Germany to pursue the expansion of its borders, which was a key component of Hitler’s international goals. It also shows that Hitler had moved toward coordinating with other fascist leaders as opposed to working with democratic Britain, even if the fascist leaders’ goals were not perfectly aligned. As German historian William Carr puts it, the three countries created a “fascist ‘Holy Alliance’ utterly opposed to the values of Western Democracy.”55

Trump also established relationships with authoritarian leaders, or at the very least normalized them and did little to condemn them. Because the evidence showed that the Russian interference in the 2016 United States election was done with the intention o f helping

54 Kershaw, Hitler: 1936-1945, 13-18.

55 Carr, A History of Germany, 345.

Trump win the presidency, Trump often attacked the intelligence as false. After the CIA definitively proved that Russia interfered with elections and briefed Trump with the reports, Trump still defended Putin. He also attempted to spin the scandal in an odd way, arguing that the interference was intended to aid the Clinton campaign, which was simply untrue. 56

Trump continued to normalize Putin’s authoritarian leadership throughout his presidency. When Putin was reelected via a sham Russian electi on in 2018, Trump’s advisors vehemently warned him of the bad PR that would follow a congratulatory call to Putin. Trump disregarded their advice and called him anyways, and the first thing he told Putin was congratulations for his election win. He even went so far as to attempt to invite Putin to the White House after his “reelection.” The transcript of Trump’s phone call with Putin was eventually released to the public, and Britain and other NATO allies were incensed. Trump was cozying up to a direct enemy of the NATO alliance. 57

As Trump’s presidency trudged on, he continuously refused to accept the CIA intelligence that verified Russian interference in American elections, and that Putin ordered the interference. In 2018, Trump claimed that “Dan Coats ca me to me and some others and said they think it’s Russia. I have President Putin. He just said it’s not Russia. I will say this: I don’t see any reason why it would be.” 58

56 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!, ” 204.

57 Ibid., 229-232.

58 Ibid., 275. He continued the conversation by bringing up Hil lary Clinton’s email scandal, which he finished by stating “I have great confidence in my intelligence people, but I will tell you that President Putin was extremely strong and powerful in his denial

59

today.”

Even though Trump’s intelligence agency had proven without a doubt that Putin ordered Russian hackers to interfere with America’s 2016 election, he was still willing to take the word of an authoritarian over the intelligence from his own department.

Putin was not the only authoritarian that Trump’s presidency helped normalize. In June 2018, Trump also dealt with North Korean authoritarian Kim Jong-Un in an important diplomatic moment for America and for the Trump presidency. Trump initially hoped that the meeting could even win him the Nobel Peace Prize, an award he coveted due to Barack Obama having won one during his presidency.

60 Even though Kim had violated multiple human rights and had committed North Korea to nuclear armament, Trump hosted Kim as if he were hosting an esteemed guest and ally. This only helped to further normalize Kim’s regime.

61

Similar to Trump’s willingness to take Putin at his word, Trump also accepted claims from Kim with little hesitation. An example of this is when Trump willingly accepted that Kim was not involved in the death of American Otto Warmbier. When Warmbier toured North Korea with a group of friends, he was arrested under the pretenses that he had attempted to steal a North Korean propaganda sign. As the details surrounding the grounds for Warmbier’s

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., 260.

61 Ibid., 262. More shocking than Trump’s treatment of Kim was the way he spoke about the dictator after the summit. Trump claimed that he admired the way that Kim drew respect from his citizens, stating that when Kim spoke North Koreans “sit up at attention.” 62

62 Ibid., 263.

imprisonment, his time in incarceration, and how he became ill are unknown, it is difficult to ascertain exactly what happened to Warmbier when he was in North Korea. However, when North Korea finally released him, Warmbier was in a vegetative state and died within weeks of his return to America. 63

When Trump was pressed by reporters if he would hold Kim accountable for Warmbier’s death, he claimed that Kim said he was unaware that his health had deteriorated so rapidly while imprisoned. Trump said that he believed Kim and went on to argue that North Korean prisons are rough places and there was no reason not to believe Kim. However, Warmbier’s case was highly publicized from the moment he was imprisoned, and it is highly unlikely that Kim was not briefed on his poor health. Regardless, Trump was willing to take another authoritarian at his word, and treated Kim as if he were a typical political leader. 64

Political Social Darwinism

Another commonality between Trump and Hitler’s leadership style was that they believed in a form of political Social Darwinism. Both Trump and Hitler believed that a “survival of the fittest” style to politics would push subordinates to present the best ideas possible. Hitler gained dictatorial power, the Nazi state became less centralized, leading to multiple competing powers and administrations. Hitler would often intentionally allow departments to fight out their arguments and would decide on the matter once a clear winner had presented itself.

