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Global Environmental Change journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha
Climate change and the transition to neoliberal environmental governance a,⁎
David Ciplet , J. Timmons Roberts a b
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University of Colorado Boulder, 397 UCB, Boulder, CO 80309, USA Brown University, IBES, Brown University, Box 1951, 85 Waterman Street, Providence, RI 02912, USA
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords: Climate change Neoliberal environmental governance United nations framework convention on climate change Inequality Climate justice
What are the guiding principles of contemporary international governance of climate change and to what extent do they represent neoliberal forms? We document five main political and institutional shifts within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and outline core governance practices for each phase. In discussing the current phase since the Paris Agreement, we offer to the emerging literature on international neoliberal environmental governance an analytical framework by which the extent of international neoliberal governance can be assessed. We conceptualize international neoliberal environmentalism as characterized by four main processes: the prominence of libertarian ideals of justice, in which justice is defined as the rational pursuit of sovereign self-interest between unequal parties; marketization, in which market mechanisms, private sector engagement and purportedly ‘objective’ considerations are viewed as the most effective and efficient forms of governance; governance by disclosure, in which the primary obstacles to sustainability are understood as ‘imperfect information’ and onerous regulatory structures that inhibit innovation; and exclusivity, in which multilateral decision-making is shifted from consensus to minilateralism. Against this framework, we argue that the contemporary UNFCCC regime has institutionalized neoliberal reforms in climate governance, although not without resistance, in a configuration which is starkly different than that of earlier eras. We conclude by describing four crucial gaps left by this transition, which include the ability of the regime to drive adequate ambition, and gaps in transparency, equity and representation.
1. Introduction During the last week of the long-anticipated UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009, leading climate activist Bill McKibben published an article in the Guardian with the title “Copenhagen: only the numbers count – and they add up to hell on earth.” He was referring to the fact that a new website called Climate Interactive had added up all of the promises made by states to reduce their emissions, and the conclusion was that global emissions concentrations would increase to more than double what many scientists believed to be reasonably safe by the year 2100. McKibben said that under these conditions, “we would live in hell, or at least a place with a similar temperature” (McKibben, 2009). At the time of McKibben’s statement, a shift in governance in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was believed by many to have weakened the ability of the regime to carry out its core function: reducing greenhouse gas emissions and stabilizing the global climate system, which had particular implications in the near term for the world’s poorest and lowest-lying island countries (Ciplet et al., 2015). Changes in international climate governance
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that were introduced in Copenhagen were institutionalized over the next six years of negotiations, culminating in Paris in late 2015. In particular, a ‘top down’ system of more binding national ‘targets and timetables’ for emissions based on responsibility for climate change and capabilities to address it were replaced by a system of ‘bottom up’ pledges by each nation. Though there was much celebration at the final gavel in Paris, the ambivalence about the outcome and new direction was still palpable. Some observers hailed the outcome and approach as bringing nations to the table with the level of commitment they were comfortable with, providing the best outcome possible (e.g. Stavins, 2015; Bodansky, 2016; Victor, 2016). But acknowledging the inadequacy of the deal to stabilize the climate, journalist George Monbiot wrote, “By comparison to what it could have been, it’s a miracle. By comparison to what it should have been, it’s a disaster” (Monbiot, 2015). What drove the shift in climate governance, and how do we understand its potential for future success in addressing the need for rapid of greenhouse gas emissions reductions in an equitable fashion? This article contributes to an emergent body of scholarship that seeks to make sense of climate governance and particularly the post-Paris
Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: david.ciplet@colorado.edu (D. Ciplet), timmons@brown.edu (J.T. Roberts).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2017.09.003 Received 15 December 2016; Received in revised form 18 August 2017; Accepted 1 September 2017 $YDLODEOH RQOLQH 6HSWHPEHU (OVHYLHU /WG $OO ULJKWV UHVHUYHG