Translators,thecrucialintermediariesofglobalculturalexchange,aresubjecttoaunique set of dangers and opportunities in the multinational era. Structurally, translators occupy a positionanalogoustotheglobalcurrencyandcreditmarkets.Attheirbest,theyfacilitateatruly equalculturalexchange,inwhichtheachievementsofoneculturearemadeavailabletoanother. Attheirworst,theycensortheoriginal text,short-circuiting theflowofideas,mediationsand aesthetic achievements. The task of the translator,toparaphraseWalterBenjamin’slandmark essayontranslation,istothinknotonlywhatisbeingtranslated,butthehistoricalconstellations inwhichitissaid;putsimply,totranscodeacomplexculturalmatrix,insteadofjustthewords, phrasesorevenindividualmeanings.This,ofcourse,isimpossible,butgoodtranslationsnourish themselvesonpreciselytheimpossibilityinquestion.Thisiswhythefirstlawoftranslationis, “change nothing”,whilethesecondis“anything goes”.Itistheepicstrugglebetweenthetwo extremes which results in translations worthy of the name; anythinglessjustisn’tworththe paper it’s printed on. Strange as it sounds, good translations are actually rather like the false-colorimagesofdistantplanetsrelayedbyspacecraft:NeptuneandPlutowouldn’tactually looklikethattothenakedeyesofanastronautcruisingthedimouterreachesofthesolarsystem in person, but the reprocessed and rescaled image does justice to the reality, by makingthe inexperienceableneverthelessexperienceableafterall.
All these issues are exacerbated to the breaking point by Adorno’s texts, which are mind-bogglingcomplex,breathtakinglybeautifulmeditationsonwhatitmeans(aswellaswhat itdoesn’tmean)tobeasociallyresponsiblecitizenofthetotalsystem.Thinking,saidBrecht,is oneofthegreatest pleasures oflife,andonthisscoreAdorno,whocertainlyhadhisshareof disagreements withCentralEurope’sgreatestmodernistplaywright,wouldnotonlyconcur,but match Brecht’s own aesthetic praxis step for dialectical step by writing some of the most gorgeous theory ever written. ThoughI’vedonemybesttorendersomethingofthesubtlety, grace, tact and sheer power of Adorno’s original, bear in mind that what you’re reading is nothingbutthefalse-colorbitmapimage,asitwere,oftheplanetarysurfaceoftheoriginal.
Inthefollowingtext,I’veusedthestandardphilosophicaltranslationsfortermswherever possible,e.g.Anschauungisrenderedasintuition,Austauschisexchange,Seiendesisexistent, etc.AsmuchofAdorno’sgorgeous,intricatelypoeticgrammarhasbeenpreservedaspossible, by using “the latter” and “the former” in place ofpronouns,whicharemarkedbygenderin German,thusallowingforcomplexsentencestobearrangedincompactform;thepronounsof thetexthasalsobeengender-balanced, sofarasthisispossible(i.e.bysubstituting “one”or “they” for“he”).CertaintermshavealsobeengivenmorespininEnglish,tocarryacrosstheir contextualmeaning(i.e.Ordnungisusuallytranslatedas“socialorder”insteadofthecolorless, bland “order”). Allgemeine is usually “general” and Allgemeinheit “generality” or “universality”; thedelightfully untranslatabletermSchein(appearance,semblance,aswellasa financialnoteorbill;“seemingness”mightcometheclosest)isalwaysandeverywheremarked as follows: “appearance [Schein]”, whereas the mundane Erscheinung (ordinary, everyday appearance)isusuallytranslatedas“appearance”and,morerarely,as“phenomenon”,depending onthecontext.TheequallyuntranslatableGeist(“mind”,“spirit”)isrenderedincapitalizedform as “Spirit”, following the standard Hegel translations. I have, however, made a point of translatinggeistlichandrelatedadjectivesas“intellectual”whereverpossible,duetothespecific conditions of Anglo-Saxon culture, i.e. the fact that the culture of the Cold War constantly
Anglo-saxon culture is also at issue in one of the most common terms Adornouses, namely Bann, “spell”, translated hereinasthedeliberately malign, archaic “bane” ratherthan “spell”, “charm” or “magic” (with the one exception that“Bannkreis” isrenderedas“magic circle”).Thereasonisthatthemultinationalmediaandinformationculturehasabsorbedmassive amounts of mythology and folklore into itself, effectively rendering these terms harmless, somethingapparent everywherefromJimiHendrix’sclassiclineinPurpleHaze:“AmIhappy, or inmisery/whateveritis,thatgirlputaspellonme”totheendlessreferences tosoftware wizardsandlistserv trolls.Thewordbanehasresisted thisincorporation,atleastsofar,while remainingcloseenoughtotheoriginaltostick.
Selectednounswereexpandedintoclauses,togivethephilosophicalfeeloftheoriginal, i.e.“dasUnvermittelte”mightberenderedas“thatwhichisimmediate”ratherthansimply“the immediate”, dependingonthecontext. Individuumisusuallytranslated as“theindividuated”, withonlyafewexceptions, duetothefactthatAdornoisconstantlyplayingofftheobjective overtonesoftheterm(itmeanstheindividualinanabstract,categoricalsense)againstthemore subjective Einzelne orIndividual (“individual” inthesenseofaconcreteperson).Sachverhalt hasbeentranslatedas“matter-at-hand”,exceptforafewcaseswherethecontextoverwhelming suggesteditsassociatedmeaningofanexistential,abstract“stateofaffairs”;Sache,literallythe “thing” or“matter”, inthesenseofasetofimmediatefactsordata,hasadirect,immediately material ring in German which “state of affairs” doesn’t quite capture. Other minor points: Technicis“technics”,aperfectlygoodwordreferringtothetotalityoftechnicalknowledgeand praxis,nottechnologyortechnique.Finally,alltheGreek,Latin,FrenchandItaliantermshave beentranslated, andtheGreektermsgiventheirLatin spellings; philosophical termsinGreek were translated with the assistance of the superb Perseus Digital Library, available at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu
–DennisRedmond October2001
Editorial Note 2021: The following text convertsAdorno’stwohundredfootnotes,originally organizedbysection,intostandardbook-lengthfootnotes.Alloriginalnotations(e.g.theuseof “ibid” are preserved so far as possible. Adorno’s forty-six asterisked notes have also been numberedandincluded attheendofeachsection,toenable text-searches. Notethatthepage numbers next to each section in bold font, as well as the page numbers listed next to the asteriskednote,refertotheoriginalGermantextpublishedbySuhrkampVerlag.
NegativeDialectics
ByTheodorAdorno
Prologue
The formulation “negative dialectics” transgresses against tradition. Already in Plato dialectics intended toestablish somethingpositivethroughthethought-means ofthenegation; thefigureofanegationofthenegationnamedthisprecisely.Thebookwouldliketoemancipate dialectics from these types of affirmative essence, withoutrelinquishing anythingintermsof determinacy.Thedevelopmentofitsparadoxicaltitleisoneofitsintentions.
What in accordance with the conception of philosophy would be the foundation, the authordevelopsonlyafteragreatdealofexplicationofwhatthatconceptionpresumeswouldbe raisedonafoundation.Thisimpliesthecritiqueoftheconceptofthefoundation,aswellasof the primacy of substantive thought.Itsself-consciousness achieves itsmovement solelyinits consummation.Itrequireswhat,accordingtothegroundrulesoftheSpiritwhichalwaysremain ineffect,issecondary.
What is given herein is not solely a methodology of material labor of the author; according tothetheoryofnegative dialectics,nocontinuumexistsbetweentheformerandthe latter Howeversuchadiscontinuity,andwhatinstructions maybereadoutofitforthinking, willindeedbedealtwith.Theprocedureisnotgrounded,butjustified.Theauthorlays,sofaras hecan,hiscardsonthetable;thisisbynomeansthesamethingasthegame.
When Benjamin in 1937 read the part oftheMetacritique ofEpistemology whichthe authorhadfinishedatthattime –thelastchapterofthepublishedwork–hecommented,one hadtojourneythroughtheicywastelandofabstractioninordertodefinitivelyarriveatconcrete philosophizing. Negative dialectics nowindicates suchapath,retrospectively Concretion was forthemostpartsmuggledintocontemporary philosophy.Bycontrastthelargelyabstracttext wishestovouchforitsauthenticitynolessthanfortheexplanationoftheauthor’sconcretemode ofprocedure.Ifonespeaksinthenewestaestheticdebatesofanti-dramaandanti-heroes,then Negative Dialectics, which holds itself distant from all aesthetic themes, could be called an anti-system.Withlogicallyconsistentmeans,itattemptstoput,inplaceoftheprincipleofunity andofthehegemonyofthesupra-ordinatedconcept,thatwhichwouldbeoutsideofthebaneof suchunity.Sincetheauthorhastrustedhimselftofollowhisownintellectualimpulses,hefeltit tobehistasktobreakthroughthedelusionofconstitutivesubjectivitybymeansofthepowerof the subject; he no longer wished to put off this task. To reachstringently acrosstheofficial divisionofpurephilosophyandwhatisrelevanttothematter[Sachhaltigem]orwhatisformally scientific,wasoneofthedeterminingmotivestherein.
The introduction expounds the concept of philosophical experience. The first section startsoutfromthestateoftheontologywhichdominatestodayinGermany.Itisnotjudgedfrom above, but is comprehended out of its need, which is no less problematic for its part, and criticized immanently. The secondsectionproceedsfromtheresultstotheideaofanegative dialectics and its position in relation to several categories, which it preserves as well as qualitatively transforms.Thethirdsectionthencarriesoutmodelsofnegativedialectics.They arenotexamples;theydonotsimplyilluminategeneralconsiderations.Byleadingtowardswhat isrelevanttothematter,theywouldliketosimultaneouslydojusticetothesubstantiveintention
ofwhatisatfirstdealtwithgenerally,outofnecessity,incontrasttotheusageofexamplesas something indifferent in themselves, which Plato introduced and which philosophy has ever sincemerelyrepeated.Whilethemodelsaresupposedtoclarifywhatnegativedialecticswould be,andtodrivethislatter,accordingtoitsownconcept,intotherealmofreality,theyelucidate, notdissimilar totheso-called exemplary models,keyconceptsofphilosophicaldisciplines,in ordertocentrally intervene inthese.Adialecticsoffreedomwilldothisforthephilosophyof ethics;“World-SpiritandNaturalHistory”forthatofhistory;thelastchaptercircles,feelingits way,aroundmetaphysicalquestions,inthesenseoftheaxialrevolutionoftheCopernicanturn, bymeansofcriticalself-reflection.
Ulrich Sonneman is working on a book which is supposed to be entitled Negative Anthropology.Neitherhenortheauthorknewbeforehandaboutthecoincidence.Itreferstoa compulsioninthethingitself.
The author is prepared for the resistance, which Negative Dialectics will provoke. Withoutrancor,hedoesnotbegrudgethejoyofallthose,bothhitherandyonder[i.e.onboth sides of the BerlinWall],whowillproclaim thattheyhadalwayssaiditandnowtheauthor wouldbeconfessingit.
Frankfurt,Summer1966
Introduction
OnthePossibilityofPhilosophy15-16
Philosophy,whichonceseemedoutmoded,remainsalivebecausethemomentofitsrealization wasmissed.Thesummaryjudgementthatithadmerelyinterpretedtheworld isitselfcrippled byresignation beforereality,andbecomesadefeatismofreasonafterthetransformationofthe worldfailed.Itguaranteesnoplacefromwhichtheoryassuchcouldbeconcretelyconvictedof theanachronism,whichthenasnowitissuspectedof.Perhapstheinterpretationwhichpromised thetransitiondidnotsuffice.Themomentonwhichthecritiqueoftheorydependedisnottobe prolonged theoretically. Praxis, delayed for the foreseeable future, is no longer the court of appeals against self-satisfied speculation, but for the most part the pretext under which executivesstrangulatethatcriticalthoughtasidlewhichatransformingpraxismostneeds.After philosophybrokewiththepromisethatitwouldbeonewithrealityoratleaststruckjustbefore thehourofitsproduction,ithasbeencompelledtoruthlesslycriticizeitself.Whatonce,against theappearance [Schein]ofthesensesandeveryoutwards-oriented experience, feltitselftobe that which is purely unnaive, has for its part become asnaiveasthosemiserable candidates Goethereceived ahundredandfiftyyearsago,whonourishedthemselvesonspeculation.The introverted thought-architect lives behind the moon which extroverted technicians have confiscated. In the face of an immeasurably expanded society and the progress of positive cognition of nature, the conceptual structures in which, according to philosophic mores, the totality is supposed to be housed, resemble remnants of simple commodity society amidst industriallatecapitalism.Themeanwhilecompletelymismatchedrelationship(sincedegradedto ameretopos)betweeneachSpiritandpower,strikestheattempttocomprehendthishegemony by those inspired with their own concept of the Spirit with futility. The very will to do so betokens a power-claim which countermands what is to be understood. The retrogression of philosophytoanarrowscientificfield,renderednecessarybytheriseofspecificscientificfields, is the singlemosteye-opening expressionofitshistorical fate.HadKant,inhiswords,freed himselffromthescholasticconceptofphilosophyintoitsworld-concept,1 thenthishasregressed undercompulsiontoitsscholasticconcept.Whereitconfusesthislatterwiththeworld-concept, itspretensions degenerate intosheerludicrousness.Hegelknewthis,inspiteoftheteachingof theabsoluteSpirittowhichheassignedphilosophy,asameremomentofreality,asanactivityin thedivisionoflabor,andtherebyrestrictedit.Sincethen,itsownnarrownessanddiscrepancyto reality has emerged out of this, and all the more so, the more thoroughly it forgot this delimitationandexpungeditfromitselfassomethingalien,inordertojustifyitsownpositionin atotalitywhichitmonopolizesasitsobject,insteadofrecognizinghowverymuchitsimmanent truthdependsonsuch,downtoitsinnermostcomposition.Onlythephilosophywhichdispenses withsuchnaivete istheslightest bitworththinkingfurther.Itscritical self-reflection maynot stophoweverbeforethehighestachievementsofitshistory.Itneedstobeaskedifandwhether, following the collapse of the Hegelian one, itwouldevenbepossibleanymore,justasKant investigated the possibility of metaphysics after the critique of rationalism. If the Hegelian doctrineofthedialecticrepresentedtheimpossiblegoalofshowing,withphilosophicalconcepts,
that it wasequaltothetaskofwhatwasultimately heterogenoustosuch,anaccount islong overdueofitsrelationshiptodialectics,andwhypreciselyhisattemptfailed.
DialecticsNotaStandpoint16-18
Notheoryescapes themarket anymore: eachoneisofferedasapossibility amongcompeting opinions,allaremadeavailable,allsnappedup.Thoughtneednomoreputblindersonitself,in theself-justifyingconvictionthatone’sowntheoryisexemptfromthisfate,whichdegenerates intonarcissistic self-promotion, thandialectics needfallsilentbeforesuchareproachandthe onelinkedtoit,concerningitssuperfluityandrandomnessasaslapdashmethod.Itsnamesays tobeginwithnothingmorethanthatobjectsdonotvanishintotheirconcept,thattheseendupin contradiction withthereceived normoftheadaequatio. Thecontradiction isnotwhatHegel’s absoluteidealismunavoidablytransfigureditinto:noHeracliteanessence.Itistheindexofthe untruthofidentity,ofthevanishingoftheconceptualintotheconcept.Theappearance[Schein] of identity dwells however in thinking itself as a pure form from within.Tothinkmeansto identify.Conceptualschematasself-contentedlypushasidewhatthinkingwantstocomprehend. Its appearance [Schein] and its truth delimit themselves. The former is not to besummarily removed, for example by vouchsafing some existent-in-itself outside of the totality of thought-determinations. There is a moment in Kant, and this was mobilized against him by Hegel, which secretly regards the in-itself beyond the concept as something wholly indeterminable, as null and void. To the consciousness of the phenomenal appearance [Scheinhaftigkeit] oftheconceptual totality thereremainsnothingleftbuttobreakthroughthe appearance [Schein] of total identity: in keeping with its own measure. Since however this totality is formed according to logic, whose core is constructed from the proposition of the excluded third,everything whichdoesnotconformtosuch,everything qualitatively divergent assumes the signature of the contradiction. The contradiction is the non-identical under the aspectofidentity; theprimacy oftheprinciple ofcontradiction indialectics measures whatis heterogenousinunitarythinking.Bycollidingagainstitsownborders,itreachesbeyonditself. Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of non-identity. It is not related in advance to a standpoint.Thoughtisdriven,outofitsunavoidable insufficiency,itsguiltforwhatitthinks, towardsit.Ifoneobjected,ashasbeenrepeatedeversincebytheAristoteliancriticsofHegel,2 that dialectics for its part grinds everything indiscriminately in its mill down into the mere logicalformofthecontradiction,overlooking–evenCrocearguedthis3 –thetruepolyvalenceof thatwhichisnotcontradictory,ofthesimplydifferent,oneisonlydisplacingtheblameforthe thingontothemethod.Thatwhichisdifferentiatedappearsasdivergent,dissonant,negative,so long as consciousness must push towards unityaccording toitsownformation: solongasit measures that which is not identical with itself, with its claim to the totality. This is what dialectics holdsuptotheconsciousnessasthecontradiction.Thankstotheimmanentnatureof consciousness, that which is in contradiction has itself the character of inescapable and catastrophic nomothetism [Gesetzmässigkeit: law-abiding character].Identityandcontradiction inthinkingareweldedtooneanother.Thetotalityofthecontradictionisnothingotherthanthe
Thislawishowevernotoneofthinking,butreal.Whoeversubmitstodialecticaldiscipline,must unquestionably pay with the bitter sacrifice ofthequalitative polyvalence ofexperience. The impoverishment ofexperience throughdialectics, whichinfuriates mainstream opinion,proves itself however to be entirely appropriate totheabstract monotonyoftheadministered world. Whatispainfulaboutitisthepainofsuch,raisedtoaconcept.Cognitionmustbowtoit,ifit does not wish toonceagaindegradetheconcretion totheideology,whichitreally beginsto become. Another version of dialectics satisfied itself with its lackluster renaissance: with its derivationinthehistoryofideasfromtheKantianaporiasandthatwhichwasprogrammedinto thesystemsofhissuccessors,butnotachieved.Itistobeachievedonlynegatively.Dialectics developsthedifferenceoftheparticularfromthegenerality,whichisdictatedbythegenerality. While itisinescapable tothesubject,asthebreakbetweensubjectandobjectdrilledintothe consciousness,furrowingeverythingwhichitthinks,eventhatwhichisobjective,itwouldhave an end in reconciliation. This would release the non-identical, relieving it even of its intellectualized compulsion,openingupforthefirsttimethemultiplicityofthedivergent,over which dialectics would have no more power Reconciliation would be the meditation onthe no-longer-hostile multiplicity, something which is subjective anathema to reason. Dialectics servesreconciliation.Itdismantlesthelogicalcharacterofcompulsion,whichitfollows;thatis whyitisdenouncedaspan-logism.Initsidealisticformitwasbracketedbytheprimacyofthe absolutesubjectasthepower,whichnegativelyrealizedeverysinglemovementoftheconcept and the course of suchinitsentirety Suchaprimacy ofthesubjecthasbeencondemned by history, even in the Hegelian conception, that of the particular human consciousness, which overshadowedthetranscendentalonesofKantandFichte.Notonlywasitsuppressedbythelack of power of the waning thought,whichfailed toconstruethehegemonyofthecourseofthe world before this latter. None of the reconciliations, however, from the logical one to the political-historical one, which absolute idealism maintained – every other remained inconsequential –wasbinding.Thatconsistent idealism couldsimplynototherwise constitute itself than as the epitome ofthecontradiction, isasmuchitslogically consistent truthasthe punishment, which its logicity incurs as logicity; appearance [Schein],asmuchasnecessary. Reopening the case of dialectics, whose non-idealistic form degenerated in the meantime to dogmajustastheidealisticonesdegeneratedintoeducationalbaggage,doesnotsolelydetermine the contemporary relevance of a historically established mode of philosophizing or of the philosophicalstructureoftheobjectsofcognition.Hegelreconstitutedtherightandcapacityof philosophy to think substantively, instead of settling for the analysis of empty and in the emphaticsensenullandvoidformsofcognition.Itscontemporaryversionfallsback,wherever anythingatallsubstantive isdealt with,either intowhatevermundaneworld-viewishandyor into that formalism, that “indifference”, against which Hegel rebelled. The development of phenomenology,whichwasonceanimatedbytheneedforcontent,intoonewhichdismissedany sort of content as polluting the invocation of being, is historical evidence for this. Hegel’s substantive philosophizing hadasitsfundamentandresulttheprimacyofthesubjector,inthe famousformulationfromtheintroductiontotheLogic,theidentityofidentityandnon-identity.4
4 SeeHegel,WW4,HermanGlockner,Stuttgart1927,pg78.
To him, the determinate particular was determinable by the Spirit, because its immanent determination was supposed to be nothing other than the Spirit. Without this supposition, philosophywould,according toHegel,beincapableofcognizingthatwhichissubstantiveand essential. If the idealistically-achieved concept of dialectics did not hide experiences which, contrarytoHegel’sownemphasis, areindependent fromtheidealistic apparatus,thennothing would remain of philosophy than the unavoidable renunciation which rejects the substantive insight,restricts itselftothemethodology ofscience, declares thislatter tobephilosophyand therebyvirtuallycancelsitselfout.
InterestofPhilosophy19-21
Philosophy has, at this historical moment, itstrueinterest inwhatHegel,inaccordance with tradition, proclaimed hisdisinterest: inthenon-conceptual,theindividualandtheparticular;in what, ever since Plato, has been dismissed astransient andinconsequential andwhichHegel stampedwiththelabeloflazyexistence.Itsthemewouldbethequalitieswhichithasdegraded tothemerelycontingent,toquantiténégligeable[French:negligiblequantity].Whatisurgentfor theconcept iswhatitdoesnotencompass, whatitsabstraction-mechanismeliminates,whatis not already an exemplar of the concept. Bergson as well as Husserl, thestandard-bearers of philosophical modernity, innervated this, but shrank away from it back into traditional metaphysics. Bergson created, by fiat, a different type of cognition for the sake of the non-conceptual. Thedialectical saltwaswashedawayintheundifferentiated flowoflife;that whichwasmaterially solidified wasdismissed assubaltern,insteadofbeingunderstoodalong withitssubalternity Hatredoftherigidgeneralconceptproducedacultofirrationalimmediacy, of sovereign freedom amidst unfreedom. He designed both of his cognitive modes as dualistically againstoneanotherasthedoctrinesofDescartes andKant,whichherepudiated, had ever been; the causal-mechanical one remained, as pragmatic knowledge, as little illuminated by the intuitive one as the bourgeois establishment from the relaxed, easy-going attitude of those who owe their privileges to that establishment. The celebrated intuitions themselves appearassomethingratherabstractinBergson’sphilosophy,hardlymovingbeyond thephenomenalconsciousnessoftime,whichalreadyunderwroteKant’schronological-physical one; inBergon’sinsight,spatialized time. Infact,theintuitive modeofconductoftheSpirit, although somewhat difficult to develop, does continue to exist as the archaic rudiments of mimetic reactions. What transpired before its past promises something beyond the hardened present. Intuitions succeed, however, only desultorily. Every cognition, even Bergson’s own, requires the rationality which he so despised, precisely if they are ever to be concretized. Durationraisedtoanabsolute,purebecoming,theactuspurus[Latin:pureact],recoilsintothe sametimelessnesswhichBergsonchastisesinmetaphysicssincePlatoandAristoteles.Itdidnot occurtohimthatwhathegropesfor,ifitisnottoremainaFataMorgana,couldonlybeviewed through the instrumentarium of cognition, through the reflection upon its own means, and degenerates intosheercapriceinaprocedurewhichis,fromtheverybeginning,unmediatedto thatofthecognition.–ThelogicianHusserl,ontheotherhand,sharplycontrastedthemodeby whichonebecomesawareoftheessenceagainstthegeneralizingabstraction.Hehadaspecific intellectual experience in mind, which was supposed to be able to descrytheessence inthe particular.Theessence,however,towhichthisreferred,didnotdifferentiateitselfintheslightest fromthatofthethen-currentgeneralconcept.Acrassdiscrepancyreignsbetweenthefunctional organization of the apperception [Wesensschau] and its terminus adquem[Latin: end-point].
Neitherbreak-outattemptsucceededinmovingbeyondidealism:Bergsonorientedhimself,just like his positivistic arch-enemies, towards the données immédiate de la conscience [French: immediatefactsoftheconsciousness],Husserllikewisetowardsthephenomenaofthestreamof consciousness. The former aswellasthelatter remained frozeninthedemesneofsubjective immanence.5 Whatistobeinsistedonagainstbothiswhateachtriestoconjureupinvain;pace Wittgenstein, to say what cannot be said. The simple contradiction ofthisdemandisthatof philosophy itself: it qualifies the latter as dialectics, before it embroils itself in its specific contradictions. Theworkofphilosophical self-reflection consistsofworkingoutthisparadox. Everythingelseissignification,post-construction,todayasinHegel’stimepre-philosophical.A faith, as always subject to question, that philosophy wouldstillbepossible; thattheconcept couldleapfrogtheconcept, thepreparatory stagesandthefinaltouches,andtherebyreachthe non-conceptual, isindispensabletophilosophyandthereinliessomethingofthenaivete,which ailsit.Otherwise itwouldhavetocapitulate andwithiteverything todowiththeSpirit.Not eventhesimplestoperationcouldbethoughtthrough,therewouldbenotruth,everythingwould beemphatically nothing.Whatever ofthetruthcanbegleaned throughconceptsbeyondtheir abstract circumference, can have no other staging-grounds than that which is suppressed, disparaged and thrown away by concepts. The utopia of cognition would be to openupthe non-conceptualwithconcepts,withoutmakingitthesameasthem.
TheAntagonisticWhole21-22
Such a concept of dialectics casts doubt on its possibility The anticipation of universal movement incontradictions seems,howevervaried,toteachthetotalityoftheSpirit,precisely theidentity-thesisjustnullified.TheSpirit,whichwouldunceasinglyreflectonthecontradiction inthings,oughttobethisitself,ifitistobeorganizedaccordingtotheformofthecontradiction. Thetruth,whichintheidealisticdialecticdrivespasteveryparticularityassomethingfalseinits one-sidedness,wouldbethatofthewhole;ifitwerenotalreadythoughtout,thenthedialectical stepswouldlosetheirmotivationanddirection.Againstthisonemustcounterthattheobjectof intellectual experience woulditselfbetheantagonistic system,somethingutterly real,andnot just by virtue of its mediation to the cognizing subject which rediscovers itself therein. The compulsoryconstitution ofreality whichidealism projected intotheregionsofthesubjectand Spirit is to be retranslated back out of these. What remains of idealism is that society, the objectivedeterminantoftheSpirit,isjustasmuchtheepitomeofsubjectsastheirnegation.Init theyareunknowableanddisempowered;thatiswhyitissodesperatelyobjectiveandaconcept, whichidealismmistakesassomethingpositive.ThesystemisnotthatoftheabsoluteSpirit,but ofthemostconditionedofthosewhohaveitattheirdisposal,andcannotevenknowhowmuch itistheirown.Thesubjective pre-formationofthematerialsocialproduction-process,entirely separate fromitstheoreticalconstitution,isthatwhichisunresolved,irreconcilabletosubjects. Their own reason which produces identity through exchange, as unconsciously as the transcendental subject,remainsincommensurable tothesubjects whichitreducestothesame commondenominator: thesubjectastheenemyofthesubject.Theprecedinggeneralityistrue so much as untrue: true, becauseitformsthat“ether”, whichHegelcalled theSpirit;untrue, becauseitsreasonisnothingofthesort,itsgeneralitytheproductofparticularinterests.Thatis whythephilosophicalcritiqueofidentitystepsbeyondphilosophy.Thatitrequires,nonetheless, what is not subsumed under identity – in Marxian terminology, use-value – so that life can continue toexistevenundertherulingrelationsofproduction,iswhatisineffableinutopia.It
Philosophy, Hegel’s included, invites the general objection that insofar as it would have compulsoryconceptsasitsmaterial,italreadycharacterizesitselfinadvanceasidealistic.Asa matter offactnoneofthem,notevenextreme empiricism, canhauloffthefactabruta[Latin: brutefacts]andpresentthemlikeanatomical casesorphysicsexperiments; none,assomany paintingstemptonetobelieve,gluespecificthingsontothetext.Buttheargumentinitsformal generalitygraspstheconceptasfetishisticallyasthemannerinwhichitnaivelyexplicatesitself withinitsdomain,asaself-sufficienttotality,whichphilosophicalthinkingcannotdoanything about. In truth all concepts, even philosophical ones, move towards what is non-conceptual, because they are for their partmomentsofthereality,whichnecessitated –primarily forthe purposeofcontrollingnature–theirformation.Thatwhichappearsastheconceptualmediation fromtheinside,thepreeminenceofitssphere,withoutwhichnothingcouldbeknown,maynot beconfusedwithwhatitisinitself.Suchanappearance[Schein]oftheexistent-in-itselflendsit themovement whichexemptsitfromthereality,withinwhichitisforitspartharnessed.The requirement thatphilosophymustoperatewithconceptsisnomoretobemadeintoavirtueof this priority than, conversely, the critique of this virtue is to be the summary verdict over philosophy Meanwhile,theinsightthatitsconceptualessencewouldnotbeitsabsoluteinspite ofitsinseparabilityisagainmediatedthroughtheconstitutionoftheconcept;itisnodogmaticor evennaively realistic thesis.Concepts suchasthatofbeinginthebeginningofHegel’sLogic indicate first of all that which is emphatically non-conceptual; they signify, as per Lasks expression,beyondthemselves.Itisintheirnaturenottobesatisfiedbytheirownconceptuality, althoughtotheextentthattheyincludethenon-conceptualintheirmeaning,theytendtomake thisidenticaltoitselfandtherebyremainentangledinthemselves.Theircontentisasimmanent in the intellectual sense as transcendent in the ontical sense to such. By means of the self-consciousness of this they have the capacity of discarding their fetishism. Philosophical self-reflectionassuresitselfofthenon-conceptualintheconcept.Otherwisethislatterwouldbe, afterKant’sdictum, null,ultimately nolongertheconceptofsomethingandtherebyvoid.The philosophy which recognizes this, which cancels out the autarky of the concept, strikes the blindersfromtheeyes.Thattheconceptisaconceptevenwhenitdealswiththeexistent,hardly changesthefactthatitisforitspartenmeshedinanon-conceptualwholeagainstwhichitseals itself offsolelythroughitsreification, whichindeedcreated itasaconcept. Theconcept isa moment like any other in dialectical logic. Its mediated nature through the non-conceptual survivesinitbymeansofitssignificance,whichforitspartfoundsitsconceptualnature.Itis characterized as much by its relation to the nonconceptual – as in keeping with traditional epistemology, where every definition of concepts ultimately requires non-conceptual, deictic moments – as the contrary, that the abstract unity of the onta subsumed under it are to be separated from the ontical. To change this direction of conceptuality, to turn it towards the non-identical,isthehingeofnegativedialectics.Beforetheinsightintotheconstitutivecharacter ofthenon-conceptualintheconcept,thecompulsionofidentity,whichcarriesalongtheconcept without the delay of such a reflection, dissolves. Its self-determination leads away from the
Thedisenchantmentoftheconceptistheantidoteofphilosophy.Itpreventsitsovergrowth:that ofbecomingtheabsoluteitself.Anideaistoberefunctionedwhichwasbequeathedbyidealism and,morethananyother,corruptedbyit,thatoftheinfinite.Itisnotforphilosophytoreduce thephenomenontoaminimum setofaxioms,exhaustingthingsaccordingtoscientificusage; Hegel’spolemicagainstFichte,thatthelatterstartedoutfroma“dictum”,registersthis.Onthe contrary it wishes to literally immerse itself into that which is heterogenous to it, without reducingittoprefabricatedcategories.Itwouldliketoadhereascloselytothisastheprogramof phenomenology and of Simmel vainly wished for: it aims at undiminished realization [Entaeusserung:realization,relinquishment].Philosophicalcontentistobegraspedsolelywhere philosophydoesnotmandateit.Theillusionthatitcouldcaptivatetheessenceinthefinitudeof its determinations must be given up. Perhaps the word infinite dropped so quickly fromthe tonguesoftheidealisticphilosophersbecausetheywishedtohushupgnawingdoubtsaboutthe threadbarefinitudeoftheirconceptualapparatus,evenHegel’s,inspiteofhisintent.Traditional philosophybelieves itpossessesitsobjectinfinitely,andtherebybecomesasphilosophyfinite, conclusive. Adifferentoneoughttocashierthatclaim,nolongertryingtoconvinceitselfand others that it has the infinite at its disposal. Instead of this it would become, putdelicately, infinitetotheextentthatitrefusestodefineitselfasacorpusofenumerabletheorems.Itwould haveitscontentinthepolyvalenceofobjectsnotorganizedintoascheme,whichimpingeonit or whichitseeksout;itwouldtrulydeliver itselfovertothem,wouldnotemploythemasa mirror,outofwhichitrereadsitself,confusingitsmirror-imagewiththeconcretion.Itwouldbe nothingotherthanthefull,unreducedexperienceinthemediumofconceptualreflection;even the“scienceoftheexperienceofconsciousness”woulddegradethecontentofsuchexperiences toexamplesofcategories.Whatspursphilosophytotheriskyexertionofitsowninfinityisthe unwarrantedexpectation thateveryindividualandparticularwhichitdecodeswouldrepresent, asinLeibniz’smonad,thatwholeinitself,whichassuchalwaysandagaineludesit;tobesure, inthemannerofaprestabilizeddisharmonyratherthanharmony.Themetacriticalturnagainst primaphilosophia[Latin:originaryphilosophy]isatthesametimeoneagainstthefinitudeofa philosophy, which blusters about infinity and paysnoheedtoit.Cognitionholdsnoneofits objectscompletely.Itisnotsupposedtopreparethefantasmofawhole.Thusitcannotbethe taskofaphilosophicalinterpretationofworksofarttoestablishtheiridentitywiththeconcept, togobblethemupinthis;theworkhoweverdevelopsitselfthroughthisinitstruth.Whatmay beglimpsedinthis,beittheformalprocessofabstraction,beittheapplicationofconceptsto what is grasped under their definitions, may be of use as technics inthebroadestsense:for philosophy,whichrefusestosubornitself,itisirrelevant. Inprincipleitcanalwaysgoastray; solely for that reason, achieve something. Skepticism and pragmatism, latest of all Dewey’s strikingly humane version of the latter, recognized this; thisishowevertobeaddedintothe fermentofanemphaticphilosophy,notrenouncedinadvanceforthesakeofitstestofvalidity. Against the total domination ofmethod,philosophyretains,correctively,themoment ofplay, whichthetraditionofitsscientifizationwouldliketodriveoutofit.EvenforHegelthiswasa sorepoint,hereproached“…typesanddistinctions,whicharedeterminedbypureaccidentand
by play, not by reason.”6 The non-naïve thought knows how little it encompasses what is thought, and yet must always hold forth as if it had such completely in hand. It thereby approximatesclowning.Itmaynotdenyitstraces,nottheleastbecausetheyaloneopenupthe hopeofthatwhichisforbiddentoit.Philosophyisthemostseriousofallthings,butnotallthat serious,afterall.Whataimsforwhatisnotalreadyaprioriandwhatitwouldhavenostatutory power over, belongs, according to its own concept, simultaneously to a sphere of the unconstrained, which was rendered taboo by the conceptual essence. The concept cannot otherwise represent the thing which it repressed, namely mimesis, than by appropriating somethingofthislatterinitsownmodeofconduct,withoutlosingitselftoit.Tothisextentthe aesthetic moment is, albeit for totally different reasons than in Schelling, not accidental to philosophy.Nottheleastofitstasksistosublatethisinthecommittalness[Verbindlichkeit]of itsinsightsintowhatisreal.Thislatterandplayareitspoles.Theaffinityofphilosophytoart doesnotjustifytheborrowingofthisbytheformer,leastofallbyvirtueoftheintuitionswhich barbarians consider the prerogative of art. Even in aesthetic labor they hardly ever strike in isolation,aslightning-boltsfromabove.Theygrowoutoftheformallawoftheconstruction;if onewishedtotitrate themout,theywouldmeltaway.Thinkingbynomeansprotectssources, whosefreshnesswouldemancipateitfromthought;notypeofcognitionisatourdisposal,which wouldbeabsolutely divergentfromthatwhichdisposesoverthings,beforewhichintuitionism fleespanic-stricken andinvain.Thephilosophywhichimitatedart,whichwantedtobecomea workofart,wouldcancelitselfout.Itwouldpostulatetheidentity-claim:thatitsobjectsvanish into it, indeed that they grant their mode of procedureasupremacywhichdisposesoverthe heterogenous as a priori material, whiletherelationship ofphilosophytotheheterogenousis virtually thematic. What art and philosophy have in common is not form or patterning procedures,butamodeofconductwhichforbidspseudomorphosis.Bothkeepfaithwiththeir own content through their opposition; art, by making itself obdurate against its meaning; philosophy,bynotclingingtoanythingimmediate.Thephilosophicalconceptdoesnotdispense withthelongingwhichanimates artassomethingnon-conceptual andwhosefulfillment flees from its immediacy as appearance [Schein]. The concept, the organon of thought and nevertheless the wall [Mauer: external wall] betweenthisandwhatistobethoughtthrough, negates that longing. Philosophycanneither circumvent suchnegation norsubmititselftoit. Whatisincumbentonit,istheefforttogobeyondtheconcept,bymeansoftheconcept.
SpeculativeMoment27-29
Even after renouncing idealism, it [philosophy] cannot dispense with speculation, albeit ina widersensethanHegel’salltoopositiveone,*01*whichidealism exalted andwhichfellinto disreputealongwithit.Positivists arequicktowriteoffMarxistmaterialism, whichisoneof objectivelawsofessence,whichbynomeansproceedfromimmediatedataorsetsofaxioms,as speculation. In order topurifyoneselffromthesuspicionofideology,ithasrecently become moreadvantageous tocall Marxametaphysician thanaclassenemy.Butthesafegroundisa fantasm,wherethetruth-claimdemandsthatoneriseaboveit.Philosophyisnottobefobbedoff withtheoremswhichwouldliketotalkitoutofitsessentialinterestsinsteadofsatisfyingthese, evenifitwereonlybysayingno.Thecounter-movements againstKantsincethe19th century have felt this, although over and over again compromising this through obscurantism. The resistance of philosophy requires however development. Evenmusic,andprobablyeveryart,
6 Hegel,WW6,HeidelbergerEncyclopedia,pg28.
doesnotinstantlysatisfytheimpulsewhichanimatestheopeningbar,butonlyinitsarticulated course.Tothisextent itpractices,howevermuchitisitselfappearance[Schein]asatotality,a critiqueofappearance[Schein]throughthis,ofthepresenceofcontentinthehereandnow.Such mediation befitsphilosophynoless.Ifitpresumestospeaktooquickly,thenitisstrickenwith the Hegelian verdict of empty profundity. Whoeverrecites profundities,isnomoreprofound thananovelismetaphysical,justbecauseitreportsonthemetaphysicalviewsofitscharacters. Todemandofphilosophythatitdirectitselftothequestionofexistenceorotherkeynotethemes ofWesternmetaphysics isacrudefetishism ofthematerials. Thoughitisnottobeseparated from the objective dignity of those themes, there is however no guarantee that itstreatment would correspond tothegreatobjectsinquestion.Ithassomuchtofearfromthewell-worn pathsofphilosophicalreflection,thatitsemphaticinterestseeksrefugeinephemeralobjects,not yet overdetermined by intentions. The traditional philosophical problematic iscertainly tobe negated, fettered as this is to such questions. The world which is objectively knotted intoa totality doesnotrelease theconsciousness. Itunceasinglypinsthelatterdown,fromwhenceit wishes to escape; the thinking, however, which starts happy-go-lucky from the beginning, unencumbered by the historical form of its problems, falls prey to these that much more. Philosophypartakesoftheideaofprofundityonlybyvirtueofitsthinkingbreath.Themodelfor this is, in modern times, the Kantian deduction ofthepureconcept ofunderstanding,whose author,withabysmally apologetic irony,describedas“somewhatprofoundlyput”.7 Profundity, too,isamomentofdialectics,noisolatedquality,asHegeldidnotfailtonotice.Accordingtoa dreadfulGermantradition, thoughtswhichswearallegiance tothetheodicy ofEvilandDeath figureasprofound.Whatissilencedandsweptundertherugisatheologicalterminusadquem [Latin:end-point],asifitsresult,theconfirmationoftranscendence,woulddecidethedignityof thought,orelsethemerebeing-for-itself, similarly fortheimmersion intointeriority;asifthe withdrawalfromtheworldwereunproblematicallyasonewiththeconsciousnessofthegrounds oftheworld.Bycontrast,resistancetofantasmsofprofundity,whichthroughoutthehistoryof theSpiritwerealwayswell-disposed totheexistingstateofaffairs,whichtheyfoundtoodull, would be its true measure. The power of the existent constructs the facades into which the consciousness crashes. It must try to break through them.Thisalonewouldsnatchawaythe postulate fromtheprofundityofideology.Thespeculativemomentsurvivesinsuchresistance: whatdoesnotallowitselftobegovernedbythegivenfacts,transcendsthemevenintheclosest contact withobjectsandintherenunciationofsacrosancttranscendence.Whatinthoughtgoes beyondthattowhichitisboundinitsresistanceisitsfreedom.Itfollowstheexpressiveurgeof thesubject.Theneedtogivevoicetosufferingistheconditionofalltruth.Forsufferingisthe objectivity whichweighsonthesubject;whatitexperiencesasmostsubjective,itsexpression, isobjectivelymediated.
Thismayhelptoexplainwhyportrayal[Darstellung]isnotamatterofindifferenceorexternal to philosophy, but immanent to its idea. Its integral moment of expression, non-conceptually-mimetic,becomesobjectifiedonlythroughportrayal–language.Thefreedom ofphilosophyisnothingotherthanthecapacityofgivingvoicetothisunfreedom.Ifthemoment ofexpressiontriestobeanythingmore,itdegeneratesintoapointofview;wereittorelinquish
the moment of expression and the obligation of portrayal, it would converge with science. Expressionandstringencyarenotdichotomouspossibilitiesforit.Theyneedeachother,neither iswithouttheother.Theexpressionisrelievedofitscontingencybythought,onwhichitworks justasthoughtworksonit.Thinkingbecomes,assomethingwhichisexpressed,conclusiveonly throughlinguisticportrayal;whatislaxlysaid,isbadlythought.Throughexpression,stringency iscompelledfromwhatisexpressed.Itisnotanendinitselfatthelatter’sexpense,butcarriesit off out of the thingly bad state of affairs, for its part an object of philosophical critique. Speculativephilosophywithoutidealisticsubstructiondemandsfidelitytostringency,inorderto break the latter’s authoritarian power-claim. Benjamin, whose original sketch oftheArcades projectcombinedincomparablespeculativepowerwithmicrologicalproximitytothesubstance of the matter [Sachgehalten], remarked later in a correspondence concerning the first, authentically metaphysical layer of that work, that it could only be realized as something “impermissibly‘poetic’”.8 Thisdeclarationofcapitulationdesignatesthedifficultyofphilosophy whichdoesnotwishtogoastray,asmuchasthepointwhereitsconceptistobepushedfurther. Itwasprobablyduetothewholesale adoptionofdialecticalmaterialismasaworld-view,asit were, with closed eyes. That Benjamin didnothoweverdecide onadefinitive outline ofthe Arcades project isareminder thatphilosophyismorethanjustbustle,onlywhereitexposes itselftototalfailure,astheresponsetotheabsolutesecuritywhichistraditionallysmuggledin secretly. Benjamin’s defeatism towards his own thought was conditioned by a remainder of undialectical positivity, which he secretly carried along from his theological phase, its form unchanged,intohisdialecticalone.Incontrast,Hegel’sequatingofnegativitywiththethought, which philosophy shielded from the positivity of the sciences as much as from amateurish contingency, has its experience-content. To think is, already initselfandaboveallparticular content, negation, resistance againstwhatisimposedonit;thisiswhatthinkinginheritedfrom therelationship oflabortoitsrawmaterial,itsUr-image.Ifideologyencouragesthoughtmore thanevertowaxinpositivity,thenitslylyregistersthefactthatpreciselythiswouldbecontrary to thinking and that it requires the friendly wordofadvice fromsocialauthority,inorderto accustom it to positivity. The effort whichisimplied intheconcept ofthinkingitself,asthe counterparttothepassiveintuition,isalreadynegative,therejectionoftheoverweeningdemand ofbowingtoeverythingimmediate.Thejudgementandtheconclusion,thethought-formswhose critique thought cannot dispense with either, contain critical sprouts in themselves; their determination isatmostsimultaneously theexclusionofwhattheyhavenotachieved,andthe truthwhichtheywishtoorganize,repudiating, thoughwithdoubtfuljustification, whatisnot already moldedbythem.Thejudgement thatsomethingwouldbeso,isthepotentialrejection that the relation of its subject and its predicate would be expressed otherwise than in the judgement. Thought-formswanttogobeyondwhatismerelyextant,“given”.Thepointwhich thinkingdirectsagainstitsmaterialisnotsolelythedominationofnatureturnedspiritual.While thinking does violence upon that which it exerts its syntheses, it follows atthesametime a potential which waits in what it faces, andunconsciously obeystheideaofrestituting tothe pieceswhatititselfhasdone;inphilosophythisunconsciousnessbecomesconscious.Thehope of reconciliation is conjoined to irreconcilable thinking, because the resistance of thinking againstthemerely existent, thedomineering freedomofthesubject,alsointendsintheobject what,throughitspreparationtotheobject,waslosttothislatter.
Traditionalspeculationhasdevelopedthesynthesisofwhat,onKantiangrounds,wasthoughtof asachaotic polyvalence, ultimately attemptingtoshakeoffanysortofcontent.Incontrastthe telosofphilosophy,thatwhichisopenandunveiled,isasanti-systematicasitsfreedomtorelay thephenomena,withwhichitnon-violently[unbewehrt]absorbs.Itcontinuestopayheedtothe system,totheextentthatwhatisheterogenoustoitfacesitasasystem.Theadministeredworld moves in this direction. The system is the negative objectivity, notthepositivesubject.Ina historicalphasewherethesystems,insofarastheytakecontentseriously,havebeenrelegatedto the ominous realm of thought-poetry and have left only the pale outline of organizational schematas behind, it is difficult to really imagine what once drove the philosophical Spirit towards the system. The virtue of partisanship ought not to hinder the consideration of the historyofphilosophyfromrecognizing howsuperiorthislatter wastoitsopponents,forover two hundred years, rationalistic oridealistic; theyappear,incomparison,trivial. Thesystems carry it out, interpret the world; the others actually insist only: that won’t do; they resign, refraining[Versagen:torefrain,tofail]inbothsensesoftheterm.Iftheyhadhadmoretruthin the end, this wouldhavebespokenthetransience ofphilosophy.Itisincumbent onit,inany case,towrestsuchtruthfromsubalternityandtouseittocombatthosephilosophieswhichnot onlypuffthemselvesupassomethinghigher;evenmaterialismbearsthemarks,tothisday,that it was invented in Abdera. AccordingtoNietzsche’scritique, thesystemdocumentsonlythe narrow-mindednessoftheeducated,whocompensatedfortheirpoliticalpowerlessnessbymeans oftheconceptualconstructionofanadministrativeright-of-domain,asitwere,overtheexistent. Butthesystematicneed–thatwhichprefersnottodisportitselfwiththemembradisiecta[Latin: dissected members] of knowledge, but achieves it absolutely, whose claim is already involuntarilyraisedintheconclusivenessofeveryspecificjudgement–wasattimesmorethan the pseudomorphosis of the Spirit into irresistibly successful mathematical, natural-scientific methods.Inthehistoryofphilosophythesystemsoftheseventeenthcenturyhadanespecially compensatorypurpose.Thesameratiowhich,inunisonwiththeinterestsofthebourgeoisclass, smashed the feudal order of society and its intellectual reflection, scholastic ontology, into rubble, promptly felt the fear of chaos while facing the ruins, their own handiwork. They trembledbeforewhatominouslycontinuedundertheirrealmofdominationandwhichwaxedin proportiontotheirownpower.Thisfearshapedtheearliestbeginningsofthemodeofconduct entirely constitutive of bourgeois thought, of hurriedly neutralizing every step towards emancipation throughthestrengthening ofthesocialorder.Intheshadowsoftheincompletion of its emancipation, the bourgeois consciousness had to fear being cashiered by a more progressiveclass; itsuspected thatbecauseitwasnottheentirefreedom,itonlyproducedthe travestyofsuch;thatiswhyitexpandeditsautonomytheoreticallyintothesystem,whichatthe sametimetookonthelikenessofitscompulsorymechanisms.Thebourgeoisratioundertookto produce the social order out of itself which it had already negated outside. Once produced, however,thislatterisalreadynothingofthesortanymore;thereforeinsatiable.Thesystemwas justsuchanonsensically-rationallyproducedsocialorder:aset-up[Gesetztes]whichappearsas abeing-in-itself.Itsoriginshadtoberelocatedintoaformalthinkingwhichwassplitofffromits content;itcouldnototherwiseexertitsmasteryoverthematerial.Thephilosophicalsystemwas fromtheverybeginningantinomical.Itsveryfirstsignsweredelimitedbyitsownimpossibility; exactlythishadcondemned,intheearlierhistoryofthemodernsystems,eachtoannihilationby the next. Theratiowhich,inordertopushitselfthroughasasystem,rootedoutvirtually all qualitativedeterminationswhichitreferredto,endedupinirreconcilablecontradictionwiththe
objectivity to which it did violence, by pretending to comprehend it.Itbecame allthemore removedfromthis,themorecompletely itsubjugatedthistoitsaxioms,finally totheoneof identity.Thepedantryofallsystems,allthewaytothearchitectonicponderousnessofKantand, inspiteofhisprogram,evenHegel,aremarksofanaprioriconditionalfailure,documentedwith incomparable honesty by the rifts of the Kantian system; in Moliere pedantry is already the centerpiece oftheontologyofthebourgeoisSpirit.Whatshrinksbackfromtheidentityofthe concept in what is to be comprehended, compels this to outrierten [French: excessive] organization, so that no doubts are raised astotheunimpeachable seamlessness, closureand acribia ofthethought-product.Greatphilosophywasalwaysaccompaniedbytheparanoidzeal to tolerate nothing but itself, and to pursue this with all the ruses of its reason, while this constantly withdraws further and further from the pursuit. The slightest remainder of non-identitywouldsuffice,totallyaccordingtoitsconcept,todenyidentity.Theexcrescencesof thesystemssincetheCartesianpinealglandandtheaxiomsanddefinitionsofSpinoza,already filled to the brim withtheentire rationalism whichhethendeductively extracts, proclaim by theiruntruththatofthesystemsthemselves,theirmadness.
IdealismasRage33-35
ThesystembywhichthesovereignSpiritthoughttotransfigureitselfhasitsUr-historyinthat whichispre-intellectual,intheanimallifeofthespecies.Predatorsarehungry;thepounceonto thepreyisdifficult,oftendangerous.Theanimalneeds,asitwere,additionalimpulsesinorder todarethis.Thesefusewiththedispleasure [Unlust]ofhungerintorageatthevictim,whose expressionisdesignedtoterrifyandweakenthelatter Duringtheprogressiontohumanitythisis rationalized throughprojection. Theanimalrationale[French:rationalanimal]whichishungry for its opponent, already the fortunate owner of a super-ego, must have a reason.Themore completely that what it does follows thelawofself-preservation, thelessitmayconfessthe primacyofthistoitselfandothers;otherwiseitslaboriouslyachievedstatusasazoonpolitikon [Greek: political animal] loses, as modern German puts it, credibility. The life-form to be devoured must be evil. This anthropological schemata has been sublimated all the way into epistemology.Inidealism–mostobviouslyinFichte–theideologyunconsciouslyrulesthatthe non-Ego,l’autrui[French:theothers],finallyeverythingreminiscentofnature,isinferior,sothat theunityofthethoughtbentonpreservingitselfmaygobbleitup,thusconsoled.Thisjustifies itsprinciple asmuchasitincreases thedesire.ThesystemistheSpiritturnedbelly,ragethe signatureofeachandeveryidealism;itdistortsevenKant’shumanity,dispellingthenimbusof thatwhichishigherandmorenobleinwhichthisknewhowtoclotheitself.Theopinionofthe personinthemiddleisthesiblingofcontemptforhumanbeings:toletnothinggoundisputed. The sublime inexorability of moral law was of a piece with such rationalized rage at the non-identical,andeventheliberalHegelwasnobetter,whenhewalledoffthesuperiorityofthe badconscience, fromthosewhodemurredfromthespeculative concept, thehypostasisofthe Spirit.*02*WhatwasemancipatoryinNietzsche,atrueturning-pointofWesternthinking,which later versionsmerely usurped,wasthatheexpressedsuchmysteries.TheSpirit,whichthrows offitsrationalization –itsbane–ceasesbyvirtueofitsownself-reflectiontobethatwhichis radically evil, which irritates it in the Other. – The process, however, wherein the systems decomposed by means of their own insufficiency, counterpoints a social one. As the exchange-principle thebourgeoisratiocame toresemble thatwhichitmadecommensurable–wished toidentify –withitself,therealoneofthesystems,withincreasing albeit potentially
murderoussuccess,leavinglessandlessoutside.Whatprovedtobeidleintheorywasironically confirmedbypraxis.Thisiswhythetalkofthecrisisofthesystemhasbecomesopopularasan ideology, even among those types who previously could not issue forth enough rancorous bombastagainsttheapercu,accordingtothesystem’sownalreadyobsoleteideal.Realityisnot supposed to be construed anymore, because it would be all too thoroughly construed. Its irrationality,whichstrengthensitselfunderthepressureofparticularrationalities–disintegration throughintegration–providespretextsforthis.Ifsocietycouldbeseenthroughasaclosedand hence irreconcilable system to its subjects, it would become all too embarrassing to those subjects, as long as they were anything of the sort. The alleged existential angst is the claustrophobiaofthesystembecomesociety.Itssystem-character,yesterdaystilltheshibboleth ofscholastic philosophy,isstrenuouslydeniedbyitsadepts;theyshamelesslypassthemselves offasspokespersonsforfree,primordial, wherepossiblenon-academic thinking.Suchmisuse does not annul the critique of the system. All emphatic philosophy had, in contrast to the skepticalkind,whichrenouncedemphasis,onethingincommon,thatitwouldbepossibleonly asasystem.Thishascrippledphilosophyscarcelylessthanitsempiricalcurrents.Whateverit mightbeabletoappropriatelyjudgeispostulatedbeforeitarises.System,theformofportrayal ofatotalityinwhichnothingremainsexternal,setsthethoughtinabsoluteoppositiontoeachof its contents and dissolves the content in thought: idealistically, beforeanyargumentation for idealism.
DoubleCharacteroftheSystem35-36
Critique doesnotsimplyliquidate thesystem.AttheheightoftheEnlightenment,D’Alembert hadreasontodifferentiate betweenespritdesystème [French:spiritofthesystem]andesprit systématique [French: systemic spirit], and the method of the Encyclopedia took this into account. Notonlythetrivial motive ofanattachment whichinsteadcrystallizesoutinwhatis unattached speaks for the esprit systématique; it is not only that it satisfies the bureaucratic ambitiontostuffeverythingintoitscategories.Theformofthesystemisadequatetotheworld inwhichthecontent eludesthehegemonyofthought;unityandunanimityarehoweveratthe same time the oblique projections of a contented, no longer antagonistic condition on the coordinatesofdominating,repressivethinking.Thedoublemeaningofphilosophicalsystematics leavesnochoice buttotransposetheenergyofthoughtonceunboundfromthephilosophical systems into the open determination of particular moments. This was not exactly foreign to Hegelian logic. The micro-analysis of the individual categories, appearing simultaneously as theirobjective self-reflection, wassupposedtoalloweachandeveryconcepttopassoverinto others, regardless of anything laid out from above. The totality of this movement meant the systemtohim.Between thisconcept, astheonewhichconcludesandtherebybringstoahalt, andtheoneofthedynamic,whichcreatesoutofthesubjectbypureautarkicproduction,which constitutes all philosophic systematics, prevails contradiction as well asaffinity.Hegelcould balancethetensionbetweenthestaticandthedynamiconlybymeansoftheconstructionofthe principle ofunity,thatoftheSpirit,assomethingatthesametime existent initselfandpure becoming,undertherecuperationoftheAristotelean-scholasticactuspurus[Latin:pureact].The inadequacy ofthisconstruction –subjectiveproductionandontology,nominalismandrealism, syncopatedtotheArchimedean point–alsohinderssystem-immanentlythedissolutionofthat tension. Nevertheless such a philosophical system-concept towers over the merely scientific systematic which demands ordered and well-organized representations from thought, the
consistentconstructionofdisciplinaryfields,withouthoweverstrictlyinsistingontheinnerunity of the moments, from the object’s point of view. As prejudiced as this postulate is in the presuppositionoftheidentityofeverythingexistentwiththecognizingprinciple,sotoodoesthat postulate, once burdenedasinthemanneroftheidealistic speculation, legitimately recall the affinityofobjectstoeachother,whichisrenderedtaboobythescientificneedfororderinorder toyieldtothesurrogateofitsschemata.Whattheobjectscommunicatein,insteadofeachbeing theatomtowhichclassificatory logicreducesit,isthetraceofthedeterminationofobjectsin themselves,whichKantdeniedandwhichHegelwishedtoreestablishagainstKantthroughthe subject. To comprehend a thing itself, not to merely fit it in, to register it in a system of relationships, isnothingotherthantobecome awareoftheparticularmomentinitsimmanent contextwithothers.Suchanti-subjectivismstirsbeneaththecracklingshellofabsoluteidealism, intheimpulsetoopenupthethinginquestion,byrecoursetohowtheybecame.Theconceptof asystemrecalls, ininverted form,thecoherence ofthenon-identical,whichisexactlywhatis damaged by deductive systematics. Critique of the system and asystematic thinking are superficial,solongastheydonotmakeitpossibletounbindthepowerofcoherence,whichthe idealisticsystemssignedovertothetranscendentalsubject.
SystemAntinomical36-39
Thesystem-producingegoprinciple,theprescribedmethodpurifiedofeverysortofcontent,was from time immemorial the ratio. It is not delimited by anything outside of it, nor through so-called intellectual orders.Ifidealism attested toitsprinciple ofpositiveinfinityatallofits stages, then it made the constitutive nature of thinking, its historical autonomization, into metaphysics. Iteliminated everything heterogenousintheexistent. Thisdefinedthesystemas purebecoming,pureprocess,ultimatelyasthatabsolutecreationwhichFichte,tothisextentthe authentic systematizer of philosophy, declared philosophy as being. Already in Kant the emancipated ratio, the progressus ad infinitum, was held together solely through theatleast formalrecognitionofthenon-identical.Theantinomyoftotalityandinfinity–fortherestlessAd infinitum explodes the self-contained system, which nevertheless exists solely thanks to the infinite –isthatofidealisticessence.Itmimicsacentralfeatureofbourgeoissociety.Thistoo must,inordertopreserveitself,tostaythesame,to“be”,constantlyexpand,gofurther,pushthe borderseverfurther,respectnolimits,notstaythesame.9 Ithasbeendemonstratedtoitthatas soonasitreachedalevelwhereitcouldnolongerdisposeovernon-capitalistrealmsoutsideof itself,thenaccordingtoitsownconceptitwouldhavetosublateitself.Thismakesitclearwhy, Aristotelesnotwithstanding,themodernconceptofdynamicswasasinappropriatetoantiquityas thesystem.EveninPlato,whochosetheaporeticformforsomanyofhisdialogues,bothcould beimputedonlyretrospectively.ThecensurewhichKantconsequentlyappliedtotheoldmanis notsimplylogical, asheheld,buthistorical: modernthroughandthrough.Ontheotherhand systematicsissoingrownintothemodernconsciousnessthateventheanti-systematiceffortsof Husserl,whichtookthefieldunderthenameofontology,andfromwhichfundamentalontology later branched off, irresistibly reverted backintothesystem,atthepriceofitsformalization. Thus delimited by each other, the static and dynamic essence of the system are always in conflict.Ifthesystemreallywasinfactclosed,andtoleratednothingoutsideofitsmagiccircle, thenitbecomes,beiteversodynamicallyconceived,finiteasapositiveinfinity,static.Thatit
sustainsitselfassuch,asHegelpraisedhisownfordoing,bringsittoahalt.Closedsystems have to be, put crudely, done. The drolleries for which Hegel is always taken to task, that world-history was consummated in the Prussian state, are neither mere aberrations for ideological purposes nor irrelevant in regards to the whole. In their necessary absurdity, the emphaticunityofsystemanddynamicfallsapart.Thislatter,bynegatingtheconceptofthelimit andassuringitself,intherealmoftheory,thatsomethingwouldalwaysstillbeoutside,alsohas thetendencytodisavowthesystem,itsproduct.Itwouldnotbeunfruitfultoexaminethehistory of recent philosophy under this aspect, namely how it managed todealwiththeantagonism betweenthestatic anddynamic inthesystem.TheHegelian onewasnottrulyinitselfoneof becoming, but was already implicitly preconceived in each particular determination. Such assurancecondemnedittountruth.Consciousnessmustimmerseitselfunconsciously,asitwere, into the phenomena on which it takes a position. Therein indeed dialectics transforms itself qualitatively.Systematic unanimity wouldfallapart.Thephenomenonwouldnolongerremain what it nevertheless remains in Hegel, in spite of alldeclarations tothecontrary,namely an example of its concept. The thought would be burdened with more labor and effort than in Hegel’s definition, because to him thought alwaysonlyextracted outofitsobjectswhatwas already thought.Inspiteoftheprogramofrealization[Entäußerung],itsatisfiesitselfinitself, whirring right along as often as it demands the contrary. If the thought truly realized itself [entäussern]inthething,ifthiscountedforsomethingandnotitscategory,thentheobjectitself wouldbegintospeakunderthethought’sleisurelyglance.Hegelhadobjectedtoepistemology, thatonebecomesasmithonlybysmithing,intheconsummationofthecognitionofwhatresists this,theatheoretical,asitwere.Inthisheistobetakenathisword;thisalonewouldreturnto philosophywhatHegelcalledthefreedomtowardstheobject[FreiheitzumObjekt],whichthis latterlostunderthebaneoftheconceptoffreedom,thesense-positingautonomyofthesubject. Howeverthespeculative powertoblastopenthatwhichisirresolvableisthatofthenegation. Solelyinitdoesthesystematicmovementliveon.Thecategoriesofthecritiqueofthesystem areatthesametimethosewhichcomprehendtheparticular Whathasoncelegitimatelystepped beyond the particularity in the system has its place outside of the system. The gaze which becomes aware, by interpreting the phenomenon, of more than what itmerely is,andsolely thereby,whatitis,secularizesmetaphysics.Onlyaphilosophyinfragmentformwouldgivethe illusionary monads sketched by idealism what is their due. They would be representations [Vorstellungen]ofthetotality,whichisinconceivableassuch,intheparticular.
ArgumentandExperience39-42
Thethoughtwhichmaypositivelyhypostasizenothingoutsideofthedialecticalconsummation overshootstheobjectwithwhichitnolongerhastheillusionofbeingonewith;itbecomesmore independent than in the conception of its absoluteness, in which the sovereign and the provisionalshadeintooneanother,eachdependentontheother.PerhapstheKantianexemption oftheintelligible spherefromeveryimmanence aimed forthis.Immersionintotheparticular, dialectical immanence raisedtoanextreme,requiresasoneofitsmomentsthefreedomtoalso step out of the object, the freedom which the claim of identity cuts off. Hegel would have abjured this;herelied uponthecomplete mediation inobjects.Inthepraxisofcognition, the resolutionoftheirresolvable,themomentofsuchtranscendenceofthoughtcomestolightinthat solely as a micrology does it employ macrological means. The demand for committalness [Verbindlichkeit] without system is that for thought-models. These are not of a merely
monadologicalsort.Themodelstrikesthespecificandmorethanthespecific,withoutdissolving it into its more general master-concept. To think philosophically is so much as to think in models; negative dialectics is an ensemble of model-analyses. Philosophy debases itselfinto apologeticaffirmationthemomentitdeceivesitselfandothersoverthefactthatwhateversetsits objectsintomotionmustalsoinfluencethesefromoutside.Whatawaitswithinthese,requiresa footholdinordertospeak,withtheperspectivethattheforcesmobilizedfromoutside,andinthe end every theory applied tothephenomena, wouldcometorestinthose.Tothisextent, too, philosophical theory means its own end: through its realization. There is no lack of related intentions throughouthistory.TheFrenchEnlightenment wasendowedbyitshighestconcept, that of reason, with something systematic under the formal aspect; however the constitutive entanglementofitsideaofreasonwiththatofanobjectivelyreasonablearrangementofsociety deprivesthesystemofthepathos,whichitonlyregainedwhenreasonrenouncedtheideaofits realizationandabsolutizeditselfintotheSpirit.Thinkingakintotheencyclopedia,assomething rationally organized and nevertheless discontinuous, unsystematic andspontaneous,expressed the self-critical Spirit of reason. It represented what was erased from philosophy, as much throughitsincreasingdistancefrompraxisasthroughitsincorporationintotheacademicbustle: worldlyexperience, thateyeforreality,whosemomentisalsothatofthought.Thefreedomof theSpiritisnothingelse.Thoughtcannomoredowithouttheelementofthehommedelettres [French:personofeducation] whichthepetit bourgeoisscientific ethosmaligns,thanwithout what thescientific philosophies misuse,themeditative drawing-together,theargument,which earnedsomuchskepticism.Wheneverphilosophywastrulysubstantial,bothmomentsappeared together From a distance, dialectics could be characterized as the effort raised to self-consciousness of letting itself be permeated bysuch.Otherwise thespecialized argument degenerates into the technics of non-conceptual experts in the midst of the concept, just as nowadaysso-called analytic philosophy,memorizable andcopyable byrobots,isdisseminated academically Whatisimmanently argumentative islegitimate whereitregisterstheintegrated realitybecomesystem,inordertoopposeitwithitsownstrength.Whatisontheotherhandfree inthoughtrepresentstheauthoritywhichisalreadyawareofwhatisemphaticallyuntrueofthat context. Without this knowledge it would not have come to the breakout, without the appropriation of the power of the system it would have failed. That both moments do not seamlessly meld into oneanotherisduetotherealpowerofthesystem,whichincludesthat whichalsopotentially surpassesit.Howevertheuntruthofthecontextofimmanencediscloses itselfintheoverwhelmingexperiencethattheworld,whichisassystematicallyorganizedasifit weretrulythatrealizedreasonHegelsoglorified,simultaneouslyperpetuatesthepowerlessness oftheSpirit,apparentlysoall-powerful,initsoldunreason.Theimmanentcritiqueofidealism defendsidealism,totheextentitshowshowfaritisdefraudedbyitself;howmuchthatwhichis first,whichisaccordingtosuchalwaystheSpirit,standsincomplicitywiththeblindprimacyof the merely existent [Seiendes]. The doctrine oftheabsoluteSpiritimmediately promotesthis latter. – The scientific consensus would probably concede that evenexperience wouldimply theory. It is however a “standpoint”, at best hypothetical. Conciliatory representatives of scientivism demand what they call properorclean science, whichissupposedtoaccount for thesesortsofpresuppositions.Exactlythisdemandisincompatiblewithintellectualexperience. Ifastandpointisdemandedofthelatter,thenitwouldbethatofthedinertotheroast.Itlivesby ingestingsuch;onlywhenthelatterdisappearsintotheformer,wouldtherebephilosophy.Until thispointtheoryembodiesthatdisciplineinintellectualexperiencewhichalreadyembarrassed Goetheinrelation toKant.Ifexperience relied solelyonitsdynamic andgoodfortune,there
would be no stopping.IdeologylurksintheSpiritwhich,dazzled withitselflikeNietzsche’s Zarathustra,irresistiblybecomeswell-nighabsolute.Theorypreventsthis.Itcorrectsthenaivete of its self-confidence, without forcing it tosacrifice thespontaneity whichtheoryforitspart wishes to get at. By no means does the difference between theso-called subjective shareof intellectualexperienceanditsobjectvanish;thenecessaryandpainfulexertionofthecognizing subjecttestifiestoit.Intheunreconciledcondition,non-identityisexperiencedasthatwhichis negative. Thesubjectshrinksawayfromthis,backontoitselfandthefullnessofitsmodesof reaction. Only critical self-reflection protects it from the limitations of its fullness and from buildingawall[Wand:interiorwall]betweenitselfandtheobject,indeedfrompresupposingits being-for-itselfasthein-itselfandfor-itself.Thelesstheidentitybetweenthesubjectandobject can be ascertained, the more contradictory what is presumed to cognize such,theunfettered strength and open-minded self-consciousness. Theoryandintellectual experience requiretheir reciprocal effect. The former does not contain answers for everything, but reacts to aworld whichisfalsetoitsinnermostcore.Theorywouldhavenojurisdictionoverwhatwouldbefree of the bane of such. The ability to move is essential to consciousness, not an accidental characteristic. Itsignifies adoubleprocedure: thatoftheinsideout,theimmanentprocess,the authenticallydialectical,andafreeone,somethingunfetteredwhichstepsoutofdialectics,asit were.Neitherofthemarehoweverdisparate.Theunregimentedthoughthasanelectiveaffinity to dialectics, which as critique of the system recalls to mind what would be outside of the system; andtheenergywhichdialecticalmovementincognitionunleashesisthatwhichrebels againstthesystem.Bothpositionsofconsciousnessareconnectedtooneanotherthrougheach other’scritique,notthroughcompromise.
TheVertiginous42-43
A dialectics which is no longer “pinned”10 to identity provokes, if not the objection of bottomlessness, whichistoberecognizedbyitsfascistfruits,thenthatofthevertiginous.This feeling has been central to great modern poetry since Baudelaire; philosophy, runs the anachronisticsuggestion,oughtnottoparticipateinanysuchthing.You’resupposedtosaywhat youwant;KarlKraushadtolearnthatthemoreexactlyeachofhissentenceswasexpressed,the morethereifiedconsciousnessbemoanedjustsuchprecision,asmakingtheirheadsswim.The meaning ofsuchcomplaintsistobegraspedinausageofthedominantopinion.Thisrefersto present alternatives in such a way that one would have to choose between oneortheother. Administrations frequently reduce decisions overplanssubmitted toittoasimpleyesorno; administrative thinkinghassecretly become thelonged-formodelofonewhichpretendstobe freeofsuch.Butitisuptophilosophical thought,initsessentialsituations,nottoplayalong. Thegivenalternativeisalreadyapieceofheteronomy.Onlythatconsciousnesswhosedecision is moralistically presumed in advance would be able to judge the legitimacy of alternative demands.Theinsistenceonprofessingtoastandpointistheextendedcoercionoftheconscience intotheory.Itcorrespondstoacoarsening.Noteventhetruthofthegreattheoremscansurvive theuprootingoftheirscaffolding;MarxandEngelsforexampleobjectedmightilytothedilution oftheirdynamic class-theory anditssharpenedeconomicexpressionbythesimpleropposition ofrichandpoor.Theessenceisfalsifiedbytheresumeofthatwhichisessential.Aphilosophy whichreducesitselftowhatHegelalreadymocked–accommodatingitsreadersbydeclarations, ofwhatonewouldnowhavetothink–conjoinsitselftotheonrushingregression,withouteven
keepingpacewithsuch.Behindtheanxietyofwherethingsneedtobetakenonstands,forthe mostpart,onlyaggression,thedesiretotakethingson,justastheschoolshistoricallydevoured each other. The equivalent of guilt and penance has transposed itself onto the sequence of thought. Exactly this assimilation of the Spirit into the dominating principle is what philosophical reflection mustseethrough.Traditional thinkingandtheplatitudes ofthesound human understanding which it left behind, after perishing philosophically, demand a coordinate-system, a“frameofreference”[inEnglish],inwhicheverythingfindsitsplace.Not too much value is attached to the intelligibility of the coordinate-system – it may even be expressed in dogmatic axioms – insofar as every reflection is localizable and unaffiliated [ungedeckte]thoughtsarekeptatadistance.Incontrasttothis,thecognitionthrowsitselfàfond perdu[French:intothedepths]atobjects,soastobefruitful.Thevertigowhichthiscreatesisan index veri [Latin: index of truth]; the shock of the revelation, the negativity, or what it necessarilyseemstobeamidstwhatishiddenandmonotonous,untruthonlyfortheuntrue.
FragilityoftheTruth43-45
Thedemolitionofthesystemsandofthesystemisnoformal-epistemologicalact.Whatinany case the system wished to supply in the details is to be sought out solely in these. Neither whether it is still there, nor what it might be, is granted to thought inadvance. Therein the thoroughlymisusedtalkofthetruthassomethingconcrete wouldatlastcomeintoitsown.It compelsthinkingtolingerbeforethesmallest ofallthings.Notabouttheconcrete,butonthe contraryoutfromthis,iswhatneedstobephilosophized.Thededicationtothespecificobject becomessuspecthoweverduetoalackofanunequivocalposition.Whatisdifferentfromthe existent is regarded by such as witchcraft, while in the false world nearness, homeland and security are for their part figures of the bane. With these human beings fear they will lose everything, becausetheyhavenootherhappiness,alsononewithinthought,thanwhatyoucan hold on to yourself, perennial unfreedom. What is demanded is at the very least a piece of ontologyinthemidstofitscritique;asifnoteventhesmallestunaffiliated[ungedeckte]insight couldbetterexpresswhatiswishedfor,thana“declarationofintention”[inEnglish]whichstays atthat.ThisconfirmsanexperienceinphilosophywhichSchoenbergnotedintraditionalmusical theory:youonlyreallylearnfromthishowapassagebeginsandends,butnothingaboutititself, its trajectory. Analogous to this, philosophy ought not to reduce itself to categories butina certain senseshouldcomposeitself[komponieren: tocomposemusically]. Itmustcontinually renewitselfinitscourse,outofitsownpowerjustasmuchasoutofthefrictionwiththatwhich itmeasuresitselfby;whatitbearswithinitselfisdecisive,notthethesisorposition;theweb,not theinductiveordeductive,one-trackcourseofthought.Thatiswhyphilosophyisessentiallynot reportable. Otherwise it would be superfluous; that it for the most part allows itself to be reported, speaks against it. But a mode of conduct whichprotectsnothingasthefirstorthe secure,andyet,solelybypowerofthedeterminationofitsportrayal,makessofewconcessions torelativism, thebrotherofabsolutism, thatitapproachesadoctrine,causesoffence.Itdrives pastHegel,whosedialecticmusthaveeverything,andyetalsowishedtobeprimaphilosophia (andintheidentity-principle, theabsolutesubject,wasindeedthis),tothebreaking-point.The jettisoning ofthatwhichisfirstandsolidifiedfromthoughtdoesnotabsolutizeitassomething free-floating.Exactlythisjettisoningattachesitallthemoretowhatititselfisnot,andremoves theillusionofitsautarky.Thefalsityofthejettisonedrationalitywhichrunsawayfromitself,the recoil ofEnlightenment intomythology,isitselfrationallydeterminable.Thinkingisaccording
to its own meaning the thinking of something. Even in the logical abstraction-form of the Something, as something which is meant or judged, which for its part does not claim to constitute anything existent, indelibly survives that which thinking would like to cancel out, whosenon-identity isthatwhichisnotthinking.Theratiobecomesirrationalwhereitforgets this,hypostasizing itsowncreations,theabstractions,contrarytothemeaningofthinking.The commandment ofitsautarkycondemnsittonullity,intheendtostupidityandprimitivity.The objectionofbottomlessnessneedstobeturnedagainsttheintellectualprinciplewhichpreserves itself as the sphere of absolute origins; there however, where ontology, Heidegger first and foremost,hitsbottomlessness, istheplace oftruth.Itswaysgently,fragileduetoitstemporal content; Benjamin penetratingly criticizedGottfriedKeller’sUr-bourgeoismaximthatthetruth cannotrunawayfromus.Philosophymustdispensewiththeconsolationthatthetruthcannotbe lost.Onewhichcannotfallintotheabyss,ofwhichthefundamentalistsofmetaphysicsprattle–it is not that of agile sophistics but that of insanity – turns, under the commandment of its principle of security, analytical, potentially into tautology. Only those thoughts which go to extremes can face up to the all-powerful powerlessness of certain agreement; only mental acrobaticsrelatetothething,whichaccordingtothefableconvenu[French:agreed-uponfiction] it holds in contempt for the sake of its self-satisfaction. No unreflective banality can,asthe imprintofthefalselife,stillbetrue.Everyattempttodaytoholdbackthought,forthesakeofits utility, by talk of its smugoverwroughtnessandnon-committal aspect[Unverbindlichkeit], is reactionary Theargumentcanbesummarizedinitsvulgarform:ifyouwant,Icangiveyouany numberofsuchanalyses.Thereineachbecomesdevaluedbyeveryother PeterAlternberggave theanswertosomeonewhoinasimilarfashionwassuspiciousofhiscompressedforms:butI don’t want to. The open thought is unprotected against the risk of goingastrayintowhatis popular;nothingnotifiesitthatithasadequatelysatisfieditselfinthething,inordertowithstand thatrisk.Theconsistencyofitsexecution,however,thedensityoftheweb,enablesittohitwhat itshould.Thefunctionoftheconceptofcertaintyinphilosophyhasutterlyrecoiled.Whatonce wishedtoovertakedogmaandtutelagethroughself-certaintybecamethesocialinsurancepolicy ofacognitionwhichdoesallowanythingtohappen.Nothinginfacthappenstoanythingwhich iscompletelyunobjectionable.
AgainstRelativism45-48
Inthehistoryofphilosophy,epistemological categories haverepeatedlybeentransformedinto moralones;Fichte’sinterpretationofKantisthemoststrikingexample,thoughfarfromtheonly one. Something similar occurred with logical-phenomenological absolutism. For fundamental ontologiststheoffenceofbottomlessthoughtisrelativism.Dialecticsopposesthisassharplyas itdoesabsolutism;notbyseekingamiddlepositionbetweenthetwo,butthroughtheextremes, whichconvict themofuntruthaccordingtotheirownideas.Toproceedinthismanneragainst relativismislongoverdue,becauseitscritiquewasforthemostpartsoformallyapplied,thatit permitted the fiber of relativistic thinking to remain more or less untouched. The popular argument against Spengler since Leonard Nelson, that relativism presupposes an absolute, namelyitsownvalidityandthuscontradictsitself,iswretched.Itconfusesthegeneralnegation of a principle with its own ascent to an affirmation, without consideration of the specific difference ofthepositional valueofboth.Itwouldbemorefruitfultocognizerelativismasa delimited formofconsciousness. Atfirstitwasthatofbourgeoisindividualism, whichforits parttookthemediatedindividualconsciousnessthroughthegeneralityfortheultimateandthus
accorded theopinionsofeverysingleindividualthesameright,asiftherewerenocriterionof their truth. The abstract thesisoftheconditionality ofeverythoughtistobemostconcretely remindedofthatofitsown,theblindnesstowardsthesupra-individualmoment,throughwhich individual consciousness alone becomes thought. Behind this thesisstandsacontempt ofthe Spiritwhichpreferstheprimacyofmaterialrelationships,astheonlythingwhichshouldcount. Thefather’sreplytotheuncomfortable anddecidedviewsofhissonis,everythingisrelative, thatmoney,asintheGreeksaying,makeththeman.Relativismisvulgarmaterialism,thought disturbs the business. Utterly hostile towards the Spirit, such an attitude remainsnecessarily abstract. Therelativity ofallcognition canonlybemaintainedfromwithout,forsolongasno conclusive cognition isachieved. Assoonasconsciousnessentersintoadeterminatethingand poses its immanent claim totruthorfalsehood,thepresumablysubjective contingency ofthe thoughtfallsaway.Relativismisnullandvoidsimplybecause,whatitontheonehandconsiders popular and contingent, and on the other hand holds to be irreducible, originates out of objectivity – precisely that of an individualistic society – and is to be deduced as socially necessary appearance [Schein].Themodesofreaction whichaccording torelativisticdoctrine areuniquetoeachindividual,arepreformed,alwayspracticallythebleatingofsheep;especially thestereotype ofrelativity.Individualistic appearance [Schein]isthenextendedbythecannier relativists such as Pareto to group interests. But thestrata-specific boundsofobjectivity laid down by the sociology of knowledgearefortheirpartonlydeducible fromthewholeofthe society, from that which is objective. If Mannheim’s late version of sociological relativism imagineditcoulddistillscientificobjectivityoutofthevariousperspectivesofsocialstratawith “free-floating” intelligence, thenitinvertsthatwhichconditionsintotheconditioned. Intruth divergent perspectives have their law in the structure of the social process, as one of a preestablished whole. Through its cognition they lose their non-committal aspect. An entrepreneur who does not wish to be crushed by the competition mustcalculate sothatthe unpaidpartoftheyieldofalienatedlaborfallstohimasaprofit,andmustthinkthatlikeforlike –labor-powerversusitscostofreproduction–istherebyexchanged;itcanjustasstringentlybe shown, however, why this objectively necessary consciousness is objectively false. This dialecticalrelationshipsublatesitsparticularmomentsinitself.Thepresumedsocialrelativityof theintuitionsobeystheobjectivelawofsocialproductionunderprivateownershipofthemeans ofproduction.Bourgeoisskepticism,whichembodiesrelativismasadoctrine,isnarrow-minded. Yet the perennial hostility to the Spirit is more than a feature of subjective bourgeois anthropology.Itisduetothefactthattheconcept ofreasoninsideoftheexistingrelationsof production,onceemancipated, mustfearthatitsowntrajectory willexplodethis.Thisiswhy reasondelimits itself; duringtheentirebourgeoisepoch,theideaoftheautonomyoftheSpirit was accompanied by its reactive self-loathing. It cannot forgive itself for the fact that the constitution oftheexistenceitcontrolsforbidsthatdevelopmentintofreedom,whichliesinits ownconcept.Relativismisthephilosophicalexpressionofthis;nodogmaticabsolutismneedbe summoned against it, the proof of its own narrowness crushes it. Relativism was always well-disposed towards reaction, no matter how progressive its bearing,already displayingits availability forthestrongerinterest inantiquity.Thecritique ofrelativismwhichintervenesis theparadigmofdeterminatenegation.
DialecticsandTheSolidified48-50
Unfettered dialectics doesnotdispensewithanythingsolidanymorethanHegel.Ratheritno longeraccordsitprimacy.Hegeldidnotemphasizeitsomuchintheoriginsofhismetaphysics: it was supposed to emerge at the end, as the thoroughly illuminated whole.Thatiswhyhis logical categories havetheirownpeculiar doublecharacter.Theyareemergent,self-sublating and at the same time a priori, invariant structures. They are brought into harmony with the dynamicthroughthedoctrineofanimmediacywhichreproducesitselfanewateverydialectical level.Hegel’salreadycriticallytingedtheoryofasecondnatureisnotlosttonegativedialectics. Ittakestheunmediatedimmediacy,theformations,whichsocietyanditsdevelopmentpresentto thought, tel quel [French: as such], in order to reveal their mediations through analysis, according tothemeasureoftheimmanentdifferenceofthephenomenatowhattheyclaim,for theirownpart,tobe.Thatwhichholdsitselftogetherassolid,the“positive”oftheyoungHegel, is the negative of such analyses, just like his. Thought, archenemy of that positivity, is still characterized as the negative principle in the preface to the Phenomenology.*03* Even the simplest reflection leads to this: what does not think, but yields itself to the intuition, tends towardsthebadpositivebyvirtueofthatpassiveconstitution, whichinthecritiqueofreason indicated thesensorysourceoftherightofknowledge.Toperceivesomethingso,simplyasit offersitself,whilerenouncingreflection,isalwayspotentiallytantamounttorecognizingit,asit is; by contrast, virtually every thought causes a negative movement. InHegeltobesurethe primacyofthesubjectovertheobjectremains,despiteallassertionstothecontrary,undisputed. Itismerelyhiddeninthesemi-theologicalwordSpirit[Geist:mind,spirit],inwhichthememory of individual subjectivity cannot be erased. The Hegelian Logic foots the bill for this in its thoroughly formal character While it must according to its own concept be substantive, it excises,initsefforttobeeverythingatthesametime,metaphysicsandadoctrineofcategories, the determinate existent out of itself, in which its beginnings could have legitimated itself; therein not so far away from Kant and Fichte, who Hegel never tired of denouncing as the spokespersons for abstract subjectivity The Science of Logic is for its part abstract in the simplest sense;thereduction ofgeneral conceptsalready uprootsinadvancethecounter-force [Widerspiel] to such,thatwhichisconcrete, whichidealistic dialectics boastsofharboringin itselfanddeveloping.TheSpiritwinsthebattleagainstthenon-existentenemy.Hegel’sslighting remarkoncontingent existence, theKrugianfeather whichphilosophyscornstodeduceoutof itselfandyetmust,isa“stopthief”.SinceHegelianlogicalwayshadtodowiththemediumof the concept and only generally reflected ontherelationship oftheconcept toitscontent, the non-conceptual,itisalreadyassuredinadvanceoftheabsolutenessoftheconcept,whichitwas bentonproving.Themoretheautonomyofsubjectivity isseenthroughcritically,themoreit becomesawareofitselfassomethingmediatedforitspart,themoreconclusivetheobligationof thoughttotakeupwhatsolidityhasbroughttoit,whichitdoesnothaveinitself.Otherwise there couldnotevenbethatdynamic, bywhichdialectics movedtheburdenofthatwhichis solid. Not every experience which appears to be primary is to be denied point-blank. If the experienceofconsciousnesswhollylackedwhatKierkegaarddefendedasnaivete,thenthinking woulddothatwhichisexpectedofitbywhatisestablished,wouldgoastrayinitself,andwould becomequitenaïve.EventerminisuchasUr-experience,compromisedthroughphenomenology and neo-ontology, designate something true, while they haughtily damage it. If they did not spontaneously create resistance against the façade, heedless of their own dependencies, then thought and activity would only be dim copies. What in the object goes beyond the determinations laiduponitbythinking,returnsfirstlytothesubjectassomethingimmediate;
wherethesubjectfeelsitselftobequitecertain ofitself,intheprimaryexperience,itisonce againleastofallasubject.Thatwhichismostsubjectiveofall,theimmediatelygiven,eludesits grasp.Yetsuchimmediateconsciousnessisneithercontinuouslyheldfastnorpositivepureand simple.Forconsciousness isatthesametimetheuniversalmediationandcannotleap,evenin thedonnéesimmédiate[French:givenfacts]whichareitsown,overitsshadow.Theyarenotthe truth.Theconfidence thatthewholeseamlessly emergesoutofthatwhichisimmediate,solid andsimplyprimary,isidealisticappearance[Schein].Todialecticsimmediacydoesnotremain what it immediately expresses. It becomesamoment insteadofthegrounds.Attheopposite pole, the same thing happens to the invariants of pure thought. Solely achildlike relativism woulddisputethevalidityofformallogicormathematicsanddenouncethem,becausetheyhave cometobe,asephemeral.Howevertheinvariantswhoseowninvarianceissomethingproduced arenottobepeeledoutofwhatvaries,asifonehadalltruthinone’shands.Thisgrewtogether withthatwhichissubstantivetothematter[Sachhaltigen],whichchanges,anditsimmutability isthedeceptionofprimaphilosophia[Latin:originaryphilosophy].Whileinvariantsdonotmelt awayintothehistoricaldynamicinquitethesamewayasinconsciousness,theyaremomentsin it; they pass over into ideology, as soon as they are solidified as transcendence. Explicitly idealistic philosophyisbynomeansalwaysideology.Ithidesinthesubstructionofsomething primary, almost indifferent as to which content, intheimplicit identity ofconcept andthing, which the world then justifies, even when the dependence of consciousness on being is summarilytaught.