63 Kevin Ponniah & Tom Spender, “Otto Warmbier: How Did North Korea Holiday End in Jail, and a Coma?” BBC News, June 20, 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada40308028.

64 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!, ” 317.

Trump’s political style also encouraged a form of Social Darwinism in the White House. New members of the White House staff understood that they did not have long to earn Trump’s trust, and they were often willing to climb over one another in order to earn it. Furthermore, the Social Darwinism in the Trump White House and in the Third Reich, combined with the aloofness in decision making by Trump and Hitler, led go-getters to assume what the leader desired and to act on it. Ian Kershaw describes the phenomenon in the Third Reich as “working towards the Führer,” as Nazi leaders often had to guess what exactly Hitler wanted.65

Many German historians have noted the chaotic nature of bureaucracy that was featured in the Third Reich. 66

65 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 533 The Trump White House operated similarly, and t his helped lead to the collective radicalization of both parties.

66 Ibid., 530. The Nazi administrative apparatus and its bureaucracies became less centralized than they were during the Weimar Republic, which led to a much more disordered Nazi state. One outcome of the lack of coordination among the bureaucratic apparatuses within the Third Reich is that there were often departments with overlapping duties or authorities.67

67 Ibid. Hitler would purposefully maintain the overlapping of responsibilities between different departments and would foster argument and competition between them. In a style of political Social Darwinism, Hitler would wait until a clear winner had emerged from the argument, and he would then back the winning argument. Not only did this keep Hitler

from making decisions and from the minutiae of daily politics, but it also kept his role as the Führer unblemished. 68

Survival of the fittest also occurred in Nazi politics in the way that Nazi subordinates would “work towards the Fuhrer.” In assuming Hitler’s desire s when it came to policy making, Nazi leaders would compete to enact the policies they believe Hitler most wanted. This led to the collective radicalization of the Third Reich, and it also led to Nazi leaders competing for the most radical ideas. Those with the most drastic policies were most likely to ascend Nazi rankings, as the radical ideas were the ones most likely to appease Hitler. 69

After Trump fired his first campaign manager Corey Lewandowski and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly following their

68 Kershaw, The Nazi Dictatorship, 74.

69 Kershaw, Hitler: 1889-1936, 529. Furthermore, Hitler avoided decision-making whenever possible. This led to fiercer competition among overlapping departments, as they understood that the Führer was unlikely to make the decision for them. 70

70 Ibid., 532. When Trump took office, he already had a reputation of being a businessman who liked to let his employees fight it out, so long as he reaped the benefits. As president, he did not stray far from this mindset. Trump continued the motif of his show The Apprentice once in the White House and fired people with little hesitation. This left White House staffers who were eager to remain employed scrambling to try to raise their value by gaining Trump’s trust. Furthermore, it also made the White House staff compete with one another, and they were often willing to sell each other out for the opportunity to gain Trump’s favor. 71

71 Philip Elliott, “Inside Donald Trump's White House Chaos, ” Time, February 16, 2017, https://time.com/4672974/donald-trump-white-house-chaos/.

criticisms of Jared Kushner gaining security clearance, White House staffers were made aware just how easily one could be fired when working for Trump. 72

As White House staffers guided their policy in a manner that they believed would most appease Donald Trump, the collective radicalization they experienced offers similarities in how Nazi leaders would “work towards the Fuhrer.” An example of this is the human -rights scandal that stemmed from American border patrol separating immigrant children from their parents. The plan to separate children from their family was the most hard-lined approach to immigration reform that the administration could think of. Some within the Trump administration, like Homeland Security Advisor Kirstjen Nielsen, argued against the plan and claimed it would be a mistake for America to proceed with such a heartless policy. However, because it seemed like the policy Trump would most likely back, the child-separation policy was enacted by Jeff Sessions and endorsed by Stephen Miller. 73

However, the chaotic nature of the Trump administration led to border patrol enacting the policy before they were fully prepared and had a clear plan. The issues at the border quickly worsened. As families were separated, border patrol scrambled to find a place to put the displaced children. Eventually, the immigrant children were placed in make-shift detention centers, which many reporters argued resembled farming enclosures. 74

