656847
research-article2016
SRDXXX10.1177/2378023116656847SociusVachon et al.
Original Article
Union Decline in a Neoliberal Age: Globalization, Financialization, European Integration, and Union Density in 18 Affluent Democracies
Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World Volume 2: 1–22 © The Author(s) 2016 DOI: 10.1177/2378023116656847 srd.sagepub.com
Todd E. Vachon1, Michael Wallace1, and Allen Hyde1
Abstract This paper examines the long-run effects of globalization, financialization, and European integration on union density in 18 affluent capitalist democracies between 1981 and 2010. After appropriate controls, imports from developing and imports from advanced countries and financialization negatively affect, and capital mobility positively affects, unionization. Immigration has no consistent effect on unionization. Also, European integration—measured as logged years of membership in the European Union (EU)—negatively affects unionization. Interactions of EU membership with globalization and financialization variables reveal a complicated pattern with distinctive effects for EU and nonEU countries. Overall, our findings contribute to the ongoing stream of scholarly research about the causes of union decline among affluent democratic countries in the neoliberal period. Keywords globalization, financialization, European Union, unionization
Introduction The era of neoliberalism has created tremendous challenges for workers throughout the world, including those in the most affluent capitalist democracies. Unionized and nonunionized workers alike are confronted by competition within new, globalized markets that extend the logic of comparative advantage to include differences in wages and working conditions. A prominent concern for workers in many countries is globalization’s potential erosion of the strength of workers’ organizations and ultimately the political power and economic standing of the working class. It has been well documented that union density—the percentage of the labor force that belongs to unions—has been declining since the 1980s in most affluent democratic countries (Wallerstein and Western 2000). This decrease of union density combined with the increasing centralization and concentration of capital on a global scale has threatened the uneasy balance of power that existed between capital and labor throughout much of the post–World War II period (Harvey 2011). Despite widespread evidence of union decline, there is little agreement about the mechanisms eroding workers’ power. The unionization literature has focused on a variety of explanations, including fluctuations in the business cycle
(Ashenfelter and Penceval 1969; Bain and Elsheikh 1976; Fiorito and Greer 1982; Hirsch and Addison 1986), variations in labor market institutions (Griffin, McCammon, and Botsko 1990; Western 1993, 1995, 1997; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1999; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Brady 2007), and to a lesser extent specific aspects of globalization (Brady and Wallace 2000; Scruggs and Lange 2002; Lee 2005). The past couple decades have witnessed conspicuous levels of union decline, even in labor strongholds such as Germany and Sweden. These declines have corresponded with a growing trend toward the decentralization of wage bargaining, the ongoing globalization of national economies, and a shift of traditionally left political parties to more centrist positions regarding markets and the welfare state. Further, many of the world’s affluent democracies have been undergoing a process of regional integration—both political and economic—within the European Union (EU). Considering 1University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
Corresponding Author: Todd E. Vachon, Department of Sociology, University of Connecticut, 344 Mansfield Rd., Storrs, CT 06269-2068, USA. Email: todd.vachon@uconn.edu
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