PrivilegeofExperience50-53
Insharpcontrasttotheusualscientificideal,theobjectivityofdialecticalcognitionneedsmore subject,notless.Otherwise philosophical experience shrivels.Butthepositivistic spiritofthe epochisallergictothis.Noteveryoneissupposedtobecapableofsuchexperience.Itisheldto be the prerogative of individuals, determined through theirnatural talents andlife-history; to demand this as the condition of cognition, so runs the argument, would be elitist and undemocratic. It is to be conceded that not everyone in fact is capable of the same sort of philosophicalexperiences,inthewaythatallhumanbeingsofcomparableintelligenceoughtto be able to reproduce experiments in the natural sciences or mathematical proofs, although according to current opinion quite specific talents are necessary for this. In any case the subjective quotient of philosophy, compared with the virtually subjectless rationality of a scientific ideal which posits the substitutability of everyone with everyone else, retains an irrational adjunct. It is no natural quality. While the argument pretends to be democratic, it ignoreswhattheadministeredworldmakesofitscompulsorymembers.Onlythosewhoarenot completely modeled after it can intellectually undertake somethingagainstit.Thecritique of privilege becomesaprivilege:sodialecticalisthecourseoftheworld.Itwouldbefictitiousto presume that everyone could understand or even be aware of all things, under historical conditions, especially those of education, which bind, spoon-feed and cripple theintellectual forces of production many times over; under the prevailing image-poverty; and under those pathological processes of early childhood diagnosed but by no means changed by psychoanalysis. Ifthiswasexpected, thenonewouldarrangecognitionaccordingtothepathic featuresofahumanity,forwhomthepossibilityofexperienceisdrivenoutthroughthelawof monotony,insofarastheypossesseditinthefirstplace.Theconstructionofthetruthaccording totheanalogyofthevolontédetous[French:popularwill]–themostextremeconsequenceof
the subjective concept of reason – would betray everyone ofeverything whichtheyneed,in everyone’s name. To those who have had the undeserved good fortune tonotbecompletely adjustedintheirinnerintellectualcompositiontotheprevailingnorms–astrokeofluck,which theyoftenenoughhavetopayforintermsoftheirrelationshiptotheimmediateenvironment–it is incumbent to make themoralistic and,asitwere,representative efforttoexpresswhatthe majority,forwhomtheysayit,arenotcapableofseeingor,todojusticetoreality,willnotallow themselves tosee.Thecriterionoftruthisnotitsimmediatecommunicabilitytoeveryone.The almostuniversalcompulsiontoconfusethecommunicationofthatwhichiscognizedwiththis former,alltoooftenrankingthelatter ashigher,istoberesisted; whileatpresent,everystep towardscommunication sellstruthoutandfalsifies it.Inthemeantime, everything todowith language labors under this paradox. Truth is objective and not plausible. So little as it immediatelyfallsintoanyone’slap,andsomuchasitrequiressubjectivemediation,whatcounts foritsimbricationiswhatSpinozaalltooenthusiasticallyproclaimedforthespecifictruth:that itwouldbetheindexofitself.Itlosesitsprivilegedcharacter,whichrancorholdsagainstit,by notallowingitselftobetalked outoftheexperiencestowhichitowesitself,butratherallows itselftoenterintoconfigurationsandexplanatorycontextswhichhelpmakeitevidentorconvict itofitsinadequacies.Elitistarrogancehasnottheleastplaceinphilosophicalexperience.Itmust giveanaccountofhowmuch,accordingtoitsownpossibilityintheexistent,itiscontaminated withtheexistent, withtheclassrelationship. Init,thechanceswhichtheuniversaldesultorily affords to individuals turn against that universal, which sabotages the universality of such experience. Ifthisuniversalitywereestablished,theexperienceofallparticularswouldthusbe transformedandwouldcastasidemuchofthecontingencywhichdistortedthemuntilthatpoint, even where it continues to stir Hegel’s doctrine, that theobject wouldreflect itselfinitself, survives its idealistic version, because in a changed dialectics the subject, disrobed of its sovereignty, virtually becomes thereby the reflection-form ofobjectivity Thelessthattheory comesacrossassomethingdefinitive andall-encompassing, thelessitconcretizes itself,even with regard to thinking. It permits the dissolution of the systemic compulsion, relying more frankly on its own consciousness and its own experience, than the pathetic conception of a subjectivity which pays for its abstract triumph with the renunciation of its specific content wouldpermit.Thisiscongruentwiththatemancipationofindividualityborneoutoftheperiod betweenthegreatidealismsandthepresent,andwhoseachievements,inspiteofandbecauseof thecontemporary pressureofcollectiveregression,aresolittletoberemandedintheoryasthe impulses of the dialectic in 1800. The individualism of the nineteenth century no doubt weakenedtheobjectifying poweroftheSpirit–thatoftheinsightintoobjectivityandintoits construction–butalsoendoweditwithasophistication,whichstrengthenstheexperienceofthe object.
QualitativeMomentofRationality53-54
Toyieldtotheobject issomuchastodojustice toitsqualitative moments.Thescientivistic objectification tends, in unitywiththequantifying tendency ofallscience sinceDescartes, to flattenoutqualities,totransformthemintomeasurabledeterminations.Rationalityitselfistoan increasing extent equated moremathematico[Latin:inmathematicalterms]withthecapability of quantification. As much as this took into account the primacy of the triumphant natural sciences,solittledoesitlieintheconceptoftheratioinitself.Itisblindednottheleastbecause itblocksitselfofffromqualitative momentsassomethingwhichisforitsparttoberationally
thought.Ratioisnotameresunâgôgê[Greek:gathering, assembly],theascentfromdisparate phenomena[Erscheinungen]totheconceptofitsspecies.11 Itdemandsjustasmuchthecapacity ofdistinction.Withoutitthesyntheticfunctionofthinking,abstractiveunification,wouldnotbe possible: toaggregate whatisthesamemeansnecessarilytoseparateitfromwhatisdifferent. Thishoweveristhequalitative; thethoughtwhichdoesnotthinkthis,isalreadycutoffandat oddswithitself.Plato,thefirsttoinauguratemathematicsasamethodologicalmodel,stillgave powerful expression to the qualitative moment of the ratio at thebeginningoftheEuropean philosophy of reason, by endowing sunâgôgê [Greek: gathering, assembly] next to diairesis [Greek:adividing]withequalrights.Theyfollowthecommandment,thatconsciousnessought, in keeping with theSocratic andSophistic separation ofphysei[Greek:bynature]andthesei [Greek:thesis],snuggleuptothenatureofthings,insteadofproceedingwiththemarbitrarily. ThequalitativedistinctionistherebynotonlyabsorbedbythePlatonicdialectic,intoitsdoctrine ofthinking,butinterpretedasacorrectivetotheviolenceofquantificationrunamok.Aparable from the Phaedros is unambiguous on this score. In it, the thought which arranges and non-violence arebalanced. Oneshould,sorunstheargument,inthereversaloftheconceptual movementofthesynthesis,“havethecapacity,todivideintospeciescorrespondingtoitsnature, tocarryoutthecutaccording tothejoints,andnotattempt,afterthemannerofabadcook,to shatter every member”.12 That qualitative moment is preserved as a substrate of what is quantifiedinallquantification,whichasPlatocautionsshouldnotbesmashedtopieces,lestthe ratio, by damaging the object which it was supposed to obtain, recoil into unreason. In the secondreflection,therationaloperationaccompaniesthequalityasthemomentoftheantidote, asitwere,whichthelimitedfirstreflectionofsciencewithheldfromphilosophy,assubornedto thislatterasitisestrangedfromit.Thereisnoquantifiableinsightwhichdoesnotfirstreceive its meaning, its terminus ad quem [Latin: end-point],intheretranslation intothequalitative. Even the cognitive goal of statistics is qualitative, quantification solely the means. The absolutizationofthequantifyingtendencyoftheratiotallieswithitslackofself-consciousness. Insistenceonthequalitativeservesthis,ratherthanconjuringupirrationality LaterHegelalone showedanawarenessofthis,withoutanyretrospective-romanticinclinations,atatimetobesure when the supremacy of quantification was not yet so widespread as today. For him, in accordance with the scientific formulation, “the truth of quality [is]itselfquantity”.13 Buthe cognized itintheSystemofPhilosophyasa“determinationindifferenttobeing,extraneousto it”.14 Itretainsitsrelevanceinthequantitative;andthequantumreturnsbacktothequality.15
QualityandTheIndividuated[Individuum]54-57
Thequantifyingtendencycorrespondedonthesubjectivesidetothereductionofthatwhichwas cognizedtosomethinguniversal,devoidofqualities,tothatwhichwaspurelylogical.Qualities would no doubt first be truly free in an objective condition which was no longerlimited to quantificationandwhichnolongerdrilledquantificationintothoseforcedtointellectuallyadapt tosuch.Butthisisnotthetimelessessencewhichmathematics,itsinstrument,makesitappear
as. Just like its claim to exclusivity, it became transient. The qualitative subject awaits the potential of its qualities in the thing, not its transcendental residue, although the subject is strengthened solely thereto bymeansofrestrictions basedonthedivisionoflabor.Themore meanwhile its own reactions are denounced as presumably merely subjective, the more the qualitative determinations in things escape cognition. The ideal of the distinction [Differenzierten] andthenuanced,whichcognition nevercompletely forgotdowntothelatest developments inspiteofall“science ismeasurement” [inEnglish],doesnotsolelyrefertoan individual capacity,whichobjectivity candispensewith.Itreceivesitsimpulsefromthething. Distinction means that someone is capable of discerning in this and initsconcept eventhat whichissmallestandwhichescapestheconcept;solelydistinctionencompassesthesmallest.In its postulate, that ofthecapability toexperience theobject –anddistinction isthesubjective reaction-formofthisbecomeexperience–themimeticmomentofcognitionfindsrefuge,thatof theelectiveaffinityofthecognizerandthatwhichistobecognized.Intheentireprocessofthe Enlightenment this moment gradually crumbled. But itdoesnotcompletely removeit,lestit annulitself.Evenintheconceptofrationalcognition,devoidofallaffinity,thegraspingforthis concordance lives on, which was once kept free of doubt by themagical illusion.Werethis moment whollyextirpated, thepossibility ofthesubjectcognizing theobject wouldbeutterly incomprehensible, thejettisoned rationality therebyirrational.Themimeticmomentforitspart howeverblendsinwiththerationalinthecourseofitssecularization.Thisprocesssummarizes itself in the distinction. It contains the mimetic capability of reaction initselfaswellasthe logical organ for the relationship of genus, species and differentia specifica [Latin: specific difference]. Therein the capability of distinction retains as much contingency as every undiminished individuality doesinregardstotheuniversaloneofitsreason.Thiscontingency meanwhile is not so radical as the criteria of scientivism would wish. Hegel was peculiarly inconsistent whenhearraignedtheindividualconsciousness,thestaging-groundsofintellectual experience, which animated his work, as the contingent and that which is limited. This is comprehensible onlyoutofthedesiretodisempower thecritical moment whichistiedtothe individual Spirit.Initsparticularization hefeltthecontradictions betweentheconceptandthe particular. Individual consciousness is always, and with reason, the unhappy one. Hegels aversiontowardsthisdeniestheverystateofaffairs[Sachverhalt]whichheunderlined,whereit suited him: how much the universal dwells within that which is individual. According to strategicnecessityhedenouncestheindividuatedasifitweretheimmediate,whoseappearance [Schein] he himself is destroying. With this however the absolute contingency of individual experience disappears, too. It would have no continuity without concepts. Through its participation inthediscursive medium itis,according toitsowndetermination, alwaysatthe same time more than only individual. The individuated becomes the subject, insofar as it objectifies itselfbymeansofitsindividualconsciousness,intheunityofitselfaswellasinits ownexperiences:animalsarepresumablybereftofboth.Becauseitisuniversalinitself,andas far as it is, individual experience also reaches into that which is universal. Even in epistemological reflection the logical generality and the unity of individual consciousness reciprocally condition oneanother.Thisaffectshowevernotonlythesubjective-formalsideof individuality.Everycontentoftheindividualconsciousnessisbroughttoitbyitsbearer,forthe sakeofitsself-preservation, andreproducesitselfwiththelatter.Throughself-awareness itis possiblefortheindividualconsciousnesstoemancipateitself,toexpanditself.Whatdrivesitto thisisthemisery,thatthisuniversalitytendstoexertitshegemonyinindividualexperience.Asa “realitycheck”experiencedoesnotsimplymirrortheimpulsesandwishesoftheindividual,but
alsonegatesthem,sothatitwouldsurvive.Thatwhichisgeneralinthesubjectissimplynotto be grasped any other way than in the movement of particular human consciousness. If the individuated were simply abolished by fiat, no higher subject purified of the dross of contingency wouldemerge,butsolelyonewhichunconsciouslyfollowsorders.IntheEastthe theoretical short-circuit intheviewoftheindividuated hasservedasthepretextforcollective repression.ThePartyissupposedtohaveacognitive powerapriorisuperiortothatofevery individual solely due to the number of its members, even if it is terrorized or blinded. The isolated individual [Individuum]however,unencumbered bytheukase,mayattimesperceive the objectivity more clearly than a collective, which in any case is only the ideology of its committees.Brecht’ssentence,thePartyhasathousandeyes,theindividualonlytwo,isasfalse asanybromide.Theexactimaginationofadissentercanseemorethanathousandeyeswearing thesamered-tintedglasses,whothenmistakewhattheyseewiththeuniversalityofthetruthand regress.Theindividuationofcognitionresiststhis.Theperceptionoftheobjectdependsnotonly onthis,onthedistinction:itisitselfconstitutedfromtheobject,whichdemandsitsrestitutioin integrum [Latin: restitution in whole] in it, as it were. Nevertheless the subjective modesof reactionwhichtheobjectneedsrequirefortheirparttheunceasingcorrectiveintheobject.This occursintheself-reflection,thefermentofintellectualexperience.Theprocessofphilosophical objectification would be, put metaphorically, vertical, intra-temporal, as opposed to the horizontal,abstractquantifyingoneofscience;somuchistrueofBergson’smetaphysicsoftime.
Substantiality[Inhaltlichkeit]andMethod57-58
That generation, also Simmel, Husserl, and Scheler, sought in vain for a philosophy which, receptive to the objects, would render itself substantive. What tradition dismissed is what tradition desired. This does not obviate themethodological consideration, ofhowsubstantive particular analysis stands in relation to the theory of dialectics. The idealistic-identity-philosophical avowal that the latter dissolves itself in the former is unconvincing.Objectively,however,thewholewhichisexpressedbytheoryiscontainedwithin theparticular tobeanalyzed, notfirstthroughthecognizing subject.Themediationofbothis itselfsubstantive, thatthroughthesocialtotality.Itishoweveralsoformalduetotheabstract nomothetism[Gesetzmässigkeit]ofthetotalityitself,thatofexchange.Idealism,whichdistilled its absolute Spirit out of this, encrypted somethingtrueatthesametime, thatthismediation encounters phenomena as a compulsory mechanism; this lurks behind the so-called constitution-problem. Philosophical experience does not have this universal immediately, as appearance, but as abstractly as it objectively is. It is constrained towards the exit of the particular,withoutforgettingwhatitdoesnothave,butknows.Itspathisdoubled,similartothe Heracliteanone,theupwardsandthedownwards.Whileitassuresitselfoftherealdetermination of the phenomena through its concept, it cannot professthisontologically,aswhatistruein itself. It is fused with what is untrue, with the repressive principle, andthislessensevenits epistemologicaldignity.Itformsnopositivetelosinwhichcognitionwouldhalt.Thenegativity of the universal solidifies for its part the cognition into the particular asthatwhichistobe rescued. “The only thoughts which are true are those which do not understandthemselves.” [Self-citationofAdorno’sMinimaMoralia]Intheirinalienablygeneralelements,allphilosophy, eventhosewiththeintentionoffreedom,carriesalongtheunfreedominwhichthatofsocietyis prolonged.Ithasthecompulsioninitself; howeverthislatteraloneprotectsitfromregression intocaprice.Thinkingiscapableofcriticallycognizingthecompulsorycharacterimmanenttoit;
itsowninnercompulsionisthemedium ofitsemancipation. Thefreedomtowardstheobject, whichinHegelresultedinthedisempowerment ofthesubject,isfirstofalltobeestablished. Untilthen,dialecticsdivergesasmethodandasoneofthething.Conceptandrealityareofthe samecontradictory essence. Whattearssocietyapartantagonistically,thedominatingprinciple, is the same thing which, intellectualized, causes the difference betweentheconcept andthat which is subordinated under it. The logical form of the contradiction however achieves that difference, because every one which does not suborn itself to the unity of the dominating principle, according tothemeasureoftheprinciple,doesnotappearasapolyvalencewhichis indifferent to this, but as an infraction against logic.Ontheotherhandtheremainder ofthe divergencebetweenphilosophicconceptionandfollow-throughalsotestifiestosomethingofthe non-identity, which neither permitsthemethodtowhollyabsorbthecontents,inwhichalone they aresupposedtobe,norintellectualizes thecontents.Thepreeminence ofcontent reveals itself as the necessary insufficiency of the method. What as such, in the form of general reflection,mustbesaid,inordernottobedefenselessagainstthephilosophyofthephilosophers, legitimates itself solely in the follow-through, and is negated therein in turn as method. Its surplusiswithrespecttoitscontentabstract,false;Hegelalreadyhadtoacceptthisdiscrepancy intheprefacetothePhenomenology.Thephilosophicalidealwouldbetorendertheaccounting onewouldgiveforwhatonedoessuperfluous,bydoingit.
Existentialism58-61
The most recent attempt to break out of conceptual fetishism –outofacademic philosophy, without letting go of the claim of committalness [Verbindlichkeit] –wentunderthenameof existentialism. Like fundamental ontology, from which it separated itself through political engagement, it remained idealistically biased; it retained by thewaysomethingaccidental in relation to philosophical structure, replaceable through a contrary politics, so long as this satisfied the Characteristica formalis[Latin: formalcharacteristic] ofexistentialism. Thereare partisansbothhereandthere[hübenunddrüben:i.e.WestandEastGermany,respectively].No theoretical borderline on decisionism is drawn. Nevertheless the idealistic component of existentialism isforitspartafunctionofpolitics. Sartreandhisfriends,criticsofsocietyand unwilling to limit themselves to theoretical critique, did not fail to see that Communism, whereveritcametopower,entrencheditselfasasystemofadministration.Theinstitutionofthe centralized state-party is a mockery of everything which was once thought concerning the relationshiptothepowerofthestate.ThatiswhySartrestakedeverythingonthemomentwhich wasnotpermittedbytherulingpraxis;spontaneity,inthelanguageofphilosophy.Thelessthat social power-distribution gave it an objective chance, the more exclusively did he extol the Kierkegaardian category ofthedecision.Thelatter received itsmeaning fromitsterminusad quem[Latin:end-point],fromChristology;inSartreitbecomestheabsolutewhichitwasonce supposedtoserve.Inspiteofhisextremenominalism*04*Sartre’sphilosophyorganizeditselfin itsmosteffectivephaseaccordingtotheoldidealisticcategoryofthesubject’sfreely-conceived act [Tatbehandlung]. Similar to Fichte, existentialism is indifferenttowardseveryobjectivity. Social relationships and conditions consistently became tacked-on albeit timely additions in Sartre’s plays, structurally however hardly more than an occasion for the action. This was condemned by Sartre’s philosophical objectlessness to an irrationality which the tireless Enlightenerintendedleastofall.Theconceptionofabsolutefreedomofdecisionisasillusionary asthatoftheabsoluteI,whichwastoderivetheworldoutofitself.Themostmodestpolitical
experience wouldsufficetomakethesituationsconstructedasfoilsforthedecisionsofheroes startwobblinglikestagebackdrops.Noteventheatricallycouldsovereigndecisionsofthissort bepostulatedinconcretehistoricalimbrication.Afieldgeneralwhodecidedtoceasecommitting actsofcrueltyjustasirrationallyasheusedtocarrytheseout,whobrokeoffthesiegeofacity alreadybetrayedtohiminadvanceandfoundedautopiancommunity,wouldbe,ifnotkilledby mutinous soldiers, then surely dismissed by his superiors, even in the wildest times of the farcical,romanticizederaoftheGermanrenaissance.ItisonlytootruethatGoetz,bragginglike Nestroy’sHolofernes,wholearnedthelessonofthefreely-conceivedactinthemassacreofthe City of Light, put himself at thedisposalofanorganizedpopularmovement, thetransparent likeness of those against which Sartre played absolute spontaneity. The man in the window [Butzenscheibemann] thus once again commits the atrocities – only now openly with the blessingofphilosophy–whichhehadforswornoutoffreedom.Theabsolutesubjectdoesnot escapefromitsentanglement:thefetterswhichitwouldliketotearapart,thoseofdomination, areasonewiththeprinciple ofabsolutesubjectivity.ItistoSartre’shonorthatthismanifests itselfinhisplays,againsthisphilosophicalmasterwork;hisplaysdisavowthephilosophywhose thesestheydealwith.Thefolliesofpoliticalexistentialismhowever,likethephraseologyofthe depoliticized German kind, havetheirphilosophicbasis.Existentialism raisedthatwhichwas unavoidable, themereexistence ofhumanbeings,toawayofthinkingwhichtheindividualis supposedtochoosewithoutdeterminable reasonsforthechoice, andalsowithouthavingany othersortofchoice.Whereexistentialismteachesmorethansuchtautologies,itjoinsincommon withthesubjectivityexistentforitself,asthatwhichisalonesubstantial.Theschoolswhichtake derivatives oftheLatin existere [Latin: toexist]astheirdevice,wouldliketosummonupthe realityofcorporealexperienceagainstthealienatedparticularscience.Outoffearofreification theyshrinkbackfromwhathassubstantivecontent.Itturnsunwittinglyintoanexample.What theysubsumeunderepochê[Greek:suspension]revengesitselfbyexertingitspowerbehindthe backofphilosophy,inwhatthislatterwouldconsiderirrationaldecisions.Thenon-conceptual particularscienceisnotsuperiortothinkingpurgedofitssubstantivecontent;allitsversionsend up, a second time, in precisely the formalism which it wishedtocombat forthesakeofthe essential interest of philosophy. It is retroactively filled up with contingent borrowings, especially from psychology.Theintention ofexistentialism atleastinitsradical Frenchform wouldnotberealizableatadistancefromsubstantivecontent,butinitsthreateningnearnessto this.Theseparation ofsubjectandobject isnottobesublatedthroughthereductiontohuman nature,wereiteventheabsoluteparticularization.Thecurrentlypopularquestionofhumanity, allthewayintotheMarxismofLukacsianprovenance,isideologicalbecauseitdictatesthepure form of the invariant astheonlypossibleanswer,andwerethislatter historicity itself.What humanbeingsaresupposedtobe,isalwaysonly,whattheywere:theyarechainedtothecliffof theirpast.Theyarenotonlywhattheywereandare,butjustasmuchwhattheycouldbe;no determination reaches far enough to anticipate that. How little the schools grouped around existence, eventheextreme nominalistic ones,arecapable ofthatrealization[Entaeusserung], whichtheylongforintherecoursetotheparticular humanexistence,isconfessedbythefact thattheyuniversally-conceptuallyphilosophizethatwhichdoesnotvanishintoitsconcept,that whichiscontrarytoit,insteadofthinkingitthrough.Theyillustrateexistence[Existenz]inthe existing[Existierenden].
Thing,Language,History61-63
How to think otherwise than this has its distant and shadowy Ur-modelinlanguages,inthe nameswhichdonotcategoricallyoverreachthething,admittedlyatthepriceoftheircognitive function.Undiminished cognition wishesthatwhichonehasbeenalready drilledtorenounce, andwhatthenameswhicharetooclosetosuchobscure;resignationanddeceptioncompleteone anotherideologically.Idiosyncraticexactnessinthechoiceofwords,asiftheyshouldnamethe thing,isnottheleastofthereasonsthatportrayal[Darstellung]isessentialtophilosophy.The cognitive grounds for such insistence of expression before tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here] is its own dialectic, its conceptual mediation in itself; it is the point of attack for comprehending what is nonconceptual in it. For the mediation in the midst of what is non-conceptualisnoremainderofacompletesubtraction,norisitsomethingwhichwouldrefer tothebadinfinityofsuchprocedures.Onthecontrary,themediationisthehyle[Greek:primary matter]ofitsimplicithistory.Philosophycreates,whereveritisstilllegitimate,outofsomething negative: thatinitsattitudeofthings-are-so-and-not-otherwise,theindissolubilitybeforewhich itcapitulates,andfromwhichidealismveersaway,ismerelyafetish;thatoftheirrevocabilityof theexistent.Thisdissolvesbeforetheinsightthatthingsarenotsimplysoandnototherwise,but cametobeunderconditions.Thisbecomingdisappearsanddwellsinthething,andisnomore tobebroughttoahaltinitsconceptthantobesplitofffromitsresultandforgotten.Temporal experience resembles it.Inthereadingoftheexistent asatextofitsbecoming,idealisticand materialistic dialectics touch.However,whileidealism justifiestheinnerhistoryofimmediacy as a stage of the concept, itbecomesmaterialistically themeasurenotonlyoftheuntruthof concepts, but also that oftheexistingimmediacy Whatnegative dialectics drivesthroughits hardenedobjectsisthepossibility whichtheirrealityhasbetrayed,andyetwhichgleamsfrom eachoneofthese.Yeteveninthemostextremeeffortstoexpressthehistorycongealedinthe thingsinlanguage,thewordsusedforthisremainconcepts.Theirprecisionisasurrogateofthe selfnessofthething,neverwhollypresent;agapyawnsbetweenitandwhatitwantstoconjure. Thus the dregs of caprice and relativity in the choice of words as well as in portrayal [Darstellung] generally. Even in Benjamin concepts have a tendency of hiding their conceptuality in an authoritarian manner. Only concepts canfulfill whattheconcept hinders. Cognitionisatrôsasiasêta[Greek:woundedhealing]. Thedeterminatefailureofallconcepts necessitates the citation of others; therein originate those constellations, into which alone something of the hope of the Name has passed.Thelanguage ofphilosophyapproachesthis latter through itsnegation. Whatitcriticizes inwords,itsclaim toimmediate truth,isalmost always the ideology of the positive, existing identity of the word and the thing. Even the insistenceonthespecificwordandconcept,astheirongatetobeunlocked,issolelyamoment ofsuch,thoughanindispensableone.Inordertobecognized,thatwhichisinternalized,which thecognitionclingstointheexpression,alwaysneedssomethingexternaltoit.
TraditionandCognition63-65
Itisnolongerpossibletopaddlealonginthemainstream–eventhewordsoundsdreadful–of modern philosophy.Therecent kind,dominant untiltoday,wouldliketoexpelthetraditional moments of thought, dehistoricizing it according to its own content, assigning history to a particular branch of an established fact-collecting science. Ever since the fundament of all cognition was sought in the presumed immediacy of the subjectively given,therehavebeen
attempts,inthralltotheidolofthepurepresence,asitwere,todriveoutthehistoricaldimension ofthought.Thefictitiousone-dimensionalNowbecomesthecognitivegroundofinnermeaning. Underthisaspect,eventhepatriarchsofmodernitywhoareofficiallyviewedasantipodesarein agreement:intheautobiographicalexplanationsofDescartesontheoriginofhismethodandin Bacon’s idol-theory. What is historical in thinking, instead of reining in the timelessness of objectivated logic, is equated with superstition, whichthecitation ofinstitutionalized clerical tradition againsttheinquiringthoughtinfactwas.Thecritiqueofauthoritywaswellfounded. But what it overlooked was that the tradition of cognition was itself as immanent as the mediatingmomentofitsobjects.Cognitiondistortsthese,assoonasitturnsthemintoatabula rasabymeansofobjectificationsbroughttoahalt.Evenintheconcretizedforminoppositionto itscontent, ittakespartinthetradition asunconsciousmemory; noquestioncouldsimplybe asked,whichwouldnotvouchsafetheknowledgeofwhatispastandpushitfurther.Theformof thinking as an intra-temporal, motivated, progressive movement resembles in advance, microcosmically, the macrocosmic, historical one, which was internalized in the structure of thought.Amongthehighestachievements oftheKantiandeduction wasthathepreservedthe memory, the trace of what was historical in the pure form of cognition, in the unity of the thinkingI,atthestageofthereproductionofthepowerofimagination.Becausehoweverthereis notimewithoutthatwhichisexistentinit,whatHusserlinhislatephasecalledinnerhistoricity cannot remain internalized, pure form. The inner historicity of thought grew along with its contentandtherebywiththetradition.Thepure,completelysublimatedsubjectwouldbeonthe otherhandthatwhichisabsolutelytraditionless.Thecognitionwhichexperiencedonlytheidol ofthatpurity,totaltimelessness,coincideswithformallogic,wouldbecometautology;itcould not grant even a transcendental logic any room. Timelessness, towards which the bourgeois consciousnessstrives,perhapsascompensationforitsownmortality,isthezenithofitsdelusion. Benjamin innervated this when he strictly forswore the ideal of autonomy anddedicated his thinkingtoatradition,albeittoavoluntarilyinstalled,subjectivelychosenonewhichdispenses with the same authority, which it indicts autarkic thought of dispensing with. Although the counter-force [Widerspiel] to the transcendental moment, the traditional one is quasi transcendental, not a point-like subjectivity, but rather that which is actually constitutive, in Kant’swordsthemechanismhiddeninthedepthsofthesoul.Amongthevariantsofthealltoo narrow concluding questions of the Critique of Pure Reason, one ought not to beexcluded, namely howthought,byhavingtorelinquishtradition,mightbeabletopreserveandtransform such;16 intellectual experience is nothing else. The philosophyofBergson,andevenmoreso Proust’snovel,abandonedthemselves tothis,onlyfortheirpartunderthebaneofimmediacy, outofloathingforthatbourgeoistimelessnesswhichanticipatestheabolitionoflifeinadvance of the mechanics of the concept. The methexis of philosophyintradition wouldbehowever solelyitsdeterminaterepudiation[Verneinung].Itisconstructedbythetextswhichitcriticizes. In them, which the tradition brings to itandwhichthetextsthemselves embody,itsconduct becomes commensurable with tradition. This justifies the transition from philosophy to interpretation,whichenshrinesneitherwhatisinterpretednorraisesthesymboltotheabsolute, butseekswhatmightbereallytruethere,wherethoughtsecularizestheirretrievableUr-modelof holytexts.
Through the now apparent, now latent delimitation to texts, philosophy confesses to whatit vainlydeniedundertheidealofthemethod,itslinguisticessence.Initsmodernhistory,itis-analogous to tradition -- denigrated as rhetoric. Tossed aside and degraded into a means of realizingeffects,itwasthebearerofliesinphilosophy.Thecontemptforrhetoricatonedforthe guilt in which this latter, since antiquity, hadincurredthroughthatseparation fromthething itselfwhichPlatocomplainedabout.Buttheprosecutionoftherhetoricalmomentthroughwhich the expression was to be rescued as thought contributed no less to its technification, to its potential abolition, than the cultivation of rhetoric which disdained the object. Rhetoric representsinphilosophywhatcannototherwisebethoughtexceptinlanguage.Itmaintainsitself in the postulates ofportrayal [Darstellung], bywhichphilosophydifferentiates itselffromthe communicationofalreadycognizedandsolidifiedcontents.Itisindanger,likeeverythingwhich represents,becauseitslideseasilytowardstheusurpationofwhatthoughtcannotdirectlyobtain fromtheportrayal. Itisincessantly corruptedbyconvincingpurposes,withoutwhichhowever therelation ofthinkingtopraxiswouldonceagaindisappearfromthethought-act.Theallergy against expressionintheentire official philosophical tradition, fromPlatotothesemanticists, conforms to the tendency of all Enlightenment, to punish that which is undisciplined in the gesture,evendeepintologic,asadefense-mechanismofreifiedconsciousness.Iftheallianceof philosophy with science tends towards the virtual abolition of language, and therein of philosophyitself,thenitcannotsurvivewithoutitslinguisticeffort.Insteadofsplashingaboutin linguisticfalls,itreflectsonsuch.Thereisareasonwhylinguisticsloppiness–scientificallyput: theinexact –iswonttoallyitselfwiththescientificmienofincorruptibilitythroughlanguage. Fortheabolitionoflanguageinthoughtisnotitsdemythologization.Thusdeluded,philosophy sacrifices with language whatever might have related to its thing otherwise than as mere signification; only as language is that which is similar capable ofcognizing thesimilar The permanent denunciation of rhetoric by nominalism, for which the name bears not the least similaritytowhatitsays,isnotmeanwhiletobeignored,norisanunbrokenrhetoricalmoment tobesummonedagainstsuch.Dialectics,accordingtoitsliteralmeaninglanguageastheorgan ofthought,wouldbetheattempttocriticallyrescuetherhetoricalmoment:tohavethethingand theexpressionapproachoneanotheralmosttothepointofnon-differentiability.Itappropriates whathistorically appeared asthedefectofthought,itsnever-to-be-brokencontextinlanguage, forthepowerofthought.Thisinspiredthephenomenologies,whenthey,naïveasever,wantedto assurethemselvesofthetruthintheanalysisofwords.Intherhetoricalquality,culture,society, andtraditionanimatethought;whatispoint-blankanti-rhetoricalisalliedwiththebarbarismin which bourgeois thought ended. The defamation of Cicero, even Hegel’s antipathy against Diderot testify to the resentment of those whose attempts tofreelyraisethemselves upwere struckdownbylife-and-deathnecessity,andtowhomthebodyoflanguagecountedassinful.In dialectics the rhetorical moment takes, contrary to the vulgar viewpoint, the sideofcontent. Dialectics seeks to master the dilemma between the popular opinion and that which is non-essentializingly [wesenslos] correct, mediating this with the formal, logical one.Ittends however towards content as that which is open, not already decided in advance by the scaffolding:asprotestagainstmythos.Thatwhichismonotonousismythic,ultimatelydiluted into the formal juridicality of thinking [Denkgesetzlichkeit]. The cognition which wishesfor content, wishesforutopia.This,theconsciousness ofthepossibility,clingstotheconcreteas whatisundistorted.Itiswhatispossible,nevertheimmediatelyrealized,whichobstructsutopia; thatiswhyinthemiddle oftheexistent itappearsabstract.Theinextinguishablecolorcomes
from the not-existent. Thinking serves it as a piece of existence, as that which, as always negatively, reaches out to the not-existent. Solely the most extreme distance would be the nearness;philosophyistheprism,inwhichitscolorsarecaught.
AsteriskedNotesPages15-66
*01*[Footnotepg27]
“Ifbythewayskepticism isoftenconsideredeventodaytheirresistible enemyofallpositive knowledgeatlargeandtherebyalsoofphilosophy,insofaraspositivecognitionisconcerned, thenitistobenotedagainstthisthatitisinfactmerelythefinite,abstractlygraspedthought, which need fear skepticism and is not capable of countering the same, whereas by contrast philosophy contains theskeptical asamoment initself,namely asthedialectical. Philosophy doesnotremainstandinghoweveratthemerelynegativeresultofdialectics,asisthecasewith skepticism. This latter mistakes itsresult,inthatitholdsfasttosuchaspure,i.e.asabstract negation.Sincethedialectichasthenegativeasitsresult,soisthislatter,justasaresult,atthe sametimethepositive,foritcontainsthesamethingfromwhichitresults,assublatedinitself, andisnotthesamewithoutit.Thishoweveristhefundamentaldeterminationofthethirdform oflogic,namelythespeculativeorpositivereasoning.”Hegel,WW8,Pg.194ff.
*02*[Footnotepg34]
“Thethinkingorconception,whichonlyseesadeterminatebeing,existence[Dasein]beforeit, is to bereferredbacktotheafore-mentioned beginningsofscience, whichParmenides made, whichhisconceptionandthereinalsotheconceptionofsubsequenterasdiscussedandraisedto thatofpurethought,tobeingassuch,andthuscreatedtheelementofscience.”(Hegel,WW4, Page96)
*03*[Footnotepg48]
“Theactivityofdistinctionisthepowerandlaborofunderstanding,ofthemostwonderfuland greatest,orratheroftheabsolutepower Thecircleinwhichitremainsenclosedandcontainsits momentsassubstance,istheimmediateandforthatreasonnotwonderfulrelationship.Butthat accidental thingsseparated fromtheirownrealm, thingsboundupwhicharetrulyrealonlyin theircontextwithothers,thattheseachieveagenuineexistenceandaparticulated[abgesonderte] freedom, is the monstrous power of the negative; it istheenergyofthought,ofthepureI.” (Hegel,WW2,page33)
*04*[Footnotepg59]
Hegel’s restitution of conceptual realism, all the way to the provocative defense of the ontological proofofGod,wasreactionary according totheground-rulessetbyanunreflective Enlightenment. Meantime the course of history has justified his anti-nominalistic intent. In contrasttothecrudeschemeofScheler’ssociologyofknowledge,nominalismcrossedoverfor itspartintoideology,thatoftheeye-blinking“Butthatdoesn’texist”,whichofficialscienceis wont to deploy as soon as embarrassing entities such as class, ideology andnowadayseven society are mentioned. The relationship of genuine critical philosophy to nominalism is not invariant, it changes historically with the function of skepticism (see Max Horkheimer, “Montaigne and the Function of Skepticism”, in: Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung, VII. 1938, passim). Every fundamentum in re [Latin: fundamental basis] ascribed to the concept ofthe subject is idealism. Nominalism separated itself from it only there,whereidealism raisedan objectiveclaim.Theconceptofacapitalistsocietyisnoflatusvocis[Latin:bowdlerizedspeech].
PartI:RelationshiptoOntology
I.TheOntologicalNeed
QuestionandAnswer69-73
The ontologies in Germany, particularly the Heideggerian one,remain influential tothisday, withoutthetracesofthepoliticalpastgivinganyonepause.Ontologyistacitlyunderstoodasthe readiness to sanction a heteronomous social order, exempted from the justification of consciousness.Thatsuchconsiderationsaredeniedahigherplace,asmisunderstanding,afalling astrayintotheontic,andalackofradicalisminthequestion,onlyreinforcesthedignityofthe appeal:ontologyseemsallthemorenuminous,thelessitsolidifiesintoadefinitecontent,which the impertinent understanding would be permitted to get a hold of. Intangibility turns into unassailability. Whoever refuses to follow suit, is suspected of being someone without a fatherland, withoutahomelandinbeing,indeednotsodifferentlyfromtheidealistsFichteand Schelling,whodenigratedthosewhoresistedtheirmetaphysicsasinferior.Inallofitsmutually combative schools, which denounce each other as false, ontology isapologetic. Itsinfluence couldnotbeunderstood,however,ifitdidnotmeetanemphaticneed,theindexofsomething omitted,thelongingthattheKantianverdictontheknowledgeoftheabsoluteoughtnottorest there.Whenintheearlydaysoftheneo-ontologicalmovementstheresurrectionofmetaphysics was spoken of with theological sympathy, this was still crudely but openly evident. The Husserlian willtoreplace theintentio obliqua[Latin: obliqueintention]withtheintentiorecta [Latin:directintention],toturntothethingsthemselves,alreadyhadatouchofthis;whatinthe critiqueofreasondelimitedthebordersofthepossibilityofcognitionwasnothingotherthanthe recollection of the capacity of cognition itself, which the phenomenological program at first wished to dispense with. In the “draft” of the ontological constitution of subject areas and regions,finallyinthe“worldastheepitomeofallexistence”,thewillclearlystirredtograspthe wholewithoutthebordersdictatedbyitscognition;theeidê[Greek:form,kind],whichbecame Heidegger’s existential [Existentialien] in Being and Time, is supposed to comprehensively anticipatewhatthoseregions,allthewaytothehighest,actuallywere.Theunspokenassumption wasthatthedraftsofreasoncouldsketchoutthestructureofallfullnessoftheexistent;second repriseoftheoldphilosophyoftheabsolute,thefirstofwhichwaspost-Kantianidealism.Atthe same time however the critical tendency continued to have an effect, less against dogmatic concepts than as the effort to no longer set forth orconstruetheAbsoluta[Latin: absolutes] which had relinquished their systematic unity and were set in opposition each other, but to receptively receive anddescribethem,fromthestandpointofthepositivistic ideal ofscience. Thereinabsoluteknowledgebecameonceagain,asinSchelling,intellectualintuition.Onehopes to cancel out the mediations, instead of reflecting on them. Thenon-conformistmotive, that philosophy need not compartmentalize itself into its branches – those of organized and immediately applicable science –capsized intoconformism.Thecategoricalconstruct,exempt fromanysortofcritique, asthescaffoldingofexistingrelationships,isconfirmedasabsolute, andtheunreflectiveimmediacyofthemethodlendsitselftoeverysortofcaprice.Thecritiqueof criticism becomespre-critical. Hencetheintellectual modeofconductofthepermanent“Back to”.Theabsolutebecomeswhatitleastofallwouldlikeandwhatindeedcriticaltruthsaidit
was,somethingnatural-historical,outofwhichthenormstobeadaptedtocouldbequicklyand crudelyinferred.Incontrasttheidealisticschoolofphilosophydeniedwhatonewouldexpectof philosophy, by those who take it up unprepared. This was the flip side of its scientific self-responsibility,imposedonitbyKant.Theconsciousnessofthis,thataphilosophyrunasa specialty niche,whichdismisses thequestionsofthosewhohaveturnedtoitfortheanswers onlyitcanprovideasidle,hasnothingtodowithpeopleanymore,couldalreadybeglimpsedin Germanidealism;itisexpressedwithoutcollegialdiscretionbySchopenhauerandKierkegaard, and Nietzsche broke off every accord with academia. Under this aspect, the contemporary ontologiesarenotsimplymakingtheanti-academictraditionofphilosophytheirown,byasking, as Paul Tillich once put it, questions about what concerns one unconditionally. They have academicallyestablishedthepathosofthenon-academic.Inthem,thecomfortableshudderatan impending world-catastrophe is combined with the soothing feeling of operating on solid, possiblyevenphilologicallysecureground.Audacity,evertheprerogativeofyoungsters,knows enoughtocoveritselfbygeneralaccordandthroughthemostpowerfuleducationalinstitutions. Outoftheentiremovement,theoppositebecameofwhatitsbeginningsseemedtopromise.The concernwiththerelevantreboundedintoanabstraction,whichcouldinnowaybetrumpedby anyneo-Kantianmethodology.Thisdevelopmentisnottobeseparatedfromtheproblematicof the need itself. It is so little to beplacated bythatphilosophyasoncebythetranscendental system. That is why ontology has surrounded itself with its miasma. Inkeepingwithanold Germantradition,itconsidersthequestionmoreimportantthantheanswer;whereitoweswhat ithaspromised,ithasraiseditsfailure foritsparttoaconsolingexistential.Infactquestions haveadifferentweightinphilosophythanintheparticularsciences,wheretheyareabolished throughtheirsolution,whiletheirrhythminthehistoryofphilosophywouldbemoreakinto duration and forgetting. This does not mean, however, as in the constant parroting of Kierkegaard,thattheexistenceofthequestionerwouldbethattruth,whichsearchesinvainfor the answer Rather in philosophy the authentic question almost always includes in a certain manneritsanswer Itdoesnotfollow,asinresearch,anif-thenpatternofquestionandanswer It mustmodelitsquestiononthatwhichithasexperienced,sothatitcancatchuptoit.Itsanswers are not given, made, produced: the developed, transparent question recoilsinthem.Idealism would like to drown out precisely this, to always produce, to “deduce” its own formandif possibleeverycontent.Bycontrast,thethinkingwhichdoesnotclaimtobeanorigin,oughtnot tohidethefactthatitdoesnotproduce,butgivesbackwhatit,asexperience,alreadyhas.The moment of expression in thinking prevents it from dealing more mathematico [Latin: in mathematicalterms]withproblems,andthenservingupapparentsolutions.Wordslikeproblem andsolutionringfalseinphilosophy,becausetheypostulatetheindependenceofwhatisthought fromthinkingexactly there,wherethinkingandwhatisthoughtaremediated byoneanother. Only what is true, can truly be understood philosophically. The fulfilling completion of the judgement in which understanding occurs is as one with the decision over true and false. Whoeverdoesnotparticipate inthejudgingofthestringencyofatheoremoritsabsencedoes notunderstandit.Ithasitsownmeaning-content,whichistobeunderstood,intheclaimofsuch stringency.Thereintherelationshipofunderstandingandjudgementdistinguishesitselffromthe usual temporal order. There can be no judging without the understanding any more than understandingwithoutthejudgement.Thisinvalidatestheschema,thatthesolutionwouldbethe judgement, theproblemthemerequestion,basedonunderstanding.Thefiberoftheso-called philosophical proof isitselfmediated, incontrasttothemathematical model,butwithoutthis simply disappearing. For the stringency of the philosophical thought bids its manner of
procedure to measure itself by its conclusive forms. Proofs in philosophy are the effort, to procure a committalness [Verbindlichkeit] to what is expressed, in that the latter becomes commensurable to the means of discursive thinking. Ithoweverdoesnotpurelyfollowfrom these: the critical reflection of such productivity of thought is itselfacontent ofphilosophy. AlthoughinHegeltheclaimtothederivationofthenon-identicaloutofidentityisraisedtoan extreme, the thought-structure of the great Logic implies the solutions in the way that the problems are posed, instead of presenting the results after settling all accounts. While he sharpenedthecritique ofanalytical judgement tothethesisofits“falsehood”,everythingisan analytical judgement for him, the turning to and fro of the thought without the citation of anything extraneous to it. That the new and thedifferentwouldbetheoldandfamiliar,isa moment ofdialectics.Soevidentitscontextwiththeidentity-thesis,solittleisitcircumscribed by this. The more the philosophical thought yields itself to its experience, the closer it approaches,paradoxically,theanalyticjudgement.Tobecomeawareofadesiderataofcognition ismostlythiscognitionitself:thecounterpartoftheidealisticprincipleofperpetualproduction. In renunciation of thetraditional apparatusoftheproof,bystressingtheknowledgewhichis alreadyknown,philosophyestablishesthatitisbynomeanstheabsolute.
AffirmativeCharacter73-74
Theontological needguarantees solittleofwhatitwishesasthemiseryofthehungrydoesof food.Howevernodoubtofsuchaguaranteeplaguedaphilosophicalmovement,whichcouldnot haveforeseenthis.Therein wasnottheleastreasonitendedupintheuntrueaffirmative.“The dimming of the world never achieves the light of being.”17 In those categories to which fundamental ontology owes its resonance and which they for that reason either deny or so sublimate,thattheycannolongergiverisetounwelcomeconfrontations,istobereadhowmuch they are the imprints of something missing and not produced, however much they are its complementary ideology Howeverthecultofbeing,oratleasttheattraction whichtheword exertsassomethingsuperior,livesfromthis,thatfunctionalconceptsreallyhavecomemoreand more to repress substantive concepts, as once in epistemology. Society has become thetotal functional context which liberalism once thought itwas;whatis,isrelative towhatisother, irrelevant initself.Thehorrorofthis,thedawningconsciousness thatthesubjectislosingits substantiality, prepares it to listen to the assertion that being, covertly equated with that substantiality, survives as something which cannot be lost in the functional context. What ontological philosophizing attempts toawaken,toconjure,asitwere,ishoweverhollowedout by real processes, the production and reproduction of social life. The effort to theoretically vindicate humanity and being and time as Ur-phenomena does not halt the destiny of the resurrected ideas. Concepts, whose substrate is historically passed by, were thoroughly and penetratingly criticized even in the specifically philosophical areaasdogmatic hypostases; as with Kant’s transcendence of the empirical soul, the aura of the word being-there [Dasein: existence], in the paralogism chapter; the immediate recourse to being in the one on the amphiboly of the concept of reflection. Modern ontology does not appropriate that Kantian critique, doesnotdriveitfurtherthroughreflection, butactsasifitbelongedtoarationalistic consciousness whose flaws a genuine thinking had to purify itself of, as if in a ritual bath. Despitethis,inordertoropeincriticalphilosophy,animmediateontologicalcontentisimputed
tothislatter.Heidegger’sreadingoftheanti-subjectivisticand“transcending”momentinKantis not without legitimation. The latter raises the objective character ofhismodeofquestioning programmaticallyintheprefacetotheCritiqueofPureReasonandleftnodoubtofitincarrying out the deduction of the pure concept of understanding. It does not vanish, in what the conventional history of philosophy terms the Copernican turn; the objective interest retains primacy over the subjectively directed, happenstance cognition, in a dismembering of the consciousness inempirical style.Bynomeanshoweveristhisobjectiveinteresttobeequated withahiddenontology.AgainstthisspeaksnotonlythecritiqueoftherationalisticoneinKant, whichgrantedroomfortheconceptofadifferentoneifneedbe,butthatofthetrainofthought ofthecritiqueofreasonitself.Thishastheconsequencethatobjectivity–thatofcognitionand thatoftheincarnationofeverythingcognized–ismediatedsubjectively.Itindeedtoleratesthe assumption ofanin-itselfbeyondthesubject-objectpolarity,butleavesitquiteintentionallyso indeterminate, that no sort ofinterpretation howevercobbledtogether couldpossiblyspellan ontologyoutofit.IfKantwishedtorescuethatkosmosnoetikos[Greek:cosmosoftheintellect] whichtheturntothesubjectattacked;ifhisworkbearstothisextentanontologicalmomentin itself,itnonetheless remainsamoment andnotthecentral one.Hisphilosophywouldliketo achievethatrescuewiththepowerofthatwhichthreatenswhatistoberescued.
DisempowermentoftheSubject74-76
Ontology’sreturntolifeduetoobjectivisticintentionwassupportedbywhatadmittedlyleastof allsuiteditsconcept:thefactthatthesubjectbecametoalargeextentideology,whichconcealed theobjectivefunctionalcontextofsocietyandassuagedthesufferingofthesubjectsunderit.To thisextent,andnotjusttoday,thenot-IisdrasticallysubornedtotheI.Heidegger’sphilosophy omits this, but registers it: in his hands that historical primacy becomes the ontological preeminence of being of pure and simple, above everything ontic, everything real. He also prudentlyrefrained fromturningbacktheCopernican turn,thattotheidea,beforeeveryone’s gaze.Hezealouslyseparatedhisversionofontologyfromobjectivism,hisanti-idealisticattitude fromrealism,whetheritbecriticalornaïve.18 Unquestionably,theontologicalneedwasnottobe levelledouttoanti-idealism,accordingtothebattlelinesoftheacademicschools.Butunderits impulses,perhapsthemostenduringwasthedisavowalofidealism.Theanthropocentricwayof thinkingaboutlifehasbeenshaken.Thesubject,philosophicalself-reflection,hasappropriated thecritiqueofgeocentrism,asitwere,datingbacktocenturiesearlier.Thismotifismorethana merely superficial world-view, so easily as it was exploited in world-viewing terms. Overweeningsynthesesbetweenphilosophicaldevelopmentsandtheonesofthenaturalsciences areofcourseoffensive:theyignorethegrowingindependenceofphysical-mathematicalformal languages,whicharenolongeraccessibletotheintuition,orindeedanycategoriesimmediately commensurable to human consciousness. Nevertheless theresultsofmoderncosmologyhave radiated farandwide:allconceptions, whichwouldmaketheuniverseresemblethesubjector even deduce its pride of place therein, are relegated to naivete, comparable tothecranksor paranoids who consider their little town to be the center of the world. The grounds of philosophical idealism, the control of nature itself, has lost the certainty of its omnipotence precisely becauseofitsunstoppableexpansionduringthefirsthalfofthetwentiethcentury;as much because theconsciousness ofhumanbeingslaggedbehindandthesocialorderoftheir
relationships remained irrational, as because it took the measurement of what wasachieved, whose minuteness was measurable only by comparison to what was not achievable. The suspicion and presentiment are universal, that thecontrolofnatureweavesevermoretightly throughitsadvance thecatastrophe whichitalsointended towardoff;thesecondnature,into which society has overgrown. Ontology and the philosophy ofbeingare–nexttootherand coarser ones – modes of reaction in which consciousness hopes to escape from that entanglement. Buttheyhaveafatal dialectic inthemselves. Thetruth,whichexiledhumanity fromthemidpointofcreationandwhichremindsitofitspowerlessness,strengthensthefeeling ofpowerlessnessassubjectivemodesofbehavior,causinghumanbeingstoidentifythemselves withit,andtherebyfurtherreinforcesthebaneofsecondnature.Thenaïvebeliefinbeing,the ignominiously ideological [weltanschaulich] derivative of critical apprehension, really does degenerate into what Heidegger once defined incautiously as membership-in-being [Seinsgehoerigkeit: belonging-in-being]. TheyfeelthemselvestobefacingtheAll,butclingat theslightestprovocationtoeverythingparticular,insofarasitisenergeticenoughtoconvictthe subjectofitsownweakness.Itsreadinesstoturnablindeyetothecatastrophewhichoriginates inthecontextofthesubjectitself,istherevengeforthevainwishtospringoutofthecageofits subjectivity. The philosophic leap, Kierkegaard’s Ur-gesture, is itself the caprice bywhichit imaginestoescapethesubjugationofthesubjectunderbeing.Onlywherethesubjectisalso,in Hegel’swords,somehowthere,isitsbanelessened;itperpetuatesitselfinthatwhichwouldbe simplydifferentfromthesubject,justasthedeusabsconditus[Latin:absentgod]alwaysbore tracesoftheirrationalityofmythicaldeities.Lightfallsontherestorativetendenciesoftoday’s philosophiesfromthekitschyexoticismofcobbled-togetherworld-views,asinforexamplethe astonishingly consumable ZenBuddhism.Similar tothis,thesesimulate apositionofthought whichthestored-uphistoryinsubjects makesitimpossibletoassume.Thedelimitationofthe Spirit to what is open and achievable in its historical level of experience is an element of freedom;non-conceptualmeanderingembodiestheopposite.Doctrineswhichunhesitatinglyrun away from the subject into the cosmos are along with the philosophies of being far more compatiblewiththehardenedconstitutionoftheworld,andthechancesofsuccessinit,thanthe slightestbitofself-reflectionofthesubjectonitselfanditsrealimprisonment.
Being,Subject,Object76-78
TobesureHeideggersawthroughtheillusionwhichsustainedthepopularsuccessofontology: thatthestateoftheintentio obliqua[Latin: obliqueintention]couldsimplybechosenoutofa consciousness in which nominalism and subjectivism are sedimented, byonethat,aboveall, becamewhatitisonlybyself-reflection.Hebypassedthealternativewiththedoctrineofbeing, which maintained that it was beyond the intentio recta [Latin: direct intention] and intentio obliqua[Latin:obliqueintention],beyondthesubjectandobject,aswellastheconceptandthe existent.Beingisthehighestconcept–forwhoeversaysbeing,doesnothaveit,butmerelythe word–andwouldneverthelessbeprivilegedbeforeallconceptuality,byvirtueofthemoments thoughtalongwiththewordbeing,whichdonotexhaustthemselvesintheabstractlyachieved conceptualunityofcharacteristics.AlthoughatleastthematureHeideggertooknomorenoteof it, his talk of being presupposes the Husserlian doctrine of the categorical intuition or apperception [Wesenschau].AccordingtothestructurewhichHeidegger’sphilosophyascribed to being, solely by means of such an intuition could it be unsealed or unveiled, to use the language of the school; Heidegger’s emphatic being would be the ideal of what yields to
ideation. The critique contained in that doctrine of classificatory logic as the unity of characteristics ofthatwhichisgraspedundertheconceptremainsinforce.ButHusserl,whose philosophyhelditselfwithintheboundariesofthedivisionoflaborandleft,despiteallso-called foundationalquestions,theconceptofstrictscienceunexamineduntilitslatephase,sought,via the latter’s ground-rules, to bring whatever had its own meaning inthecritique ofsuchinto immediate agreement; “he wanted to eat the cakeandhaveittoo”[inEnglish].Hismethod, expresslystatedassuch,wouldliketoimbuetheclassificatory conceptsthroughthemodein whichthecognition assuresitself,withwhatitcannothaveassomethingclassificatory,asthe mere preparation ofthegiven,butwouldhavesolelythroughthecomprehension ofthething itself,whichinHusserloscillatesbetweensomethingintramentalandsomethingopposedtosuch in the immanence of consciousness. Husserl is not, as was customary in his lifetime, to be reproachedasirrationalistic,duetothenon-scientificityofthecategoricalintuition–hisoeuvre asawholeopposesirrationalism –butratheritscontamination withscience. Heideggernoted thisandtookthestepwhichHusserlhesitatedtotake.Hetherebycastofftherationalmoment which Husserl guarded,*05* and, inthisrespectquitesimilar toBergson,tacitly undertooka procedure which sacrificed the relation to the discursive concept, an inalienable moment of thought.ThereinhecoveredovertheweaknessofBergson,whojuxtaposedtwodisparatemodes ofcognition, eachunmediated bytheother,inthatbymobilizing theallegedlyhigherdignity, which was bestowed on the categorical intuition, he removed the epistemological one as pre-ontological, along with the question concerning its legitimation. Thediscomfortwiththe epistemological preliminary questionbecomesthelegal writtosimplyeliminate this;forhim dogmatics simplyturns,incontrasttothetraditionofitscritique,intoahigherwisdom.Thisis theoriginofHeidegger’sarchaicism.TheambiguityoftheGreekwordforbeing,datingbackto theIoniannon-differentiationbetweenmaterials,principlesandpureessence,isnotbookedasan inadequacybutasthesuperiorityofwhatisoriginary Itissupposedtohealtheconceptofbeing fromthewoundsofitsconceptuality,thedivisionofthethoughtandwhatistobethought.
OntologicalObjectivism78-79
Whathoweverappearsasifithaditsplaceintheepochoftheworldbeforetheoriginalsinof subjectivizing and concretizing metaphysics, becomes contra coeur [French: against its own wishes] the crass In-Itself. The subjectivity, whichabjuresitself,recoilsintoobjectivism. No matter how painstakingly such thinking evades the criticist controversy, by adding both antithetical positions in equal measure to the loss of being, the sublimation of its concepts, restless continuation of the Husserlian reduction, relinquishes what is meant with being, all individualizedexistencesasmuchasalltracesofrationalabstraction.Inthetautologywhichthis beingistantamountto,thesubjectisdrivenoff:“Yetbeing–whatisbeing?ItisItself.”19 Being necessarily approximates such tautology. It becomes no better if one opts for it with clever candoranddeclares itapledgeofthedeepestprofundity.Everyjudgement,eventheanalytical kindasHegelshowed,bearstheclaiminitself,whetheritwishesorno,ofpredicatingsomething whichisnotsimplyidenticalwiththemeresubject-concept.Ifthejudgementignoresthis,thenit breaks the contract, which it signed in advance through its form. This however becomes unavoidable in the concept of being, as modern ontology handles it. It “ends up in caprice,
‘being’,whichpreciselyinitspurityismeaningfulonlyintheexactoppositeofpureimmediacy, namelyassomethingmediatedthroughandthrough,foistingthisoffastheimmediatepureand simple”.20 Being must be determined only through itself, because it cannot be touched with concepts, would neither be “mediated”, nor allows itself to be immediately demonstrated accordingtothemodelofthesensibleconscience;inlieuofanycriticalauthorityforbeing,there is only the repetition of the pure name. The residuum, the presumably undistortedessence21 comes to be similar to an archê [Greek: beginning, origin] similar to the type which the motivatedmovementofthethoughthadtodismiss.Thataphilosophydeniesbeingmetaphysics, doesnotdecide,asHeideggeronceregisteredagainstSartre,22 astowhetheritisornot,butdoes justifythesuspicionthatsomethinguntrueishidingintherefusaltoadmittoitsmetaphysical content. The new beginning from a presumed zeropointisthemaskofstrenuousforgetting, sympathywithbarbarismisnotextraneoustoit.Thattheolderontologiesdecayed,thescholastic ones just as much as their rationalist successors,wasnocontingent changeofworld-viewor thought-style;thisiswhatthesamehistoricalrelativism,againstwhichtheontologicalneedonce rose up, believed. No sympathy with Plato’s enthusiasm in regards to the resignatory, particular-scientific characteristics of Aristoteles defuses the objection againstthedoctrine of ideasastheduplicationoftheworldofthings;nopleafortheblessingsoforderclearsawaythe difficulties whichtherelationshipbetweentodeti[Greek:individualthing,this-here]andprôtê ousia [Greek: primary substance] causes in Aristotelean metaphysics; theyarederivedrather from the unmediated nature of the determinations of being and the existent, which modern ontology resolutely and naively restored. Just as little couldthedemandforobjective reason alone,beiteversolegitimate,thinktheKantiancritiqueoftheontologicalproofofGodoutof existence. The Eleatic transition to the concept of being glorified today was, in regard to hylozoism,alreadyEnlightenment,somethingglossedoverbyHeidegger Howevertheintention towipeallthisawaybyregressingtotheholydawnoftime priortothereflectionofcritical thought, would like solely to circumvent the philosophical compulsion which, oncegrasped, wouldpreventtheneutralization[Stillung]oftheontologicalneed.Thewillnottobespoon-fed, to experience something essential from philosophy, is deformed through answers which are tailored according to the need, in the shadows between the legitimate obligation, to provide bread,notstones,andtheillegitimateconvictionthatbreadhastoexist,becauseitmust.
DisappointedNeed80-83
That the philosophy oriented towards the primacy of themethodremainssatisfied withsuch preliminary questions,andforthatreasonpossiblyalsofeelsasabasicscienceonsafeground, only creates the illusion that the preliminary questions, and philosophy itself, scarcely have consequences anymoreforcognition.Thereflectionsontheinstrumenthavelongsinceceased totouchuponwhatisscientificallycognized,butsolelyuponwhatwouldbecogizableatall,the validity of scientific judgements. That which isdefinitely cognized issomethingsubalternto suchareflection,amereconstitutum[Latin:whatisconstituted];whilederivingitsclaimfrom this,inwhosegeneralconstitutionitimmersesitself,itleavesitindifferent.Thefirstformulain which this was expressed was the famous Kantian one, “the transcendental idealist” is “an
empirical realist”.23 The admiration of the Critique of Pure Reason’s attempt to ground experience was deaf to the declaration of bankruptcy, that the immeasurable tension of that critique would itself be adiaphorou [Greek: indifferent] with respect to the content of the experience. It encouraged only the normal functioning of the understanding and the corresponding view of reality; incidentally Heidegger still opts for the “normally thinking person”.24 Fewoftheinner-worldlyintuitionsandjudgementsof“commonsense”[inEnglish] are taken outofcirculation. “Kantwishedtoprove,inamannerwhichwouldoffend‘allthe world’,that‘alltheworld’wasright:–thatwasthesecretjokeofthissoul.Hewroteagainstthe learned in favor of the popular prejudices of the people, but for the learned andnotforthe people.”25 [Aphorism 193 from Nietzsche’s Joyful Science] Defeatism hamstrings the specifically philosophical impulsetoexplodesomethingtrueoutfrombehindtheidolsofthe conventional consciousness. Thescornoftheamphibolychapteragainstthepresumptuousness which wished to cognize what is innermost to things, theself-satisfied manlyresignation by which philosophy settles down in the mundussensibilis [Latin: sensible world]assomething external, isnotmerely theenlightening negative replytothatmetaphysicswhichconfusedthe conceptwithitsownreality,butalsotheobscurantistonetothosewhichdonotcapitulatetothe façade. Somethingoftherecollectionofthisbestofallmoments,whichcriticalphilosophydid not so much forget, as zealously excise in honor of the science which it wished to found, survivesintheontologicalneed;thewillnottoallowthethoughttoberobbedofthat,forwhose sake it has been thought. Since the irrevocable sundering of the sciences from idealistic philosophy,thesuccessful onesseeknomorelegitimationthanthestatementoftheirmethods. Their self-exegesis turns science intoacausasui[Latin: causeinitself],accepting itselfasa givenandalsosanctioningtherebyitsexistingforminthedivisionoflabor,whoseinsufficiency nevertheless cannot remain hidden forever The intellectual sciences inparticular fallpreyto irrelevancyandnon-conceptualityincountlessspecificinvestigations,duetotheborrowedideal ofpositivity Thepartitionbetweensolitarydisciplinessuchassociology,economicsandhistory allowstheinterestofcognitiontodisappearinpedanticallydrawnandoverblowntrench-battles. Ontologyremembersthis,butnolongerwishes,havinggrowncautious,tobreathelifeintothat whichisessentialbythespeculativethoughtofthething.Rather,itissupposedtospringforthas agiven,astribute totheground-rulesofpositivity,whichtheneedwantstogobeyond.Many adeptsofscienceexpectadecisivecompletionfromontology,withoutthisneedingtotouchon scientific procedures. If Heideggerian philosophy claimed in its later phasetoriseabovethe traditional distinction between essence and facts, it mirrors the well-founded irritation atthe divergence of the essential and factual sciences, of the mathematical-logical and substantive disciplines, whichblossominscientificactivitydisconnectedlynexttoeachother,althoughthe cognitive ideal ofonewouldbeincompatible withtheother.Buttheantagonism betweenthe exclusivescientificcriteriaandtheabsoluteclaimofadoctrineofessenceorlaterthatofbeing willnotvanishatthemerebehesttodoso.Itopposesitsadversaryabstractly,afflictedwiththe samedeficienciesoftheconsciousnesswithinthedivisionoflabor,asthecureitpassesitselfoff as. What it provides against science, is not its self-reflection, not even, as Walter Broecker evidently thought, something imposed over such, with necessary movement, as what is qualitatively different. It comes, in the terms of the old Hegelian parable against Schelling, straightoutofthepistol,anadditiontoscience,whichsummarilyfinishesthislatteroff,without
really changing anything. Its distinguished turn from science ultimately only confirms the supremacy of such, similar to how irrational sloganscounterpoint thescientific-technological activitiesofFascism.Thetransitionfromthecritiqueofthesciencestothatwhichisessentialas tobeingdisregardsinturnwhatevercouldhavebeenessentialinthesciences,androbstheneed ofwhatitseemedtogrant.Bydistancingitselffromeverythingsubstantive[Sachhaltigen]even morefearfullythanKanteverdid,ontologicalphilosophizingpermitslessunregimentedinsight than idealism in its Schellingesque and even Hegelian form. The social consciousness in particular, though philosophically inseparable to the antique ontologies, is denounced as heterodoxy, as theengagement withthemerely existent andmetabasiseisallogenos[Greek: change into another genus]. Heidegger’s hermeneutics adopted the turnagainstepistemology which Hegel inaugurated in the introduction to the Phenomenology as his own.26 But the reservations of transcendental philosophy against a substantive one, whichforbidscontent to crossitsthresholdasmerelyempirical,surviveinhisprogramtoraisebeingfromtheexistent, and to explicate being itself, despite all the protests to the contrary.27 Fundamental ontology eludes itself not the least because it holds up an ideal of “purity” which stemmed from the methodologization ofphilosophy–thelatest linkofthechainwasHusserl–asthecontrastof beingtotheexistent,neverthelessphilosophizingasifoversomethingsubstantive.Thishabitus wastobereconciledwiththatpurityonlyinarealmwherealldeterminabledistinctions,indeed allcontentblurredtogether.HauntedbyScheler’sweaknesses,Heideggerdoesnotpermitprima philosophia[Latin: originaryphilosophy]tobecrasslycompromisedbythecontingencyofthe material, the transience ofthemomentary eternities. Butnordoesherenouncetheconcretion originally heralded by the word existence.*06* The distinction between the concept and the material is supposed to be the original sin, while itperpetuates itselfinthepathosofbeing. Amongitsotherfunctions,suchasemphasizingitshigherdignityinrelationtotheexistent,one shouldnotunderestimatethefactthatitsimultaneouslycarriesthememoryoftheexistent,from which it wishedtoberaisedup,asoneofsomethingpriortodifferentiation andantagonism. Being tempts alluringly, eloquent as wind-blown leaves in bad poetry But what it praises harmlesslyslipsoutofitsgrasp,whileitisinsisteduponphilosophicallylikesomethingitowns, over which the thought,whichthinksit,hasnocontrol.Thatdialectic whichallowsthepure particularization andthepuregenerality topassintoeachothersimultaneously,bothsimilarly indeterminate,issilencedandexploitedinthedoctrineofbeing;indeterminacyisrenderedasa mythicalpanzer[Panzer:ancientsword,alsoWWIIGermantank].
“LackasGain”83-84
Heidegger’sphilosophy,amidstallaversiontowhathecallsMan,inwhosenameanthropology issupposedtodenouncethecirculation-sphere,resembledahighlydevelopedcreditsystem.One conceptborrowsfromanother.Thestateofsuspensewhichresultsfromthisrenderstheposeof a philosophy ironic, which feelssoclosetothegroundthatitpreferstheGerman“thinking” [Denken]totheforeignword“philosophy”[Philosophie].Asinafadedjoke,wherethedebtor hastheupperhandoverthecreditorbecausethelatterisdependentontheabilityoftheformerto repay,Heideggersqueezes ablessingfromeverything heowes.Thatbeingwouldbeneithera factum noraconcept exemptsitfromcritique. Whatever couldbepickedonisdismissedasa misunderstanding. The concept borrows from the factual an “air” [in English] of proper
plenitude, of that which is not justthoughtuportacked together –a.k.a.ofthein-itself; the existent oftheSpirit,whichsynthesizes it,theauraofthemorethanfactualbeing–a.k.a.the consecrationoftranscendence;andjustthisstructurehypostasizesitselfassomethinghigherthan the reflective understanding which slices the existent and concept from each other with the dissecting-knife.EventhemeagernessofwhatallthisleavesHeideggerinhand,hecoinsintoan advantage:itisoneofthepervasiveinvariantsofhisphilosophy,althoughnevernamedassuch, torevalueeverylackofcontent,everynon-possessionofacognitionintoanindexofprofundity. Involuntary abstractness presentsitselfasvoluntaryvow.“Thethinking”, sorunsthetract on Plato’sdoctrineofthetruth,“isonthedescenttothepovertyofitsprovisionalessence”28 –asif theemptiness oftheconceptofbeingwerethefruitofthemonasticchastityofthatwhichwas original, unconditioned bytheaporiasofthought.Beinghowever,whichissupposedtobeno concept at all, or at least an entirely specific one, is the aporetic one29 pure and simple. It transforms what is more abstract intowhatismoreconcrete andhencemoretrue.Heidegger confessesinhisownlanguagewhatthisasceticismisallabout,informulationswhichcriticize him far morecuttingly thananyhostilecritique: “Thinking drawsinconspicuous furrowsinto language with its sayings. They are even more inconspicuous than the furrows, which the slow-footedmanofthelanddrawsthroughthefields.”30 Inspiteofsuchaffectedhumilitynot even theological risks are undertaken. The attributes of being do indeed resemble, like the absoluteideaofold,theonestransmittedbythedeity.Butthephilosophyofbeingguardsitself fromtheexistence ofsuch.Soarchaistic thewhole,solittle doesitwishtorevealitselftobe unmodern.Insteaditparticipatesinmodernityasthealibioftheexistent,ofthattowhichbeing transcendedandyetwhichissupposedtobeshelteredtherein.
No-man’sLand85-86
Substantive philosophizing since Schelling was founded on the identity-thesis. Only if the epitome of the existent, finally the existent itself, the moment of the Spirit, is reducible to subjectivity;onlyifthethingandtheconceptareidenticalinthehigherrealmoftheSpirit,could one proceedaccording toFichte’saxiom,thattheapriorisatthesametime theaposteriori. However Heidegger runs into the historical judgement on the identity-thesis at the very conception. Tohisphenomenological maxim, thatthoughtshouldbowtowhatitisgivenorin the end “sent” – as ifthethoughtcouldnotpenetrate theconditionsofsuchasending–the possibility of construction is taboo, of the speculative concept which grewtogether withthe identity-thesis. Husserl’s phenomenology already labored under the desiretobreakfreefrom epistemology,undertheslogan“tothethingsthemselves”.Husserlexpresslynamedhisdoctrine non-epistemological*07* just as Heidegger later called his non-metaphysical, but shuddered beforethetransitionintosubstantialitymorethananyMarburgneo-Kantian,whomightfindthe infinitesimal method of help in making such a transition. Like Husserl, Heideggersacrifices empirics [Empirie], pushingasideeverything whichwouldnot,inthewordsoftheformer,be eidetic phenomenology, onto theunphilosophical particular sciences. Butheextendsthebane eventotheHusserlianeidê[Greek:form,kind],tothehighest,fact-free,conceptualunityofthe factual, in which traces of substantiality areintermixed. Beingisthecontraction ofessences.
Ontology ends up due to its own consistency in a no-man’s land. It must eliminate the a posterioris, nor is it supposed to even be logic, as a doctrine of thinking and a particular discipline; everythinkingstepwouldtakeitoverthepoint,atwhichithopedtosatisfyitself alone.Intheenditscarcelydarestopredicateanything,evenofbeing.Thereinappearslessany mystical meditation than the privation of athought,whichwishestogotoitsOtherandcan permititselfnothing,forfearoflosingwhatitclaims.Philosophyturnstendentiallyintoaritual pose.Initindeedstirssomethingtrue,itsfallingsilent.
Thehistoricalinnervationofmateriality-at-hand[Sachlichkeit]asamodeofconductoftheSpirit isnotforeigntothephilosophyofbeing.Itwouldliketobreakthroughtheintermediarylayerof subjectivepositions,whichhasbecomeasecondnature,thewalls[Waende:interiorwalls]which thinking has built around itself. There are echoes of this in the Husserlian program, and Heidegger agreed with it.31 The achievement of the subject, which founded the cognition in idealism, gives rise toirritation afterthelatter’sdownfallasadispensable ornament. Therein fundamental ontologyremained justlikephenomenology theunwillingheirofpositivism.32 In Heidegger, the matter-at-hand does asomersault: heisintent tophilosophize purelyfromthe things,withoutform,asitwere,andtherebythesedissolveforhim.Thesurfeitofthesubjective prisonofcognitiongivesrisetotheconvictionthatwhatistranscendenttosubjectivitywouldbe immediate forit,withoutbeingsoiledbytheconcept. Analogoustoromanticcurrentslikethe later Jugendbewegung [youth-movement] fundamental ontology mistakes itself for being anti-romantic in the protest against the delimiting and obscuring moment of subjectivity; it wishestoovercome thiswithamilitaristicmannerofspeaking,somethingHeideggerdoesnot shrink from.33 Because subjectivity however cannot think its mediations out of existence, it wishesthembackinthestagesofconsciousness,whichliepriortothereflectiononsubjectivity andmediation.Thisfails.Wheretheythoughttoclingsubjectlessly,asitwere,towhatthethings themselves show, doing justice to what is material, originary and New Functionalist [neusachlich]alike,theyeliminatealldeterminationsfromwhatisthought,justasKantoncedid from the transcendental thing-in-itself. They gave offense as the work of merely subjective reasonasmuchasthedescendantsoftheparticularexistent.Contradictorydesideratacollideand reciprocally annihilate eachother.Because neither speculative thinking,aswhatevermightbe positedfromthought,isallowed,nor,asinthereversecase,isanexistentinsistedonwhich,asa piece of the world, wouldcompromise theprecedence ofbeing,thethoughtdoesnotdareto think of anything other than something totally empty, far more of an X than the old transcendental subjecteverwas,whichalwayscarriedalongwithitthememoryoftheexisting consciousness, “egoity”, as the unit of consciousness. This X, the absolutely inexpressible, removed from all predicates, becomes an ens realissimum [Latin: mostrealbeing]underthe nameofbeing.Inthecompulsorynatureoftheaporeticconstructionoftheconcept,againstthe will of the philosophy of being, Hegel’s judgement on being is brought down on it: it is indistinguishablyonewithnothingness,andHeideggerbynomeansdeceivedhimselfaboutthis. Howeverexistential ontologyisnothowevertobereproachedwiththatnihilism,34 whichtoits
However much being is compressed into a single dimensionless point, through permanent caution from either side, the procedure doeshaveitsfundamentum inre[Latin: fundamental basis].Categorical intuition, theinnervationoftheconcept,isareminderthatthecategorically constituted factsofthematter [Sachverhalten], whichtraditional epistemology knewsolelyas syntheses,mustalwayscorrespondtoamomentbeyondthesensoryeidê[Greek:form,kind].To this extent they always have something immediate, reminiscent of what can be intuited [Anschaulichkeit:concreity,whatcanbeconcretelygrasped].Solittleasasimplemathematical statement isvalidwithoutthesynthesisofthefigures,betweenwhichtheequationisposed,so little would – Kant neglects this – the synthesis be possible, unless the relationship of the elementscorrespondedtothissynthesis,regardlessofthedifficultiesinwhichsuchamannerof speaking entangles itself according to current logic; unless, put drastically andattheriskof beingmisunderstood,bothsidesoftheequationinfactequalledoneanother.Thismatchingisno moretobespokenofoutsideofthethinkingsynthesisthanarationalsynthesiswouldbewithout that correspondence: a textbook caseof“mediation”. Thatonewaversinthereflection, asto whetherthinkingwouldbeanactivityandnotonthecontrary,preciselyinitseffort,something which measures itself, referstothis.Whatisspontaneously thoughtis,inseparable fromthis, something which appears. If Heidegger had emphasized the aspect of the appearance [Erscheinens] againstitscomplete reduction tothought,thatwouldbeasalutarycorrectiveon idealism.Butheisolatesthereinthemomentofthematter-at-hand[Sachverhalt],getsholdofit, inHegel’sterminology,justasabstractlyasidealismsynthesizedit.Hypostasized,itceasestobe amoment,andbecomesintheendwhatontology,initsprotestagainstthedivisionbetweenthe concept andtheexistent, leastofallwishedtobe:reified. Itishoweveraccording toitsown charactergenetic.TheHegeliandoctrineoftheobjectivityoftheSpirit,productofthehistorical process,permitssomethinglikeanintuitiverelationshiptowhatisintellectual,asmanyidealists rediscovered,thelateRickertforexample.Themoreinsistentlytheconsciousnessfeelsassured oftherealizedobjectivityofwhatisintellectual,insteadofattributingittothereflectingsubject asa“projection”,thecloseritcomestoabindingphysiognomyoftheSpirit.Suchformsbecome a second immediacy to a thinking which does not draw all determinations to one side and disqualify what it faces. The doctrine ofcategorical intuition relied alltoonaively onthis;it confusedthatsecondimmediacywithafirst.Hegelwentfarbeyondthisinthelogicofessences; ittreated theessence asmuchassomethingwhichsprangfrombeingassomethingwhichwas independent of this, as akindofexistence, asitwere.Bycontrast,Husserl’sdemand,tacitly takenupbyHeidegger,forthepuredescriptionofintellectualmatters-at-hand–totakethemfor what they claim to be, and only as that – dogmatizes such matters-at-hand, as if what is intellectual,byreflecting,isoncemorethought,wouldnotbecomesomethingdifferent.Without hesitationitismaintainedthatthinking,inalienableactivity,couldhaveanobjectatlargewhich isnotatthesametimesomethingproducedbybeingthought.Idealism,alreadypreservedinthe concept ofthepureintellectual matter-at-hand,ispotentially reshapedintoontology.However with the substruction of purely accepting thought the claim of phenomenology to whichthe entireschooloweditseffectcollapses:thatitdoesnotthinkup,butresearches,describes,isnot anepistemology,inshort,doesnotbearthestigmaofthereflectingintelligence.Thearcanumof
fundamental ontology however, being, is the allegedly pure self-providing categorical matter-at-hand,raisedtothehighestformulation. –Phenomenological analysis wasforalong timeawareofthefactthatthesynthesizingconsciousnesshassomethingreceptiveaboutit.What belongs together in the judgement allows itself to be cognized in examples, not merely comparatively. The immediacy of the insight isnottobedisputedinitsownright,ratherits hypostasis. The sharpest light falls onthespecies, whensomethingprimaryemanates froma specificobject:initthetautologydissolves,whichknowsnothingelseofthespecies,thanhowit isdefined.Withoutthemoment ofimmediate insightHegel’sremark,thattheparticularisthe general,wouldremainmereassertion.PhenomenologysinceHusserlrescuedit,albeitatthecost of its complement, of the reflecting element. Its apperception however–thelater Heidegger shiedawayfromthesloganoftheschool,whichproducedhim–involvescontradictionswhich arenottoberesolvedforthesakeofpeaceandquietfromthenominalisticortherealisticside. On the one hand, ideation has an elective affinity to ideology, the smuggling of immediacy through that which is mediated, which clothed it with the authority of the absolute, evident being-in-itself, unimpeachable by the subject. On the other hand theapperception namesthe physiognomicgazeatintellectual matters-at-hand. Itlegitimates thefactthattheintellectualis not constituted by means of the cognizing consciousness directed at this, but is objectively groundedinitself,farbeyondtheindividualprimemover,inthecollectivelifeoftheSpiritand according toitsimmanent laws.ThatobjectivityoftheSpiritisadequatetothemomentofthe immediategaze.Assomethingalreadypreformedinitself,itcanlookatitselfjustlikeatsensory things.Butthisintuitionissolittleabsoluteandirrefutableasthatofsensorythings.Husserlhas noqualmsascribingthatwhichflashesfromthephysiognomy,liketheaprioriKantiansynthetic judgement, tonecessity anduniversality,asinscience.Whathoweverthecategoricalintuition, fallibly enough, contributes to, would be the comprehension of the thing itself, not its classificatory preparation. The pseudos [Greek: falsity] is not the non-scientificity of the categoricalintuition,butitsdogmaticscientificization.Undertheideationalgaze,themediation stirswhichwasfrozenintheappearance[Schein]oftheimmediacyoftheintellectuallygiven; thereintheapperceptionisclosetotheallegoricalconsciousness.Astheexperienceofthatwhich hascometobeinwhatpresumablymerelyis,itwouldbealmosttheexactoppositeofwhatitis used for: not the trusting acceptance of being, but its critique; the consciousness not of the identityofthethingwithitsconcept,butoftheriftbetweenboth.Whatthephilosophyofbeing swearsby,asifitweretheorganofthepureandsimplepositive,hasitstruthinnegativity.–Heidegger’semphasisonbeing,whichisnotsupposedtobeanymereconcept,canbesupported bytheindissolubility ofthejudgement-content injudgements aspreviouslyHusserldidtothe ideal unityofthespecies.Thepositionalvalueofsuchexemplaryconsciousnessesmayindeed risehistorically.Themoresocializedtheworld,themoretightlyitsobjectsarespunwithgeneral determinations, the more the particular matter-at-hand is tendentially, as Günther Anders remarked, immediately transparent initsgenerality; themorecanbedescriedbymicrological immersion in it; a state of facts ofnominalistic bentindeed,whichisstrictly opposedtothe ontological intent, although it may have given rise to the apperception without this latter’s knowledge.Ifhoweverthisprocedurealwaysandagainexposesitselftotheparticularscientific objection, to the in the meantime long since automatized reproach of the false or overhasty generalization,thenthisisnotonlythefaultofthethought-habitswhichhavelongmisusedtheir scientific ethos to modestlyordainthematter-at-handfromoutside,astherationalization that they are no longer in this, or do not understand them. Insofar as empirical investigations concretely confronttheanticipationoftheconcept,themediumofexemplarythought,withthe
Theassertion thatbeing,ordainedbeforeeveryabstraction,wouldbenoconceptoratthevery leastsomethingqualitatively superior,suppressesthefactthateveryimmediacy,whichalways reproduces itself in all mediations according to the doctrine of Hegel’sPhenomenology,isa moment, nottheentirety ofthecognition.Noontologicaldraftcangetbywithoutabsolutizing specific moments which arescrapedtogether.Ifcognition isaninterweaving ofthesynthetic thought-function andwhatitsynthesizes, neither ofthemindependent fromtheother,thenno immediatemindfulness,whichHeideggerstipulatedasthesolelegalwritofaphilosophyworthy of the name, cansucceedeither,unlessbyvirtueofthespontaneity ofthethought,whichhe spurned. If no reflection had content without something immediate, then it would pause non-committally [unverbindlich] and arbitrarily without reflection, without the thinking, distinguishing determination of what the presumably purely demonstrative being meant to a passive,not-thinkingthought.Theartificialsoundofpronunciamenti[Italian:pronouncements], thatitdeconcealsitselforalights[lichte],isduetothefictionalcharacterofwhatisasserted.If the thinking determination and fulfillment ofthepresumedUr-word,itscritical confrontation withwhatitaimsfor,isnotpossible,thenthisindictsalltalkofbeing.Itisnotthought,because intheindeterminacywhichitdemandsitissimplyunthinkable.Thathoweverthephilosophyof being turns unachievability into unassailability, the exemption from the rational process into transcendence inregardstothereflecting understanding,isanactofviolenceascleverasitis desperate. More determinedly than the phenomenology which stops at the halfway mark, Heideggerwouldliketobreakoutoftheimmanenceofconsciousness.Hisbreakouthoweveris oneintoamirror,blindtowardsthemomentofthesynthesisinthesubstrate.Hefailstonotethat theSpirit,whichintheEleatic philosophyofbeingworshippedbyHeideggerprofessedtobe identicalwithbeing,isalreadycontainedasanimplicationofmeaninginwhatitpresentsasthat pure selfness, which faced opposite it. Heidegger’s critique of the tradition of philosophy becomes objectively contrary to what it promises. By suppressing the subjective Spirit, and therein necessarily also the material, the facticity, on which the synthesis confirmsitself; by pretendingthatwhatisarticulatedaccordingtothesemomentsissomethingunifiedandabsolute, itbecomesthereverseof“destruction”,ofthedemandtodisenchantthatwhichisartificialinthe conceptsofhumanbeings.Insteadofdiagnosinghumanrelationshipstherein,itconfusesthese withthemundusintelligibilis [Latin: intelligibleworld].Itrepeatedlypreserveswhatitrejects, the thought-forms which, according to its own program, are supposed to be removed as coverings.Onthepretextofbringingwhatliesbeneaththemtolight,itimperceptiblyturnsonce moreintothatIn-itself,intowhichithasanywayalreadybecometothereifiedconsciousness. Whatactsasifitisdestroyingthefetishes,isdestroyingonlytheconditionsofseeingthrough themasfetishes. Theapparent breakoutterminates inwhatitfleesfrom;thebeinginwhichit culminates isthesei[Greek:thesis].Inthecedingofbeing,ofwhatisintellectualmediated,to theacceptingglance[Schau],philosophyconvergeswiththeflatlyirrationalisticoneoflife.The signofirrationality wouldnotbyitselfbeasonewithphilosophical irrationalism. Thatisthe mark which the insuperable non-identity of subject and object leaves on cognition, which
postulatesthepredicativejudgementofidentitythroughitsmereform;alsothehopecontraryto thehegemonyofthesubjectiveconcept.Butirrationalityremainsjustlikethisthefunctionofthe ratioandtheobject ofitsself-critique:whatslipsthroughthenet,isfilteredbysuch.Eventhe philosophemesofirrationalismrelyonconceptsandtherebyonarationalmoment,whichwould beincompatible withthem.Heideggerevadeswhatneedstobedone,according tooneofthe motivesofdialectics,inthatheusurpsastandpointbeyondthedifferenceofsubjectandobject, inwhichtheinadequacy oftheratiotowhatisthoughtisrevealed.Suchaleaphoweverfails withthemeansofreason.Thoughtcannotconqueranypositionwhereintheseparationofsubject andobject whichliesineverythought,inthinkingitself,wouldimmediatelydisappear.Thatis why Heidegger’s moment of truth levels out into just another world-view of irrationalism. Philosophy demands today as in Kant’s time the critique of reason through this, not its banishmentorabolition.
“MeaningofBeing”93-94
Underthebanningofthought,thinkingsanctionswhatmerelyis.Thegenuinelycriticalneedof thought,toawakenfromthephantasmagoriaofculture,isensnared,canalized,steeredintofalse consciousness.Thecultureinwhoseenvironsitgrewstoppedthoughtfromasking,what’sitall about,andwhatfor–roughlyput,thatofitsmeaning,whichbecomesevermoreurgent,theless suchmeaningisobvioustohumanbeings,andthemorecompletelytheculturalbustlereplaces it. Instead of this, the now-things-are-so-and-not-otherwise is enthroned of what, as culture, claims to have meaning. Undertheweightofitsexistence, theissueofwhetherthemeaning whichitclaimswouldberealized,isinsisteduponaslittleastheissueofitsownlegitimacy On theotherhandfundamental ontologystepsforwardsasthespokespersonoftheinterestwhich was spirited away, of “the forgotten”. This is not the least of the reasonsforitsaversionto epistemology,whichisquicktorankthatinterestamongtheprejudices.Neverthelessitcannot annulepistemologyanywayitwishes.Inthedoctrineofexistence–ofsubjectivity–astheroyal roadtoontology,theresecretly risesuponceagaintheoldsubjectiveinquiry,whichhadbeen humbledbyontologicalpathos.Theclaimofthephenomenologicalmethodstodisempowerthe tradition of Western philosophizing isstillboundupinthelatter,andscarcely deceives itself overthis;fortheeffectoforiginality itmaythanktheprogressofforgettingunderthosewho appealtoit.Theturninthequestionofthemeaningofexistenceoritstraditionalvariants,whyis thereanythingatall,andnotnothing?–isofphenomenologicalorigin:itiscededtotheanalysis ofmeaning ofthewordbeing.Whatit,orexistence,wouldinanycasemean,wouldbeasone withthemeaningofbeingorexistence;somethingwhichisitselfalreadyasculturallyimmanent asthemeaningswhichsemanticsdeciphersinlanguagesisdenounced,asifithadescapedfrom therelativityofsomethingartificialasmuchasfromthemeaninglessnessofthemerelyexistent. ThatisthefunctionofHeidegger’sversionofthedoctrineoftheprimacyoflanguage.Thatthe senseofthewordbeingwouldimmediatelybethemeaningofbeingisabadequivocation.Tobe sureequivocationsarenotmerelyimpreciseexpressions.35 Theconsonanceofwordsdoesindeed refertoasimilarity.Bothsensesofmeaning areinterwoven.Concepts, instruments ofhuman thought,cannotmakesense,ifsenseisitselfnegated,ifeverymemoryofsomethingobjective, beyond the mechanisms of the formation of concepts, is driven out. Positivism, to which concepts are only exchangeable, accidental tokens, drew the consequences from this and extirpated thetruthinhonoroftruth.Certainlythecounter-positiontakenbythephilosophyof
being reproves the folly of its reason. But the unity of theequivocal becomesvisiblesolely throughitsimplicit differentiation. ItisdiscardedinHeidegger’stalkofmeaning. Hefollows therein his inclination to hypostasis: he lends the appearance [Schein] of unconditionality to findingsfromthesphereofwhatisconditionedbythemodeoftheirexpression.Thisbecomes possible through the iridescent shimmer of the word being. If true being is conceived of as radically chôris[Greek:separately] fromtheexistent,thenitisidenticalwithitsmeaning:one needonlycitethemeaningofwhatisessential[Wesenheit]tobeingandonehasthemeaningof being itself. According to this scheme the breakout attempt out of idealism isimperceptibly revoked,thedoctrine ofbeingregressesintooneofathinkingwhichremoveseverythingfrom being,whichwouldbedifferentfrompurethought.Inordertomakeanysortofsenseofbeing, whichisperceivedasabsent,thecompensatoryofferismadeofwhatisconstitutedinadvanceas therealmofmeaningintheanalyticjudgement,thedoctrineofinterpretation.Thatconcepts,in ordertobeanythingofthesort,mustmeansomething,servesasthevehicleforthefactthattheir hypokeimeuou [Greek: underlying ground, substratum] – being itself – must have meaning, becauseitwouldnototherwise begiventhanasaconcept,aslinguisticsignification.Thatthis conceptisnotsupposedtobeaconceptbutimmediate,veilsthesemanticmeaninginontological dignity. “The talk of ‘being’ never understands these names in thesenseofaspecies, under whose empty generality the historically conceived doctrine of theexistent belongsasspecial cases. ‘Being’ speaks ever and anon as sent and thereby permeated by tradition.”36 Such philosophies derive their consolation from this.Itisthemagnet offundamental ontology,far beyonditstheoreticalcontent.