72 Elliot, “Inside Donald Trump's White House Chaos .”

73 Luckovich, “A Very Stable Genius!,” 268-69.

74 Ibid. Trump continued to send mixed messages to his subordinates, and they were left wondering and pl anning for what

would best serve his agenda. The child -separation policies were a PR nightmare for the Trump administration, and he did his best to let others absorb the blame for them. 75

Trump and Hitler both promoted Social Darwinism amongst their subor dinates, as they believed those with strength and the best ideas would naturally find themselves on top. Hitler’s aversion to ruling on day -to-day policies combined with the chaotic structure of the Third Reich’s bureaucracies fostered competition amongst the overlapping departments. Furthermore, Hitler would often allow the departments to fight with one another and would only come to a decision once a clear winner had presented itself. Trump’s administration also enacted Social Darwinism for the Trump Whit e House. Trump continued to fire people throughout his presidency, and the quickness with which he could come to that decision forced White House staffers to compete with one another to earn Trump’s trust and favorability. Furthermore, the collective radicalization in the White House, similar to the Nazi feature of “working towards the Fuhrer,” pushed White House executives to enact more radical policies that they knew Trump would approve of.

The style in which Trump ruled America and Hitler ruled Germany offer many similarities, which helps define Trump and his movement as fascist. Both movements benefited from an economy that was moving in a positive direction, and this helped give their styl e of leadership legitimacy among the initial skeptics. Although Hitler inherited an economy that had barely begun to rebound from the Great Depression, while Trump took office with an already

75 Ibid., 267-70.

thriving economy, they were both able to use their nation’s econ omies as a reason to trust them with governmental reigns.

Hitler and Trump were also similar in the way that they placed personal loyalty above loyalty to the country. Trump showed this through his willingness to fire highly qualified White House staffers who made the mistake of speaking out against him. Hitler’s expectations for loyalty were more lethal than Trump’s, but they were still similar in essence. He made it clear to the Nazi Party that disloyalty was not an option, and he placed loyalty to the Führer above loyalty to the country.

There is also a similarity between Trump and Hitler in how they managed their country’s foreign policies. Both men made policies that were isolationist and were anti -globalization at heart. Trump’s anti-immigration and anti-Muslim policies were naturally anti -globalization, and the coldness with which he handled treaties was as well. Hitler maintained similar antiglobalization policies as well, often touting the stipulations of the Versailles Treaty and shunning the League of Nations. Hitler’s foreign policy was naturally more aggressive though, as he wished to extend the German borders into Eastern Europe. Still, Hitler and Trump both pushed anti-globalization policies, and held a similar indifference in regard to int ernational treaties.

Moreover, both Trump and Hitler normalized authoritarians from other countries. Trump did so by refusing to condemn Vladimir Putin’s role in the cyber -attacks that affected the 2016 United States elections. He also was far too willing to take the word of authoritarians like Kim Jong -Un and Vladimir Putin over the intelligence that came from his own agencies. Hitler

built relations with the Spanish fascist General Francisco Franco as soon as he was given the opportunity. Furthermore, af ter the Spanish Civil War had begun, he built relations with the authoritarian Italian and Japanese governments.

Finally, both Trump and Hitler ran chaotic governments that featured political Social Darwinism. For Trump, the “survival of the fittest” mentality is evidenced in the way that he was willing to fire his White House staff, making it vital for his subordinates to earn his trust. It can also be noted in the way that his cabinet would push towards a more radical agenda, hoping that it would appease Trump. The political Social Darwinism in the Third Reich is prevalent in the way Nazi leadership would “work towards the Fuhrer.” J.P. Stern, an authority on fascism and German history, had this to say about the chaotic nature of the Third Reich:

“The state of permanent institutional chaos, the fluidity of social status, the mobility of power and the controlled arbitrariness of its exercise – all of these were not part of an abstract ideology, but the conditions which best suited Hitler’s personal rule and ‘artistic’ temperament.” 76

Mira Crouch goes on further to claim that the Final Solution, in which Hitler and the Nazi Party systematically killed European Jews, was also a component of the Third Reich’s chaotic nature. Crouch argues that the Final Solution was somewhat arbitrary in how it was approached by Hitler and other Nazi leaders. Everything was left to spoken words, and the Nazis had to work towards what they believed Hitler wanted. 77

77 Ibid., 26-27. Yes, Hitler had long spewed

76 Mira Crouch “The Oppressors and the Oppressed in Interaction: A Shared Dimension of Everyday Life,” found in The Attractions of Fascism: Social Psychology and Aesthetics of the ‘Triumph of th e Right,’ edited by John Milfull, 26.

hatred for European Jews, and considered them a part of the “November Criminals” and an extension of Marxism, but the Final Solution was still made possible by the collective radicalization that stemmed from the mindset of “working towards the Fuhrer.”

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

On January 6, 2021, Donald Trump gave a speech to his most ardent supporters, who came to protest the results of the 2020 presidential election. Shortly after Trump’s speech, the mob of Trump supporters stormed the United States Capitol in an attempt to subvert the election certification that was to take place that day. 1

1 Peter Baker and Sabrina Tavernise, “One Legacy of Impeachment: The Most Complete Account So Far of Jan. 6,” The New York Times , February 13, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/13/us/politics/capitol-riots-impeachment-trial.html. The violent crowd left multiple officers injured. Roughly 80 members of the Capitol force and approximately 65 Metropolitan Police members were injured during the insurrection. One officer l ost an eye in the attack. An insurrectionist tasered another officer so many times by that it led to cardiac arrest. 2

2 Ibid. Some officers that had served as veterans of Iraq claimed that the experience was more traumatizing than the combat they had experienced while deployed. 3

As the insurrectionists proceeded further into the Capitol and toward United States Congressmen and Vice President Mike Pence, many within the Capitol hoped that Trump would call off his supporters. Their hopes were not met with any action from Trump. Instead, Trump poured gasoline onto the fire as the insurrectionists proceeded. The rioters entered the Capitol

3 Ibid.

at 2:12, and at 2:24 Donald Trump tweeted “Mike Pence didn’t have the courage t o do what should have been done to protect our Country and Constitution, giving States a chance to certify a corrected set of facts, not the fraudulent or inaccurate ones which they were asked to previously certify. USA demands the truth!” 4

One of the ins urrectionists read Trump’s tweet about Mike Pence through a bullhorn, and it further incensed the crowd. They began chants of “Hang Mike Pence,” and they even erected gallows outside the Capitol in case they found him. 5

Trump also offered no help for House Republican Leader Kevin McCarthy when they spoke on the phone during the insurrection. When McCarthy recommended to Trump that he make a plea to his supporters to stop the insurrection, Trump initially tried to blame Antifa, a scapegoat he often accused throughout the last year of his presidency. McCarthy assured Trump that the rioters were certainly Trump supporters. Once McCarthy had convinced Trump that the mob was not composed of Antifa members, Trump responded coldly, claiming that “I guess these people are more upset about the election than you are.” 6

When Trump finally addressed the rioters via a White House video release, his comments did little, if anything at all, to condemn the actions of the insurrectionists. Trump continued to make baseless claims about the election results, stating that “I know you’re hurt.

We had an election stolen from us. It was a landslide election, and everyone knows it, especially

4 Philip Bump, “Analysis: What Donald Trump Has Said about the Capitol Rioters,” The Washington Post , July 22, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/07/22/whatdonald-trump-has-said-about-capitol-rioters/.

5 Baker and Tavernise, “One Legacy of Impeachment. ”

6 Ibid.

the other side.”7

His address continued to decry that the election had been stolen from Trump and the Republican voters, and he continued to pander to the rioters. One of the last things he said in the address was “we have to have peace. So go home. We love you. You’re very special.”8

8 Ibid. He was telling a mob of insurrectionists, a mob that had stormed the White House and threatened to hang Trump’s vice president Mike Pence , that they were special, and he loved them. He continued to justify the rioters’ acts on Twitter, claiming “these are the things and events that happen when a sacred landslide election victory is so unceremoniously & viscously stripped away from great patriots who have been badly & unfairly treated for so long. Go home with love & in peace. Remember this day forever!” 9

The January 6 attack on the United States Capitol has pushed many historians of fascism to shift their position on whether Trump is indeed fascist or not. Fo llowing the attempted insurrection, fascist scholar Robert Paxton claimed that “Trump’s incitement of the invasion of the Capitol on January 6, [2021] removes my objection to the fascist label. His open encouragement of civic violence to overturn an electi on crosses a red line. The label now seems not just acceptable but necessary.”10

Other fascist scholars have similarly moved their position

7 Bump, “What Donald Trump Has Said about the Capitol Rioters. ”

9 Ibid. Trump’s plea to his base to remember this day forever further illustrates that Trump was completely willing to defend the actions of the insurrectionists.