OntologySuborned94-96
OntologywouldliketorestorethesocialorderexplodedbytheSpirit,includingitsauthority, from out of the Spirit. The expression “draft” [Entwurf: draft, design, sketch] betrays its tendency tonegate freedomoutoffreedom: transsubjective committalness[Verbindlichkeit]is delivered over to an act of constitutive subjectivity. This all tooapparent absurditycouldbe expressed by the later Heidegger only dogmatically. The memory ofsubjectivity isuprooted fromtheconcept ofthedraft:“That whichisthrown[Werfende]inthedraft[Entwerf]isnot humanity,butbeingitself,whichsendshumanityintotheeverydayexistence[Eksistenz]ofthe exist-ence[Da-Sein]asitsessence.”37 ToHeidegger’smythologizationofbeingasthesphereof sending38 isaddedthemythicalhubris,whichproclaimsthedecreedplanofthesubjectasoneof thehighestauthority,passingitselfoffasthevoiceofbeing.Theconsciousnesswhichdoesnot experience thisisdisqualified as“forgetfulness ofbeing”.39 Suchproscriptive claims ofsocial order harmonize with the Heideggerian thought-structure. Only as an act ofviolence against thought does it have a chance. For the loss which resonates in the kitschy expression forgetfulnessofbeingwasnostrokeofdestinybutmotivated.Whatismourned,thelegacyof the early archai [Greek: ancient, old], melted awayfromtheconsciousness, whichwrenched itselfawayfromnature.Mythositselfbecomesapparentasdeception;thedeceptionalonecan concretizeit,andthecommand.Itissupposedtorealizetheself-stylizationofbeingasaBeyond ofthecriticalconceptandyetatthesametimethelegaltitle,whichheteronomyrequires,solong
as something survives of Enlightenment. The suffering under what Heidegger’s philosophy registersasthelossofbeingisnotonlytheuntruth;hewouldscarcelyhavesoughtsuccorfrom Hölderlinotherwise.Thesociety,accordingtowhoseownconcepttherelationsofhumanbeings are to be founded in freedom, without freedom being realized tothisday,isasparalyzed as defective.Intheuniversalexchange-relationshipallqualitativemomentsareflattenedout,whose epitome couldbesomethinglikeastructure.Themoreoverweeningthepowerofinstitutional forms, the more chaotic the life which they hem in and deform in their own image. The production and reproduction of life, including everything which bears the name of the superstructure,arenottransparenttothatreason,whosereconciledrealizationwouldonlybeone withasocialorderworthyofhumanbeings,onewithoutviolence.Theold,naturally-spawned orders have either passedawayoroutlived theirownlegitimation forill.Bynomeansisthe courseofsocietyanywheresoanarchic,asitstillseemsintheconstantlyirrationalcontingency of the individual destiny. But its objectified juridicality [Gesetzlichkeit] istheadversaryofa constitution ofexistence, inwhichonecouldlivewithoutfear.Eventheontologicaldraftsfeel this,projectingitontothevictims,thesubjects,andfranticallydrowningouttheapprehensionof objectivenegativitybymeansofthetidingsoforderinitself,allthewaytothemostabstractone ofall,thestructureofbeing.Everyplace theworldispreparingtopassoverintothehorrorof socialorder,notintowhattheapologeticphilosophiesovertlyorcovertlylamentasitsopposite. Thatfreedomremainedlargelyanideology;thathumanbeingsarepowerlessbeforethesystem andarenotcapable ofdetermining theirlifeandthatofthewholethroughreason;indeedthat theycannoteventhinkthethoughtofsuch,withoutsufferingevenmore,ensorcelstheirrebellion intoitsinvertedform:theyinvidiouslyprefertheworsetotheappearance[Schein]ofsomething better Thecontemporaryphilosophieshavetheirshareincontributingtothis.Theyalreadyfeel themselves in tune with the dawning order of the mightiest interests, whilethey,likeHitler, tragically bear the lonely risk. That they pose as metaphysically homeless and bound up in nothingness, is the ideology of justification as much as of the social order, which causes humanitytodespairandthreatensitwithphysicalextermination.Theresonanceofaresurrected metaphysics is anticipatory agreement with that oppression, whose victory lies in the social potential of the West and was long ago achieved in the East, where the thought of realized freedomistwisted intounfreedom.Heideggerpromotesabondagethinkingandrejectstheuse of the word humanism, with the standard gesture against the market of public opinion. He therebytakeshisplaceinthecommonfrontofthosewhorailagainsttheisms.Itmightwellbe askedifhedoesnotwishforthatreasonmerelytoabolishthetalkofhumanism,whichishorrid enough,becausehisdoctrinewishestoendthematter.
ProtestAgainstReification96-99
Inspiteoftheirauthoritarian intentions,theontologies,enrichedbyafewexperiences,seldom praisehierarchy asopenlyasinthetimeswhenastudentofSchelerpublishedaworkon“The WorldoftheMiddleAgesandUs”.Thetactic ofcoveringallflanksharmonizeswithasocial phase,whoserelationsofdominationareonlyhalf-heartedlyfoundedinapaststageofsociety. Thepower-seizurereckonswiththeanthropologicalend-productsofbourgeoissocietyandneeds them.JustastheFuehrerrisesabovetheatomizedpeople,railsagainstsnobberyand,inorderto perpetuate himself, occasionally changes the guards, so too did hierarchical sympathies disappearsincethedawningeraoftheontologicalrenaissanceintothehegemonyandsolitudeof being.Thistooisnotmerelyideology.Theanti-relativismusdatingbacktoHusserl’stextonthe
foundationoflogicalabsolutism,theProlegomenatoPureLogic,isintermixedwithanaversion againststatic, thingly[dinghaft]thinking,expressedinGermanidealism andMarx,butinthe meantime atfirstneglectedbytheearlySchelerandtheearliestsproutsofmodernontology.In any case the relevance of relativism has lessened; there is less chatter about it, too. The philosophical needhaspassedoverimperceptibly fromoneofsubstantive matter[Sachgehalt] andsolidityintooneofevadingthereificationoftheSpiritwhichwascarriedoutbysocietyand categorically dictated byitsmembers,throughametaphysicswhichcondemnssuchreification, delimiting itthroughtheappeal toanoriginal whichcannotbelost,andtherebydoessolittle harmtoitasontologydoestothescientificbustle.Nothingremainsofthecompromisedeternal valuesexcept confidence inthesanctityofbeing,whoseessenceispriortoeverythingthingly. Forthesakeofitscontemptibleinauthenticityinviewofthinglybeing,whichissupposedtobe dynamic in itself, to “occur”, the reified world is considered unworthy, as it were, of transformation; the critique of relativism is exorbitantly raised into the denunciation of the progressiverationalityofWesternthought,includingsubjectivereason.Thetime-testedhueand cryalreadybeingraisedinthepublicopinionagainstthesubversiveintellectalliesitselfwiththe oneagainstwhatismaterially[dinghaft]alienated:botheverplayedtotheother.Heideggerisat oncehostiletowardsthingsandanti-functional.Atnopriceisbeingsupposedtobeathingand yet, as the metaphor indicates over and over again, the “soil”, something solid.40 Therein becomesapparent,thatsubjectivizationandreificationdonotmerelydiverge,butarecorrelates. Themorethatwhichiscognizedbecomesfunctionalizedastheproductofcognition,themore completelythemomentofmovementinitisreckonedtothesubjectasitsactivity;theobject,to the result of the labor congealed in it, something dead. The reduction of the object tomere material, which precedes all subjective synthesis as its necessary condition, sucks its own dynamicoutofit;itisimmobilizedassomethingdisqualified,robbedofwhateverwouldallow movementtobepredicated.ItisnotfornothingthatKantnamedawholeclassofcategoriesas dynamic.41 Thematerialhowever,exclusiveofdynamics,isnomereimmediacybut,despitethe appearance[Schein]ofitsabsoluteconcreity,mediatedthroughabstraction,firstpiercedthrough, as itwere.Lifeispolarized according tothatwhichisentirely abstract andentirely concrete, whileitwouldexistsolelyinthetensionbetweenthem;bothpolesareequallyreified,andeven whatisleftofthespontaneoussubject,thepureapperception,ceasestobeasubjectthroughits dissolution from every living I, as Kant thought of the I, and passes over in its logicity, autonomized, intothehegemonicparalysis.Only,Heidegger’scritiqueofreificationsummarily chargesthereflectingandrealizingintellectofwhathasitsorigininreality,whichisitselfreified along with its world of experience. What the Spirit does, is not the fault of its irreverent presumptuousness,butitgivesbackwhatitiscompelledtobythecontextofreality,inwhichit itselfformsonlyamoment.Toslidebackreificationintobeingandthehistoryofbeing,thereby mourningasfateandconsecratingwhatself-reflectionandthepraxisitcansparkwouldperhaps liketochange,issolelyuntruth.Indeedthedoctrineofbeinghandsdown,legitimatelyagainst positivism,whattheentirehistorywhichitslandersgrounded,notablyKantandHegel:thatthe dualismoftheinnerandouter,ofsubjectandobject,ofessenceandappearance,ofconceptand factarenotabsolute.Theirreconciliationhoweverisprojectedontotheirretrievableoriginand therebythedualismitself,againstwhichthewholewasconceived,ishardenedcontrarytothe reconciling impulse.Thedirgeovertheforgetfulnessofbeingisthesabotageofreconciliation;
Thiscontextofdeceptionextendshowevernotonlytotheontologicaldraftsbutjustasmuchto theneeds,towhichtheyareboundandoutofwhichtheyindistinctlyreadsomethinglikethe suretyoftheirtheses.Needitself,theintellectualonenotlessthanthematerialone,isopento critique, sinceevenhard-boiled naivete cannolongerbecertain thatsocialprocessesarestill directedimmediatelytowardssupplyanddemand,andtherebytowardsneeds.Aslittleasthese are something invariant, non-deducible, so little do they guarantee their satisfaction. The appearance[Schein]inthemandtheillusionthatwheretheyregisterthemselves,theymustalso be sated, goes back to the same false consciousness. Insofar as they are produced heteronomously,theyhaveashareinideology,weretheyeversotangible.Indeedthatwhichis realisnottobecleanlypeeledoutoftheideological,ifthecritiquedoesnotwishforitspartto succumbtoideology,thatofthesimplenatural life.Realneedscanobjectivelybeideologies, withoutrenderingthisasalegalmandatetonegatethem.Forintheneedsthemselvessomething reactsinthehumanbeingswhoarerecorded[erfassten]andadministered,whereintheyarenot entirely recordings[erfasstsind],thesurplusofthesubjective share,whichthesystemdidnot entirelymaster Materialneedsoughttobetakenseriouslyevenintheirtopsy-turvyform,caused byoverproduction.Eventheontologicalneedhasitsrealmomentinaconditioninwhichhuman beingsdonothavethecapacitytorationally–meaningfully–knoworrecognizethenecessity which alone rules their behavior The false consciousness of needsaimsatsomethingwhich self-aware subjects would not need, and compromises thereby every possible fulfillment. To false consciousness can be added, that it passes off what is unattainable as attainable, complementarily to the possible attainment ofneeds,whichitisforbidden.Atthesametime thesesortsofinvertedneedsintellectuallydemonstratethesufferingunawareofitselfinmaterial privation.Itmustpushforitsabolition,asmuchastheneedbyitselffailstodoso.Thethought withoutneed,whichwantsnothing,wouldbenugatory;butthinkingoutoftheneedbecomes confused,iftheneedisconceivedmerelysubjectively.Needsareaconglomerateofthetrueand thefalse;thetruethoughtwouldbetheone,whichwishedforwhatisright.Ifthereisanytruth to the doctrine which says needs are to be read not as anynatural condition butagainstthe so-called cultural standard, then what also hides inthisaretherelations ofsocialproduction along with its bad irrationality. This latter is to be relentlessly criticized against intellectual needs,theersatzforeverythingwhichhasbeenwithheld.Modernontologyisanersatzinitself: whatpromisestobebeyondtheapproachofidealism remainslatent idealismandpreventsits incisive critique. Notonlytheprimitive wish-fulfillments, whichtheculture-industryfeedsthe masses without thelatter everquitebelieving inthem,aregenerally ersatz.Deception hasno borders there, where the official cultural canon places itsgoods,inthepresumedsublimeof philosophy.Themosturgentofitsneedstodayseemstobethatforsomethingsolid.Itinspires theontologies;itiswhattheytakethemeasureof.Ithasitsrightinthis,thatonewishestohave security,tonotbeburiedbyahistoricaldynamicagainstwhichonefeelspowerless.Thatwhich isimmovable wouldliketoconservethatwhichiscondemnedasold.Themorehopelesslythe existingsocialformsblockthislonging,themoreirresistiblydoesdespairingself-preservation strikeaphilosophy,whichissupposedtobebothinone,despairingandself-preservation.The invariant structures are created in the spitting image of omnipresent terror, the vertigo of a
Theneedismorespecificforastructureofinvariantreactionsrelatingtotheconceptionofthe lossofformsintheworld,originallydrawnupbyconservativeculture-critiqueinthenineteenth centuryandpopularizedsincethen.Art-historicaltheseslikethatoftheextinctionofthepower to form styles fed them; it spread from aesthetics into a view of the whole. What the art-historians assumedisbynomeansconclusive, i.e.thatthislossactually wasone,andnot instead a mighty step towards the unleashing of the productive forces. Aesthetically revolutionary theoreticians like Adolf Loos still dared toexpressthisatthebeginningofthe century;42 onlythefrightened consciousness ofthoseculturalcriticswhosworebytheexisting culture forgot it. The lament over the lossoforderingformsincreases withtheirpower.The institutions are mightier thanever;theyhavelongsinceproducedsomethingliketheneon-lit styleoftheculture-industry,whichspreadsovertheworldliketheBaroquestyleoncedid.The undiminishedconflictbetweensubjectivityandformsreversesitselfunderthehegemonyofthe latterintotheconsciousnesswhichexperiencesitselfaspowerless,whichnolongertrustsitself to change the institutions and their intellectual mirror-images, into identification with the aggressor Thelament overthelossofformsintheworld,thepreludetothecallforabinding socialorder,whichthesubjecttacitly expectsfromoutside,heteronomously,is,insofarasthe assertion ismorethanmereideology,notthefruitoftheemancipationofthesubjectbutofits failure.Whatappearsasformlesstoaconstitutionoftheexistentmodeledsolelyaftersubjective reasoniswhatsubjugatesthesubjects,thepureprincipleofbeing-for-others,ofthecommodity form. For the sake of universal equivalence and comparability it debases all qualitative determinations in all places, leveling tendentially The same commodity form however, the mediateddominationofhumanbeingsoverhumanbeings,solidifiesthesubjectsintheirlackof autonomy;theirautonomyandthefreedomtowardsthequalitativewouldgotogether.Underthe spotlightofmodernartstylerevealsitsrepressivemoments.Theneedforformborrowedfrom suchdeceptively glossesoverwhatisbadinit,whatiscompulsory.Theform,whichdoesnot justifyitsrighttoexistinitselfbymeansofitstransparentfunction,butisonlyposited,justso thattherewouldbeform,isuntrueandtherebyalsoinadequateasform.TheSpirit,whichone wishestopersuadethatitwouldbehiddeninthem,ispotentiallybeyondthem.Onlybecausethe attempt toarrangetheworldsuchthatitnolongerobeyedtheform-categoriescontrarytothe mostadvanced consciousness failed, mustsuchprevailing categories frantically bemadetheir ownthing.Because howevertheSpiritcannotcompletely represstheirinadequacy,itopposes thecontemporary,crasslyvisibleheteronomyagainstanotherone,beitpast,beitabstract,with values as causae sui [Latin: causingthemselves] andthefantasmoftheirreconcilability with livingbeings.Thehatredforradicalmodernart,inwhichrestorativeconservativismandfascism constantly chime together blissfully, rests on this, that they are reminders ofthatwhichwas missed,bringingtolightthedubiousnessoftheheteronomousstructuralidealthroughitspure existence. Socially, the subjective consciousness ofhumanbeingsistooweaktoexplodethe invariants inwhichitisimprisoned.Insteadofthisitadjustsitselftothem,whilemourningits absence.Reified consciousness isamoment inthetotalityofthereifiedworld;theontological needitsmetaphysics,evenwhen,accordingtoitsdoctrinalcontent,itexploitsthesamecritique
ofreification,nowadaysgrowncheap.Theformofinvarianceassuchistheprojectionofwhatis paralyzedinthatconsciousness.Incapableoftheexperienceofanythingnotalreadycontainedin the repertory of monotony, it coins immutability into the idea of something eternal, that of transcendence.Theemancipatedconsciousness,whichindeednoonehasinastateofunfreedom; one,whichhadcontrolofitself,astrulyautonomousasithithertoonlypretendedtobe,would notbeconstantly afraidoflosingitselftoanOther–secretly,tothepowerswhichruleit.The needforsupport,forthealleged substantial, isnotassubstantialasitsself-justificationwould like;rather,thesignoftheweaknessoftheI,familiartopsychologyasatypicalinjurynowadays ofhumanbeings.Whoeverwasnolongeroppressedfromwithoutandfromwithinwouldnot seek support, perhaps not even from themselves. Subjects, who might rescue something of freedom even under heteronomous conditions, suffer less from the lack of support than the unfree ones, whochargethisonlytoohappilytofreedom,asfreedom’sfault.Ifhumanity no longerhadtomakethemselvesintotheequivalentsofthings,theywouldneedneitherathingly [dinghaft]superstructure, norwouldtheyhavetodesignatethemselves,followingthemodelof thingliness [Dinglichkeit], as invariant. The doctrine of invariance eternalizes how little has changed, its positivity as what is bad. To this extent the ontological need is false. Probably metaphysicswoulddawnonthehorizononlyafterthefallofinvariants.Buttheconsolationisof little help.Whatwouldberightontime, hasnotime tospare,thereisnowaitingonwhatis decisive; whoever relies on this, encounters the separation of the temporal and the eternal. Becauseitisfalseandneverthelesstheanswers,whichitrequires,areblockedbythehistorical moment,allquestionswhichhavetodowithconsolationhaveanantinomicalcharacter
II.BeingandExistence
ImmanentCritiqueofOntology104-107
Thecritique ofontological needdrivestowardstheimmanentoneofontology.Nothingwhich attacksthephilosophyofbeinggenerally,fromoutside,wouldhaveanypoweroverit,insteadof meeting itonitsownturf–afterHegel’sdesiderata, turningitsownpoweragainstitself.The motivations and results of Heidegger’s thought-movements permit their reconstruction in retrospect, evenwheretheyarenotexpressed;tobesurehardlyanyoneofhissentenceslacks positional valueinthefunctionalcontextofthewhole.Tothatextentheisthesuccessorofthe deductivesystems.Thelatter’shistoryalreadyhasawealthofconceptsrealizedfromthecourse ofthought,evenwhenonecannotputafingeronthematter-at-hand[Sachverhalt]whichwould correspond to them; the speculative moment of philosophy originates outofthenecessity of forming them. That which is petrified in the thought-movement is toberenderedfluidonce more,byrepeatedlyfollowinguponitsvalidity,asitwere.Itdoesnotsufficetodemonstrateto thephilosophyofbeingthat,inregardstowhatitcallsbeing,therewouldbenosuchthing.For it postulates no such “giving” [Geben]. Instead, such a blindness ofbeingwouldneedtobe deduced in reply to the claim of irrefutability, which employs that blindness. Even the meaninglessness, whoseestablishment stirredthetriumphal cryofpositivism,ismeaningfulin the philosophy of history Because the secularization ofthetheological content oncedeemed objectivelybindingisnottoberevoked,itsapologistseekstorescueitthroughsubjectivity The Reformation’sdoctrineofbeliefalreadyvirtuallydidso;itwassurelythedefiningfigureofthe Kantianphilosophy SincethenEnlightenmenthasprogressedirresistibly,subjectivityhasitself become drawnintotheprocessofdemythologization. Thechanceforrescuesanktherebytoa limit-point.Paradoxicallyitshopehasbeencededtoitssacrifice,toanunconditionalandatthe same time self-reflecting secularization. Heidegger’s approach is true, to the extent that he submitstothisinthenegationoftraditionalmetaphysics;hebecomesuntrue,wherehe,notatall sodifferentfromHegel,speaksasifwhatwastherebytobesavedwasimmediatelypresent.The philosophy of being fails as soon as it proclaims a meaning in being, which that thinking dissolvedaccordingtoitsowntestimony,towhichbeingitselfisstillattachedastheconceptual reflection, ever since it has been thought. The meaninglessness of the word being, atwhich sound common sense is wont to sneer, is not to be ascribed to thinking too little or to an irresponsible scattershot thinking.Deposited initistheimpossibilityofgraspingorproducing positivemeaninginthethought,whichwasthemediumoftheobjectivedissolutionofmeaning. If one sought to complete the Heideggerian distinction between being and its logically circumscribing concept, one would beleft,afterthesubtraction oftheexistent aswellasthe categories of abstraction, withsomethingunknowninhand,whichhasnoadvantage overthe Kantianconceptofthetranscendentalthingin-itselfexceptthepathosofitsinvocation.Therein howeverthewordthinking,whichHeideggermaynotrenounce,becomesasdevoidofcontentas whatistobethought:thinkingwithouttheconceptisnothingofthesort.Thatthisbeing,whose thinking would according to Heidegger be the true task, blocks itself off from every thought-determination, hollowsouttheappealtothinkit.Heidegger’sobjectivism,thecurseof thebaneoverthethinkingsubject,isthetruereversed-image ofsuch.Insentences whichare meaningless to positivists, change [Wechsel: change, also financial note] is presented to the epoch;theyarefalseforthisreason,thattheyclaimtobemeaningful,resoundingliketheecho
of something which has content in itself. Meaning does not dwell in the innermost cell of Heidegger’s philosophy; while it expounds itself as the knowledge of salvation, it is what Scheler called the knowledge of domination. To be sure Heidegger’scultofbeingdidhave, polemically against the idealistic one of the Spirit, the critique of its self-deification as its prerequisite.TheHeideggerianbeinghowever,almostindistinguishablefromSpirit,itsantipode, isnolessrepressive thanthis;onlymoreopaquethansuch,whoseprinciplewastransparency; henceevenlesscapableofcriticalself-reflectionofthedominatingessencethanthephilosophies of the Spirit. Theelectrical chargeofthewordbeinginHeideggerfitsnicely withthepraise bestowedbyaneutralizedcultureonhumanbeingswhoaredevoutorfaithfulpureandsimple, asifdevotionandbeliefweremeritsinthemselves,irregardlessofthetruthofwhatisbelieved in. This neutralization comes into its own in Heidegger: ritual devotion to beingcompletely cancelsoutthecontent,whichwasnoncommittallydraggedalonginhalforentirelysecularized religions.NothingisleftofreligiouscustomsinHeidegger,whodrillsthemin,thanthegeneral strengthening of dependence and submissiveness, surrogates of the objective law of form of thinking.While thestructurepermanently recedes,itdoesnotleaveitsadepts,justlikelogical positivism. With the facts expropriated of everything which made them more than facts, Heidegger thus takes charge of the waste-product, as it were, of the evaporating aura. It guaranteestophilosophysomethinglikeapost-existence,insofarasitoccupiesitselfwiththeeu kaipau[Greek:wellandended,wellandfinished]asitsspecialty.Theexpressionofbeingis nothingotherthanthefeelingofthataura,oneindeedwithoutstars,whichshedlightonit.Init, the moment of mediation becomes isolated and thereby immediate. Mediation ishoweverso littletobehypostasizedasthepolesofsubjectandobject;itisvalidsolelyintheirconstellation. Mediation is mediated through that which is mediated. Heidegger overstretches it into a non-objectiveobjectivity,asitwere.Hesettlesinanimaginaryintermediaryrealmbetweenthe obtusesensibility ofthefactabruta[Latin:brutefacts]andthetwaddleoftheworld-view The conceptofbeing,whichdoesnotwanttogivevoicetoitsmediations,becomesthenon-essence, therepetitionoftheexistent,whichAristotelessawthroughinthePlatonicidea,theessencepar excellence. From this is exacted whatever is ascribed to being. While theemphatic claim of beingtopureessentiality thusbecomesinvalid, theexistent, whichdwellsinextinguishablyin beingwithout,intheHeideggerianversion,havingtoconfesstoitsonticcharacter,partakesof that ontological claim parasitically. That being would demonstrate itself, that it would be passively received bythesubject,isborrowedfromtheolddataofepistemology,whichwere supposedtobesomethingfactical,somethingontic.Howeverthatwhichisonticsimultaneously castsasidethetraceofcontingencyinthesacreddistrictofbeing,whichpreviouslypermittedits critique. By virtue of the logic of the philosophicaporia,withoutwaitingfortheideological supplement ofthephilosopher,itdisplacestheempiricalhegemonyoftheexistentassuchinto that which is intrinsic [Wesenhafte]. The conception of being as an entity, whose thinking determinationinvariablymisseswhatisthoughtbycuttingitintopiecesandthereby,according tothecurrentpoliticalterm,subvertsit,hearkensbacktotheEleaticunityofconclusivenessjust likethesystemoncedidandtodaytheworld.Contrarytotheintentofthesystems,however,the unity of what is conclusive is heteronomous: unattainable by the rational will as well asby individuals basedonthatsocialtotal subject,whichuntilthisdayhasnotbeenrealized.Inthe staticallyrenewedsociety,therebyindicated,nonewmotifsseemtobeswellingthestockpileof apologeticideology;ratherthecurrentonesaresodilutedandrenderedunrecognizable,thatthey canbedisavowedfromcontemporaryexperienceonlywithdifficulty.Ifthefallbacksandartful dodgesofphilosophyprojecttheexistentonbeing,thentheexistentishappilyjustified;ifitis
Thecultofbeinglivesbytheancientideologyoftheidolafori[Latin:idolsofthemarketplace]: that which thrives in the darkness of the word being and the forms derived from it. “Is” establishes the context of the existential judgement between the grammatical subjectandthe predicate andtherebysuggestssomethingontic.Atthesametime,takenpurelybyitself,asthe copula, it means the general categorical matter-at-hand of a synthesis, without representing somethingontic.Thatiswhyithasnoqualmsaboutaddingitselftotheontologicalsideofthe ledger.Heideggerdrawstheontological purityfromthelogicityofthecopula,thussuitinghis allergy against the factical; fromtheexistential judgement howeverthememoryoftheontic, whichthenpermitsittohypostasizethecategoricalachievementofthesynthesisasagivenfact. Tothe“is”theredoesindeedcorresponda“matter-at-hand”:ineverypredicativejudgementthe “is” has its meaning just as much as the subject and the predicate. The “matter-at-hand” is howeverintentional, notontic.Thecopulafulfillsitselfaccordingtoitsownmeaningsolelyin the relation between the subject and the predicate. It isnotindependent. Byconfusingitfor somethingbeyondthatthroughwhichitalonebecomesmeaningful,Heideggerisovercomeby thatthingly[dinghaft]thinking,againstwhichherebelled.Inthathesolidifieswhatismeantby the “is” into the absolute ideal in-itself – exactly that of being –whatisrepresented bythe subjectandpredicate ofthejudgement, oncetornloosefromthecopula,wouldhavethesame rights. Both would experience their synthesis through the copula merely superficially; the concept ofbeingwasthoughtupprecisely againstthis.Subject,copula,predicate wouldonce again,asinobsoletelogic,beconclusiveinthemselves,finishedparticularities,accordingtothe modelofthings.Intruthhoweverthepredicationisnotaddedin,butbycouplingbothtogether, is also what they would be in themselves, if this “would be” could somehow be conceived without the synthesis of the “is”. This is what bars the extrapolation from the copula to a preordained essence of “being”, just as much as to a “becoming”, the pure synthesis. That extrapolation rests on an interpretive-theoretical confusion: that the general meaning of the copula “is”, the constant grammatical token for the synthesis of thejudgement, achieves the specific one,thatofthe“is”ineveryjudgement.Bynomeansdobothcoincide.Tothisextent the“is”couldbecomparedtooccasionalexpressions.Itsgeneralityisapromissorynoteonthe particularity,thegeneralformfortheconsummationofparticularjudgements.Thenomenclature takes this into account, in that it already reserves the scientific terminus “copula” for that generality and for the specific achievement, which the judgement always has to achieve, precisely the“is”.Heideggerfailstonoticethedifference.Thereinthespecificachievementof the“is”becomesmerelysomethinglikeamodeofappearanceofthatgenerality.Thedistinction betweenthecategory andthecontentoftheexistentialjudgementmeltsaway.Thesubstitution ofthegeneralgrammaticalformfortheapophanticcontenttransformstheonticachievementof the “is” into an ontological one, a mode of being of being.Ifoneneglects howeverwhatis postulated inthesenseof“is”,themediated andmediatingachievementintheparticular,then there would remain no other sort of substrate left to that “is”, except the abstract form of mediation at large. This pure becoming, in Hegel’s words, issolittle anUr-principle asany other, unless one wishes to drive out Parmenides with Heraclitus. The word being has an
overtone, which only the arbitrary definition could fail to hear; it lends the Heideggerian philosophyitschromata[Klangfarbe:tone-color].Everyexistentismorethanwhatitis;being, incontrasttotheexistent,isareminderofthis.Becausenothingisexistent,whichdoesnot,by being determined anditselfdetermining, requireanother,whichitisnotitself–forbyitself alonetherewouldbenothingtodetermine–itpointsbeyonditself.Mediationissimplyanother wordforthis.Heideggerhoweverseekstoreininthatwhichpointsbeyonditselfandreduces whatitpointstowardstorubble.Forhimimbrication becomesitsabsoluteopposite,theprôtê ousia[Greek:primarysubstance].Inthewordbeing,theepitomeofthatwhichis,thecopulais concretized.Onecouldsolittlespeakofthe“is”without“being”asviceversa.Thewordpoints to the objective moment, which conditions the synthesis in every predicative judgement, in whichitneverthelessfirstcrystallized.Butbeingissolittleindependentinregardstothe“is”as that matter-at-hand is in the judgement. Language, whichHeideggercorrectly takesformore than mere signification, testifies by virtue of the dependence of its forms against what he squeezesoutofit.Ifgrammarlinksthe“is”withthesubstrate-categoryofbeingasitsasset:that somethingis,thenitreciprocallyusesbeingsolelyinrelationtoallofwhatis,notinitself.Tobe suretheappearance [Schein]ofwhatisontologically pureisreinforced bythefactthatevery analysisofjudgementsleadstowardstwomoments,neitherofwhichistobereducedtotheother –nomoresothan,metalogically,subjectandobject.*08*Thethoughtfascinatedbythechimera ofanabsolutefirstwilleventuallybeinclinedtoclaimeventhatirreducibilityitselfasthatwhich isultimate. InHeidegger’sconcept ofbeingthereareechoesofthereductiontoirreducibility Butitisaformalization,whichdoesnotmeshwithwhatisbeingformalized.Itsays,takenonits ownbehalf,nothingmorethanthenegative,thatthemomentsofjudgement,wheneverjudged, donotpassoverintoeachotherononesideortheother;thattheyarenotidentical.Outsideof thisrelationshipofmomentsofjudgement,irreducibilityisnothing,nothingatallcanbethought underit.Thatiswhynoontologicalprioritycanbeimputedtoitinrelationtothemoments.The paralogismliesinthetransformationofthatnegative,thatnosinglemomentistobereducedto theother,intosomethingpositive.Heideggerreachestheverybordersofthedialecticalinsight intothenon-identityinidentity.Buthedoesnotcarrythroughthecontradictionintheconceptof being. He suppresses it. Whatever could be thought under being, mocks the identity of the concept with that which it means;butHeideggermaltreats itasidentity,asitselfpurebeing, excluding all its otherness. He hushes up the non-identity in absolute identity like a family scandal. Because the “is” is neither merely subjective function nor something thingly [Dinghaftes],somethingexistent,accordingtotraditionalthinkinghasnoobjectivity,Heidegger callsitbeing,thatwhichisthird.Thetransition ignorestheintention oftheexpressionwhich Heideggerhumblybelieves tohaveexplicated. Thecognition, thatthe“is”wouldbenomere thoughtandnomereexistent,doesnotpermititstransfigurationintosomethingtranscendentin relation tooneofthesetwodeterminations.Everyattempttoeventhinkthe“is”,wereitinthe palest of generalities, leads to the existent here and intoconceptsthere.Theconstellation of momentsisnottobereducedtoasingularessence;whatdwellswithinit,isitselfnotessence. Theunity,whichthewordbeingpromises,lastsonlysolong,asitisnotthought,aslongasits meaning,inlinewithHeidegger’sownmethod,isnotanalyzed;anysuchanalysiswillbringto lightwhatdisappearedintheabyssofbeing.Iftheanalysisofbeingitselfbecomestaboo,then theaporiapassesoverintosubreption.Inbeing,theabsoluteissupposedtobethought,butonly becauseitisnottobethought,woulditbetheabsolute; onlybecauseitmagically blindsthe cognitionofthemoments,doesitseemtobebeyondthemoments;becausereasoncannotthink itsbest,itbecomes,toitself,theworst.
NoTranscendenceofBeing111-114
Intruthallparticularconceptsare,contrarytothelinguisticatomismofHeidegger,thefaithful believer in the whole, already entwined in themselves along with the judgements which classifying logic neglected; theoldtripartite schemeoflogicdividedintoconcept, judgement and conclusion is an archaicism just like the system of Linnaeus. Judgements are no mere synthesisofconcepts,fornoconceptiswithoutajudgement;Heideggeroverlooksthis,perhaps underthebaneofscholasticism.Howeverinthemediatedness[Vermitteltheit]ofbeingaswell asthe“is”hidesthesubject.Heideggerignoresthisidealisticmoment,ifyouwill,andthereby raisessubjectivity tosomethinggivenpriortothesubject-object dualism,somethingabsolute. Thateveryanalysis ofthejudgement leadstothesubjectandobject,createsnoregionbeyond those moments, which wouldbeinitself.Itresultsintheconstellation ofthosemoments,no highernorevenmoregeneralthird.Itcancertainlybeargued,inHeidegger’ssense,thatthe“is” wouldnotbethingly,nottahouta[Greek:tothewound],notanexistent,notanobjectivityin the usual sense of the term. For without the synthesis the “is” has no substrate; in the matter-at-hand in question no tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here]couldbepointedto which would correspond to it. Therefore, goes theconclusion,the“is”oughttoindicate that third,preciselythatofbeing.Thishoweveriswrong,acoupofself-satisfiedsemantics.Thefalse conclusion becomes flagrant, in that such a presumably pure substrate of the “is”cannotbe thought.Everyattempt todosolandsinmediations,fromwhichthehypostasizedbeingwould liketobeexempt.Theconclusionhoweverthatitcannotbethought,Heideggerbooksasanet gain,anaddition tothemetaphysical dignityofbeing.Becauseitrefusesthinking,itwouldbe theabsolute; becauseitcannot,inbestHegelian manner,bereproducedasasubjectorobject withoutaremainder,itwouldbebeyondthesubjectandobject,althoughifitwereindependent ofthem,itcouldnotatallbe.Reason,whichcannotthinkit,isintheenditselfdefamed,asif thoughtcouldeverbeseparatedfromreason.Itisindisputable,thatbeingwouldnotsimplybe theepitome ofwhatis,ofwhatisthecase.Suchananti-positivisticinsightdoesjusticetothe surplusoftheconcept overfacticity.Noconceptcouldbethought,indeednonewouldevenbe possible without the “more”, which makes language into language. What in the meantime resonatesinthewordbeing,asopposedtotahouta[Greek:tothewound]:thateverythingwould bemorethanitis,meansimbrication,notsomethingtranscendenttoit.Thatiswhatitbecomes in Heidegger, who addsittotheparticular existent. Hefollowsthedialectic tothepointthat neithersubjectnorobjectwouldbesomethingimmediateandultimate,butspringsoutofit,by reaching beyondthemforsomethingimmediate, somethingfirst.Thinkingbecomesarchaistic, assoonasittransfigureswhatinthescatteredexistentismorethanitselfintothemetaphysical archê[Greek:beginning,origin].Asareactiontothelossoftheaura,43 thislatter,asthatwhich pointsbeyonditselfinthings,isrefunctionedbyHeideggerintoasubstrateandtherebymadethe sameasthethings.Heprescribesarepristinationoftheshudderwhich,longbeforethemythical nature-religions, preparedthesacredcommingling [In-ein-ander]: mana44 isrecuperated outof theGermanname“being”,asifthedawningpowerlessnessresembledthatofthepre-animistic primitivestowardsthunderandlightning.Heideggersecretlyobeysthelawthatwithadvancing rationality theconstantly irrational societyreacheseverfurtherback.Wiserforexperience,he avoidstheRomantic Pelagianism ofKlagesandthepowersofOskarGoldbergandfleesfrom
theregionoftangible superstition intoatwilight,inwhichnotevenmythologemeslikethatof thereality ofimagescantakeshapeanymore.Heescapesthecritique,withoutdispensingwith theadvantages oftheorigin;thisispushedbacksofar,thatitseemstobetimelessandhence ubiquitous.“Butthat/won’tdo.”45 Thereisnootherwaytobreakoutofhistorythanthrough regression.Itsgoal,theoldestofall,isnotwhatistruebuttheabsoluteappearance[Schein],the obtuseentanglement inanature,whoseimpenetrableopacitymerelyparodiesthesupernatural. Heidegger’s transcendence*09* is absolutized immanence, obdurate against its own immanence-character.Thatappearance [Schein]requiresexplanation; howitisthatthepurely deduced, the mediated, being, can hijack theinsigniaoftheensconcretissimum [Latin: most concrete being]. It is based on the fact that the poles of traditional epistemology and metaphysics, the pure this-right-here [Diesda] and pure thought,areabstract. Botharesofar removed from so many determination that little more can be said of them,ifthejudgement wishestoproceedbywhatitjudges.Thereinbothpolesseemindistinguishablefromeachother, andthispermitstheimperceptiblesubstitutionofoneinplaceoftheother,dependingonwhatis tobedemonstrated. Theconcept oftheexistentpureandsimple,accordingtoitsidealwithout anycategories,initscompletelackofqualifications,needonlydelimititselftonothingexistent, andcanthuscall itselfbeing.Beinghowever,asabsoluteconcept,doesnotneedtolegitimate itselfasbeing:witheverycircumscription itwoulddelimit itselfandviolateitsownmeaning. Thatiswhyitcanbegarbedwiththedignityoftheimmediateasmuchasthetodeti[Greek: individual thing, this-here] with that which is intrinsic [Wesenhaften]. Heidegger’s entire philosophyplaysoutbetweenthesetwoextremes,indifferenttoeachother.*10*Butagainsthis willtheexistentendsupprevailingoverbeing.Thislatteriskeptalivebytheforbiddenfruit,as ifthiswereFreya’sapples.Whilebeing,forthesakeofitsauraticabsoluteness,doesnotwishto be contaminated with anything existent, only therein does it become that immediacy which delivers the legal title oftheclaim toabsoluteness, thatbeingalwaysmeanssomuchas:the existentpureandsimple.Assoonasthetalkofbeingaddsanythingatalltothepureinvocation, it stems from the ontic. The rudiments of material ontology in Heidegger are temporal; are somethingwhichhascometobeandwhicharetransient,asSchelerbefore.
ExpressionoftheInexpressible114-116
Justicewouldatanyratebedonetotheconceptofbeingonlyifthegenuineexperiencewhichits instauration realizes isunderstood:thephilosophicspurtoexpresstheinexpressible.Themore anxiously philosophyblocksitselffromthatspur,itspeculiarity,thegreater thetemptation to directlygoaftertheinexpressible,withoutthelaborofSisyphus,whichwouldnotbetheworst definitionofphilosophy,andwhichisthesourceofsomuchmockeryofit.Philosophyitself,as aformoftheSpirit,containsamoment withadeepaffinitytothatwhichissuspended,asin Heidegger’sassumption ofwhatisbemeditated over,whichalsopreventsthemeditation.For philosophy is far more specifically a form, than the history of its concept would have one presume,inwhichitseldomincorporatesinreflection,asidefromalayerofHegel,itsqualitative difference from science, the doctrine of science, and logic, with which it is nonetheless intertwined. Philosophy consists neither of vérités deraison[French:truthsofreason]norof véritésdefait[French:truthsinfact].Nothingwhichitsaysbowstothetangiblecriteriaofa caseofbeing;itsthesesonwhatisconceptualaresolittlethelogicalmatter-at-handthanthose onwhatisfactical areempiricalresearch.Itisfragilealsobecauseofitsdistance.Itcannotbe
nailed down.Itshistoryisoneofpermanent failure, totheextentthatitabandoneditselfover andover,terrorizedbyscience,towhatistangible.Itearneditspositivisticcritiquebytheappeal toscientificity,whichsciencereproachesitfor;thatcritiqueerrs,inthatitconfrontsphilosophy withacriterion, whichisnotitsown,whereveritmayhavefolloweditsownidea.Itdoesnot howeverrenouncethetruth,butilluminatesthescientificoneaslimited.Whatissuspendedinit isdetermined bythis,thatinitsdistance fromtheverifyingcognition itisnotnon-committal [unverbindlich], butleadsitsownlifeofstringency.Itseeksthisinwhatitisnotitself,what opposesit,andinthereflectiononwhatpositivecognitionviewswithbadnaiveteascommittal [verbindlich]. Philosophy is neither scientific procedure nor the thought-poetry to which positivism,withaludicrousoxymoron,wouldliketodegradeit,butisaformjustasmediatedby what it is divergentfromasbywhatitsublates. Whatissuspendedisnothingotherthanthe expressionoftheinexpressible initself.Therein itistrulythesiblingofmusic.Thatwhichis suspendedisscarcely capable ofbeingputintowords;thismayhavecausedthephilosophers, with the partial exception of Nietzsche, to gloss over it. It is more the prerequisite for the comprehensionofphilosophictextsthanitsdefinitivecharacteristic.Itoriginatedhistoricallyand may yet fall silent, just as music threatens to do. Heidegger innervated this and literally transformedwhatisspecific tophilosophy,perhapsbecauseitisonthepointofgoingextinct, intoaniche,anobjectivityofquasisuperiorsocialrank:thephilosophywhichrecognizesthatit neitherjudgesoverfacticitynoroverjudgementsthewayotherthingsarejudged,andwhichis notevenentirelycertainofitsobject,wouldliketohaveitspositivecontent,asitwere,beyond thefactum, concept andjudgement alike. Whatissuspendedinthoughtistherebyraisedupto the inexpressible itself, which it wishes to express; that which is nonobjectified, to the penciled-in [umrissenen] object ofitsownessence;andtherebydamaged.Undertheweightof tradition, which Heidegger wishes to shake off, the inexpressible becomes expressible and compact inthewordbeing;theobjection againstreification isreified, divorcedfromthinking andirrational. Bytreating theinexpressible ofphilosophyasimmediatelythematic,Heidegger damsthisupallthewaybacktotherevocationofconsciousness.Aspunishmenttheblocked-up wellspring which he wishes to dig out runs dry, its trickle scantier than any insight of the presumably destroyed philosophies, which incline towards the inexpressible through their mediations.Whatwasascribedtothescantinessoftime,throughthemisuseofHoelderlin,isthat of the thinking which imagines itself to be beyond time. The immediate expression of the inexpressible isnugatory;whereitsexpressionhadweight,asingreatmusic,itssealwasthat whichslipsawayandistransient,anditwasattachedtothecourse,nottothesignifying“that’s it”. The thought, which wishes to think the inexpressible through the sacrifice of thought, falsifiesitintothatwhichitwouldlikeleasttobe,thegratuitousabsurdity[Unding]ofanutterly abstractobject.
TheChild’sQuestion116-118
The child, fundamental ontology could argue, if it wasn’t too ontic-psychological to do so, inquiresintobeing.Thereflectiondrivesthisoutofit,andthereflectionofthereflectionwould like,aseverinidealism,torendercompensationforthis.Butthedoubledreflectionhardlyasks immediately, as the child does. Philosophy paints the latter’s conduct with the anthropomorphism, as it were, of the adult, as thatofthechildhoodoftheentire species, as pretemporal-supratemporal. What it labors under is its relationship to the words, which it appropriates with an effortscarcely imaginable anymoreatalater age,ratherthantheworld,
whichinitsearliestphasesissomewhatfamiliartoitasoneofaction-objects.Itwishestoassure itself of the meaning of words, and the occupation with them, probably something psychoanalytically explicable, itskobold-like,naggingstubbornness,leadsittotherelationship ofthewordandthething.Itmaypesteritsmotherwiththeembarrassingproblemofwhythe benchiscalled abench.Itsnaivete isunnaive.Aslanguage, culture migrates intotheearliest impulses ofitsconsciousness; amortgage onalltalkoforiginality.Themeaningofthewords andtheirtruth-content,their“positiontowardsobjectivity”arenotyetsharplydefinedfromeach other;toknowwhatthewordbenchmeans,andwhatabenchreallyis–whichdoesincludethe existentialjudgement–isoneandthesametothatconsciousnessornotatalldifferentiated,and whichbythewayincountless casescanbedistinguished onlywithdifficulty.Orientedtothe storehouseofwordsithasacquired,childhoodimmediacyistothisextentmediatedinitself,the preformedboringintothewhy,intothefirst.Speechisexperiencedasphysei[Greek:bynature], “takenforgranted”[inEnglish],notasthesei[Greek:thesis];inthebeginningisfetishism,and thehuntforthebeginningalwaysremainsyokedtothis.Tobesurethatfetishismishardlytobe seenthrough,becauseeverythingthoughtisatanyratealsolinguistic,unreflectivenominalism asfalseastherealismwhichendowsfalliblelanguagewiththeattributesofarevealedone.Itis in Heidegger’s favor that there is no non-linguistic in-itself; thattherefore language isinthe truth,thislatter isnotinlanguage,assomethingmerelysignifiedbysuch.Buttheconstitutive share oflanguage inthetruthdoesnotestablish anyidentity ofboth.Thepoweroflanguage provesitselfbytheexpressionandthingsteppingoutofeachotherinthereflection.46 Language becomesanofficeoftruthonlyintheconsciousnessofthenon-identityoftheexpressionwith what is meant. Heidegger denies that reflection; he halts after the first step of linguistic-philosophicaldialectics.Histhinkingisalsorepristinationinthis,thatitwouldliketo reestablish thepowerofthenamebyaritualofnaming.Thispowerhoweverisnotofthesort present in contemporary secularized languages, which would permit the subject to do so. Throughsecularizationthesubjectshavewithdrawnthenamefromthem,andtheirintransigence necessitatestheobjectivityoflanguage,notthephilosophicaltrustinGod.Itismorethanasign onlythroughitssignifyingpower,therewhereitmostexactlyanddenselyholdswhatismeant. Itis,onlyinsofarasitbecomes,inthecontinuousconfrontationofexpressionandthing;Karl Krausproceededsimilarly,thoughhehimselfmayhavebeeninclinedtoanontologicalviewof language. Heidegger’s procedure however is, in Scholem’s phrase, Teutonic Kabbalistics. He treatsthehistoricallanguages,asiftheywerethoseofbeing,asromanticallyasanyonewhois violently anti-romantic. Hismannerofdestructionfallssilentbeforetheunnoticedphilological culturalformation[Bildung:education],whichheatthesametimesuspends.Suchconsciousness affirmswhatsurroundsit,oratleastmakesitspeacewithit;genuinephilosophicalradicalism, whereverithistorically emerged,istheproductofdoubt.Theradical questionwhichdestroys nothingbutthislast,isitselfillusory[scheinhaft].
QuestionofBeing118-121
Underlying Heidegger’s emphatic expression of the word being is his old category of authenticity, which indeed was hardly mentioned later on. The transcendence of being as opposedtotheconceptandtheexistentwishestodissolvethedesiderataofauthenticity,asthat whichwouldnotbeappearance[Schein],neitherinstitutionallyorganizednorinapplicable.Itis
protested, with good reason, that the historical development of philosophy flattened out the distinction betweenessenceandappearance[Schein],theinherentimpulseofphilosophyasthe thaumaxein [Greek: wonder, marvel], as dissatisfaction with the façade. Unreflective Enlightenmentnegatedthemetaphysicalthesisofessenceasthetrueworldbehindappearances withthenolessabstractcounter-thesis,thattheessencewouldbe,astheepitomeofmetaphysics, theappearance[Schein]:asiftheappearance[Schein]wereforthatreasontheessence.Byvirtue ofthedivisionoftheworld,thelawofdivision–whatisauthentic–ishidden.Thepositivism which adjusts to this, by cancelling out what is not hidden,whatisadatum,asmythosand subjectiveprojection,therebyreinforcesillusoriness[Scheinhaftigkeit]asoncedidthedoctrines, whichconsoledthesufferinginthemundussensibilis[Latin:sensibleworld]withtheassertion ofthenoumenal. Heideggerfeltsomethingofthismechanism.Butwhatisauthentic,whichhe misses, recoils instantly into positivity, authenticity as a conduct ofconsciousness which,by emigratingfromtheprofane,powerlesslyimitatesthetheologicalhabitusoftheancientdoctrine ofessences.Thehiddenessenceisrenderedproofagainstthesuspicionthatitwouldbethebad stateofaffairs.Thereisnoconsiderationwhichdarestomentionthatthecategoriesofso-called massification,developedinBeingandTimeasmuchasinJaspers’paperbackontheintellectual situationofthetime,couldthemselvesbethathiddenabsurditywhichmakeshumanbeingsinto whattheyare;theymustthenbescoldedbyphilosophy,becausetheyhaveforgottentheessence. Theresistanceagainstreifiedconsciousness,whichstillresonatesinthepathosofauthenticity,is broken.Theremainderofthecritiqueisunleashedagainsttheappearance,namelythesubjects; the essence remainsundisturbed,whoseguiltislaidtothosewhoaremerely represented and which reproduces itself. – While fundamental ontology would not be distracted from the thaumaxein[Greek:wonder,marvel],itblockstheanswer,astowhatreallyisauthentic,through the form of the question. It is not for nothing that this is shuffled off onto the dégoutanten [French: disgusting] terminus, the question of being. It ismendacious, becausethecorporeal interestofeveryindividual–thenakedoneofHamlet’smonologue,astowhethertheindividual isabsolutely annihilated withdeathorwhetherhehasthehopeoftheChristiannonconfundar [Latin: nonconfundarinaeternum, “Ishallnotperishineternity”] –isappealed to,butwhat Hamlet means by to be or not to be is replaced by the pure essence, which swallows up existence. In that the existential ontologies, in phenomenological custom, make something thematic,withafullpaletteofdescriptionsanddistinctions,theysatisfytheinterestanddistract from it. “The question of being”, says Heidegger, “aims thus at an a priori condition of possibility not only of the sciences, whichresearchthroughtheexistent assuchandsuchan existentandthereinalwaysevermoveinanunderstandingofbeing,butalsofortheconditionof possibility oftheontologieswhichliebeforetheonticsciencesandgroundthem.Allontology, nomatter howrichandfirmly-compacted asystemofcategories itmaydisposeover,remains fundamentallyblindandaninversionofitsinnermostintent,ifithasnotsufficientlyexplicated themeaningofbeingandcomprehendedthisexplanationasitsfundamentaltask.”47 Throughthe overextension of what serves up phenomenological ponderousness in such sentences as the questionofbeing,whatevercouldbeconceivedunderthewordisforfeited,andthatconception becomes if possible even more devalued into the frenetic entanglement which recuses the renunciationasahigherwisdom,astheauthenticanswertothequestionitducked.Inordertobe alltooauthentic, theso-called questionofbeingshrinkswhatitstylesasthesolenative-born meaning ofbeingdowntoadimensionlesspoint.Ittransformsitselfintothebanagainstgoing beyonditself,andultimate goingbeyondthattautology,whichinHeideggermanifestsitselfas
the fact that the self-revealing being says nothing other than being, over and over again.48 Heidegger would even pass off the tautological essence of being if possible as something superiores [Latin: superior] to the determinations of logic. But it is to be developed out of aporetics.AsHusserlbeforehim,Heideggerunthinkinglybowstodesiderataofthinkingplaced nexttoeachother,which,inthehistoryofthemetaphysicswhichheputoutofcirculationinall toosovereignafashion,provedtobeincompatible:tothepure,thatwhichisfreeofallempirical admixtureandhenceabsolutelyvalid,andtotheimmediate,thepurelygiven,irrefutablebecause it lacks the conceptual supplement. ThusHusserlcombined theprogramofa“pure”,namely eidetic, phenomenology withthatoftheself-givenfactoftheapparent object. Thetitle “pure phenomenology” alreadyassemblescontradictorynorms.Thatitwishedtobenoepistemology, butapositionarrangedentirelythewayitpleased,relieveditofthinkingthroughtherelationship ofitscategories.InthisregardHeideggerdiffersfromhisteacheronlyinsofarasherelocatesthe contradictoryprogramawayfromitsHusserlianstaging-grounds,theconsciousness,andintothe transcendence ofconsciousness, aconceptionwhichbythewaywasalreadyanticipatedbythe preponderanceofthenoemainHusserl’smiddleperiod.Howevertheincompatibilityofthepure andthatwhichwasgraphicallyconcrete[Anschauliches]compelledthesubstrateofitsunityto bechosensoindeterminately,thatitnolongercontainedanymomentinwhicheitherofthetwo demandscouldbelietheother.ThatiswhytheHeideggerianbeingmaybeneitherexistingnora concept. It must pay for the unimpeachability thereby achieved with its nihility, with an unattainabilitybyeverythoughtandeveryintuition,whichleavesnothingleftinhandexceptfor the self-sameness of the mere name.*11* Even the endless repetitions which abound in Heidegger’spublications aretobeascribedlesstohishonestythantoaporetics.Onlythrough the determination can a phenomenon reach beyond itself. What remains completely indeterminate, issaidoverandoveragainasasubstituteforthis,likegestures,whichhaveno affectontheirobjectsofaction,butarerepeatedoverandoveragainasasenselessritual.The philosophyofbeingsharesthisritualofrepetitionwithmythos,whichitwouldhappilybe.
Volte[French:suddenabout-face]121-123
Thedialecticofbeingandtheexistent–thatnobeingcanbethoughtwithouttheexistentandno existent withoutmediation –issuppressedbyHeidegger:themoments,whicharenot,without onebeingmediatedbytheother,aretohimimmediatelytheOne,andthisoneispositivebeing. Butthesumdoesnotcheck.Thedebtor-relationshipofthecategoriesisputontrial.Drivenout by the pitchfork, the existent returns; the being which is purified from the existent is an Ur-phenomenononlyforsolongasitneverthelesshastheexistentinitself,whichitexcludes. Heideggerdealswiththiswithamaster-stroke;itisthematrixofhisthoughtinitsentirety.His philosophylayshandsonthewell-nighindissoluble moment oftheexistent withtheterminus ontological difference. “What in any case istobeunderstoodundersucha‘being’,whichis presumably completely independent of the sphere of the ontic, must remain unsettled. Its determinationwoulddrawitintothedialecticofsubjectandobject,fromwhichitissupposedto beexempted. Inthisindeterminacy,inwhatisprobablythemostcentralplaceofHeideggerian ontology,liesthereasonthattheextremesofbeingandtheexistentmustalsoremainnecessarily indeterminate towardseachother,sothatitcannotevenbesaid,whereintheirdifferencelies. Thetalkofthe‘ontologicaldifference’reducesitselftothetautology,thatbeingwouldnotbethe
48Seetext,VolI,pg78.
existent, because it isbeing.Heideggerconsequently makesthemistake whichhereproaches Western metaphysics for, namely that what being would mean as distinct from the existent, would remain unsaid.”49 Under the breath of philosophy theexistent becomesanontological factual state*12*[Tatbestand], thedimmed andhypostasizedexpressionofthefactthatbeing cansolittlebethoughtwithouttheexistentas,inkeepingwithHeidegger’sfoundingthesis,the existentwithoutbeing.Thereinheexecuteshisvolte[French:suddenabout-face].Theprivation of ontology, which cannot make do without what opposes it, without what is ontic; the dependency of the ontological principle on its counterpart, the inalienable skandalon [Latin: scandal] of ontology, becomes a piece of its inventory. Heidegger’s triumph over other,less canny ontologies is the ontologization of the ontic. That no being is without theexistent, is reduced to the form, that the being of the existent belongs to the essence of being.Therein somethingtrueturnsintountruth:theexistentintoanessence.Beingarrogatestoitselfwhaton theotherhanditwouldnotliketobeinthedimensionofitsbeing-in-itself,oftheexistentwhose conceptual unityalwaysmeansthemeaningofthewordbeinganyway.Theentireconstruction oftheontologicaldifferenceisaPotemkinvillage.Itisconstructedsolelytohavealldoubtsin absolutebeingbrushedasidethatmuchmoresovereignly,bymeansofthethesisoftheexistent asbeing’smodeofbeing.*13*Byreducingeverythingindividuallyexistenttoitsconcept,that oftheontic,whatmakesitintotheexistent,incontrasttotheconcept,consequentlydisappears. Theformalgeneral-conceptualstructureofthetalkoftheonticandallitsequivalentstakesthe place ofthecontent ofthatconcept,whichisheterogenoustowhatisconceptual.Whatmakes this possible is the fact that the concept of the existent – therein not at all dissimilar from Heidegger’scelebratedoneofbeing–isthesameonewhichencompassesthepurelyandsimply non-conceptual, circumscribing what does not exhaust itself intheconcept, withouthowever everexpressingitsdifference fromwhatisencompassed.Because“theexistent”istheconcept for everything existent, the existent becomes itself a concept, an ontological structurewhich mergesseamlessly intothatofbeing.Theontologization oftheexistent isreducedtoitsmost precise formulation in Being and Time: “The ‘essence’ of being-there [Dasein] lies in its existence [Existenz].”50 Theoutcome ofthedefinition ofbeing-there, ofthatwhichexistsqua thatwhichexists,throughtheconceptsbeing-there andexistence, isthatwhatispreciselynot intrinsic in being-there, is not ontological, but would indeed be ontological. The ontological difference is removed by virtue of the conceptualization of what is non-conceptual into non-conceptuality.
MythologyofBeing123-124
Ontologywillceasetobedisturbedbytheontic,onlywhenitisofakindwithit.Thesubreption grounds the precedence of ontology before the ontological difference: “But here it is not a questionofanoppositionbetweenexistentia andessentia, becausebothofthesemetaphysical determinations of being, let alone their relationship, are not even in question.”51 Thatwhich presumablyprecedestheontologicaldifferenceinHeideggerfalls,inspiteoftheassurancetothe contrary, on the side of the essence [Essenz]: bydenyingthedistinction whichexpressesthe concept oftheexistent, theconcept exaltedbywhatisnon-conceptual,whichitissupposedto
have under itself. This becomesclear inanotherpassageofthetract onPlato.Hedirectsthe question of existence away from this and transforms it into one of essence: “Thestatement, ‘Humanityexists’,doesnotanswerthequestion,astowhetherhumanityreallywouldbeornot, butanswersthequestionofthe‘essence’[Wesen]ofhumanity.”52 Thetalkofthe“not-yet”there, wheretheantithesisofexistenceandessenceisrejected,53 isnoaccidentaltemporalmetaphorfor somethingwhichisnon-temporal.Infactitisarchaicthinking,thatoftheIonianHylozoistsfar morethanoftheEleatics; inthesketchyphilosophemeshandeddownbytheformer,existence andessence aremurkilyintermixed. Thelaborandeffortofthemetaphysicsofantiquity,from theParmenidical one,whichhadtoseparate thinkingandbeinginordertobeabletoidentify them,downtotheAristotelianone,consistedofimposingtheseparation[Scheidung].Separation isdemythologization, mythosthedeceptiveunityofwhatisundifferentiated.Becausehowever theinadequacyoftheUr-principlesinexplainingtheworlddenotedthereincauseditsanalytical exegesis [Auseinanderlegung], and thereby caught themagical extra-territoriality ofbeing,as onevagabondbetweenessenceandfactsinthewebofconcepts,Heideggermustforthesakeof the privilege of being condemn the critical labor of the concept as a history of decay, asif philosophy could occupy a historical standpoint beyond history, while it nevertheless on the otherhandissupposedtoobeyahistory,whichisitselfontologizedasexistence.Heideggeris anti-intellectual out of systemic compulsion, anti-philosophical out of philosophy, just as contemporary religious revivals are inspired not by the truth of their teachings but by the philosophythatitwouldbegoodtohavereligion.Thehistoryofthoughtis,howeverfarbackit istraced,adialecticofenlightenment.ThatiswhyHeideggerdoesnothalt,resolutelyenough,at one of its stages, ashemightperhapshavebeentempted toinhisyouth,butplungeswitha Wellesiantime-machineintotheabyssofarchaicism,inwhicheverythingistobeeverythingand can mean everything. He reaches out towards mythos: his own, though, remains one of the twentieth century, theappearance [Schein]whichhistoryunmaskeditas,andwhichbecomes strikinginthecompleteincompatibilityofmythoswiththerationalizedformofreality,inwhich everyconsciousness isdelimited. Itpresumestoamythologicalcondition,asifthiswereeven possible, without itself being the samething.Whatisregistered withHeidegger’sconcept of beingisthemythical oneoffate: “Thearrival oftheexistentrestsinthefateofbeing.”54 The much-praisednon-differentiationofexistenceandessenceinbeingistherebycalledbyname,as whatitis:theblindnessofthenatural context, thedoomofenchaining[Verkettung:chaining, interconnection],theabsolutenegationoftranscendence,whichquaversinthetalkofbeing.The appearance [Schein] in the concept of being is this transcendence; its basis however is that Heidegger’sdeterminations,deductedfrombeing-there,fromthenecessityofrealhumanhistory tothisday,dispensewiththerecollection ofthese.Theybecome momentsofbeingitselfand thereby something preordained [Vorgeordneten] to that existence. Their astral power and splendor is just as cold to the humiliation and fallibility of historical reality, asthislatter is sanctionedasimmutable.Thecelebrationofwhatismeaninglessasmeaningfulismythical;the ritual repetition of natural contexts in symbolic individual actions, as if they were thereby supernatural.Categorieslikefear,whichisatleastnottobestipulated,thatitwouldhavetolast forever, become by means of their transfiguration constituents of being as such, something preordained [Vorgeordnetes] to every existence, their a priori. They install themselves as precisely the “meaning”, which in contemporary socialconditionsisnottobepositively and
The special ontological position of being-there was anticipated by Hegel by means of the idealistic thesisofthepreeminenceofthesubject.Hegelexploitsthefactthatthenon-identical foritspartwouldonlybedetermined asaconcept; itistherebydialecticallyclearedawayfor him,reducedtoidentity: thatwhichisontic,ontological.LinguisticshadingsintheScienceof Logicarequicktobetraythis.Spaceandtimeare,asthethirdnoteto“Becoming”expoundsin reference to Jacobi, “expressly determined as indeterminate, which–inordertoreturntoits simplest form – is being. Precisely this indeterminacy is however what makes out its determination; forindeterminacy isopposedtodeterminacy; itistherewithaswhatisopposed itselfthedeterminate, orthenegative, andindeedthepure,completely abstractnegative.This indeterminacy orabstract negation, whichbeingthushasinitself,iswhatexternal aswellas inner reflection expresses, in that it equates it with nothingness, declares it as an empty thought-figure [Gedankending],asnothingness.–Oronemayexpressit,thatbecausebeingis that which is devoid ofdetermination, itisnotthe(affirmative) determinacy,whichitis,not being,butnothingness.”55 Indeterminacyistacitlyusedasasynonymfortheindeterminate.That whichitisaconceptofdisappearsinitsconcept;itbecomesequatedtotheindeterminateasits determination, andthispermitstheidentification oftheindeterminatewithnothing.Thereinin truththeabsoluteidealismisalreadypresupposed,whichlogicwouldhavetoprove.Something similaristrueofHegel’srefusaltobeginwiththesomethinginsteadofwithbeing.Trivial,that thenon-identical isnoimmediacy,thatitismediated. ButHegelfailstodojusticetohisown insightatcentralpoints.Itsays,thenon-identicalwouldindeedbeidentical–asitselfsomething mediated –butneverthelessnon-identical,theOtherinregardtoallitsidentifications.Hedoes notcarryoutthedialecticofthenon-identical,whilehehoweverhastheintentionelsewhereof defendingthepre-criticaltermofspeechagainstthatofreflection-philosophy.Hisownconcept ofthenon-identical,tohimthevehicleforturningitintotheidentical,intoself-sameness,hasits inalienablecontentinitsopposite;thatiswhyhehurriedlybrushesthisaway.Whatheexpressly establishedinthetextondifference,inordertoimmediatelyintegrateitintohisownphilosophy, turns into the weightiest objection against this. Hegel’s absolute system, which reliesonthe perennialresistanceofthenon-identical,negatesitself,againstitsownself-understanding.Truly noidentity iswithoutthenon-identical, whilethisformer,assomethingtotal,ascribestoitself ontological preeminence inhiswork.Theelevation ofthemediatedness[Vermitteltheit]ofthe non-identical intoitsabsoluteconceptualbeingassistsittherein.Insteadoftheorybringingthe indissoluble to what is its own in concepts, it swallows it by subsumption underitsgeneral concept, that of indissolubility. The necessary condition of being related [Verwiesensein] of identity to the non-identical, as Hegel nearly achieved it, is the objection against all identity-philosophy.TheAristoteleancategoryofsteresisbecomesitstrumpcardanditsdoom. What necessarily diverges from the abstract concept: that it is not capable of being the non-conceptual itself,heaccountsforasamerit, assomethinghigher,asSpirit,incontrastto what it is forcibly abstracted from. What is lesser is supposed tobetruer,aslater oninthe self-justifying Heideggerian ideology of the magnificence of simplicity. The apology for scantinessishowevernotmerelyoneforathinkingwhichhasoncemoreshrunktoapoint,but
55Hegel,WW4,pg110.
has its precise ideological function. The affectation of noble simplicity, which warms to the dignity of poverty and of the frugal life, suits the continuing absurdity of real scarcity in a society,whosestateofproductionnolongerpermitstheappealthattherearesimplynotenough goodstogoaround.Byflirting withtheRhenishHomeCompanion,philosophy,barredbyits ownconceptfromunnaivete,helpsitaroundthis:initshistoryofbeing,scarcitygleamsasthat whichishigherpureandsimple,orattheveryleastadkalendasGraecus[Latin:thefirstofthe month,bytheGreekcalendar].AlreadyinHegel,whatresultedthroughabstractioncountedas themoresubstantial.Hetreatsthematerialaccordingtothesametopos,eveninthetransitionto existence.56 Because its concept wouldbeindeterminate, lacking asconcept precisely whatis meant by it, all light is shed on its form. Hegel fits this into Western metaphysics, at its outermostlimits. Engelssawthis,butdrewthereversed,equallyundialecticalconclusion,that the material would be the first being.57 The concept of first being itself deserves dialectical critique. HeideggerrepeatstheHegelian sleight-of-hand maneuver.Onlythelatter practicedit openly,whileHeidegger,whowishestobenoidealist,nebulouslyconcealstheontologizationof theontic.Themainspring,however,whichgarbswhatislessintheconcept asitsmore,isin eachcasetheoldPlatonic denial, thatthenon-sensible wouldbethehigher.Logicsublimates thatasceticidealtotheextremeandatthesametimefetishizesit,devoidofthetensionwiththe sensible, in which the ascetic ideal has its truth against the deception of its franchised [konzessionierter:licensed]fulfillment.Theconcept,whichbecomespurebyelbowingasideits content,secretlyfunctionsasthemodelofanarrangementoflifewherein,inspiteofallprogress oftheapparatus–towhichtheconceptcorresponds–atnopricemaypovertybeeliminated.If ontology were at all somehow possible, then ironically, as the epitome of negativity What remainsequivalenttoitself,pureidentity,iswhatisbad;mythicaldoomistimeless.Philosophy was, as its secularization, its slave, in that it reinterpreted the immutable as the good with giganticeuphemisms,allthewaytothetheodiciesofLeibnizandHegel.Ifonewishedtodraw upanontologyandtherebyfollowthebasicmatter-at-hand,whoserepetitionmakesitintoan invariant,thenitwouldbehorror Anontologyofculturewouldaboveallhavetotakeup,where culture at large failed. Philosophically legitimate ontology would have its place more in the construction of the culture-industry than in that of being;good,onlythatwhichhasescaped ontology.
FunctionoftheConceptoftheExistent128-130
Theontologization oftheonticistheprimaryaimofthedoctrineofexistence.Sincethislast, after the age-old argument, cannot be deduced out of the essence, itissupposedtobeitself essential.ExistenceisraiseduphigherthanKierkegaard’smodel,buttherebybluntedincontrast tothelatter.EventheBiblicalsentence,thatbytheirfruitsyeshallknowthem,resoundsinthe temple of existence like its profanation and must fall silent. Existence no longer stands antitheticaltotheconceptofbeing’smodeofbeing,whatispainfulinitisremoved.Itreceives the dignity of the Platonic idea, but also the bulletproof nature of what cannot be thought
differently,becauseitisnotsomethingthoughtbutwouldsimplybethere.ThereinHeidegger and Jaspers concur. The latter guilelessly confesses the neutralization of existence against Kierkegaard:“I…feltinhisnegativedecisions…theoppositeofeverything,whichIlovedand wished,whichIwasreadyandnotreadytodo.”58 EvenJasperlianexistentialism,whichdidnot allowitselftobeinfectedbythepatersubtilis[Latin:paternaldistinction]intheconstructionof the concept of being,understooditselffromtheverybeginningasthe“inquiryintobeing”;59 bothcould,withoutbeinguntruetothemselves,makethesignofthecrossbeforewhatinParis, inthesignofexistence,drovealltoorashlyforitstastefromthelecture-roomsintothebistros60 andtheremadeitselfsoundfarlessrespectable.Tobesure,aslongascritiqueremainsstanding by the thesis of the non-ontologizability of the ontic, it is itself merely a judgement over invariantstructuralrelationships,tooontological,asitwere;thatwasthephilosophicalmotiveof Sartre’s turn towardspolitics. Themovement aftertheSecondWorldWar,whichcalled itself existentialist andstageditselfasanavant-garde,hadsomethingpowerless,somethingshadowy about it. Existentialism, which the German establishment suspectsofbeingsubversive,hasa likeness tothebeardsofitsfollowers.Theycostumethemselves asoppositional, theyouthas cave-people, whonolongerplayalongwiththeswindleofculture, whiletheyarereallyonly donningtheout-of-fashionemblemsofpatriarchaldignityoftheirgrandfathers.Whatistruein theconcept ofexistence istheobjection againstacondition ofsocietyandscientificthinking, whichvirtually drivesouttheunregimented experience, thesubjectasamomentofcognition. Kierkegaard’s protest against philosophy was also oneagainstthereified consciousness from which,inhiswords,subjectivityhasgoneout:againstphilosophyhealsoperceiveditsinterest. ThisrepeatsitselfanachronisticallyintheexistentialistschoolsinFrance.Themeanwhilereally disempowered and internally weakened subjectivity is isolated and – complementary to the Heideggerian hypostasis of itscounter-pole,thatofbeing–hypostasized. Thedivisionofthe subject proceeds no differently from that of being, unmistakable in the Sartre of Being and Nothingness,towardstheillusionoftheimmediacyofwhatismediated.Asmediatedasbeingis bytheconceptandthereinbythesubject,somediatedis,inthereversecase,thesubjectbythe world in which it lives, so powerless and merely internalized too is its decision. Such powerlessnesspermitsthevictoryofthethinglybadstateofaffairs[dinghafteUnwesen]overthe subject. The concept of existence impressed many as an approach to philosophy, because it seemedtobindtogetherwhatisdivergent:thereflectiononthesubject,whichwouldconstitute every cognition andtherebyeverything existent, andtheconcrete individuation, immediate to every individual subject, to its experience. The divergence of both irritated the subjective approachasawhole:theconstitutive subjectcallsdownthereproachthatitwouldbemerely deduced from the empirical and hence of no use in grounding it and any other empirical existence [Dasein]; to thatwhichisindividuated [Individuum],thatitwouldbeanaccidental pieceoftheworldandwouldlacktheessentialnecessity,whichitrequiresinordertoencompass theexistentandifpossibletoproduceit.Existenceor,indemagogicjargon,humanity[Mensch], appearstobeasgeneral, theessence commontoallhumanbeings,asspecific,insofarasthis generality can neither be imagined nor even thought through otherwise than in its particularization, the determinate individuality. Before all cognitive critique however, in the simplestreflectionontheconceptofhumanityinintentionerecta[Latin:initscorrectintention],
thisEurekalosesitsstatusasevidence.Whathumanityis,isnottobepresumed.Itisnowadays merefunction,unfree,regressingbehindeverythingwithwhichitisstampedasinvariant,beit even the defenseless neediness on which many anthropologists swear. It carries along the disfigurementswhichitexperiencedovermillenniaasasociallegacy.Iftheessenceofhumanity weredeciphered fromitscontemporary constitution,thenthiswouldsabotageitspossibility.A so-called historical anthropology would scarcely suffice any longer. Itwouldindeedhavean insight into thenatureofcomingtobeandconditionality,butwouldshufflethisoffontothe subjects,undertheabstractionofthedehumanization,whichmadethemintowhattheyare,and whichcontinuestobetolerated inthenameofaqualitas humana[Latin:humanquality].The moreconcretelyanthropologyappears,themoredeceptiveitbecomes,indifferenttowardsthatin human beings which is by no means grounded within them as the subject but rather in the process of desubjectivization, which since time immemorial ran parallel with the historical formation of the subject. The thesis of arrivierter [French: new-fangled] anthropology, that humanity wouldbeopen–seldomdoesitlacktheinvidiousside-glanceatanimals–isempty; theypassofftheirownindeterminacy,theirfallissement[French:archaictermforbankruptcy]as somethingdeterminateandpositive.Existenceisamoment,notthewhole,againstwhichitwas thoughtupandfromwhich,oncesevered,itseizedtheunredeemablepretensionofthewholeas soon as it stylized itself asphilosophy.Thatitcannotbesaid,whathumanity really is,isno especiallysublimeanthropologybutavetoagainsteverysort.
“Existenceontologicalinitself”130-131
While Kierkegaard nominalistically plays off existence against essence, as the weapon of theologyagainstmetaphysics,existence,theimmediateindividual,istohimconsideredendowed withmeaningfulness, quiteinkeepingwiththedogmathatthepersonismadeintheimageof God. He polemicizes against ontology, but the existent, astheexistence of“that individual”, sucks its attributes dry The initial reflections of Sickness Unto Death do not characterize existence all that much differently from itsexaltation inBeingandTime;theKierkegaardian “transparency”ofthesubject,consciousness,isthelegaltitleforitsontologization:“Beingitself, towhichtheexistentconductsitselfassuch-and-suchandalwayssomehowconductsitself,we call existence”,61 or literally: “Existence [Dasein] is on the grounds of its existential determination‘ontological’initself.”62 Theconceptofsubjectivityiridescentlyshimmersnoless thanthatofbeingandthusistobeattunedtothelatteranywhichway.Itsambiguitypermitsthe existent to be equated to being’s mode of beingandthusanalyzes theontological difference away. Existence [Dasein] is then called ontic, by virtue of its spatio-temporal individuation, ontologicalasthelogos.WhatisdubiousinHeidegger’sinferencefromtheexistentintobeingis that“atthesametime”,whichhistalkofthe“multiplepreeminence”of“being-there”[Dasein] “beforeallotherexistents”implies.Thefactthatthesubjectisdeterminedbyconsciousnessdoes notmeanthatwhatconsciousnesscannotbedetachedfromistotallyconsciousness,transparent, “ontological”. No something, only propositions could be at all ontological. That which is individuated, which has consciousness, and whose consciousness would not be without it, remainsspatio-temporal,facticity,existent;notbeing.Thesubjectlieshiddeninbeing,foritisa concept, notimmediatelygiven:theparticularhumanconsciousnesshoweverlieshiddeninthe subjectandtherebythatwhichisontic.Thatthisexistentcanthink,doesnotsufficetostripitof
To be critiqued is not merely thefactthattheontological concept ofexistence extirpates the non-conceptual, by exalting it to its concept, but also the positional value which the non-conceptual moment thereby conquers. Nominalism, one of the roots of existential philosophy of the Protestant Kierkegaard, endows Heideggerian ontology with the attractive power of what is not speculative. Just as that which exists is falsely conceptualized in the concept ofexistence, sotooisthatwhichexistsascribedacomplementarypreeminencebefore the concept, from which the ontological concept of existence once more profits. If what is individuated issocially mediated appearance [Schein],sotooareitsepistemological formsof reflection. Why the individual consciousness of every speaking person, which already presupposesalinguisticgeneralityintheparticle“my”,whichitdeniesthroughtheprimacyof itsparticularity,issupposedtobepriortoanythingelse,isunfathomable;thesheercontingency, whichimpelsittocommencewiththeconsciousness,inwhichitjusthappenedtogrowup,turns intoagroundsofnecessity forit.AsHegelsawearlyon,thelimitationofthe“my”impliesa priori the relation to that other, which was supposed to be excluded. Society is prior to the subject.Thatitmistakesitselfasanexistentpriortosocietyisitsnecessarydeceptionandsays somethingmerely negative aboutsociety Inthe“my”thepropertyrelationshipislinguistically perpetuated, hasallbutbecome alogical form.Withoutthemomentofthegeneral,whichthe “my” points to by distinguishing itself from it, the pure tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here]isasabstractasthegeneralitywhichtheisolatedtodetiscoldsasemptyandnugatory ThephilosophicalpersonalismofKierkegaard,andperhapsalsoitsBuberianoffshoot,sensesthe latent chance of metaphysics in nominalism; however, consistent Enlightenment recoils into mythologyattheplace whereitabsolutizes nominalism,insteadofdialecticallypenetratingits thesis–there,whereitbreaksoffthereflectioninthebeliefofsomethingultimatelygiven.Such a cessation of reflection, the positivistic pride in one’s own naivete, is nothing other than non-reflectiveself-preservation,turnedintoarecalcitrantconcept.
ExistenceAuthoritarian132-134
Theconcept ofthatwhichisexistential[Existentielle],thoughHeideggerpreferstothealready ontologizedexistential[Existential]ofbeing-therequabeing,isgovernedbytheconceptionthat themeasureofthetruthwouldnotbeanysortofobjectivity,butthepurebeing-soandacting-so ofthethinker.Thesubjectivereasonofthepositivistsisennobled,bystrippingawayitsmoment of reason. Jaspers unceremoniously joined Kierkegaard in this respect; though Heidegger’s objectivism hardlysubscribestothepropositionthatsubjectivity wouldbethetruth,thisrings through however intheanalysis oftheexistential inBeingandTime.Whatcontributed toits Germanpopularity wasthefactthattheradical poseandthesacredtonecouldberecombined into the newly-minted ideology of a person who was authentic and rocksolid [Kernigen], qualities which individuals in the spirit [Geist] of privilege reserve for themselves with sly dim-wittedness. If subjectivity dissolves solidified preordained substances by its – in Kant’s term,functional–essence,itsontologicalaffirmationassuagesthefearofthese.Subjectivity,the
functional concept kat’hexochên [Greek:whatispreeminent,whatleads],becomessomething absolutelysolid,aswasalreadybythewaypresupposedinKant’sdoctrineofthetranscendental unity.Buttruth,theconstellationofsubjectandobject,inwhichbothpenetrateeachother,isas little to be reduced to subjectivity, as in the reverse case to that being, whose dialectical relationship to subjectivity Heidegger attempts to erase. What istrueinthesubjectdevelops itselfinrelation towhatitisitselfnot,bynomeansthroughtheone-uppingaffirmationofits being-so.Hegelknewthis,buttheschoolofrepristinationabhorsit.Ifthetruthreallywerein factsubjectivity,ifthethoughtreallywerenothingbuttherepetitionofthesubject,thenitwould benugatory.Theexistentialexaltationofthesubjecteliminatesthis,forthesakeofwhatcould ariseinit.Ittherebydeliversitselfovertorelativism,overwhichitthinksitselftobesuperior, and brings the subject down to its impenetrable contingency. Such irrational existentialism poundsitschestandscapegoatsintellectuals,byconfessingitselftobeone:“Butthephilosopher bravesthetalk,thatthereisnoobjectivedistinctionbetweengenuine,philosophicallyoriginary speaking[Sprechen]andemptyintellectuality.While humanity astheResearcher[derMensch als Forscher] always has generally valid criteria for its results and has itssatisfaction inthe inescapability of their validity, it has as the Philosopher [er als Philosoph] only the ever-subjective criterion of its own being to distinguish empty speaking from existence-awakening speaking. Hencetheethosoftheoretical endeavorinthesciences andin philosophyisdifferentatitsveryroot.”63 Excludingwhatisotherfromit,whichithasdispensed with, existence, whichproclaims itselfwilly-nilly asthecriterion ofthought,thussecuresthe validityofitsdecreesinauthoritarianfashion,justasthepoliticalpraxisofdictatorsdoestothe world-viewoftheday Throughthereduction ofthoughttothethinker,itscourse,inwhichit wouldfirstbecome thoughtandinwhichalonesubjectivity wouldlive,isbroughttoahalt.It becomesreifiedasthethreshed-outgroundsoftruth.Thiscouldalreadybeheardintheringof the old-fashionedwordpersonalism. Thinkingmakesitselfintowhatthethinkerisalready in advance, into a tautology, into a form of regressive consciousness. The utopian potential of thoughtwouldbe,rather,thatthought,mediated throughthereasonincorporatedinindividual subjects, wouldbreakthroughthenarrownessofthethinker.Itisitsbestpower,tosurpassthe weak and fallible thinker. It is hamstrung – since Kierkegaard to obscurantist ends–bythe existentialconceptoftruth,propagatingprovincialismasthepowertotruth;thatiswhythecult ofexistenceblossomsintheprovincesofallcountries.
“Historicity”134-136
Ontology has long cashiered theoppositionoftheconcept ofexistence againstidealism. The existent, which was once supposed totestifyagainstthesanctity oftheideamadebyhuman beings,isoutfittedwiththemuchmoreambitioussanctityofbeingitself.Itsetherennoblesitin advance in contrasttotheconditionsofmaterial existence, whichKiekegaard meant withthe “moment”,whenheconfrontedtheideawithexistence.Throughtheabsorptionoftheconceptof existenceintobeing,indeedalreadybyitsphilosophicalpreparationtoageneralconceptworthy ofdiscussion,thathistoryisoncemorespiritedawaywhich,inKierkegaard,whodidnotregard theLeftHegeliansasinsignificant,brokeintothespeculationunderthesignoftheology,inthe paradoxical touching of time and eternity. The ambivalence of the doctrine of being: that it simultaneously deals with the existent, and ontologizes it, thus expropriating it of all its nonconceptuality byrecoursetoitscharacteristica formalis[Latin:formalcharacteristics],also
63Jaspers,Philosophy,ibid.pg264.
determines its relationship to history.*14* On the one hand the salt of what is historical is removedbyitstranspositionintotheexistentialofhistoricity,theclaimofallprimaphilosophia [Latin: originary philosophy] extended to a doctrine of invariants over that which varies: historicitybringshistorytoahaltintheunhistorical,heedlessofthehistoricalconditions,which undergird the inner composition and constellation of the subject and object.*15* This then permitstheverdict oversociology.Itisdistorted,aspreviouslyHusserl’spsychology,intothe relativization extraneous to the thing itself, which would damage the upstanding labor of thought:asifrealhistorywerenotstoredupinthecoreofeverythingwhichistobecognized;as ifeverycognitionwhichseriouslyresistsreificationwouldnotbringparalyzedthingsintoflux, preciselytherebybecomingawareofthehistoryinthem.Ontheotherhandtheontologizationof historyonceagainpermitsthepowerofbeingtobeascribedtoindiscriminatehistoricalpower, andtherebytojustifythesubjugationtohistorical situations, asifitwerethebehestofbeing itself. Karl Löwith has highlighted thisaspectoftheHeideggerian viewofhistory.*16*That historycanaccordinglybeignoredordeifiedasneedbe,isapracticalpoliticalconsequenceof thephilosophyofbeing.Timeitself,andtherebytransience,isbothtransfiguredandabsolutized bytheexistential-ontological draftsaseternal.Theconceptofexistence,astheintrinsicalityof transience,ofthetemporalityofthetemporal,keepsexistenceatbaybyitsnaming.Oncetreated as a phenomenological problem-title, then it is already integrated. These are the latest consolationsofphilosophy,akindofmythicaleuphemism;thefalselyresurrectedbelief,thatthe baneofwhatisnaturalwouldbetherebybroken,bysoothinglyimitatingit.Existentialthought crawls into the cave of a long-past mimesis. Therein it accommodates nonetheless the most catastrophicprejudiceofthehistoryofphilosophy,whichitlaidofflikeasuperfluousemployee, namely thePlatonic one,thatwhatisimperishablemustbethegood;whichsaysnothingmore than, whoever is currently mightier in a permanent state ofwarisright.IfPlato’spedagogy meanwhilecultivatedthemartialvirtues,thesewerehoweveranswerableintheGorgiasdialogue to the highest idea of all, to that of justice. But in the darkened heavens of the doctrine of existence nostarshinesanymore.Existenceissanctifiedwithoutthatwhichsanctifies.Nothing isleftoftheeternal idea,whichtheexistent istoshareorthroughwhichitissupposedtobe conditioned,butthenakedaffirmationofwhatitisanyway:theaffirmationofpower.
GuentherAnders(TheAntiquationofHumanity,Munich1961,Pg.186,220,326,andaboveall: “OnthePseudo-ConcretenessofHeidegger’sPhilosophy”,in:Philos.&Phenomenol.Research, Vol.VIII,Nr.3,pg.337)criticizedthepseudo-concreityoffundamentalontologyyearsago.The word concretion, chargedwiththeutmostaffectintheGermanphilosophybetweenthewars, wassaturated withthespiritofitstime.ItsmagicemployedthatfeatureoftheHomericnekia, where Odysseus, in order to get theshadowstotalk,feedsthemwithblood.Presumably the effectiveness of “bloodandsoil”wasnotreally basedontheappeal totheorigin.Theironic overtonewhichaccompaniedtheformulafromthebeginningbetrayedtheconsciousnessofthe threadbareappearanceofthearchaicundertheconditionsofhighcapitalistproduction.Eventhe BlackCorpssnickeredatthebeardsoftheancient Teutons.Thetemptation oftheappearance [Schein]oftheconcrete was,rather,somethingnotexchangeable,notfungible.Thatphantasm aroseinthemiddle ofaworlddrivingitselftowardsmonotony;aphantasm,becauseitdidnot touchthegroundoftheexchange-relationship;otherwisethosewholongedforitwouldhavefelt quitethreatenedbywhattheycalledlevelingout,theprinciple,unknowntothem,ofcapitalism, whichtheyaccusedtheiropponentsof.Theobsessionwiththeconcept oftheconcretebound itselfupwiththeincapacitytoachieveitinthought.Theconjuringwordreplacedthething.To besureHeidegger’sphilosophystillemployed thepseudosofthatkindofconcretion;because tode ti [Greek: individual thing, this-here] and ousia [Greek: substance] would be indistinguishable, he equates, as was already projected in Aristoteles, one with the other, according totheneedandthema probandum[Latin: theme tobeproven].Themerelyexistent becomessomethingnugatory,ridofthedefectofbeingtheexistent,raisedtobeing,itsownpure concept.Beingbycontrast,byexcludingeverydelimitingcontent,nolongerneedstoappearasa concept,butcountsimmediatelyasthetodeti[Greek:individualthing,this-here]:concrete.Both moments,onceabsolutely isolated, havenodifferentia specifica [Latin: specific difference] in relation to one another and become exchangeable; this quid pro quo is a central feature of Heidegger’sphilosophy.
*07*[Footnotepg85]
Heexpounds,inthephenomenologicalfundamentalconsiderationsoftheIdeas,hismethodasa structureofoperations,withoutdeducingit.Thecapricetherebyconceded,whichhewishedto removeonlyinhislatephase,isunavoidable.Iftheprocedurewastobededuced,itwouldreveal itself as being that “from above”, that it at no price wished to be. It would violate that quasi-positivistic“tothethingsthemselves”.Theselattermeanwhilebynomeansnecessitatethe phenomenological reductions,whichforthatreasonassumetheformofsomethingpositedany whichway.Inspiteofallthepreserved“jurisdiction[Rechtsprechung]ofreason”theyleadto irrationalism.