10 Robert O. Paxton, “I've Hesitated to Call Donald Trump a Fascist. Until Now: Opinion,” Newsweek, January 11, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/robert-paxton-trump-fascist1560652.

and are now claiming Trump is a fascist. Some have also noted that the attack on the United States Capitol should serve as a warning. David Renton notes that if the election was closer, Donald Trump may have found more success in swaying the results of the election. He goes on further to offer a warning to America, claiming that “it turns out that our society is more polarized, and more vulnerable to authoritarianism than we like to believe.” 11

However,

Trump’s rhetoric, as discussed in the first two chapters of this work, shows that he was a fascist before January 6, 2021.

Trump’s January 6th speech serves as the catalyst that inspired this horrific event, one which led to the United States’ Capitol being breached for the first time since the British had done so in the War of 1812. 12

The insurrection was the culmination of the cumulative radicalization of Trump’s base, which started when he began campaigning in 2015. As discussed in chapter four, the Trump administration radicalized in their efforts to appease Trump, which was similar to the way Nazi leaders “worked towards the Fuhrer.” But it was not just Trump’s cabinet that experienced a cumulative radicalization. Trump’s base also became more radicalized throughout Trump’s administration, which is clear in the way the insurrectionis ts stormed the Capitol on January 6th. As noted above, Trump’s tweet about Mike Pence led the insurrectionists to shout, “Hang Mike Pence.” They were willing to jump to the most radical

11 David Renton, “Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” edited by Paul Nicholas Jackson, Fascism 10, 1 (2021): 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-10010009.

12 Lawrence B. A. Hatter, “Perspective: The Similarities to the Last Invasion of the Capitol Matter, So Do the Differences,” The Washington Post , January 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/01/11/similarities-last-invasion-capitolmatter-so-do-differences/.

solution possible to satisfy Trump. Trump’s rhetoric throughout his ad ministration also played a large role in this collective radicalization, as he had long condoned and supported violence.

The speech Trump gave that incited his crowd of supporters contained each of the components of fascist rhetoric discussed in the firs t two chapters. As discussed in chapter one, Trump often described himself as an outsider to the political world, which he claimed gave him the advantage of being able to “fix Washington,” or to “drain the swamp.” Trump’s January 6 speech continued this tr end, even though he had been the United States President for the past four years. He claimed that “together, we will drain the Washington swamp, and we will clean up the corruption in our nation’s Capitol. It’s a dirty business. You have a lot of bad peopl e there.”13

Trump’s claim that he was an outsider positioned himself as not only someone who could fix it, but also as a victim to the corruption due to his losing the election.

Trump’s January 6 speech also referred to America’s great past. Although he d id not use the phrase “Make America Great Again,” he did make claims that had the same palingenetic core. Similar to remarks Trump has made about Confederate statues, Trump brought up the notion of “cancel culture” multiple times throughout the speech and argued that the Left was trying to erase American history. He claimed that Democrats wanted to remove Washington’s name from the Washington Monument, and he also said that Democrats wanted to get rid of the Jefferson Memorial.14

14 Ibid. Trump went on to claim that the Left was attacking American heroes,

13 Brian Naylor, “Read Trump's Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial,” NPR, February 10, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-partof-impeachment-trial.

stating “they’ll knock Lincoln too, by the way. You hurt our monuments, you hurt our heroes, you go to jail for 10 years.”15

15 Ibid. Trump’s claims that Democrats wanted to tear down historic American statues was a statement he made throughout his presidency, and he used it as way to argue that Democrats were trying to make children ashamed to be American. 16

As discussed in chapter one, Trump was staunchly anti -press, and his anti-press position was perhaps the most central component of his January 6 speech, as he attacked them repeatedly throughout. One of the first claims he made, aside from addressing the crowd and its size, was an attack on the United States press. He argued that “the media is the biggest problem we have as far as I’m concerned, single biggest problem. The fake news.” 17