*08*[Footnotepg109-110]
Thesubject-objectrelationinthejudgement,assomethingpurelylogical,andtherelationshipof subject and object, as something epistemological-material, are first of all to be strictly distinguished; the terminus subject means something almost contradictory in the former and latter.Inthetheoryofjudgementitisthebasicassumptiononwhichsomethingispredicated;in contrasttotheactofjudgementandthatwhichisjudgedinthesynthesisofthejudgement,ina certain sense the objectivity by which thinking is confirmed. Epistemologically however the subjectmeansthethought-function,manytimesoveralsothatexistentwhichthinksandwhichis tobeexcludedfromtheconceptoftheIonlyatthepricethatitceasestomean,whatitmeans. Butthisdistinctioninvolvesinspiteofeverythingaclosekinshipofwhatisdistinguished.The constellation ofamatter-at-handfoundinthejudgement –inthelanguageofphenomenology, “thatwhichisjudgedassuch”–andthesynthesis,whichisbasedonthatmatter-at-hand,justas much as it produces it, is a reminder of the material one of the subject and object. These differentiate themselves similarly,arenottobereducedtothepureidentity oftheoneorthe otherside,andconditioneachothertherereciprocally,becausenoobjectisdeterminablewithout the determination which makes it into such, the subject, and because no subject can think anythingwhichitcannotconfront,notexcepting eventhesubjectitself:thinkingischainedto theexistent.Theparallelbetweenlogicandepistemologyismorethanamereanalogy.Thepure logical relationship between matter-at-hand and synthesis, which would know space-time facticityirregardlessofexistence,isintruthanabstractionofthesubject-objectrelation.Thisis whattheviewpointofpurethinkingfocuseson,neglectingallparticularonticmatters-at-hand, without this abstraction having any power however over the something which occupies the empty place of substantiality, and which indeed meanssomethingsubstantial, nomatter how generally this is named, only becoming whatititselfmeansthroughwhatissubstantial. The methodologicalprocedureoftheabstractionhasitslimitinthemeaningofwhatitwishestohold in hand as pure form. The trace of the existent is inextinguishable in the formal-logical “something”.TheformSomethingisformedaccordingthemodelofthematerial,ofthetodeti [Greek:individualthing,this-here];itistheformofthematerialandinsofarrequiresthatwhich is metalogical according to its own purely logical meaning, for which the epistemological reflectionstroveasthecounter-poleofthought.
*09*[Footnotepg113]
“Beingasthefundamentalthemeofphilosophyisnospeciesofanexistent,andyetitconcerns every existent. Its ‘universality’ is to be sought higher. Being and the structure of being lie beyond every existent and every possible existing determination of an existent. Being isthe transcendens [Latin: what transcends] pure and simple. The transcendence of being as being-there [Daseins]isadistinctively superiorone,insofarasthepossibilityandnecessityof the most radical individuation lies in it. Every disclosure of being as transcendens [Latin: transcendental]istranscendentalcognition.Phenomenologicaltruth(thedisclosednessofbeing) is veritas transcendentalis [Latin: transcendental truth].” (Heidegger, Being and Time,6.Ed., Tübingen1949,Pg.38)
*10*[Footnotepg114]
That in spite of its contact with Hegel it detours around the dialectic, lendsittheappeal of achieved transcendence. Bulletproof against the dialectical reflection, though incessantly touching onit,itrunsitshouseholdaccording totraditional logicandchargesitself,afterthe
model of the predicative judgement, with upholding the character of solidity and unconditionality of that which would be merely a moment to dialectical logic.Forexample, according toaninitial formulation (seeHeidegger,BeingandTime,op.cit.pg13),being-there [Dasein]issupposedtobethatwhichisontic,thatwhichisexisting,whichhasthe–secretly paradoxical –advantage ofbeingontological.Being-thereisaGermanandashamedvariantof subject.ItdidnotescapeHeidegger,thatitisasmuchtheprincipleofmediationasunmediated, that astheconstituens [Latin: whatconstitutes] itpresupposestheconstitutum [Latin: whatis constituted], facticity.Thematter-at-handisdialectical; Heideggertranslates itatanycostinto thelogicofnon-contradictoriness.Outofthemutuallycontradictorymomentsofthesubject,two attributes are made, which he attaches to it as though to a substance. This however is of assistance to the ontological dignity: the undeveloped contradiction becomes the surety of somethinghigherinitself,becauseitdoesnotfollowtheconditionsofdiscursivelogic,inwhose languageitistranslated.Bymeansofthisprojectionthesubstancecalledbeingissupposedtobe something positive, as far beyond the concept as beyond the fact. Such positivity could not withstanditsdialecticalreflection.Thesesortsofschemataarethetopoi[Greek:place,position] of fundamental ontology in its entirety. It derivestranscendence beyondthinkingasmuchas beyond facts from the fact that dialectical structures are expressed and hypostasized undialectically,asiftheyweresimplytobenamed.
*11*[Footnotepg121]
“Theexcessofobjectivity,whichit”–being–“isascribed,allowsthistoappearinitscomplete emptiness:‘asemptyopinionofeverythingpureandsimply’.Onlybymeansofaquidproquo–specifically,thatmodernontologysubmergesthemeaning,whichcomestowardsbeingaswhat ismeant, underit–doesbeingmeananythingwithouttheopinion-forming subject.Arbitrary subdivision, therefore subjectivity, thereby proves to be its principale vitale [French: vital principle]. Ontologyisnotcapableofconceptualizingbeingotherthanfromtheexistent,butit suppresses exactly this conditionality.” (Karl Heinz Haag, Critique of Modern Ontology, Stuttgart,pg.69)
*12*[Footnotetopage122]
Heidegger’s doctrine of the privileging of being-there over the ontic, which would be simultaneously ontological; ofthepresenceofbeing,hypostasizesbeingfromthestart.Onlyif being, as he wishes it, became independent as something which precedes being-there, does being-therereceivethattransparencyofbeingwhichthisisneverthelesssupposedtouncover.To this extent toothepresumedovercoming ofsubjectivism issurreptitious. Despite Heidegger’s reductiveplanthedoctrineofthetranscendenceofbeingservedtooncemoresmuggleprecisely the ontological primacy of subjectivity into the existent, which the language of fundamental ontology abjures. Heidegger was being consistent when he later changed the course of the analysis of being-there in the sense of the undiminished primacy of being, which cannotbe groundedintheexistent,becauseaccordingtohimbeingsimplyisnot.Therebyeverythingfell bythewayside,tobesure,whichmadehimeffective,butthateffecthadalreadypassedintothe authorityofthelaterworks.
*13*[Footnotetopage123]
“…unless it otherwise belonged to the truth of being, that being never essences [west: Heideggerian neologism based on archaic verb “wesen”, literally “to essence”] without the
“Onlytheexistent,whichisintrinsicallyfuture-orientedinitsbeing,sothatitcanbefreeforits death,shattering onthisbyletting itselfbethrownbackontoitsfactical‘there’,thatistosay onlytheexistent, whichassomethingfuture-oriented hasbeenequi-originary,can,byhanding down to itself the inherited possibility, overtake its own thrownness [Geworfenheit] and be momentarily of‘itstime’. Onlyauthentic temporality,whichisatthesametimefinite,makes somethinglikefate,thatistosayauthentic historicity possible.” (Heidegger,BeingandTime, ibid.Pg385).
*15*[Footnotetopage135]
Fundamental ontology convicts itself of ahistorical andsocialmoment initslinguistic form, whichisnotforitsparttobereducedinturntothepureessentia[Latin:essence]ofhistoricity. The linguistic-critical findings of Jargon of Authenticity are for that reason those against philosophicalcontent.ThesheerrandomnesswhichHeideggersmugglesintotheconceptofthe draft, the immediate legacy of phenomenology since its transition to a material discipline, becomes flagrant in the results: the specific determinations of being-there and existence in Heidegger,whichhecreditstotheconditionhumaine[French:humancondition]andconsiders thekeyofatruedoctrine ofbeing,arenotasstringentasheposits,butdeformedbywhatis contingentlyprivate.Thefalsetonedrownsthisout,andbydoingsotherebyconfessesit.
*16*[Footnotetopage135]
“Thequotationmarks,bywhichHeideggermarks‘itstime’intheabovecitation,arepresumably toindicate thatitisnotdealing withanysortofrandom‘deployment’ [Einsatz: commitment, operation]toamomentary,up-to-date,urgentlypressing‘today’,butwiththedecisivetimeofan authentic moment, whose decisive character results from the distinction between vulgar and existentialtimeandhistory.Buthowcanoneunequivocallydistinguishinagivencase,whether time is an ‘originary’ moment or only a pressing ‘today’ in the course and trajectory of world-events?Thedecisiveness,whichdoesnotknowwhatithasdecided,providesnoanswer. Ithasalreadyhappenedmorethanonce,thatthosewhoareresolutehavecommittedthemselves tosomething,whichwasclaimedtobefatefulanddecisive,andyetwasmerelyvulgarandnot worththesacrifice.Howcanonedraw,whileinsideathoroughlyhistoricalthinking,theborders between ‘authentic’ history and that which happens ‘vulgarly’, and be abletounequivocally distinguishbetweentheself-chosendestinyandthenon-chosenvicissitudes,whichbefallhuman beings or lure [verfuehren] them into a momentary choice anddecision? Andhasnotvulgar history clearly enough revenged itself for Heidegger’s contempt for today’s merely extant existence [Vorhandene], when it lured him in a vulgarly decisive moment to take on the leadership oftheFreiburguniversityunderHitlerandtotransportthemostauthentic,decisive being-thereintoa‘Germanbeing-there’,inordertopracticetheontologicaltheoryofexistential historicity ontheonticgroundoftrulyhistorical,thatistosaypoliticalevents?”(KarlLöwith, Heidegger,ThinkerinNeedyTimes,FrankfurtamMain1953,Pg.49)
PartII.NegativeDialectics:ConceptandCategories
IndissolubilityoftheSomething139-140
Nobeing[Sein]withoutexistents [Seiendes]. TheSomethingasthenecessarysubstrateofthe concept inthinking,alsothatofbeing,istheutmostabstraction –nottobeabolishedbyany furtherthought-process–ofwhatissubstantive,whichisnotidenticalwiththought;withoutthe Something, formal logic cannot be thought. It is not to be purified of its metalogical rudiment.*17*Thatsubstantivewhichtheformofwhatisatlarge[Überhaupt]inthoughtwould like to shake off, the supposition of its absolute form, is illusionary. Constitutive towhatis substantive [Sachhaltiges] for the form is above all the substantial experience of what is substantive. Correlatively, the pure concept, the function of thought, is not to be radically separated at the subjective counter-pole from the existent “I”. The prôtou pseudos [Greek: proto-falsity]ofidealismsinceFichtewasthatthemovementoftheabstractionwouldpermitthe discardingofwhatisabstractedfrom.Itiseliminatedfromthought,exiledfromthelatter’shome domain,notannihilatedinitself;thebeliefinthisismagical.Thinkingwithoutwhatisthought wouldcountermanditsownconceptandthatwhichisthoughtindicatesinadvancetheexistents, which were supposed to be posited inthefirstplace byabsolutethinking: asimplehosteron proteron [Greek:whatisafteriswhatisbefore].Thiswouldremain offensivetothelogicof non-contradictoriness;solelydialecticscancomprehenditintheself-critiqueoftheconcept.Itis objectivelycausedbyepistemology,bythecontentofwhatisdiscussedinthecritiqueofreason, andforthatreasonsurvivesthedownfallofidealism,whichculminatedinit.Thethoughtleads tothemomentofidealism,whichiscontrarytothis;itdoesnotpermititselftobedissolvedback intothethought.TheKantianconceptionstillpermitteddichotomiessuchasthatbetweenform andcontent,subjectandobject,withoutbeingputoffbythemutualmediatedness[Vermittelheit] of the opposing pairs;itdidnotnotice itsdialectical essence, thecontradiction implied inits meaning. It was Heidegger’s teacher Husserl who so sharpened the idea of a priori-ty that, againsthiswillasmuchasHeidegger’s,thedialecticoftheeidê[Greek:form,kind]wastobe derived from its own claim.64 If dialectics has however become inescapable, then it cannot remaingluedtoitsprinciplelikeontologyandtranscendentalphilosophy,asapivotalstructure, howevermodifiable.Thecritiqueofontologydoesnotaimatanyotherontology,norevenatone whichisnon-ontological.OtherwiseitwouldmerelypositanOtheraswhatissimplyandpurely first;thistime nottheabsoluteidentity,being,theconcept, butthenon-identical,theexistent, facticity.Therein itwouldhypostasizetheconceptofthenon-conceptualandtreatitcounterto what it means. Foundational philosophy, prôtê philosophia [Greek: originary philosophy] necessarily carries the primacy of the concept with itself; what withholdsitselffromit,also departs from the formofaphilosophizing allegedly basedonafoundation.Philosophycould remain pacifiedbythethoughtofthetranscendentalapperception,orevenbybeing,solongas those concepts were identical with the thought that it thinks. Ifsuchidentity isdismissed in principle, then it drags down the tranquillity oftheconcept assomethingultimate initsfall. Because the fundamental character of every general concept dissolvesbeforethedeterminate existent,philosophymaynolongerhopefortotality.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, sensation occupied theplace oftheindissolubly onticasthe something.Howeversensationhasnosortofpreeminenceofcognitivedignitybeforeanyother realexistent. Its“my”,accidental toitstranscendental analysis andtiedtoonticconditions,is mistaken for a legal claim by the experience which is entangled in its reflection-hierarchy, nearesttoitself; asifwhatanyparticular humanconsciousnesspresumedastheultimatewere reallyanultimateinitself,asifeveryotherparticularhumanandlimitedconsciousnesscouldnot claim thesameprivilege foritssensations. Iftheformhowever,thetranscendental subject,is supposedtostrictly requiresensation inordertofunctionandthustojudgeaccurately,thenit wouldbequasiontologically attached notonlytothepureapperceptionbutjustasmuchtoits counter-pole,toitsmatter.Thisoughttoshattertheentiredoctrineofthesubjectiveconstitution, to which, following Kant, matter cannot be traced back. The idea of something immutable, identicaltoitself,wouldalsotherebycollapse.Itisderivedfromthedominationoftheconcept, which wishedtobeconstanttowardsitscontent, precisely its“matter”, andforthatreasonis blind to such. Sensations, the Kantian matter, without which the forms could not even be imagined, whicharetherefore theconditionsofthepossibility ofcognitionintheirownright, havethecharacterofthatwhichistransient.Thenon-conceptual,inalienablefromtheconcept, disavowsitsbeing-in-itselfandtransformsit.Theconceptofthenon-conceptualcannotpauseby itself, in epistemology; this necessitates the substantiality [Sachhaltigkeit] of philosophy Whenever itwasmasterofitself,itdealtwiththehistoricallyexistentasitsobject,notfirstin Schelling and Hegel, but contre coeur [French: against its own will] already in Plato, who baptized theexistent asthenon-existent andyetwroteadoctrineofthestate,inwhicheternal ideasarecloselytiedtoempirical determinations suchastheexchange ofequivalentsandthe divisionoflabor Todayithasbecome customarytomaketheacademicdistinctionbetweena regular,properphilosophy,whichwoulddealwiththehighestconcepts,eveniftheydenytheir conceptuality, and a merely genetic, extra-philosophical relation to society, whose notorious prototypeswouldbethesociologyofknowledgeandthecritiqueofideology.Thedistinctionis asunfoundedastheneedforregularphilosophyisforitspartsuspect.Itisnotmerelythatby belatedlytrumpetingitspurity,itturnsawayfromeverythinginwhichitoncehaditssubstance. Rather the philosophical analysis strikes immanently,inwhatisinnermosttothepresumably pureconceptsandtheirtruth-content,intothatwhichisontic,beforewhichtheclaimofpurity shuddersand,witharrogantmien,cedestotheparticularsciences.Thesmallestonticresiduum intheconcepts,whichregularphilosophystirsinvain,compelsittoreflectivelyincludewhatis existent there[Daseiende] initself,insteadofmakingdowithitsmereconcept andbelieving itselftobesafetherefromwhatitmeans.Philosophicalthinkinghasforitscontentneitherthe remainder after the cancellation of space and time, nor general findings about what is spatio-temporal. It crystallizes intheparticular,inwhatisdetermined inspaceandtime. The conceptoftheexistentpureandsimpleismerelytheshadowofthefalseoneofbeing.
PeepholeMetaphysics142-144
Wherever an absolute first is taught, there is always talk of something inferior, something absolutely heterogenous to it, as its logical correlate; prima philosophia [Latin: originary philosophy]anddualismgotogether.Inordertoescapethis,fundamentalontologymusttryto
keepitsfirstatadistancefromdetermination.WhatwasfirstforKant,thesyntheticunityofthe apperception,sufferedthesamefate.Tohimeverydeterminationoftheobjectisaninvestment ofsubjectivity innon-qualitative multiplicity,irregardless ofthefactthatthedeterminingacts, which count for him as spontaneous achievements of transcendental logic, also model themselves [sichanbilden]onamomentwhichtheythemselvesarenot;irregardlessofthefact thatwhatistobesynthesizeddoessoonlybyrequiringandpermittingthislastoutofitself.The active determination is not something purely subjective, and that is why the triumph of the sovereignsubject,whichdictateslawstonature,ishollow.Becausehoweverintruthsubjectand object do not firmly oppose one another, as in the Kantian outline, but penetrate eachother reciprocally,thedegradation ofthethingtosomethingchaoticallyabstractbyKantalsoaffects thepowerwhichissupposedtoformit.Thebanewhichthesubjectexertsbecomesjustasmuch one over the subject; both pursue the Hegelian fury of disappearance. In the categorical achievement itexpendedandimpoverisheditself;inordertobeabletodetermine,toarticulate what opposes it, sothatitwouldbecome theKantianobject, itmustdilute itselftothemere generality forthesakeoftheobjectivevalidityofthatdetermination,amputateitfromitselfno lessthanfromtheobjectofcognition,sothatthiswouldbereducedtoitsconceptaccordingto program.Theobjectivatingsubjectshrinksdownintoapointofabstractreason,finallyintothe logical non-contradictoriness,whichforitsparthasnomeaningindependentofthedeterminate object.Theabsolutefirstnecessarilyremainsasindeterminateasitsopposite;noinvestigationof whatisconcretelyprecedentrevealstheunityofwhatisabstractlyantithetical.Rathertherigid dichotomicalstructurecrumblesbyvirtueofthedeterminationsofeachpoleasthemomentofits ownopposite.Thedualismisalreadygiveninthephilosophicalthoughtandasinescapable,as theprocessbywhichitbecomesfalseinthought.Mediation ismerelythemostgeneral,itself inadequate expressionforthis.–Ifhowevertheclaim ofthesubjectthatitisthefirst,which surreptitiouslyinspiredontology,iscashiered,thenwhatissecondaryaccordingtotheschemaof traditionalphilosophyisnolongersecondary,inadoublesensesubordinate.Itsdenigrationwas theflipsideofthetrivialitythateverythingexistentwouldbecoloredbytheobserver,itsgroup orspecies. Intruththecognition ofthemoment ofsubjectivemediationintowhatisobjective impliesthecritiqueofthenotionofaglanceintothepurein-itself,which,forgotten,lurksbehind thattriviality.Westernmetaphysicswas,exceptforheretics,peepholemetaphysics.Thesubject–itself only a limited moment – was locked for all eternity in itself, as punishment for its deification. It gazes into the darkenedheavens,inwhichthestaroftheideaorthatofbeing would arise, as throughtheembrasures ofatower.Itisprecisely thewallaroundthesubject however which throws the shadow of what is thingly [Dinghaften] over everything whichit conjures,whichsubjectivephilosophypowerlesslycombatsagain.Whateverofexperiencemay becarriedalonginthewordbeing,isexpressibleonlyinconfigurationsofexistents,notbythe allergyagainstsuch;otherwisethecontentofphilosophybecomestheimpoverishedresultofa process of subtraction, no different from the erstwhile Cartesian certainty of thesubject,the thinkingsubstance. Onecannotseeout.Whatwouldbebeyond,appearsonlyinthematerials andcategorieswithin.ThatiswherethetruthanduntruthoftheKantianphilosophywouldstep outofeachother.Itistrue,inthatitdestroystheillusionoftheimmediateknowledgeofthe absolute; untrue, in that it describes this absolutewithamodel,thatwouldcorrespondtoan immediate consciousness,wereitmerelytheintellectusarchetypus[Latin:archetypalintellect]. Thedemonstrationofthisuntruthisthetruthofpost-Kantianidealism;thislatterhoweverisin turn untrueinitsequation ofsubjectively mediated truthtothesubject,asifitspureconcept werebeingitself.
Non-contradictorinessnotHypostasizable144-146
Thesesortsofconsiderationsseemtogiverisetoaparadox.Subjectivity,thinkingitself,would notbeexplainedbyitselfbutratherbythefactical,especiallybysociety;buttheobjectivityof cognitioninturncouldnotbewithoutthinking,subjectivity.Suchaparadoxoriginatesfromthe Cartesiannormthattheexplanationoughttogroundwhatcomeslater,oratleastlogicallylater, inwhatcomesearlier.Thenormisnolongerbinding[verbindlich].Accordingtoitsmeasurethe dialectical matter-at-hand [Sachverhalt] would be the simple logical contradiction. But the matter-at-hand isnottobeexplained according toahierarchical orderingschemata, called up from outside. Otherwise the explanatory attempt presupposes the explanation, which it first needstofind;presupposingnon-contradictoriness, thesubjectivethought-principle,asinherent towhatisthought,totheobject.Incertainrespectsdialecticallogicismorepositivisticthanthe positivism which condemns it: it respects the object whichistobethoughtasthought,even there, where it does not follow the rules of thought. Its analysis istangential totherulesof thought.Thoughtneednotremain content withitsownjuridicality [Gesetzlichkeit]; ithasthe capacitytothinkagainstitself,withoutsacrificingitself;wereadefinitionofdialecticspossible, thismightbeoneworthsuggesting.Thearmatureofthinkingneednotremainingrowntoit;it reachesfarenoughtoseethroughthetotalityofitslogicalclaimasdelusion.Whatisseemingly unbearableaboutthis,thatsubjectivitywouldpresupposethefactical,butobjectivitythesubject, isunbearable onlytosuchdelusion,tothehypostasisoftherelationshipofcauseandeffect,of thesubjectiveprinciplewhichtheexperienceoftheobjectdoesnotmeshwith.Thedialectic,as aphilosophicalmodeofprocedure,istheattempttounraveltheknotofthatwhichisparadoxical withtheoldestmediumoftheEnlightenment,theruse[List:cunning].Itisnoaccidentthatthe paradoxwasthebowdlerizedformofdialecticssinceKierkegaard.Dialecticalreasonfollowsthe impulse to transcend the natural context and its delusion, which perpetuates itself in the subjective compulsion of logical rules, without imposing its rule on it:withoutsacrifice and revenge. Even its own essence is something which has come to be and as transient as antagonisticsociety.Tobesureantagonismisnomorelimitedtosocietythansuffering.Solittle asdialecticsistobeextendedtonatureasauniversalexplanatoryprinciple,solittlenevertheless aretwokindsoftruthtobemaintainednexttoeachother,thedialecticaloneinsidesocietyand one indifferent towards it. The separation of social and extra-social being, oriented to the compartmentalization of the sciences, deceptively veils the fact that blind natural-rootedness perpetuates itself in heteronomous history.65 Nothing leads out of the dialectical context of immanencethanititself.Dialecticsmeditatescriticallyonitself,reflectsonitsownmovement; otherwiseKant’slegalclaimagainstHegelwouldneverexpire.Suchadialecticsisnegative.Its idea names the difference from Hegel. Identity and positivity coincided in the latter; the inclusion ofeverything non-identical andobjective inthesubjectivity,whichisexpandedand exalted totheabsoluteSpirit,issupposedtoachieve thereconciliation. Ontheotherhandthe powerofthewholewhichiseffectiveineveryparticulardeterminationisnotonlyitsnegation butalsothenegative,theuntrue.Thephilosophyoftheabsolute,totalsubjectisparticular.*18* The reversibility of the identity-thesis, which is inherent in this, counteracts its intellectual principle.IftheexistentistobetotallydeducedfromtheSpirit,thenthelatterwouldbedoomed tobecomesimilartothemereexistent,whichitmeanttocontradict:otherwisetheSpiritandthe existent would not harmonize. Precisely the insatiable identity-principle perpetuates the
FirstKarlKorschandlaterthefunctionariesofDiamathaveobjectedthattheturntonon-identity would be, due to its immanent-critical and theoretical character, an insignificant nuance of neo-Hegelianism or of the historically obsolete Hegelian Left; as if the Marxist critique of philosophyhaddispensedwiththis,whileatthesametimetheEastcannotdowithoutastatutory Marxistphilosophy.Thedemandfortheunityoftheoryandpraxishasirresistiblydebasedthe formertoamereunderling,eliminating fromitwhatitwassupposedtohaveachievedinthat unity.Thepracticalvisa-stampdemandedfromalltheorybecamethestampofthecensor.Inthe famedunityoftheory-praxis,theformerwasvanquishedandthelatterbecamenon-conceptual,a piece of the politics which it was supposed to lead beyond; delivered over to power. The liquidation oftheorybydogmatization andthebanonthinkingcontributed tobadpraxis;that theoryshouldwinbackitsindependenceistheinterestofpraxisitself.Therelationshipofboth momentstoeachotherisnotsettledforonceandforall,butchangeshistorically.Today,since the hegemonic bustle cripples and denigrates theory, theory testifies in all its powerlessness againsttheformerbyitsmereexistence. Thatiswhyitislegitimateandhated;withoutit,the praxis which constantly wishestochangethingscouldnotitselfbechanged.Whoeverscolds theory as anachronistic, obeys the topos of dismissing as outmoded what was thwarted and remainspainful.Therein precisely thecourseoftheworldisreconfirmed,whichitisthevery idea of theory not to obey, and the theoretical target is missed, evenwhenitissuccessfully abolished,whetherpositivistically orbypower-decree.Therageattherecollectionofatheory which carries its own weight is by the way not far removed from the short-windedness of intellectual customsonthewesternside.Thefearofepigonalityandoftheacademicodorthat clingstoeveryrepriseofmotivescodifiedinthephilosophyofhistoryhaslongledthevarious schools to advertise themselves as something which has never yet existed. Precisely that strengthensthefatalcontinuityofwhatalreadyexists.Sodubioushoweveraprocedureis,which insistsallthemoreloudlyonUr-experiences thequickeritscategories aredelivered fromthe social mechanism, solittle tooarethoughtstobeequated withwhattheyoriginate from;this habitisequallyapieceoforigin-philosophy.Whoeverstrugglesagainstforgetting,onlyindeed againstthehistoricalone,not,asHeidegger,againstthatofbeingandtherebytheextra-historical one; against the universally expected sacrifice of a previously achieved freedom of consciousness, advocates no intellectual-historical restoration. That history has stepped past positions,ishonoredasajudgement overtheirtruth-content onlybythosetowhomhistoryis calledtheworld-court.Oftenwhathasbeencastaside,buttheoreticallynotabsorbed,revealsits truth-content onlylater.Itbecomesthesoreofthedominatinghealth;thisleadsbacktoitover andoveragaininchangedsituations.WhatremainedtheoreticallyinadequateinHegelandMarx becamepartofhistoricalpraxis;thatiswhyitistobetheoreticallyreflecteduponanew,instead of the thought bowing irrationally to the primacy of praxis; this was itself an eminently theoreticalconcept.
“LogicofDisassembly”[LogikdesZerfalls]148-149
Thefarewell toHegelbecomespalpable inacontradictionconcerningthewhole,whichisnot programmatically settled asaparticular one.Thecritic oftheKantianseparation offormand content, Hegelwantedaphilosophywithoutadetachableform,withoutamethodimplemented independently from the thing, and yet proceeded methodically.Infactthedialectic isneither solelyamethodnorsomethingrealinthenaïveunderstandingoftheterm.Notamethod:forthe unreconciled thing, which lacks precisely that identity which the thought surrogates, is contradictory and blocks every attempt at unanimous interpretation. This thing, not the organizational drive of thought, is the impetus to dialectics. Not something simply real: for contradictoriness is a reflection-category, the thinking confrontation of concept and thing. Dialecticsasaproceduremeans,tothinkforthesakeofwhatwasonceexperiencedinthething asacontradictionandagainstitincontradictions.Acontradictioninreality,itisacontradiction againstthese.SuchadialecticsishowevernolongercompatiblewithHegel.Itsmovementdoes not tendtowardsidentity inthedifference ofeveryobject fromitsconcept; ratheritsuspects something identical in it. Its logic is one of disassembly [Zerfalls]: of the prepared and concretized form of concepts, which the cognizing subject immediately faces at first. Their identity withthesubjectisuntruth.Throughitthesubjectivepre-formationofthephenomenon slides in front of what is non-identical, before the individuum ineffabile [Latin: ineffable individual].Thesummationofidenticaldeterminationswouldcorrespondtothefondestwishof traditionalphilosophy,totheaprioristructureandtoitsarchaisticlateform,ontology However thisstructureis,beforeeverysortofspecificcontent,inthesimplestsensenegativeassomething abstractly maintained,Spiritbecomecompulsion.Thepowerofthatnegativityrulestothisday inreality Whatwouldbedifferent,hasnotyetbegun.Thisaffectsallspecificdeterminations. Each one which appears non-contradictory proves to be as contradictory as the ontological modelsofbeingandexistence.Nothingpositiveistobeobtainedfromphilosophywhichwould beidenticalwithitsconstruction.Intheprocessofdemythologizationpositivitymustbenegated all the way into the instrumental reason, which demythologization supplies. The idea of reconciliation rejects itspositivepositingintheconcept. Nevertheless thecritique ofidealism does not discard what theconstruction oftheconcept towardstheinsightoncegarnered,and what the guidance of the concepts once won in termsofenergyfromthemethod.Onlythat whichisinscribedintheidealisticmagiccirclegoesbeyonditsfigure,bycallingitbynamein thecompletion ofitsowndeductive process,demonstrating whatisseparated fromit,whatis untrueinit,inthedevelopedsummationofthetotality.Pureidentityiswhatissetup[Gesetzte: posited] by the subject, andtothisextent isbroughtfromoutside.Toimmanently criticize it means therefore, paradoxically enough, to criticize it from outsideaswell.Thesubjectmust rendercompensationtothenon-identical,forwhatitperpetratedonit.Preciselythissetsitfree fromtheappearance[Schein]ofitsabsolutebeing-for-itself.Thislatterforitspartistheproduct oftheidentifyingthought,which,themoreitdevaluesathingtothemereexampleofitskindor species,themoreitimaginesthatithasitassuch,withoutsubjectiveaddition.
OntheDialecticsofIdentity149-151
By immersing itself in what initially opposes it, the concept, and becoming aware of its immanentlyantinomicalcharacter,thoughtabandonsitselftotheideaofsomethingwhichwould be beyond the contradiction. The opposition in thinking to what is heterogenous to it is reproducedinthoughtitselfasitsimmanentcontradiction.Reciprocalcritiqueofthegeneraland
the particular, the identifying acts whichjudgewhethertheconcept doesjustice towhatitis dealing with, and whether the particular also fulfills its ownconcept, arethemedium ofthe thinkingofthenon-identityoftheparticularandconcept.Andnotofthinkingalone.Ifhumanity istoriditselfofthecompulsion,whichreally isimposedonitintheformofidentification,it mustatthesametimeachieveidentitywithitsconcept.Allrelevantcategoriesplayapartinthis. Theexchange-principle,thereductionofhumanlabortoanabstractgeneralconceptofaverage labor-time,isUr-relatedtotheidentification-principle.Ithasitssocialmodelinexchange,andit would not be without the latter, through which non-identical particular essences and achievementsbecomecommensurable,identical.Thespreadoftheprincipleconstrainstheentire world to theidentical, tototality.Iftheprinciple meanwhile wasabstractly negated; ifitwas proclaimedasanidealthat,forthegreaterhonoroftheirreduciblyqualitative,thingsshouldno longer go according to like for like, this would create an excuse for regressingintoage-old injustice.Fortheexchangeofequivalentswasbasedsincetimeimmemorialexactlyonthis,that somethingunequalwasexchangedinitsname,thatthesurplus-valueoflaborwasappropriated. Ifonesimplyannulledthemeasurement-categoryofcomparability,thenwhatwouldstepintothe place of the rationality, which was indeed ideological yet also inherent as a promise in the exchange-principle, is immediate expropriation, violence, nowadays: the naked privilege of monopoliesandcliques.Whatthecritique oftheexchange-principle astheidentifying oneof thoughtwishes,isthattheidealoffreeandfairexchange,untiltodayamerepretext,wouldbe realized. This alone would transcend the exchange. Once critical theoryhasdemystified this latterassomethingwhichproceedsbyequivalentsandyetnotbyequivalents,thenthecritiqueof theinequality intheequality aimstowardsequality,amidstallskepticismagainsttherancorin the bourgeois egalitarian ideal, which tolerates nothing qualitatively divergent. If no human beingwasdeprivedoftheirshareoftheirlivinglabor,thenrationalidentitywouldbeachieved, andsocietywouldbebeyondtheidentifying thought.ThiscomescloseenoughtoHegel.The demarcation line from him is scarcely drawn by particular distinctions; rather by the intent: whether consciousness, theoretically and in practical consequence, would like to maintain identity as the ultimate, as the absolute and reinforce it, or else become aware of it as the universal apparatus of compulsion, which it ultimately requires in order to escape from the universal compulsion, just as freedom can only really come to be through the civilizing compulsion,notasaretouràlanature[French:backtonature].Thetotalityistobeopposedby convicting it of the non-identity with itself, which it denies according to its own concept. Negative dialectics is thereby tied, at its starting-point, to the highest categories of identity-philosophy. To thisextent italsoremainsfalse,identity-logical, itselfthatwhichitis beingthoughtagainst.Itmustcorrect itselfinitscritical course,whichaffectsthoseconcepts whichithandlesaccordingtoform,asiftheywerestillthatwhichisfirstforit.Itisonethingif thinking,sealedoffbythenecessity ofeveryinescapable form,adaptsinprincipleinorderto immanentlyrepudiatetheclaimoftraditionalphilosophytotheconclusivestructure–itisquite anothertospuronthatformofconclusivenessbyitself,withtheintentionofmakingitselfinto what is first. In idealism the highly formal principle of identity had, by means of its own formalization, the affirmation for its content. This is innocently brought to light by the terminology;thesimplepredicativesentencesarecalledaffirmative.Thecopulasays:itisso,not otherwise;thefactualhandlingofthesynthesis,forwhichitstands,announcesthatitshallnotbe otherwise: elseitwouldnotbeachieved.Thewilltoidentitylaborsineverysynthesis;asana priori task of thinking, immanent to it, it appears positive and desirable: through this, the substrateofthesynthesiswouldbereconciledwiththeIandforthatreasongood.Thispromptly
permitsthemoraldesideratathatthesubject,byvirtueoftheinsightintohowmuchthethingis itsveryown,oughttobowtowhatisheterogenoustoit.IdentityistheUr-formofideology.Itis consumed as the adequacy to the thing suppressed thereby; adequacy was always also subjugationunderdominating ends,tothisextent itsowncontradiction.Aftertheunspeakable effortwhichitmusthavecostthehumanspecies inordertoestablish theprimacy ofidentity evenagainstitself,itrejoicesandbasksinitsvictorybyturningthislatterintoadeterminationof thevanquishedthing:whatthislastexperienced,itmustpresentasitsin-itself.Ideologyowesits power of resistance against the Enlightenment tocomplicity withidentifying thought:indeed withthinkingatlarge.Itdemonstrates therein itsideologicalside,thatitnevermakesgoodon the assertion, that the non-I would in the end be the I; the more the I grasps it, the more completely the I finds itself downgraded to an object. Identity becomes the authority of a doctrine ofadjustment, whereintheobject, according towhichthesubjectwouldbedirected, paysbacktothelatterwhatthesubjectinflictedonit.Itissupposedtoacceptreasonagainstits reason. That is why the critique of ideology is not something peripheral andintra-scientific, something limited to the objective Spirit and the products of the subjective one, but philosophicallycentral:thecritiqueoftheconstitutiveconsciousnessitself.
Self-reflectionofThought152-154
The power of consciousness reaches all the way into its own deception. It is rationally cognizable, where a detached rationality whichhasrunawaywithitselfbecomesfalse,turns truly into mythology The ratio recoils into irrationality assoonasmistakes, initsnecessary course,thefactthatthedisappearanceofitssubstrate,beiteversodiluted,isthehandiworkof its abstraction. If thinking follows its laws of motion unconsciously, it turns againstitsown meaning,thatwhichisthoughtbythinking,whichcommandstheflightofsubjectiveintentions tohalt.Thedictateofitsautarkydamnsthinkingtonullity;thisbecomesintheend,subjectively, stupidity and primitivity The regression of consciousness is the product of its lack of self-reflection. It has thecapacity toseethroughtheidentity-principle, butcannotbethought withouttheidentification;everydeterminationisanidentification.Butpreciselythisapproaches whattheobjectis,asnon-identical:bystampingit,itwishestobestampedbyit.Non-identityis secretly the telos of theidentification, itiswhatistoberescuedinthelatter; themistake of traditionalthoughtisthatidentityisheldforitsgoal.Thepowerwhichexplodestheappearance [Schein]ofidentityisthatofthinkingitself:theapplicationofits“thatis”shakesitsnevertheless inalienable form. The cognition of the non-identical is dialectical too, in the sense that it identifiesmore,andidentifiesdifferently,thanidentity-thinking.Itwishestosaywhatsomething wouldbe,whileidentity-thinkingsayswhatitfallsunder,whatitisanexampleorrepresentative of,whatitconsequently isnotitself.Identity-thinking distancesitselffartherandfartheraway fromtheidentityofitsobject,themorerelentlesslyittearsatthelatter’sbody.Identitydoesnot disappear through itscritique; ittransformsitselfqualitatively.Elements oftheaffinityofthe objecttoitsthoughtliveoninit.Itishubris,thatidentitywouldbe,thatthethinginitselfwould correspondtoitsconcept.Butitsidealisnottobesimplythrownaway:inthereproachthatthe thingwouldnotbeidenticalwiththeconceptlivestoothelongingthatitwouldliketobeso.In thisformtheconsciousness ofnon-identitycontainsidentity.Indeedthesuppositionofthis,all the way down to formal logic, istheideological moment inpurethinking.Inithoweverthe moment oftruthofideologyisalsohidden,theinjunctionthatnocontradiction,noantagonism oughttobe.Inthesimpleidentifyingjudgement,thepragmaticelementwhichcontrolsnatureis
already conjoined to a utopian one. “A” is supposed to be, what it is not yet.Suchhopeis contradictorily tied to that which breaks through the predicative identity. For these the philosophicaltraditionhadthewordideas.Theyareneitherchôris[Greek:separately]norempty soundsbutnegativesigns.Theuntruthofallachievedidentityistheinvertedformoftruth.The ideasliveinthehollowsbetweenwhatthethingsclaimtobe,andwhattheyare.Utopiawould be beyond identity andbeyondthecontradiction, atogetherness ofwhatisdivergent.Forthe sakeoftheformer,identificationreflectsonhowlanguageusesthewordoutsideoflogic,which doesnotspeaktotheidentificationofanobject,butrathertothatwithhumanbeingsandthings. TheGreekargumentastowhetherthelikeortheunlikecouldrecognizethelike,issolelytobe settled dialectically. If the thesis holds that only the like would be capable of bringing the indelible moment ofmimesis inallcognitionandallhumanpraxistoconsciousness,thensuch consciousness becomes untruth when the affinity, at the same time infinitely far away inits indelibility, posits itself as positive. In epistemology the invariable result was the false conclusion, that the object would be the subject. Traditional philosophy imagined it could recognize theunlike,bymakingitlikeitself,whiletherebyinactualityitonlycognizesitself. Theideaofadifferentonewouldbetobecomeawareofthelike,inthatitdetermineswhatis unlike it. – The moment of non-identity in the identifying judgement is reasonably comprehensible, to the extent that every individual object subsumed under a class has determinations, which are not contained inthedefinition ofitsclass.Meanwhile inthemore emphaticconcept,whichisnotsimplythecharacteristicoftheindividualobjectsfromwhichitis derived,theoppositesimultaneously holdsgood.Thejudgementthatsomeoneisafreemanis related, thoughtemphatically,totheconceptoffreedom.Howeverthisisforitspartmorethan whatispredicatedofthatman,justasthatman,throughotherdeterminations,ismorethanthe conceptofhisfreedom.Itsconceptsaysnotonlythatitcouldbeappliedtoallotherindividuals, asfreelydefinedmen.Itnourishestheideaofaconditioninwhichtheindividualswouldhave qualities, which here and now could be ascribed to noone. What is specific about praising someone as free is the sous-entendu [French: undertone], thatsomethingimpossible isbeing ascribed to him, because it manifests itself in him;thissimultaneously contingent andsecret thinganimateseveryidentifyingjudgementwhichisworthmaking.Theconceptoffreedomlags behind itself, as soon as it is empirically applied. It is then itself not what it says.Because howeveritmustalwaysbeaconceptofwhatisgraspedunderit,itistobeconfrontedwiththis latter.Suchaconfrontation impelsittothecontradiction withitself.Everyattempt,bymerely posited, “operational” definitions of the concept of freedom, to exclude what philosophical terminology once called its idea, arbitrarily degradestheconcept forthesakeofitsutility in relation to what it means in itself. The individual is both more and less than its general determination. Because however the particular, the determinate would come to itself only through the sublation of that contradiction, hence through the achieved identity between the particular anditsconcept,theinterestoftheindividualisnotonlytopreservewhatthegeneral conceptrobbeditof,butasmuchinthat“more”oftheconceptasinitsneediness.Itexperiences thistothisdayasitsownnegativity.Thecontradictionbetweenthegeneralandparticularhasas itscontent,thatindividualityisnotyetandforthatreasonisbad,whereitestablishesitself.At thesametime,thatcontradictionbetweentheconceptoffreedomanditsrealizationalsoremains theinsufficiency oftheconcept; thepotential offreedomwishesthecritique ofthatwhichits compulsoryformalizationmadeitinto.
ObjectivityoftheContradiction154-156
Such a contradiction is no subjective thought-error; objective contradictoriness is what is embitteringindialectics,especiallyforthereflection-philosophywhichisashegemonictodayas in Hegel’s time. It would be simply incompatible with the prevailing logic and thus to be abolishedbytheformalunanimityofthejudgement.Solongascritiqueholdsitselfabstractlyto its rules, the objective contradiction would be only a pretentious way of saying, that the subjective conceptual apparatus unavoidably maintains the truth of its judgement on the particular existents over which it judges,whilethisexistent accordswiththejudgement only insofarasitisalready preformedbytheapophanticrequirementinthedefinitionsofconcepts. Thiswouldbeeasytoincorporateintoadvancedreflection-philosophicallogic.Buttheobjective contradictorinessdesignatesnotonlywhateveroftheexistentremainsoutsideofthejudgement, butsomethinginwhatisjudgeditself.Forthejudgementalwaysmeansthatexistentwhichis judged beyond that particular, which is included in the judgement; otherwise it would be, accordingtoitsownintention,superfluous.Andexactlythisintentioniswhatitdoesnotsatisfy. The negative motive of identity-philosophy has retained itspower;nothingparticular istrue, none is, as its particularity claims, it itself. The dialectical contradiction is neither the mere projection of a miscarried conceptual construction of the thing nor metaphyics run amok. Experience refuses to settle whatever would appear in what is contradictory in the unity of consciousness. A contradiction for example like that between the determination, which the individualknowsasitsown,andthatwhichsocietyimposesonit,ifitwishestokeepitselfalive, that ofthe“role”, isnottobereducedtoanysortofunitywithoutmanipulation, withoutthe fine-tuning of impoverished master concepts, which cause the essential differences to disappear;*19* any more so than the fact that the exchange-principle, which increases the productive-forcesinexistingsociety,simultaneouslythreatensthesetoanincreasingdegreewith annihilation. The subjective consciousness, to which the contradiction isunbearable, endsup beforeadesperatechoice.Eitheritmustharmonisticallystylizeitselfascontrarytothecourseof theworldand,againstitsbetterinsight,obeyitheteronomously;oritmust,inhard-bittenfaithin itsowndetermination,conductitselfasiftherewerenocourseoftheworld,andperishinit.It cannot eliminate the objective contradiction and its emanations by itself, through conceptual arrangement.Itcanhowevercomprehendit;allelseisidleassertion.Thisweighsmoreheavily thanforHegel,whofirstenvisionedit.Oncethevehicle oftotalidentification,itbecomesthe organ of its impossibility. Dialectical cognition does not, as its opponents charge, construe contradictions fromaboveandstepthroughtheirresolution,althoughHegel’slogicproceedsin thismannerattimes.Instead,itstaskistopursuetheinadequacy ofthethoughtandthing;to experienceitinthething.Dialecticsneednotfearthereproach,thatitisobsessedwiththefixed ideaoftheobjectiveantagonism,whilethethingwouldalreadybepacified;nothingindividual findspeace intheunpacified whole.Theaporeticconceptsofphilosophyaremarksofwhatis objectively unresolved, not merely in thinking. To accuse contradictions of incorrigible speculativeobstinacymerelyshiftstheblame;shamebidsphilosophynottosuppresstheinsight ofGeorgSimmel,thatitisastonishinghowlittleonenoticesthesufferingsofhumanityintheir history. The dialectical contradiction “is” not purely and simply, but has its intention – its subjective moment–inthatitcannotbetalkedoutofthis;initdialecticsgoestowardswhatis divergent.Thedialecticalmovementremainsphilosophicalastheself-critiqueofphilosophy.
OutsetfromtheConcept156-158
Becausetheexistentisnotimmediatebutonlythroughtheconcept,oneshouldcommencewith theconcept, notthemeregivenfact.Theconceptoftheconceptbecameitselfproblematic.No less than its irrationalistic counterpart, intuition, ithasassucharchaic traces,whichintersect withthoseoftherational; relicsofstaticthoughtandofastaticcognitiveidealinthemidstof dynamizedconsciousness.Theimmanentclaimoftheconceptisitsorder-creatinginvarianceas opposedtothechangeinwhatitanalyzes.Theformoftheconceptrejectsthislatter,istherein “wrong”.Indialecticsthoughtraisestheobjectionagainstthearchaismsofitsconceptuality.The concept in itself, before all content, hypostasizes its own form against the content. Thereby howeveralsotheidentity-principle:thatwhatissolelypostulatedinthought-practicewouldbea matter-at-handinitself,somethingsolid,somethingproper.Identifying thoughtconcretizes by meansofthelogicalidentityoftheconcept.Dialecticsamounts,accordingtoitssubjectiveside, toathinkingwhereintheformofthoughtnolongerturnsitsobjectsintoimmutablethingswhich staythesame;thattheywouldbeso,isrefutedbyexperience.Howlabiletheidentityofwhatis solid to traditional philosophy is, can be learned from its guarantor, the individual-human consciousness.InKant,itissupposedtogroundeveryidentityasagenerallydesignatedunity.In factanolderone,lookingbacktowhenitoncebegantoconsciouslyexisttosomeextent,clearly recallsitsdistantpast.Itproducesaunity,howeverirreallychildhoodmayslipawayfromit.In thatirreality howevertheIwhichoneremembers,whichoneoncewasandpotentiallyisonce again,becomesatthesametimeanother,analien,tobedetachedlyobserved.Suchambivalence ofidentityandnon-identityispreservedallthewayintothelogicalproblematicofidentity The expert jargonhadtheready-made formulaoftheidentity inthenon-identity readyforthis.It wouldneedtobecontrastedfirstwiththenon-identityinidentity Suchamereformalinversion meanwhileallowsroomforthesubreption,thatdialecticswouldbeinspiteofeverythingprima philosophia,as“primadialectica”[Latin:originarydialectics].*20*Theturntothenon-identical isborneoutinitsexecution;ifitremainedadeclaration,itwouldrevokeitself.Inthetraditional philosophies,evenwherethey,inSchelling’swords,construed,theconstructionwasinactuality post-construction, which tolerated nothing not already predigested by the former. In that it interpreted even what was heterogenous toitasitself,ultimately astheSpirit,itturnedonce againintowhatisthesame,intotheidentical,inwhichtheyrepeatedthemselvesasinagigantic analytic judgement, leaving no room for the qualitatively new. It was ingrained into the thought-habitthatwithoutsuchanidentity-structurephilosophywouldnotbepossibleandwould crumble into the pure juxtaposition of established positions. The mere attempt to turn philosophical thoughttowardsthenon-identicalinsteadofidentitywouldbeabsurd;itwoulda priori reduce the non-identical to its concept and thereby identify it. All these sorts of considerationsaretooradicalandforthatreason,likemostradicalquestions,notradicalenough. The form of the untiring recourse, in which something of the lash of the work-ethic rages, shrinks ever further away from what is to be seen through, and leaves it undisturbed. The category of the root, of the origin itself is dominating, the confirmation of what came first, becauseitwastherefirst;ofthechthonicagainstthemigrant,ofthesettledagainstthemobile. Whatisalluring astheorigin,becauseitdoesnotwanttobeassuagedbywhatisderived,by ideology, is for its part an ideological principle. The conservative-sounding sentence ofKarl Kraus,“Originisthegoal”,alsoexpressessomethingscarcelymeantinitsowntimeandplace: thatthestaticbadstateofaffairsoftheconceptoftheoriginmustberemoved.Thegoalwould notbetofindthewaybacktotheorigin,tothephantasmofagoodnature,butrathertheorigin
Initsidealistic formdialectics wasalsoaphilosophyoforigins.Hegelcomparedittoacircle. The returnoftheresultofthemovement toitsbeginningfatally annulsit:theidentity ofthe subject and object was supposed to smoothly produce itself thereby. Its epistemological instrument iscalled thesynthesis.Itisnottobecritiqued asanindividual thought-act,which combinesseparate momentsintotheirrelation,butasaguidingandhighestidea.Initsgeneral usagemeanwhile theconcept ofthesynthesis,thebulwarkagainstdecomposition,haspatently takenonthattenorwhichtookonitsperhapsmostrepulsiveforminthediscoveryofanalleged psycho-synthesis againstFreudianpsychoanalysis; idiosyncrasy balksattheusageoftheword synthesis. Hegel used it far more seldom than his triple schemata, already convicted of its rattling, might lead one to suspect. This ought to correspond to the factual structure of his thinking. What predominates are the determinate negations of concepts, turned to and fro, envisionedfromthemostextreme proximity.Whatcharacterizesitselfasthesynthesisinsuch meditations,keepingfaithwiththenegationinsofaraswhatissupposedtoberescuedtherein,is what each preceding movement of the concept succumbed to. The Hegelian synthesis is throughouttheinsightintotheinsufficiencyofthatmovement,intothecostsofitsproduction,as it were. As early as the introduction tothePhenomenology hegetstotheveryborderofthe consciousnessofthenegativeessenceofthedialecticallogicheisexpounding.Itscommand–to gazepurelyateachandeveryconceptuntilitmovesitself,becomesnon-identicalwithitself,by virtueofitsownmeaning,henceofitsidentity–isoneofanalysis,notsynthesis.Whatisstatic intheconceptsissupposed,soastosatisfytheselatter,toreleasewhatisdynamicoutofitself, comparabletothecommotionofthedropofwaterunderamicroscope.Thatiswhythemethod wascalled phenomenological, apassiverelationshiptowhatappears.Itwas,inHegel,aswhat Benjamin called a dialectics atastandstill, already farmoreprogressivethananythingwhich appearedahundredyearslaterasphenomenology.Dialecticsmeans,objectively,thebreakingof theidentity-compulsionthroughthestored-upenergieswhichareboundupinitsconcretizations. ThisendeduppartlyprevailinginHegel,whoindeedcouldnotconfesstowhatwasuntrueinthe identity-compulsion. Inthattheconceptexperiencesitselfasnon-identicalandmoves,itleads, nolongermerelyitself,towhatHegelianterminologytermsitsOther,66 withoutsuckingitdry.It determinesitselfbythatwhichisoutsideit,becauseitdoesnotexhaustitselfaccordingtowhat isitsown.Asitselfitisnotatallmerelyititself.WhereHegelintheScienceofLogicdealswith the synthesis of the first triad, that of becoming,67 it is only after he equates being and nothingnessaswhatisentirelyemptyanddevoidofdetermination,thathepaysattentiontothe difference which registers the absolute divergence of the literal linguistic meaning of both concepts.Herefinedhisearlierdoctrinethatidentitycouldbemeaningfullypredicated,thatisto saymorethantautologically,onlybythenon-identical:onlywhenidentifiedwitheachother,by meansofitssynthesis,wouldthemomentsbecomenon-identical.Fromthistheassertionoftheir identity accrued that restlessness, which Hegel called becoming: it trembles in itself.Asthe consciousness of non-identity through identity dialectics is not only a progressive but a simultaneouslyretrogradeprocess;tothisextenttheimageofacircledescribesitaccurately.The
66SeeHegel,WW4,ibidpg543.
67Seeibid.pg98.
development of the concept is also a reaching back, the synthesis the determination of the differencewhichperishedintheconcept,“disappeared”;almostasinHoelderlin’sanamnesisof what is natural, which fell away. Only in the consummated synthesis, the unification of the contradictory moments, is theirdifference revealed. Withoutthestepthatbeingwouldbethe sameasnothingness,bothwouldbeindifferenttoeachother,touseafavoritetermofHegel; only when they aresupposedtobethesame,dotheybecome contradictory.Dialectics isnot ashamed of the reminiscence of the Echternach spring parade. Unquestionably Hegel had, against Kant, delimited the priority of the synthesis: in keeping with the model of the later Platonicdialogue,hecognizedtheManyandtheOne[Einheit:theOne,theunitary],whichKant regarded as contiguous categories, as moments,neither ofwhichwouldbewithouttheother. Nevertheless Hegelis,likeKantandtheentiretradition,includingPlato,apartisanoftheOne. Notevenitsabstractnegationdeservesthinking.TheillusionofholdingtheManyimmediately inhandwouldrecoil asmimeticregressionbackintomythology,intothehorrorofthediffuse, just as the counter-pole of unitary thinking [Einheitsdenken], the imitation of blind nature through its suppression, ends up in mythical domination. The self-reflection of the Enlightenmentisnotitsrevocation:itiscorruptedintothelatterforthesakeofthecontemporary status quo. Even the self-critical turn of unitary thinking rests upon concepts, congealed syntheses.Thetendencyofthesynthesizingactsistoberedirected,bybecomingawareofwhat itinflictsupontheMany.SolelytheOnetranscendstheOne.Inittheaffinityisgranteditsright toexist,whichwasdrivenbackbytheadvanceoftheOneandnevertheless,secularizedtothe point ofunrecognizability,hibernates init.Thesynthesesofthesubjectimitate, asPlatowell knew,whatthatsynthesis,mediately[mittelbar],withtheconcept,wishesonitsown.
CritiqueofPositiveNegation161-163
Thenon-identical isnottobewonimmediately assomethingpositiveforitspartandalsonot throughthenegation ofthenegative. Thislatter isnotitself,asinHegel,theaffirmation.The positive,whichtohimissupposedtoresultfromthenegation, hasmorethanjustitsnamein commonwiththatpositivity whichhefoughtinhisyouth.Theequationofthenegationofthe negation withpositivity isthequintessenceofidentification,theformalprinciplereducedtoits purestform.Withittheanti-dialectical principle winstheupperhandintheinnermostcoreof dialectics, thattraditional logic,whichmorearithmetico [Latin: inmathematical terms]books minus times minus as a plus. It was borrowed from that mathematics, against which Hegel otherwisesoidiosyncraticallyreacted.Ifthewholeisthebane,thenegative,thenthenegationof theparticularitieswhichhavetheirepitomeinthatwholeremainsnegative.Itspositivewouldbe solelythedeterminatenegation,critique,notacircumventingresult,whichtheaffirmationcould happilyholdinitshand.Inthereproductionofanopaqueimmediacywhich,assomethingcome tobe,isalsoappearance[Schein],theverypositivityofthematureHegelbearsmarksofwhat according topredialectical usageisbad.Whilehisanalysesdestroytheappearance[Schein]of thebeing-in-itselfofsubjectivity,*21*forthatreasonhowevertheinstitutionwhichissupposed to sublate subjectivity and bring it to itself is by no means the higher one, as he almost mechanicallytreatsit.Ratherwhatisreproducedinitstillfurtheriswhatwasnegatedwithgood reasoninsubjectivity,howeverabstract thislatter maybeasitselfsomethingsuppressed.The negation whichthesubjectpracticedwaslegitimate;alsothatwhichwaspracticedonit,andis neverthelessideology.Byforgettingtherightoftheprecedingoneateverynewdialecticallevel, againsttheintermittentinsightofhisownlogic,Hegelpreparestheimitationofwhathescolded
as the abstract negation: abstract – namely confirmed bysubjective caprice –positivity.This springstheoreticallyfromthemethod,not,asitoughttoaccordingtoHegel,fromthething,and has spread throughout the world as an ideology as muchasitturnsintoarealmockeryand thereby convicts itself of its unwholesome nature [Unwesen]. What is positive in itself is fetishized from the vernacular, in which humanbeingspraisewhattheypositively wouldbe, finallytothebloodthirstyphraseofthepositiveforces.Bycontrastwhatistobetakenseriously abouttheunwaveringnegationisthatitdoesnotlenditselftothesanctioningoftheexistent.The negation of the negation does not make this revocable, but proves that it was not negative enough;otherwisedialecticsremainsindeedwhatinHegelitwasintegratedinto,howeveratthe priceofitsdepotentialization, indifferentintheendtowardswhatispositedatthebeginning. Whatisnegatedisnegative,untilithaspassedaway.ThisisthedecisivebreakfromHegel.To gloss over the dialectical contradiction, theexpressionoftheindissolubly non-identical, once more by identity means so much as to ignore what it says, returning it to pure consistency-thinking.Thatthenegationofthenegationwouldbeapositivity,canonlybeargued bythosetowhompositivity,asauniversalconceptuality,isalreadypresupposedattheoutset.It rakes inthespoilsoftheprimacy oflogicoverthemetalogical, oftheidealistic deception of philosophyinitsabstractform,justificationinitself.Thenegationofthenegationwouldbeonce moreidentity,reneweddelusion;theprojectionofconsistency-logic,finallythatoftheprinciple of subjectivity, on the absolute. Between the most profound insight and its decay, Hegel’s sentence shimmers iridescently:“Thetruthisalsothepositiveastheknowledgewhichaccords withtheobject,butitisonlythisequality[Gleichheit]withitself,insofarasknowledgeconducts itselfnegativelytowardstheother,haspenetratedtheobjectandhassublatedthenegation,which it is.”68 Thequalification oftruthasthenegative conductofknowledge,whichpenetrates the object –henceextinguishes theappearance [Schein]ofitsimmediatebeing-so–soundslikea programofnegativedialecticsasoneofaknowledgewhich“accordswiththeobject”;however the establishment of this knowledge as a positivity abjures that program. Through the formulationofthe“equalitywithitself”,ofpureidentity,theknowledgeoftheobjectisrevealed to be mere rigmarole, because this knowledge is no longer that of the object at all, but the tautology of an absolutely posited noêsis noêseôs [Greek: thinking of thinking]. Theideaof reconciliationirreconcilablyopposesitsaffirmationintheconcept.Ifitwasobjectedtothisthat thecritiqueofthepositivenegationofthenegationwouldcutthevitalnerveofHegel’slogicand permit nodialecticalmovementatall,thenthislatterwouldbedelimitedtoanaïvefaithinthe authorityofHegel’sself-understanding.Whiletheconstructionofhissystemwouldundoubtedly fallapartwithoutthatprinciple, dialectics hasitsexperience-contentnotintheprinciplebutin the resistance of the Otheragainstidentity; henceitspower.Initthesubjecttoolieshidden, insofarasitsrealdomination creates contradictions, butthesehaveseepedintotheobject.To attributedialecticspurelytothesubject,toclearawaythecontradictionthroughitself,asitwere, alsoclearsawaydialectics, byexpandingitintoatotality.InHegelitoriginatedinthesystem, butdoesnothaveitsmeasuretherein.
WhatisIndividualTooisNoUltimate163-164
Thinking,whichwentastrayinidentity,capitulateseasilytowhatisindissolubleandturnsthe indissolubilityoftheobjectintoatabooforthesubject,whichissupposedtoirrationalisticallyor scientifically resign itself not to touch whatisnotthesameasit,surrenderingtothecurrent
68Hegel,ibid.pg543.
cognitive ideal, therebyevenpayinghomagetoit.Suchanattitudeofthoughtisbynomeans foreigntothatideal. Ineverycaseitbindstheappetite forincorporation withtheaversionto whatisnotincorporated,whichpreciselyrequirescognition.Theresignationoftheorybeforethe individualitylaborsindeednolessforwhatexists,towhichitlendsthenimbusandtheauthority ofintellectualimpenetrabilityandhardness,thandoesavoraciousexuberance.Aslittleaswhat individually exists coincides with its master-concept, that of existence, so little is it uninterpretable,norforitspartanyultimate,againstwhichcognitionknocksitsheadinvain.In keepingwiththemostenduringresultofHegelianlogicitisnotsimplyforitselfbutanotherin itself and tied to others. What is, is more, than it is. This “more” is not imposed onit,but remains,aswhatissqueezedoutofit,immanenttoit.Tothisextentthenon-identicalwouldbe thething’sownidentityagainstitsidentifications.Theinnermostcoreoftheobjectprovestobe simultaneouslyexternaltothis,itssealed-offcharacterasappearance[Schein],thereflexofthe identifying, solidifying procedure. Where the thinking insistence in relation totheindividual leads is towards its essence, instead of towards the general, which it would represent. Communicationwithotherscrystallizesitselfintheindividual,whichismediatedinitsexistence [Dasein] by them. In fact the general, as Husserl recognized, dwells in the center of the individualthing,doesnotconstituteitselfinthecomparisonofsomethingindividualwithothers. Forabsoluteindividuality –andHusserlpaidnoattention tothis–istheproductofthesame processofabstraction,whichissetinmotionforthesakeofthegenerality.Whiletheindividual is not tobededucedoutofthought,thecoreoftheindividual wouldbecomparable tothose worksofartwhichrenounceallschematas,whichareindividuatedtotheutmostdegree,whose analysis rediscovers moments of the generality in the extremity of their individuation, its participation,hiddenevenfromitself,inwhatistypical.
Constellation164-166
Theunifyingmomentsurvives,withoutthenegationofthenegation,yetalsowithoutdelivering itself to the abstraction as the highest principle, not by advancing step by step towards the generalmaster-conceptfromtheconcepts,butbytheselatterenteringintoaconstellation.These illuminate thespecifics oftheobject whichtheclassifying procedureisindifferenttowardsor uncomfortablewith.Themodelforthisistheconductoflanguage.Itoffersnomeresign-system for cognitive functions. Where it appears essentially as language, becoming portrayal [Darstellung],itdoesnotdefineitsconcepts.Itobtainstheirobjectivitythroughtherelationship inwhichitpositstheconcepts,centered aroundathing.Ittherebyservestheintention ofthe concept,towhollyexpresswhatismeant.Solelyconstellationsrepresent,fromwithout,whatthe concepthascutawayfromwithin,the“more”,whichtheformerwishestobe,soverymuchasit cannot be the latter. By gathering around the thing to be cognized, the concepts potentially determine itsinnermostcore,thinkingtoattainwhatthinkingnecessarilystampedoutofitself. TheHegelian usageoftheterminusconcrete,accordingtowhichthethingitselfisitscontext, notitspureselfness,registers this,withouthowever,inspiteofallcritiqueofdiscursivelogic, ignoringthis.ButHegel’sdialecticwasonewithoutlanguage,whilethesimplestliteralmeaning ofdialecticspostulateslanguage;tothisextentHegelremainedtheadeptofcurrentscience.He didnotneedlanguageintheemphaticsense,becausetohimeverything,evenwhatisdevoidof language and opaque, issupposedtobeSpiritandtheSpirit,thecontext. Thissuppositionis beyondsalvation.Thatwhichisresolvable,whichisnotinanypreviously-thoughtcontext,does indeedtranscenditsself-enclosednatureoutofitself,aswhatisnon-identical.Itcommunicates
withthatfromwhichtheconceptseparatedit.Itisopaqueonlyforthetotality-claimofidentity; itresiststhelatter’spressure.Assuchhoweveritseeksexpression.Throughlanguageitdispels thebaneofitsselfness.Whatinthenon-identicalisnottobedefinedinitsconcept,surpassesits individual existence, which shrinks into the polarity to the concept, at which it stares. The interiorofthenon-identicalisitsrelationshiptothatwhichitisnotitselfandwhichitsinstituted, frozenidentitywithitselfwithholdsfromit.Itattainsitselfonlyinitsdisclosure[Entaeusserung: removal, relinquishment, realization], notinitshardening;thiscanstillbelearnedfromHegel, without making concessions to the repressive moments of his doctrine of realization [Entäußerung].Theobjectopensitselftoamonadologicalinsistence,whichistheconsciousness of the constellation, in which it stands: the possibility of immersion in what is internal necessitateswhatisexternal.Suchimmanentuniversalityoftheindividualhoweverisobjective assedimentedhistory.Thisisinitandoutsideit,somethingall-encompassing,inwhichithasits place. To become aware of the constellation inwhichthethingstands,meanssomuchasto decodetheonewhichthelatterbearswithinitself,aswhathascometobe.Thechorismosofthe outside and the inside is for its parthistorically conditioned. Theonlyknowledgewhichcan unleashthehistoryintheobject,isthatwhichisawareofthehistoricalpositionalvalueofthe objectinitsrelationshiptoothers;theupdatingandconcentrationofsomethingalreadyknown, whichittransforms.Thecognitionoftheobjectinitsconstellationisthatoftheprocess,whichit hasstoredupwithinitself.Asaconstellationthetheoreticalthoughtcirclesaroundtheconcept, whichitwouldliketoopen,hopingthatitspringsajarlikethelockofaheavilyguardedsafe: onlynotbymeansofasinglekeyorasinglenumber,butbyanumber-combination.
ConstellationinScience166-168
Howobjectsaretobedisclosed throughconstellations istobegatheredlessfromphilosophy, whichdidnotinterestitselfinthis,thanfromscientificinvestigationsofmerit:inmanycasesthe achieved scientific workwasaheadofitsphilosophicalself-understanding,thatofscientivism. Oneneedbynomeansstartoutfromitsowncontent,accordingtometaphysicalinvestigations likeBenjamin’sOriginoftheGermanTragedy-Play,whichgrasptheconceptoftruthitselfasa constellation.69 OnecouldreturntoascholarofsopositivisticabentasMaxWeber.Heindeed understood the “ideal types”, quite in keeping with subjectivistic epistemology, as an aid in approaching theobject, excluding everysubstantiality initselfandtobereliquefiedanywhich way. But just as in all nominalism, however null and void it may consider its concepts, something of the constitution of the thing strikes through this and reaches beyond the thought-practical advantage –nottheleastmotiveforthecritiqueofunreflectivenominalism–so are the material works of Weber derived far more fromtheobject, thanthesouthwestern Germanmethodologywouldleadonetoexpect.Infacttheconceptisadequategroundsforthe thing*22*, insofar as theinvestigation ofanatanyratesocialobject becomesfalse,whereit limitsitselftoadependencyinsideitsdomain,whichgroundedtheobject,andwhichignoresits determinations through the totality. Without the superordinated concept, those dependencies concealthemosteffectiveoneofall,thatofsociety,andthiscannotbeadequatelymadeupfor bytheindividualres,whichtheconcepthasunderitself.Itappearshoweversolelythroughthe individual, and thereby the concept changes once more into the determinate cognition. In contrast to current scientific practice, the difficulty of the definition of historical concepts
became cleartoWeberwhen,inthetreatiseontheProtestantethicandtheSpiritofcapitalism, he raised the question of their definition, as only philosophersbeforehimhad:Kant,Hegel, Nietzsche. He expressly rejected the delimiting definition-procedure according totheschema “genusproximum,differentiaspecific”70 anddemandedinsteadthatsociologicalconceptsought to “be gradually composed [komponieren: to compose musically] outofindividual particular piecesextractedfromhistoricalreality.Theplaceofthefinalconceptualreportingoftheresults lies therefore not at the beginning of the investigation, but at the end.”71 Whether such a definition isrequiredforonceandforall,orwhetherwhatWebercalled“composing”,without formallydefinitoryresults,hasthecapacitytobewhatWeber’sepistemologicalintentwouldlike ittobe,remainsunsettled.Solittleasdefinitionsarethebe-allandend-allofcognition,which vulgarscientivism regardsthemas,solittlearetheytobebanished.Thethinking,whichcould not master the definition during its course, which is incapable of moments where linguistic precisioncouldstandinforthething,wouldverylikelybeassterileasonewhichglutteditself on verbal definitions. More essential, however, is what Weber termed as composing, which wouldbeunacceptabletoorthodoxscientivism.Heisindeedkeepingmerelythesubjectiveside, theprocedureofthecognition,inview.Butthecompositionsinquestionmaywellbesimilarly arrangedastheiranalogue, themusical ones.Subjectively produced,thesearesuccessfulonly wherethesubjective productionperishesinthem.Thecontext,whichcreatesit–preciselythe “constellation”–becomeslegibleasthesignofobjectivity:ofintellectualcontent.Thatwhichis similar to a text [Schriftähnliche] in such constellations is the recoil of what is subjectively thoughtandbroughttogetherinobjectivitybymeansoflanguage.Evenaprocedureasobliged tothetraditional ideal ofscienceanditstheoriesasthatofMaxWeberbynomeanslacksthis moment,thoughitisnotthematicinhim.Whilehismostmatureworks,aboveallEconomyand Society, seem to suffer at times from a surplus of verbal definitions borrowed from jurisprudence, these latter are, looked at more closely, more than such; not only conceptual anchoringsbutratherattempts,bythegatheringofconceptsaroundthesought-aftercentralone, toexpresswhatitaimsat,insteadofcircumscribing ittooperativeends.Theineveryrespect decisive concept of capitalism is thus emphatically demarcated from isolated and subjective categories likeacquisitivenessortheprofit-motive,similarlybythewaytoMarx.Theoft-cited profit-motive hastobeorientedincapitalismtotheprofit-principle,tomarketchances,itmust availitselfofthecalculatingcapitalaccount;itsorganizationalformhastobethatoffreelabor, householdandfirmhavetobeseparated,itrequiresbookkeepingandarationallegalsystemin accordancewiththedominatingprincipleofrationalityincapitalismatlarge.72 Thecompleteness of this catalogue remains in doubt; it is especially to be asked, as to whether the Weberian emphasis onrationality,disregardingtheclass-relationship whichreproducesitselfthroughthe exchange of equivalents, already equates the method of capitalism overmuch to its “Spirit”, although the exchange of equivalents and its problematic would certainly not be thinkable without rationality. Precisely the increasing tendency of integration of the capitalist system however,whosemomentsintertwineintoaconstantlymorecompletefunctionalcontext,makes theoldquestionconcerningthecauseasopposedtotheconstellationevermoreprecarious;not the critique of epistemology, but the real course of history necessitates the search for constellations. If these appear in Weber in place ofasystematics, whoseabsenceonewould
gladly reproach him for, then his thinking proves its worth as a thirdpossibility beyondthe alternativesofpositivismandidealism.
EssenceandAppearance169-172
Whereacategory –throughnegativedialectics,thatofidentityandoftotality–changesitself, the constellation of all changes and thereby in turn each one. The concepts of essence and appearance are paradigmatic of this. They originate out of the philosophical tradition, are maintained,buttheirdirectionaltendencyisredirected.Essenceisnolongertobehypostasized aspureintellectualbeing-in-itself.Rather,essencepassesoverintowhatlieshiddenbeneaththe façadeoftheimmediate,ofthepresumedfacts,whichmakesthemintowhattheyare;thelawof doom,whichhistoryhasobeyedhitherto;allthemoreirresistible,thedeeperitcrawlsbeneath the facts, in order to be comfortably denied by them. Such essence [Wesen] is downright mischief-making [Unwesen],thearrangement oftheworldwhichdegradeshumanbeingsinto themeansoftheirseseconservare[Latin:self-preservation],curtailingandthreateningtheirlife, by reproducing it and deceiving them that things areso,inordertosatisfytheirneeds.This essence too must appear like theHegelian one:maskedinitsowncontradiction. Onlyinthe contradictionoftheexistenttothatwhichitclaimstobe,canessencebecognized.Indeedit,too, isconceptualinrespecttothepresumedfacts,notimmediate.Butsuchconceptualityisnotmere physei[Greek:bynature],theproductofthesubjectofcognition,inwhichitfinallyfindsitself oncemoreconfirmed.Insteaditexpressesthefactthattheconceptualizedworld,howevermuch alsothroughthefaultofthesubject,isnotitsownbuthostiletoit.Thisisalmostimperceptibly attested to by the apperception [Wesenschau] of the Husserlian doctrine. It amounts to the complete alienation ofessence fromtheconsciousness whichgraspsit.Itrecalls, albeitinthe fetishized form of an utterly absolute ideal sphere, that even the concepts to which their essentialities areunthinkingly equated arenotonlytheproductsofsynthesesandabstractions: theyrepresentequally,too,amomentinthemany,whichcallsuptheconcepts,whichaccording toidealisticdoctrinearemerelyposited.Husserl’shypertrophiedidealism,theontologizationof pure Spirit, for that reason long unknown to itself, helped in itsmosteffective textstogive distorted expression to an anti-idealistic motive, the dissatisfaction with the thesis of the hegemony of the thinking subject. Phenomenology forbade the latter from proscribing laws, where italready hadtoobeythem: tothatextent itexperiences themassomethingobjective. BecausemeanwhileforHusserl,asfortheidealists,allmediationsareputonthenoeticside,that ofthesubject,hecannototherwiseconceiveofthemomentofobjectivityintheconceptthanas immediacysuigeneris[Latin:generalinitself]andmustcopyit,withanepistemologicalactof violence,fromthesense-perception.Hefranticallydeniedthattheessenceinspiteofeverything is also for its part a moment: originated. Hegel, whom he damned with the arrogance of ignorance,alreadyhadthesuperiorinsightthattheessence-categoriesofthesecondbookofthe Logicareasmuchhistoricallybecome,productsoftheself-reflectionofthecategoriesofbeing, asobjectivelyvalid.Athinkingwhichzealouslyrejecteddialecticscannolongerattainthis,even thoughHusserl’sbasictheme, thelogical propositions,oughttohavethrustthisuponhim.For suchpropositionsare,accordingtohistheory,equallyobjectiveincharacter,“lawsofessence”, as,somethingheatfirstpassedoverinsilence,tiedtothinkinganddependentintheirinnermost coreonthatwhichtheyfortheirpartarenot.Theabsoluteoflogicalabsolutismjustifiesitselfin thevalidity offormalpropositionsandofmathematics;neverthelessitisnotabsolute,because the claim of absoluteness, as the positively achieved identity of subject and object, is itself
conditioned, thecondensation ofthesubjective totality-claim. Thedialectic ofessence,asone which is simultaneously initsownwayquasiexistent andyetnot-existent, ishoweverbyno means,asinHegel,toberesolvedintheunityoftheproducedandproducingSpirit.Hisdoctrine of the objectivity ofessence postulates, beingwouldbetheSpiritnotyetcometoitself.The essencerecallsthenon-identityintheconceptofwhatisnotinitiallypositedbythesubject,but whichthelatterfollows.Eventheseparationoflogicandmathematicsfromtheonticrealm,on which the appearance [Schein] of its being-in-itself, the ontological interpretation of formal categoriesrests,hasitsonticaspectassomethingwhichreboundsfromtheontic,asHegelwould haveputit.Thatonticmomentreproducesitselfinthem.Becauseitisimpossibleforthemtosee through themselves as something separate and conditioned – for the separation is their own essence–theyachieveakindofexistence[Dasein].Evenmorehoweverthelawsofessenceof society and its movement. They are realer thanthefactical, inwhichtheyappearandwhich deceptively veils them.Buttheycastasidethetraditional attributes oftheiressentiality.They could be called the negativity, reduced to its concept, whichmadetheworldthus,asitis.–Nietzsche, theirreconcilable opponentofthetheological heritageinmetaphysics,ridiculedthe distinction between essence and appearance anddelivered thebackgroundworld[Hinterwelt] over to the backwoodsmen [Hinterwäldlern], therein in accordance with the entirety of positivism. Perhapsnowhereelseisitsopalpable, howindefatigable Enlightenment comesto benefittheobscurantists.Essenceis,whatisitselfconcealedaccordingtothelawofthebadstate ofaffairs;todisputethatanessencewouldexist,meanstakingthesideofappearance[Schein], of total ideology, to which the existent has meanwhile become. Those who would count everything whichappearsasthesame,becausetheyknowofnoessencewhichwouldpermita distinction, make common cause with the untruthoutofthefanatical loveoftruth,withthat scientific tedium whichNietzsche sodespised,whichcan’tbebotheredwiththedignityofthe objectstobedealt with,andeither parrotspublicopinionaboutthisdignityorelseselectsits criterion bywhether,astheysay,athinghasnotyetbeenworkedout.Thescientificmindset cedesthedecisionoverwhatisessential andinessentialtothedisciplines,whichareoccupied with the object at any given time; whatisessential toonecanbeinessential totheother.In accordance with this Hegel located the distinction in a third thing, initially outside of the immanentmovementofwhatliesinthething.*23*Husserl,whowouldnotdreamofadialectic betweentheessenceandappearance[Schein],isironicallyintherightagainsthim:infactthere isindeedafallible,yetimmediateintellectualexperienceoftheessentialandinessential,which the scientific need for order can talk the subjects out of only with violence. Wheresuchan experience does notoccur,cognition remainsimmobile andfruitless. Itsmeasureis,whatthe subjects experience objectively astheirsuffering.Paralleltothetheoreticallevelingofessence andappearance,thosewhocognizesubjectivelylose,alongwiththecapacitytosufferandtobe happy, the primary capability to separate what is essential and what is inessential, without anyonereally knowingwhatisthecauseandwhatiseffect.Theobstinateurgetocheckonthe accuracyofwhatisirrelevant,ratherthantoreflectonwhatisrelevantattheriskoferror,counts as one of the most widespread symptoms of regressive consciousness. The latest style of backwoodsmen do not botherthemselves withanybackgroundworld,satisfied withwhatthe front-doorworld[Vorderwelt] talksthemintobuying,inwordsandinsilence.Positivismturns intoideology,byeliminatingtheobjectivecategoryofessenceandthen,logically,theinterestin the essential. By no means is it exhausted however in the hidden general law. Its positive potential survivesinwhatthelawcovers,whatisinessentialtotheverdictofthecourseofthe world,whatisthrowntothemargins.Thegazeatthis,theoneattheFreudian“hubbubofthe
The mediation ofessence andappearance, ofconcept andthing,doesnotremain whatitwas either, the moment of subjectivity in the object. What mediates the factsisnotsomuchthe subjectivemechanismwhichpre-formsandrendersthem,astheobjectivity,heteronomoustothe subject, behind that which it can experience. It is denied to the primary subjective circle of experience, is preordained to this. Wherever at the present historical stage one judges too subjectively,tousethecurrentparlance,thesubjectalmostautomaticallyparrotstheconsensus omnium[Latin:generalconsensus].Foritwouldgivetheobjectwhatisitsown,insteadofbeing satisfied with the false copy,onlywhereitresisted theaverage valueofsuchobjectivity and madeitselffreeasasubject.Itisonthisemancipation, notontheinsatiablerepressionofthe subject, that objectivity depends today. The overwhelming power of what is objectivated in subjects, whichthenpreventsthemfrombecoming subjects, equally preventsthecognitionof what is objective; that is whatbecame ofwhatwasoncecalled the“subjective factor”. Now subjectivity is what is mediated ratherthanobjectivity,andsuchmediation isinmoreurgent needofanalysis thanthetraditional one.Inthesubjective mechanisms ofmediation, thoseof objectivityareextended,inwhicheverysubject,eventhetranscendentalone,isharnessed.That the data are apperceived, according to their claim, as so and not otherwise, is what the pre-subjective social order sees to, which for its part essentially constitutes the subjectivity, which epistemology regards as constitutive. What in the Kantian deduction of categories ultimatelyremainscontingent,byitsownconfession,“given”:thatreasonhastheseandnoother basicconceptsatitsdisposal,isattributedtowhatthecategories,accordingtoKant,haveyetto establish. The universality of mediation isnothoweveralicense tolevel everything between heaven and earth down to it, as if the mediation of the immediate and themediation ofthe concept were the same. The mediation is essential totheconcept, itisitselfaccording toits constitution immediately themediation; themediationofimmediacyismeaningfulhoweveras thereflection-determination,onlyinrelationtowhatitopposes,theimmediate.Ifthereisindeed nothingwhichwouldnotbemediated,thensuchmediationalwaysnecessarilyarises,asHegel emphasized,insomethingmediated,withoutwhichitforitspartwouldnotbe.Thatontheother hand what is mediated would not be without mediation, has a purely privative and epistemological character: the expression of the impossibility of determining the something without mediation, hardly more than the tautology that the thinking of something would be thinkingjustthesame.Converselynomediationwouldremainwithoutthesomething.Itsnature assomethingmediateddoesnotlieinimmediacy,inthesamemannerassomethingimmediatein themediation, whichwouldbemediated.Hegelneglectedthedistinction.Themediationofthe immediateaffectsitsmodus:theknowledgeofitandthebordersofsuchknowledge.Immediacy is no modality, no mere determination of the “how” for a consciousness, but objective: its conceptpointstowhatisnottobeclearedawaythroughitsconcept.Mediationbynomeanssays thateverythingwouldgointoit,butpostulateswhatitismediatedby,somethingnotcompletely worked through; immediacy itself however stands for a moment which does not require the cognition, the mediation, in the same way this latter does of the immediate. So long as philosophyemploystheconceptsimmediateandmediate[mittelbar],whichforthetimebeingit
canscarcelydowithout,itslanguageannouncesthematter-at-hand,whichtheidealisticversion ofdialecticsdenied.Thatthislastpassesovertheapparentlyminimaldifference,iswhatlendsit itsplausibility.Thetriumph,thattheimmediacywouldineverycasebemediated,bulldozesover themediatedandattainsthetotalityoftheconceptinitsblessedjourney,nolongerheldbackby anythingnon-conceptual,theabsolutedominationofthesubject.Becausehoweverthedifference spiritedawayisrecognizablebydialectics,thetotalidentificationinthisdoesnothavethelast word.Ithasthecapacity tobreakoutofthemagic circle, withoutcontrasting itdogmatically from outside to a presumably realistic thesis. The circle of identification, which ultimately always identifies only itself, was drawn by the thinking, which tolerates nothingoutside;its imprisonment isitsownhandiwork.Suchtotalitarian andforthatreasonparticular rationality was historically dictated by what wasthreatening innature.Thatisitslimitation. Identifying thought,themakingofeverythingdifferentintothesame,perpetuatesthebondageofnaturein fear.Unreflectivereasonisdeludedtothepointofmadnessinviewofeachandeveryonewhich eludesitsdomination. Forthetime being,reasonispathic;onlybycuringitselfofthis,would reasonbe.Eventhetheoryofalienation,thefermentofdialectics,confusestheneedtoapproach the heteronomous and to thisextent irrational world,inNovalis’words“tobeeverywhereat home”,withthecravingforincorporationandpersecution;withthearchaicbarbarism,thatthe longingsubjectisincapableoflovingthealien,oflovingwhatisdifferent.Ifthealienwereno longerostracized,therewouldhardlybeanymorealienation.
ParticularityandtheParticular174-175
Theequivocationintheconceptofmediation,whichgivesrisetothefactthattheopposingpoles ofcognitionareequatedtoeachotheratthecostoftheirqualitativedifference,onwhichsimply everything depends, dates back to the abstraction. The word “abstract” is however still too abstract,itselfequivocal.Theunityofwhatissubsumedundergeneralconceptsisfundamentally different from the conceptually determined particular In this latter the concept is always simultaneously itsnegative;itcutsshortwhatitisitselfandyetcannotimmediatelybenamed, andreplacesitwithidentity.Thisnegative,whichisfalse,butatthesametimenecessary,isthe staging-groundsofdialectics.Thecore,whichinitsidealisticversionisalsoforitspartabstract, is not simply eliminated. By virtue of its differentiation from nothingness, even the most indeterminate something would be, contrary to Hegel, not something purely and simply indeterminate. This refutes the idealistic doctrine ofthesubjectivity ofalldeterminations. So little as the particular would be determinable without the general, by which it is identified according tocurrentlogic,solittle isitidentical withit.Idealism doesnotwishtoseethata something,beiteversodevoidofqualities,maynothoweverforthatreasonalreadybecalled nothing.BecauseHegelshrankbackfromthedialecticoftheparticularwhichheconceived–it annihilated theprimacy oftheidenticalandconsequentlyidealism–heisincessantlydrivento shadow-boxing.Intheplace oftheparticular heslidesthegeneralconceptofparticularization pureandsimple,of“existence”, forexample,inwhichitisnolongeranythingparticular.This restoresthemannerofprocedureofthinking,whichKantjustifiablyscoldedastheamphibolyof theconceptsofreflection intheearlierrationalisms.TheHegeliandialecticbecomessophistic, whereitfails.Whatmakestheparticular intothedialectical impulse,itsindissolubility inthe master-concept,itdealswithasauniversalmatter-at-hand,asiftheparticularwereitselfitsown master-concept and thereby indissoluble. Precisely thereby the dialectic of non-identical and identitybecomesillusory[scheinhaft]:thevictoryofidentityovertheidentical.Theinadequacy
ofthecognition,whichcannotassureitselfofanyparticularwithouttheconcept,whichisbyno meanstheparticular,redoundstotheadvantageoftheSpiritasinacard-trick,whichraisesitself over the particular and purifies it of what resisted the concept. The general concept of particularityhasnopowerovertheparticular,whichitabstractivelymeans.
OntheSubject-ObjectDialectic176-177
Itiseasyforthepolarityofsubjectandobjecttoappearforitspartasanundialecticalstructure, inwhichalldialecticsissupposedtotakeplace.Butbothconceptsareoriginatedcategoriesof reflection,formulationsforsomethingwhichisnottobeunified;notanythingpositive,norany primarymatter-at-hand,butnegativethroughout,theexpressionsolelyofnon-identity.Inspiteof thisthedifference betweensubjectandobjectisforitspartnottobesimplynegated.Theyare neither theultimate duality,nordoestheultimateunityhidebehindthem.Theyconstituteeach other just as much as they diverge from each other by means of such a constitution. If the dualism of subject and object were laid down as a principle, it would be once again total, monistic, just like the identity-principle which itrejects; theabsoluteduality wouldbeunity. Hegelusedthisforthepurposeofabsorbingthesubject-objectpolarity,whichhefeltrendered himpreeminent toFichteandSchellingbydevelopingitaccordingtobothsides,intothinking. As a structure of being the dialectic of subject and object becomes according to him the subject.*24* As abstractions both are thought-products; the supposition of their opposition declares thinkinginalienablytowhatisfirst.Butthedualismdoesnottakethehintofthepure thought.Aslongasthisremainsthought,itisconsummatedaccordingtothedichotomy,which has become the form of thinking and without which thinking would perhaps not be. Every concept, eventhatofbeing,reproducesthedifference ofthinkingandwhatisthought.Itwas burnedintothetheoreticalconsciousnessoftheantagonisticconstitutionofreality;insofarasit expresses this, the untruth of the dualism is the truth. Once detached fromthishoweverthe antagonism would become the philosophical excuse of its eternity Nothing else is possible exceptthedeterminatenegationoftheindividualmoments,throughwhichsubjectandobjectare opposedabsolutelyandpreciselytherebyidentifiedwitheachother.Thesubjectisintruthnever wholly the subject,theobject neverwhollytheobject; nevertheless botharenottobepieced togetheroutofathird,whichwouldtranscendthem.Thatwhichisthirdisnolessdeceptive.The Kantianagenda[Auskunft],ofdrawingitawayfromthepositive,finitecognitionastheinfinite, andspurringthisontountiringeffortviatheunattainable,isinadequate.Thedualityofsubject and object is to be critically maintained against the totality-claim which inheres to thought. Indeedtheseparation, whichmakestheobject intowhatisalien,whatistobedominatedand appropriates it, is subjective, the result of ordering preparation. Only the critique of the subjective originoftheseparationdoesnotonceagainbringtogetherwhatisseparated,afterit hasreally split.Consciousness boastsoftheunification ofwhatitfirstarbitrarilydividedinto elements;hencetheideologicalovertoneofalltalkofthesynthesis.Itistheveiloftheanalysis, hidden from itself and increasingly tabooed.Theantipathy ofthevulgarnobleconsciousness towardsthisisduetothefactthatthedismemberment,whichthebourgeoisSpiritreproachesits critics for practicing, is its own unconscious handiwork. The rational labor-processes are its model. They require compartmentalization as the condition of commodity production, which resembles the universal-conceptual procedure of the syntheses. If Kant had included the relationshipofhismethodtotheory,thatoftheepistemologicallyinvestigatingsubjecttotheone underinvestigation,inthecritiqueofreason,thenitwouldnothaveescapedhimthattheforms
by which the multiplicity is supposed to be synthesized are for their part the products of operations,whichthestructureofthework,revealinglyenough,entitledtranscendentalanalytics.