17 Naylor, “Trump’s Jan. 6 Speech.” Somehow, his assaults on the media only got worse from there. Later in the speech, he asserted “we don’t have a free and fair press. Our media is not free, it’s not fair. It suppresses tho ught. It suppresses speech and it’s become the enemy of the people. It’s become the enemy of the people. It’s the biggest problem we have in this country.” 18

18 Ibid. He attacked the press other times as well, but the core of his assaults against the press remained the same. Trump argued that since the media covered the election, and because they claimed that he had lost, they were obviously spreading lies.19

16 Shannon Pettypiece, “Trump Calls for 'Patriotic Education,' Says Anti -racism Teachings Are 'Child Abuse,’” NBCNews.com, September 18, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/whitehouse/trump-calls-patriotic-eduction-says-anti-racism-teachings-are-child-n1240372.

19 Ibid.

As discussed in the first chapter, Trump’s rhetoric targeted immigrants since his presidential campaign beg an in 2015. Trump’s January 6 speech continued his racist and xenophobic claims, and he primarily used these attacks as a means to discredit the results of the 2020 election. Trump argued that the only reason Democrats did not want to pass stricter voter identification laws was because they wanted illegal immigrants to be able to vote in the elections, which is a baseless claim. There is no evidence that a large number of illegal immigrants casted votes in the 2020 election, or in any election at all. 20

Towards the end of his speech, he made a much more overtly racist and xenophobic comment. He argued that the Biden administration would allow illegal immigration to flow into America unimpeded. Trump claimed “but now, the caravans. I think Biden’s getting in, the caravans are forming again. They want to come in again and rip off our country. Can’t let it happen.” 21

Chapter two discussed Trump’s rhetoric that focused on America’s need for a strong law and order, and it also discussed the way Trump used fearmongering to claim that the Left should not be allowed to lead the country. Trump’s January 6th speech did include his support

20 Daniel Dale, Tara Subramaniam, and Holmes Lybrand, “Fact Ch eck: A Sample of the False Claims Trump, Republicans Told on the Day the Capitol Was Stormed,” CNN, January 07, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/07/politics/fact-check-trump-republicans-electoral-collegeobjections/index.html.

21 Naylor, “Trump's Jan. 6 Speech.” His claim here is strikingly similar to the one he made in his 2015 campaign announcement speech, in which he argued that Mexico was sending drug dealers and rapists into America. 22

22 Time Staff, “Donald Trump's Presidential Announcement Speech,” Time, June 16, 2015, https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech/.

for the military and for the police, but it was not a main component. 23

Chapter two also discussed the way Trump defined his movement as one of strength and placed it in diametrical opposition to those he deemed weak. Like the anti-press component, strength and weakness was a key component of Trump’s January 6 th speech. Throughout the entire speech he argued that those who were supporting his effort to undermine the election were strong, and those who were opposed to this were weak. He argued that the Republican Party was filled with weaklings, and they were the ones who were going to allow the election to be stolen by the Democratic Party. 25

23 Naylor, “Trump's Jan. 6 Speech. ” However, his speech was highly alarmist, which was intended to scare his viewers about the upcoming Biden administration. Multiple times throughout the speech, Trump used phrases with the same theme: “you’re not going to have a country anymore.” 24

24 Ibid. He utilized this idea multiple times throughout the speech to argue to his base that if nothing were done about Biden’s victory, then the country they knew and grew up with would be gone forever. If Trump’s supporters did not act, the Biden administration would bring the country to ruin.

25 Ibid. He also claimed multiple times that his supporters needed to be strong fighters. He argued that “you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have to show strength and you have to be strong.” 26

26 Ibid. Trump’s insistence on using the metaphor of a fighte r is an extension of his condoning of violence, which was also discussed in chapter two.

The core of Trump’s speech was populist, which chapter two described as a key component to fascism. The crux of Trump’s argument on January 6 was that the political establishment was taking away the election that Trump and his supporters had won, and they needed to do something in response to prevent their voices from being silenced. 27

Another key component of Trump’s January 6 speech was his utilization of misinformation to incite the crowd. The lies that Trump preached to the crowd were the same ones he had claimed as soon as he lost the 2020 presidential election, and they were the lies that made the attack on the Capitol possible.29

27 Ibid. After Trump claimed that the election had been stolen from the Republicans, an elec tion that he argued he won by a landslide, he told his supporters “we will not let them silence your voices. We’re not going to let it happen. I’m not going to let it happen.” 28

28 Ibid. The rest of Trump’s January 6th speech flowed from this populist idea, that only Trump’s supporters could stop the Democrats from rigging the presidential elections.

29 Ibid. Immediately following his election loss in November 2020, Trump peddled lies that the election was a sham and that he, not Joe Biden, was the winner.30

As discussed in chapter two, Trump’s base accepted his lies with little -to-no hesitation. The lie that Democrats stole the 2020 election built resentment among Trump’s

30 Andrew Higgins, “The Art of the Lie? The Bigger the Better,” The New York Times , January 10, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/10/world/europe/trump-truth-lies-power.html.

31

base, and when Trump spoke on January 6 they were re ady to act. Trump’s base still largely believes that Trump won the 2020 election.

Trump’s falsehoods regarding the results of the 2020 election are still influencing the Republican Party and the trust Americans have in their democratic system. According to a May 2, 2021 poll from Reuters, most Republicans, roughly 53 percent, still believed that Trump had the election stolen from him and that Joe Biden only won due to illegal voting. 32

Joe Biden won his election handily, and Trump was still able to inspire an insurrection. If the results are closer in the 2024 presidential election, and Republicans lose again, who knows what the dejected voters may be capable of.

As discussed in the third chapter of th is work, Hitler’s 1923 coup attempt was a resounding failure in terms of taking control of the German government. 34

However, the event gave Hitler a platform from which to speak, and he was also given a light sentence from the German justice system for wha t amounts to treasonous acts.35

31 “53% of Republicans View Trump as True U.S. President,” Reuters, May 24, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/us/53-republicans-view-trump-true-us-presidentreutersipsos-2021-05-24/.

32 Ibid. While it is speculative at this point, the Republican Party’s distru st of American elections can lead to massive problems in the future, especially if there is a close presidential election. As fascist scholar Mattias Gardell puts it, “Trump’s 74 million voters and their grievances are still out there…”33

33 Mattias Gardell, “Debate: Donald Trump and Fascism Studies,” edited by Paul Nicholas Jackson, Fascism 10, no. 1 (2021): 3-4, https://doi.org/10.1163/22116257-10010009.

34 Harold J. Gordon Jr., Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972), 479.

35 Ibid. During his short imprisonment,

Hitler’s popularity only increased, and it continued to rise after his release of Mein Kampf.36

On February 13, 2021, the Senate voted 57-43 in favor of convicting Trump, which was short of the two-thirds necessary for conviction. 38

36 Ibid. Similarly, five days after the attack on the United States Capitol, the House of Representatives voted to impeach Donald Trump for his role of inciting the insurrectionists. 37

38 Ibid. Had Trump been convicted by the Senate, they could have barred Trump from running for any future elections. 39

With those numbers, it is

37 Weiyi Cai, “A Step-by-Step Guide to the Second Impeachment of Donald J. Trump,” The New York Times , February 08, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/02/08/us/politics/trump-second-impeachmenttimeline.html.

39 Ibid. The Republican Senators balked at the chance of preventing Trump from ever being president again, a man who had just incited a riot that could have killed them. Similar to the weak way the German government handled Hitler’s trial and sentencing for the Beer Hall Putsch, the Senate’s acquittal of Trump following his incitement of an insurrection means that he can run for president as soon as 2024.

Like Hitler’s popularity after his attempted coup, Trump’s popularity within his party has hardly diminished following the January 6 riot. According to a poll from the Pew Research Center, two thirds of Republican voters or conservative independents want Trump to continue having a role in the Republican Party. Furthermore, 44 percent of those polled claimed they want Trump to be the frontrunner for the Republican nomination. 40

40 Amina Dunn, “Two-thirds of Republicans Want Trump to Retain Major Political Role; 44% Want Him to Run Again in 2024,” Pew Research Center, October 18, 2021, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/10/06/two-thirds-of-republicans-want-trumpto-retain-major-political-role-44-want-him-to-run-again-in-2024/.

hard to believe Trump will not be running for president in 2024. The Trump campaign will likely run a campaign based on “taking back what had been stolen from them,” as this was a main component of his January 6th speech and would surely rile up his base.41

Should Trump win, America will have a fascist in the White House for another f our years. Should Trump lose, and especially if he loses a close election, it is difficult to foresee how he and his base will react. Hopefully, the storming of the Capitol by Americans is a one -time phenomenon for this country.

41 Naylor, “Trump's Jan. 6 Speech .”

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