RedirectionoftheSubjectiveReduction178-180
The course of the epistemological reflection was,according toitspredominant tendency,that whichtraced backobjectivity moreandmoretothesubject.Preciselythistendencyshouldbe reversed.Whatinthetraditionofphilosophydistinguishedtheconceptofsubjectivityfromthe existent, is modeled after the existent. Thatphilosophy,laboringtothisdayfromthelackof self-reflection,forgotthemediationinwhatismediated,inthesubject,issolittlemeritoriousof sublimitythananyothersortofforgetting.Aspunishment,asitwere,thesubjectisovertakenby whatisforgotten.Assoonasitismadeintoanobject ofepistemological reflection, itshares withthisthatcharacterofobjectivity,whoseabsenceithappilylaysclaimtoasthepreeminence before the realm of the factical. Its essentiality, an existence [Dasein] of second potency, presupposes (as Hegel did not fail to state) the first one, facticity, as the condition of its possibility,althoughnegated.Theimmediacyoftheprimaryreactionswasbrokenthroughinthe formationoftheIandwiththemthespontaneityintowhichaccordingtotranscendentalcustom thepureIissupposedtocontract;itscentristicidentitygoesattheexpenseofwhatidealismthen attributes to it. The constitutive subject of philosophy is more thingly [dinghafter] than the specific psychological content which it expelled from itself as thingly-naturalistic. Themore autocratically the I raisesitselfupabovetheexistent, themoreitimperceptibly turnsintoan object and ironically countermands its constitutive role. Not merely the pure I is ontically mediatedthroughtheempiricalone,whichshinesthroughunmistakablyasthemodelofthefirst treatment of the deduction of the pure concept of reason, but so too is the transcendental principleitself,inwhichphilosophybelievestopossessitsfirstincontrasttotheexistent.Alfred Sohn-Rethel wasthefirsttopointoutthatinthelatter,inthegeneralandnecessaryactivityof theSpirit,inalienablysociallaborlieshidden.Theaporeticconceptofthetranscendentalsubject –onewhichisnot-existent,whichnonethelessacts;onewhichisuniversal,whichisnonetheless supposedtobeexperiencedasparticular–wouldbeasoapbubble,couldneverbecreatedoutof the autarkic context of immanence of necessarily individual consciousness. To this latter howeveritrepresents notonlywhatismoreabstract,butbymeansofitsformativepoweralso whatismorereal.Beyondthemagiccircleofidentityphilosophy,thetranscendentalsubjectcan be deciphered as the society which is unconscious of itself. Such unconsciousness can be deduced. Since intellectual labor was separated from the manual kind in the sign of the dominationoftheSpirit,ofthejustificationofprivilege,thedividedSpiritwasobliged,withthe exaggeration due to a bad conscience, to vindicate precisely that domination-claim, whichit derivedfromthethesisthatitwouldbethefirstandoriginary,andthatiswhyittakespainsto forgetfromwhenceitsclaimcomes,ifitisnottocrumble.DeepdowntheSpiritsuspectsthatits stableruleisnotatallthatoftheSpirit,butpossessesitsultimaratio[Latin:ultimateratio]inthe physical violence at its disposal. It may not utter its secret,atthepriceofitsdownfall.The abstraction which, even by the lights of extreme idealists like Fichte, made the subject to a constituens inthefirstplace,reflectstheseparationfrommanuallabor,discernablethroughthe confrontation with the latter. When Marx told the Lassalleans in the critique of the Gotha programthatlaborwasnot,asthevulgarsocialistswerewonttohold,thesolesourceofsocial
wealth,73 hetherebyphilosophically expressed,inaperiodinwhichhehadalreadyleftbehind theofficialphilosophicalthematic,nolessthanthefactthatlaborisnottobehypostasizedinany form, in the industriousness of hands so little as in intellectual production. Such hypostasis merely perpetuates theillusionoftheprimacy oftheproducingprinciple. Itcomestoitstruth solelyintherelationshiptothatnon-identical,forwhichMarx,inhiscontemptforepistemology, first chose the crude, all too narrow name of nature, later natural material and other, less incriminating termini.74 WhateversincetheCritiqueofPureReasoncomprisedtheessenceof thetranscendental subject,functionality,thepureactivity,whichoccursintheachievementsof the individual subjects and simultaneously surpassesthese,projectsfree-floating laboronthe puresubjectasorigin.IfKanttherebyrestrictedthefunctionalityofthesubject,inthatitwould be null and void without something material befitting it,thenheunflinchingly indicated that sociallaborisoneonsomething;thegreaterconsistencyofthesubsequentidealistseliminated this without hesitation. The universality of the transcendental subject however is that of the functionalcontextofsociety,thatofawhole,whichcoalescesoutoftheindividualspontaneities and individual qualities, limiting them in turn through the leveling exchange-principle and virtually removingthem,aspowerlessly dependent onthewhole.Theuniversaldominationof exchange-value over human beings, which a priori does not permit subjects to be subjects, degrades subjectivity itself to a mere object, relegating that principle of universality, which asserts that itwouldestablish thepredominance ofthesubject,tountruth.The“more” ofthe transcendentaloneisthe“less”oftheempiricalsubject,itselfutterlyreduced.
OntheInterpretationoftheTranscendental180-182
Astheextremeborderlinecaseofideologythetranscendentalsubjectcomestowithinahairof thetruth.Thetranscendentaluniversalityisnomerenarcissisticself-exaltationoftheI,notthe hubris of its autonomy, but has its reality in the domination which ends up prevailing and perpetuating itself through the exchange-principle. The process of abstraction, which is transfiguredbyphilosophyandsolelyascribedtothecognizing subject,playsitselfoutinthe factualexchange-society.–Thedeterminationofthetranscendentalaswhatisnecessary,which conjoinsitselftofunctionalityanduniversality,expressestheprincipleoftheself-preservationof thespecies.Thislastdeliversthelegalgroundsfortheabstraction,withoutwhichitcannotwork; it is the medium of self-preserving reason. It would not take too much artifice to parody Heidegger,byinterpretingthethoughtofthenecessityinwhatisphilosophicallyuniversalasthe needtoavertprivation,byremedyingthelackofgroceriesthroughorganizedlabor;therebythe Heideggerian mythologyoflanguagewouldindeedbeunhinged:anapotheosisoftheobjective Spirit,whichfromtheverybeginningostracized thereflection onthematerial process,which reaches deep into such, as inferior. – The unity of the consciousness is that of the individual-humanandasitsprinciplealsovisiblybearsitstrace;therebythatoftheexistent.For transcendental philosophy, individual self-consciousness indeed becomes due to its ubiquity something universal, which may no longer insist on the advantages of the concretion of self-certainty; inthemeantime insofarastheunityofconsciousnessismodeledonobjectivity,
thatistosayhasitsmeasureinthepossibilityoftheconstitutionofobjects,itistheconceptual reflex of the total, seamless amalgamation of the actsofproductioninsociety,bywhichthe objectivity [Objektivität] ofcommodities, their“objectivity”[Gegenständlichkeit],isformedin the first place. – Moreover that which is solidified, persisting, impenetrable in the I is the mimesis oftheimpenetrability oftheexternal world,asperceivedbyprimitiveconsciousness, for the experiencing consciousness. In the intellectual supremacy of the subject, its real powerlessnesshasitsecho.Theego-principleimitatesitsnegation.Itisnot,asidealismhasbeen drilling in for centuries, that obiectum subiectum [Latin: object is subject]; unquestionably however,subiectum obiectum [Latin: subjectisobject]. Theprimacyofsubjectivityspiritually perpetuatestheDarwinianstruggleforexistence.Thesubjugationofnatureforhumanendsisa merenaturalrelationship;thatiswhythesuperiorityofthereasonwhichcontrolsnatureandof itsprincipleisappearance[Schein].Thesubjectparticipatesepistemologically-metaphysicallyin it,proclaimingitselfastheBaconianmasterandfinallytheidealisticcreatorofallthings.Inthe exertion of its domination it becomes part of whatitintendstocontrol,succumbinglikethe Hegelian master. What comes tolightinitis,howverymuchitisinthrall totheobject, by consumingthislatter.Whatitdoes,isthebaneofthatwhichthesubjectimaginestobeunderits bane.Itsdesperate self-exaltation isthereaction totheexperience ofitspowerlessness,which prevents self-reflection; absolute consciousness, unconscious.Kantianmoralphilosophygives splendidtestimonytothisintheunconcealedcontradictionthatthesamesubject,whichhecalls freeandsublime,isassomethingexistentapartofthatnaturalcontextwhichitsfreedomwishes toescape.ThePlatonic doctrine ofideas,apowerfulsteptowardsdemythologization, already repeats the mythos: iteternalizes thoserelationships ofdomination whichpassedfromnature overtohumanbeings,andwhichispracticedbythelatter,asessences.Ifdominationovernature wasaconditionandstageofdemythologization,thenthislatterwouldhavetoreachbeyondthat domination, if it is itself not to fall prey to mythos. The philosophical emphasis on the constitutive powerofthesubjective moment howeveralwaysblocksthetruth.Thusdoanimal species like the tricerotops dinosaur or the rhinoceroscarryaroundthearmorwhichprotects them,astheirowningrownprison,whichthey–atleastsoitappearsanthropologically–seekin vaintoshed.Theimprisonment intheapparatusofits“survival”[inEnglish]mayexplainthe especial ferocity of the rhinoceros just as much astheunacknowledged andtherefore allthe more fearsome one of homo sapiens. The subjective moment is enmeshed as it were in the objectiveone,isitself,assomethingdelimitingwhichissetdownonthesubject,objective.
“TranscendentalAppearance”[Schein]182-184
All this has, according to the traditional norms of philosophy, of the idealistic one and the ontological one, something of the hosteron proteron [Greek: what is after is whatisbefore] attached to it. What the weighty tone of stringency is to propose, is that these sorts of considerations presuppose,withoutconfessingit,asmediating whattheywishedtodeduceas mediated,i.e.thesubject,thought;alltheirdeterminationswouldalreadybe,asdeterminations, solelythought-determinations. Butthecritical thoughtdoesnotwishtoplacetheobjectonthe orphanedroyalthroneofthesubject,onwhichtheobjectwouldbenothingbutanidol,butto removethehierarchy.Indeedtheappearance [Schein]thatthetranscendentalsubjectwouldbe theArchimedeanpointofleverage,isscarcelytobebrokenbytheanalysisofsubjectivitypurely in itself. For this appearance [Schein] contains, without itneedingtobeextracted outofthe mediations of thought, that which is true of the precedence of society before the individual
consciousnessandallitsexperience.Theinsightintothemediatednessofthinkingbymeansof objectivitydoesnotnegatethinkingandtheobjectivelawsbywhichitisthinking.Thatthereis no getting around this, indicates for its part exactly that support on the non-identical which thinking,throughitsownform,deniesjustasmuchasitseeksandexpresses.Thegroundsofthe transcendental appearance [Scheins]arehoweverstilltransparentaboveandbeyondKant:why thinking in the intentio obliqua [Latin: obliqueintention] alwaysculminates inexorably inits own primacy, the hypostasis of the subject. The abstraction namely, whosereification inthe historyofnominalismsincetheAristoteleancritiqueofPlatohasbeenascribedtothesubjectas itserror,isitselftheprinciplewherebythesubjectbecomesthesubjectinthefirstplace,itsown essence. That is why the recourse to that whichitisnotitselfseemsexternal, violent. What convicts the subject of its own caprice, its prius [Latin: first]ofitsownposteriority,always soundsliketranscendental dogmatoit.Ifidealism iscriticizedstrictlyfrominsideout,thenit has the defense at hand that thecritique therebysanctions it.Byemploying itspremises, the formerwouldhavethelatter virtually already initself;hencewouldbesuperiortoit.Idealism dismisses objections from outside however as reflection-philosophical, predialectical. The analysisneednothoweverabdicateinviewofthisalternative.Immanenceisthetotalityofthose identity-positions,whoseprincipleisrenderedvoidinimmanentcritique.Idealismistobemade, asMarxputit,todancetoits“owntune”.Thenon-identical,whichdeterminesitfrominside out,followingthecriterion ofidentity,issimultaneously theoppositeofitsprinciple,whichit vainlyclaimstocontrol.Indeednoimmanentcritiquecanserveitspurposecompletelywithout knowledge from outside, without a moment of immediacy, if you will, something accessory [Dreingabe]tothesubjectivethought,whichlooksbeyondtheapparatusofdialectics.Precisely idealism cannot denounce that moment, that of spontaneity, because it itself would not be withoutit.Idealism,whoseinnermostcorewastermedspontaneity,breaksthroughspontaneity –ThesubjectasideologyisenchantedinthenameofsubjectivitylikeHauff’sDwarfNosebythe spiceSneeze-with-pleasure.Thisherbwaskeptsecretfromhim;thusheneverlearnedtoprepare thepâtéSuzeraine[French:sovereignpâté],whichbearsthenameofoverlordshipindecline.No introspectionalonewouldbringhimtotheinsightintotheruleofhisdeformedshapeasthatof hislabor.Itrequiresthepushfromoutside,thewisdomofGooseMimi.Tophilosophy,andmost ofalltotheHegelian one,suchapushisheresy.Immanentcritiquehasitsbordertherein,that thelawofthecontext ofimmanence isultimatelyonewiththedelusiontobebrokenthrough. Butthismoment,trulyindeedthatofthequalitativeleap,isrealizedsolelyinthecompletionof theimmanentdialectic,whichhasthetendencytotranscenditself,notentirelydissimilartothe transition ofthePlatonic dialectic toideaswhichexistinthemselves; ifdialectics madeitself totally conclusive, then it would already be that totality, which leads back to the identity-principle.SchellingperceivedthisinterestagainstHegel,andtherebyofferedhimselfup toridicule fortheabdication ofthought,whichfledtomysticism.Thematerialisticmomentin Schelling, whichascribedsomethinglikeadrivingpowertothematerialinitself,mayhavea share in that aspect of his philosophy. But the leap, too, is not to be hypostasized as in Kierkegaard. Otherwise itwouldtransgressagainstreason.Dialecticsmustdelimititselfoutof theconsciousnessofitself.Thedisappointment,however,thatphilosophydoesnotawakenfrom itsdreambyitsownmovemententirelywithouttheleap;thatitrequireswhatitsbanekeepsata distancefromit,somethingotherandsomethingnew–thisdisappointmentisnothingotherthan that of thechild,whichfeelssorryduringthereadingofHauff’sfairytale, becausethedwarf releasedfromitsmisshapenformneverhadtheopportunitytoservetheDukethepâtéSuzeraine.
Preponderance[Vorrang]oftheObject184-187
The thorough-going critique of identity gropes for the preponderance [Präponderanz] of the object. Identity-thinking is, even where it claims otherwise, subjectivistic. To revise this, to account for identity as untruth, establishes no equilibrium between subject and object, no hegemonyofthefunctional concept inthecognition:evenwhereitisonlyinfringedupon,the subject is already disempowered. It knows whyitfeelsabsolutely threatened bytheslightest surplus of the non-identical, according to the measure of its own absoluteness. Even as something minimal it violates the whole, because the whole is its pretension. Subjectivity changesitsqualityinacontext,whichitisnotcapableofdevelopingoutofitself.Bymeansof theinequality intheconceptofmediation,thesubjectfallstotheobjecttotallydifferentlythan thelattertotheformer.Theobjectcanonlybethoughtthroughthesubject,butalwayspreserves itselfincontrasttothisasanother;thesubjectis,however,accordingtoitsownconstitution, already anobject inadvance.Theobjectisnottobethoughtoutofexistencefromthesubject, even as an idea; but the subject, from the object. In the meaning of subjectivity is also the reckoning of being an object; but not so in the meaning of objectivity, to beasubject.The existingIisimpliciteveninthesenseofthelogical“Ithink,whichallmyconceptionsshouldbe abletofollowalong”,becauseitisthesequenceoftimefortheconditionofitspossibilityandis the sequence of time only as something temporal. The “my” referstoasubjectasanobject among objects, and without this “my” there would be in turn no “I think”. The expression existence[Dasein],synonymouswiththesubject,playsatsuchmatters-at-hand.Fromobjectivity itisassumed,thatthesubjectwouldbe;thislendstothelatter atouchofobjectivity;itisno accident thatsubiectum [Latin:whatissubject],thatwhichunderlies,recallswhattheartificial languageofphilosophynamedobjective.Theobjectbycontrastisonlyrelatedtosubjectivityin the reflection on thepossibility ofitsdetermination. Notthatobjectivity wouldbesomething immediate,thatthecritiqueofnaïverealismcouldbeforgotten.Thepreponderance[Vorrang]of the object means the progressive qualitative differentiation of what is mediated initself,not beyonddialecticsbutamomentinit,inwhichitishoweverarticulated.Kantstillrefusedtobe talked out of the moment of the preponderance of objectivity. He directed the subjective compartmentalization of the capacity of cognition in the critique ofreason75 outofobjective intent, aswellastenaciouslydefendingthetranscendentalthing-in-itself.*25*Itwasevidentto himthatitdidnotsimplycontradicttheconceptofanobject,ofbeinginitself;thatitssubjective mediationistobereckonedlesstotheideaoftheobjectthantotheinsufficiencyofthesubject. While itdidnotsucceedingoingbeyonditselfinhimeither,hedidnotsacrifice theideaof otherness.Withoutit,thecognitionwoulddegenerateintotautology;whatiscognizedwouldbe thisitself.ThisclearlyirritatedtheKantianmeditationmorethantheinconcinnity,thatthething initselfwouldbetheunknowncauseoftheappearances,eventhoughcausalityasacategoryis annexedtothesubjectinthecritiqueofreason.Insofarastheconstructionofthetranscendental subjectivity was the magnificently paradoxical and fallible effort to master the object in its antipode, then what positive, idealistic dialectics only proclaimed is to be achieved solely throughitscritique.Itrequiresanontologicalmoment,totheextentthatontologycriticallystrips the binding constitutive role from the subject, without however substituting for the subject throughtheobjectinasortofsecondimmediacy.Thepreponderanceoftheobjectisattainable solely by subjective reflection, and that upon the subject. One may illuminate this
matter-at-hand,difficult toreconcile withtherulesofcurrentlogicandseeminglyabsurdinits abstract expression, by noting that an Ur-history of the subject could indeed be written, as outlined intheDialectic ofEnlightenment,butnoUr-historyoftheobject.Thiswouldalways already deal with objects. If it was argued against this that there would be no cognition concerning the object without the cognizing subject, then no ontological priority of the consciousnessfollowsfromthis.Everyassertionthatsubjectivitywouldsomehow“be”,already includes an objectivity, which the subject by meansofitsabsolutebeingwouldfirstneedto ground.Onlybecausethesubjectisforitspartmediated,henceisnottheradicalOtherofthe object, whichfirstlegitimates this,doesithavethecapacity tograspobjectivityatall.Rather thanconstitutive, thesubjective mediation istheblockbeforeobjectivity; theformerdoesnot absorbwhatisessentialtothelatter,theexistent.Theautonomizedconsciousness,theepitomeof whatisactiveintheachievementsofcognition,hasgeneticallybranchedofffromthelibidinous energyofthespecies-beingofhumanity.Itsessenceisnotindifferenttowardsthis;bynomeans doesitdefine,asinHusserl,the“sphereofabsoluteorigins”.Consciousnessisthefunctionof thelivingsubject,itsconcept isformedinitsimage.Thisisnottobeexorcisedoutofitsown meaning. Theobjection thattheempiricalmomentofsubjectivitywouldtherebybeintermixed with the transcendental or essential one is feeble. Without any relation to an empirical consciousness, tothatofthelivingI,therewouldbenotranscendental,purelyintellectualone. Analogous reflections on the genesis of the object would be nugatory. Themediation ofthe objectsays,thatitmaynotbestatically,dogmaticallyhypostasized,butisonlytobecognizedin its imbrication with subjectivity; the mediation of the subject, that without the moment of objectivity it would literally be nothing. The index of thepreponderance oftheobject isthe powerlessness of the Spirit in all its judgements hitherto in the arrangement of reality The negative, that the Spirit’s reconciliation failed along with the identification, that its preponderance[Vorrang]miscarried,becomesthemotorofitsowndisenchantment.Itistrueand appearance [Schein]:true,becausenothingisexemptfromthedomination,whichitreducedto itspureform;untrue,becauseinitsintertwining withdomination itisnotatalltheSpirit,for which it takes itself and claims to be. Thereby the Enlightenment transcends its traditional self-understanding:itisdemythologizationnotmerelyasreductioadhominem[Latin:reduction totheperson],butalsoconverselyasreductiohominis[Latin:humanreduction],astheinsight intothedeceptionofthesubject,whichstylizesitselfastheabsolute.Thesubjectisthelateform ofmythos,andyettheequalofitsmostancientform.
ObjectNotaGiven187-190
Thepreponderance oftheobject, assomethingwhichisnevertheless itselfmediated,doesnot break off the subject-object dialectic. Immediacy is so little beyond dialectics as mediation. Accordingtothetraditionofepistemologytheimmediatefallsunderthesubject,butasitsgiven fact[Gegebenheit] oraffection.Indeedthesubjectissupposed,insofarasitisautonomousand spontaneous, to have formative power over this; it has none however insofar as what is immediately given would be simply there. It is just as much the bedrock state of affairs [Grundbestand], on which the doctrine ofsubjectivity rested–thatofthe“mine”, thatofthe contentofthesubjectasitspossession–asitresistssomethingobjectiveintheformofwhatis given,theMenetekel,asitwere,ofobjectivityinthesubject.ThatiswhyHume,inthenameof whatisimmediate,criticizedidentity,theprincipleoftheI,whichwouldliketomaintainitself asindependently-realized againsttheimmediate.Immediacyisnothowevertobesolidified,so
astopleaseanepistemology calibrated toconclusiveness. Initwhatisimmediatelygivenand theforms,whichareequallysimplygiven,aretailoredcomplementarilytoeachother.Though immediacy does command a halt to the idolatry of derivation, itishoweverforitspartalso somethingabstracted fromtheobject, therawmaterial ofthesubjectiveproduction-processin which epistemology had its model. The given is in its impoverished and blind form not objectivity, but rather merely the borderline value which the subject, after it confiscated the concrete object,hasnotcompletelymasteredinitsownmagiccircle.Tothisextentempiricism tooknote,inspiteofallsensualisticreductionofthethings,ofsomethingofthepreponderance oftheobject:sinceLockeitinsistedthattherewouldbenocontentofconsciousnesswhichdid notstemfromthesenses,wouldnotbe“given”. Thecritiqueofnaïverealisminthewholeof empiricism, culminating in the abolition of the thing byHume,wasalways,byvirtueofthe characteroffacticityofimmediacytowhichitwastied,andtheskepticismagainstthesubjectas creator,despiteeverythingstillrudimentarily“realistic”.Oncethinkinghasfreeditselffromthe suppositionofthepreponderanceofthesubject,thenempiristicepistemologynolongerhasthe legal right to transfer, as a residual determination, a kind ofminimum oftheobject intothe immediacyofthedata,bymeansofthesubjectivereduction.Suchaconstructionisnothingbuta compromise betweenthedogmaofthepreponderanceofthesubjectanditsunattainability;the naked, sensible datum, divested of its determinations, is the product of that process of abstraction,towhichtheKantiansubjectiveepistemologycontrastedit;thepurerthedatumfrom its forms, the more threadbare, “abstract” italsobecomes.Theresiduumoftheobject asthe given, which remains after the subtraction of subjective additions, is a deception of prima philosophia. That the determinations through which the object becomes concrete would be merely imposedonit,isvalidonlyfortheunshakablefaithintheprimacy ofsubjectivity Its forms are however not, as in Kant’s doctrine, something ultimate to cognition; this latter is capableofbreakingthroughitinthecourseofitsexperience.Ifphilosophy,disastrouslysplitoff fromthenaturalsciences,mayrefertophysicsatallwithoutshort-circuitingitself,thenitwould be in such acontext. Thelatter’sdevelopment sinceEinstein has,withtheoretical stringency, blasted apart the prison of the intuition as well as the subjective aprioriofspace,time and causality.Thesubjective–inkeepingwiththeNewtonianprincipleofobservation–experience speaks,withthepossibilityofsuchanoutbreak,onbehalfofthepreponderanceoftheobjectand againstitsownsupremacy.Itturns,asinvoluntarilydialecticalSpirit,thesubjectiveobservation againstthedoctrine ofwhatissubjectively constituted. Theobjectismorethanpurefacticity; that this is not to be removed,forbidsitatthesametime toremain content withitsabstract conceptanditsdregs,therecordedsense-data.Theideaofaconcreteobjectfallstothecritique ofsubjective-external categorization andthatofitscorrelate, thefiction ofsomethingfactical, devoid of determination. Nothing in the world is comprised – added up,asitwere–outof facticity and concept. The power of proof of the Kantianexample ofthehundredimaginary thalers,whoserealityisnotascribedtothemasafurthercharacteristic,strikestheform-content dualismoftheCritiqueofPureReasonitselfandhasapowerfarbeyondthis;actuallyitdenies the distinction between the Many and the One, which the tradition of philosophy has been making since Plato. Neither concept nor facticity are additions to theircomplement. Hegel’s presumptuouslyidealisticpresupposition,thatthesubjectcouldthuspurely,unreservedlydeliver itselfovertotheobject,tothethingitself,becausethatthingwouldrevealitselfintheprocess, aswhatitwouldalreadybeinitself,thesubject,notessomethingtrueagainstidealismbeyond thethinkingmodeofconductofthesubject:itmustreally“lookat”theobject,becauseitdoes notcreatetheobject,andthemaximofcognitionistofacilitatethis.Thepostulatedpassivityof
thesubjectismeasuredbytheobjectivedeterminacyoftheobject.Butitrequiresamorelasting subjective reflection thantheidentifications which,already according toKantiandoctrine, the consciousnessautomatically,asitwere,unconsciouslycarriesout.ThattheactivityoftheSpirit, even that which Kant reckoned as the constitution-problem, is something different than that automatism whichheequated itwith,specifically comprises theintellectual experience which the idealists discovered, thoughimmediately castrated. Whatthethingitselfmaymeanisnot positive,immediatelyavailable;whoeverwishestocognizeit,mustthinkmore,notlessthanthe pointofrelationofthesynthesisoftheMany,whichisthesame,atbottom,asnothinkingatall. Therein the thing is itself by no means a thought-product; rather the non-identical, by and through identity. Such non-identity is no “idea”; but something supplemental to such. The experiencing subjectlaborstodisappearinit.Truthwouldbeitsdownfall.Thelatterismerely feigned by the subtraction of everything specific of subjectivity in the scientific method, ad maiorem gloriam[Latin:tothegreaterglory]ofthesubject,whichhasgrownindependentasa method.
ObjectivityandReification190-193
Tophilosophyofimport,thethoughtofthepreponderanceoftheobjectissuspect,theaversion againstthisinstitutionalizedsinceFichte.Thethousand-foldrepeatedandvariedassurancetothe contrarywishestodrownoutthefesteringsuspicionthattheheteronomouswouldbemightier than the autonomy,whichalready inKant’sdoctrine isnotsupposedtobecompelled bythat overwhelming power Such philosophical subjectivism ideologically accompanies the emancipation of the bourgeois I as its foundation. It draws its tenacious power from the misdirected oppositionagainsttheexistent:againstitsthingliness.Byrelativizingorliquefying this, philosophy believes itself to be beyond the primacy of commodities and beyond its subjectiveformofreflection,thereifiedconsciousness.InFichtethatimpulseisunmistakableas thedrivetowardshegemony Itwasanti-ideologicalinsofarasitsawthroughthebeing-in-itself of the world, which wasconfirmed byconventional, unreflective consciousness assomething artificiallymade,somethingbadlyself-preserved.Inspiteofthepreponderanceoftheobjectthe thingliness oftheworldisalsoappearance [Schein].Itmisleadsthesubjectsintoascribingthe social relationship of their production to things in themselves. This is developed in Marx’s chapter on fetishism, truly a piece of the legacy of classic German philosophy. Even its systematic motive survives therein: the fetish-character of commodities is not chalked up to subjective-mistakenconsciousness,butobjectivelydeducedoutofthesocialapriori,theprocess of exchange. Already in Marx the difference is expressed between the preponderance ofthe objectassomethingtobecriticallyestablishedanditsremnantsintheexistent,itsdistortionby the commodity-form. Exchange has,assomethingwhichoccurs[Vorgängige],realobjectivity andisneverthelessobjectivelyuntrue,violatesitsownprinciple,thatofequality;thatiswhyit necessarily creates false consciousness, the idol of the market. The natural-rootedness of exchange-societyisonlysardonicallyalawofnature;theprimacyoftheeconomic,noinvariant. Itiseasyforthoughttoimagine asconsolation thatitpossessesthephilosopher’sstoneinthe dissolutionofreification,ofthecommoditycharacter.Butreificationitselfisthereflection-form of false objectivity; to center theory on it, a form of consciousness, makes critical theory idealisticallyacceptabletothedominatingconsciousnessandthecollectiveunconscious.Itisto this that the earlier texts of Marx, in contrast toCapital,owetheircontemporary popularity, especially among theologians. There is no lack of irony that the brutal and primitive
functionaries who labeled Lukacs a heretic more than forty years ago due to thechapter on reificationintheimportantbookHistoryandClassConsciousnesssuspectedwhatwasidealistic in his conception. Dialectics is so little to be reduced to reification as to any other isolated category,wereiteversopolemical. Whathumanbeingssufferfrom,thelamentofreification wouldinthemeantimeratherglossoverthandenounce.Thewoeliesintherelationshipswhich damnhumanbeingstopowerlessnessandapathyandyetwouldhavetobechangedbythem;not primarilyinhumanbeingsandthemannerinwhichtherelationshipsappeartothem.Incontrast to the possibility of total catastrophe, reification isanepiphenomenon; allthemoresoisthe alienation coupled to it, the subjective state of consciousness, which corresponds to it. It is reproducedbyfear;consciousness,reifiedinthealreadyconstitutedsociety,isnotitsconstituens [Latin:whatconstitutes].Thosewhoregardthethinglyaswhatisradicallyevil;whowouldlike to dynamize everything, which is, into pure contemporaneity, tend to be hostile towards the other, the alien, whose name does not resoundinalienation fornothing;tothatnon-identity, whichwouldneedtobeemancipatednotsolelyinconsciousnessbutinareconciledhumanity. Absolute dynamics however would be that absolute handling of the facts, which violently satisfies itselfandmisusesthenon-identicalasitsmereoccasion.Unbrokenuniversallyhuman slogansservetherebyonceagaintomakewhatisnotthesameasthesubject,intowhatisthe same. The things harden themselves asfragmentsofwhatwassubjugated; thelatter’srescue means the love for things. What consciousness experiences as thingly and alien isnottobe expelled fromthedialecticoftheexistent:negatively,compulsionandheteronomy,yetalsothe distortedfigureofwhatoughttobeloved,andwhatthebane,theendogamyofconsciousness, doesnotpermittobeloved.FarbeyondtheRomanticismwhichfeltitselfasweltschmerz,asthe suffering from alienation, hover Eichendorff’s words, “beautiful stranger [Fremde: alien, stranger]”. The reconciled condition would not annex the alien [Fremde] by means of a philosophicalimperialism,butwouldfinditshappinessinthefactthatthelatterremainswhatis distantanddivergentinthegivennearness,asfarbeyondtheheterogenousaswhatisitsown. Theuntiringchargeofreification blocksthatdialectic, andthisindictstheconstruction inthe philosophyofhistory,whichsupportsthatcomplaint.Thetrulymeaningfultimes,whosereturn the young Lukacs longed for, were just as much the product of reification, of inhuman institutions, as he only attested to those of the bourgeois ones. Contemporary depictions of medieval cities often look as if executions took place precisely as a form of popular entertainment. Shouldanysortofharmonyofsubjectandobjecthaveprevailedanno[Latin:in that year], then it was realized by pressure exactly like the recent ones, and fragile. The transfiguration of past conditions serves the later and superfluous renunciation, which is experienced as inexorable; only when lost do they gain their allure. Their cult, that of the pre-subjective phases, came to itself in the era of declining individuation and the regressive collective inhorror.Reificationandreifiedconsciousnessrealized,alongwiththeunbindingof thenatural sciences, alsothepotential ofaworldwithoutscarcity;previouslytheconditionof humanity was already dehumanized by what was thingly;76 at least these wenttogether with thinglyformsofconsciousness, whiletheindifferenceforthings,whichareappraisedaspure meansandreducedtothesubject,helpedtogrinddownhumanity.Bothareineachotherinthe thingly, the un-identical of the object and the subjugation ofhumanity underthedominating relations of production, their own functional context, unbeknownst to them. In his sparse utterances on the constitution of an emancipated society, the mature Marx changed his
relationship to the division of labor, to the grounds of reification.77 He differentiated the conditionoffreedomfromprimevalimmediacy.Inthemomentofplanning,inwhichheplaced hishopesofproductionforlivingbeings–inasense,fortherestitutionofimmediacy–instead offorprofit,thethinglyalienispreserved;asisthemediationintheoutlineoftherealization, whichphilosophyatfirstonlythought.Thatmeanwhiledialecticswouldnotbepossiblewithout the moment of what is solidified as thingly and would be glossed asaharmless doctrine of transformation, is neither to be chalked up to philosophical habit nor solely to the social compulsion, which the consciousness gives itself to cognize in such solidity. It is up to philosophy,tothinkwhatisdivergentfromthought,whichalonemakesitintothought,whileits daemontriestotalkitintothinking,thatitshouldnotbe.
TransitiontoMaterialism192-194
Throughthetransition tothepreponderance oftheobjectdialecticsbecomesmaterialistic.The object, the positive expression of the non-identical, is a terminological mask. In the object, prepared to this by the cognition, what is corporeal is intellectualized in advance by its translation intoepistemology,reducedtothesortwhichHusserl’sphenomenology,ingeneral, methodologicallysubornedit.Ifthecategoriesofsubjectandobject,indissolubletothecritique ofcognition,appeartobepositedfalselyinsuch:asnotpurelyopposedtoeachother,thenthis also means, it would name what is objective in the object, whatisnottobeintellectualized therein,astheobjectonlyfromthestandpointofthesubjectivelydirectedanalysis,inwhichthe primacy ofthesubjectseemsunquestionable.Observedfromtheoutside,whatinthereflection ontheSpiritisspecificallyrepresentedasnotintellectual,asobject,ismaterial.Thecategoryof non-identity still obeys the measure of identity Emancipated from such a measure, the non-identicalmomentsshowthemselvesasmatter,orasinseparablyfusedwithwhatismaterial. Sensation,thecruxofallepistemology,isreinterpretedbythislatterintoafactofconsciousness, in contradiction to itsownfull-fledged constitution, whichisnevertheless supposedtobethe juridical source of cognition. No sensation without the somatic moment. To this extent its conceptis,incontrasttowhatitpresumablysubsumed,twistedforthesakeofthedemandofan autarkiccontextofallstagesofcognition.Whilesensationbelongstoconsciousness,inkeeping withthecognitiveprincipleofstylization,itsphenomenology,whichisunbiasedaccordingtothe rulesofcognition,mustdescribeitbythesametokenasthatwhichisnotcompletelyworkedout in consciousness. Eachoneoftheseisinitselfalsocorporeal feeling. Thesensation doesnot even“accompany” it.Thiswouldpresupposeitschorismosbythebodily;itisobtainedsolely fromthenoologicalintentioninit,inthestrictsensethroughabstraction.Thelinguisticshading ofwordslikesensual,sensuous,indeedevensensationbetraysjusthowlittlethematters-at-hand designated thereby are what epistemology treats them as, pure moments of cognition. The subject-immanentreconstructionoftheworldofthingswouldnothavethebasisofitshierarchy, thatofsensation,withoutthephysis,whichautarkicepistemologywouldliketoconstructoverit. Thesomatic moment isirreducible asthenotpurelycognitive oneincognition. Withthisthe subjective claim also becomes untenable, exactly where radical empiricism hadconservedit. That the cognitive achievements of the cognitive subject are, according to itsownmeaning, somatic, affectsnotonlythefoundationalrelationshipofsubjectandobjectbutalsothedignity ofthecorporeal. Itemergesattheonticpoleofsubjectivecognitionasitscore.Thisdethrones the guiding notion of epistemology, which constitutes the body as the law of thecontext of
sensations and acts, i.e. as intellectualized; sensations are already in themselves what the systematics would like to establish as their formation through consciousness. Traditional philosophy has bewitched what is heterogenous to it through the tailoring of its categories. Neithersubjectnorobjectaremerely“posited”,intheHegelianmannerofspeaking.Thisalone would fully explain why the antagonism which philosophy clothed in thewordssubjectand object cannot be interpreted as an Ur-matter-at-hand. Otherwise theSpiritwouldbecome the utterlyotherofthebody,incontradictiontowhatisimmanentlysomatictoit;theantagonismis not however to be annulled bytheSpiritalone,becausethatwouldvirtually intellectualize it once more. What is announced in it is both what the preponderance would have before the subjectandslipsawayfromthislatter,aswellastheirreconcilabilityoftheepochoftheworld withthesubject,theinvertedform,asitwere,ofthepreponderanceofobjectivity.
MaterialismandImmediacy195-197
Theidealisticcritiqueofmaterialismgladlydeploys,insofarasitproceedsimmanentlyanddoes not simply preach, the doctrine of the immediately given. The facts of consciousness are supposedtoground,likealljudgementsovertheworldofthings,theconceptofmatteraswell.If one wished, according to the lights of vulgarmaterialism, toequate whatisintellectual with events in the brain, then the originary sensuous perceptions would have to be, so runs the idealisticcounter-argument,suchoftheeventsofthebrain,notthoseofforexamplecolors.The indisputable stringencyofsucharefutationisowedtothestolidcapriceofwhatitpolemicizes against.Thereductiontotheeventsofconsciousnessallowsitselftobetiedtotheapron-strings ofthescientificcognitiveideal,ofthenecessitytoseamlesslyandmethodicallysteelthevalidity of scientific propositions. Verification, which for its part is subject to the philosophical problematic, becomes its guideline, science is as itwereontologized, asifthecriteria ofthe validity of judgements, thepathoftheirtesting,weresimplythesameasthematters-at-hand whichtheydealwithretroactively,assomethingalreadyconstituted,inkeepingwiththenorms oftheirsubjective comprehensibility.Thetestingofscientific judgements mustbeachievedin multiplecases,bymakingitclearstepforstep,howonearrivedatthejudgementinquestion.It is thereby subjectively accentuated: which mistakes the cognizing subject made, when its judgement – say, one which runs counter to other propositions in thesamediscipline –was made. It is evident, however, that such retrospective questions do not coincide with the matter-at-handbeingjudgedanditsobjective foundation.Ifsomeonehasmiscalculated,andif this is demonstrated to them, then this does not mean thattheexample ofcalculation orthe mathematicalrulesgoverningthiswouldbereducibleto“their”calculation,asmuchasthistoo, as a moment of its objectivity, may require subjective acts.Thisdistinction hasconsiderable consequences fortheconcept ofatranscendental, constitutive logic.Kantalreadyrepeatedthe mistake forwhichhelambasted hisrationalisticpredecessors,anamphibolyoftheconceptsof reflection. He substituted the reflection on the path which the cognizing subject took in judgements, inplace oftheobjective foundationofthejudgement.Thisisnottheleastreason thattheCritiqueofPureReasonshowsitselftobeatheoryofscience.Toinstallthatamphiboly asaphilosophicalprinciple,ultimatelytopressmetaphysicsoutofitlikewine,wasprobablythe most disastrous Freudian slip in the history of modern philosophy. It is for its part to be understoodinthephilosophyofhistory.AfterthedestructionoftheThomisticordo[Latin:social order], which regarded objectivity as the will of God, this latter appeared to break down. Simultaneously however scientific objectivity, in contrast to mere opinion, increased
immeasurablyandwithittheself-confidenceofitsorgan,theratio.Thecontradictionwastobe resolvedbycausingtheratiotopermititsreinterpretationfromtheinstrument,fromthecourtof appeals of reflection, intowhatisconstituted, inthesortofontological mannerbywhichthe rationalism of the Wolff school expressly proceeded. To this extent the Kantian criticism remained bound to pre-critical thought and the entire subjective doctrine ofconstitution; this became evident in the post-Kantian idealists. The hypostasisofthemeans,todayalready the self-evidentcustomofhumanbeings,laytheoreticallyintheso-calledCopernicanturn.Itisnot fornothingthatthismetaphorinKantis,accordingtothesubstantivetendency,theoppositeof theastronomical one.Thetraditional discursive logic,whichdirectsthecurrentargumentation againstmaterialism,wouldhavetocriticizetheprocedureaspetitioprincipii[Latin:beggingthe question].Theprecedenceofconsciousness,whichforitspartissupposedtolegitimatescience, as it is presupposed at the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason, is deduced from the standardsofthemannerofprocedure,whichconfirmorrefutejudgementsaccordingtoscientific ground-rules.Suchacircular conclusionistheindexofafalseapproach.Whatithushesup,is thatthereisnopurefactoftheconsciousnessinitself,asanunquestionableandabsolutefirst: thatwasthebasicexperience ofthegenerationoftheJugendstilandneo-romantics,whowere horror-stricken by the prevailing conception of a conclusive factuality of what is psychic. Retrospectively,underthedictateofvalidity-controlsandoutoftheclassificatoryneed,thefacts ofconsciousnessbecomedifferentiatedfromtheirsubtleborder-transitions,whichrefutewhatis supposedly solid inthem,especially tothoseofcorporeal innervations. Thisconfirmsthatno subjectoftheimmediatelygiven,noI,whichmightbegiven,ispossibleindependentfromthe transsubjective world.Thosetowhomsomethingisgivenbelongaprioritothesamesphereas whatwasgiventothem.Thiscondemnsthethesisofthesubjectiveapriori.Materialismisnot thedogmawhichitscannyopponentsaccuseitof,butratherthedissolutionofsomethingwhich foritspartisseenthroughasdogmatic;henceitsjustificationincriticalphilosophy WhenKant construedfreedomasfreedomfromsensationintheFoundationforaMetaphysicsofMorals,he did involuntary honortowhathewishedtoargueaway Theidealistic hierarchy ofthegiven facts [Gegebenheiten] is so little to berescuedastheabsoluteseparation ofbodyandSpirit, which was secretly already tantamount to the preponderance of the Spirit. Both ended up historically,inthecourseofthedevelopmentofrationalityandtheego-principle,inoppositionto eachother;yetneitheriswithouttheother.Thoughthelogicofnon-contradictorinessmayfind faultwiththis,itishowevercommandedtohaltbythatmatter-at-hand.Thephenomenologyof thefactsofconsciousnessnecessitatesgoingbeyond,wheretheyhavebeendefinedassuch.
DialecticsNoSociologyofKnowledge197-198
Marx had emphasized historical materialism as opposed to the vulgar-metaphysical kind.He thereby drew it into the philosophical problematic, leaving vulgarmaterialism torompabout dogmaticallyonthissideofphilosophy.Sincethenmaterialismisnolongeracounter-positionto bevoluntarily takenup,buttheepitomeofthecritiqueofidealismandoftherealityforwhich idealismopts,bydistortingit.Horkheimer’sformulation“criticaltheory”doesnotwishtomake materialism acceptable, but rather to bring to the latter the theoretical self-consciousness, wherebyitdistinguishes itselfnolessfromtheworld-explanationsofdilettantesthanfromthe “traditional theory”ofscience. Theorymust,asadialecticalone–liketheMarxistone,byfar andaway–beimmanent, evenwhenitultimatelynegatestheentiresphereinwhichitmoves. Thiscontrastsittoasociologyofknowledge,whichmerelybroughtsomethingfromoutsideand,
asphilosophyquicklydiscovered,ispowerlessagainstthis.Thisfailsbeforephilosophy,whose socialfunctionandwhoseconditionality ofinterest itsubstitutedforthetruth-content,whileit did not enter into that truth-content’s own critique, behaving indifferently towards it.Itfails equally beforetheconcept ofideology,outofwhichitcooksitswaterybeggar’ssoup.Forthe conceptofideologyismeaningfulonlyintherelationshiptothetruthoruntruthofwhatitaims at;socially necessary appearance [Schein]canbespokenofsolelyinreference towhatisnot appearance [Schein],andwhatindeedhasitsindexintheappearance [Schein].Itisuptothe critiqueofideologytojudgetheshareofthesubjectandobjectanditsdynamic.Itrejectsfalse objectivity,thefetishismofconcepts,throughthereductiontothesocialsubject;similarlywith falsesubjectivity,theclaim, attimesconcealedalmosttoinvisibility,thatwhatiswouldbethe Spirit, by the proof of its swindle, its parasitic bad state of affairs as well as its immanent hostility to the Spirit. By contrast the all of the undifferentiated total concept of ideology terminatesinnothingness.Assoonasitceasestodistinguishitselffromtherightconsciousness, thenitnolongerservesforthecritiquethewrongone.Intheideaofobjectivetruthmaterialistic dialectics becomes necessarily philosophical, despite and by virtue of all the critique of philosophy, which it practices. The sociology of knowledge on the other hand denies the objectivestructureofsocietyaswellastheideaofobjectivetruthanditscognition.Toitsociety is nothing but the average value of individual modes of reaction, similar to the type of positivistic economics co-founded by Pareto. It turns the doctrine of ideology back into a doctrineofidols,inthemoldoftheearlybourgeoisone;actuallyacheaplegaltrick,inorderto beridofmaterialisticdialecticsalongwiththeentiretyofphilosophy InclassificationtheSpirit becomes localized tel quel [French: as such]. Such a reduction of so-called forms of consciousnessisentirelycompatiblewithphilosophicalapologetics.Theexcuseofthesociology of knowledge remains undisturbed, that thetruthoruntruthofwhatisphilosophically taught would have nothing to do with social conditions; relativism and the division of labor ally themselves.ThetwoworldstheoryofthelaterSchelerwastednotimeinexploitingthis.Social categoriesaretobeaccessedphilosophicallysolelythroughthedecodingofthetruth-contentof thephilosophicalones.
as one mediated in itself, as much the Spirit as non-Spirit; he would not have drawn the conclusion,ofthrowingoffthechainsofabsoluteidentity.IfhowevertheSpiritneeds,inwhatit is,thatwhichitisnot,thentherecoursetolaborisnolongerwhattheapologistsofthebranchof philosophy reiterate astheirultimate wisdom:ametabasiseisallogenos[Greek:changeinto anothergenus].Theinsightofidealismisnotlost,thattheactivityoftheSpiritisperformedas laborthroughindividuals asmuchasthroughtheirmeans,andthatindividuals arereducedto theirfunctionsinitsperformance.TheidealisticconceptofSpiritexploitsthetransitiontosocial labor: it all too easily permits the general activity, whichabsorbstheindividual doers,tobe transfigured into an in-itself, while ignoring these latter. The polemic answer to this is the sympathyofmaterialismwithnominalism.Philosophicallyhoweveritwastoonarrow;thatwhat is individual and the individuals would be solely what istrulyreal,isincompatible withthe Marxisttheoryofthelawofvalue,schooledinHegel,whichrealizesitselfincapitalismoverthe heads of human beings. The dialectical mediation of the universal and the specific doesnot permitthetheorywhichoptsfortheparticulartooverhastilytreattheuniversalasasoapbubble. Theorycouldthenneithergraspthenoxiousprimacyofthegeneralintheexistentnortheideaof acondition which,bygivingindividuals whatistheirs,wouldremovetheuniversalofitsbad particularity. Just aslittle howeverisatranscendental subjecttobeimagined withoutsociety, without the individuals which it integrates for good or ill; that is what the concept of the transcendentalsubjectfounderson.EvenKant’suniversalitywishestobeoneforall,namelyfor allbeingsendowedwithreason,andthoseendowedwithreasonareapriorisocialized.Scheler’s attempttounceremoniouslybanishmaterialismtothenominalisticsidewasatacticalmaneuver Materialismisfirst,notwithouttheassistanceofanundeniablelackofphilosophicalreflection, blackened assubaltern,andthenitssubalternityisgloriouslyovercome.Thecrudeworld-view, whichwassodetested bythematerialistic dialectic thatitpreferredtoallyitselfwithscience, waswhatititselfbecameinitsdegradationtoapoliticalmeansofdomination.Itconflictswith whatBrechtsuicidally demandedofit,thesimplificationfortacticalends.Itisdialecticaleven accordingtoitsownessence,asphilosophyandanti-philosophy Thephrasethatconsciousness dependsonbeingwasnoinvertedmetaphysics,butaimedagainstthedeceptionoftheSpirit,that it would be in itself beyond the total process, in which itfindsitselfasamoment. Evenits conditions meanwhile are no in-itself. Theexpression“being” inMarxandHeideggermeans something completely divergent, althoughnotwithoutatrace ofsimilarity: intheontological doctrine of the priority of being before thought, its “transcendence”, a materialistic echo reverberates out of the furthest distance. The doctrine of being becomes ideological, by imperceptiblyintellectualizingthematerialisticmomentinthoughtthroughitstranspositioninto pure functionality beyond everything existent, magically dispelling what dwells within the materialistic concept ofbeinginthecritiqueoffalseconsciousness.Theword,whichthetruth wishedtonameagainstideology,becomesthatwhichismostuntrue:thedenialofidealityinto theproclamationofanidealsphere.
conceptitsactivityisintratemporal,historical;abecomingaswellaswhathasbecome,inwhich becoming accumulates. Just like time, whose most general conception requires something temporal,noactivityiswithoutasubstrate,withouttheactivatorandwithoutthatonwhichitis exerted.Intheideaofabsoluteactivitylieshiddenonly,whatissupposedtobedonethere;the pure noêsis noêseôs [Greek: thinking of thinking] is the shamefaced belief, neutralized into metaphysics, inthedivinecreator.Theidealistic doctrine oftheabsolutewouldliketoabsorb theological transcendence asprocess,tobringittoanimmanencewhichtoleratesnoabsolute, nothing independent from ontic conditions. It is perhaps the most profound inconsistency of idealism, thatitmustontheonehandcarryoutsecularization totheextreme, inordernotto sacrifice its claim to the totality, on the other hand however can express its phantomofthe absolute,thetotality,solelyintheologicalcategories.Tornfromreligion,theybecomedevoidof essenceandarenotfulfilledinthat“experienceofconsciousness”,whichtheyarenowdelivered overto.TheactivityoftheSpirit,oncehumanized,canbeattributedtonooneandnothingelse butlivingbeings.Thisinfiltrateseventheconcept,whichovershootsallnaturalismthefurthest, thatofthesubjectivityasthesyntheticunityofapperception,withthemomentofnature.Solely insofarasitisalsothenot-I,doestheIrelatetothenot-I,“does”something,andwoulditselfbe the doing ofthethinking.Thinkingbreaksthesupremacyofthoughtoveritsotherinsecond reflection,becauseitisalwaysalreadytheotherinitself.Thatiswhythehighestabstraktum[the abstract, the abstract concept] of all activity, the transcendental function, affords no preponderance [Vorrang] over the factical genesis. No ontological abyss yawns between the momentofrealityinitandtheactivityofrealsubjects;hencenonebetweentheSpiritandlabor Indeedthislatterisnotexhausted,astheassemblingofsomethingpreconceivedwhichwasnot yetfactical,inwhatisinexistencethere[Daseiendem];theSpiritissolittletobeleveleddown toexistenceasthislattertotheformer YetthenotexistingmomentintheSpiritissointerwoven withexistence, thattoneatly pickitoutwouldbesomuchastoconcretizeandfalsifyit.The controversyoverthepriorityofSpiritandbodyproceedspre-dialectically Itdragsonfurtherthe questionconcerningafirst.ItalmostaimsHylozoisticallyatanarchê[Greek:beginning,origin], ontological according to the form, though the answer may sound materialistic in terms of content. Both, body and Spirit, are abstractions of their experience, their radical difference somethingposited.Theyreflect thehistoricallyachieved“self-consciousness”oftheSpiritand its renunciation of what itnegated, forthesakeofitsownidentity.Everything intellectual is modified corporeal impulse, and such modification, the qualitative recoil intothatwhichnot merelyis.Stress[Drang],accordingtoSchelling’sinsight*26*,istheprecursorofSpirit.
SufferingPhysical202-204
Thepresumedbasicfactsofconsciousness areanythingbut.Inthedimensionofpleasureand displeasure, the bodily reaches deep into them. All pain and all negativity, the motor of dialectical thought,arethemanytimesovermediated,sometimesbecomeunrecognizableform ofthephysical,justasallhappinessaimsatsensualfulfillmentandgarnersitsobjectivityinit.If anyaspectofhappinessisfrustrated,thenitisnonewhatsoever.Inthesubjectivesensuousdata, thatdimension,whichforitspartcontradictstheSpiritinthis,becomesasitwerewatereddown toitsepistemologicalcopy,notatallsodifferentfromthecurioustheoryofHume,accordingto whichconceptions,“ideas”[inEnglish]–thefactsofconsciousnesswithintentionalfunction–are supposed to be mere copies of impressions. This doctrine is easily criticized as secretly naïve-naturalistic. But in it the somatic moment trembles epistemologically foronelasttime,
beforeitiscompletely drivenout.Incognition itsurvivesasitsdisquiet,whichbringsitinto motion and reproduces itself unpacified in its course; unhappy consciousness is no deluded vanity of the Spirit but inherent to it, the sole authentic dignity, which it received in the separation from the body. This remindsit,negatively,ofitscorporeal aspect; solelythatitis capable of this, lends it any sort of hope. The smallest trace of senseless suffering in the experienced world condemns the whole of identity-philosophy, which would like to talk experienceoutofthis,asalie:“Solongasthereisevenasinglebeggar,therewillbemythos”;78 that is why identity-philosophy is mythology asthought.Thecorporeal moment registers the cognition,thatsufferingoughtnottobe,thatthingsshouldbedifferent.“Woespeaks:go.”That is why what is specifically materialistic converges with what is critical, with socially transformingpraxis.Theabolition ofsuffering,oritsmitigationtoadegreewhichisnottobe theoretically assumedinadvance, towhichnolimitcanbeset,isnotuptotheindividualwho endures suffering, but solely to the species that it belongsto,evenwhereithassubjectively renouncedthelatterandisobjectivelyforcedintotheabsolutelonelinessofthehelplessobject. Allactivitiesofthespeciesmakereferencetoitsphysicalcontinuedexistence,eveniftheyfail torecognizethis,becomingorganizationallyautonomousandseeingtotheirbusinessonlyasan afterthought. Even the institutions which society creates in ordertoexterminate itselfare,as unleashed, absurd self-preservation, simultaneously their own unconscious actions against suffering. Narrowly restricted indeed by what is their own,theirtotal particularity alsoturns against this. Confronted with them, the purpose which alone makes society into a society demandsthatitbesoarranged,aswhattherelations ofproductionhereandthererelentlessly prevent,andaswhatwouldbeimmediatelypossibletotheproductiveforcesrighthereandnow Suchanarrangementwouldhaveitstelosinthenegationofphysicalsufferingofeventheleast ofitsmembers,andoftheinnervatedreflection-formsofthatsuffering.Itisintheinterestofall, at this pointtoberealized solelythroughasolidarity transparent toitselfandtoeveryliving being.
MaterialismImageless204-207
Tothosewhowishthatitnotberealized,materialismhasinthemeantimedonethefavorofits self-degradation.Theimmaturitywhichcausedthisisnot,asKantthought,thefaultofhumanity itself. In the meantime atleastitisreproducedaccording toplanbythepowersthatbe.The objective Spirit, which they direct, because they require its chaining, adjusts itself to that consciousness, which was enchained for millenia. The materialism which achieved political powerhasdevoteditselftosuchpraxisnolessthantheworld,whichitoncewantedtochange;it continuestochaintheconsciousness, insteadofcomprehending itandforitspartchangingit. Terroristic state-machineries entrench themselves underthethreadbare pretext ofasoontobe fifty-year-olddictatorshipofthelongsinceadministeredproletariataspermanentinstitutions,the mockery of the theory which they pay lip service to. They chain their underlings to their immediateinterestsandkeepthemnarrow-minded.Thedepravationoftheorymeanwhilewould nothavebeenpossiblewithoutthedregsoftheapocryphalinit.Byleapingsummarilyoutsideof culture, the functionaries who monopolize it would like to crudely feign that theywouldbe beyond culture, and thus give sustenance touniversalregression.Whatphilosophywishedto liquidate, in theexpectation oftheimmediately impending revolution, was,impatient withits claim, alreadyatthatmomentlaggingbehindit.Whatisapocryphalinmaterialismrevealsthat
ofhighphilosophy,thatwhichisuntrueinthesovereigntyoftheSpirit,whichtheprevailing materialism disdainsascynically asbourgeoissocietyhaddoneinsecretbefore.Theidealistic sublimeisthecognateoftheapocryphal;thetextsofKafkaandBeckettharshlyilluminatethis relationship. What is inferior in materialism is the unreflective inferiority of prevailing conditions.Whatthroughthefaultofintellectualizationdidnotkeepup,asitsfailingprinciple, isinrelation tothatwhichishigher,whichwasshamedbythesightofwhatwasperpetually inferior, also that which is worse. What is banal and barbaric inmaterialism eternalizes that extraterritoriality ofthefourthestate intoculture, whichmeanwhileisnolongerlimitedtothe membersofsuch,buthasspreadovertheentireculture.Materialismturnsintotherelapseinto barbarism,whichitwassupposedtoprevent;toworkagainstthisisnottheleastofthetasksofa criticaltheory.Otherwisethatwhichisuntrueofoldwill,withareducedcoefficiencyoffriction andalltheworseforthat,continue.Whatissubalterngrows,aftertherevolutionwentthewayof the return of the Messiah. Materialistic theory became not merely aesthetically defective in contrasttothehollowed-outsublimeofbourgeoisconsciousness,butuntrue.Thisistheoretically determinable.Thedialecticisinthethings,butitwouldnotbewithouttheconsciousnesswhich reflects it; no more than it could be dissolved into the latter. In the One pure and simple, undifferentiated, totalmatter,therewouldbenodialectic.Theofficialmaterialisticoneskipped overepistemology bydecree. Thelatter’srevengeisepistemological:inthereflection-doctrine [Abbildlehre]. The thought is no reflection of the thing – it is made into this solely by materialisticmythologyinEpicureanstyle,whichdiscoveredthatmattersendsoutlittleimages–butaimsatthethingitself.Theenlightening intentionofthought,demythologization,nullifies the image-character of consciousness. Whatclingstotheimage remainsmythically ensnared, idolatry The summation of images forms a wall before reality Reflection-theory denies the spontaneityofthesubject,amovens[Latin:whatmoves]oftheobjectivedialecticofproductive forcesandrelations ofproduction.Ifthesubjectisboundtothestubbornmirror-imageofthe object,whichnecessarilylackstheobject,whichdisclosesitselfonlytothesubjectivesurplusin thought, then the result is the restless intellectual silence of integral administration. Solely indefatigably reified consciousness imagines, ortriestopersuadeothersintoimagining,thatit would possess photographs of objectivity. Its illusion crosses over intodogmatic immediacy. WhenLenin,insteadofenteringintoepistemology,compulsivelyandrepeatedlyassertedagainst this the being-in-itself of cognitive objects, he wanted to demonstrate the complicity of subjective positivism withthe“powersthatbe”[inEnglish].Hispoliticalneedturnedthereby againstthetheoretical cognitivegoal.Transcendentargumentationfinishesthingsoffbymeans ofthepower-claim,andforill:bybeingleftunpenetrated,whatiscriticizedremainsundisturbed as it is, and is capable, as what has not been properly examined, of being resurrected in transformedpower-constellationsanywhichway.Brecht’soffhandremark,thatafterthebookon empirio-criticism no critique of immanence-philosophy would be necessary anymore, was short-sighted.Philosophicaldesiderataareenactedinmaterialistictheory,ifitisnottosuccumb tothesameprovincialismwhichdisfigurestheartoftheEasternblocstates.Theobjectoftheory isnothingimmediate,whosereplicaitcoulddragbackhome;cognitiondoesnotpossess,asthe statepolice,aportfolioofitsobjects.Ratheritthinkstheseintheirmediation:otherwiseitwould remain content with the description of the façade. Theoverextended andalready initsplace problematiccriterionofsensibleintuitionis,asBrechtneverthelessconfessed,notapplicableto what is radically mediated, society; what migrates into the object as its law of motion, necessarily hiddenfromtheideological formofthephenomenon,slipsawayfromtheformer. Marx,whooutofdisgustforpettyacademic squabblesrampaged throughtheepistemological
categories like the proverbial bull in the china-shop, scarcely put too much weight on expressionslikereflection[Wiederspiegelung].Theirpresumedsupremacycomesatthecostof thesubjective-criticalmoment.Initsemphasis,apieceofhostilitytoideologylivesnexttothe ideology;whatispreventedistheunderhandedmove,thatwhatisproducedandtherelationsof production would immediately be nature. No theory may for the sake of propagandistic simplicity playdumbinrelationtotheobjectivelyachievedstateofcognition.Itmustreflectit and drive it further. The unity of theory and praxis was not meant as a concession to the weaknessofthinking,whichisthemonstrousproductofrepressivesociety.Intheformofthe computer,whichthinkingmakesitselfsimilartoandforwhosegloryitwouldlikemostofallto cancelitselfout,consciousnessdeclaresbankruptcybeforeareality,whichatthepresentstageis not intuitively given but functionally, abstractly in itself. Reflection-based [Abbildendes] thinking would be devoid of reflection, an undialectical contradiction; without reflection, no theory.Theconsciousness,whichwouldslideathird,images,betweenitselfandwhatitthinks, unwittingly reproduces idealism; a corpus of conceptions would substitute for the object of cognition, and the subjective caprice of such conceptions is that which commands. The materialisticlonging,tocomprehendthething,wishestheopposite;thefullobjectcouldonlybe thoughtdevoidofimages.Suchimagelessnessconvergeswiththetheologicalbanonthegraven image. Materialism secularized it,bynotpermittingutopiatobepositivelypictured;thatisthe contentofitsnegativity.Itcomestoagreewiththeologythere,whereitismostmaterialistic.Its longingwouldbetheresurrectionoftheflesh;thisisutterlyforeigntoidealism,totherealmof theabsoluteSpirit.Thevanishing-pointofhistoricalmaterialismwouldbeitsownsublation,the emancipation of the Spirit from the primacy of material needs in the condition of their fulfillment. Onlywiththesatiation ofthebodilyurgewouldtheSpiritbereconciled toitself, becomingthatwhichitonlypromises,solongasthebaneofmaterialconditionsrefusestoletit satisfymaterialneeds.
AsteriskedNotesPages139-207
*17*[Footnotepg139]
HegelrefusestobeginwiththesomethinginsteadofwithbeinginthefirstnotetothefirstTrias oftheLogic(seeHegel,WW4,ibid.especiallypg89,alsopg80).Hethusprejudicestheentire work,whichwishestoexpoundtheprimacyofthesubject,initsownsense,idealistically.The dialectic wouldscarcely runanyotherwayforhim,evenifhestarted,aswouldcorrespondto thework’sfundamentallyAristotelianassumptions,fromtheabstractsomething.Theconception ofsuchasomethinginitsownrightmayattesttogreatertoleranceinregardstothenon-identical thanthatofbeing,butisscarcelylessmediated.Ratherthanremainingstandingbytheconcept ofthesomething,itsanalysisoughttomovefurtherinthedirectionofwhatitthinks:towardsthe non-conceptual. Hegel meanwhile cannot bear even the minimal trace of non-identity in the approachoftheLogic,whichtheword“something”recalls.
*18*[Footnotepg145]
Thewordidentityhadseveralmeaningsinthehistoryofmodernphilosophy.Onceitdesignated theunityofpersonalconsciousness: thatanIremained thesameinallitsexperiences.Thisis whattheKantian“Ithink,whichallmyconceptionsshouldbeabletofollowalong”meant.Then againidentitywassupposedtobewhatwasjuridicallythesameinallrationalbeings,thinkingas thelogical generality; furthermore, theself-samenessofeverythought-object,thesimpleA=A. Finally,epistemologically: thatthesubjectandobject,howevermediated,gotogether Thefirst twolayersofmeaningarebynomeansstrictlyseparatefromeachother,noteveninKant.This isnotthefaultofalaxusageofspeech.Rather,identityindicatesthepointofindifferenceofthe psychologicalandlogicalmomentinidealism.Thelogicalgeneralityasthatofthinkingistiedto individual identity,withoutwhichitwouldnotcometobe,becauseotherwisenothingwhichis pastcouldbemaintained insomethingwhichispresent,nothingatallcouldremainthesame. Therecoursetothis,whichpresupposesoncemorethelogicalgenerality,isoneofthinking.The Kantian “I think”, the individual moment of unity, always requires the supra-individual generality.Theindividual-IisOneonlybyvirtueoftheuniversalityofthenumericalprincipleof the unitary [Einheit]; the unity [Einheit] ofconsciousness itselfthereflection-form oflogical identity. That an individual consciousness would be One, is valid only under the logical presuppositionoftheexcludedthird:thatitisnotsupposedtoabletobesomethingelse.Tothis extent its singularity is super-individual, simply in order to be possible. Neither of the two momentshaspriorityovertheother.Iftherewerenoidenticalconsciousness,noidentityofthe particularization, there would be so little a generality as the reverse. This epistemologically legitimatesthedialecticalconceptionoftheparticularandthegeneral.
“Ifthedialecticonlyreworksthegainsoftheparticularsciencesandthinksthemintoawhole: thenitisahigherempiricism,andactuallynothingbutthesortofreflection,whichtoilstodepict theharmonyofthewholeoutoftheexperiences.Thenhoweverdialecticsmaynotbreakfrom the genetic observation; it may not boast of immanent progress, which indeed excludes all accidental acquisition ofobservationanddiscovery;thenitworksonlyinthesamewaysand withthesamemeansasalltheothersciences,differingsolelyinthegoal,tounitethepartsinto thethoughtofthewhole.Athought-provokingdilemma canthusbeobservedhere.Eitherthe dialectical developmentisindependentandonlydeterminedbyitself;thenitmustinfactknow everythingoutofitself.Oritpresupposesthefinitesciencesandempiricalformsofknowledge; thenhoweverimmanentprogressandtheseamlesscontextisshotthroughbywhatisexternally absorbed;anditactsuncriticallytowardsexperience.Thedialecticmaychoose.Weseenothird possibility.”(F.A.Trendelenburg,LogicalInvestigations,Vol.I.,Leipzig1870,Pg.91)
*21*[Footnotepg161]
Like almost every one of the Hegelian categories, that of the negated and thereby positive negation also has a degree of experience-content. Specifically, for the subjective course of philosophicalcognition.Ifthecognizerknowspreciselyenough,whataninsightlacksorwhere itiswrong,thenheorsheispracticallyobligedbyvirtueofsuchdeterminacytoalreadyhave what is missing. Only this moment of the determinate negation, as something for its part subjective,isnottobecreditedassomethingobjectiveletalonetometaphysics.Inanycasethat momentisthestrongestargumentinfavoroftheadequacyofemphaticcognition;infavorofits capacity for nevertheless doing so, and therein the possibility of a metaphysics, beyond the Hegelianone,findssupport.
*22*[Footnotepg166]“Thisrelation,thewholeastheessentialunity,liesonlyintheconcept, in the purpose. For this unity the mechanical causes are not sufficient, becausetheyarenot groundedinthepurpose,astheunityofthedeterminations.Undersufficientgrounds,Leibniz understoodonewhichwouldalsosufficeforthisunity,hencewouldcomprehendinitselfnotthe mere causes, but thefinalcauses.Thisdetermination ofthegrounddoesnothoweverbelong here;theteleologicalgroundisapropertyoftheconceptandofthemediationthroughthesame, whichisreason.”(Hegel,WW4,ibid.Pg555)
“Thecomprehensionofanobjectconsistsinfactthatnothingotherthanthis,thattheImakesthe selfsame object to its own, penetrates it, and brings it into its own form, that is into the universality, which is immediate determinacy, or the determinacy, which is immediate universality.Theobjectintheintuitionoralsointheconceptionisstillsomethingexternal,alien.
Through comprehension the being-in-itself and being-for-itself which it has in intuiting and conceiving,istransformedintoapositedbeing;theIpenetratesitthinking.Howitishoweverin thinking, so it is in and for itself; howitisintheintuition andconception, itisappearance; thinkingsublatesitsimmediacy,withwhichitatfirstcomestous,andmakesapositedbeingout of it; however this, its posited being, is its in-itself and for-itself, or its objectivity. This objectivity has the object therewith in the concept, and this latter is the unity of self-consciousness, in which it has been received; its objectivity or theconcept isthusitself nothingother,thanthenatureofself-consciousness;ithasnoothermomentsordeterminations, thantheIitself.”(Hegel,WW5,ibid,pg16)
*25*[Footnotepg185]
Thepreponderance oftheobject wouldneedtobeliterallypursuedbacktowherethethought imaginestohaveachieveditsownabsoluteobjectivity,bythereleaseofeverysingleonewhich isnotitselfthethought:informallogic.Thesomething,towhichalllogicalpropositionsrefer,is still, even where it may utterly ignore this, thecopyofwhatthethoughtmeansandwithout whichititselfcouldnotbe;thatwhichisnotthoughtout[Gedankliche]isthelogical-immanent condition of thought. The copula, the “is”, actually always contains, after the model of the existential judgement, objectivity. Therein allhopesoftheneedforsecurity,ofpossessingin formallogicsomethingsimplyandpurelyunconditional,asthecertainfoundationofphilosophy, arerenderedvoid.
*26*[Footnotepg202]
“So is being, too, completely indifferent towards the existent. But the more innervated and blissfulthisstateofrelaxationis,allthemoremustasilentlonging,ineternity,withoutitsdoing andwithoutknowingit,becreatedtoknowitself,tofindandenjoyitself,anurge[Drang]tothe becoming-conscious,ofwhichititselfisneverthelessnotyetconsciousof.”(Schelling,TheAge oftheWorld,Munich1946,pg136)“Andsoweseenature,fromthedeepestlevel,desiringwhat isinnermostandmostsecrettoitandalwaysrisingandstridingfurtherinitsobsession,until finally it hasdrawntoitselfthehighestessentiality,thatwhichispurelyintellectual initself, makingititsown.”(ibid.pg140)
The talk of false problems once wished to prevent, for the purposes of enlightenment, the unquestionedauthorityofdogmastosetthecourseofconsiderations,whosedecisionswouldbe impossiblepreciselytothethinkingtowhichtheyweresubmitted.Thereisanechoofthisinthe pejorative use of the word scholastic. For some time however false problems are no longer presumedtobethosewhichridiculerationaljudgementsandrationalinterests,butthosewhich use concepts not clearly defined.Asemantic taboostrangles substantive questions,asifthey were only questions of meaning; the preliminary consideration degenerates into the ban on consideration altogether. The ground-rules of methods modeled without further ado on the currentonesofexact science regulate whatmaybethought,nomatter howurgentthematter; approvedmodesofprocedure,themeans,winprimacy overwhatistobecognized,theends. Experiences whichconflict withtheexplicitsignsassignedtothemaregivenadressing-down. Thedifficultieswhichtheycausearelaidsolelytolaxpre-scientificnomenclature.–Whetherthe willwouldbefree,issorelevant astherecalcitrance ofthetermini towardsthedesiderata of simplyandclearlystatingwhattheymean.Sincejusticeandpunishment,finallythepossibility of what the tradition of philosophy has throughout called morality orethics,dependsonthe answer,theintellectualneedisnottobetalkedoutofthenaïvequestionasafalseproblem.The self-righteous tidiness of thinking offers it a poor substitute satisfaction. Nevertheless the semantic critique isnottobecarelesslyignored.Theurgencyofaquestioncannotcompelany answer,insofarasnotrueoneistobeobtained;stilllesshowevercanthefallibleneed,eventhe desperate one, indicate the direction of the answer. The objects under discussion are to be reflected upon,notbyjudgingthemasanexistentoranot-existent,butbyabsorbingintotheir owndeterminationtheimpossibilityofmakingthemtangiblythingly[dingfest],asmuchasthe necessitytothinkthem.ThisisattemptedintheantinomychapteroftheCritiqueofPureReason andingreatswathesoftheCritique ofPracticalReason,withtheexpressintentorwithoutit; admittedlyKantdidnottotallyavoidthereinthedogmaticusage,whichhe,likeHume,upbraids inothertraditional concepts.Hesettled theconflict betweenfacticity–“nature”–andwhatis necessary tothought–theintelligible world–indichotomical fashion.Ifhoweverthewillor freedomcannotbepointedoutassomethingexistent,thenthisdoesnotatallexclude,afterthe analogy to simple predialectical epistemology, individual impulses or individual experiences from being synthesized under concepts to which no naturalistic substrate corresponds,which howeversimilarlyreducethoseimpulsesorexperiencestoacommondenominator,comparable tohowtheKantian“object”doestoitsappearances.Accordingtoitsmodel,thewillwouldbe thelawful[gesetzmäßige] unityofallimpulses, whichprovethemselves tobesimultaneously spontaneousandrationallydetermined,asdistinctfromthenaturalcausalityinwhoseframework itinanycaseremains:nosequenceofactsofwilloutsideofthecausalnexus.Freedomwouldbe the word for the possibility of those impulses. But the snap epistemological answer is not adequate.Thequestionastowhetherthewillwouldbefreeornot,compelsaneither/or,justas dubiousasconclusive, whichtheconcept ofthewillasthelawful[gesetzmäßiges]unityofits impulses glosses over indifferently. And above all the monadological structure of will and freedom is tacitly assumed, as in themodelofconceptual construction oriented tosubjective immanence-philosophy. The simplest of things contradicts it:mediated throughwhatanalytic
psychologycallsthe“realitycheck”,countlessmomentsofexternalized,indeedsocialrealitygo along together with the decisions designated by will and freedom; if the concept of what rationally accordsinthewillissupposedtosayanythingatall,thenitreferstothis,however stubbornly Kant may dispute this. What lends the immanence-philosophical determination of those concepts their elegance and their autarky is, in truth, in view of thefactual decisions, wherebythequestionastowhethertheyarefreeorunfreecanbeasked,anabstraction;whatit leavesoverofwhatispsychological, isscantyincontrasttotherealcomplexionofinnerand outer.Nothingistobereadoutofthisimpoverished, chemical extract,whichmightpredicate freedomoritsopposite.PutmorestrictlyandatthesametimemoreKantianstill,theempirical subject which makes those decisions – and only an empirical one can make them, the transcendental pure“Ithink”wouldnotbecapable ofanyimpulse–isitselfamomentofthe spatio-temporal“external”worldandhasnoontologicalprioritybeforeit;thatiswhytheattempt tolocalizethequestionoffreewillinitfailed.Itdrewthelinebetweenwhatisintelligibleand whatisempiricalinthemidstofempiricism.Thatmuchistrueinthethesisofthefalseproblem. As soon as the question of free will shrinks into that of the decision of every individual, dissolvingthisoutofitscontext andthatwhichisindividuated[Individuum]outofsociety,it hewstothedeceptionofabsolutepurebeing-in-itself:delimitedsubjectiveexperienceusurpsthe dignityofwhatismostcertainofall.Thesubstrateofthealternativehassomethingfictiveabout it. The presumed subject, which is existing-in-itself, is in itself mediated by that which it separatesitselffrom,bythecontextofallsubjects.Throughthemediationitbecomesitselfwhat, according toitsconsciousness offreedom,itdoesnotwishtobe,heteronomous.Evenwhere unfreedom is positively assumed, its conditions, as those of an immanently closed psychic causality,aresoughtinthesplit-offindividuated,whichisessentiallynothingsplit-offofthesort. Ifnoteventheindividualcanfindthematter-at-handoffreedominitself,justaslittlemaythe theoremofthedeterminationofthenaïvefeelingofcapricebesimplyextinguishedpostfestum; thedoctrineofpsychologicaldeterminismwascarriedoutonlyinalatephase.
InterestinFreedomSplit213-215
Sincetheseventeenthcenturygreatphilosophyhasdeemedfreedomtobeitsmostcharacteristic interest; undertheunexpressedmandateofthebourgeoisclass,totransparentlygroundit.That interesthoweverisantagonisticinitself.Itgoesagainsttheoldoppressionandpromotesthenew one, which lies hidden in the rational principle itself. A common formulation is sought for freedomandoppression:theformeriscededtorationality,whichdelimitsit,andremovedfrom empiricism,inwhichonedoesnotwishtoseeitrealizedatall.Thedichotomyisalsorelatedto advancing scientization. Theclassisallied toit,insofarasitencouragesproduction,andmust fear it, as soon as it infringes upon the belief that their freedom, already resigned to sheer inwardness,wouldbeexistent.Thisiswhatreallystandsbehindthedoctrineoftheantinomies. AlreadyinKantandlaterintheidealiststheideaoffreedomappearedinoppositiontospecific scientific research,particularlypsychology.TheirobjectswerebanishedbyKantintotherealm ofunfreedom; positivescience issupposedtohaveitsplaceunderneathspeculation–inKant: underneath the doctrine of the noumena. With the waning of the speculative power and the correlative developmentoftheparticularsciences,theoppositionsharpenedtoanextreme.The particular sciences paid for this with hidebound pettiness, philosophy with non-committal emptiness.Themoretheparticularsciencesconfiscatedofitscontent–aspsychologydidtothe genesisofthecharacter,overwhichevenKantmadewildguesses–themoreembarrassinglydo
philosophemesonthefreedomofthewilldegenerateintodeclamations.Iftheparticularsciences seek ever more nomothetism [Gesetzmässigkeit]; if theyarethereby,beforeanyfundamental views,driventothepartyofdeterminism,thenphilosophyincreasinglybecomesthestorehouse ofpre-scientific, apologetic intuitionsoffreedom.TheantinomicsoffreedominKant,justlike thedialecticsoffreedominHegel,formanessentialphilosophicalmoment;afterthemacademic philosophy, at least, swore by the idol ofahigherrealm beyondempiricism. Theintelligible freedomofindividuals ispraised,sothatonecanholdtheempiricalonesevenmoreruthlessly accountable, tobetter curbthembytheprospectofametaphysicallyjustifiedpunishment.The allianceofthedoctrineoffreedomandrepressivepraxisdistancesphilosophyeverfurtherfrom genuine insight into the freedom and unfreedom of living beings. It approximates, anachronistically, that faded sublimity which Hegel diagnosed as the misery of philosophy. Because howevertheparticular science –thatofcriminaljusticeisexemplary–cannothandle the question concerning freedom and must reveal its own incompetence, it seeks assistance precisely from the philosophy which through its bad and abstract opposition to scientivism cannot provide such assistance. Where science hopes for the decision on what it finds irresolvable from philosophy, it receives from the latter only the solace of the humdrum world-view.Initindividual scientists thusorientthemselves according totasteand,itmustbe feared,accordingtotheirownpsychologicaldrive-structure.Therelationshiptothecomplexof freedom and determinism is delivered helter-skelter over to irrationality, oscillating between inconclusive, moreorlessempiricalspecificfindingsanddogmaticgeneralities.Ultimatelythe attitudetothatcomplexbecomesdependentonpoliticalaffiliationorthepowerrecognizedatthe moment. Reflections on freedom and determinism sound archaic, as if datingfromtheearly epochoftherevolutionarybourgeoisie.Butthatfreedomgrowsobsolete,withoutbeingrealized, isnottobeacceptedasafatality;resistancemustexplainthis.Nottheleastofthereasonswhy the idea of freedom lost its power over human beings is that it was conceived of so abstractly-subjectively in advance, that the objective social tendency could bury it without difficulty
Freedom,Determinism,Identity215-217
Theindifferencetowardsfreedom,itsconceptandthethingitself,iscausedbytheintegrationof society,whichthesubjectsexperienceasifitwereirresistible.Theirinterestinbeingcaredfor has crippled the one in a freedom which they fear as defenselessness. The very mention of freedom,justliketheappealtoit,alreadyringshollow.Thatiswhatanintransigentnominalism adjustsitselfto.Thefactthatitrelegates theobjective antinomies,inkeepingwiththelogical canon, into the realm of false problems, has for its part a social function: to conceal contradictions through denial. By holding on to data or their contemporary heirs, protocol statements, consciousness is disburdened of what would contradict that which is external. Accordingtotherulesofthatideology,onlythemodesofconductofhumanbeingsinvarious situations wouldneedtobedescribedandclassified; anytalkofthewillorfreedomwouldbe conceptual fetishism. AlldeterminationsoftheIoughtthereby,asbehaviorisminfactplanned, tobesimplytranslatedbackintomodesofreactionandindividualreactions,whichcouldthenbe naileddown.Whatisleftoutofconsiderationisthatwhatisnaileddownproducesnewqualities in contrast to the reflexes, out of which the former may have originated. The positivists unconsciously obey the dogma of the preeminence of the first, which their metaphysical archenemies entertained: “What isspecifically mostreverediswhatismostancient,thesworn
witnessishoweverthemosthonoredofall.”79 InAristotelesitismythos;whatsurvivesofitin straightoutanti-mythologists istheconception thateverything whichiswouldbereducibleto whatitoncewas.Inthelikeforlikeoftheirquantifyingmethodsthereisaslittleroomforthe self-producingotherasthebaneofdestiny.Whathoweverhasbeenobjectifiedinhumanbeings out of their reflexes and against these,character orwill,thepotential organoffreedom,also underminesthislast.Foritembodiesthedominatingprinciple,towhichhumanityprogressively submits.Identity oftheselfandself-alienationaccompanyeachotherfromtheverybeginning; thatiswhytheconceptofself-alienationisbadlyromantic.Theconditionoffreedom,identityis immediatelyatthesametimetheprincipleofdeterminism.Thewillis,insofarashumanbeings objectify themselves intocharacter.Therebytheybecome, towardsthemselves–whateverthat may be – something externalized, according to the model of the external world of things, subjugatedtocausality.–Moreoverthepositivisticconceptofthe“reaction”,purelydescriptive byitsownintent,presupposesincomparablymorethanwhatitconfesses:passivedependenceon each given situation. What isspiritedawayaprioriisthereciprocal influence ofsubjectand object,spontaneityisalreadyexcludedbythemethod,inunisonwiththeideologyofadjustment, whichbreakshumanbeings,readytoservethecourseoftheworld,oncemoreofthehabitof that moment. If there remained only passive reactions, then there would remain, in the terminologyofolderphilosophy,onlyreceptivity:nothinkingwouldbepossible.Ifthereiswill onlythroughconsciousness,thenconsciousnessisindeed,correlatively,alsoonlywherethereis will.Self-preservation foritspartdemands,initshistory,morethantheconditionedreflexand therebypreparesforwhatitfinallystepsbeyond.Thereinitpresumablyresemblesthebiological individual[Individuum],whichstipulatestheformofitsreflexes;thereflexescouldscarcelybe withoutanymomentofunity Itreinforcesitselfastheselfofself-preservation;freedomopens itselftothelatterasitshistorically-becomedifferencefromthereflexes.
FreedomandOrganizedSociety217-221
Withoutanythoughtoffreedom,organizedsocietycouldscarcelybetheoreticallygrounded.It would then once again cut short freedom. Both can be demonstrated in the Hobbesian construction of the state-contract. A factical, thorough-going determinism would sanction,in oppositiontothedeterministHobbes,thebellumomniumcontraomnes[Latin:warofallagainst all];everycriterionoftreatmentwouldfallasunder,ifeveryonewereequallypredeterminedand blind.Theperspectiveofsomethingatanextremityisoutlined;astowhether,inthedemandfor freedomforthesakeofthepossibilityoflivingtogether,aparalogismlieshidden:freedommust bereal,sothattherewouldnotbehorror.Butratherthereishorror,becausethereisnotyetany freedom. The reflection on the question concerning will and freedom does not abolish the question,butturnsitintoonefromthephilosophyofhistory:whydidthetheses,“Thewillis free”,and,“Thewillisunfree”,become anantinomy? Kantdidnotoverlookthefactthatthis reflectionoriginatedhistorically,andexpresslyfoundedtherevolutionaryclaimofhisownmoral philosophyonitsdelay:“Onesawhumanbeingsboundtolawsbytheirduty,itdidnothowever occur to anyone, that they would be subject only to their own and nevertheless universal legislation, and that they would only be bound to act according to their own yet generally legislatedwill,accordingtothepurposeofnature.”
astowhetherfreedomitself,tohimaneternalidea,couldbeahistoricalessence;notmerelyasa conceptbutratheraccordingtoitsexperience-content.Entireepochs,entiresocietieslackedthe concept offreedomasmuchasthething.Toascribethistothemasanobjectivein-itselfeven whereitwasthoroughlyconcealedfromhumanbeings,wouldconflictwiththeKantianprinciple of the transcendental, which is supposed to be founded in the subjective consciousness, and would be untenable to the degree that the presumedconsciousness totally lacked anysortof living being at all. Hence no doubt Kant’s tenacious effort to demonstrate the moral consciousness as something ubiquitous, existent even in what is radically evil.Otherwise he wouldhavehadtoreject, intheappropriatephasesandsocietiesinwhichthereisnofreedom, along with the character of rationally-endowed beings also that ofhumanity; thefollowerof Rousseau could scarcely havefoundcomfortinthat.Beforethatwhichisindividuated inthe modern sense formed, something self-evident for Kant, which is not meant simply as the biological individualbeingbutaswhatisfirstconstitutedasaunitybytheself-reflection,81 the Hegelian“self-consciousness”,itisanachronistictospeakoffreedom,oftherealkindasmuch as the demand for such.Freedom,tobeestablished initsfulldimensions solelyundersocial conditions of an unfettered plenitude of goods, could on the other hand also be totally extinguished, perhaps without atrace. Thetroubleisnotthatfreehumanbeingsactradically evil, as is beingdonefarbeyondanymeasureimaginable toKant,butthatthereisnotyeta worldinwhichthey,andthisflashesinBrecht,wouldnolongerneedtobeevil.Evilwouldbe thereforetheirownunfreedom:whathappenswhichisevil,wouldcomefromthelatter Society determines individuals, even according to their immanent genesis, as what they are; their freedomorunfreedomisnotwhatisprimary,asthisappearsundertheveiloftheprincipium individuationis [Latin: individuating principle]. For even the insight into its dependence is obscuredtosubjective consciousness bytheego,asSchopenhauerexplainedbythemythosof the veil of Maya. The individuation-principle, the law of particularization to which the universality ofreasoninindividuals istied,insulates thistendentiallyfromthecontextswhich surround it and promotes thereby the flattering confidence in the autarky of the subject. Its epitomeiscontrastedunderthenameofthefreedomtothetotalitywhichrestrictsindividuality. Theprincipium individuationis ishoweverbynomeansthatwhichismetaphysicallyultimate andunalterable, andtherefore alsonotfreedom; thisisratheramomentinadoublesense:not isolatable but imbricated, and for the time being always only a moment of spontaneity, a historical intersection blockedundercontemporary conditions.Aslittleastheindependenceof theindividuated, inappropriately emphasized byliberalideology,prevails,solittleisitsutterly realseparation fromsocietytobedenied,whichthatideologywronglyinterprets.Attimesthe individuated has opposed society as something self-realized although particular, whichcould pursueitsowninterests throughreason.Inthatphase,andbeyondit,thequestionoffreedom wasgenuine,astowhethersocietypermitstheindividuatedtobeasfree,astheformerpromises thelatter;therebyalso,astowhethertheformerisitselfso.Theindividuatedtemporarilytowers abovetheblindcontextofsociety,helpinghoweverinitswindowlessisolationjustthatcontext toreproduceitself.–Thethesisoftheunfreedomofhistoricalexperienceregistersnolessthe irreconcilabilityofinnerandouter:humanbeingsareunfreeintheirbondagetowhatisexternal, andthatwhichisexternaltothemisinturnalsothemselves.Onlyinwhatisseparatedfromthis andnecessarilyagainstit,accordingtothecognitionofHegel’sPhenomenology,doesthesubject acquire the concepts of freedom and unfreedom, which it can then relate back to its own
monadologicalstructure.Thepre-philosophicalconsciousnessisonthissideofthealternative;to the naïvely acting subject, which posits itself against the immediate environment, its own conditionality is impenetrable. To master it, consciousness must make it transparent. The sovereignty of thought, which by virtue of its freedom turns back to itself as to its subject, realizes also the concept ofunfreedom.Botharenosimpleoppositionbutineachother.The consciousnessdoesnotbecomeawareofthisoutofthetheoreticalurgetowardsknowledge.The sovereigntywhichexploitsnatureanditssocialform,dominationoverhumanbeings,suggests its opposite, the idea of freedom. Those who were at the top of hierarchies, but not visibly dependent, wereitshistorical archetype. Freedombecomes,intheabstract general concept of something beyond nature, intellectualized into freedom from the realm of causality.Thereby howeverintoself-deception. Putpsychologically,theinterestofthesubjectinthethesis,thatit would be free, is narcissistic, as boundless as anything which is narcissistic. EveninKant’s argumentation,despitehislocalizationofthesphereoffreedomcategoricallyabovepsychology, narcissism shows through. Every human being, even the “mostmalign ruffian”,wouldwish, according totheFoundationforaMetaphysicofMorals,that“whenonesetforthexamplesof honestyinintent,ofsteadfastnessinfollowinggoodmaxims,ofcompassionandofgeneralgood will”,evenhewouldliketobesominded.Fromthishecouldexpect no“gratificationofthe desires”,“noconditioninwhichanyotherofhisrealorotherwiseimaginableinclinationswould besatisfied”,“butonlyagreaterinnerworthofhisperson…Hebelieveshimselftobethisbetter person however, when he puts himself in the standpoint of a member of the world of understanding,towhichtheideaoffreedom,thatistosayindependencefromthedetermining causesofthesensibleworld,involuntarilycompelshim…”82 Kantsparesnoefforttojustifythat expectationofagreaterinnerworthoftheperson,whichwouldmotivatethethesisoffreedom, withthatobjectivityofthelawofmoralitytowhich,foritspart,consciousnesswouldfirstneed to rise on the grounds of that expectation. Nevertheless he cannot make us forget that the “practical usageofcommonhumanreason”83 inviewoffreedomiscoupledwiththeneedfor self-exaltation, with the “worth” of the person. Meanwhile that immediate consciousness experiences the “common moral cognition of reason”, from which the Kantian Foundation methodically starts out, no less than the interest to deny the self-same freedom which it proclaims. Themorefreedomthesubject,andthecommunityofsubjects,ascribestoitself,the greateritsresponsibility,andbeforethelatteritfailsinabourgeoislife,whosepraxishasnever vouchsafedtheundiminishedautonomytosubjectswhichitwasaccordedintheory.Thatiswhy it must feel guilty. Subjects become aware of the limits of their freedom as their own membership in nature, ultimately as their powerlessness in view of the society become autonomous before them. The universality of the concept offreedom,however,inwhichthe oppressedalsoparticipate,recoilsagainstdominationasamodeloffreedom.Inreactiontothis, thosewhoareprivilegedwithfreedomdelightindiscerningthatotherswouldnotyetbemature enoughforfreedom.Theyrationalizethis,revealinglyenough,asnaturalcausality.Subjectsare notonlyfusedwiththeirowncorporeality,buteveninthatwhichispsychological,painstakingly separated fromtheimmediateworldofthebodilybyreflection,athorough-goingnomothetism [Gesetzmässigkeit]prevails.Theconsciousnessofthisroseinproportiontothedeterminationof the soul as something unitary. So little meanwhile does an immediately evident self-consciousness of freedom exist, as one of unfreedom; it always requires either the mirror-reflection ofwhatisperceived insocietyuponthesubject–theoldestistheso-called
Platonicpsychology–oronewhichisconcretizedbypsychologicalscience,inwhosehandsthe life of the soul it discovered becomes a thingamongthingsandendsupunderthecausality predicatedbytheworldofthings.
ThePre-egoizedImpulse221-222
Thedawningconsciousness offreedomnourishesitselfonthememoryofthearchaicimpulse, not yet directed by a solidified ego. The more the ego curbs this, the more questionable pre-temporal freedom becomes to it as something chaotic. Without the anamnesis of the unbridled, pre-egoized impulse, which is later banished into the zone of unfree bondage to nature, the idea offreedomcouldnotbecreated, eventhoughitterminates foritspartinthe strengthening of the ego. In the philosophical concept, which raises freedom as a mode of conduct as the highest beyond empirical existence, namely that of spontaneity, the echo reverberates ofthatbywhichtheegoofidealisticphilosophyintendstosecureitsfreedom,by controlling itallthewaytoitsannihilation.Throughtheapologyforitsinvertedform,society encouragesindividualstohypostasizetheirownindividualityandtherebytheirfreedom.Insofar as such tenacious appearance [Schein]reaches,theconsciousness istaughtthemoment ofits unfreedomsolelyinpathogenicconditions,asincompulsoryneuroses.Theycommandit,inthe midstofthecircumferenceofitsownimmanence,toactaccordingtolawswhichitexperiences as“ego-alien”;therejectionoffreedominitsowndomesticrealm.Thepainofneurosisalsohas themetapsychologicalaspect,inthatitdestroysthesimplisticnotion:freeinside,unfreeoutside, without the subject coming to realize thetruthwhichitspathic condition communicates, and whichitcanreconcile neither withitsdrivenorwithitsrationalinterest.Thistruth-contentof neuroses is that they demonstrate theunfreedomoftheegoinitselfinwhatisego-alien, the feelingof“Butthat’snotmeatall”;there,whereitsdominationoverinnernaturefails.Whatever fallsundertheunityofwhattraditionalepistemologytermedpersonalself-consciousness–itself compulsory essence, insofar as all moments of this unity are stamped with nomothetism [Gesetzmässigkeit] –appearstobefreetotheself-retrievingego,becauseitderivestheideaof thefreedomfromthemodelofitsowndomination,firsttheoneoverhumanbeingsandthings, then,innervated,theoneoveritsownentireconcretecontent,overwhichitdisposesbythinking it.Thisisnotonlytheself-deceptionoftheimmediacy,whichisinflatedintotheabsolute.Solely wheresomeoneactsasanego,notmerelyreactively,cantheiractioninanysensebecalledfree. Neverthelessthatwhichisnotboundtotheegoastheprincipleofeverydeterminationwouldbe equally free,asthatwhichappearstobeunfreetotheego,asinKant’smoralphilosophy,and whichinfacthasbeenequallyunfreetothisday.Freedomasagivenfactbecomesproblematic throughtheprogressofself-experienceand,becausetheinterestofthesubjectinitnevertheless does not wane, is sublimated into an idea. This is metapsychologically verified by the psychoanalytic theory of repression [Verdrängung: displacement]. According to this the repressingauthority,themechanism ofcompulsion,is,dialectically enough,onewiththeego, the organon of freedom. Introspection discovers neither freedom nor unfreedom in itself as somethingpositive.Itconceivesofbothintherelationtosomethingextra-mental:freedomasthe polemical counter-image to the suffering under social compulsion, unfreedom as its mirror-image. That is how little the subject is the “sphere of absolute origins” which it is philosophized as; eventhedeterminations, byvirtueofwhichitlaysclaim toitssovereignty, alwaysalsoneedthatwhich,according totheirself-understanding, aresupposedtoneedonly them. What is decisive in the ego, its independence and autonomy, can only be judged in
relationship to its otherness, to the not-ego. Whether or not autonomyexists,dependsonits adversaryandcontradiction,theobject,whichgrantsordeniesthesubjectautonomy;dissolved fromthis,autonomyisfictive.
How little the consciousness can discern of freedom by means of the recourse to its self-experience,isattestedtobytheexperimentacrucisofintrospection.Itisnotfornothingthat themostpopularoneissaddledontoadonkey.Kantstillfollowsitsschemaintheattemptto demonstrate freedombythedecision,somethingrelevanttoBeckett’splays,tostandupfroma chair.Inordertodecide conclusively,empiricallysotospeak,astowhetherthewillwouldbe free, situations must be rigorously cleansed of their empirical content; thought-experimental conditions established, in which as fewdeterminants aspossiblecanbeobserved.Everyless clownishparadigmcontainsrationalgroundsfortheself-decidingsubject,whichwouldhaveto bechalkedupasdeterminants;theexperimentaisdamnedbytheprinciple,accordingtowhichit issupposedtodecide,tosilliness,andthisdevaluesthedecision.Puresituationsinthestyleof Buridanarenotlikelytooccur,exceptwheretheyarethoughtoutorestablishedforthesakeof demonstratingfreedom.Evenifsomethingremotelysimilartothiscouldbediscovered,itwould beirrelevanttoanyperson’slifeandhenceadiaphorou[Greek:indifferent]forfreedom.Indeed many of Kant’s experimenta crucis have greater pretensions. Hedrawsthemupasempirical evidenceoftheright“tointroducefreedomintoscience”,since“theexperiencetooconfirmsthis orderofconceptsinus”;84 whereasempiricalevidenceforsomethingwhichisaccordingtohis own theory simply supra-empirical ought to make him suspicious, because the critical matter-at-handistherebylocalized inthatsphere,fromwhichithasbeenprincipallyremoved. Theexampleisthenalsonotstringent:“Supposing,thatsomeoneisgivenovertocarnaldesire, suchthatitwouldbecompletely irresistible forhim,ifthebelovedobjectandtheopportunity thereto presented themselves; ask whether if a gallows before the house, wherehetookthis opportunity, were constructed in order to hang him immediately after the carnal pleasure, whether hethenwouldnotrepresshisdesire.Itwouldnottakelongtoguesswhathewould answer.Ifhewasaskedhowever,whetherhisprinceunderthethreatsofthesameimmediate punishmentofdeathrequiredhimtobearfalsewitnessagainstanhonestman,whichtheformer isbentonruiningunderamerepretext,whetherthere,howevergreathisloveoflifemaybe,he could consider it possible to overcome this latter. He will perhaps not trust himself to say whether he would do it or not; that it would be possible, however, he wouldadmit without hesitation. Hejudgestherefore,thathecandosomething,becauseheisconsciousofit,thathe ought to do it, and cognizes in himself the freedom, which without the moral law would otherwisehaveremainedunknowntohim.”85 Thathecoulddoit,mightpresumablybeconceded bythepersonchargedbyKantwith“carnal desire”asmuchasthevictim ofextortionbythe tyrant,whoKantrespectfullynameshisprince;itwouldprobablybethetruthifbothsaid,inthe consciousness of the weight of self-preservation in thesesortsofdecisions, thattheydidnot knowhowtheywouldbehaveintherealsituation.Intheemergencysituation,apsychological momentlikethe“ego-drive”andthefearofdeathwouldappearirrefutablydifferentlythaninthe improbable thought-experiment, which neutralizes that moment to the cogitative affectless conception.Noonecanpredict,noteventhosewiththemostintegrity,howtheywouldactunder
torture; this in the meantime by no means fictive situation denotes a limit upon what is self-evidenttoKant.Hisexampledoesnotpermit,ashehoped,thelegitimationoftheconceptof freedomaccordingtoitspracticaluse,butatmostashruggingoftheshoulders.Noteventhatof thecard-cheatservesanymore:“Hewhohaslostatcards,canbeangryathimselfandhislackof cleverness,butifheisconsciousnessofhavingcheatedinthegame(althoughtherebywinning), then he mustdespisehimself,assoonashecompareshimselfwiththemorallaw.Thismust thereforebesomethingotherthantheprincipleofone’sownhappiness.Fortobeobligedtosay to myself: I am a good-for-nothing, though I have lined my pockets, must have a different standardofjudgement,thangivingoneselfapplauseandsaying:Iamacleverhumanbeing,forI have enriched myself.”86 Whether card-cheats despise themselves ornot,evenassumingthey wouldreflectonthemorallaw,isacrasslyempiricalquestion.Theymayfeelthemselves,inan infantilefashion,tobeexemptfromeverybourgeoisobligation;evenlaughinguptheirsleevesat thesuccessfulstunt,theirnarcissismshieldingthemagainstthepresumedself-loathing;andthey may simply be following an ethical code approved among their own kind. Thepathos,with which they aresupposedtoabusethemselves asunworthy,isbasedontherecognition ofthe Kantianmorallaw,whichthislatterwishestogroundwiththeexample.Inthegroupofallthose coveredforexamplebytheconceptof“moralinsanity”[inEnglish],itissuspended,yettheyby no means lack reason; only metaphorically could they be classified as insane. What in propositions over the mundus intelligibilis [Latin: intelligible world]seeksconsolation inthe empiricalone,mustitselfaccordwithempiricalcriteria,andthisspeaksagainsttheconsolation, inkeepingwiththataversionofspeculativethoughtagainsttheso-calledexampleassomething inferior,forwhichthereisnolackoftestimonyinKant:“Thisisalsothesoleandgreatuseof examples, that they sharpen the power of judgement. For in regards to the correctness and precision of the insight of understanding, they commonly cause the latter some obstruction, becausetheyonlyseldomadequatelyfulfilltheconditionoftherule(ascasusinterminis[Latin: caseintheend])andmoreoveroftenweakenthecorrespondingeffortofunderstanding,tolook intotheadequacy oftherulesingeneral andindependently oftheparticular circumstancesof experience, and ultimately cultivate the habit of using these more as formulations than as foundations.Thusexamplesaretheleading-stringsofthepowerofjudgement,whichthose,who lackthenaturaltalentforthesame,canneverdispensewith.”
87 GiventhatKantdidnot,contrary tohisowninsight,disdaintouseexamplesintheCritiqueofPracticalReason,onesuspectsthat heneededthembecausetherelation betweentheformalmorallawandexistence,andthereby thepossibility oftheimperative,couldnothavebeenachievedexceptbyempiricalsubreption; his philosophy thereby revenges itselfonhim,inthattheexamples dissolvelikesmoke.The absurdity of moral experiments might have as their core, the fact that they couple what is incompatible; they claim to calculate out, what for its part explodes the realm of the calculable.*27*
causal chain, but occur as a jolt. This supplementary, the factical, which realizes itself[sich entaeussert] in consciousness, is interpreted again by the philosophical tradition only as consciousness. Itissupposedtointervene,asiftheinterventionweresomehowconceivableby thepureSpirit.WhatisconstruedforthesakeoftheQED[quoderatdemonstrandum:whatisto beshown]:thatsolelythereflectionofthesubjectwouldbeable,ifnottobreakthroughnatural causality, then at least to add in other chains of motivations, to change its direction. The self-experience ofthemoment offreedomisboundupwithconsciousness; thesubjectknows itself to be free,onlyinsofarasitsaction appearstobeidentical withit,andthatisthecase solelyinconsciousones.Inthesealonesubjectivityraises,laboriouslyandephemerally,itshead. Buttheinsistence onthisnarroweditselfrationalistically.Tothisextent Kantwas,inkeeping withhisconceptionofpracticalreasonasthatwhichistruly“pure”,namelysovereigninrelation to every material, closely attached to the school which the critique of theoretical reason demolished.Consciousness,therationalinsight,isnotsimplythesameasthefreeact,isnotto be flatly equated to the will. Exactly that occurs in Kant. The willistohimtheepitome of freedom, the “capacity”, to act freely, the characteristic unity of all the acts, which can be conceived of as free. Of the categories which “in the field of the supra-sensory” stand in “necessary connection” withthe“determining groundsofthepurewill”,heteaches“thatthey alwaysreferonlytobeingswhichareintelligent, andinthesealsoonlyastherelationshipof reasontothewill,andthereforealwaysonlytowhatispracticed.”88 Reasonwouldobtainreality through the will, untrammeled by any sort of material. The formulations scattered inKant’s moral-philosophical texts ought to converge therein. In the Foundation for a Metaphysic of Morals the will is “thought of as a capacity, to determine oneself to act according to the conceptionofcertainlaws.”89*28*Accordingtoalaterpassageofthesametext,thewillwould be“akindofcausality oflivingbeings,insofarastheyarerational,andfreedomwouldbethe selfsame characteristic of this causality, since it can have an affect independent from alien fundamental causes which determine it.”90 The oxymoron “causality through freedom”, appearing in the thesis of the Third Antinomy and explicated in the Foundation, becomes plausible solelyduetotheabstraction, whichallowsthewilltobeexhaustedinreason.Infact freedombecomesforKantacharacteristicofthecausalityoflivingsubjects,becauseitwouldbe beyondthealienfundamentalcauseswhichdeterminethemandwouldshrinkintothatnecessity whichcoincideswithreason.Eventhetreatmentofthewillasthe“capacityofpurposes”91 inthe CritiqueofPracticalReasonexpoundsthis,inspiteofitsorientationtotheobjectiveconceptof thepurpose,astheoreticalreason,sincethepurposes“areateverytimethedetermininggrounds forthecapacityofdesireaccordingtoprinciples”;92 however,solelythelawsofreasonaretobe conceivedunderprinciples,whicharetacitlyascribedthecapabilityofdirectingthecapacityto desire,whichforitspartbelongstotheworldofthesenses.Aspurelogos[Greek:logic]thewill becomesano-man’slandbetweenthesubjectandtheobject,antinomicalinamannerwhichwas notenvisionedbythecritiqueofreason.–Atthebeginningoftheself-reflectionofthemodern, self-emancipatingsubject,however,inHamlet,thedivergencebetweentheinsightandtheactis paradigmatically displayed. The morethesubjectbecomesanexistent foritselfanddistances itself from an unbroken accord with pre-established order, the less are the deed and
consciousnessasone.Thesupplementaryispossessedofanaspectwhichisirrationalaccording to rationalistic ground-rules. It denies the Cartesian dualism of res extensa [Latin: extended substance] and res cogitans [Latin: thinking substance], in which the supplementary, as somethingmental,islumpedtogetherwiththerescogitans[Latin:thinkingsubstance],without considerationofitsdifferencefromthethought.Thesupplementaryisanimpulse,therudiment ofaphase,inwhichthedualismoftheextra-andintramentalwasnotthoroughlynaileddown, neither to be bridged as volition nor an ontological ultimate. Theconcept ofthewillisalso touched by this, which has the so-called facts of consciousness as its content, which are simultaneouslypurelydescriptive,andnotonlysuch;thislieshiddeninthetransitionofthewill into praxis. The impulse, intramental and somatic in one, drives beyond the sphere of consciousness, whichitneverthelessbelongsto.Withit,freedomreachesdeepintoexperience; this animates its concept as one of a condition, which would be so little blind nature as suppressed nature.Itsphantasm,whichreasondoesnotallowtobewitheredbyanyproofof causalinterdependence,isthatofareconciliationofSpiritandnature.Itisnotsoalientoreason as it seems under the aspect of its Kantian equation with the will; it does not fallfromthe heavens.Itappearsassomethingsimplyandpurelyothertothephilosophicalreflection,because thewill,reducedtothepurepracticalreason,isanabstraction.Thesupplementaryisthename forwhatwasstampedoutofthatabstraction;withoutitthewillwouldnotberealatall.Itflashes like a bolt of lightning between the poles of somethinglongpast,whichhasbecome almost unrecognizable,andthatwhichitonedaycouldbe.Truepraxis,theepitomeofactswhichwould satisfy the idea of freedom, requires indeed full theoretical consciousness. The decisionism whichcancels outreasoninthetransition totheactiondeliversthisovertotheautomatismof domination: the unreflective freedom, which it adjusts to, becomes the servant of total unfreedom. Hitler’s realm, which united decisionism and social Darwinism, the affirmative extension of natural causality, taught this lesson. But praxis also requires something other, something not exhausted in consciousness, something corporeal, mediated into reason and qualitatively divergentfromit.Bothmomentsarebynomeansexperiencedseparately;yetthe philosophicalanalysishasclippedthephenomenoninsuchamannerthatitcannototherwisebe expressed in the language of philosophy, than as if something other were being added to rationality. By allowing only reason to be a movens [Latin: what moves] of praxis, Kant remainedinthebaneofthatfadedtheoretics,againstwhichheinventedtheprimacyofpractical reasonascomplementary.Hisentiremoralphilosophylaborsunderthis.Whatisdifferentinthe action from the pure consciousness, which to Kant compels the former: that which abruptly springs out, is the spontaneity, whichKantlikewise transplanted intothepureconsciousness, becauseotherwise theconstitutive functionofthe“Ithink”wouldhavebeenendangered.The memory of what has been expelled lives on in him only in the double interpretation of the intramentallyinterpretedspontaneity.Itisontheonehandanachievementoftheconsciousness: thinking;ontheotherhand,unconsciousandinvoluntary,theheartbeatoftherescogitans[Latin: thinkingsubstance]beyondthislatter.Pureconsciousness–“logic”–isitselfsomethingwhich hasbecome andsomethingvalid,inwhichitsgenesisperished.Ithasthislatterinthemoment glossedoverbytheKantiandoctrine,ofthenegationofthewill,whichaccordingtoKantwould be pure consciousness. Logic is a praxis sealed off from itself. Contemplative conduct, the subjective correlate oflogic,istheconductwhichwantsnothing.Converselyeveryactofwill breaksthroughtheautarkicmechanismoflogic;thisjoltstheoryandpraxisintoopposition.Kant turns the matter-at-hand upside down. However more sublimated the supplementary may constantly become withincreasing consciousness, indeedhowevertheconceptofthewillmay
form thereby as something substantial and uniform – ifthemotorreaction-form weretotally liquidated, if the hand no longer twitched, then there would be no will. What the great rationalistic philosophers conceived under this latter, already repudiates it, withoutgivingan accountofit,andtheSchopenhauerofthefourthbookwasnotwronginfeelinghimselftobea Kantian. That without the will there is no consciousness, was blurred by the idealists into point-blank identity:asifthewillwerenothingotherthanconsciousness.Inthemostprofound conceptoftranscendentalepistemology,thatoftheproductivepowerofimagination,thetraceof thewillmigrates intothepureintellectivefunction.Oncethishasoccurred,thenspontaneityis curiouslyglossedoverinthewill.Itisnotmerelyreasonwhichhasgeneticallydevelopeditself out of drive-energy as its differentiation: without that willing, which manifests itself in the caprice ofeverysuchactofthinkingandalonefurnishesthegroundforitsdistinctionfromthe passive, “receptive” moment of the subject, there would be no thinking in thepropersense. Idealismhoweversworeanoathtotheoppositeandmaynotpermitthistospeak,atthepriceof itsannihilation;thisexplainstheinversionofaswellasitsproximitytothetruematter-at-hand.
FictionofPositiveFreedom230-231
Freedomissolelytobegraspedindeterminatenegation,inaccordancewiththeconcreteformof unfreedom.Positivelyitbecomesan“asif”.LiterallysointheFoundationforaMetaphysicof Morals: “I say now: every such being, which can not act otherwise than under the idea of freedom,ispreciselytherebyreallyfreeinthepracticalconsideration,i.e.thatalllaws,whichare inseparablyboundtofreedom,areapplicableasmuchtotheselfsamebeing,asifitswillalsoin itselfandintheoreticalphilosophywerevalidlydeclaredfree.”93 Whatisaporeticinthisfiction, whichperhapsprecisely becauseofitsweaknesslendssomuchsubjective stresstothe“Isay now”,isilluminatedbyafootnote,inwhichKantapologizes,“freedomissufficientlypresumed byourintentonlyinthattheactionsofrationalbeingsarefoundedmerelyintheidea”,“sothatI maynotbeobliged,toprovefreedomalsoinitstheoreticalintent”.94 Hehashoweverthebeing inview,whichcannotactotherwisethanunderthatidea,thereforerealhumanbeings;andthese, following the Critique of Pure Reason, are meant by that “theoretical intent” which records causalityinitstableofcategories.Toascribefreedomtoempiricalhumanbeings,asiftheirwill could also be demonstrated as free in theoretical philosophy, in that of nature, requires an immense effortonKant’spart;forifthemorallawweresimplyincommensurablewiththem, thenmoralphilosophywouldbemeaningless. Itwouldbeonlytoohappytoshakeoffthefact thattheThirdAntinomypunishedbothpossibleanswersinequalmeasureasborder-violations, endinginadeadlock.WhileinthepracticalphilosophyKantrigorouslyproclaimsthechorismos oftheexistent andthatwhichoughttobe,heisneverthelessdriventomediations.Hisideaof freedombecomesparadoxical:incorporatedintothecausalityoftheworldofappearance,which is incompatible with its Kantian concept. With themagnificent innocence, whichraiseseven Kant’serrorsfaraboveallcraftiness,heexpressesthisinthesentenceonthebeings,whocould not act otherwise than under the idea of freedom, whose subjective consciousness wouldbe chained to this idea. Their freedom hasasitsbasistheirunfreedom,onnotbeingabletodo otherwise,andatthesametimeonanempiricalconsciousness,whichcoulddeceiveitselfabout its freedom just as muchasaboutcountless otherdetails ofitsownpsychological lifeoutof amour propre [French: narcissism]; the being of freedom would be delivered over to the
contingency ofspatio-temporal existence. Iffreedomispositedaspositive,assomethinggiven orunavoidableinthemidstofwhatisgiven,thenitimmediatelyturnsintounfreedom.Butthe paradoxofKant’sdoctrine offreedomcorrespondsstrictly toitslocationinreality.Thesocial emphasis on freedom as something existent coalesces with undiminished oppression, psychologically with compulsive traits. They are what the Kantian moral philosophy, antagonisticinitself,hasincommonwithacriminologicalpraxisinwhichthedogmaticdoctrine of the free will is coupled with the necessity of harsh punishment, regardless of empirical conditions. All of the concepts in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason which, in honor of freedom, are supposed to fill in the cleft between the imperative and human beings, are repressive: law, constraint, respect, duty. Causality out of freedom corrupts the latter into obedience. Kant, like the idealists after him, cannot bear freedom without compulsion; its undistortedconception already provokesinhimthatfearofanarchy,whichlaterrecommended the liquidation of itsownfreedomtothebourgeoisconsciousness. Thiscanberecognized in formulations takenatrandomfromtheCritique ofPractical Reason,almostmorebythetone than by the content: “The consciousness of a free submission of the will to the law, as neverthelessboundupwithanunavoidablecompulsion,whichisexertedonallinclinations,but onlythroughitsownreason,isthustherespectforthelaw.”95 Thefearsomemajesty ofwhat Kant a prioritized is what the analysts trace back to psychological conditions. In that deterministicsciencecausallyexplains,whatdebasedfreedomtothenon-deduciblecompulsion inidealism,itreallycontributestofreedom:apieceofitsdialectic.
UnfreedomofThought231-234
Fully-developedGermanidealismchimeswithoneofthesongscollectedinthesameperiodby TheBoy’sMagicHorn:thoughtsarefree.Sinceaccordingtoitsdoctrineeverythingwhichis,is supposedtobethought,thatoftheabsolute,everything,whichis,issupposedtobefree.Butthis wishesonlytoassuagetheconsciousness thatthoughtsarebynomeansfree.Evenbeforeall socialcontrols,beforealladjustmenttorelationsofdomination,theirpureform,thatoflogical stringency,wouldbeproofofunfreedom,ofcompulsion,inrelationtowhatisthoughtasmuch asinrelationtothosewhothink,whoexactitfromthemselvesthroughconcentration.Whatdoes notfitintotheconsummationofthejudgementischokedoff;thinkingpracticesinadvancethat violence which philosophy reflected in the concept of necessity. Through identification, philosophy and society mediate each other into the former’s innermost core. The nowadays universal regimentation of scientific thoughtexternalizes thisUr-oldrelationship inmodesof conductandorganizational forms.Withoutthemomentofcompulsionhoweverthinkingcould notbeatall.Thecontradictionoffreedomandthinkingissolittletoberemovedbythinkingas itistoberemovedforthinking,butdemandsinsteaditsself-reflection.Speculativephilosophers fromLeibniztoSchopenhauerwererighttoconcentratetheireffortsoncausality.Itisthecruxof rationalism inthatwidersense,whichincludesSchopenhauer’smetaphysics,insofarasitknew itself to be on Kantian grounds. The nomothetism of the pure thought-forms, the causa cognoscendi [Latin: cause of cognition], isprojected ontheobjectsascausaefficiens[Latin: efficient cause]. Causality presupposes the formal-logical principle, actually the non-contradictoriness,thatofnakedidentity,astheruleofthematerialcognitionofobjects,even though historical development proceeded in the other direction. Thustheequivocation inthe wordratio:reasonandground.Causalitymustatoneforthis:itcannot,inkeepingwithHume’s
insight, appeal to any sensory immediate. To this extent, it is severed from idealism as a dogmaticremainder,whilewithoutcausalitytheformercouldnotexertthedominationoverthe existent,whichitstrivesfor.Freedofthecompulsionofidentity,thinkingwouldperhapsescape the causality, which that compulsion is modeled after. This last hypostatizes the form as committalforacontent,whichdoesnotassumethisformbyitself;metacriticalreflectionwould havetoabsorbempiricism wholesale. Incontrasttothis,theentire philosophyofKantstands under the sign of unity [Einheit]. This lends it, in spite of the heavy accentuation of the “material”, whichdoesnotstemfromthepureform,thecharacterofasystem:heexpectedno lessfromsuchaonethanhissuccessors.Theprevailingunityhoweveristheconceptofreason itself,finallythelogicaloneofpurenon-contradictoriness.TheKantiandoctrineofpraxisadds nothing to it. The distinction suggestedterminologically betweenthepuretheoretical andthe pure practical ones,justasmuchasbetweentheformal-logical andthetranscendental-logical andfinallythatofthedoctrineofideasinthenarrowsense,arenotdifferencesinsideofreason initself; butaresolelysuchinviewoftheirusage,whicheither hasnothingatalltodowith objects,orsimplyreferstothepossibilityofobjects,or,likepracticalreason,createsitsobjects, thefreeacts,outofitself.Hegel’sdoctrine, thatlogicalandmetaphysicwouldbethesame,is inherenttoKant,withoutityetbecomingthematic.Tothelattertheobjectivityofreasonassuch, theepitome offormal-logicalvalidity,becomestheplaceofrefugefortheontologywhichwas fatallyassailedbycritiqueinallmaterialrealms.Thisnotonlyestablishestheunityofthethree Critiques: it is precisely as this moment of unity that reason achieves that doublecharacter, which later helped to motivate dialectics. Tohimreasonisontheonehand,asdistinct from thinking,thepureformofsubjectivity; ontheotherhand,thesummationofobjectivevalidity, the archetype of all objectivity Its double character permits the turn taken by Kantian philosophy, as wellastheGermanidealists: toteach theobjectivity ofthetruthandofevery content, which is nominalistically hollowed-out by subjectivity, by virtue of the same subjectivity, which destroyed it. In reason, both would be already as one; wherein indeed whateverismeantbyobjectivity,whichopposesthesubject,perishesthroughtheabstractionin thislatter,howevermuchthisdismayedKant.Thestructuraldouble-jointednessoftheconceptof reasonissharedhoweverbythatofthewill.Whileinthenameofspontaneity,ofthatwhichisat no price to be concretized inthesubject,itissupposedtobenothingotherthanasubject,it becomes, solidified and identical like reason, concretized into a hypothetical, yet factical capacityinthemidstofthefactical-empiricalworld,andthuscommensurablewiththislatter.It isonlyduetoitsapriorionticnature,whichissomethingavailablelikeacharacteristic,thatthe judgementcanbemade,withoutabsurdity,thatitwouldcreateitsobjects,theactions.Itbelongs to the world, in which it has its effect. That this can be confirmed to it, is the fee for the installationofthepurereasonasanindifferentconcept.Thewill,fromwhichallimpulseswhich refusetheirconcretizationarebanishedasheteronomous,hastopayforthis.
“Formalism”234-236
Thesystem-immanentobjectionraisedagainstKant,thatthesubdivisionofreasonaccordingto itsobjectswouldmakeitdependent,againstthedoctrineofautonomy,onwhatitisnotsupposed to be, on the extra-rational, ought not to weigh too heavily. What breaks through in that discrepancy,despitehisintent,iswhatKantshoosaway,theinnervatedreferentialityofreasonto whatisnon-identicaltoit.OnlyKantdoesnotgothatfar:thedoctrineoftheunityofreasonin allofitspresumeddistrictsofapplicationpresupposesafirmseparationbetweenreasonandits
“whatabout”.Because howeveritnecessarilyreferstosucha“whatabout”,inordertobeany sort of reason, it is also determined, against his theory, in itself by this. Theconstitution of objects enters for example into judgements about whatistobepractically donequalitatively differently than in the Kantian theoretical founding propositions. Reason distinguishes itself accordingtoitsobjects,itmaynotbesuperficiallystamped,withvaryingdegreesofvalidity,as always thesameinvariousobject-realms. Thisalsoinformsthedoctrine ofthewill.Itisnot chôris[Greek:separately] fromitsmaterial, society.Ifitwere,thenthecategoricalimperative wouldviolateitself;asnothingotherthanitsmaterial,otherhumanbeingswouldbeusedbythe autonomous subject only as means, not as ends. That is the absurdity of the monadological construction of morality. Moral conduct, evidently more concrete thanthemerely theoretical kind,becomesmoreformalthanthislatterasaconsequenceofthedoctrine,thatpracticalreason wouldbeindependent fromeverythingwhichis“alien”toit,fromeveryobject.Tobesurethe formalism of Kantian ethics is not merely damnable, as reactionary German scholastic philosophysinceSchelerhasbrandedit.Whileitprovidesnoreadilypositivecasuisticofwhatis tobedone,ithumanelypreventsthemisuseofqualitative-substantivedifferencesforthebenefit of privilege and ideology. Itstipulates thegeneral juridical norm;tothisextent somethingof substancelivesonin,itspiteofandbecauseofitsabstraction,theideaofequality.TheGerman critique,towhichKantianformalismwastoorationalistic,hasmadeitsbloodycolorsknownin Fascist praxis,whichmadewhowastobekilled dependent onblindappearance [Schein],on membershipornon-membershipinadesignatedrace.Theillusorycharacter[Scheincharakter]of such concreity: that in the complete abstraction human beings are subsumed under arbitrary conceptsandaretreatedaccordingly,doesnotwipeawaythestigmawhichhassoiledtheword concreteeversince.Thereinhoweverthecritiqueofabstractmoralityisnotabrogated.Itsuffices so little, in view of the continuing irreconcilability of the particular and universal, as the allegedly material valueethicsofshort-termeternalnorms.Raisedtoaprinciple,theappealto one so much as the other does an injustice to the opposite. Thedepracticalization ofKant’s practical reason, that is to say its rationalism, and its deobjectification are coupled; only as deobjectifieddoesitbecomethatwhichisabsolutelysovereign,whichissupposedtobeableto have its effect in empiricism regardless of this latter, and regardless oftheleapbetweenthe acting and the doing. The doctrine of pure practical reason prepares the re-translation of spontaneityintocontemplation,whichreallyoccurredinthelaterhistoryofthebourgeoisieand which culminated in political apathy, something utterly political. Its consummated subjectification produces the appearance [Schein] of the objectivity of practical reason, as existent-in-itself;itisnolongerclearhowitissupposedtoreach,beyondtheontologicalabyss, intoanysortofexistent.ThisisalsotherootofwhatisirrationalintheKantianmorallaw,for which he chose the expression, the given fact [Gegebenheit], which denies all rational transparency: itcommandsthecourseofreflectiontohalt.Becausefreedomtohimamountsto theinvariant self-sameness ofreasoneveninthepractical realm, itforfeitswhatthelinguistic usage distinguishes between reason and the will. By virtue of its total rationality the will becomesirrational.TheCritiqueofPracticalReasonmovesinthecontextofdelusion.Ithasthe Spiritserveassurrogateoftheaction,whichisnotsupposedtobeanythingotherthanthesheer Spirit there. This sabotages freedom: its Kantian bearer, reason,coincides withthepurelaw. Freedom would require what is heteronomous to Kant. Freedom would be so little, without somethingaccidentalaccordingtothecriterionofpurereason,aswithouttherationaljudgement. The absolute separation between freedom and accident [Zufall: chance, contingency] is as arbitrary as the absolute one between freedom and rationality. According to an undialectical
standard of lawfulness [Gesetzmässigkeit], it always appears to freedom as something contingent; it demands reflection, which rises above the particular categories of law and accident.
TheWillasThing236-237
Themodernconceptofreasonwasoneofindifference.Init,thesubjectivethinkingreducedto thepureform–andtherebypotentially objectivated, detached fromtheego–isbalancedout withthevalidityoflogicalforms,removedfromtheirconstitution,whichneverthelesscouldnot inturnbeconceivedwithoutsubjectivethinking.InKanttheexpressionsofthewill,theactions, participate insuchobjectivity; theyarethuscalled objects.*29*Theirobjectivity,copiedfrom themodelofreason,paysnoattentiontothedifferentiaspecificaofactionandobject.Thewill, themaster-concept ormoment ofunityoftheacts,isanalogouslyconcretized.Whatitthereby experiences theoretically, does not meanwhile in all flagrant contradiction completely lack truth-content. Inviewoftheindividualimpulsethewillisinfactindependent,quasithingly,to theextentthattheprincipleofunityoftheegoachievesadegreeofindependenceinrelationto itsphenomenaaswhatis“its”.Onecantalkofanindependentandtothisextentevenobjective willsomuchasofastrongegoor,inarchaicterminology,ofcharacter;evenoutsideofKant’s construction, it is that middle ground between nature and the mundus intelligibilis, which Benjamin contrasted to fate.96 The concretization of individual impulses in the will which synthesizes and determines them, is their sublimation, the successful, displaced redirection, involved as duration, of the primary drive-goal. It is faithfully circumscribed inKantbythe rationality of the will. Through it the will becomes something other than its “material”, the diffuseexcitations.Toemphasizethewillofahumanbeing,meansthemomentofunityoftheir actions, and thatistheirsubordinationunderreason. IntheItalian title ofDonGiovannithe libertineisnamed“ildissoluto”,thedissoluteone;languageoptsformoralityastheunityofthe personaccordingtotheabstractrationallaw Kant’sdoctrineofethicsascribestothetotalityof thesubjectthepredominance overthemoments,inwhichtheyalonehavetheirlifeandwhich yetoutsideofsuchtotality wouldnotbethewill.Thediscoverywasprogressive:itprevented casuistic judgements frombeingmadeanylongerovertheparticularimpulses;italsoinwardly prepared the end of the righteousness over texts. This contributed to freedom. The subject becomesmoralforitself,cannotbeweighedaccordingtointernalandexternalparticulars,which are alien to it. By establishing the rational unity ofthewillasthesolemoralauthority,itis sheltered from the violence done to it by a hierarchical society,which–aseveninDante–judgesitsacts,withouttheirlawbeingacceptedbyitsownconsciousness.Theindividualactions become venial; no isolated oneisabsolutely goodorevil,theircriterion is“goodwill”,their principleofunity.Theinternalizationofsocietyasawholestepsintotheplaceofthereflexesof afeudalorder,whoseapparatus,thetighteritbecomes,fragmentsthegeneralityofhumanbeings all the more. The relegation of morality to the sober unity of reason was Kant’s bourgeois sublime,despitethefalseconsciousnessintheconcretizationofthewill.
ObjectivityoftheAntinomy238-239
TheassertionoffreedomasmuchasunfreedomterminatesaccordingtoKantincontradictions. That is why the controversy is supposed to be fruitless. Under the hypostasis of
scientific-methodical criteria it is expounded as self-evident, that theorems, which cannot be safeguardedfromthepossibility oftheircontradictoryopposite,aretobediscardedbyrational thinking.SinceHegelthisisnolongertenable.Ratherthanblamingtheprocedureinadvance, thecontradictionmaybeoneinthethingitself.Theurgencyoftheinterestinfreedomsuggests suchobjective contradictoriness. InthatKantdemonstrated thenecessityoftheantinomies,he also disdained the excuse of the false problem, overhastily bowing however to the logic of contradictoriness.*30* Thetranscendental dialectic doesnotentirely lacktheconsciousnessof this.TobesuretheKantiandialecticisexpoundedaccordingtotheAristotelianmodelasoneof trick statements [Fangschluessen]. But each time it develops thesis like antithesis non-contradictorilyinitself.Tothatextentitbynomeanscomfortablydisposesoftheantithesis, butwishestodemonstrateitsinevitability.Itwould“bedissolved”onlythroughareflectionona higherlevel,asthehypostasisoflogicalreasoninrelationtothatwhich,whosebeing-in-itselfit knows nothing of, and over which it is therefore not entitled to positively judge. That the contradiction would be inescapable to reason, indicates it as something beyond that and its “logic”.Intermsofcontent,thisallowsforthepossibilitythatthebearerofreason,thesubject, would be both free andunfree.Kantsettles thecontradiction withthemeansofundialectical logic,bythedistinctionbetweenthepureandempiricalsubject,whichignoresthemediatedness ofbothconcepts.Thesubjectissupposedtobeunfreetotheextentthatit,too,isitsownobject, submittingtothelawfulsynthesisthroughcategories.Inordertobeabletoactintheempirical world, the subject cannot in fact be conceived as other than the“phenomenon”. Kantbyno meansalwaysdeniesthis.Thespeculativecritiquegrants,teachestheworkonpracticalreasonin unisonwiththatonthepureone,that“theobjectsofexperienceassuchandamongtheseour ownsubjectarevalidonlyasappearance”.97 Thesynthesis,themediation,cannotbesubtracted from anything which can be positively judged. The moment of unity of thought, it grasps everything thoughtunderitselfanddeterminesitasnecessary Thiswouldcatchupeventothe talkofthestrongegoasfirmidentity,astheconditionoffreedom.Itwouldhavenopowerover thechorismos.TheconcretizationofcharacterwouldinKantiantermsbelocalizableonlyinthe realm oftheconstitutum[Latin:whatisconstituted],notinthatoftheconstituens[Latin:what constitutes]. Otherwise Kant would commit the same paralogism, for which he convicts the rationalists. The subject would howeverbefree,inthatitposits,“constitutes” intheKantian sense,itsownidentity,thegroundofitslawfulness.Thattheconstituensissupposedtobethe transcendentalsubject,theconstitutumtheempiricalone,doesnotremovethecontradiction,for thereisnotranscendentalonewhichisnotindividuatedintheunityofconsciousness,henceasa momentoftheempiricalone.Itrequireswhatisirreduciblynon-identical,whichsimultaneously delimits lawfulness. Withoutit,identity wouldbesolittle asanimmanentlawofsubjectivity. Only for the non-identical is it one; otherwise, a tautology. The identifying principle of the subject is itself the internalized one of society. That is why intherealm ofsocially existent subjects unfreedom is preponderant over freedom to this day. Inside of the reality, which is modeled after the identity-principle, no freedom is positively available. Where, under the universal bane, human beings seem to be relieved of the identity-principle and thereby of comprehensibledeterminants,theyareforthetimebeingnotmorethanbutlessthandetermined: asschizophrenia, subjective freedomissomethingdestructive, whichonlyincorporateshuman beingsunderthebaneofnaturethatmuchmore.
97Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,ibid.pg6.
DialecticalDeterminationoftheWill240-241
Thewillwithoutthebodilyimpulse,whichlivesonweaklyintheimagination,wouldbenoneat all; at the sametime howeveritarrangesitselfasacentralizing unityoftheimpulses, asthe authority which restrains and potentially negates them. This necessitates its dialectical determination. It is the power of consciousness, by whichitleavesitsownmagic circle and therebytransformswhatmerelyis;itsrecoilisresistance.Nodoubtthememoryofthisalways accompanied the transcendental rational doctrine of morals; as in the Kantian avowalofthe givenfact[Gegebenheit]ofthemorallawindependentofphilosophicalconsciousness.Histhesis isheteronomousandauthoritarian,buthasitsmomentoftruthinthatitlimitsthepurerational character of the moral law. If one took the one reason strictly,itcouldbenootherthanthe unabbreviated, philosophical one. The motif culminates in the Fichtean formulation of the self-evidenceofwhatismoral.Asthebadconscienceoftherationalityofthewill,however,its irrationalitybecomescrumpledupandfalse.Ifitisoncesupposedasself-evident,exemptfrom rational reflection, then what is self-evident affords sheltertotheunexamined residueandto repression.Self-evidence isthehallmark ofwhatiscivilized: goodiswhatisone,immutable, identical. Whatdoesnotfitintothis,thewholelegacyofthepre-logicalnaturalmoment,turns immediately into evil, as abstract as the principle of its opposite. Bourgeois evil is the post-existence of that which is older, subjugated, not entirely subjugated. It is however not unconditionally evil, any more than its violent counterpart. Solely the consciousness, which reflectsthemomentsasfarandasconsistentlyastheyareaccessibletoit,canrenderjudgements eachtimeoverthis.Actuallythereisnootherauthorityforcorrectpraxisandforthegooditself thanthemostadvancedstateoftheory Anideaofthegood,whichissupposedtodirectthewill, withoutitbeingcompletelyabsorbedintotheconcreterationaldeterminations,unwittinglyobeys thereifiedconsciousnessandwhatissociallyapproved.Thewillwhichistornfromreasonand declareditsownpurpose,whosetriumphtheNationalSocialists[Nazis]themselvesdocumented ateachoneoftheirpartymeetings,standslikeallidealswhichprotestagainstreasonreadyfor anyatrocity Theself-evidenceofgoodwillgrowsobdurateinthemirage,thehistoricalsediment ofpower,whichthewillshouldresist.Incontrasttoitspharisaism,theirrationalmomentofthe willprincipallycondemnseverythingmoraltofallibility.Moralcertaintydoesnotexist;toposit itwouldalreadybeimmoral,thefalseexonerationofwhatisindividuatedfromanythingwhich might be called morality. The more pitilessly society gathers itself up objectively-antagonisticallyintoeverysituation,thelessisanysortofmoralindividualdecision accordedtherighttobethecorrectone.Whatevertheindividualorthegroupundertakesagainst the totality, which they formapartof,isinfected bythatevil,andnolessarethosewhodo nothingatall.Thatiswhatoriginalsinhasbeensecularizedinto.Theindividualsubject,which imaginesitselftobemorallycertain,failsandbecomesculpable,becauseharnessedtothesocial order,ishardlyabletodoanythingabouttheconditions,whichappealtomoralingenium[Latin: naturalability,talent]:cryingoutforitstransformation.Forsuchadecay,notofmorality,butof what is moral, the canny neo-German after the war hatched the name of the “overdemand” [Überforderung],foritspartoncemoreanapologeticinstrument.Allthinkabledeterminationsof whatismoral,downtothemostformalofall,theunityoftheself-consciousnessasreason,are squeezedoutofthatmatter,withwhichmoralphilosophydidnotwishtosoilitshands.Today morality hasonceagainbeengrantedthehatedheteronomyitloathes,andtendentiallysublates itself.WithoutrecoursetothematerialnoOught[Sollen]couldissuefromreason;howeveronce itisforcedtorecognize itsmaterial inabstracto [Latin: intheabstract] astheconditionofits possibility,thenitmaynotcutofftheself-reflectiononthespecificmaterial;otherwiseitwould
thereby become heteronomous. In hindsight the positivity of what is moral, the infallibility whichtheidealistsattestedtoit,revealsitselfasthefunctionofastillsomewhatclosedsociety, oratleastofitsappearance[Schein]totheconsciousnessdelimitedbyit.ThisiswhatBenjamin may have meant by the conditions and boundaries of humanity. The primacy taught by the doctrinesofKantandFichteofpractical reasonovertheory,actuallyofreasonoverreason,is validonlyfortraditionalisticphases,whosehorizondoesnoteventoleratethedoubt,whichthe idealistsimaginedtheyweredissolving.
Contemplation242-243
MarxreceivedthethesisoftheprimacyofpracticalreasonfromKantandGermanidealismand sharpeneditintothedemandtotransformtheworldinsteadofmerelyinterpretingit.Hethereby underwrotetheprogramofabsolutecontrolofnature,somethingUr-bourgeois.Therealmodel of the identity-principle breaks through, which dialectical materialism disputes as such, the effort,bywhichthesubjectmakeswhatisdissimilar toitsimilar.Howeverwhileturningthat whichisimmanentlyrealtotheconceptinsideout,Marxispreparingarecoil.Thetelosofthe long overdue praxis, according to him, was the abolition of its primacy in the form which dominated bourgeois society through and through. Contemplation would be possible without inhumanity,justassoonastheproductiveforceswereunfetteredtothepointthathumanbeings were no longer devoured by a praxis, which scarcity extorts from them and which then automatizesitselfinthem.Whatisbadincontemplationtothisday,whichcontentsitselftothis sideofpraxis,asAristoteleswasthefirsttodevelopitforthesummumbonum[Latin:highest good], was that it became a piece of narrow-minded praxis precisely due to its indifference towards the transformation of the world: that it became a method andinstrumentalized. The possible reduction of labor to a minimum ought toradically influence theconcept ofpraxis. Whatever insights would befall a humanity emancipated through praxis, would be divergent from a praxis, which ideologically exalts itself and in one fashion oranotherkeepssubjects running on a treadmill. A reflection of thisfallsoncontemplation today.Againstthecurrent objection, extrapolated fromthethesesonFeuerbach,thatthehappinessoftheSpiritwouldbe impermissible amidst the increasing unhappiness of the exploding population of the poor countries,afterthecatastrophesofthepastandthosewhichthreateninthefuture,isnotmerely that it makes for the most part impotence into a virtue. Certainly there is no longer any justification forenjoyingthatoftheSpirit,becauseahappinessforcedtoseethroughitsown nullity, the borrowed time, which is given to it,wouldbenoneatall.Subjectively,too,itis undermined,evenwhereitstillbestirsitself.Thereismuchtospeakforthefactthatcognition, whosepossiblerelation toatransformingpraxisisatleastmomentarilycrippled,wouldnotin itselfbeanysortofblessing.Praxisisputoffandcannotwait;theory,too,ailsfromthis.Those howeverwhocandonothing,whichdoesnotatsomepointthreatentoturnoutfortheworse eventhoughitwishesforwhatisbetter,areconstrainedtothinking;thatistheirjustificationand thatofthehappinessoftheSpirit.Itshorizonneedbynomeansbethatofatransparentrelation to a possible later praxis.Thedelayed thinkingofpraxisalwayshassomethinginappropriate aboutit,evenwhenitputsitoffoutofnakedcompulsion.Howeverthingsgoalltooeasilyawry, forthosewhospoon-feedtheirthinkingbythecuibono[Latin:whobenefits].Whatwillonebe incumbentuponandbestowedbyabetterpraxis,thinkingcansolittleforeseehereandnow,in keepingwiththewarningofutopianism, thanpraxis,accordingtoitsownconcept,couldever exhaust itself in cognition. Withoutthepractical visa-stamp, thinkingshouldpushagainstthe
façade, moving as far as it can possibly move itself. A reality which seals itselfoffagainst traditional theory,evenagainstthebesthitherto, demandsthisforthesakeofthebanewhich shroudsit;itgazesatthesubjectwitheyessoalien,thatthelatter,mindfulofitsfailure,maynot spare itself the effort of the reply. The desperate state of affairs, that the praxis on which everything depends is thwarted, paradoxically affords thinking the breathing-space which it wouldpracticallybecriminalnottouse.Ironically,thinkingbenefitsfromthefactthatonemay not absolutize its own concept: it remains, as conduct, apiece ofpraxis,howevermuchthis wouldbehiddenfromitself.Butwhoevercontrastsliteral,sensoryhappinessassomethingbetter than theimpermissible oneoftheSpirit,failstorecognize thatattheconclusionofhistorical sublimation,thesplit-offsensoryhappinesstakesontheaspectofsomethingregressive,similar tothewayadultsfindtherelationship ofchildren tofoodoff-putting.Tonotbesimilartothe latterinthisrespect,isapieceoffreedom.
StructureoftheThirdAntinomy243-244
Accordingtotheresultsofthetranscendentalanalytic,theThirdAntinomywouldbecutoffin advance:“Whocalleduponyou,tothinkupapurelyandsimplyfirstconditionoftheworldand withthisanabsolutebeginningofthegradualsequenceofappearances,andtherebyprovidinga resting-point foryourimagination, bysettingbordersonboundlessnature?”98 MeanwhileKant wasnotcontentwiththesummaryobservation,thattheantinomywouldbeanavoidablemistake of the use of reason, and carried it out, like the others.TheKantiantranscendental idealism contains the anti-idealistic ban onpositingabsoluteidentity Epistemology isnotsupposedto behave as if the unforeseeable, “infinite” content of the experience couldbegarneredoutof positive determinations of reason. Whoever violates this, would end up in a contradiction unbearableto“commonsense”[inEnglish].Thisisplausible,butKantboresfurther Thereason whichproceeds,asheupbraidsitfordoing,must,accordingtoitsownmeaning,andforthesake ofitsinexorablecognitiveideal,keeprightongoingwhereitshouldn’t,asifunderanaturaland irresistible temptation. It is whispered to reason, that the totality of the existent would nonethelessconvergeinit.Ontheotherhand,whatisauthenticinthesystem-aliennecessity,as itwere,intheinfinitecontinuationofthereasonwhichsearchesforconditions,istheideaofthe absolute,withoutwhichthetruthcouldnotbethought,incontrasttothecognition asamere adaequatio reiatquecogitationis[Latin:makingthethingequalwithwhatisthought].Thatthe continuation, and thereby the antinomy, would be inalienable from the same reason, which nevertheless, as the critical one, must suppress these sorts of excesses in the transcendental analytic, documentswithunintentionalself-critiquethecontradictionofthecriticalapproachto itsownreasonasoftheorganofemphatictruth.Kantinsistsonthenecessityofthecontradiction and at the same time stops up the hole by spiriting away that necessity, which presumably originated from the nature of reason, to its greater honor, explaining itassolelyafalse,but correctable,usageofconcepts.–Theexplanationoffreedom,asthe“causalitythroughfreedom” mentioned inthethesisoftheThirdAntinomy,isreferredtoas“necessary”.99 Itsownpractical doctrine offreedom,asunequivocallyasitsintentionmanifests,canaccordinglynotsimplybe acausal oranticausal. Hemodifiesorexpandstheconcept ofcausality,aslongashedoesnot explicitly distinguishitfromthatemployedintheantithesis.Histheoremisfissuredbywhatis contradictory even before all paradoxicality of the infinite. As a theory of the validity of
98Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.pg311. 99Ibid.
scientific cognition, the Critique of Pure Reason cannot deal with its themes otherwise than undertheconceptofthelaw,noteventhosewhicharesupposedtobebeyondlawfulness.
OntheKantianConceptofCausality245-246
The most famous, utterly formal Kantian definition ofcausality holds,thateverything which happens,wouldpresupposeapreviouscondition,“uponwhichitinexorablyfollowsinkeeping with a rule.”100 Historically it was directed against the school of Leibniz; against the interpretation ofthesequenceofconditionsoutofinnernecessity,assomethingbeing-in-itself. On the other hand it distinguishes itself from Hume: without the rule-based nature [Regelhaftigkeit] of thought, which the latter delivers over to convention, to something accidental, unanimousexperience wouldnotbepossible; Humewouldthenandtherehaveto speakcausally,inordertomakewhatheisrenderingindifferentasconventionplausible.InKant bycontrastcausalitybecomesthefunctionofsubjectivereason,andwhatisimaginedthereunder becomesmoreandmorewatereddown.Itdissolveslikeapieceofmythology.Itapproximates theprincipleofrationalityassuch,ofthinkingaccordingtorules.Judgementsoncausalcontexts runoutintotautology:reasonobservesinthem,whatiteffectsanywayasthecapacityoflaws. Thatitprescribeslawsofnatureorratherthelaw,saysnomorethanthesubsumptionunderthe unityofreason.Ittransposesthisunity,itsownidentity-principle,ontotheobjectsandshufflesit offonthemastheircognition.Oncecausalityisthoroughlydisenchanted,asifbythetabooon theinnerdeterminationofobjects,thenitalsocorrodesitselfinitself.Kant’srescuehasthesole advantage over Hume’s denial, that what the latter swept away isregardedbytheformeras inborntoreason,asthenecessityofitsconstitution,asitwere,thoughnotasananthropological contingency Causality is not supposed to originate in the objects and their relationship, but insteadsolelyinthesubjective thought-compulsion. Thatonecondition couldhavesomething essential, somethingspecific todowiththenext,isdogmaticforKant.Howevernomothetisms ofsuccessions,inkeepingwiththeKantianconception,couldbesetup,whichrecallnothingof thecausalrelationship. Therelationship oftheobjectstoeachother,whichhavegonethrough what is inwards,virtually becomessomethingsuperficial tothetheorem ofcausality.Whatis ignoredisthesimplestofutterances,thatsomethingwouldbethecauseofsomethingelse.The causality which rigorously sealsitselfofffromtheinsideofobjects,isnomorethanitsown shell.Thereductioadhominem[Latin:reductiontotheperson]intheconceptoflawreachesa borderline value, where the law no longer says anything about the object; the expansion of causality into the pure concept ofreasonnegatesit.Kantiancausality isonewithoutacausa [Latin: cause].Bycuringitfromthenaturalisticprejudice,itmeltsawayinhishands.Thatthe consciousness cannotindeedescapecausality,asitsinbornform,certainly answerstoHume’s weak point. But when Kant says that the subject must think causally,healsofollowsinthe analysisofwhatisconstituted,accordingtotheliteralmeaningof“must”,thecausalproposition, towhichhefirstoughttosubmittheconstituta[Latin:thingsconstituted].Iftheconstitutionof causality throughthepurereason,whichforitspartisnonethelesssupposedtobefreedom,is already subject tocausality,thenfreedomisalready compromised fromtheoutset,thatithas scarcely any other place than the complaisance of the consciousness towardsthelaw.Inthe constructionoftheentireantithetics,freedomandcausalityintersect.BecausetheformerinKant issomuchastoactoutofreason,itisalsolawful;eventhefreeactions“followrules”.Whathas resultedfromthisistheunbearablemortgageofpost-Kantianphilosophy,thattherewouldbeno
100Ibid.pg308.
freedom without the law; that it would consistsolelyintheidentification withthis.Through Germanidealism, thiswasinherited byEngelswithunforeseeablepoliticalconsequences:*31* thetheoreticaloriginofthefalsereconciliation.
PleaforOrder247-249
That claim to totality which is stakedonbehalfofcausality,solongasitcoincides withthe principle of subjectivity, wouldbecome untenable alongwiththeepistemological compulsory character. What in idealism can appear as freedom only paradoxically, would thus become substantivelythatmoment,whichtranscendsthebracketingofthecourseoftheworldwithfate. If causality was sought as a determination – however subjectively mediated – of the things themselves, then what would open itself up in such a specification, in contrast to the indiscriminateOneofpuresubjectivity,istheperspectiveoffreedom.Itwouldbeapplicableto what is differentiated from compulsion. Compulsion would then no longer be praisedasthe factualactionofthesubject,itstotalitywouldnolongerbeaffirmed.Itwouldforfeittheapriori power, which was extrapolated from real compulsion. The more objective the causality, the greaterthepossibilityoffreedom;thisisnottheleastreasonwhywhoeverwishesforfreedom, mustinsistonnecessity.BycontrastKantdemandsfreedomandpreventsit.Thefoundationof thethesisoftheThirdAntinomy,thatoftheabsolutespontaneityofthecause,thesecularization of the freely deified act of creation, isCartesian instyle;itissupposedtobevalid,soasto satisfy the method. The completion of the cognition establishes itself as the epistemological criterion; withoutfreedom,“eveninthecourseofnaturethesequenceofappearances[would] never [be] complete on the side of the causes.”101 The totality of cognition, which istacitly equated therein withthetruth,wouldbetheidentityofsubjectandobject.Kantrestrictsitasa critic ofcognitionandteachesitasatheoreticianofthetruth.Acognitionwhichdisposesover the sort of complete sequence which according to Kant can only be conceived under the hypostasis of an originary act ofabsolutefreedom; whichtherefore permitsnothingwhichis sensiblygiventobeoutside,wouldbeonewhichisnotconfrontedwithanythingdivergentfrom it.Thecritiqueofsuchidentitywouldstrikethepositive-ontologicalapotheosisofthesubjective causalconcept aswellastheKantianproofofthenecessity offreedom,whosepureformhas something contradictory aboutitanyway.Thatfreedommustbe,isthehighestiniuria [Latin: injustice]ofthelegislatingautonomoussubject.Thecontentofitsownfreedom–identity,which has annexed everything non-identical – is as one with the must, with thelaw,withabsolute domination. This kindles the Kantianpathos.Heconstruesevenfreedomasaspecial caseof causality. What matters to him are “constant laws”. His deprecating bourgeois aversion to anarchyisnotlessthanhisself-consciousbourgeoisantipathyagainstdisenfranchisement.Even heresocietyreachesdeepintohismostformaldeliberations.Whatisformalinitself,whichon theonehandemancipatestheindividualsfromtherestrictivedeterminationsofwhathasbecome soandnototherwise,ontheotherhandconfrontstheexistentwithnothing,isbasedonnothing butdomination raisedtoapureprinciple,issomethingbourgeois.IntheoriginsoftheKantian MetaphysicofMoralslieshiddenthelatersociologicaldichotomyofComtebetweenthelawsof progressandtothoseofthesocialorder,includingthepartisanshipforthislatter;bymeansofits lawfulness it is supposed to restrain progress. The sentence from the Kantian proof of the antithesis hassuchanovertone:“thefreedom(independence)fromthelawsofnatureisindeed
101Ibid.pg310.
anemancipationfromcompulsion,butalsofromtheguidelinesofallrules”.102 Itissupposedto be “torn down” through “unconditional causality”, that is to say: the free act ofproduction; where Kant scientifically criticizes the latter in the antithesis, he scorns it, as elsewhere the stubbornfact,as“blind”.103 ThatKanthurriedlythinksoffreedomasthelaw,betraysthefact that he takes it no more scrupulously than his class ever did. Even before they feared the industrial proletariat, they combined, for example in Smithian economics, praise of the emancipated individual with the apology for a social order, in which on the one hand the “invisible hand”[inEnglish]takescareofthebeggarsaswellastheking,whileontheother handeventhefreecompetitorwasobligedtofollowacodeof–feudal–“fairplay”[inEnglish]. Kant’spopularizerdidnotfalsifyhisphilosophicalteacher,whenhenamedthesocialorderthe “blessed daughterofheaven”[referencetoSchiller’spoem,TheBell]inthesamepoem,which hammers home that when peoples arise, well-being does not thrive. Both wished to know nothingofthefactthatthechaoswhichthatgenerationdiscernedinthecomparativelymodest terrorsoftheFrenchRevolution –theydisplayedlessoutrageoverthecrueltyofthechouans [French: 18th century counter-revolutionaries] –wasthemonsterofarepressionwhosetraces survive in those who rise up against it. Like all theotherGermangeniuseswho,assoonas Robespierre providedapretext, felloverthemselves inrelief castigating therevolution which they at first had hailed, Kant praises “nomothetism” [Gesetzmässigkeit] at the expense of “lawlessness” intheproofoftheantithesisandevenspeaksofa“mirageoffreedom”.104 Laws arelenttheglorifyingepithet “constant”, whichissupposedtoraisethemabovethespecterof anarchy,withoutaglimmer ofthesuspicion,thatexactly thesewouldbetheoldillofwhatis unfree.ButwhatdemonstratestheprimacyoftheconceptoflawinKant,isthathecallsuponit intheproofforthethesisasmuchasfortheantithesis,astheirallegedhigherunity
DemonstratingtheAntithesis249-252
Theentiresectionontheantitheticsofpurereasonargues,asiswellknown,econtrario[Latin: tothecontrary];inthethesis,thatthecounter-thesiswouldbeguiltyofthattranscendentalusage ofcausality,whichviolatesthedoctrineofcategoriesinadvance;thatthecausalcategoryinthe antithesiswouldoverstepthebordersofthepossibilityofexperience.Whatisoverlookedtherein intermsofcontent,isthataconsistentscientivismguardsitselffromsuchametaphysicalusage ofthecausalcategory.Inordertoescapefromtheagnosticconsequencesofscientivism,which the doctrine of the theoretical reason unmistakably sympathizes with, Kant constructs an antithesis whichdoesnotatallcorrespondtothescientivisticposition:freedomisachievedby thedestructionofastraw-manmadetoorder.Whatisprovenisonlythatcausalityoughtnotto beseenassomethingpositively givenintoinfinity –atautology,accordingtothetenorofthe Critique of Pure Reason, which the positivists would be the last to object to. By no means however,noteveninthecontextoftheargumentationofthethesis,doesitfollowthatthecausal chainwouldbreakwiththesuppositionofafreedom,whichispresumednolesspositivelythan the former. The paralogism is of indescribable import, because it allows it to positively reinterpretthenonliquet[Latin:notproven].Positivefreedomisanaporeticconcept,conceived, inordertoconservethebeing-in-itself ofsomethingintellectualincontrasttonominalismand scientifization.AtacentralmomentintheCritiqueofPracticalReasonKantconfessedwhatthis
102Ibid.pg309.
103Ibid.pg311.
104Ibid.
wasallabout,namelythesalvationofaresidue:“Sincethislawhoweverunavoidablyconcerns allcausalityofthings,insofarastheirexistenceisdeterminableintime,sowouldfreedom,ifthis were the manner in which one had to conceive of the existence of these things, have tobe rejected asanugatoryandimpossibleconcept.Consequentlyifonestillwishestorescueit,no otherwayisleftthantoattribute theexistenceofathing,insofarasitisdeterminableintime, consequentlyalsocausalityaccordingtothelawsofnaturalnecessity,merelytotheappearance; to attribute to freedom, however, the same essence as the things in themselves.”105 The construction offreedomconfessestobeinginspiredbywhatElectiveAffinitieslatercalledthe salvationaldesire,whiletheformer,relegatedtothecharacteristicoftheintratemporalsubject,is revealedas“nugatoryandimpossible”.Theaporeticessenceoftheconstruction,nottheabstract possibility oftheantithesis intheinfinite,speaksagainstthepositivedoctrineoffreedom.The critiqueofreasonapodicticallyrejectsalltalkofasubjectbeyondspaceandtimeasanobjectof cognition.Atfirsteventhemoralphilosophyarguesthis:“Evenofitselfandindeedaccordingto the knowledge, which the human being has through inner sensation, it may not presume to cognize, howitwouldbeinitself.”106 TheforwardtotheCritiqueofPracticalReasonrepeats this, by citing that of thepurereason.107 Thatthe“objects ofexperience”, asKantstipulates, would“neverthelessbegroundedasthingsinthemselves”,108 soundscrasslydogmaticafterthat. Aporeticmeanwhile isbynomeansonlythequestionofthepossibility,ofcognizingwhatthe subject would be in andforitself.Everymerely thinkable, intheKantiansense“noumenal”, determination ofthesubjectendsupthisway,too.Inordertoshareinfreedom,thisnoumenal subjectmust,accordingtoKant’sdoctrine,beextratemporal,“asapureintelligence,whichisnot determinable initsexistence accordingtotime”.109 Thesalvationaldesiremakesthisnoumenal intoanexistence–becausenothingatallofthiscouldbepredicatedotherwise–eventhoughit isnotsupposedtobedeterminableaccordingtotime.Existencehowever,asanythingwhichis given,whichhasnotfadedintothepureidea,isaccordingtoitsownconceptintratemporal.In theCritiqueofPureReason–inthedeductionofthepureconceptofunderstandingaswellasin the chapter on schematism*32* – the unity of the subject becomes apuretemporal form.It integrates the facts of consciousness, as those of the same person. No synthesis withoutthe intratemporalinterrelationofthesynthesizedmomentstoeachother;itwouldbetheconditionof eventhemostformallogicaloperationsandoftheirvalidity.Accordinglyhowevertimelessness couldnotbeascribedtoanabsolutesubjecteither,solongassomethingunderthenameofthe subjectissupposedtobethought.Atmost,rather,itwouldbeabsolutetime.Itisunfathomable, how freedom, the principal attribute of the temporal act and realized solely temporally, is supposed to be predicated by something radically non-temporal; equally unfathomable, how somethingnon-temporal ofthissortcouldhaveanaffectinthespatio-temporalworld,without itself becoming temporal andstrayingintotheKantianrealm ofcausality.Theconcept ofthe thing-in-itselfstepsinasadeusexmachina[Latin:automaticgod].Hiddenandindeterminate,it marksablindspotofthought;solelyitsindeterminacypermitsittobeutilizedasneededforthe explanation. TheonlypeepoutofthethinginitselfwhichKantpermitsisthatit“affects”the subject. Thereby however it would be sharply opposed to this, and only byanirredeemable speculation, nowhereperformedbyKant,coulditbethrowntogetherwiththemoralsubjectas
somethingwhichlikewiseexistsinitself.Kant’scritiqueofcognitionpreventsthesummoningof freedomintoexistence; hehelpshimselfbyconjuringupasphereofexistence, whichindeed wouldbeexemptfromthatcritique,butalsofromeveryjudgement,overwhatitwouldbe.His attempttoconcretizethedoctrineoffreedom,toascribefreedomtolivingsubjects,iscaughtin paradoxical assertions: “One can thus concede, that ifitwerepossibleforustohaveadeep insightintothemannerofthinkingofahumanbeing,astohowitshowsitselfthroughinneras wellasouteractions,thateverylastmainspringthereofwouldbeknowntous,alongwithallthe external causes which affect them, one couldcalculate thebehaviorofahumanbeinginthe futurewithcertainty,justlikethelunarorsolareclipseandneverthelessmaintain,thatthehuman beingwouldbefree.”110 ThatKantevenintheCritiqueofPracticalReasoncannotdowithout termini like mainspring, is relevant in terms of content. The attempt to make freedom comprehensible, insofarasadoctrine offreedomcannotaffordtodowithoutthis,inescapably leads through the medium of its metaphors to conceptions from the empirical world. “Mainspring” is a causal-mechanical concept. Even if the previous proposition were valid, however, then the one afterwards would be nonsense. Itwouldservesolelytorelate whatis being metaphysically related to, which is empirically in total causality, throughthemythical context of destiny, by burdening it in the name of freedom with the guilt, which would be nothing of the sort in the totally given determination. Through its culpability this would be reinforced intotheinnermostcoreofitssubjectivity.Nothingislefttosuchaconstruction of freedomotherthan,underthesacrifice ofthereasononwhichitissupposedtorest,tocowin authoritarianfashionthosewhoattempttothinkitinvain.Reasonforitsparthoweverisnothing othertohimthanthelegislating capacity Thatiswhyhemustconceive offreedomfromthe verybeginningasa“specialkindofcausality”.111 Bypositingit,hetakesitback.
OnticandIdealMoments252-257
Infacttheaporeticconstructionoffreedomisbasednotonthenoumenalbutonthephenomenal. There,thatgivenfactofmorallawcanbeobserved,bywhichKantbelieves,despiteeverything, freedomtobewarrantedassomethingexistent.Meanwhilethegivenfact,astheverywordhints, is the opposite of freedom, naked compulsion, exerted in space andtime. ForKantfreedom meanssomuchasthepurepracticalreason,whichproducesitsobjectsitself;thiswouldhaveto do “not with objects, to recognize them, but with their own capacity, to really make these (according tothecognitionofthesame).”112 Theabsoluteautonomyofthewillimpliedtherein wouldbesomuchasabsolutedominationoverinnernature.Kantcontinues:“Tobeconsistent, is the greatest obligation of a philosopher and yet is themostseldommet.”113 Thisnotonly passesofftheformallogicofpureconsistency asthehighestmoralauthority,butatthesame timethesubordinationofeveryimpulseunderthelogicalunity,itsprimacyoverwhatisdiffuse innature,indeedoverall diversityofthenon-identical; thatalwaysappearsinconsistent inthe closedcircleoflogic.InspiteoftheresolutionoftheThirdAntinomy,Kantianmoralphilosophy remainsantinomic:itiscapable,accordingtotheentireconception,ofconceivingoftheconcept of freedom solely as repression. The entirety of the concretizations ofmorality inKantbear repressive features. Their abstractness is substantive, because they exclude from the subject,
110Ibid.pg99.
111Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.pg309.
112Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,ibid.pg89.
113Ibid.pg24.
what does not correspond to its pure concept. Thus the Kantian rigorism. The hedonistic principleisarguedagainst,notbecauseitisevilinitself,butbecauseitwouldbeheteronomous tothepureego:“Thepleasurefromtheconception oftheexistence ofathing,insofarasitis supposedtobeagroundsofdeterminationofdesireofthisthing,isbasedonthesensitivityof thesubject,becauseitdependsontheexistenceofanobject;itthusbelongsthesenses(feelings) andnottotheunderstanding,whichexpressesarelationofaconceptofanobjectaccordingto concepts,butnotofasubjectaccordingtofeelings.”114 ButthehonorwithwhichKantsanctifies freedom, by wishing to purify it from everything which impinges on it, simultaneously condemnsthepersontounfreedominprinciple.Itcannotexperiencesuchafreedom,tightened to an extreme pitch, otherwise than as the restriction of its own impulses. If Kant inclines nevertheless towards happiness in many passages, as in the magnificent second note of the secondtheorem fromthefoundationsofpracticalreason,thenhishumanitybreaksthroughthe normofconsistency.Itmayhavedawnedonhim,thatwithoutsuchclemencyonecouldnotlive accordingtomorallaw.Thepureprincipleofreasonofpersonalityoughttoconvergewiththat of the self-preservation of the person, with the totality of its “interests”, which includes happiness. Kant’s position to this is as ambivalent asthebourgeoisSpiritasawhole,which wouldliketoguarantee “thepursuitofhappiness” [inEnglish]totheindividual[Individuum] andwouldforbiditthroughthework-ethic.Suchsociologicalreflectionisnotintroducedfrom theoutside,inaclassificatorymanner,intotheKantianapriorism.Thefactthatterminiofsocial content appearoverandoveragainintheFoundationandintheCritiqueofPracticalReason, maybeincompatible withtheaprioristic intention. ButwithoutsuchametabasisKantwould havetofallsilentbeforethequestionconcerningthecompatibilityofmorallawwithempirical human beings. He would have to capitulate to heteronomy, as soon as he confessed that autonomy was unrealizable. Ifintheserviceofsystematic validity onewishedtoexpropriate thosesocially content-based termini oftheirsimplemeaningandsublimatethemtoideas,then one would ignore not onlytheirwording.Thetrueoriginofmoralcategories isregistered in themwithgreater power,thanKant’sintentionisabletohandle.Thusthefamedvariantofthe categorical imperativefromtheFoundation:“Actso,thatyoualwaysusethehumanityinyour person,asmuchasineveryotherperson,atthesametimeasanend,nevermerelyasmeans”,115 then “humanity”, the human potential in human beings, may have been meant only as a regulative idea;humanity,theprincipleofhumanexistence,bynomeansthesumofallhuman beings,isnotyetrealized.Neverthelesstheadditionofthefacticalcontentinthewordisnotto beshakenoff:everyindividualistoberespectedastherepresentativeofthesocializedspecies humanity, no mere function of the exchange-process. The decisive distinction urgedbyKant betweenmeansandendsissocial,thatbetweensubjectsascommoditiesoflabor-power,outof whichvalueiseconomically produced,andthehumanbeingswhoevenassuchcommodities remain subjects, forwhosesaketheentire operation, whichforgetsthemandonlyincidentally satisfies them,issetintomotion.Withoutthisperspective thevariantoftheimperativewould loseitselfinavoid.The“nevermerely”howeveris,asHorkheimerputit,oneofthoseusagesof asublimesobriety,inwhichKant,inordertonotspoilthechanceoftherealizationofutopia, acceptsempiricismeveninitsmostdegradedform,thatofexploitation,astheconditionofwhat is better, insofar as he then develops it in the philosophy of history, under the concept of antagonism.Thisreads:“Themeans,bywhichnatureservestobringthedevelopmentofallits predispositions intoexistence, istheantagonism ofthesameinsociety,insofarasthislatterin
theendbecomesnonethelessthecauseofalawfulsocialorderofthesame.WhatIunderstand here under antagonism is theunsociable sociability ofhumanbeings,i.e.thetendency ofthe same to enter into society, which however is tied to a thorough-going resistance, which constantly threatens toseparatethissociety.Thispredispositionevidentlyliesinhumannature. Humanbeingshaveaninclinationtobesocialized:becausetheyfeelthemselvestobemoreofa humanbeinginsuchacondition,i.e.thedevelopmentoftheirnaturalpredispositions.Theyhave however also a great tendency to particularize (isolate) themselves: because they find in themselves simultaneously theunsociable characteristic, thewishtoarrangeeverythingmerely accordingtotheirmind,andhenceexpectresistanceeverywhere,justastheyknowthemselves, thattheyfortheirpartareinclinedtoresistanceagainstothers.Nowthisresistanceisthatwhich awakensallpowersofhumanity,bringingittherebytoovercomeitstendencytowardslaziness and,drivenbythedesireforhonor,forlordshiporforproperty,toestablishapositionamongst their fellows, which they most likely cannot stand, but cannot do without, either.”116 The “principle of humanity as an end in itself”117 is, despite allmeditative ethicstothecontrary, nothing merely innervated, but a promissory note on the realization of a concept of human beings, whichhasitsplace onlyasthesocial,albeit innervated, principle ineveryindividual. Kantmusthavenoticed thedoublemeaningofthewordhumanity,astheideaofbeinghuman andoftheepitomeofallhumanity.Withdialecticalprofundityheintroduceditintotheory,even if only playfully. Consequently his usage of speech continues to oscillate betweenonticand idea-related modesofparlance.“Rationalbeings”118 arejustascertainlylivinghumansubjects, asthe“generalrealmofendsinthemselves”,119 whicharesupposedtobeidenticalwithrational beings, transcends these in Kant. He would like neither to cede the idea ofhumanity tothe existent societynortodissolvesuchintoaphantasm.Thetensionrisestothebreakingpointin hisambivalence towardshappiness.Ontheonehandhedefendssuchintheconceptofbeing worthyofhappiness,ontheotherhandhedisparages itasheteronomous,especiallywherehe finds“universalhappiness”120 tobeofnousetothelawofthewill.HowlittleKant,inspiteof the categorical character of the imperative, would dream of ontologizing this posthaste, is confirmed bythepassage,“that… theconceptofgoodandevilmustbedeterminednotbefore the moral law (on which it superficially seems it ought to be grounded), but only (as also happens here) after the selfsame and through the selfsame.”121 Good and evil are no mere existents-in-themselves of some intellectual-moral hierarchy but are something posited by reason; that is how deeply nominalism still reaches into Kantian rigorismus. However by fastening the moral categories to self-preserving reason, they are no longer thoroughly incompatible with that happiness, against which Kant so harshly expounded them. The modifications ofhisstancetowardshappinessinthecourseoftheCritiqueofPracticalReason arenobackpedalingconcessionstothetraditionoftheethicsofgoods;rather,precedingHegel, themodelofamovement oftheconcept.Themoraluniversalitypasses,whetherwilledorno, overintosociety.ThisisformallydocumentedbythefirstnotetothefourththeoremofPractical Reason:“Thereforethemereformofalaw,whichrestrictsthematter,mustatthesametimebea
groundstoaddthismattertothewill,butnottopresupposeit.Thematerialmaybeforexample myownhappiness.This,ifIattribute ittoeveryone(asImayinfactdoinfinitebeings),can thusonlybecomeanobjectivepracticallaw,ifIincludethatofothersinthesame.Thusthelaw topromotethehappinessofothersoriginatesnotfromthepresupposition,thatthiswouldbean object for everyone’s caprice, but merely from the fact that the form of universality, which reason requires as a condition ofgivingamaxim ofself-lovetheobjective validity ofalaw, becomes the grounds of the determination of the will, and therefore the grounds of the determination ofthepurewillwasnottheobject(thehappinessofothers),butsolelythemere lawfulformofit,bywhichIrestrictedmymaximgroundedonmyinclination,inordertoobtain the universality of alawandtomakeitfitforthepurepractical reason,solelyoutofwhose restriction, and notfromtheaddition ofanexternal mainspring,couldtheconcept ofwhatis committal–toextendthemaximsofself-lovealsotothehappinessofothers–originate.”122 The doctrineoftheabsoluteindependenceofthemorallawoftheempiricalbeingandindeedofthe pleasure-principle is suspended, by the incorporation ofthethoughtoflivingcreatures inthe radical,generalformulationoftheimperative.
DoctrineofFreedomRepressive257-258
Adjacent to this, Kant’s ethics, fragile in itself, retains its repressive aspect. It triumphs in unmitigated formintheneedforpunishment.*33*Thefollowinglinesstemnotfromthelate worksbutfromtheCritique ofPractical Reason:“Likewise ifsomeone,whootherwise isan honestman(orisonlyplacedinthoughtinthepositionofanhonestman),confrontsthemoral law,inwhichherecognizestheunworthinessofaliar,hispracticalreason(inthejudgementover that,whichheissupposedtodo)immediatelydepartsfromtheadvantage,unifyingitselfwith whatpreservestherespectforhisownperson(truthfulness),andtheadvantagewillnow,afterit hasbeenseparatedfromeverythingextraneoustoreason(whichissolelyandtotallyontheside ofduty)andcleansed,isweighedbyeveryone,inordertobringinalllikelihoodstillothercases intoconnectionwithreason,onlynotwhereitcouldruncountertothemorallaw,whichreason never departs from, but thereby unites its innermost core with it.”123 In the contempt for compassion, thepurepracticalreasonaccordswiththe“Growhard”ofNietzsche,itsantipode: “Eventhefeelingofcompassionandsoft-heartedparticipation,ifitprecedestheconsiderationof whatdutywouldbeandbecomesagroundsofdetermination,burdensthewell-meaningperson, bringingtheirconsideredmaximsintoconfusionandcausesthemtowishtoberidofthemand tosubmitsolelytothelegislating reason.”124 Attimes,theintermixedheteronomyoftheinner compositionofautonomyboilsoverintorageagainstthesamereason,whichissupposedtobe theoriginoffreedom.ThenKanttakesthesideoftheantithesisoftheThirdAntinomy:“Where howeverdetermination according tonatural lawsceases, thereceasealsoallexplanations,and nothingremainsbutthedefense,thatisthedrivingawayoftheobjectionsofthose,whopretend to have seen deeper into the essence of things and hence blithely declare freedom to be impossible.”125 Obscurantism entwines itself with the cult of reason as that which rules absolutely.Thecompulsion,whichaccordingtoKantproceedsfromthecategoricalimperative, contradicts thefreedom,whichissupposedtobeconstituted initasitshighestdetermination.
Thisisnottheleastofthereasonswhytheimperative,strippedofallempiricism,ispresentedas a“factum”126 whichneedsnotestbyreason,inspiteofthechorismosbetweenfacticityandthe idea.TheantinomicsoftheKantiandoctrineoffreedomissharpenedtothepointthatthemoral lawcountsasrationalforitandasnotrational;rational,becauseitreducesitselftopurelogical reasonwithoutcontent; notrational, becauseitwouldbeacceptedasagivenfact,itwouldno longerbeanalyzed;everyattempttodosoisanathema.Thisantinomicsisnottobeshuffledoff onto the philosopher: the pure logic of consistency, compliant to self-preservation without self-reflection,isdeludedinitself,irrational.ThehideousKantianexpressionof“reasonalizing” [Vernünfteln: reasoning], which still echoes in Hegel’s “raisonnement” [Raisonnieren: reasoning], which denounces reason without any valid grounds of distinction, and whose hypostasisisbeyondallrational ends,isconsistent despiteitsglaringcontradiction. Theratio turnsintoirrationalauthority.
Self-experienceofFreedomandUnfreedom258-262
Thecontradiction datesbacktotheobjective onebetweentheexperience ofconsciousness of itselfanditsrelationship tothetotality.Theindividuated feelsfree,insofarasitisopposedto societyandmayundertakesomethingagainstitorotherindividuals,althoughincomparablyless than it believes. Its freedom is primarily that of pursuing its own ends, which are not immediately exhausted in social ones; to this extent it coincides with the principle of individuation. Freedom of this type has escaped the natural-rootedness of society; within an increasingly rational one it has achieved a degree of reality At the same time it remains appearance [Schein]inthemidstofbourgeoissociety,nolessthanindividualitygenerally The critique ofthefreedomofthewill,likethatofdeterminism,meanscritiqueofthisappearance [Schein].Thelawofvaluerealizes itselfovertheheadsofformallyfreeindividuals.Theyare unfree, according to Marx’s insight, as its involuntary executors, and indeed all the more thoroughly, the more the social antagonisms grow, in which the conception of freedom first formed. The processbywhichwhatisindividuated becomesautonomous,thefunctionofthe exchange-society,terminatesinitsabolitionthroughintegration.Whatproducedfreedom,recoils intounfreedom.Theindividuated wasfreeastheeconomicallyactivebourgeoissubject,tothe extent that autonomy was promoted by the economic system, so that it would function. Its autonomyistherebyalreadypotentiallyrepudiatedatitsorigin.Thefreedomofwhichitboasted was, as Hegel first discerned, also something negative, the mockery of the true one; the expressionofthecontingencyofthesocialfateofeachandeveryindividual.Therealnecessity in freedom,whichhadtomaintain itselfand,asultra-liberal ideologypraisedit,prevailed by elbowingitswaythrough,wasthecover-image[Deckbild]ofthetotal socialnecessity,which compels the individual towards ruggedness [in English and italicized in original], so that it survives.Evenconceptswhicharesoabstract,thattheyappeartoapproximateinvariance,prove themselvestobehistorical.Justsothatoflife.Whileitreproducesitselffurtherunderconditions ofunfreedom,itsconceptpresupposes,accordingtoitsownmeaning,thepossibilityofwhatis notyetincluded,oftheopenexperience,whichhasbeensomuchmorelessened,thattheword lifealreadysoundslikeemptyconsolation.Thefreedomofthebourgeoisindividuatedisnoless of a caricature, however, than the necessity of its action. Itisnot,astheconcept ofthelaw commands,transparent, butstrikeseveryindividual subjectasanaccident,thecontinuationof mythical fate. Life has retained this negativity, an aspectwhichfurnishedthetitle foraduet
piano piece of Schubert, Storms of Life. In the anarchy of commodity production the natural-rootednessofsocietyrevealsitself,asitvibratesinthewordlife,asabiologicalcategory forsomethingessentially social.Iftheprocessofproductionandreproductionofsocietywere transparent to subjects and determined bythem,thentheywouldalsonolongerbepassively buffetedtoandfrobytheominousstormsoflife.Whatiscalledlifewouldtherebydisappear, includingthefatalaura,withwhichtheJugendstilsurroundedthewordintheindustrialage,as the justification of a bad irrationality. At times the transience of that surrogate cast out its friendly shadow beforehand: today the adultery literature ofthenineteenth centuryisalready rubbish,exceptingitsgreatestproducts,whichcitethehistoricalUr-imagesofthatepoch.Justas notheaterdirectorwoulddaretoplayHebbel’sGygesbeforeanaudiencewhichdoesnotwishto dispensewiththeirbikinis–thefearofwhatismaterially anachronistic, thelackofaesthetic distance, has atthesametime somethingbarbaric aboutit–somethingsimilar willtranspire, once humanity worked it out, for nearly everything which counts today as life and merely deceivesoneoverhowlittlelifetherereallyis.Untilthentheprevailinglawfulnessiscontraryto theindividualanditsinterests.Undertheconditionsofthebourgeoiseconomythisisnottobe shaken;thequestionconcerning thefreedomorunfreedomofthewill,assomethingavailable, cannot be answered in it. It is for its part the molded castofbourgeoissociety: theintruth historical category oftheindividualdeceptivelyexemptsthatquestionfromthesocialdynamic and treats every individual as an Ur-phenomenon. Obediently freedom has innervated the ideology of individualistic society badly within itself; this bars every definitive answer to ideology If the thesis of the freedom of the willburdensthedependent individuals withthe social injustice, over which they can do nothing, and humiliates them unceasingly with desiderata, before which they must fail, then on the other hand the thesis of unfreedom metaphysically prolongs the primacy of the given, declares itself to be immutable and encouragesindividuals,insofarastheyarenotalreadypreparedtodoso,tocower,sinceindeed nothing else is left for them to do. Determinism acts as if dehumanization, the commodity character of labor-power developed into a totality, were human essence pure and simple, incognizant ofthefactthatthecommodity character findsitsbordersinlabor-power,whichis notmereexchange-valuebutalsohasuse-value.Ifthefreedomofthewillismerelydenied,then humanbeingsarereducedwithoutreservationstothenormalformofthecommoditycharacterof their labor in developed capitalism. No less topsy-turvy is a prioristic determinism as the doctrine ofthefreedomofthewill,whichinthemiddle ofcommodity societyabstractsfrom this.Theindividuated itselfformsamoment ofit;theformerisascribedthepurespontaneity which society expropriates. The subject needs only toposetheinescapable alternative ofthe freedom or unfreedom of the will, and it isalready lost.Eachdrasticthesisisfalse.Thatof determinism and that of freedom coincide in their innermost core. Both proclaim identity. Throughthereductiontopurespontaneity,theempiricalsubjectsaresubjectedtothesamelaw, which expandsitselfintothecategory ofcausality ofdeterminism. Freehumanbeingswould perhapsalsobeemancipated fromthewill;surelyonlyinafreesocietywouldindividualsbe free.Alongwithexternalrepression,theinneronewoulddisappear,probablyafteralonginterim periodandunderthepermanentthreatofregression.Ifthephilosophicaltradition,intheSpiritof repression, confounded freedom and responsibility, then this latter would pass over into the fearless, active participation of every individual: in a whole, which would no longer institutionally hardentheparticipation, inwhichhowevertheywouldhaverealconsequences. Theantinomybetweenthedeterminationoftheindividuatedandthesocialresponsibilitywhich contradicts itisnofalseusageofconceptsbutreal,themoralformoftheirreconcilability of
universal and particular. That even Hitler and his monsters, according to all psychological insight,areslavesoftheirearliest childhood,productsofmutilation, andthatneverthelessthe few,whichwereabletobecaught,oughtnottobeallowedtogofree,iftheatrocityisnotto repeat itselfintotheindefinitefuture,whichtheunconsciousofthemassestherebyjustifies,in that no ray of light fell from the heavens – this is not to be glossed over by jury-rigged constructions such asautilitarian necessity,whichquarrelswithreason.Whatisindividuated befallshumanityonlywhentheentiresphereofindividuation,includingitsmoralaspect,isseen through as an epiphenomenon. At times the total society, out ofthedespairofitscondition, represents thefreedom,againstindividuals, whichgoesintoprotestintheirunfreedom.Onthe other hand,intheepochofuniversalsocialoppressionthepicture offreedomagainstsociety livesonlyinthetorn-apart,maimedtraitsoftheindividuated.Wherethishidesawayeachtime inhistory,isnotdecreedforonceandforall.Freedombecomesconcreteinthechangingforms of repression: in resistance against these. There was somuchfreedomofthewill,ashuman beingswishedtofreethemselves.Howeverfreedomitselfissotangledupwithunfreedom,that itisnotmerelyinhibitedbythelatter,buthasitastheconditionofitsownconcept.Thisisno moretobeseparatedoutasanabsolutethananyotherindividualone.Withouttheunityandthe compulsion of reason, nothing whichissimilar tofreedomcouldeverhavebeenthought,let alonecometobe;thisisdocumentedinphilosophy.Nomodeloffreedomisavailable,exceptas consciousness, asinthesocialtotal constitution, interveningthroughthisinthecomplexionof whatisindividuated.Thatiswhythisisnotthoroughlychimerical,becauseconsciousnessforits partisbranched-offdrive-energy,itselfalsoimpulse,isamoment,too,ofwhatitintervenesin.If there were not that affinity, which Kant frantically denies, nor would there be the idea of freedom,forwhosesakehewishestohushuptheaffinity
OntheCrisisofCausality262-266
What is happening to the idea of freedom meanwhile appears also to be happening to its counterpart, theconcept ofcausality; thatinkeepingwiththeuniversaltrendtowardsthefalse sublation of the antagonisms, the universal liquidates the particular from above, through identification. Thisisnottobeshort-circuited byreturningtothecrisisofcausalityinnatural sciences.Itappliesthereexpresslyonlyinthemicro-realm;ontheotherhandtheformulationsof causalityinKant,atleastthoseoftheCritiqueofPureReason,areso“large”[inEnglish],that theypresumablyhaveroomevenformerelystatisticalnomothetisms[Gesetzmässigkeiten].The naturalsciences,whichcontentthemselveswithoperationaldefinitionsimmanenttotheirmode of procedure, even with respect to causality, and philosophy, which cannotdispensewithan accounting ofcausality,ifitwishestodomorethanmerelyabstractlyrepeatnatural-scientific methodology,aremiserablybrokenfromeachother,andtheneedalonewillnotgluethemback together. Thecrisisofcausality isvisiblehowevereveninwhatphilosophical experience can stillreach,incontemporarysociety.Kantacceptedastheunquestionablemethodofreason,that everycondition istraced backto“its”cause.Thesciences,whichphilosophyforthemostpart moves further and further away from, the more enthusiastically it recommends itself as the former’s spokesperson, may operate less with causal chains than causal networks. This is howevermorethananincidentalconcessiontotheempiricalambiguityofcausalrelations.Even Kanthadtoacknowledgethattheconsciousnessofallcausalsequenceswhichintersectinevery phenomenon,insteadofbeingunequivocallydeterminedbycausalityintemporalsuccession,is essentialtothecategoryitself,inhiswords,isapriori:noindividualeventisexceptedfromthat
multiplicity.Theinfinityofwhatisinterwovenandwhichintersectsinitselfmakesitimpossible inprinciple, bynomeansmerely practically,toformunequivocal causalchains,astheThesis and Antithesis of the Third Antinomy stipulate in equal measure. Even tangible historical inquiries,whichinKantstillremained inafinite course,involve,horizontally asitwere,that positiveinfinitywhichappliesinthecritiqueintheantinomychapter.Kantignoresthis,asifhe were transposing relationships clearly visible in small towns to all possibleobjects.Nopath leads from his model to full-fledged causal determinations. Because he treats the causal relationshipsolelyasaprinciple,hethinkspastwhatisinterwoveninprinciple.Thisomissionis conditioned bytherelocation ofcausality intothetranscendental subject.Asthepureformof lawfulnessitshrinkstoone-dimensionality.Theinclusionoftheill-famed“reciprocaleffect”in thetable ofcategories istheretrospective attempt toanswerforthatlack,attestingalsotothe dawningcrisisofcausality.Itsschematareplicated,asdidnotescapetheDurkheimschool,the simplegenerationalrelationship,soverymuchasitsexplanationrequirescausality.Ittakesonan aspect of something feudal, if not, as in Anaximander andHeraclitus, ofanarchaic juridical relationshipofvengeance.Causality,theinheritoroftheactivatingspiritsinthings,hasbeenas delimitedbytheprocessofdemythologizationasmuchasreinforcedbysuchinthenameofthe law.Ifcausalityistheactualunityinthepolyvalence,whichledSchopenhauertofavoritamong the categories, thenthebourgeoiserawasthroughoutasmuchcausality assystem.Themore unequivocal therelationships were,theeasieritwastospeakofitinhistory.Hitler’sGermany caused the Second World War more precisely thantheWilhelmine onedidtheFirst.Butthe tendency recoils on itself. Ultimately there is a level of system – the social keyword is: integration–inwhichtheuniversaldependenceofallmomentsonallotheronesmakesthetalk ofcausalityobsolete;thesearchforwhatinsideamonolithicsocietyissupposedtobethecause isinvain.Thecauseisonlythislatteritself.Causalityhaswithdrawnasitwereintothetotality; inthemidstofitssystemitbecomesindistinguishable. Themoreitsconcept, underscientific mandate, dilutes itself to abstraction, the less the simultaneous threads of the universally socialized society,whicharecondensedtoanextreme, permit oneconditiontobetracedback with evidence to others. Each one hangs together horizontally as vertically with all others, tincturesall,istincturedbyall.Thelatestdoctrineinwhichenlightenmentemployedcausalityas a decisive political weapon, the Marxist one of superstructure andinfrastructure, lagsalmost innocently behind a condition, in which the apparatuses of production, distribution and domination,aswellaseconomicandsocialrelationsandideologiesareinextricablyinterwoven, andinwhichlivinghumanbeingshaveturnedintobitsofideology.Wheretheselatterareno longer addedtotheexistent assomethingjustifyingorcomplementary,butpassoverintothe appearance [Schein], that what is, would beinescapable andtherebylegitimated, thecritique which operates with the unequivocal causal relation ofsuperstructure andinfrastructure aims wide of the mark. In the total society everything is equally close to the midpoint; it is as transparent, its apologetics as threadbare, as those who see through it,whodieout.Critique could portray, in every administration building and every airport, to what extent the infrastructure has become its own superstructure. For this it needs on the one hand the physiognomics ofthetotalconditionandoftheextendedindividualdata,ontheotherhandthe analysisofeconomicstructuraltransformations;nolongerthederivationofanideology,whichis notatallavailableassomethingindependentorevenwithitsowntruth-claim,outofitscausal conditions. That the validity of causality decomposes correlative to the downfall of the possibility offreedom,isthesymptomofthetransformationofasociety,rationalinitsmeans, into that openly irrational one, which latently, according to its ends, it was long ago. The
philosophy of Leibniz and Kant, by means of the separation of the final cause from the phenomenally valid causality in the narrow sense, and the attempt at unifying both, felt something of that divergence, without getting to its root in the ends-means antinomy of bourgeoissociety.Butthedisappearanceofcausalitytodaysignalsnorealmoffreedom.Inthe total reciprocal effect,theolddependence reproducesitselfonanexpandedlevel.Throughits million-fold web it prevents the long overdue, palpably graspablerational penetration, which causalthinkingwishedtopromoteintheserviceofprogress.Causalityitselfmakessenseonlyin ahorizonoffreedom.Itseemedtobeprotectedfromempiricism,becausewithoutitsassumption the cognition organized into science did not seem possible; idealism possessed no stronger argument. Kant’s effort however, to raise causality as a subjective thought-necessity to a constitutiveconditionofobjectivity,wasnomorebindingthanitsempiricistdenial.Evenhehad todistancehimselffromtheassumptionofaninnervatedcontextofphenomena,withoutwhich causalitybecomesanif-thenrelation,whichglidesawaypreciselyfromthatemphaticlawfulness – “a priority” – which the doctrine of subjective-categorical essence of causality wishes to conserve; scientific development then fulfilled the potential of Kant’s doctrine. Another makeshift substitute isthefoundationofcausality throughitsimmediateself-experienceinthe motivation.Meanwhilepsychologyhassubstantivelydemonstratedthatself-experiencenotonly candeceive,butmust.
CausalityasBane266-267
If causality asasubjective thought-principle istainted withabsurdity,ifthereisnocognition howevercompletelywithouttheformer,thenonewouldneedtoseekoutamomentinit,which isitselfnotthinking.Whatistobelearnedfromcausality,iswhatidentityperpetrateduponthe non-identical. The consciousness ofcausality is,asthatoflawfulness [Gesetzmässigkeit], the consciousnessofthis;asthecritiqueofcognition,alsothatofthesubjectiveappearance[Schein] in the identification. Reflective causality points to the idea of freedom as the possibility of non-identity. Objectively causality would be, in a provocatively anti-Kantian sense, a relationship betweenthingsinthemselves,insofarandonlyinsofarasthesearesubordinatedto theprincipleofidentity.Itis,objectivelyandsubjectively,thebaneofcontrollednature.Ithasits fundamentum inre[Latin: fundamental basis]inidentity,whichasanintellectual principle is onlythereflection oftherealcontrolofnature.Inthereflectiononcausality,whichfindsthis everywhere innaturethere,wherethelatter isdominated bytheformer,reasonalsobecomes aware ofitsownnatural-rootedness, ofthebane-casting principle. Insuchself-consciousness, progressive enlightenment separates itself from the regression into mythology, which it unreflectivelysubscribedto.Itescapestheomnipotenceoftheschemataofitsreduction,“thatis whathumanbeingsare”,inthathumanbeingsrecognizethemselves,forwhattheyareotherwise insatiably reduced to. Causality is nothing other however than the natural-rootedness of humanity,whichthelatter perpetuates asdomination overnature.Ifthesubjectoncecomesto know the moment of its equality with nature, then it would no longerturnnatureintowhat resembles itself. That is the secret and inverted truth-content of idealism. For the more thoroughly the subject, according to idealistic custom, makes nature the same as itself, the further it distances itself from all equality with it. Affinity is the razor’s edge of dialectical enlightenment. Itrecoilsintodelusion,thenonconceptualexecutionfromoutside,assoonasit completelycutsthroughtheaffinity.Notruthwithoutthelatter:thisiswhatidealismcaricatured inidentity-philosophy.Consciousnessknowsasmuchaboutitsotherasitissimilartothelatter,
not by canceling itself out along with the similarity. Objectivity as the residue after the subtractionofthesubjectisamereaping.Itistheschemata,unconscioustoitself,towhichthe subject reduces its other. The less it tolerates the affinity to things, the more ruthlessly it identifies.Butevenaffinityisnopositiveontologicalindividualdetermination.Ifitturnsintoan intuition, intoanimmediate,empathicallycognizedtruth,thenitisgroundupasanarchaicism bythedialecticoftheenlightenment,aswarmed-overmythos;inaccordancewiththemythology which reproduces itself out of pure reason,withdomination. Affinityisnoremainder,which cognition would hold in its hands after the mandatory leveling [Gleichschaltung] of identification-schemata of the categorical apparatus, but rather their determinate negation. Causalityisreflecteduponinsuchcritique.Initthinkingconsummatesthemimicryofthebane ofthings,whichitcastaroundthese,onthethresholdofasympathy,whichwouldcausethebane tovanish.Thesubjectivityofcausalityhasanelectiveaffinitytoobjects,asthepremonitionof whatthesubjectcausedthemtoexperience.
Reason,Ego,Superego267-271
TheKantianturnofmorallawintothefactumdrawsitssuggestivepowerfromthefactthathe can cite suchagivenfactinthesphereoftheempirical person.Thisisadvantageous forthe mediation, always problematic, between what is intelligible and what is empirical. The phenomenology ofempiricalconsciousness,andindeedthepsychology,runsintopreciselythat conscience which is the voice of moral law in the Kantian doctrine. The descriptions of its efficacy, for example that of “constraint”, arenomental phantoms.Thetraitsofcompulsion, whichKantcarvedintothedoctrineoffreedom,aretobereadoutoftherealcompulsionofthe conscience. The empirical irresistibility of the psychologically existent conscience, of the superego,vouchsafesforthefacticityofthemorallawagainstitstranscendentalprinciple,which nonethelessoughttodisqualifyitasthefoundationofautonomousmoralityforKantasmuchas the heteronomous drive. That Kant tolerates no critique of the conscience, brings him into conflict with his own insight, that in the phenomenal world all motivations are thoseofthe empirical, psychological ego. That is why he removed the genetic moment from moral philosophyandreplaced itwiththeconstruction oftheintelligiblecharacter,whichindeedthe subjectwouldinitially givetoitself.*34*Thetemporal-geneticandinspiteofeverythingonce again“empirical”claimofthat“initially”,ishowevernottoberedeemed.Whateveroneknows of the genesis of the character, is incompatible with the assertion of such an act of moral Ur-generation.Theego,whichissupposedtoconsummateitinKant,isnotanythingimmediate but itself something mediated, something originated, in psychoanalytic termini: branched off fromdiffuselibido-energy.Notonlyisallspecificcontentofthemorallawconstitutivelyrelated tofacticalexistencebutalsoitspresumablypure,imperativeform.Itpresupposestheinnervation ofrepressionasmuchasthepriordevelopmentofthefixed,identicalself-maintainingauthority of the ego, which is absolutized by Kant as the necessary condition of morality. Every interpretationofKant,whichwouldcomplainabouthisformalismandwhichwouldundertaketo demonstrate,withitshelp,theempiricalrelativityofthemoralitythiseliminatedinthecontent, doesnotreachfarenough.Eveninitsmostextremeabstraction,thelawissomethingwhichhas cometobe;theanguishofitsabstraction,sedimentedcontent,dominationreducedtoitsnormal form,thatofidentity.PsychologyhasconcretelycaughtupwithwhatinKant’stimeitdidnot yetknowandwhichittherefore didnotspecifically needtoconcernitselfwith:theempirical genesis of what Kant glorified, unanalyzed, astimelessly intelligible. Initsheroicperiodthe
Freudian school, in agreement on this point withtheother,enlightening Kant,demanded the ruthlesscritiqueofthesuperegoassomethingalientotheego,somethingtrulyheteronomous.It sawthroughitastheblindandunconsciousinnervationofsocialcompulsion.SandorFerenczi’s BuildingBlocksofPsychoanalysisstates,withacaution whichisbestexplainedasfearofsocial consequences, “that arealcharacter-analysismustremove,atleastprovisionally,everykindof superego,andthuseventhatoftheanalyst.Ultimatelythepatientmustindeedbecomefreeofall emotional bonds,insofarastheygobeyondreasonandtheformer’sownlibidinoustendencies. Onlythissortofdemolitionofthesuperegocanleadatalltoaradicalhealing;successes,which consist merely of substituting one superego for another, must be characterized as merely transference-successes;theycertainlydonotdojusticetotheend-goaloftherapy,whichistobe rid of the transference, too.”127 Reason,inKantthegroundoftheconscience, issupposedto refuteitbydissolvingit.Fortheunreflectivedominationofreason,thatoftheegoovertheid,is identicalwiththerepressiveprinciple,whichpsychoanalysis,whosecritiquewassilencedbythe reality-principle oftheego,displacedintothelatter’sunconsciousreign.Theseparationofego andsuperego,whichitstopologyinsistsupon,isdubious;genetically bothleadequallytothe innervation of the father-image. That is why the analytic theories of the superego wanedso quickly, however boldly they were raised: otherwise they would have to infringe on the cherished ego. Ferenczi immediately qualifies his critique: “his struggle” is directed “only against the part of the superego which has become unconscious and thus impervious to influence”.128 But this does not suffice: theirresistibility ofthecompulsionoftheconscience consists, as Kant observed, in such becoming unconscious, just like the archaic taboos; if a conditionofuniversallyrationaltopicalitywereconceivable,nosuperegowouldestablishitself. Attempts, like that of Ferenczi and particularly psychoanalytic revisionism, which subscribe along with other healthy viewpoints also to that ofthehealthy superego,todivideitintoan unconsciousandapreconsciousandthereforemoreharmlesspart,areinvain;theconcretization and processofbecoming independent, throughwhichtheconscience becomesanauthority,is constitutively aforgettingandtothisextent ego-alien. Ferenczi emphasizes inagreement that “thenormalhumanbeingcontinuestoretainintheirpreconsciousfurthermoreasumofpositive and negative models”.129 If however a concept in the strict Kantian understanding is heteronomous,inpsychoanalytical termsisoneofalibidinouscathexis,itisthatofthemodel, the correlate of that “normal human being”, who Ferenczi equally respects, who deliver themselves over actively and passively to every social repression and who psychoanalysis uncritically draws,outofthedisastrousfaithinthedivisionoflabor,fromtheexistingsociety. Howcloselypsychoanalysiscomestothatrepression,assoonasthecritiqueitinauguratedofthe superego was braked out of social conformism, which to this day disfigures alldoctrinesof freedom,isshownmostclearly bypassagesfromFerenczilikethis:“Solongasthissuperego takescareinamoderatemanner,thatonefeelsoneselfasamoralcitizenandactsassuch,itisa useful institution, which ought not to be disturbed. But pathological exaggerations of the formation of the superego…”130 The fear of exaggerations is the mark of the same ethical bourgeois nature, which may at no price renounce thesuperegoalongwithitsirrationalities. How the normal and the pathic superego would be subjectively distinguished, according to
psychologicalcriteria,issomethingwhichpsychoanalysis,comingtoitssensesalltooquickly,is justassilentaboutastheupstandingcitizenry[Spiessbuerger]areabouttheborderbetweenwhat theycherishastheirnaturalnationalfeelingandnationalism.Thesolecriterionofthedistinction isthesocialeffect,whosequaestionesiuris[Latin:legalquestion]psychoanalysisdeclarestobe outside itsrealm ofcompetence. Reflections onthesuperegoare,asFerenczi says,thoughin contradiction to his words, truly “metapsychological”. The critique of the superego oughtto become the critique of the society which produced it; if it falls silent before this, then it accommodatestheprevailingsocialnorm.Torecommendthesuperegoforthesakeofitssocial utility or inalienability, while it itself, as a mechanism of compulsion, does not confer that objective validity,whichitclaimsinthecontextofaffectivepsychologicalmotivations,repeats andreinforcestheirrationalitiesinsideofpsychology,whichthelattermadeitselfstrongenough to“remove”.
PotentialofFreedom271-272
Whathoweverhasbeenoccurringinthemostrecentepoch,istheexternalizationofthesuperego intounconditionaladjustment,notitssublationinamorerationalwhole.Theephemeraltracesof freedom,theemissariesofpossibilityinempiricallife,arebecomingtendentiallyfewer;freedom intoaborderlinevalue.Notevenasacomplementaryideologyisitentrustedtopresentitself;the functionaries, whomeanwhile alsoadminister ideologywithafirmhand,evidently havelittle confidence intheattractive poweroffreedomaspropaganda-technicians.Itisbeingforgotten. Unfreedom is consummated in its invisible totality, which tolerates nothing“outside”, outof whichitcouldlookandbreakthrough.Theworldasitis,isbecoming thesoleideology,and humanbeings,itsinventory Eventhereinhoweverdialecticaljusticereigns:ittranspiresoverthe individuated, theprototypeandagentofaparticularistic andunfreesociety Thefreedom,for which it musthope,couldnotbemerely itsown,itwouldhavetobethatofthewhole.The critiqueoftheindividuatedleadsbeyondthecategoryoffreedominsofarasthisiscreatedinthe image ofwhatisunfreelyindividuated. Thecontradiction,thatnofreedomofwillandthusno morality canbeproclaimedforthesphereoftheindividuated,whilewithoutthemnoteventhe life of the species can be preserved, is not to be settled through the imposition ofso-called values. Its heteronomous posited being, the Nietzschean new commandments, would be the oppositeoffreedom.Itneednothoweverremain,whatitoriginatedfromandwhatitwas.Rather whatmaturesintheinnervationofsocialcompulsionintheconscience,alongwiththeresistance againstthesocialauthority,whichcritically measures thisbyitsownprinciples, isapotential which would get ridofcompulsion.Thecritique oftheconscience envisionsthesalvation of such potential, only not in the psychological realm but intheobjectivity ofareconciled life amongthefree.IfKantianmoralityultimatelyconverges,apparentlyagainstitsrigorousclaimto autonomy,withtheethicsofgoods,thenwhatitmaintains therein isthejuridical truthofthe break, which can be bridged by no conceptual synthesis, between the social ideal and the subjective oneofself-preservingreason.Thereproach,thatsubjectivereasonputsonairsasan absolute in the objectivity of moral law, would be subaltern. Kant expresses, fallibly and distortedly, what ought indeed to be demanded from society. Such objectivity is not to be translatedintothesubjectivesphere,thatofpsychologyandthatofrationality,butwillcontinue toexistforgoodandillseparatedfromit,untiltheparticularandgeneralinterestreallyandtruly concord.Theconscienceisthemarkofshameofunfreesociety.Thearcanumofhisphilosophy wasnecessarilyhiddenfromKant:thatthesubject,inordertobeabletoconstituteobjectivityor
objectivate itselfintheact,asheentrustedit,mustalwaysforitspartbesomethingobjective. Thetranscendentalsubject,thepurereasonwhichobjectivelyinterpretsitself,ishauntedbythe preponderance of the object, without which, as a moment, even the Kantian objectivating achievements ofthesubjectwouldnotbe.Hisconceptofsubjectivityhasatthecoreapersonal features. Even thepersonality ofthesubject,whatisimmediate tothis,whatisnearest,most certain, is something mediated. No ego-consciousness without society, just as no society is beyond its individuals. The postulates of practical reason, which transcend thesubject,God, freedom, immortality, imply the critique ofthecategorical imperative, thatofpuresubjective reason.Withoutthosepostulatesitcouldnotevenbethought,howevermuchKantaverstothe contrary;thereisnothinggoodwithouthope.
AgainstPersonalism272-275
Thenominalistictendencyenticesthought,whichmaynotrenouncetheprotectionofmoralityin viewoftheimmediate violencebreakingouteverywhere,toanchormoralityinthepersonlike anindestructiblegood.Freedom,whichwouldarisesolelyintheinstitutionofafreesociety,is soughtthere,wheretheinstitutionoftheexistingonedeniesit,ineachindividual,whoneedsit, butdoesnotguaranteeit,astheyare.Reflectiononsocietydoesnotoccurinethicalpersonalism anymorethanthatonthepersonitself.Oncethislatter istorncompletelyfromtheuniversal, thenitisnotcapable ofconstituting anythinguniversaleither; itisthendrawninsecretfrom existing forms of domination. Inthepre-fascist erapersonalism andthetwaddleaboutbonds werehardlyaversetosharingtheplatform ofirrationality Theperson,assomethingabsolute, negatestheuniversalitywhichissupposedtobereadoutofit,andyieldsitsthreadbarelegaltitle tocaprice.Itscharismaisborrowedfromtheirresistibilityoftheuniversal,whileit,losingfaith initslegitimacy,withdrawsintoitselfintheprivationofthought.Itsprinciple,theunshakeable unitywhichmakesoutitsselfnessdefiantlyrepeatsdominationinthesubject.Thepersonisthe historically tiedknot,whichistobeloosenedoutoffreedom,notperpetuated;theoldbaneof theuniversal,ensconcedintheparticular.Anythingmoralwhichisdeducedfromitremainsas accidental as immediate existence [Existenz]. Otherwise than in Kant’s old-fashioned talkof personality,thepersonbecameatautologyforthose,whoindeedwereleftnothingmorethanthe nonconceptual here-and-nowoftheirexistence.Thetranscendencewhichmanyneo-ontologists hope from the person, exalts solely their consciousness. This latter would however not be without that universal, which the recourse to the person would like to exclude asanethical ground. That is why the concept of the person aswellasitsvariants,forexample theI-you relation,havetakenontheoilytoneofatheologylackingcredibility.Aslittleastheconceptofa right human being can be presumed in advance, so little would it resemble the person, the sanctified duplicate of its own self-preservation. In the philosophy of history that concept presupposes the subject objectivated into the character on the one hand, as assuredly as its disassembly [Zerfall] ontheotherhand.Theconsummatedego-weakness,thetransitionofthe subjects into passive and atomistic, reflex-based behavior, is atthesametime thejudgement which the person deserved, in which the economic principle of appropriation has become anthropological. Whatcouldbethoughtinhumanbeingsastheintelligiblecharacter,isnotthe persona[Personhafte]inthem,buthowtheydistinguishthemselvesfromtheirexistence.Inthe person this distinction necessarily appears as what is non-identical. Every human impulse contradictstheunityofwhatharborsit;everyimpulseforthebetterisnotonly,inKantianterms, reason,butbeforethisalsostupidity.Humanbeingsarehumanonlywheretheydonotactas
personsandarenotatallpositedassuch;whatisdiffuseinnature,inwhichtheyarenotpersons, resembles thedelineation ofanintelligible being,thatselfwhichwouldbedeliveredfromthe ego;contemporary artinnervates somethingofthis.Thesubjectisthelie,becauseitdeniesits own objective determinations for the sake of theunconditionality ofitsowndomination; the subjectwouldbeonlywhatdetacheditselffromsuchlies,whathadthrownoff,outofitsown power,whichitowestoidentity,itsshell.Theideological badstateofaffairsofthepersonis immanently criticizable. Whatissubstantial, whichaccording tothatideologywouldlendthe persontheirdignity,doesnotexist.Humanbeingsareaboveall,andwithoutexception,notyet themselves. Their possibility is justifiably to be thoughtundertheconcept oftheself,andit stands polemically against the reality of the self. This isnottheleastreasonthatthetalkof self-alienation isuntenable. Ithas,inspiteofitsbetter HegelianandMarxist*35*days,orfor theirsake,succumbedtoapologetics,becauseitgivesustounderstandwithafatherlymienthat humanbeingswouldhavefallenfromanexistent-in-itself,whichitalwayswas,whiletheyhave neverbeensuchandthushavenothingtohopefromrecoursetoitsarchai[Greek:ancient,old] except submission to authority, precisely what is alien to them. That this concept no longer figuresintheMarxistCapital,isconditionednotonlybytheeconomicthematicsoftheworkbut makes philosophical sense. – Negative dialectics does not halt before the conclusiveness of existence,thesolidifiedselfnessoftheego,anymorethanbeforeitsnolesshardenedantithesis, therole,whichisusedbycontemporarysubjectivesociologyasauniversalnostrum,asthelatest determination of socialization, analogous to the existence [Existenz] of selfness in many ontologists. Theconcept ofrolessanctions thetopsy-turvybaddepersonalizationoftoday:the unfreedom which, in the place of the autonomy which was achieved withsuchtoilandwas subjecttorepeal,stepsforwardsmerelyforthesakeofcompleteadjustment,isbeneathfreedom, notbeyondit.Theprivationofthedivisionoflaborishypostasizedasavirtue.Withittheego ordains, what society has damned it to, oncemoretoitself.Theemancipated ego,nolonger lockedupinitsidentity,wouldnolongerbedamnedtoroles,either Whatwouldbesociallyleft behindofthedivisionoflabor,givenradicallyreducedlabor-time,wouldlosethehorrorwhich formsindividualbeingsthroughandthrough.Thethinglyhardnessoftheselfanditsreadinessto bedeployedanditsavailabilityforsociallydesiredrolesareaccomplices.Inwhatismoral,too, identity isnottobenegated abstractly,butistobevalorizedinresistance,ifitisevertocross overintoitsother.Thecontemporary stateofaffairsisdestructive: thelossofidentityforthe sakeofabstractidentity,ofnakedself-preservation.
DepersonalizationandExistentialOntology275-277
Thedouble-jointednessoftheegohasfounditsexpressioninexistentialontology.Therecourse toexistencejustasthedraftofauthenticityagainstthe“man”transfiguretheideaofthestrong, enclosed in itself, “decisive” ego into metaphysics; Being and Time acted as a manifesto of personalism. In Heidegger’s interpretation of subjectivity as a mode of being, precedent to thinking, personalism already crossed over into its opposite. That apersonal expressions like being-there [Dasein: existence] andexistence [Existenz] werechosenforthesubject,indicates this linguistically. What returns imperceptibly in such usage is the idealistic German, state-besotted [staatsfromme] predominance of identity beyond its own bearer, that of the subject.Indepersonalization,inthebourgeoisdevaluationoftheindividual,whichisglorifiedin thesamebreath,alreadyliesthedifferencebetweensubjectivityastheuniversalprincipleofthe individualego–inSchelling’swords,egoity–andtheindividualizedegoitself.Theessenceof
subjectivity asbeing-there, thematic inBeingandTime,resembleswhatremainsoftheperson, when they are no longer a person. The motives for this are not to be censured. What is commensurable intheuniversal-conceptualscopeoftheperson,itsindividualconsciousness,is alwaysalsoappearance[Schein],imbricatedinthattranssubjectiveobjectivity,whichaccording to idealistic as well as ontological doctrine is supposed to be founded in the pure subject. Whatever the ego is capable of experiencing introspectively as ego, is also not-ego, unexperienceable by absolute egoity; hence the difficulty noted by Schopenhauer, of its becomingconsciousofitself.Theultimateisnoultimate.TheobjectiveturnofHegel’sabsolute idealism, the equivalent of absolute subjectivity, does justice to this. The more thoroughly however the individual loses what was once called its self-consciousness, the more depersonalization increases.ThatinHeideggerdeathbecametheessenceofexistence[Dasein], codifies the nullity of being,whichismerely foritself.*36*Thesinister decisioninfavorof depersonalizationhoweverbowsregressivelytoadoom,feltasinescapable,insteadofpointing beyond the person through the idea, that it might achieve what is its own. Heidegger’s apersonality islinguistically instituted; wontooeasily,bythemereleavingoutofwhatmakes the subject alone the subject. He thinks past the knot of the subject. The perspective of depersonalization would not be opened by the abstract evaporation ofexistence intoitspure possibility but solely by the analysis of the existing innerworldly subject existing there. Heidegger’sanalysisofexistenceholdsofffromit;thatiswhyhisapersonalexistentialiacanbe so easily attached to persons. The micro-analysis of the latter is unbearable to authoritarian thinking: in selfness it would strike the principle of all domination. By contrast existence generally, as something apersonal, is unhesitatingly treated as if it were something beyond humanbeingsandnevertheless human.Infactthetotalconstitutionoflivinghumanbeingsas theirfunctionalcontext,whichobjectivelyprecedesthemall,movestowardstheapersonalinthe senseofanonymity Heidegger’slanguagebemoansthisasmuchasitaffirmativelyreflectsthat matter-at-handassuprapersonal.Onlytheinsightintowhatisthinglyinthepersonitselfwould overtakethehorrorofdepersonalization,inthelimitationsoftheegoity,whichwerecommanded bytheequality oftheselfwithself-preservation.InHeideggerontologicalapersonalityalways remains the ontologization of the person, without reaching this latter. Thecognition ofwhat consciousnessbecame,underthesacrificeofitslivingaspect,hasareciprocalpower:egoityhas alwaysbeensothingly.Inthecoreofthesubjectdwellobjectiveconditions,whichitmustdeny forthesakeoftheunconditionalityofitsdominationandwhichareitsown.Thesubjectoughtto get rid of these. The prerequisite of its identity is the end of the identity-compulsion. In existentialontologythisappearsonlydistortedly.Nothinghoweverisintellectuallyrelevantany longer,whichdoesnotpressintothezoneofdepersonalizationanditsdialectic;schizophreniais the truth in the philosophy of history about the subject. In Heidegger that zone, which he touches,turnsunnoticedintoaparableoftheadministeredworld,andcomplementarilyintothe despairingrigidifieddeterminationofsubjectivity.Solelyitscritiquewouldfinditsobject,which he,underthenameofdestruction,reservestothehistoryofphilosophy.Theanti-metaphysical Freud’sdoctrine oftheidisclosertothemetaphysicalcritiqueofthesubjectthanHeidegger’s metaphysics,whichwishestobenone.Iftherole,theheteronomyordainedbyautonomy,isthe mostrecentobjectiveformoftheunhappyconsciousness,thenconverselythereisnohappiness, except wheretheselfisnotitself.If,undertheunbearablepressurewhichweighsonit,itfalls schizophrenically back into the condition of dissociation and ambiguity, which the subject historically escapedfrom,thenthedissolution ofthesubjectisatthesametimetheephemeral andcondemnedpictureofapossiblesubject.Onceitsfreedomcommandedmythostohalt,then
it would emancipate itself, as from the ultimate mythos, from itself. Utopia would be the non-identityofthesubjectwithoutsacrifice.
TheUniversalandIndividualinMoralPhilosophy277-281
TheKantianzeal againstpsychologyexpresses,besidesfearofoncemorelosingthescrapsof themundusintelligibilis [Latin: intelligible world],achieved solaboriously,alsotheauthentic insight, that the moral categories of the individuated are more than only individual. What becomesevident inthem,inkeepingwiththemodeloftheKantianconceptoflaw,aswhatis universal,issecretlysomethingsocial.Nottheleastofthefunctionsoftheadmittedlyenigmatic concept of humanity in the Critique of Practical Reason is that pure reasonwouldcountas universalforallrational beings:apointofindifferenceofKant’sphilosophy.Iftheconceptof theuniversalityinthediversityofsubjectswaswonandthenbecomesautonomousinthelogical objectivity of reason, into which all individual subjects and superficially even subjectivity disappear as such, then Kant, on the narrow ridge between logical absolutism andempirical validity, would like to go back to that existent, which the system’s logic of consistency previously banished. Anti-psychological moral philosophy converges therein with later psychological findings. By unveiling the superego as an innervated social norm, psychology breaks through its monadological limitations. These are for their partsocially produced.The consciencedrawsitsobjectivityinrelationtohumanbeingsoutofthatofsociety,inwhichand throughwhichtheyliveandwhichreachesallthewayintothecoreoftheirindividuation.The antagonistic moments are indistinguishably interwoven in such objectivity: theheteronomous compulsionandtheideaofasolidarity,whichsurpassesdivergentindividualinterests.Whatin theconsciencereproducesthetenaciouslypersisting,repressivebadstateofaffairsofsociety,is theoppositeoffreedomandtobedisenchantedthroughtheproofofitsowndetermination.By contrast theuniversalnorm,whichisunconsciously appropriated bytheconscience, attests to that which points beyond the particularity in society as the principle of itstotals.Thisisits momentoftruth.Thequestionoftherightandwrongoftheconscienceadmitstonoconclusive reply,becauserightandwrongdwellswithinitandnoabstractjudgementcouldseparatethem: only in its repressive form does the solidaristic one form, which sublates the former. It is essentialtomoralphilosophythattheindividuatedandsocietyareneitherseparatedbyasimple difference, nor reconciled. What is bad in the universality has declared itself in the socially unfulfilled claim oftheindividuated.Thisisthesupraindividualtruth-contentofthecritiqueof morality. But the individuated which, at fault due to privation, turns into the ultimate and absolute, degenerates thereby for its part into the appearance [Schein] of the individualistic society,andmistakes itself;Hegeloncemorediscernedthis,andindeedmostacutelywherehe gave impetus to the reactionary misuse of such. The society, which does injustice to the individuated in its universal claim, also does justice to it, insofar as the social principle of unreflected self-maintenance, itself thebaduniversal,ishypostasized inwhatisindividuated. Societymetesitout,measureformeasure.Thesentence ofthelate Kant,thatthefreedomof everyhumanbeingmustberestrictedonlyinsofarasitimpingesonthefreedomofanother,*37* isthecipherofareconciled condition, whichwouldbenotonlybeyondthebaduniversal,the mechanismofcompulsion,butalsobeyondtheobdurateindividuated,inwhichthatmechanism ofcompulsionrepeatsitselfmicrocosmically.Thequestionoffreedomdemandsnoyesornobut theory,whichraisesitselfabovetheexistingsocietyaswellasabovetheexistingindividuality. Insteadofsanctioning theinnervated andhardenedauthorityofthesuperego,itcarriesoutthe
dialecticoftheindividualbeingandspecies.Therigorismofthesuperegoissolelythereflexof thefactthattheantagonisticconditionpreventsthis.Thesubjectwouldonlybeemancipatedas reconciled withthenot-ego,andtherebyalsobeyondfreedom,insofarasthislatterisinleague withitscounterpart,repression.Howmuchaggressionhithertoliesinfreedom,becomesvisible wheneverhumanbeingsactasiftheyarefreeinthemidstoftheuniversalunfreedom.Solittle howeverwouldtheindividuated frantically protect theoldparticularityinastateoffreedom–individuality isasmuchtheproductofpressureasthepower-center,whichresistsit–solittle wouldthatconditionbecompatiblewiththecontemporaryconceptofthecollective.Thatinthe countries which today monopolize the name of socialism, an immediate collectivism is commandedasthesubordinationoftheindividualtosociety,givesthelietotheirsocialismand reinforces the antagonism. The weakness of the ego through a socialized society, which unremittinglydriveshumanbeingstogetherand,literallyandfiguratively,makesthemincapable of being alone, manifests itself in the complaints about isolation no less than in the truly unbearablecoldnesswhichspreadseverywherealongwiththeexpandingexchange-relationship, and which is merely prolonged bytheauthoritarian andruthlessregimentation ofthealleged peoples’ democracies against the needs of their subjects. That aunionoffreehumanbeings wouldhavetocontinuallygangthemselvesup,belongsintheconceptualrealmofmaneuvers,of marching, flag-waving, orations of leaders. They thrive only so long as society irrationally wishestocobbletogetheritscompulsorymembers;objectivelytheyarenotneeded.Collectivism andindividualismcompleteoneanotherinwhatisfalse.Speculativehistoricalphilosophysince Fichteprotestedagainstboth,inthedoctrineoftheconditionofconsummatedsinfulness,laterin thatoflostmeaning.Modernityisequatedwithadeformedworld,whileRousseau,theinitiator ofretrospectivehostilitytowardsone’sowntime,setitalightonthelastofthegreatstyles:what spurredhisrevulsionwastoomuchform,thedenaturalizationofsociety Thetimehascometo dismisstheimagoofthemeaninglessworld,whichdegeneratedfromacipheroflongingtothe sloganofthosewhofetishizeorder Nowhereonearthiscontemporarysociety,asitsscientific apologists vouchsafe, “open”; nowhere deformed, either The belief that it would be so, originatedinthedevastationofthecitiesandlandscapesbyplanlesslyself-expandingindustry,in a lack of rationality, not its oversupply. Whoever traces back deformation to metaphysical processesinsteadofrelationshipsofmaterialproduction,virtuallydeliversideologies.Withtheir change,thepictureofviolencecouldbesoftened,whichtheworldpresentstothehumanbeings whodoviolencetoit.Thatsupraindividualbondsdisappeared–theybynomeansdisappeared–wouldindeednotitselfbebad;thetrulyemancipatedworksofartofthetwentiethcenturyareno worse than those, which thrived in the styles which modernity discarded with reason. The experienceinvertsitselfasifinamirror,thataccordingtothestateofconsciousnessandofthe materialproductiveforces,itisexpectedthathumanbeingswouldbefree,thattheyalsoexpect itthemselves,andthattheyarenotso,whileneverthelessnomodelofthinking,behaviorand,in thatmostdenigrating ofterms,“value”, isleftinthestateoftheirradicalunfreedom,asthose whoareunfreedesireit.Thelamentoverthelackofbondshasaconstitutionofsocietyforits substance,whichsimulatesfreedom,withoutrealizingsuch.Freedomexistsonly,dimlyenough, inthesuperstructure;itsperennialfailuredeflectsthelongingtowardsunfreedom.Probablythe questionofthemeaningofexistenceinitsentiretyistheexpressionofthatdiscrepancy.
OntheConditionofFreedom281-283
Thehorizonofaconditionoffreedom,whichwouldneednorepressionandnomorality,because the drive would no longer have to express itself destructively, is veiled in gloom. Moral questions are stringent not in their dreadful parody, sexual repression, but in sentences like: tortureoughttobeabolished;concentrationcampsoughtnottoexist,whileallthiscontinuesin AfricaandAsiaandisonlyrepressedbecausecivilizedhumanityisasinhumanaseveragainst thosewhichitshamelessly brandsasuncivilized. Ifamoralphilosopherseizedtheselinesand exulted,athavingfinallycaughtupwiththecriticsofmorality–inthatthese,too,citethevalues comfortably proclaimed bymoralphilosophers–thenthedefinitiveconclusionwouldbefalse. Thesentencesaretrueasimpulse,whentheyregister,thatsomewheretortureisoccurring.They may not be rationalized; as an abstract principle they would end up immediately in thebad infinityoftheirderivationandvalidity.Thecritiqueofmoralityisapplicabletothetransposition ofthelogicofconsistencyontothebehaviorofhumanbeings;thatiswherethestringentlogicof consistency becomes the organ of unfreedom. The impulse, the naked physical fear and the feeling ofsolidarity with,inBrecht’swords,tormentable bodies,whichisimmanent tomoral behavior, would be denied by attempts at ruthlessrationalization; whatismosturgentwould oncemorebecomecontemplative,themockeryofitsownurgency.Thedistinctionoftheoryand praxis involves theoretically,thatpraxiscannomorebepurelyreducedtotheorythanchôris [Greek: separately] from it. Botharenottobegluedtogether intoasynthesis.Thatwhichis undivided lives solely in the extremes, inthespontaneousimpulsewhich,impatient withthe argument,doesnotwishtopermit thehorrortocontinue, andinthetheoreticalconsciousness unterrorizedbyanyfunctionary,whichdiscernswhyitnonethelessgoesunforeseeablyon.This contradictionaloneis,insightoftherealpowerlessnessofallindividuals,thestaging-groundsof moralitytoday Theconsciousnesswillreactspontaneously,totheextentitcognizeswhatisbad, without satisfying itself with the cognition. The incompatibility of every general moral judgementwiththepsychologicaldetermination,whichneverthelessdoesnotdispensewiththe judgement, that something would be evil, does not originate in thinking’s lack of logical consistency,butintheobjectiveantagonism.FritzBauerhasnotedthatthesametypeswhocall forclemency forthetorturersofAuschwitz withahundredlazyarguments,arefriendsofthe reintroductionofthedeathpenalty.Theneweststateofmoraldialecticsisconcentratedtherein: clemencywouldbenakedinjustice,thejustifiedatonementwouldbeinfectedbytheprincipleof brute force, while humanity consists solely of resisting thislast.Benjamin’sremark,thatthe execution of the death penalty might be moral, but never its legitimation, prophesized this dialectic.Iftheonesinchargeofthetortureincludingtheirchiefassistantshadbeenimmediately shot,itwouldhavebeenmoremoral,thanputtingafewontrial.Thefactthattheysucceededin fleeing, hiding fortwentyyears,qualitatively transformsthejustice whichwasmissedatthat time. Assoonasajuridicalmachinehastobemobilizedwithcourtprocedure,blackrobesand understandingdefenselawyers,justice,whichinanycaseiscapableofnosanctionwhichwould fit theatrocities committed, isalready false,compromised bythesameprinciple according to which the murderers once acted. The Fascists are clever enough to exploit such objective insanity with their devilishly insane reason. The historical grounds of the aporia is that the revolution against the Fascists failed in Germany, or rather that in 1944 there was no revolutionary mass movement. The contradiction of teaching empirical determinism and neverthelesscondemningthenormalmonsters–accordingtotheformer,perhapsoneshouldlet themloose–isnottobesettledbyanysupraordinatedlogic.Theoreticallyreflectedjusticemay
Kantmediates betweenexistence andthemorallawthroughtheconstructionoftheintelligible character.Itleansonthethesis,“themorallawprovesitsreality”131 –asifwhatisgiven,whatis there,wouldtherebybelegitimated. WhenKanttalksofthis,“that thedetermininggroundof that causality can also be assumed outside of the world of the senses in freedom as the characteristicofanintelligiblebeing”,132 thentheintelligiblebeingturns,throughtheconceptof thecharacteristic, intosomethingwhichispositively conceived inthelifeoftheindividuated, something“real”.Thishoweveris,withintheaxiomaticofnon-contradictoriness,contrarytothe doctrine ofwhatisintelligibleassomethingbeyondtheworldofthesenses.Kantimmediately andunabashedlyrecalls: “Bycontrastthemoralgoodissomethingsuprasensibleinrelationto the object, for whichtherefore nosensoryintuition ofsomethingcorrespondingtoit”–most certainly thereforeno“characteristic”–“canbefound,andthepowerofjudgementunderlaws ofthepurepracticalreasonseemsthustobesubjectedtoespecialdifficulties,whichrestonthe factthatalawoffreedomissupposedtobeappliedtoactsasevents,whichoccurintheworldof the senses and to this extent belong to nature.”133 In the spirit of the critique of reason,the passageisdirected notonlyagainsttheontologyofgoodandevil,stringentlycriticizedinthe Critique of Practical Reason, as of goods which exist in themselves, but also against the subjectivecapacityascribedtothem,which,removedfromthephenomena,wouldvouchsafeto thatontologyacharacterofsimplyandpurelysupernaturalessence.Ifinordertosavefreedom Kantintroducestheutterlyexposeddoctrineoftheintelligiblecharacter,whichshrankfromall experienceandwhichneverthelesswasconceivedasthemediationtotheempirical,thenoneof thestrongestmotivesforthis,objectivelyspeaking,wasthefactthatthewillisnotdisclosedas an existent fromthephenomena, norcanitbedefinedbyitsconceptual synthesis,butwould havetobepresupposedasitscondition,withthedefectsofanaïverealismofinwardness,which he,inotherhypostasesofwhatispsychological,destroyedintheparalogismchapter.Theproof, that character would neither be exhausted in nature nor absolutely transcendent to it, as its concept bythewaydialectically implies, issupposedtotakecareoftheprecariousmediation. Motivationshoweverhavetheirpsychologicalmoment,withoutwhichnosuchmediationwould be, while those of the human will, according toKant,can“neverbeanythingotherthanthe moral law”.134 This is what the antinomy prescribes for every possible answer. It is bluntly worked out by Kant: “For how a law could be for itself and the immediate ground of determination of the will (which is nonetheless what is essential in all morality), this is an insolubleproblemforhumanreasonandasonewith:howafreewillwouldbepossible.Thuswe will not have to show apriorithegroundsofwhythemorallawwouldinitselfconstitute a
131Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,ibid.pg48.
132Ibid.pg67.
133 Ibid.pg68.
134Ibid.pg72.
mainspring,butwhat,insofarasitissuchaone,iteffectsinthemind(putevenbetter,must effect).”135 Kant’s speculation falls silent where it should start, and resigns itself to a mere description ofimmanenteffect-contexts,which,hadhenotbeenoverwhelmedbyhisintention, he would scarcely have hesitated to call a mirage: something empirical worms itself into supraempirical authority through the power of the affection which it exerts. An “intelligible existence [Existenz]”,136 of an existence without time, which according to Kant aids in constitutingwhatisintheexistent,isdealtwithwithoutfearofthecontradictioinadjecto[Latin: added contradiction], without articulating it dialectically, indeed without saying whatexactly might be thought under that existence. The furthest he dares to go is the discussion“ofthe spontaneity ofthesubjectasathinginitself”.137 Accordingtothecritiqueofreason,thiscould no morebespokenofpositively thanthetranscendental causesofthephenomena ofexternal senses,whilewithouttheintelligiblecharacter,themoralactinwhatisempirical,theeffecton this–andtherebymorality–wouldbeimpossible.Hemusttoildesperately,forwhatthebasic outlineofthesystemprevents.Whatcomestohisassistanceisthefactthatreasoniscapableof intervening againstthecausalautomatismofphysicalaswellaspsychicnature,ofproducinga newnexus.Ifhepermitshimselftothinkwhat,intheexplicatedmoralphilosophy,isnolonger theintelligiblerealm,secularizedintopurepracticalreason,asabsolutelydivergent,thenthisis, in view of that observable influx of reason, by no means the miracle it would seem to be according totheabstract relationshipoftheKantianfoundingthesestoeachother.Thatreason wouldbesomethingotherthannatureandyetwouldbeamomentofthislatter,isitsprehistory, whichhasbecome itsimmanentdetermination.Itisnature-likeaspsychicpower,branched-off fortheendsofself-preservation;oncesplitoffandcontrastedtonature,however,itturnsintoits Other Ephemerally escaping this latter, reason is identical with nature and non-identical, dialectical according toitsownconcept. Themoreruthlesslyhoweverreasonmakesitselfinto theabsoluteoppositeofnatureinthatdialecticandforgetsitselfinthis,themoreitregresses,as self-preservation run wild, to nature; solelyasitsreflection wouldreasonbesupranature.No interpretive guile [Kunst] is capable of removing the immanent contradictions of the determinationsoftheintelligiblecharacter.Kantissilentoverhowforitsownpartitwouldhave aninfluence onwhatisempirical; whetheritissupposedtobenothingbutthepureactofits positingortocontinueonnexttothat,howeverjury-riggedthissounds,butwhichisnotwithout plausibility forself-experience. Hecontentshimselfwiththedescriptionofhowthatinfluence appearsinwhatisempirical.Iftheintelligiblecharacterisconceivedentirelyaschôris[Greek: separately], whichthewordsuggests,thenitisasimpossible tospeakofitasofthethingin itself,whichKant,cryptically enough,equated totheintelligiblecharacterinanutterlyformal analogy, not even explaining whether “a” thing in itself, one in each person, would be the unknowncauseofthephenomenaoftheinnersensesor,asKantoccasionallyputit,“the”thing in itself, identical with all, Fichte’s absolute I. By having aneffect,sucharadically divided subject would become a moment of the phenomenal world and would succumb to its determinations,thereforetocausality.Kant,thetraditionallogician,oughtnevertohaveaccepted thatthesameconcept issubjecttocausalityasmuchasitisnotsubject.*12*Iftheintelligible character werenolongerchôris[Greek:separately],thenitwouldnolongerbeintelligiblebut, in the sense of the Kantian dualism, contaminated by the mundus sensibilis [Latin: sensible world] and would be no less self-contradictory. Where Kant feels obliged to explicate the
135 Ibid.
136Ibid.99.
137Ibid.
doctrineoftheintelligiblecharactermoreclosely,hemustontheonehandgrounditinanaction intime, onthatwhichisempirical, whichitissimplynotsupposedtobe;ontheotherhand, neglecting the psychology, with which he embroils himself: “There are cases, where human beingsfromchildhoodonwards,evenunderaneducation,whichwasofanadvantageousnature toothersofthesort,nevertheless showsuchmalignityearlyonandproceedtoincreaseitinto theirmature years,thatoneconsidersthembornevil-doersandcompletely incorrigible inthe modeoftheirthinking,neverthelessbecausetheiractionsandomissionsaresojudged,thatthe guilt of their crimes is proven, indeed they (the children) themselves find this proof so thoroughly founded, as if they, regardless of the hopeless natural constitution of their apportionedinnercharacter,remainedjustasresponsible,asanyotherhumanbeing.Thiscould nothappen,ifwedidnotpresupposethateverythingwhichoriginatesfromitsarbitrariness(as every intentionally perpetrated act undoubtedly does), would have a free causality for its grounds,whichexpressesitscharacter initsappearances (theacts)fromearlyyouthonwards, whichbecauseoftheuniformityofconductindicatesanaturalcontext,whichhoweverdoesnot make the ill-starred constitution of the will necessary, but rather the consequence of the free-willed acceptance ofevilandunchangeable principles, whichonlymakethemthatmuch more reprehensible and worthy of punishment.”138 It does not occur to Kant, that the moral verdictmighterroverpsychopaths.Theallegedlyfreecausalityisrelocatedintoearlychildhood, entirelyfittingbythewaytothegenesisofthesuperego.Itisludicroushoweverthat“babies”[in English],whosereasonisonlyjustforming,areattestedthatautonomy,whichisattachedtothe fullydevelopedreason.Bybackdatingthemoralresponsibilityoftheindividualactoftheadult toitsearliest,dawningprehistory,anunmoralpedagogicsentenceofpunishmentismetedoutto thosewhoarenotyetgrownupinthenameofadulthood.Theprocesses,whichdecideinthe firstyearsoflifeovertheformationoftheegoandsuperegoor,asintheKantianparadigm,over theirfailure, canevidentlyneitherbeapriorizedforthesakeoftheirancientness,norcantheir extremely empirical content be ascribed that purity, which Kant’s doctrine of the moral law demands. In his enthusiasm for thenecessity ofpunishingchildhoodcriminals, heleavesthe intelligiblerealmsolelyinordertoraisemischiefintheempiricalone.
TheIntelligibleandtheUnityofConsciousness287-292
WhatKantthoughtintheconceptoftheintelligiblecharacter,isdespitetheasceticreticenceof his theory not beyond all conjecture: the unity of the person, the equivalent of the epistemological unityoftheself-consciousness. BehindthescenesoftheKantiansystem,itis expectedthatthehighestconceptofpracticalphilosophywouldcoincidewiththehighestoneof thetheoretical kind,theego-principle,whichtheoreticallyproducesunityaswellaspractically restraining andintegrating thedrives.Theunityofthepersonisthelocationofthedoctrineof the intelligible. According to thearchitecture oftheform-content dualismendemic toKantit countsasaform:theprincipleofparticularizationis,inaninvoluntarydialecticwhichwasfirst explicated by Hegel, something universal. For the honor of universality, Kant distinguishes terminologicallybetweenthepersonalityandtheperson.Theformerwouldbe“thefreedomand independenceofthemechanismofallofnature,yetsimultaneouslyconsideredasacapacityofa beingwhosepeculiar,purepracticallaws,givenfromitsownreason,thepersontherefore,isin thralltotheworldofthesenses,issubjecttoitsownpersonality,insofarasitbelongsatthesame
138Ibid.99.
time to the intelligible world.”
139 In personality [Persönlichkeit], the subject as pure reason, indicated bythesuffix“-ity” [“-keit”,theGermanequivalentoftheEnglishsuffix“-ness”]as theindexofaconceptualgenerality,theperson,thesubject,issupposedtobesubordinatedasan empirical, natural individual being.WhatKantmeant bytheintelligible charactermightcome very close to the personality in an older usage of speech, which “belongs to theintelligible world”. The unity of self-consciousness genetically presupposes not only the psychological-factical contentsofconsciousness,butitsownpurepossibility;indicatingazone ofindifferenceofpurereasonandspatio-temporalexperience.Hume’scritiqueoftheIglosses overthefactthatthefactsofconsciousness wouldnotbeavailable,withoutbeingdetermined insideofanindividual consciousness, ratherthaninsomeotherthingchosenatrandom.Kant corrects him, but neglects however for his part the reciprocity: his critique of Hume is personalityrigidifiedintoaprinciplebeyondindividualpersons,intotheirframework.Hegrasps theunityofconsciousness independentofeveryexperience.Suchindependenceexiststosome degreeinrelationtothevariableindividualfactsofconsciousness,nothoweverradicallyagainst allexistingbeingoffactualcontentsofconsciousness.Kant’sPlatonism–inthePhaedothesoul wassomethingsimilartoanidea–epistemologicallyrepeatstheeminentlybourgeoisaffirmation of personal unity in itself at theexpenseofitscontent, whichunderthenameofpersonality ultimately leftbehindnothingbutthestrongman.Theformalachievementofintegration,byno means a priori formalbutsubstantive, thesedimented exploitation ofinnernature,usurpsthe rank of the good. The more a personality would be, it is suggested, the better it would be, heedlessofthedubiousnessofthebeing-of-one-self.Thegreatnovelsoftheeighteenthcentury intuitedthis.Fielding’sTomJones,theorphanchild,someonewhowasa“compulsivecharacter” inthepsychologicalsense,stoodforthehumanbeingunmutilatedbyconventionandbecomesat thesametime comical. Thelatest echoofthisistherhinocerosofIonesco:theonlyone,who resists bestial standardization and to this extent preservesastrongego,isanalcoholic anda professional failure, notstrongatallaccordingtotheverdictoflife.Inspiteoftheexampleof theradicallyevillittlechild,oneoughttoask,astowhetheranevilintelligiblecharacteriseven conceivable forKant;astowhetherheseeksevilinthefactthattheformalunityfails.Where thereisnounityatall,onecouldprobablynomorespeakofgoodthanamonganimals,norof evileither; hemayhaveconceivedoftheintelligiblecharacterasclosesttothestrongI,which canrationallycontrolallitsimpulses,aswastaughtintheentiretraditionofmodernrationalism, especially by Spinoza and Leibniz, who were in agreement at leastonthispoint.*13*Great philosophy hardens itself against the idea of a humanity which is not modeled after the reality-principle, not hardened in itself. This gives Kant thethought-strategical advantage, of beingabletocarryoutthethesisoffreedomparalleltoconsistentcausality.Fortheunityofthe personisnotmerely theformalapriori,whichappearsintheKantiansystem,butagainsthis will,andforthebenefitofhisdemonstrandum[Latin:whatisdemonstrated],themomentofall individual contents of the subject. Each of its impulses is “its” impulse just as muchasthe subjectisthetotalityofimpulses,andthustheirqualitativeOther.Intheutterlyformalregionof self-consciousnessbothmelttogether.Fromitonecanpredicate,withoutdistinction,whatisnot exhaustedineachother:thefacticalcontentandthemediation,theprincipleofitscontext.The matter-at-hand,tabooedaccordingtothetraditional-logicalmannerofargumentation,butallthe morereally dialectical forthat,isvindicatedintheindifference-conceptofpersonalitythrough themostextremeabstraction,bythefactthatintheantagonisticworldtheindividualsubjectsare alsoantagonistic inthemselves, freeandunfree.Inthenightofindifference,thepalestrayof
139Ibid.87.
lightfallsonfreedomaspersonalityinitself,aProtestantinwardness,removedevenfromitself. Thesubjectisjustified,inSchiller’spithysaying,bywhatitis,notbywhatitdoes,justasthe Lutherans once were by faith, not by works. The involuntary irrationality of the Kantian intelligiblecharacter,itsindeterminacy,whichismandatedbythesystem,tacitlysecularizesthe explicitlytheologicaldoctrineoftheirrationalityofelectionbygrace.Thislatterwasadmittedly conservedinadvancing enlightenment, alwaysmoreoppressively.IfGodwasoncepushedby the Kantian ethics into the as it were provident [dienende: serving, providing] role of the postulate ofpractical reason–thistooisanticipatedinLeibnizandevenDescartes–thenitis difficulttoconceiveofsomethingundertheintelligiblecharacter,irrationallyexistent-as-such,as anythingelseexceptthesameblindfate,againstwhichtheideaoffreedomtookexception.The concept ofcharacter alwaysoscillated betweennatureandfreedom.140 Themoreruthlesslythe absolute being-so of the subject is equated with its subjectivity, the more impenetrable its concept. Whatformerlyseemedtobetheelection bygraceofdivinecounsel,canscarcelybe thought anymore as onebyobjective reason,whichnevertheless wouldhavetoappeal tothe subjective one. The pure being-in-itself of human beings, excluding everyempirical content, whichissoughtinnothingbutitsownrationality,doesnotpermitrationaljudgementaboutwhy itsucceeded here,andfailedthere.Theauthorityhowevertowhichtheintelligiblecharacteris attached,purereason,isitselfsomethingbecomingandtothisextentalsosomethingconditional, notanythingabsolutelyconditioning.Thatitpositsitselfoutsideoftimeaswhatisabsolute–an anticipation ofthesameFichte,withwhomKantwasfeuding–isfarmoreirrationalthanany creation doctrine. This rendered an essential contribution to the alliance betweentheideaof freedomandrealunfreedom.Irreduciblyexistent,theintelligiblecharacterduplicatesitselfinthe concept of that second nature, as which society stamps the characters of all of its members anyway IfonetranslatedKant’sethicsintojudgementsoverrealhumanbeings,itsonlycriterion is:howsomeonewouldnowoncebe,thereforetheirunfreedom.Schiller’spithysayingcertainly wishedprimarilytoannouncetherevulsionevokedbythesubjugationofallhumanrelationships under the exchange-principle, the evaluation of one act against another Kantian moral philosophyregisters thesamemotifintheoppositionofdignityandprice.Intherightsociety howevertheexchangewouldnotonlybeabolishedbutfulfilled:noonewouldbeshortchanged oftheyieldoftheirlabor.Aslittleastheisolatedactcanbeweighed,solittleistheresomething goodwhichisnotexpressedinacts.Absolutereflection,exclusiveofanyspecificintervention, would degenerate into absolute indifference, into what is inhuman. Both Kant and Schiller objectively anticipated the loathsome concept ofafree-floating nobility,whichself-appointed elitescouldlaterattesttoatwillastheirselfsamecharacteristic.IntheKantianmoralphilosophy lurks a tendency towards its sabotage. In it the totality becomes indistinguishable from the preestablishedstatusoftheelect.Thattherightorwrongofanactisnolongertobecasuistically asked, also has its sinister moment: the competency of judgement crosses over into the compulsions of empirical society, which the Kantian agathon [Greek: the good] wished to transcend.Thecategoriesnobleandmeanare,likealldoctrinesofbourgeoisfreedom,ingrown withfamilial andnaturalrelationships.Inlatebourgeoissocietytheirnatural-rootednessbreaks through once again, as biologism and finally race-theory. The reconciliation of morality and natureenvisionedbythephilosophizingSchiller,againstKantandsecretlyinunisonwithhim,is notatallashumanandinnocentintheexistent,asitgivesitselftoknow.Nature,onceoutfitted withmeaning,issubstitutedinplaceofthatpossibility,whichtheconstructionoftheintelligible character was aimed at. In Goethe’s kalokagathia [Greek: noble character, goodness] the 140SeeBenjamin,ibid.pg36
ultimatelyhomicidalrecoilisunmistakable.AlreadyaletterofKant,concerninghisportraitbya Jewishpainter,madeuseofadespicableanti-Semiticthesis,laterpopularizedbytheNaziPaul Schultze-Naumburg.*40*Freedomisreallyandtrulyrestrictedbysociety,notonlyfromoutside butinitself.Assoonasitisutilized,itmultipliesunfreedom;theplaceholderofwhatisbetteris alwaysalsotheaccomplice ofwhatisworse.Evenwherehumanbeingsfeelthemselvestobe most free from society, in the strength oftheirego,theyareatthesametime itsagents:the ego-principle is implanted inthembysociety,andthelatter honorsit,althoughrestraining it. Kant’sethicsisnotyetawareofthisawkwardness,orpositsitselfasbeyondsuch.
IfonedaredtowagerastowhattheKantianXoftheintelligiblecharacterowesitstruecontent, whichmaintaineditselfagainstthetotalindeterminacyoftheaporeticconcept,itwouldprobably be the historically most advanced, periodically flaring,swiftlyfadingconsciousness whichis inherent intheimpulsetodotherightthing.Itistheconcrete,intermittentanticipationofthe possibility, neither alien to human beings nor identical with them. They are not only the substrates ofpsychology.Fortheyarenotexhaustedbytheconcretizedexploitationofnature, whichhasbecomeautonomous,whichtheyprojectedbackonthemselvesfromexternalnature. Theyarethingsinthemselves,insofarasthethingsareonlysomethingartificiallymadebythem; to this extent the world of phenomena is truly an appearance [Schein]. Thepurewillofthe KantianFoundationisforthatreasonnotsodifferentfromtheintelligiblecharacter Theverseof KarlKraus,“What hastheworldmadeofus”pondersruefullyonit;itisfalsifiedbyanyone who imagines they possess it.Itbreaksthroughnegatively inthepainofthesubject,thatall humanbeings,inwhattheybecame,intheirreality,aremutilated.Whatwouldbedifferent,the nolongerinvertedessence,rejectsalanguagewhichbearsthestigmataoftheexistent:theology spoke once of mystical names. However the separation oftheintelligible fromtheempirical character isexperiencedintheeons-oldblock,whichslidesthatwhichissupplementarybefore thepurewill:external considerations ofallconceivable kinds,themanytimesoversubaltern, irrational interests of subjects of the false society; in general the principle of the particular self-interest, which prescribes to everything individuated without exception its actions inthe society, as it is, and which is the death of all. The block prolongsitselffromwithin,inthe narrow-minded egoistic cravings, then in neuroses. These absorb, as everyone knows, an immeasurable quantumofavailable humanpowerandprevent,onthelineofleastresistance, with the cunning of theunconscious,thatwhichisright,whichirrefutably contradicts biased self-preservation.Thereintheneuroseshaveitsomuchtheeasier,canrationalizethemselvesso muchthebetter,astheself-preservingprincipleinastateoffreedomwouldcometothatwhich isitsownjustasmuchastheinterests ofothers,whichdamagesitapriori.Neurosesarethe pillars of society; they frustrate the better possibilities of human beings and therebywhatis objectively better, which might be brought about byhumanity.Theytendentially damupthe instincts, which press beyond thefalsecondition, intonarcissism, whichsatisfies itselfinthe false condition. This is a hinge inthemechanism ofevil: weaknesses, whicharemistaken if possibleforstrengths.Intheendtheintelligible character wouldbethecrippledrationalwill. Whatbycontrastwouldcountinitasthehigher,themoresublime,whatisnotruinedbywhatis inferior,isessentially itsownneediness, theinabilitytotransformwhatishumiliating:failure, stylizedasanendinitself.Neverthelessthereisnothingbetteramongsthumanbeingsthanthat character; thepossibility ofbeingdifferentfromwhatoneis,eventhoughallarelockedupin
theirselfandtherebylockedawayevenfromtheirself.TheglaringflawoftheKantiandoctrine, thatwhichiselusiveorabstractintheintelligiblecharacter,alsohasatouchofthetruthofthe ban on the graven image, which post-Kantian philosophy, Marx included, extended to all conceptsofwhatispositive.Asthepossibility ofthesubject,theintelligiblecharacteris,like freedom,somethingbecoming, notanythingexistent. Itwouldbebetrayed,themomentitwas incorporated into the existent by description, even by the most cautious one. In the right condition everything would be, as intheJewishtheologoumenon [Greek:theology],onlythe tiniest bitdifferentthanwhatitis,butnottheslightestthingcanbeimagined,ashowitwould thenbe.Inspiteofthistheintelligiblecharactercanbespokenofonlytotheextentitdoesnot hoverabstractlyandpowerlesslyovertheexistent,butreallykeepsarisingintheguiltycontext ofsuch,andisrealizedbythislatter.Thecontradictionoffreedomanddeterminismisnot,asthe self-understandingofthecritiqueofreasonwouldlike,onebetweenthetheoreticalpositionsof dogmatism andskepticism,butoneoftheself-experienceofthesubject,nowfree,nowunfree. Under the aspect of freedom they are non-identical with themselves, because the subject is hardlyoneyet,andindeedpreciselybyvirtueofitsinstaurationasasubject:theselfiswhatis inhuman.Freedomandtheintelligiblecharacterarerelatedtoidentityandnon-identity,without clareetdistincte[Latin:clearlyanddistinctly]allowingthemselvestobeenteredononesideof theledgeroranother.Thesubjects arefree,according totheKantianmodel,totheextentthat they are conscious of themselves, identical with themselves; and in such identity also again unfree, insofar as they are subject to its compulsion and perpetuate it. They are unfree as non-identical,asdiffusenature,andyetassuchfree,becauseintheimpulses,whichoverpower them – the non-identity of the subject with itself is nothing else – they are also rid of the compulsory character of identity Personality is the caricature offreedom.Thegroundofthe aporiaisthatthetruthbeyondtheidentity-compulsionwouldnotbepurelyandsimplyitsOther, but is mediated through it. All individuals are in the socialized society incapable ofwhatis moral, which is socially demanded, butwhichwouldberealonlyinanemancipated society Socialmoralitywouldbesolely,tofinallybringthebadinfinity,thedreadfulcycleofretribution, toanend.Theindividualmeanwhileisleftwithnothingmoreofwhatismoral,thanwhatKant’s moraltheory,whichconcededinclinationtoanimals,butnotrespect,141 hasonlycontemptfor:to attempttolivesothatonemaybelievetohavebeenagoodanimal.
141Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,ibid.pg76.
AsteriskedNotesPages211-294
*27*[Footnotepg225]
TheKantianthought-experiments arenotdissimilar toexistential ethics.Kant,whowellknew thatgoodwillhaditsmedium inthecontinuityofalifeandnotintheisolateddeed,sharpens goodwilltoadecisionbetweentwoalternativesintheexperiment,sothatitshouldprovewhatit ought to. This continuity hardly exists anymore; this is why Sartre clings steadfastly to the decision, in a kind of regression to the 18th century. Yet while autonomy issupposedtobe demonstrated in the alternative situations, it is heteronomous before all content. Kanthadto provideadespotforoneofhisexamplesofthesituationofdecision;analogously,theSartrean onesstemmanytimesoverfromfascism,trueasthedenunciationofthelatter,notasacondition humaine [French:humancondition].Onlythosewhowouldnothavetoacceptanyalternatives atallwouldbefree,andintheexistentitisatraceoffreedom,torejectthem.Freedommeans thecritiqueandtransformationofsituations,nottheirconfirmationbyadecisionreachedwithin their compulsoryapparatus.WhenBrecht,followingadiscussionwithstudents,permitted the collectivisticteaching-playoftheYes-mantobefollowedbythedeviatingNay-sayer,hehelped thisinsighttobreakthroughinspiteofhisofficialcredo.
*28*[Footnotepg227]
The “conception of certain laws” amounts to the concept ofpurereason,whichindeedKant definesas“thecapacityofcognizingoutofprinciples.”
*29*[Footnotepg236]
“Byaconcept ofpractical reason,Iunderstandtheconceptionofanobjectasapossibleeffect through freedom. To be an object of practical cognition as such, means therefore only the relation of the will to the action, by which it or its opposite would bereally made,andthe judgement,astowhethersomethingwouldbeanobjectofpurepracticalreasonornot,ismerely thedistinctionbetweenthepossibilityorimpossibilityofwillingtheactioninquestion,whereby, if we had thecapacity forthis(whichmustbejudgedbyexperience), acertain object would cometobe.”(Kant,CritiqueofPracticalReason,WWV,Academy-Edition,pg57).
*30*[Footnotepg238]
“Forthatwhichnecessarilydrivesustogobeyondthebordersofexperienceandallappearances, iswhatisunconditional,whichreasonnecessarilyandwitheveryrightdemandsinthethingsin themselves to everything which is conditioned and thereby fully achieves the sequence of conditions. If it turns out now, if one assumes, our cognition of experience directing itself accordingtotheobjectsasthingsinthemselves,thattheunconditionalcouldnotatallbethought withoutcontradiction; ontheotherhand,ifoneassumesourconception ofthings,astheyare given to us, direct themselves not according to these as things in themselves, but thatthese objects direct themselves rather as appearances according to our manner of conception, the contradictionfallsaway;andthatconsequentlytheunconditionaloughttobemetnotinthings, insofarasweknowthem(astheyaregiventous),butratherinthem,insofaraswedonotknow them,asthingsinthemselves:thusdemonstrating,thatwhatweatthebeginningonlytentatively assumed,wouldbegrounded.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,WWWIII,AcademyEdition,pg. 13)
*31*[Footnotepg246]
“Hegelwasthefirst,whocorrectlyportrayedtherelationshipoffreedomandnecessity.Forhim freedom is the insight into necessity. ‘Necessity is blind only insofar as the selfsame is not understood.’Freedomdoesnotlieinthedreamed-ofindependencefromnaturallaws,butinthe cognitionoftheselaws,andinthepossibilitygiventhereby,ofcausingthemtoactinaplanned fashionfordeterminateends.Thisappliesasmuchinrelationtothelawsofexternalnature,asto thosewhichregulatethebodilyandintellectualexistenceofhumanbeings–twoclassesoflaws, which we could separate from each other at most in the imagination, butnotinreality.The freedomofthewillmeanstherefore nothingotherthanthecapacity,tobeabletodecidewith relevant knowledge [Sachkenntnis]. The freer therefore the judgement of a human being in relationtoacertainstandpoint,thegreaterthenecessitybywhichthecontentofthisjudgement isdetermined;whiletheuncertaintywhichrestsonignorance,whichseemstoarbitrarilychoose between many various and contradictory possibilities of decision, exactly thereby proves its unfreedom,itsmasterybytheobjects,whichitissupposedtomaster.Freedomconsiststherefore inthecognitionofthedominationfoundedinnaturalnecessitiesoverourselvesandoverexternal nature;itistherebynecessarilyaproductofhistoricaldevelopment.”(KarlMarxandFrederick Engels,Works,Berlin1962,Vol.20,Pg.106)
*32*[Footnotepg251]
“This now makes clear, that the schematism of understanding through the transcendental synthesis of the power of imagination, would amount to nothing other than the unity of everythingwhichisdiverseoftheintuitionintheinnersenseandthusindirectlytotheunityof theapperceptionasafunction,towhichtheinnersense(ofareceptivity)corresponds.Therefore theschemata ofpureconceptsofunderstandingarethetrueandsoleconditionsforproviding thesewitharelationtoobjects,henceameaning,andthecategorieshavethusintheendnoother possibleempirical use,thanintherebyserving,throughgroundsofanapriorinecessaryunity (duetothenecessaryunificationofeverythingconsciousinanoriginaryapperception),tosubmit theappearancestotheuniversalrulesofthesynthesisandtherebytofitthemtothorough-going interlinkinginanexperience.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.Pg138)
*33*[Footnotepage257]
InkeepingwiththetenoroftheCritiqueofPureReason,theoppositeintentioncanstillbefound there:“Themorethatlegislationandgovernmentwerearrangedinaccordancewiththisidea,the moreseldominanycasewouldpunishmentbecome,andthusitisthenentirelyrational(asPlato maintained) that in a perfected arrangement of the former nothing of the latter would be necessary.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.pg248)
*34*[Footnotepg268]
“In the judgement of free acts in view of its causality, we can therefore come only to the intelligible cause,butnotbeyondthesame;wecanrecognize,thatitisfree,i.e.isdetermined independent ofthesenses,andinsuchamannercouldbethesensorilyunconditionalcondition ofappearances. Whyhowevertheintelligible character wouldyieldexactly theseappearances andthisempirical character underexistingcircumstances, thisgoesfarbeyondallcapacityof ourreasontoanswer,indeedbeyondallcapacityofthesameeventoask,asifonewereasking:
why does the transcendental object of our external sensory intuition yield precisely onlythe intuitioninspaceandnotsomeotherkind.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.pg376)
*35*[Footnotepg274]
“This alienation, in order to remain comprehensible to the philosophers, can naturally be sublatedonlyundertwopracticalprerequisites.”(KarlMarxandFrederickEngels,TheGerman Ideology,Berlin1960,pg31)
“Everysuchactisright,whichcanexisttogether–or,whosemaximpermitsthefreedomofthe caprice of everyone – with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law.” (Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, Introduction to the Doctrine of Law, Section C, WW VI, Academy Edition,Pg.230)
*38*[Footnotepg286]
Itiseasytoreckonagainsttheconceptoftheintelligible,thatitwouldbeforbiddentopositively mention unknown causes of appearances, even in the uttermost abstraction. A concept over whichsimplynothingistobesaid,cannotbeoperatedwith,itwouldbeequaltonothingness, nothingness also its own content. Therein German idealism had one of its most effective argumentsagainstKant,withouttheformerstoppingverylongattheKantian-Leibnizianideaof the border-concept. Meanwhile one would need to remonstrate against Fichte’s and Hegel’s plausible critique of Kant. It follows for its part traditional logic, which rejects discussing something which would not be reduced to the content of the thing, which comprises the substanceofthatconcept,asidle.IntheirrebellionagainstKant,theidealistshaveoverzealously forgottentheprinciplewhichtheyfollowedagainsthim:thattheconsistencyofthoughtcompels theconstruction ofconcepts,whichhavenorepresentativeinthepositivelydeterminablegiven fact.Forthesakeofthespeculation, theydenouncedKantasaspeculator,guiltyofthesame positivism whichtheyaccusedhimof.Inthealleged failure oftheKantianapologeticsofthe thinginitself,whichthelogicofconsistencysinceMaimoncouldsotriumphantlydemonstrate, the memory lives on in Kant of the ghostly moment counter to the logic of consistency, non-identity. That is why he, who certainly did not mistake the consistency of his critics, protested against them and would rather be convicted of dogmatism thanabsolutize identity, from whose own meaning, as Hegel recognized quickly enough, the relation to something non-identicalisinalienable.Theconstructionofthethinginitselfandtheintelligiblecharacteris thatofsomethingnon-identicalastheconditionofthepossibilityofidentification,butalsothat whicheludesthegraspofthecategoricalidentification.
“Heartfelt thanks, my most esteemed and dearest friend, for the revelation of your kind sentiments towardsme,whichdulyarrivedalongwithyourbeautifulpresentthedayaftermy birthday!Theportrait whichMr.Löwe,aJewishpainter,producedwithoutmypermission, is indeedsupposed,asmyfriendssay,tohaveadegreeofsimilaritywithme,butaconnoisseurof paintings said at the first glance: a Jew always paints another Jew; whereupon he puts the emphasis onthenose:butenoughofthis.”(From:Kant’sLetters,Volume2,1789-1794,Berlin 1900,pg33)
Whatthehumanunderstanding,ailing fromitsownsoundness,reactsmostsensitivelyagainst, the primacy of something objective beyond individual human beings, in theircoexistence as muchasintheirconsciousness,canbecrasslyexperiencedeverysingleday.Onerepressesthat primacy asagroundlessspeculation,sothattheindividuals,asiftheirmeanwhilestandardized conceptions were in a double sense the unconditional truth, can preserve their self-flattering delusionfromthesuspicion,thatitwouldnotbesoandthattheyliveunderadoom.Inanepoch which shakes off the system of objective idealism as easily as the objective value-theory of economics, theoremsarenowbecoming current,withwhichitisassertedtheSpirithasnouse for,whichseeksitsownsecurityandthatofcognition inwhatisextantasthewell-organized sumsofimmediate individual factsofsocialinstitutions orthesubjective constitution oftheir members.TheHegelianobjectiveandultimatelyabsoluteSpirit,theMarxistlawofvaluewhich realizes itself without the consciousness of humanity, is more evident to the unleashed experiencethanthepreparedfactsofthepositivisticscientificbustle,whichtodayprolongsitself deepintothenaïvepre-scientificconsciousness;onlythislatterbreakshumanityofthehabit,for thegreater gloryoftheobjectivity ofcognition, oftheexperienceofrealobjectivity,towhich they are also subjected in themselves. If thinkers were prepared for and capable of such an experience,itwouldshakethefoundationoftheirfaithinfacticity;itwouldcompelthemtogo sofarbeyondthefacts,thattheselatterwouldlosetheirunreflectivepreponderancebeforethe universals, whicharetotriumphant nominalism anothingness,thesubtractableadditionofthe compartmentalizing researcher. That sentence from the initial considerations of the Hegelian Logic, that there would be nothing in the world, which is not just as much mediated as immediate, is preserved nowhere more precisely than in the facts, by which historiography swears.Nodoubtitwouldbefoolishtotrytodisputeawaywithepistemologicalfinesse,that whenadissidentisroustedatsixinthemorningbytheGestapounderHitler’sFascism,thisis more immediate to the individual [Individuum], who experiences it, than the previously transpiringmachinations ofpowerandtheinstallationofthepartyapparatusinallbranchesof the administration; or indeed than thehistorical tendency,whichforitspartblastedapartthe continuity of the Weimar Republic, and which does not otherwise reveal itself than in the conceptual context, committal solely in developed theory Nevertheless the factum brutum [Latin:brutefact]oftheofficialonslaught,bywhichFascismstrikesatthebodiesofindividuals, dependsonallthosemomentswhichareatadistancefromandmomentarilyindifferenttothe victim.Onlythemostmiserablenitpickingcouldblinditself,underthetitleofscientificacribia, tothefactthattheFrenchRevolution,howeverabruptlymanyofitsactsoccurred,meshedwith thetotal trendoftheemancipation ofthebourgeoisie. Itwouldhavebeenneitherpossiblenor successful, hadthekeypositionsofeconomic productionnotbeenalready occupied by1789, outstripping feudalism and its absolutist heads, which from time to time coalesced with the interests of the bourgeoisie. Nietzsche’s shocking imperative, “What is falling ought to be pushed” retrospectively codifies an Ur-bourgeois maxim. Probably all bourgeois revolutions were already decided by the historical expansion of the class and had an admixture of ostentation,externalizedinartasclassicistdécor.Neverthelessthattendencywouldhardlyhave realized itselfinthehistorical moment ofrupturewithouttheacuteabsolutistmismanagement
andthefinancial crisis,onwhichthephysiocratic reformersofLouisXVIfailed.Thespecific privation at least of the Parisian masses might have ignited the movement, while in other countries,whereitwasnotsoacute,thebourgeoisprocessofemancipationsucceededwithouta revolutionandatfirstdidnottouchthemoreorlessabsolutistformofdomination.Theinfantile distinctionbetweenthefundamentalcauseandproximateoccasionhasinitsfavor,thatitatleast crudelyindicatesthedualismofimmediacyandmediation:theoccasionsarewhatisimmediate, the so-called fundamental causes arewhatmediates, whatoverwhelms, whatincorporates the details. Theprimacyofthetendencyoverthefactscanbereadeveninthemostrecenthistory. Specific military actssuchasthebombingraidsonGermanyfunctionedas“slumclearing”[in English],retrospectively integrated withthattransformation ofthecities, whichcouldlongbe observednotonlyinNorthAmerica,butallacrosstheearth.Or:thestrengtheningofthefamily intheemergencysituationofrefugeestemporarilyheldtheanti-familialdevelopmentaltendency incheck,butscarcelythetrend;thenumberofdivorcesandofsplitfamiliesincreasedafterwards even in Germany. Even theassaults oftheconquistadors onancient MexicoandPeru,which musthavebeenexperienced therein likeinvasionsfromanotherplanet,murderouslyadvanced theexpansionofrationalbourgeoissociety–irrationallyfortheAztecsandIncas–allthewayto theconceptionof“oneworld”[inEnglish]teleologicallyinherentintheprincipleofthatsociety. Suchapreponderance ofthetrendinthefacts,whichtheformeralwaysstillneeds,ultimately condemns the old-fashioned distinction between cause and occasion to silliness; the whole distinction,notonlytheoccasion,issuperficial,becausethecauseisconcreteintheoccasion.If royalmismanagementwasaleveroftheParisianuprisings,thenthismismanagementwasstilla functionofthetotal,ofthebackwardnessoftheabsolutistic“consumptioneconomy”behindthe capitalisticincomeeconomy Momentscontrarytothehistoricalwhole,whichthereby,asinthe FrenchRevolution,onlypromotesuch,garnertheirpositionalvalueonlyinthislatter Eventhe backwardness of the productive forces of one classisnotabsolutebutmerely relative tothe progressiveness ofanother Constructioninthephilosophyofhistoryrequiresknowledgeofall ofthesethings.Thisisnottheleastreasonwhythephilosophyofhistoryapproaches,asalready in Hegel and Marx, historiography just as muchasthislatter,astheinsightintotheessence which,althoughveiledbyfacticity,yetconditionssuch,isstillpossibleonlyasphilosophy.
OntheConstructionoftheWorld-spirit297-300
Evenunderthisaspect,dialecticsisnovarietyofaworld-view,nophilosophicalposition,tobe selected fromasamplechartamongothers.Justasthecritiqueofallegedlyfirstphilosophical conceptsdrivestowardsdialectics,sotooisitdemandedfrombelow.Onlytheexperiencewhich isviolently tailored byanarrow-mindedconceptofitself,excludestheemphaticconceptasan independent,althoughmediatingmoment,fromitself.IfitcouldbeobjectedagainstHegel,that absolute idealism wouldrecoil asthedeification ofthatwhichis,intoexactly thatpositivism whichitattacked asreflection-philosophy,thenconverselythedialectics duetodaywouldnot only be the indictment of the prevailing consciousness but also capable of matching it, a positivism whichisbroughttoitself,andtherebyindeednegated.Thephilosophicaldemandto immerseoneselfinthedetail,whichdoesnotallowitselftobedirectedbyanyphilosophyfrom above, nor by any of its infiltrated intentions, was already the one side of Hegel. Only its carrying-out inhimwascaughttautologically: hismannerofimmersioninthedetaildemands thatthatSpiritshowup,asifbyappointment,whichwaspositedasthetotalandabsolutefrom theverybeginning.Theintent ofthemetaphysicianBenjaminwastoopposethistautology,to
rescue the induction, something developed in the prologue to the Origin of the German Tragedy-Play.Hisstatement,thesmallestcellofintuitedrealitywouldoutweightherestofthe remaining world, attests early on to the self-consciousness of the contemporary state of experience; allthemoreauthentically,becauseitformeditselfextraterritoriallytotheso-called greatquestionsofphilosophy,whichitbefitsatransformedconceptofdialecticstodistrust.The preponderance[Vorrang]ofthetotalovertheappearanceistobegraspedintheappearance,over whichdominates,whatcountsfortraditionastheworld-spirit;nottobetakenfromthistradition, whichisinthewidestsensePlatonic,assacred.Theworld-spiritis,yetisnot,isnottheSpirit, butpreciselythenegative,whichHegelshufflesofffromitontothosewhomustcounteritand whosedownfallrenderstheverdict,thatitsdifferencefromobjectivitywouldbewhatisuntrue and bad, double-sided. The world-spirit becomes something autonomous in contrast to the individual actions, out of which the real total movement of society as well as so-called intellectualdevelopmentsaresynthesized,andincontrasttothelivingsubjectsoftheseactions. Itisrealized overtheirheadsandthroughtheseandtothisextentantagonisticinadvance.The reflection-conceptoftheworld-spiritdoesnotinterestitselfinlivingcreatures,whichthewhole, whoseprimacy itexpresses,needsjustasmuchastheselatter canexistonlybyvirtueofthat whole.Suchahypostasis,robustlynominalistic, waswhattheMarxistterminusof“mystified” meant. According to that theory, the demolished mystification wouldnothoweverbemerely ideology.Itwouldbejustasmuchthedistortedconsciousnessoftherealprimacyofthewhole. Itappropriates inthoughttheimpenetrableandirresistibleoneoftheuniversal,theperpetuated mythos. Even the philosophic hypostasis has its experience-content in the heteronomous relationships,inwhichhumanbeingsbecameinvisibleassuch.Whatisirrationalintheconcept oftheworld-spirit,itborrowedfromtheirrationalityofthecourseoftheworld.Inspiteofthisit remainsfetishistic.Historyhastothisdaynototalsubject,howeverconstruable.Itssubstrateis thefunctionalcontextofrealindividualsubjects:“Historydoesnothing,it‘possessesnogigantic wealth’,it‘fightsnobattles’! Itisratherthehumanbeing,thereal,livinghumanbeing,which doeseverything,possessesandfights;itisnotsomesortof‘history’,whichneedshumanbeing asameans,inordertoworkthroughitsends–asifthiswereapersonapart–butratherthis latter is nothing but the activity of humanbeingspursuingtheirends.”142 Thosequalities are conferred upon history, however, because the law of motion of society abstracted from its individualsubjectsovermillennia.Ithasdegradedthemjustasreallytomereexecutors,tomere partakersofsocialwealthandsocialstruggle,asthefactthat,nolessreally,nothingwouldbe without them and theirspontaneities. Marxemphasized thisanti-nominalistic aspectoverand overagain,withoutindeedgrantingphilosophicalconsistencytoit:“Onlytotheextentthatthe capitalist is personified capital, do they have a historical value and that historical right to existence…Onlyasthepersonificationofcapitalisthecapitalistrespectable.Assuchtheyshare withthetreasure-huntertheabsolutedrivetoenrichment.Whathoweverappearsinthelatteras individualmania,isinthecapitalisttheeffectofthesocialmechanism,inwhichtheyaremerely acog.Besides, thedevelopment ofcapitalist productionmakesthecontinuousincrease ofthe capital investedinanindustrial enterprise anecessity,andcompetition imposestheimmanent lawsofcapitalistmodeofproductiononeachindividualcapitalistasexternalcompulsorylaws. Itcompelsthemtocontinuallyextendtheircapital,inordertopreserveit,andtheycanextendit onlybymeansofprogressiveaccumulation.”143
Intheconcept oftheworld-spirittheprincipleofdivineomnipotencewassecularizedintothat which posited unity, the world-plan into the pitilessness of what occurs. The world-spirit is worshippedlikeadeity; itisdivestedofitspersonalityandallitsattributesofprovidenceand grace. Therein a piece of the dialectic of enlightenment fulfills itself: the disenchanted and conserved Spirit takes the form of mythos or regresses into the shudder before something simultaneouslyoverpoweringanddevoidofqualities.Theessenceofsuchisthefeelingofbeing touched by the world-spirit orofhearingitsroar[Rausch].Itbecomesthestateofthralldom [Verfallensein] infate.Justlikeitsimmanence, theworld-spirit issaturatedwithsufferingand fallibility.Bytheinflationoftotalimmanenceintowhatisessential,itsnegativityisreducedto anaccidental trifle. Howevertoexperience theworld-spiritasawholemeanstoexperienceits negativity.Schopenhauer’scritique ofofficial optimism registeredthis.Itremainedmeanwhile asobsessiveastheHegeliantheodicyofwhatexistsinthisworld.Thathumanitylivesonlyin the total imbrication, perhapsonlysurvivingbyvirtueofit,wouldnotrefuteSchopenhauer’s doubts over whether to affirm the will tolife.Inalllikelihood howeverthererested,onthat which was with the world-spirit, at times also the reflection of a happiness far beyond the individualunhappiness:asintherelationshipoftheintellectualindividualtalenttothehistorical situation.IftheindividualSpiritisnot,aswouldpleasethevulgardivisionintotheindividuated andthegeneral,“influenced”bythegeneral,butmediatedinitselfthroughobjectivity,thenthis latter cannotalwaysbeentirelyhostiletothesubject;theconstellationchangesinthehistorical dynamic.Inphaseswhentheworld-spiritandindeedthetotalityitselfisshroudedingloom,itis impossible for even the most gifted to become whattheyare;infavorable ones,suchasthe period during and immediately after the French Revolution, the average were borne up far beyond themselves. Even the individual downfall of the individuated, which is with the world-spirit, precisely becauseitisaheadofitstime,evokesattimestheawarenessofwhatis notinvain.Theexpressionofthepossibility,thatallcouldyetbewell,isirresistibleinthemusic oftheyoungBeethoven.Thereconcilementwithobjectivity,beiteversofragile,transcendsthe monotonous.Themomentsinwhichsomethingparticularfreesitself,withoutconfiningothersin turn through its own particularity, are anticipations oftheunconfineditself; suchconsolation shinesfromtheearlyperiodofthebourgeoisiewellintoitslatephase.TheHegelianphilosophy ofhistorywasscarcely independent ofthis,inthesensethatinit,alreadydistancingitself,the strikingofthehourofanepochreverberated,inwhichtherealizationofbourgeoisfreedomblew withsuchabreath,thatitovershotitselfandopeneduptheperspectiveofareconciliationofthe whole,inwhichitsviolencewouldmeltaway.
OntheUnleashingoftheProductiveForces301-303
Itistemptingtoassociateperiodsofbeingwiththeworld-spirit,ofamoresubstantialhappiness thantheindividual one,withtheunleashingoftheproductive forces,whiletheburdenofthe world-spiritthreatenstocrushhumanity,assoonastheconflictbetweenthesocialforms,under whichtheyexist,andtheirforcesbecomesflagrant.Buteventhisschemataistoosimple:thetalk oftherisingbourgeoisie hollow.Thedevelopment andunleashingoftheproductiveforcesare notoppositesofthesortwhichcouldbeordainedasalternatingphases,butaretrulydialectical. The unleashing of the productive forces, thedeedoftheSpiritwhichcontrolsnature,hasan affinitytotheviolentdominationofnature.Thoughitmayconcealitselffromtimetotime,itis
nottobethoughtawayfromtheconceptoftheproductiveforceandleastofallfromthatwhich isunleashed;theverywordresonateswithathreat.InCapitalthereisapassagewhichgoes:“As a fanatic of the valorization of value, it” – exchange-value – “ruthlessly compels humanity towards production for production’s sake.”144 In its place and time this turns against the fetishization oftheprocessofproductioninexchange-society,beyondthishoweveritviolates thenowadaysuniversaltabooondoubtingproductionasanendinitself.Attimesthetechnical forces of production are hardly restrained socially, but work in fixed relations ofproduction withoutmuchinfluence ontheselatter.Assoonastheunleashingoftheforcesseparatesitself fromtheconstitutingrelationshipsbetweenhumanbeings,itbecomesnolessfetishizedthanthe socialcastes [Ordnungen];it,too,isonlyamoment ofthedialectic,notitsmagicformula.In suchphasestheworld-spirit,thetotalityoftheparticular,canpassoverintothatwhichitburies underneath it. If appearances do not completely deceive, then this is the signature of the contemporary epoch. In periods by contrast when living beings require the progress of the productiveforcesoratleastarenotvisiblyendangeredbythem,thefeelingofconcordancewith theworld-spirit likely prevails,althoughwiththeapprehensiveundercurrent,thatthisisonlya ceasefire; also with the temptation of the subjective Spirit, to overzealously run over to the objective one under the pressure of business, like Hegel. In all of this the subjective Spirit remains a historical category, too, something originated, self-transforming, virtually transient. Thepopularspirit[Volksgeist]ofprimitive societies, notyetindividualized,whichreproduces itself in the latter under the pressure of the civilized ones, is planned by post-individual collectivism and released; the objective Spirit is then as overwhelming as much as a naked swindle.
GroupSpirit[Gruppengeist]andDomination302-303
If philosophy were, what Hegel’s Phenomenology proclaimed it to be, the science of the experienceofconsciousness,thenitcouldnot,asHegeldoestoanincreasingextent,sovereignly dismiss the individual experience ofthegeneral, whichpushesitswaythrough,assomething irreconcilably bad, and acceding to the apologetics of power from a presumably higher standpoint. The embarrassing recollection of how in committees, what is inferior ends up prevailing, in spite of the subjectively good willofthemembers,renderstheprimacy ofthe general evident, forwhosedisgracenoappeal totheworld-spirit compensates. Groupopinion dominates; through adjustment to the majority of thegroup,oritsmostinfluential members, more often by virtue of the more encompassing and authoritative opinionbeyondthegroup, especially one approved by the members of the committee. The objective Spiritoftheclass reachesdeepintotheparticipantsfarbeyondtheirindividualintelligence.Theirvoiceisitsecho, althoughtheythemselves,subjectivelywherepossiblethedefendersoffreedom,feelnothingof it;intriguesappearonlyatcriticalpoints,asopencriminality.Thecommitteeisthemicrocosm of the group of its members, finally of the total; this preforms the decisions. Thesesortsof contemporary observations ironically resemble those of the formal sociology in the mold of Simmel. However they do not have their content in socialization pure and simple,inempty categories like that of the group. Rather they are what formal sociology,inkeepingwithits definition, onlygrudginglyreflectson,theimprintofsocialcontent;theirinvarianceissolelya memento ofhowlittle thepowerofthegenerality haschangedinhistory,howmuchitstillis alwaysonlyprehistory.Theformalgroupspiritisthereflex-movementofmaterialdomination.
144Ibid.pg621.
Formalsociologyhasitsrighttoexistintheformalizationofsocialmechanisms,theequivalent ofdomination,progressingthroughtheratio.Inagreementwiththis,isthefactthatthedecisions ofthosecommittees, howeversubstantive theywouldliketobeaccordingtotheiressence,are renderedmanifest forthemostpartunderformal-juridical pointsofview.Formalizationisnot anything more neutral in contrast to the class-relationship. It reproduces itself through abstraction, thelogical hierarchy ofthestagesofuniversality,andindeedalsothere,wherethe relationshipsofdominationarecausedtomaskthemselvesbehinddemocraticprocedures.
TheJuridicalSphere303-305
FollowingthePhenomenologyandtheLogic,Hegeldrovethecultofthecourseoftheworldthe furthestinthePhilosophyofLaw.Themedium,inwhichwhatisbadispreservedforthesakeof itsobjectivityandlendsitselftheappearance[Schein]ofwhatisgood,istoalargeextentthatof legality,whichindeedpositivelyprotectsthereproductionoflife,howeverinitsexistingforms, duetothedestructiveprincipleofviolence,whatisdestructiveinitreturnsundiminished.While societywithoutlaw,asintheThirdReich,becamethepreyofpurelycaprice,thelawconserves terrorinsociety,readytogobacktoitatanymomentwiththehelpofquotablestatutes.Hegel delivered the ideology ofpositivelaw,becauseinanalready visiblyantagonistic society,this latter most urgently required it. Law is the Ur-phenomenon of irrational rationality.Initthe formal principle of equivalence becomes the norm, everyone is measured by samestandard. Suchequality,inwhichdifferencesperish,givesasecretimpetustoinequality;persistingmythos in the midst ofanonlyapparently demythologized humanity Thenormsofthelawcutshort whatisnotcovered,everyexperienceofthespecificwhichisnotpreformed,forthesakeofthe seamless systematic, and then raises instrumental rationality to a second reality sui generis [Latin: general in itself]. The entire juridical realm is one of definitions. Its systematic commands,thatnothingshallpassintoit,whichcouldescapefromitsclosedcircle,quodnonest inactis[Latin:whichisnotinthedeed].Thisenclosure,ideologicalinitself,exertsrealviolence throughthesanctionsoflawasthesociallycontrollingauthority,particularlyintheadministered world. In the dictatorships itturnsintothelatter immediately,mediately [mittelbar] italways stoodbehindthem.Thattheindividualfeelssoeasilywronged,whentheantagonismofinterest drivesitintothejuridicalsphere,isnot,asHegelwouldliketoargue,itsownfault,suchthatit wouldbetoodeludedtorecognizeitsowninterestintheobjectivelegalnormanditsguarantee; ratheritisthatoftheconstituentsofthelegalsphereitself.Meanwhilethedescriptionremains objectively true,whichHegelsketchedasoneofapresumablysubjective bias:“That legality [Recht]andmorality,andtherealworldofthelawandofthemoralaregraspedthroughthought, thatthroughthoughttheformofrationality,namelyuniversalityanddeterminacy,isgiven,this, thelaw,iswhatthatfeelingwhichreservesitselfatwill,thatconsciencewhichplaceslegalityin thesubjectiveconviction,looksatwithgroundsaswhatismosthostiletoitself.Itperceivesthe formoflegality,asoneofdutyandoneoflaw,asadead,coldletterandasafetter;foritdoes notcognizeitselfinit,henceisnotfreeinit,becausethelawistherationalityofthething,and thislatter doesnotpermit thefeelingstowarmtoitsownparticularity.”145 Thatthesubjective consciencewouldviewobjectivemorality“withgrounds”aswhatismosthostiletoitself,Hegel sets down as if by a philosophical Freudian slip. He blurts out, what in the samebreathhe disputes.Ifinfacttheindividual conscience sawthe“real worldofthelawandthemoral”as hostile, because it does not recognize itself in it, then one cannot simply gloss over this in
Ifeverysubstantively explicated, positivedoctrine ofnatural lawleadstoantinomies, thenits idea nevertheless critically preserves the untruth of positive law. Today it is the reified consciousness,translatedbackintoreality,whichmultipliesdominationtherein.Evenaccording to its very form, before class-content and class-justice, it expressesdomination, theyawning difference of individual interests fromthewhole,inwhichtheyareabstractly conglomerated. Thesystemofself-madeconcepts,whichslidesafull-fledgedjurisprudenceoverthelife-process ofsociety,decidesinadvance,bymeansofthesubsumptionofeverythingindividualunderthe category,infavorofthesocialorderwhichtheclassificatorysystemisformedintheimageof.
To his imperishable honor, Aristoteles registered this inthedoctrine oftheepieikeia [Greek: fairness,equity],offairnessagainsttheabstractlegalnorm.Themoreconsistentlyhoweverthe legal systemisconstructed throughout,themoreincapableitisofabsorbingthatwhichhasits essence inrefusingabsorption.Therational systemoflawallowstheclaimoffairness,which meant the corrective of the injustice in justice, toberegularly strickendownasaspecies of patronage,asunfairprivilege.Thetendencytodosoisuniversal,ofonemindwiththeeconomic process, which reduces individual interests to the common denominator of a totality, which remains negative, because it distances itself bymeansofitsconstitutive abstraction fromthe individual interests, outofwhichitisneverthelesssimultaneouslycomposed.Theuniversality, which reproduces the preservation of life, simultaneously endangers it, on constantly more threateninglevels.Theviolenceoftheself-realizinguniversalisnot,asHegelthought,identical to the essence of individuals, butalwaysalsocontrary.Theyarenotmerely character-masks, agentsofvalue,insomepresumedspecial sphereoftheeconomy.Evenwheretheythinkthey have escaped the primacy oftheeconomy,allthewaydowntotheirpsychology,themaison tolérée [French: universal home] of what is unknowably individual, they react under the compulsionofthegenerality;themoreidenticaltheyarewithit,themoreun-identicaltheyare withitinturnasdefenselessfollowers.Whatisexpressedintheindividualsthemselves,isthat the whole preserves itself along with them only by and through the antagonism. There are countless times when human beings, though conscious and capable of the critique of the universality, are compelled by inescapable motives of self-preservation, to acts and attitudes which help the universal to blindly maintain itself, even though they consciously oppose it. Solelybecausetheymustmakewhatisalientothemintotheirownaffair,inordertosurvive, doestheappearance[Schein]ofthatreconcilementoriginate,whichHegelianphilosophy,which incorruptibly cognized theprimacyoftheuniversal,transfigurescorruptiblyintoanidea.What radiates, asifitwerebeyondtheantagonisms, isasonewiththeuniversalentanglement.The universalensuresthatwhatissubjectedtoitasparticularwouldbenobetterthanitself.Thisis thecoreofallhithertoestablishedidentity.
IndividualisticVeil306-307
Tolooktheprimacyoftheuniversalintheeye,ispsychologicallydamagingtothenarcissismof allindividualsandthedemocraticallyorganizedsocietytoanunbearableextent.Toseethrough selfness as nonexistent, asanillusion,wouldeasilydrivetheobjective despairofallintothe subjectiveoneandwouldrobthemofthefaiththatindividualisticsocietyimplantsinthem:that they, theindividuals, wouldbewhatissubstantial. Forthefunctionally determined individual interestunderexistingformstosomehowbesatisfied,itmustitselfbecomewhatisprimary;the individualmustbeconfusedwithwhatisimmediateforit,withtheprôtêousia[Greek:primary substance]. Such subjective illusion is objectively caused: only by means of theprinciple of individual self-preservation, withallitsnarrowness,doesthewholefunction.Itcompelseach individualtogazesolelyatthemselves,interferingwiththeirinsightintotheobjectivity,andthus objectivelyworksforill.Nominalisticconsciousnessreflectsawhole,whichlivesonbymeans oftheparticularity anditsobstinacy;literallyideology,sociallynecessaryappearance[Schein]. Thegeneralprincipleisthatofisolation.Itappearstobetheindubitablecertainty,bewitchedby thefactthat,atthepriceofitsexistence, itmaynotbecome awareofhowmuchitwouldbe something mediated. Thus the popular spread of philosophical nominalism. Each individual existenceissupposedtohavepreeminenceoveritsownconcept;theSpirit,theconsciousnessof individuals, isonlysupposedtobeinindividuals andnotjustasmuchinthesupraindividual, whichissynthesizedinthemandsolelythroughwhichtheythink.Themonadsstubbornlyblock theirrealspecies-dependency fromthemselves justasmuchasthecollective aspectofallthe formsandcontentsoftheirconsciousness:offorms,whichthemselvesarethatgeneralitywhich nominalism denies,ofcontents,eventhoughnoexperience, noteventheso-calledmaterialof experience, wouldfalltotheindividual, whichisnotalreadypredigestedanddeliveredbythe generality
DynamicofGeneralandParticular307-309
Incontrasttotheepistemological reflection onthegenerality inindividualconsciousness,itis right not to allow itself to be consoled about ill, sin and death through the appeal to the generality.InHegelthisisrecalled,incontrasttothedoctrineoftheuniversalmediation,bythe apparently paradox one, that thislatter comportsitselfmagnificently withwhatisuniversally restored as immediate. But the nominalism, disseminated as prescientific consciousness, and todayoncemorecommandingsciencefromthere,whichmakesaprofessionoutofitsnaivete–the positivistic instrumentarium seldom lacks the pride in being naïve, and the category of “everyday language” is its echo – does not bother with the historical coefficient in the relationshipofthegeneralandtheparticular.Thetruepreponderance[Vorrang]oftheparticular could only be obtained bymeansofthetransformation ofthegeneral. Tosimplyinstall itas somethingexistent,isacomplementaryideology.Itconcealshowmuchthespecifichasbecome the function of the general, which, according to its logical form, it was all along. What nominalismclingstoasitsmostprizedpossessionisutopia;thusitshatredofutopianthinking, thatofthedifferencefromwhatexists.Thescientificbustlecreatestheillusionthattheobjective Spirit, produced by utterly real mechanisms of domination, which meanwhile also plans the contentsoftheconsciousnessofitsreserve-army,wouldresultmerelyfromthesumofthislast’s subjectivereactions.Thesehoweverhavelongsincebeenonlytheafterbirthsofthatuniversality, whichsolicitously fêteshumanbeings,inordertobeabletobetterhidebehindthem,tobetter
curbthem.Theworld-spirititselfturnedonthesubjectivisticallyobstinateconceptionofscience, which aims at its autarkic, empirical-rational system, insteadofcomprehending theobjective society which dictates from above. The formerly critically enlightening rebellion against the thinginitselfhasbecomethesabotageofcognition,althougheveninthemostcrippledscientific concept-formation traces of the for its part no less crippled thingsurvive.Therefusalofthe Kantianamphibolychaptertocognizetheinteriorofthething,istheultimaratio[Latin:ultimate meaning]oftheBaconianprogram.Ithadthehistoricalindexofitstruthintherebellionagainst scholasticdogmatism.Themotivecapsizesitself,however,wherethatwhichisforbiddentothe cognition ispartofthelatter’sepistemologicalandrealcondition;wherethecognizingsubject mustreflect onitselfasamomentofthegeneralitytobecognized,withouthoweverbecoming entirelythesameasthis.Itisabsurdtopreventitfromcognizingfromwithin,whatitdwellsin andwhatithasalltoomuchofinitsowninterior; tothisextentHegelianidealismwasmore realistic than Kant. Where scientific concept-formation ends up in conflict with its ideal of facticity nolessthanwiththatofsimplereason,whoseanti-speculativeexecutoritpretendsto be, its apparatus turned into unreason. The method high-handedly represses what would be incumbentonittocognize.Thepositivisticcognitiveidealofunanimousandnon-contradictory, logicallyobjection-freemodelsisuntenable,duetotheimmanentcontradictionofwhatistobe cognized, totheantagonisms oftheobject. Theyarethoseofthegeneralandtheparticularof society,andtheyaredeniedallcontentbythemethod.
SpiritasSocialTotality309-311
The experience of that objectivity, which is preordained to the individuated and its consciousness, is that oftheunityofthetotally socialized society Itistheclosest kinofthe philosophical idea of absolute identity, in that it tolerates nothing outside of itself.However deceptivelytheraisingoftheOne[Einheit]intophilosophyattheexpenseoftheManymayhave beenraised;itspreeminence,whichcountedforthesummumbonum[Latin:highestgood]ofthe victoriousphilosophical tradition sincetheEleatics, isindeednotthis,butanensrealissimum [Latin: most real being]. It really does appropriate a touch of the transcendence, which the philosopherspraisedintheunityasanidea.Whiledevelopedbourgeoissociety–andindeedthe earliestunity-thinkingwasalreadyurban,rudimentarilybourgeois–wascomposed[komponiert: to compose musically] from countless individual spontaneities of self-preserving individuals, dependent in their self-preservation oneachother,bynomeansdidthatequilibrium between unity and the individuals prevail, which theorems of justification proclaim as existent. The non-identityoftheOneandtheManymeanwhilehastheformoftheprecedenceoftheOne,as theidentity ofthesystem,whichletsnothinggo.WithouttheindividualspontaneitiestheOne wouldnothavebecome,andwasasitssynthesissomethingsecondary;nominalismrecalledthis. Howeverbyweavingitselfevertighter,throughthenecessitiesofself-preservationoftheMany or merely through irrational relationships of domination, which misused this as a pretext, it ensnared all individuals, on the pain of their downfall, integrated them, to use Spencer’s terminus,absorbedthemwithitslawfulness evenagainsttheirreasonable individual interests. This then gradually brought the advancing differentiation toanend,whichSpencermaystill have believed would necessarily accompany integration. While theunchangedwholeandthe Oneformonlybymeansoftheparticularitiesitcovers,itformsruthlesslyoverthem.Whatis realized throughtheindividualandtheManyis,andyetisnot,theMany’sownaffair[Sache]: they can do less and less about it. Its epitome issimultaneously itsOther:thisdialectic was
studiouslyignoredbytheHegelianone.Totheextentindividualssomehowbecomeawareofthe preponderance oftheOneoverthem,itisreflectedbackontothemasthebeing-in-itselfofthe generality,whichtheyinfactruninto:evenintotheirinnermostcore,itisinflictedonthem,even wheretheyinflictitonthemselves.Thesentenceethosanthrôposdaimôn[Greek:customwhich humanityisunderthepowerof]:thatthecharacterofhumanity,alwaysmodeledassuchbythe generality,wouldbetheirfate,hasmoretruththanthatofacharacterologicaldeterminism;the generality,throughwhicheveryindividualisdeterminedastheunit[Einheit]ofitsparticularity, is borrowed from what is external toitandhencealsoasheteronomoustotheindividual, as anythingwhichdemonswereoncesaidtoafflictthemwith.Theideologyofthebeing-in-itself oftheideaissopowerful,becauseitisthetruth,butitisthenegativeone;itbecomesideology throughitsaffirmativereversal.Ifhumanbeingsoncelearntheprimacyofthegenerality,thenit isalmostunavoidableforthemtotransfigureitintotheSpirit,aswhatishigher,whichtheymust propitiate. Compulsion becomessensible[zumSinn:meaningful]tothem.Notentirelywithout reason:fortheabstract generality ofthewhole,whichexertsthecompulsion,isentwinedwith theuniversalityofthinking,withtheSpirit.Thispermitsittoprojectthislatteroncemoreback ontoitsbearer,onthatuniversality,asifitwererealizedinthisandhaditsownrealityforitself. IntheSpirittheunanimityofthegeneralityhasbecomeasubject,andtheuniversalitymaintains itselfinsocietyonlythroughthemediumoftheSpirit,theabstractingoperation,whichitreally andtrulyperforms.Bothconvergeinexchange,somethingatthesametimesubjectivelythought and objectively valid, wherein however the objectivity of the generality and the concrete determination oftheindividual subjects, preciselybybecomingcommensurable,irreconcilably opposeeachother Inthenameoftheworld-spirittheSpiritismerelyaffirmedandhypostasized, aswhatitalwaysalreadywas;init,asDurkheimrecognized,whoforthatreasonwasaccusedof metaphysics, society worships itself, its compulsion as omnipotence. Society may find itself confirmed by the world-spirit, because it in fact possesses all the attributes, which it subsequentlyworshipsintheSpirit.Itsmythicalvenerationisnopureconceptualmythology:it extendsthanksforthefactthatinmoredeveloped historical phasesallindividuals havelived onlybymeansofthatsocialunity,whichisnotexhaustedinthemandwhichapproachestheir doomthelongeritgoeson.Iftheirexistencetoday,withoutthemrealizingit,isliterallygranted assomethingrevocablebythegreatmonopoliesandpowers,thenwhatcomestoitself,iswhat theemphatic concept ofsocietyteleologically hadinitselfallalong.Theideologyrendersthe world-spirit independent, becauseithadalready potentially grownindependent.Thecultofits categories however, for instance the utterly formal one of greatness, something which even Nietzsche accepted, merely reinforces in the consciousness its difference from everything individual, as if this difference were ontological; and with that the antagonism and the foreseeabledisaster.
AntagonisticReasonofHistory311-313
Itisnotonlytodaythatthereasonoftheworld-spiritis,incontrasttothepotentialone,tothe entireinterestoftheunitedindividualsubjectsfromwhichitdiffers,unreason.Hegel,likeallthe others who learned from him, was reproved for the equation oflogical categories here,with social ones and the ones from the philosophy of history there, as metabasis eis allo genos [Greek:changeintoanothergenus]:theywouldbethatpeakofspeculativeidealism,whichhad to break off in view of the unconstruability of what is empirical. Precisely thatconstruction however did justice to the reality. The tit for tat of history just as much as the
equivalence-principleofthesocialrelationshipsbetweentheindividualsubjects,whichadvances towardsthetotality,istantamount tothelogicity whichHegelispresumedtohaveinterpreted into it. Only this logicity, the primacy of the general in the dialectic of the general andthe particular,isanindexfalsi[Latin:indexoffalsity].Thereisnomorethatidentitythanfreedom, individuality, and whatever else Hegel posits with the general in identity. The total of the generality expressesitsownfailure. Whatcannotbearanyparticular,betraysitselftherebyas particularly dominating. Thegeneral reason,whichendsupprevailing,isalreadytherestricted kind.Itisnotthemereunityinsideofthemultiplicity,butratherstampedasapositiontoreality, theunityoversomething.Therebyhowever,according tothepureform,antagonisticinitself. Thedivisionisunity.Theirrationalityoftheparticularlyrealizedratioinsideofwhatissocially total is not extraneous to the ratio, not solely the fault of its usage. Rather immanent to it. Measured by complete reason, the currently prevailing one reveals itself, according to its principle, as polarized and to this extent irrational. Enlightenment truly succumbs to the dialectic:thislattertakesplaceinitsownconcept.Ratioisnomoretobehypostasizedthanany othersortofcategory.Thetransferoftheself-preservinginterestofindividualsintothespeciesis intellectually congealed in its simultaneously general and antagonistic form. It obeysalogic which great bourgeois philosophy comprehended at historic corners like Hobbes and Kant: without the ceding of the self-preserving interest to that species, which bourgeois thinking represented forthemostpartbythestate,whatisindividuated wouldnotbeabletopreserve itselfinmoredeveloped socialrelationships. Howeverbymeansofthistransfer,necessaryfor individuals,thegeneralrationalityunavoidablyappearspracticallyinoppositiontotheparticular humanbeings,whoitmustnegate,inordertobecomegeneral,andwhoitpretendstoserve,and not only pretends. In the universality of the ratio, which ratifies theneediness ofeverything particular,itsdependence onthewhole,itscontradictiontotheparticulardevelopsbyvirtueof theprocessofabstraction,onwhichthatrests.All-prevailingreason,whichinstauratesitselfover anotherone,alsonecessarilydelimitsitself.Theprincipleofabsoluteidentityiscontradictoryin itself.Itperpetuatesnon-identityassomethingsuppressedanddamaged.Atraceofthisentered into Hegel’s effort, to absorb non-identity through identity-philosophy, indeed to determine identity through non-identity. He distorts however the matter-at-hand, by affirming what is identical,concedingwhatisnon-identicalasindeednecessarilynegative,andmisconceivingthe negativityofthegenerality.Helackssympathyfortheutopiaoftheparticular,buriedunderneath the general, for that non-identity, which would only be, when realized reason had left the particularoneofthegeneralitybehind.Theconsciousnessoftheinjusticewhichtheconceptof thegeneralimplies,whichheupbraids,woulddeservehisrespectduetotheuniversalityofthe injustice itself. When at the very dawn of the modern era the mortally wounded condottieri [Italian:mercenary]FranzvonSickingenfoundthewords,“Nothingwithoutcause”forhisfate, thenheexpressedtwothingswiththepoweroftheepoch:thenecessityofthesocialcourseof theworld,whichcondemnedhimtoperish,andthenegativityoftheprincipleofacourseofthe world,whichproceedsaccordingtonecessity.Itissimplyincompatiblewithhappiness,evenof thewhole.Theexperience-contentofthedictumismorethantheplatitudeofthegeneralvalidity ofthecausalproposition.Whatglimmersintheconsciousnessoftheindividualpersoniswhat they experience, the universalinterdependence. Itsapparently isolated fatereflects thewhole. What the mythological name of fate once stood for, is as what is demythologized no less mythical than thesecular“logic ofthethings”.Itisburntintoindividuals, thefigureoftheir particularization.ThisobjectivelymotivatedHegel’sconstructionoftheworld-spirit.Ontheone handitgivesanaccountingoftheemancipationofthesubject.Itmustfirsthavewithdrawnfrom
the universality, in ordertoperceive itinandforitself.Ontheotherhandthecontext ofthe social individual actionsmustbetiedtogether intoaseamless totality,predetermining forthe individual,asneverwasthecaseinthefeudalepoch.
UniversalHistory313-315
The concept of universal history, which the Hegelian philosophy took inspiration from very muchastheKantianonedidfromthatofthemathematicalnaturalsciences,becameallthemore problematic,themoretheunifiedworldapproachesatotalprocess.Foronething,positivistically progressinghistoricalsciencetookaparttheconceptionofthetotalandofunbrokencontinuity. Thephilosophical construction hadthedubiousadvantageoveritofalessdetailedknowledge, whichiteasilyenoughbookedintheledgerasasovereigndistanceforitself;tobesurealsoless fear, of saying what is essential, whichisoutlined solelyfromadistance. Ontheotherhand advanced philosophy had to be aware of the understanding between universal history and ideology146 and the despoiledlifeasdiscontinuous. Hegelhimselfhadconceived ofuniversal history as uniform merely by virtue of its contradictions. With the materialistic reversal of dialectics,theheaviestaccentfellontheinsightintothediscontinuityofwhatisnotconsolingly heldtogetherbyanyunityoftheSpiritandconcept.Discontinuityhoweveranduniversalhistory aretobethoughttogether.Tocanceloutthislatterasaremainderofmetaphysicalsuperstition, would intellectually consolidate mere facticity astheonlythingtobecognized andtherefore accepted, inthesamefashionthatsovereigntyoncemarshaledthefactsintothetotalforwards marchoftheOneSpirit,confirmingthemasitsutterances.Universalhistoryistobeconstrued anddenied.Theassertion thatanall-encompassingworld-planforthebettermanifestsitselfin historywouldbe,afterpastcatastrophesandinviewoffutureones,cynical.Thishoweverisnot a reason to deny the unity which welds together the discontinuous, chaotically fragmented momentsandphasesofhistory,thatofthecontrolofnature,progressingintodominationover humanbeingsandultimatelyoverinternalizednature.Nouniversalhistoryleadsfromsavagery tohumanity,butoneindeedfromtheslingshottotheH-bomb.Itculminatesinthetotalthreatof organizedhumanity againstorganizedhumanbeings,intheepitome ofdiscontinuity.Hegelis therebyverified bythehorrorandstoodonhishead.Ifhetransfiguredthetotalityofhistorical sufferingintothepositivityoftheself-realizingabsolute,thentheOneandthewhole,whichto this day, with breathing-spells, keep rolling on, would teleologically be absolute suffering. History is the unityofcontinuity anddiscontinuity.Societypreservesitselfnotinspiteofits antagonism butthroughit;theprofit-motive,andtherebytheclassrelationship,areobjectively themotoroftheprocessofproductiononwhicheveryone’slifedependsandwhoseprimacyhas itsvanishing-pointinthedeathofall.Thisimpliesalsowhatisreconcilingintheirreconcilable; becauseitaloneallowshumanbeingstolive,withoutittherewouldnotevenbethepossibility of a different life. What historically created thatpossibility,candestroyitjustaseasily.The world-spirit,aworthyobjectofdefinition,couldbedefinedaspermanentcatastrophe.Underthe identityprinciplewhichyokeseveryone,whatdoesnotpassoverintoidentityandwhichescapes fromthegraspofplannedrationalityintherealmofthemeans,turnsintothatwhichprovokes fear,retributionforthatwoe,whichthenon-identicalexperiencesthroughidentity.Historycould scarcelybephilosophicallyinterpretedotherwise,withoutenchantingitintoanidea.
Speculations astowhethertheantagonism wasinheritedfromtheoriginsofhumansociety,as the principle homohominilupus[Latin: humanity iswolftohumanity], apiece ofprolonged natural history, or indeed came into being thesei [Greek:thesis]; andastowhether,ifithad already germinated, it followed from the necessities of the survival of the species and not contingently,asitwere,outofarchaicarbitraryactsofpower-seizure,arenotidle.Withthatof coursetheconstructionoftheworld-spiritwouldfallasunder.Thehistoricalgenerality,thelogic ofthings,whichiscompacted inthenecessity oftheoverall tendency,wouldbegroundedon whatisaccidental, whatisexternaltoit;thelatterneednothavebeen.NotjustHegelbutalso MarxandEngels,hardlyanywheresoidealisticasintherelationshiptothetotality,wouldhave rejected thedoubtinitsinescapability,whichnonethelessrisesupintheintentiontotransform theworld,likeadeadlyattackontheirownsysteminsteadoftheprevailingone.IndeedMarx refrains,mistrustfulofallanthropology,fromrelocatingantagonismintotheessenceofhumanity orintoprimevaltimes,whicharedrawnupinsteadaccordingtothetoposofthegoldenage,yet insists all the more tenaciously on itshistorical necessity.Theeconomywouldhaveprimacy over domination, whichmaynotbeotherwise deducedthaneconomically.Thecontroversyis hardlytobesettledwithfacts;theylosethemselvesinthemistsofprehistory.Buttheinterestin itwasinalllikelihoodnomoreoneofhistoricalfactsthantheoneinthesocialcontract,which even Hobbes and Locke would scarcely have considered to be really fulfilled.*41* Itwasa question of the deification of history, even in the atheistic Hegelians Marx and Engels. The primacy of the economy is supposed to ground the happy end with historical stringency as immanent toit;theeconomic processwouldproducethepolitical relationships ofdomination andwouldoverturnthemuntilthemandatoryemancipationfromthecoercionoftheeconomy However the intransigence of the doctrine, especially in Engels, was for its part precisely political.HeandMarxwishedfortherevolutionasoneoftheeconomicrelationshipsinsociety asawhole,inthefundamentofitsself-preservation,notasthechangingoftheground-rulesof domination, itspolitical form.Thepointwasdirected attheanarchists. WhatmotivatedMarx andEngelstotranslate evenhumanity’sprehistory,itsfallfromgrace,asitwere,intopolitical economy,althoughitsveryconcept,chainedtothetotalityoftheexchange-relationship,isitself somethinglate,wastheexpectationofimmediatelyimpendingrevolution.Becausetheywished forthisrightaway,itwasoftheutmostimportance tothemtostrikedowntendencies,which theyfearedwouldbesimilarly defeated justasSpartacus formerly,ortherebellious peasants. Theywereenemies ofutopiaforthesakeofitsrealization.Theirimagoofrevolutionstamped thatoftheprimalworld;theoverwhelmingweightoftheeconomiccontradictionsincapitalism seemedtodemanditsderivationfromtheaccumulatedobjectivityofwhat,sinceinconceivably distanttimes,washistoricallystronger.Theycouldnothavesuspectedwhatappearedlater,inthe failure oftherevolution, evenwhereitsucceeded: thatdominationiscapableofoutlastingthe plannedeconomy,whichneitherofthemtobesurewouldhaveconfusedwithstatecapitalism;a potential, which the antagonistic tendency explicated by Marx and Engels of the economic, sharpenedagainstmerepolitics,prolongsbeyonditsspecificphase.Thetenacityofdomination after the fall of what the critique of political economy had as its main object, confersupon ideology the cheap triumph, which deduces domination, be it out of presumably inalienable forms of social organization, for instance those of centralization, be it out of those of the consciousness abstracted from the real process–theratio–andsubsequently prophesizes an infinite futurefordomination, withopenunderstandingorundercrocodile-tears,foraslongas
any sort of organized society exists. By contrast the critique of the politics fetishized as an existent-in-itself,orthatoftheSpirit,inflatedintoitsparticularity,retainsitspower.Theideaof thehistoricaltotalityistoucheduponhoweverbytheeventsofthetwentiethcentury,asoneof calculable economic necessity. Only if things could have been different; only if the totality, sociallynecessaryappearance[Schein]asthehypostasisofthegenerality,whichissqueezedout of individual human beings, is broken of the claim of its absoluteness, does critical social consciousnesspreservethefreedomofthought,thatonedaythingsmightbedifferent.Theoryis capable ofmovingtheimmeasurable weightofhistorical necessity solelybycognizingthisas appearance[Schein]turnedintoreality,thehistoricaldeterminationasmetaphysicallyaccidental. Suchcognitionisthwartedbythemetaphysicsofhistory.Theloomingcatastrophecorresponds rather to the presumption of an irrational catastrophe in thebeginnings.Todaythedisdained possibilityoftheOtherhasshrunkintothatwhich,despiteeverything,wardsoffcatastrophe.
OtherworldlinessoftheHegelianWorld-spirit317-320
InHegelhowever,especially inthephilosophies ofhistoryandlaw,historicalobjectivity,asit once became, is exalted into transcendence: “This general substance is not the worldly; the worldly strives powerlessly against it. Nothingindividuated [Individuum]cangobeyondthis substance; it can indeed distinguish itself from other particular individuals, but notfromthe popular spirit [Volksgeist].”147 The opposite of “worldly”, that of the identity, which is unidentically imposed over the particular existent, is accordingly otherworldly Evensuchan ideology has its grain of truth: the critic ofhisownpopularspiritisalsochained towhatis commensurabletohim,solongashumanityissplitintonations.TheconstellationbetweenKarl Kraus and Vienna is the greatest model ofthisintherecent past,althoughforthemostpart garbed disparagingly But things are not so dialectical for Hegel, as ever where he meets something disturbing. The individuated, he continues, “can be more intellectually keen [geistreicher]thanmanyothers,butcannotsurpassthepopularspirit.Theintellectuallykeenare onlythose,whoknowthespiritofthepeopleandknowhowtodirectthemselvesaccordingly.”148 Withrancor–itcannotfailtobeoverheardintheusageoftheterm“intellectuallykeen”–Hegel describes the relationship far beneath the level of his own conception. “To direct oneself accordingly”wouldbeliterallymereadjustment.Asifbythecompulsiontoconfesshedecodes theidentity heteaches asthecontinuing breakandpostulates thesubordinationoftheweaker underthemightier.Euphemisms suchasthatofthephilosophyofhistory,thatinthecourseof worldhistory“particularindividualshavesuffered”,149 unwittinglycomeverycloseindeedtothe consciousness of irreconcilement, andthefanfare“indutytheindividuated emancipates itself towards substantial freedom”,150 incidentally a theme endemic to the entirety of idealistic Germanthought,isalreadyindistinguishablefromitsparodyinthedoctor-sceneinBuechner’s Woyzeck. Hegel puts into philosophy’s mouth, “that no power goesbeyondthepowerofthe good,ofGod,whichpreventsHim,fromreigning,thatGoddeliversjustice,thatworld-history representsnothingotherthantheplanofprovidence.Godgovernstheworld;thecontentofHis government,thefulfillmentofHisplan,isworld-history,tograspthislatteristhephilosophyof world-history,anditsprerequisite is,thattheidealberealized,thatonlywhatisinaccordance
withtheideahasreality.”151 Theworld-spiritseemstohavebeenatworkwithespecialcunning, whenHegel,asiftocrownhisedifyingsermon,toborrowawordfromArnoldSchönberg,apes Heidegger in advance: “For reason is the perception of the divine work.”152 Theomnipotent thought must abdicate and make itself available to experience as mere perception. Hegel mobilizes Greek conceptions this side of the experience of individuality, inordertogildthe heteronomy of the substantial generality. In such passages he leaps overtheentire historical dialecticandunhesitatinglyproclaimstheantiqueformofmorality,whichwasitselffirstthatof theofficialGreekphilosophyandthenthatoftheGermanhighschools,asthetrueone:“Forthe moralityofthestateisnotthemoralistic,reflectedone,whereinone’sownconvictionprevails; thisismoreaccessibletothemodernworld,whilethetrueandantiqueonehasitsrootstherein, that everyone does their duty.”153 The objective Spirit takes its revenge on Hegel. As the guest-speakeroftheSpartanoneheanticipatesthejargonofauthenticitybyahundredyearswith the expression “does their duty”. He debases himself by offering decorative remarks to the victims, withouttouchingonthesubstantiality ofthecondition, whosevictims theyare.What hauntshissuperiordeclarationslikeaghost,wasalreadypettycashinthebourgeoistreasure-box ofSchiller.IntheSongoftheBell,thislatterhasthefamilyfather,hisworldlygoodsburnedto cinders,notonlyreachforthewalking-stick, whichismerely thebeggar’sstick,butcompels himmoreovertodosojoyfully;onbehalfofthenation,whichwouldotherwisebeunworthy,he imposesthejoyousdedicationofitsutmosttoitshonor.Theterrorofgoodcheerinnervatesthe contrainte sociale [French:socialduress].Suchexaggeration isnopoeticluxury;theidealistic social pedagogue must do something extra, because without the additional and irrational accomplishment of identification, the fact that the generality robs the particular of what it promisesitwouldbecomealltooflagrant.Hegelassociatesthepowerofthegeneralitywiththe aesthetic-formal concept of greatness: “The great ones of a people are those,whodirect the people according tothegeneral Spirit.Individualities thusdisappearforusandcountonlyas those, who carry through that which the popular spirit wills.”154 The disappearance of individualities, decreed off-the-cuff,somethingnegative whichphilosophygivesitselftoknow assomethingpositive,withoutreallychangingit,istheequivalentofthecontinuingbreak.The poweroftheworld-spiritsabotageswhatHegelinalaterpassagecelebratesintheindividuated: “that it is in line with its substance, it is thus through itself”.155 Nevertheless thedismissive formulationtouchesuponsomethingserious.Theworld-spiritwouldbe“theSpiritoftheworld, asitisexplicatedinhumanconsciousness;humanbeingsconductthemselvestowardsthislatter as individuals towards the whole,whichistheirsubstance.”156 Thisistelling thescoretothe bourgeoisintuition oftheindividuated, ofvulgarnominalism.Whatconstrainsitselftowhatis immediately certain and substantial, thereby becomes precisely the agent of the generality; individuality, into adeceptive conception. Therein HegelchimeswithSchopenhauer; whathe had over the latter was the insight that the dialectic of individuation and the general is not exhaustedbytheabstract negation ofwhatisindividual. Theobjection remains,however,not only against Schopenhauer but against Hegel himself, that the individuated, necessary appearanceoftheessenceoftheobjectivetendency,isjustifiedinoncemoreturningagainstthis,
151Hegel,ReasoninHistory,ibid pg77
152Ibid pg78
153Ibid.pg115.
154Ibid.pg60.
155Ibid.pg95.
156Ibid.pg60.
to the extent it confronts such with its externality and fallibility. This is implied in Hegel’s doctrineofthesubstantialityoftheindividuated“throughitself”.Butinsteadofdevelopingit,he remains frozen in an abstract opposition of the generality and particular, which ought to be unbearableaccordingtohisownmethod.*42*
Hegel’sPartisanshipfortheUniversal320-322
Whatstandsagainstsuchadivisionofwhatissubstantiveandindividualitynolessthanagainst the biased immediate consciousness, is the insight of Hegelian logic into the unity of the particularandthegeneral,whichattimescountsforhimasidentity:“Theparticularityhowever isasuniversalityinandforitself,notsuchanimmanentrelationbytransition;itisthetotalityin itself,andsimpledeterminacy,essentiallyprinciple.Ithasnootherdeterminacythanthatwhich ispositedbymeansofthegeneralityitself,andresultsinthefollowingfashionoutofthesame. The particular is the generality itself, but it is its difference from or relation toanother,its outwards appearance [Scheinen]; it is however not extant as anything other, from whichthe particular wouldbedifferentiated, thanthegenerality itself.–Thegeneralitydeterminesitself, thusitisitselftheparticular; thedeterminacy isadistinction;itisonlydistinctfromitself.”157 Theparticularwouldaccordinglybeimmediatelythegenerality,becauseitfindseachandevery determinationofitsspeciality[Sonderheit]solelythroughthegenerality;withoutthis,concludes Hegel, according to an always recurring mode, theparticular wouldbenothing.Themodern history of theSpirit,andnotonlyit,wastheapologetic laborofSisyphus,tothinkawaythe negative of the generality out of existence. In Kant the Spirit still recalls itinoppositionto necessity:hesoughttodelimitthislattertonature.InHegelthecritiqueofwhatisnecessaryis spirited away “The consciousness of the Spirit must form in the world; the material ofthis realization,itssoil[Boden]isnothingotherthanthegeneralconsciousness,theconsciousnessof a people. Thisconsciousness containsandbymeansofitdirectsallendsandinterests ofthe people; thisconsciousness makesupthelawsofthepeople,morals,religion,etc.Itiswhatis substantialoftheSpiritofapeople,evenwhentheindividualsdonotknowit,butascertainitas a prerequisite. It is like a necessity; the individuated is raised in this atmosphere, knowing nothingelse.Yethoweveritisnotmereeducationandtheconsequenceofeducation;butrather this consciousness is itself developed out of the individuated itself, not taught to it: the individuated isinthissubstance.”158 TheHegelian formulation “itislikeanecessity” isquite fittingtotheprimacyofthegenerality;the“like”,byhintingatthemerelymetaphoricalessence ofsuchanecessity,fleetinglyhighlightswhatismerelyapparent[Scheinhafte]inwhatisrealest ofall.Anydoubtsastowhethernecessityisgoodarepromptlystrickendownbytheassertion, repeatedoverhillanddale,thatexactlynecessitywouldbefreedom.Theindividuated,asHegel puts it, “is in this substance”, thatuniversality,whichtohimstillcoincided withthepopular spirits.Butitspositivityisitselfnegativeandbecomesallthemoreso,themorepositiveitends up becoming; the One so much the worse, the stronger its grip over the Many.Itspraiseis offeredbythevictor,whoevenasoneoftheSpiritcannotdispensewiththevictoryprocession, withtheostentation,thatwhatisincessantlyinflictedonthemanywouldbethemeaningofthe world.“Itistheparticular,whichstrugglesmightilyagainsteachother,andapartofwhichgoes topieces.Butprecisely inthestruggle,inthedownfalloftheparticular,thegeneralityresults.
157Hegel,WW5,ibid.pg43.
158Hegel,ReasoninHistory,ibid.pg59.
Thisisnotdisturbed.”159 Tothisdayithasnotbeendisturbed.Nevertheless,followingHegel,the generalitytoowouldnotbewithoutthatparticular,whichitdetermines;assomethingdetached. Hegel’slogic,alsoforhimanaprioridoctrine ofgeneral structures,iscapableofdefinitively identifying thegeneral andthenotdeterminedparticular,ofequatingthemediatednessofboth polesofcognition,onlybynotdealingatallwiththeparticularaswhatisparticular,butmerely withtheparticularity,itselfalreadysomethingconceptual.160 Theprimacyofthegeneralitythus established deliversthefundament totheHegelian optionforthesocialoneandpoliticalone. ThismuchistobeconcededtoHegel,thattothinknotmerelytheparticularitybuttheparticular itself would be impossible without the moment of the generality, which distinguishes the particular,stampsit,inacertain senseonlytherebymakestheparticular.Butthefactthatone moment dialectically requirestheother,contradictoryoneopposedtoit,reduces,asHegelwell knewbutoccasionallypreferstoforget,neithertheformernorthelattertomêou[Greek:whatis not the case]. Otherwise the absolute, ontological validity of the logic of pure non-contradictoriness is stipulated, which the dialectical demonstration of “moments” had broken through; ultimately the position of an absolute first – of the concept – to which the factum issupposedtobesecondary,becauseaccording toidealistictraditionit“follows”from the concept. While nothing about the particular can be predicated without determinacy and therebywithouttheuniversality,themomentofsomethingparticular,somethingopaque,which thatpredicationreferstoandisbasedon,doesnotperishtherein.Itpreservesitselfinthemidst of the constellation, otherwise the dialectic would be tantamount to the hypostasis of the mediation, without preserving the moments of the immediacy, as Hegel judiciously wished elsewhere.
RelapseintoPlatonism322-324
TheimmanentcritiqueofdialecticsexplodesHegelianidealism.Cognitionaimsattheparticular, notthegenerality Itseeksitstrueobjectinthepossibledeterminationofthedifferenceofthat particular,evenfromthatgenerality,whichitcritiquesassomethingnonethelessinalienable.If however the mediation of thegeneral throughtheparticular andoftheparticular throughthe general issimplyreducedtotheabstract normalformofmediation pureandsimple,thenthe particularhastopayforthis,allthewaytoitsauthoritariandismissalinthematerialpartsofthe Hegeliansystem:“Whatthehumanbeingoughttodo,whatitsdutiesare,whichithastofulfill, inordertobevirtuous,iseasytosayinamoralcommunity–itistodonothingelse,thanwhatis indicated,expressedandknownbyitsrelationships.Theuprightnessisthegenerality,whichcan be demanded of it part by law, partly morally. It can easily appear however for the moral standpointassomethingsubordinate,beyondwhichoneoughttodemandyetmoreofoneself andothers;fortheurgetobesomethingparticular,isnotsatisfiedwiththatwhichisexistentin and for itself and general; only in an exception does it find the consciousness of the peculiarity.”
bytheindividualphilosopher.Thedialecticoftheparticularheenvisionsisnottobecarriedout idealistically.Because,contrarytotheKantianchorismos,philosophydoesnotarrangeitselfasa doctrineofformsinthegenerality,butissupposedtopenetratethecontentitself,philosophysets upthereality inamagnificently catastrophic petitio principii [Latin: beggingthequestion],in suchamannerthatthelatter fitstherepressive identity withtheformer.Whatismosttruein Hegel, the consciousness of the particular, without whose weight the concept of reality degenerates into farce, gives rise to that which is most false, abolishes theparticular,which Hegel’sphilosophygropesfor.Themoreinsistentlyitsconceptstrivesforthereality,themore delusively doeshecontaminate thislatter,thehicetnunc[Latin:hereandnow]tobecracked openlikethegoldennutsatachildren’sparty,withtheconceptunderwhichitissubsumed.“Itis precisely this position of philosophy to reality, which concerns the misunderstandings, andI returnherewithtowhatIpreviouslynoted,thatphilosophy,becauseitisthefathomingofwhatis rational, isexactly therebythecomprehensionofwhatispresentandreal,nottheraisingupof somethingbeyond,whichissupposedtobeGodknowswhere–orofwhichoneknowsinfact quite enough to say where it is, namely in the error of a one-sided, empty reasonalizing [Raisonnirens]… If the reflection, the feeling or whatever form the subjective consciousness wouldhave,seesthepresentassomethinginvain,isbeyonditandknowsbetter,thenitendsup aswhatisinvain,andbecauseithasitsreality onlyinthepresent,itisitselfonlyvanity.If conversely what counts for the idea, which isonlyanidea,aconception inanopinion,then philosophypreservestheinsightagainstthis,thatnothingisrealexcepttheidea.Itisaquestion of recognizing the substance, which is immanent, and the eternal, which is present, in the appearance [Scheine] of what is temporal and transitional.”162*43* So Platonically is the dialectician forcedtospeak.Hedoesnotwishtoacknowledge thatlogically aswellasinthe philosophyofhistorythegeneralitycontractsintotheparticular,untilthistearsitselffreefrom theabstract generality,whichhasbecomeexternaltoit,whilecorrelativetothis,thegenerality which he vindicates as the higher objectivity sinks down to what is badly subjective, tothe average value of the particularities. He who hadintended thetransition oflogicintotime, is resignedtotimelesslogic.
DetemporalizationofTime324-328
Thesimpledichotomy ofthetemporal andtheeternalamidstandinspiteoftheconceptionof thedialecticinHegelconformstotheprimacyofthegeneralityinthephilosophyofhistory.Just astheuniversalconcept,thefruitofabstraction,seemstobebeyondtime,andthelosssuffered bywhatissubsumedthroughtheprocessofabstractionisbookedintheledgerasanetgainand asapromissorynoteoneternity,sodotheallegedlysupratemporalmomentsofhistorybecome positiva[Latin:positivethings].Butwhatishiddeninthemisthesameoldill.Theagreement, thatitwouldalwaysremainso,discreditsthethoughtwhichprotestsagainstthisasephemeral. SucharecoilintotimelessnessisnotextraneoustotheHegeliandialecticandthephilosophyof history. By extending itself over time, his version ofdialectics becomesontologized, turning from a subjective form into a structure of being pure and simple, itself something eternal. Hegel’s speculations, which equate the absolute idea of the totality to the transience of everythingfinite,arefoundedonsuch.Hisattempttodeducetime,asitwere,andtoeternalizeit assomethingwhichdoesnottolerateanythingoutsideitself,isappropriatetothisconceptionjust
162Ibid.pg32.
asmuchastoabsoluteidealism, whichcansolittle resignitselftotheseparationoftimeand logicthanKantcouldtothatoftheintuitionandunderstanding.InthisHegel,thecriticofKant, wasincidentally alsohisexecutor.Ifthelatterapriorizedtime,asapureformofintuitionand thecondition ofeverything temporal, thisisforitspartraisedabovetime.*44*Subjectiveand objectiveidealismtherebycometoaccord.Forthefundamentofbothisthesubjectasconcept, excluding itstemporal content. Oncemoretheactuspurus[Latin: pureact],asinAristoteles, becomeswhatdoesnotmove.Thesocialpartisanshipoftheidealistsreachesallthewayintothe constituentsoftheirsystems.Theyglorifytimeasnon-temporal,historyaseternaloutofthefear thatitwouldbegin.ThedialecticoftimeandthetemporalconsequentlyturnsforHegelintoone ofanessenceoftimeinitself.*45*Itofferspositivismafavoritepointofattack.Infactitwould bebadlyscholastic, ifdialectics wereascribedtotheformalconcept oftime, purgedofevery temporalcontent.Thecriticalreflectiononthishoweverdialectizestimeastheunityofformand content, mediated initself.ThetranscendentalaestheticofKantwouldhavenothingtocounter theobjection, thatthepurelyformalcharacteroftimeasa“formofintuition”,its“emptiness”, would itself correspond to nointuition, howeverstylized. Kantiantime rejects everypossible conception and imagination: in order to conceive it, something temporal must always be co-conceived along with it, on which it can beread,asomething,onwhichitscourseorits so-called flow becomes experienceable. The conception of pure time requires precisely the conceptualmediation–theabstractionfromallthinkableconceptionsoftime–whichKant,for thesakeofthesystematic,ofthedisjunctionofsensualityandunderstanding,wishedandhadto dispensefromtheformsofintuition. Absolutetime assuch,divestedofitslattermostfactical substrate,whichisinitandproceedsinit,wouldnolongerbewhataccordingtoKanttimemust inalienably be:dynamic. Nodynamicswithoutwhatittakesplace in.Conversely howeverno facticity istobeconceived, whichwouldnotpossessitspositional valueinthecontinuum of time. Dialectics carriesthisreciprocity intoeventhemostformalrealm:noneofthemoments essentialtherein,andopposedtoeachother,iswithouttheother Itismotivatedmeanwhilenot bythepureforminitself,inwhichitunveilsitself.Arelationshipofformandcontenthasitself becomeform.Itistheinalienableformofcontent;theuttermostsublimationoftheform-content dualismintheseveredandabsolutized subjectivity.Themoment oftruthinHegel’stheoryof timecouldstillbeextracted,insofarasonedoesnotpermitthelogicoftimetoproduceitselfout of itself,ashedoes,butratherpreservesitinthelogicofcongealed time-relations, asitwas indicatedvariouslyintheCritiqueofPureReason,especiallyintheschematismchapter,though crypticallyenough.ThediscursiveLogicsimilarlypreservesmomentsoftime–unmistakablyin the conclusions – as detemporalized, rendered illusory, by meansoftheirobjectification into pure nomothetism, performed by subjective thinking.Withoutsuchdetemporalization oftime these latter would in turn never have been objectified. As the cognition of a moment, the interpretation ofthecontext betweenlogicandtimethroughtherecoursetowhat,accordingto the current, positivistic doctrine of science, is pre-logical inlogic,wouldbecompatible with Hegel.Forwhathecallsthesynthesis,isnotsimplytheutterlynewquality,whichleapsoutfrom thedeterminatenegation,butratherthereturnofwhatisnegated;dialecticalprogressconstantly also the recourse to what fell victim totheprogressingconcept: itsadvancing concretion, its self-correction.Thetransitionoflogicintotimewouldlike,insofarastheconsciousnessisable, torendercompensationtothislatter,forwhatlogichasdonetoit,withoutwhichhowevertime wouldnotbe.UnderthisaspecttheBergsoniandoublingoftheconceptoftimeisapieceofits ownunconsciousdialectic.Hesoughttotheoreticallyreconstructthelivingexperienceoftimein theconcept ofthetempsdurée[French:livedduration],ofthelivedduration,andtherebyits
substantive moment, which had fallen victim to the abstraction of philosophy and to the causal-mechanical natural sciences. Nevertheless he did notreachthedialectical concept any morethanthislatter,morepositivistically thanhispolemic knew;heabsolutized thedynamic moment,outofdégoût[French:disgust]forthedawningreificationofconsciousness,madeitfor its part into a form of consciousness, as it were, into a particular and privileged mode of cognition,reifyingit,ifyouwill,intoabranch.Isolated,thesubjectiveexperienceoftimealong withitscontentbecomesasaccidentalandmediatedasitssubject,andforthatreason,inviewof thechronometric one,alwaysatthesametime “wrong”.Toexplain this,thetrivialitysuffices thatthesubjective experiencesoftime,measuredbytheclock,aresubjecttoillusion,although noclock-timewouldbewithoutthesubjectiveexperienceoftime,whichisconcretizedbythis. ThecrassdichotomyofbothtimesinBergsonregistershoweverthehistoricalonebetweenthe livingexperienceandtheconcretizedandrepetitivelabor-processes:hisfragiledoctrineoftime is an early precipitation of the objective social crisis of temporal consciousness. The irreconcilabilityoftempsdurée[French:livedduration]andtempsespace[French:chronometric time]isthewoundofthatsplitconsciousness,whichisanysortofunityonlythroughdivision. Thiscannomorebemasteredbythenaturalisticinterpretationofthetempsespacethanbythe hypostasisofthetempsdurée,inwhichthesubject,shrinkingawayfromreification,hopesin vaintoconserveitselfbysimplybeingalive. Infactthelaughter,inwhichlifeissupposedto reestablish itselfaccording toBergsonincontrasttoitsconventionalhardening,haslongsince become the weapon of convention against the uncomprehended life, against the traces of somethingnaturalwhichisnotcompletelydomesticated.
InterruptionoftheDialecticinHegel328-331
TheHegeliantranspositionoftheparticularintotheparticularityfollowsthepraxisofasociety, whichtoleratestheparticularmerelyasacategory,astheformofthesupremacyofthegeneral. Marxdesignated thisstateofaffairs[Sachverhalt]inamannerwhichHegelcouldnotforesee: “Thedissolutionofallproductsandactivitiesintoexchange-valuespresupposesthedissolution ofallsolidified personal(historical) relationshipsofdependencyinproduction,asmuchasthe all-round dependency of the producers on each other. The production of every individual is dependentontheproductionofallothers;asmuchas(also)thetransformationofone’sproducts intofoodhasbecomedependentontheconsumptionofallothers…Thisreciprocaldependency is expressed in the constant necessity of exchange and in exchange-value as an all-round mediator.Theeconomistsexpressthisasfollows:eachpursuestheirprivateinterest;andserves thereby,withoutwillingorknowingit,theprivateinterestsofallothers,thegeneralinterest.The jokeisnotthatinsofaraseachpursuestheirprivateinterests,theentiretyoftheprivateinterests, hence the general interest is achieved. Rather it could also be concluded from this abstract phrase, that each reciprocally stymies the enforcement of the interest of the others, andthat instead of a general affirmation, rather a general negation results from this bellum omnium contra omnes [Latin: war of all against all]. The point however lies therein, thattheprivate interest isitselfalready asocially determined interest andcanbeaccomplishedonlyunderthe conditionspositedbythesocietyandthemeansgivenbyit;henceistiedtothereproductionof these conditions and means. It istheinterest oftheprivate; butitscontent, likeitsformand means of realization, are given by means of social conditions independent of all.”
negative primacy oftheconcept shedslightonwhyHegel,itsapologist,andMarx,itscritic, converge in the conception that what the former named the world-spirit, possesses a preponderanceofbeing-in-itselfandwouldnotmerely,astoHegelalonewouldbefitting,have itsobjective substance inindividuals: “Theindividuals aresubsumedundersocialproduction, whichexistsasadoomoutsideofthem;butsocialproductionisnotsubsumedunderindividuals, whooperate itastheircapacity incommon.”164 TherealchorismoscompelsHegel,againsthis will, to remodel the thesis of the reality of the idea.Withoutthetheoryconceding such,the philosophyoflawcontainsunmistakablesentencesaboutthis:“Intheideaofthestateonemust notlooktospecificstates,norparticularinstitutions,onemustratherconsidertheidea,thisreal God,foritself.Everystate,eventhoughonemayfinditbadaccordingtotheprincipleswhich onehas,cognizing thisorthatdefectinit,alwayshastheessentialmomentsofitsexistencein itself,whenitnamelybelongstothedevelopedonesofitstime.Becausehoweveritiseasierto find faults, thattocomprehend theaffirmative, onefallseasilyintothemistake, offorgetting particularsidesoftheinternalorganismofthestate.”165 Ifonemust“considertheideaforitself”, and not “particular states”, and indeed in principle, obeying an extensive structure, then the contradictionbetweentheideaandrealityrisesuponcemore,whichthetenoroftheentirework is to dispute away. The ominous sentence, that it would be easier to find faults than to comprehendtheaffirmative,isinlinewiththis;todaythishasturnedintothecryforconstructive (read: self-abasing) critique. Because the identity of the idea and reality isdeniedbythis,it requiresadevotionalspecialeffortofreason,asitwere,inordertoneverthelessreassureitselfof that identity; the “affirmative”, the demonstration of positively achieved reconciliation, is postulated,praisedasthesuperiorachievementoftheconsciousness,becausetheHegelianpure onlooker does notsufficeforsuchanaffirmation. Thepressureexerted bytheaffirmation on what strives againstit,whatisreal,untiringly reinforcesthatrealone,whichtheuniversality perpetrates onthesubjectasitsnegation. Bothyawnallthemorevisiblyfromeachother,the moreconcretelythesubjectisconfrontedwiththethesisoftheobjectivesubstantialityofwhatis moral.InHegel’slaterconceptionofeducationthisisstilldescribedassomethingmerelyhostile tothesubject:“Educationisthusinitsabsolutedeterminationtheemancipationandthelaborof higheremancipation,namelytheabsolutepointofpassagetoinfinitesubjectivesubstantialityof morality, which isnolongerimmediate, natural butintellectual, equally raisedtotheformof universality.–Thisemancipationisthehardlaborinthesubjectagainstthemeresubjectivityof conduct, against the immediacy of the desires, as well as against the subjective vanity of sensationandtherandomcaprice.Thatitisthishardlabor,comprisespartofthedisfavor,which fallsuponit.Itisthroughthislaborofeducationhowever,thatthesubjectivewillitselfwinsthe objectivity,bywhichaloneitforitspartissolelyworthyandcapableofbeingtherealityofthe idea.”166 ThisglossesovertheGreekschool-wisdomomêdareis[Greek:omêdareisanthropos ou paideutai, “the person who does not get thrashed does not get educated”, a line from Menander],whichGoethe,towhomitdidnotfitatall,didnotdisdainastheHegelian-minded mottoofhisautobiography.Howeverbytrumpetingthetruthoveridentity,whichitwouldlike to first introduce, the classicist maxim confesses its own untruth, that of the pedagogy of beatings in the most literal sense and in the metaphorical one that of the unimpeachable command,tostayinline.Asimmanentlyuntrueitisofnousetotheend,whichisentrustedto it;psychology,trivialized bygreatphilosophy,knowsmoreaboutthisthanthelatter.Brutality
164Ibid.pg76.
165Hegel,WW7,ibid.pg336.
166Ibid.pg268.
againsthumanbeingsreproducesitselfinthem;thosewhoaremaltreatedarenoteducatedbut blocked up, rebarbarized. The insightofpsychoanalysis, thatthecivilized mechanisms ofthe repression transformthelibidointoanti-civilized aggression,isnottobeextinguished. Those who are raised with violence canalize their own aggression, by identifying withviolence, in order to carryitfurtherandbereleased ofit;thusarethesubjectandobject really identified accordingtotheidealofeducationofHegel’sphilosophyoflaw.Culture,whichisnothingofthe sort,doesnotwishforitsownpartthatthosewhoendupinitsmillbecultivated.Hegelappeals, in one of the most famous passages of the Philosophy of Law, to the line attributed to Pythagoras,thatthebestwaytomorallyeducateason,wouldbetomakehimacitizenofastate ofgoodlaws.167 Thisdemandsajudgement,astowhetherthestateitselfanditslawsareinfact good.InHegelhoweverthesocialorderisjustthatapriori,withouthavingtotakeresponsibility forthosewholiveunderit.HissubsequentreminiscenceofAristotelesironicallybearsout,that the “substantial unity is the absolute, motionless endinitself”;168 motionless, itstandsinthe dialectic, whichissupposedtoproduceit.Thecommentthatinthestate“freedomcomestoits highest right”169 is thereby devalued into empty assertion; Hegel degenerates into that washed-outsublimity,whichhestilldetested inthePhenomenology.Herepeatsatoposofthe thinking of antiquity, from thestagewhenthevictorious,Platonic-Aristotelian mainstream of philosophy solidarized with the institutions againsttheirgroundinthesocialprocess;byand large humanity discovered society later than the state, which, mediated initself,appeared as givenandimmediate tothedominated. Hegel’ssentence,“Everything,whichthehumanbeing is,itowestothestate”,170 themoststrikingexaggeration,smugglestheancientconfusionalong with it. What impelled him to the thesis, is that it would be impossible to predicate that “motionlessness”whichheascribestothegeneralend,indeedoftheinstitutionwhichhasonce hardened,outoftheessentiallydynamicsociety Thedialecticianstrengthenstheprerogativeof thestate,ofbeingexemptfromdialectics,because--somethingoverwhichhedidnotdeceive himself--thislatter drivesbeyondbourgeoissociety171 Hedidnotentrusttothedialecticthe powertohealitself,anddisavowshisassuranceofthedialecticallyself-producingidentity
RoleofthePopularSpirit331-333
Thatthemetaphysicsofthereconciliationofthegeneralandparticularfailedintheconstruction ofreality,asthephilosophiesoflawandhistory,couldnothaveremainedhiddenfromHegel’s systematic need.Helaboredmightily forthesakeofthemediation.Hiscategoryofmediation, the popular spirit, reaches into empirical history. To the individual subjects it would be the concreteformofthegenerality,butthe“determinatepopularspirit”wouldbeforitspart“merely somethingindividuated[einIndividuum]inthecourseofworld-history”,172 anindividuationofa higherdegree,yetindependentassuch.Preciselythethesisofthisindependenceofthepopular spirits legalizes the violent domination overindividual humanbeingsinHegel,similar tothe
collective norms in Durkheim and the soul of each culture in Spengler, later on. The more splendidly a generality is outfitted with the insignia of the collective subject, the more completelythesubjectsdisappearthereinwithoutatrace.Thatcategoryofmediationmeanwhile, whichbythewayisnotexplicitly called themediation, butonlyfulfillsitsfunction,remains behind Hegel’sownconcept ofmediation. Itdoesnotprevail inthethingitself,certainly not immanently initsOther,butfunctionsasabridge-concept,ahypostasizedaveragebetweenthe world-spiritandtheindividuals.Hegelinterpretsthetransienceofthepopularspirits,analogous tothatoftheindividuals,asthetruelifeofthegenerality.Intruthhoweverthecategoriesofthe peopleandofthepopularspiritarethemselves transient,notjusttheirspecificmanifestations. Eventotheextentthattoday’snewlyappearingpopularspiritsaresupposedtocarryfurtherthe burning torchesoftheHegelian world-spirit, theythreaten toreproducethelifeofthehuman species at a lowerlevel. InviewoftheKantiangenerality ofhisperiod,ofvisiblehumanity, Hegel’sdoctrineofthepopularspiritwasalreadyreactionary,cultivatedsomethingalreadyseen through as particular. Without hesitation he participates with the emphatic category of the popular spirit in the same nationalism, whose funestes [Latin: fatal, sinister] overtones he diagnosed in the young frat-house [burschenschaftlichen: traditional German fraternities] agitators. His concept of the nation, the bearer of the world-spirit in monotonous variation, revealsitselftobeoneofinvariants, withwhichthedialecticalwork,paradoxicallyandyetin accordancewithitsoneaspect,overflows.IntheundialecticalconstantsinHegel,whichpunish thedialectic asalieandyetwithoutwhichnodialectics wouldbe,thereissomuchtruth,as historytakesitscourseasmonotony,asthebadinfinityofguiltandatonement,whichHegel’s star witness Heraclitus already cognized and ontologically exalted in archaic times. But the nation–theterminusasmuchasthething–isofarecent date.Afterthefalloffeudalism,a precariously centralized organizational form was supposed to restrain the diffuse natural associations for the protection of thebourgeoisinterest. Ithadtobecome afetish,becauseit could not have otherwise integrated human beings, who economically needed that form of organization, just as much as it does them incessant violence. Where the unification of the nation,thepreconditionofaself-emancipatedbourgeoissociety,failed,inGermany,itsconcept became overvalued and destructive. Inordertoseizethegentes[Latin: country],itmobilizes additionalregressiverecollectionsofthearchaictribe.Asanevilferment,theyaresuitedtohold downtheindividuated,equallysomethinglate-developedandfragile,whereitsconflictwiththe universality isabouttorecoilintoitsrationalcritique:theirrationalityoftheendsofbourgeois societycouldscarcelyotherwisehavebeenstabilizedthanwitheffectivelyirrationalmeans.The specificGermansituationoftheimmediatepost-NapoleoniceramayhavedeceivedHegelabout howanachronistic thedoctrine ofthepopularspiritwascomparedwithhisownconceptofthe Spirit, outofwhoseprogresstheprogressivesublimation, theemancipation fromrudimentary natural-rootedness is nottobeexpelled. Inhimthedoctrine ofthepopularspiritwasalready false consciousness; ideology, though provoked by the need of the administrative unity of Germany.Masked,coupledastheparticularitywithwhatisnowexistent,thepopularspiritsare proof against that reason, whose memory is nevertheless preserved intheuniversality ofthe Spirit.AfterthetractoneternalpeacetheHegelianeulogyofwarcan nolongerhidebehindthe naiveteofinsufficienthistoricalexperience.Whathepraisedassubstantialinthepopularspirits, themores,wereeventhenalreadyhopelesslydepravedintothosearchaiccustoms,whichwere dugupintheepochofthedictatorships,inordertoofficiallypropagatethedisempowermentof theindividualsbythehistoricaltrend.ThemerefactthatHegelmustspeakofthepopularspirits in the plural, already betraystheobsolescence oftheiralleged substantiality.Itisnegated, as
soon as a plurality of popular spirits is spoken of, or an internationale of the nations is envisioned.AfterFascismitresurfaced.
PopularSpiritObsolete333-335
ThroughitsnationalparticularizationtheHegelianSpiritnolongerincludesthesortofmaterial basis in itself, which itwouldliketoclaim allthesameasthetotality.Intheconcept ofthe popular spirit, an epiphenomenon, collective consciousness, a stage of socialorganization, is opposedtotherealprocessofproductionandreproductionofthesocietyassomethingessential. Thatthespiritofapeopleistoberealized,thatitwouldbe“madeintoanextantworld”,says Hegel,“isfeltbyeverypeople.”173 Todayhardlyso,andwherepeoplesaremadetofeelso,then forill.Thepredicatesofthat“extentworld”:“religion,cults,morals,customs,art,constitution, political laws, the entire extent of its institutions, its occurrences andacts”174 havelostwhat countedforHegelastheirsubstantiality,alongwiththeirself-evidentcharacter.Hisinjunction, that the individuals would have “to form themselves, to make themselves according to” the “substantialbeing”oftheirpeople,175 isdespotic;itwasalreadyinhisdayincompatiblewiththe meanwhile equally obsoleteShakespearian hypothesis,asitwere,thatthehistoricalgenerality would realize itself through the sufferings and interests oftheindividuals, whileitismerely drilled into them, as the healthy popularsentiment ofthosewhoarecaughtinitsmachinery. Hegel’s thesis, that noone could “leap beyondthespiritof[their]people,anymorethanone couldleapbeyondtheearth”,176 isintheepochoftelluricconflictsandthepotentialofatelluric arrangementoftheworldutterlyprovincial.InfewotherplacesdoesHegelpaysodearatollto history,aswherehethinkshistory Neverthelesshealsothoughttothepoint,wherethepopular spirits he hypostasized were for their part so relativized inthephilosophyofhistory,thathe mighthaveconsidereditpossiblefortheworld-spirittoonedayescapefromthepopularspirits, andclear aspaceforcosmopolitanism. “Everysinglenewpopularspiritisanewstageinthe conquestoftheworld-spirit,towardsthewinningofitsconsciousness,itsfreedom.Thedeathof apopularspiritisthetransitionintolife,andindeednotasinnature,wherethedeathofonecalls a similar one into existence. Rather the world-spirit strides forwards from the humble determination to higher principles, concepts of itself, to more developed portrayals [Darstellungen]ofitsidea.”177 Accordinglytheideaofaworld-spirittobe“conquered”,realized throughthedownfalloftheself-realizing popularspiritsandtranscending them,wouldinany casebeopen.Onlynoprogressofworld-historybyvirtueofitstransitionfromnationtonation istobetrustedanymoreinaphase,inwhichthevictornolongerendsupatthathigherstage, which was probably only attested to it, because it was the victor. Thereby however the consolationofthedownfallofpeoplescomestoresemblethecyclicaltheoriesdowntoSpengler. The philosophical decree concerning the germination [Werden] and extinction [Vergehen] of entire peoples or cultures drowns outthefactthatwhatisirrational andincomprehensible in historybecame self-evident, becauseitwasneveranydifferent;robbingthetalkofprogressof itscontent. Inspiteofthewell-knowndefinitionofhistory,Hegeldidnotworkoutanysortof theoryofprogress.TheHegelianmigrationoftheworld-spiritfromonepopularspirittoanother
173Ibid pg67
174Ibid.
175Ibid.
176Ibid.pg95.
177Ibid.pg73.
is the migration of peoples puffed up into metaphysics; this latter indeed, something which sweeps over human beings, is the prototype of world history itself, whose Augustinian conceptionfellintheeraofthemigrationofpeoples.Theunityofworldhistory,whichanimates philosophytotraceitoutasthepathoftheworld-spirit,istheunityofwhatrollsover,ofhorror, theimmediate antagonism. Concretely Hegeldidnotgobeyondnationsexceptinthenameof their unforeseeably repeated annihilation. The Ring of the Schopenhauerian Wagner is more HegelianthanWagnereverknew.
IndividualityandHistory335-337
What Hegel hypertrophically assigned the popular spirits, as collective individualities, is extracted fromindividuality,fromthehumanindividualbeing.Complementarily,itisplacedin Hegelatoncebothtoohighandtoolow.Toohighastheideologyofthegreatmen,inwhose favorHegelrecites themaster’sjokeoftheservantandthehero.Themoreimpenetrable and alienated the power of the generality, which ends up prevailing, the fiercer the need for consciousness tomakeitcommensurable.Thatiswherethegeniusescomein,themilitaryand political onesespecially.Theyarepartofthepublicityofwhatislargethanlife-size,whichis derived from precisely that success, which for its part is supposed to be explained out of individual qualities, whichtheyforthemostpartlack.Projectionsofthepowerlesslongingof all,theyfunctionastheimagoofunleashedfreedom,boundlessproductivity,asiftheselatter werealwaysandeverywheretoberealized. Suchideological excesscontrastsinHegelwitha scarcityintheideal;hisphilosophyhasnointerest,thatindividualitywouldactuallybe.Therein thedoctrineoftheworld-spiritharmonizeswithitsowntendency Hegelsawthroughthefiction ofthehistoricalbeing-for-itselfofindividualityjustlikethatofeachunmediatedimmediacy,and casttheindividuated,bymeansoftheruseofreason,whichdatesbacktotheKantianphilosophy ofhistory,astheagentofthegenerality,somethingwhichithadservedasforcenturies.Therein hethoughtoftherelationshipoftheworld-spiritandtheindividualalongwiththeirmediationas invariant, in keeping with a consistent thought-structure, which his conception of dialectics simultaneouslyskeletizesandrevokes;hetoowasinthralltohisclass,whichmusteternalizeits dynamic categoriestowardofftheconsciousnessofthelimitsofitscontinuedexistence.What hefollowedwastheimageoftheindividuatedinindividualisticsociety.Itisadequate,because theprinciple oftheexchange societyrealized itselfonlybymeansoftheindividuation ofthe specific contracting parties; because the principium individuationis [Latin: individuating principle] was thus literally its principle, its generality. It is inadequate, because in thetotal functional context, whichrequirestheformofindividuation, individuals arerelegatedtomere executive organs of the generality. The functions of the individuated, and thereby its own composition,changehistorically.IncontrasttoHegelandhisepoch,ithasbecomeirrelevanttoa degreewhichcouldnothavebeenanticipated:theappearance[Schein]ofitsbeing-for-itselfhas dissolvedforeveryone,justasmuchasthespeculation ofHegelesoterically demolished itin advance.Exemplaryforthisispassion,themotorofindividualityforHegelaswellasBalzac.To the powerless, for whom what is achievable and not achievable is always more narrowly prescribed,itbecomesanachronistic. AlreadyHitler,whowastailoredaccordingtotheclassic bourgeoismodelofthegreatman,sotospeak,parodiedpassioninhystericalfitsoftearsand carpet-chewing. Even in the private realm passion is becoming a rarity. The well-known transformations oftheerotic modesofconductoftheyoungindicatethedecompositionofthe individuated, whichnolongersummonsupthepowerforpassion–ego-strength–norrequires
it, because the social organization which integrates it, takes care to ensure that the open resistancesareremoved,whichoncesetpassionalight,andtherebyrelocatesthecontrolsintothe individuated asoneofadjustment atanyprice.Therein ithasbynomeanslostallfunctions. Nowasbeforethesocialprocessofproductionconservestheprincipiumindividuationis[Latin: individuating principle]intheregnantprocessofexchange,theprivatedisposition,andthereby alltheevilinstincts ofwhatisbottled upinsideitsownego.Theindividuated outlivesitself. Solelyinitsremainder,however,thatwhichishistoricallycondemned,iswhatdoesnotsacrifice itselftofalseidentity.Itsfunctionisthatwhichisfunctionless;oftheSpirit,whichisnotasone withthegenerality andforthatreasonpowerlessly represents it.Onlyasthatwhichisexempt from general praxis is the individuated capable of the thought, which transformative praxis requires.Hegelsensedthepotentialofthegeneralityintheindividualized:“Theactorshavein their activity finite ends, particular interests; but they are also knowers, thinkers.”178 The methexisofeachindividuatedinthegeneralitythroughthinkingconsciousness–anditbecomes theindividuatedonlyasthatwhichthinks–alreadysurpassesthecontingencyoftheparticularin contrasttothegenerality,onwhichtheHegelian contempt forwhatisindividual justlikethe later collectivistic oneisbased.Throughexperienceandconsistencytheindividuatedbecomes capableofthetruthofthegenerality,whichthislatter,asblindself-perpetuatingpower,conceals fromitselfandothers.Accordingtotheprevailingconsensusthegeneralityissupposed,dueto its mere form as universality, to be in the right. Itself a concept, it thereby becomes non-conceptual, hostile to reflection; the first condition of resistance is that the Spirit sees throughthisandnamesit,amodestbeginningofpraxis.
Bane337-340
Nowasbefore,humanbeings,individualsubjects,standunderabane.Itisthesubjectiveformof theworld-spirit,whoseprimacyovertheexternalizedlife-processisreinforcedinternally What theycandonothingabout,andwhichnegatesthem,iswhattheythemselvesbecome.Theyno longerneedtoacquireatasteforitaswhatishigher,whichitinfactisincontrasttothem,inthe hierarchyofdegreesofuniversality.Ontheirown,apriori,asitwere,theybehaveinaccordance withwhatisinescapable. While thenominalistic principle simulatesindividualizationtothem, they act collectively. This much is true in the Hegelian insistence on the universality ofthe particular,thattheparticularintheinvertedformofpowerlessindividualization,sacrificedtothe general, is dictated bytheprinciple oftheinverted universality.TheHegelian doctrine ofthe substantiality of the general in what is individual appropriates the subjective bane; what is presented here as metaphysically worthier, owes such an aura chiefly to its impenetrability, irrationality,theoppositeoftheSpirit,whichaccordingtometaphysicsitissupposedtobe.The fundamentofunfreedom,whichinthesubjectsisbeyondeventheirpsychology,whichprolongs it,servestheantagonisticcondition,whichtodaythreatenstoannihilatethepotentialofsubjects tochangethislast.Expressionism, spontaneous,collective formsofreaction, jerkily indicated something of that bane. In themeantime thislatter became asubiquitousasthedeity,whose placeitusurped.Itisnolongerfelt,becausescarcelyanythingandscarcelyanyonewouldhave escaped it far enough to realize thedifference. Humanitycontinuestodragitselfalongasin Barlach’ssculptureandKafka’sprose,anendlesstrainofbowedfigureschainedtoeachother, who can no longer raisetheirheadsundertheburden,ofwhatis.
oppositeoftheworld-spirit accordingtothehigh-flowndoctrineofidealism,isitsincarnation, coupledtotheaccident,theformoffreedomunderthebane.*46*Whileitseemsasifitiscast overalllivingbeings,itisnonethelessprobablynotwhatSchopenhauerwouldtakeitfor,simply and purely one with the principium individuationis [Latin: individuating principle] and its stubborn self-preservation. The conduct of animals differs from that of humans through something compulsory. It may have inherited itfromtheanimal species called humanity,but becomessomethingqualitatively differentinthislatter.Andindeedprecisely bymeansofthe capacity forreflection,bywhichthebanemightbedispelledandwhichenteredintothebane’s service.Bysuchaninversionofitselfitreinforcesthisandmakesthisradicallyevil,devoidof the innocence of themerely being-so.Inhumanexperience, thebaneistheequivalent ofthe fetish-characterofthecommodity.Whatisself-madebecomestheIn-itself,outofwhichtheself cannolongerescape; inthedominating faithinfactsassuch,intheirpositiveacceptance,the subjectworshipsitsmirror-image.Thereifiedconsciousnesshasbecometotalasthebane.That itisafalseone,holdsthepromiseofthepossibility ofitssublation: thatitwouldnotremain such,thatfalseconsciousnesswouldinescapablymovebeyonditself,thatitcouldnothavethe lastword.Themorethesocietyissteeredbythetotality,whichreproducesitselfinthebaneof subjects, the deeper too its tendency towardsdissociation. Thislatter threatens thelifeofthe species,asmuchasitdeniesthebaneofthewhole,thefalseidentityofsubjectandobject.The general,whichcompressestheparticularasifbyaninstrumentoftorture,untilitsplinters,labors againstitself,becauseithasitssubstance inthelifeoftheparticular;withoutit,itsinksdown intotheabstract,separateandvoidableform.FranzNeumanndiagnosedthisintheinstitutional sphere in Behemoth: the disassembly into disconnected andwarringpower-apparatuses isthe secretofthetotalfasciststate.Anthropologycorrespondstothis,thechemismofhumanbeings. Unresistingly delivered over to the collective bad state of affairs,theyloseidentity Itisnot entirelyimprobablethatthebaneistherebytearingitselfapart.Whatwouldliketoprovisionally glossoverthetotalstructureofsocietyunderthenameofpluralism,receivesitstruthfromsuch self-announcingdisintegration;simultaneouslyfromhorrorandfromareality,inwhichthebane explodes.Freud’sCivilizationanditsDiscontentshasacontentwhichwasscarcelyavailableto him;itisnotsolelyinthepsycheofthesocializedthattheaggressivedrivesaccumulatetothe point of openly destructive pressure, but the total socialization objectively breeds its counter-force[Widerspiel],withouttothisdaybeingabletosay,whetheritisthecatastropheor the emancipation. The philosophical systems drafted an unwitting schemata of this, which equally,withincreasingunity,disqualifiedwhatisheterogenoustothem,beitnamedsensation, the not-I or what have you, all the way to that chaos, whose name Kant used for the heterogenous.Whatsomeprefertocallangst andennobleasanexistential,isclaustrophobiain theworld:intheclosedsystem.Itperpetuatesthebaneasthecoldnessbetweenhumanbeings, without which the woe could not repeat itself. Whoever is not cold, who does not make themselvescoldasperthevulgarfigureofspeechofthemurdererwhoicesthevictim,mustfeel themselves condemned. Alongwithangstanditsgrounds,thecoldness,too,mightpassaway. Angstisthenecessary formofthecurselaidintheuniversalcoldnessoverthose,whosuffer fromit.
RegressionUndertheBane340-343
Whatever thedominationoftheidentity-principletoleratesofthenon-identical,ismediatedfor its part by theidentity-compulsion, thestaleremainder,aftertheidentification hascutoutits
chunk. Under the bane, what is different and whose smallest admixture would indeed be incompatible with the former, is transformed into poison. As accidental, the un-identical remainder becomesontheotherhandinturnsoabstract, thatitfitsintothelawfulnessofthe identification. ThisisthesadtruthofwhatHegelexpoundedpositively asthedoctrine ofthe unityofaccidentandnecessity.Thesubstitutionoftraditionalcausalitythroughstatisticalrules oughttoconfirmthatconvergence.Whatisfatallyincommonhoweverbetweennecessityand accident,whichAristotelesalreadyascribedtothemerelyexistent,isfate.Ithasitsplaceinthe circle, which the dominating thinking draws around itself, as much asinwhatfallsoutand, bereft of reason, acquires an irrationality which converges with the necessity posited by the subject.Theprocessofdomination spewsouttattersofsubjugatednatureundigested.Thatthe particular wouldnotmeltawayphilosophicallyintotheuniversality,requiresthatitwouldalso notsealitselfoffinthecontrarinessoftheaccident.Whatwouldhelpthereconciliationofthe generalandtheparticularwouldbethereflectionofdifference,notitsextirpation.Thislatteris whatHegel’spathossignsitselfoverto,grantingthesolerealitytotheworld-spirit,echoofthe laughterofhellinheaven.Themythicalbanehassecularizeditselfintowhatisreal,seamlessly compartmentalized. Thereality principle,whichthecleverfollow,inordertosurvive,ensnares themlikeanevilmagic;theyarethatmuchlesscapableandwillingofshakingofftheburden, whichthemagichidesfromthem:theyconsideritaslifeitself.Metapsychologicallythetalkof regression is on the mark. Everything which is nowadays called communication, without exception, is only the noise, which drowns out the silence of those under the bane. The individual human spontaneities, meanwhile to a large extent even the allegedly oppositional ones,arecondemned topseudo-activity,potentially toidiocy Thetechniques ofbrainwashing anditsrelated procedurespractice fromwithoutanimmanent-anthropologicaltendency,which indeedforitspartismotivatedfromwithout.Thenatural-historicalnormofadjustment,towhich Hegelassentedinthebeerhallwisdom,thatonehastosowone’swildoats,is,entirelylikehis own, the schemata of the world-spirit as bane. Perhaps the most recent biology projects its experience, tabooamonghumanbeings,ontoanimals, inordertoexoneratethehumanbeings whotorturethem; theontologyofanimals imitates theage-oldandconstantlynewly-acquired animality [Vertietheit] of human beings. The world-spirit is to this extent too its own contradiction, contrarytowhatHegelwished.Theanimalizedself-preservingreasondrivesout theSpiritofthespecies,whichworshipsthelatter.ThatiswhytheHegelianmetaphysicsofthe Spiritisalreadysoclose,atallofitsstages,tohostilitytotheSpirit.Justasthemythicalpower ofwhatisnatural reproducesitselfonanexpandedscaleintheunconscioussociety,sotooare thecategoriesofconsciousness,whichitproduces,allthewaytothemostenlightened,underthe bane and turn intodelusion.Societyandtheindividuated harmonize therein asnowhereelse. With society, ideology has advanced to the point that it no longer develops into socially necessary appearance [Schein]andtherebytoindependence, howeverfragile, butonlyintoan adhesive: falseidentity ofsubjectandobject. Theindividuals,theoldsubstrateofpsychology, arethemselvesbyvirtueoftheprincipleofindividuation,bythemonotonousrestrictionofevery individual to particular interests, also equal to each other and accordingly appeal to the dominating abstract universality, as if it were theirownaffair[Sache].Thisistheirformala priori.Converselythegenerality,towhichtheybow,withoutevenfeelingit,istailoredtothem insuchamanner,appealssolittletothatwhichwouldnotbethesameasthisinthem,thatthey bind themselves freelyandeasilyandjoyfully[reference toalineinSchiller]. Contemporary ideology is nolessaholding-tank toreceive thepsychologyoftheindividuals, ineverycase already mediated by the generality, just as it unceasingly produces the generality in the
individuals anew.Baneandideologyarethesame.Whatisfatalaboutthelatteristhatitdates backtobiology.TheSpinozistseseconservare[Latin:topreserveoneself],self-preservation,is trulythelawofnatureofeverythingliving.Thetautologyofidentityisitscontent:whatshould be,iswhatalreadyisanyway,thewillturnsbackontothewilling,asthemeremeansofitselfit turnsintoanend.Thisturnisalready thatoffalseconsciousness; ifthelionhadone,thenits rageattheantelope,whichitwantstodevour,wouldbeideology.Theconceptoftheend,which isexaltedintoreasonforthesakeofconsistentself-preservation,wouldhavetoemancipateitself fromtheidolofthemirror.Theendwouldbe,whatisdifferentfromthesubjectasthemeans. This however is obscured by self-preservation; it fixes the means as ends, which do not legitimatethemselvesbeforeanysortofreason.Thegreatertheincreaseoftheproductiveforces, themoretheperpetuationoflifeasanendinitselflosesitsself-evidentcharacter.Enslavedby nature,itbecomesdubiousinitself,whilethepotential ofsomethingothermaturesinit.Life preparesitselftobecome itsmeans,asindeterminate andunknownasthisotherwouldbe.Its heteronomousarrangement howeveralwaysagaininhibitsit.Becauseself-preservationthrough the eons was always difficult and precarious, the ego-drives, its instrument, have an almost irresistible power, even afterself-preservation became virtually easythroughtechnics; greater even than the object-drives, whose specialist, Freud, mistook it for. The exertion which is superfluousaccordingtothestateoftheproductiveforcesbecomesobjectivelyirrational,hence thebaneintoreally dominatingmetaphysics.Thecurrentstageofthefetishizationofmeansas endsintechnologyindicatesthevictoryofthattendencyallthewaytoopenabsurdity:formerly rational, yetobsoletemodesofconductareconjuredupbythelogicofhistoryunchanged.Itis logicalnolonger
SubjectandTheIndividuated[Individuum]343-344
Hegelformulated idealistically: “Subjectivity isitselftheabsoluteformandtheexistingreality of substance, and the subject’s difference from it as its object, end and power is only the vanisheddifference oftheform,whichisatthesametime justasimmediate.”180 Subjectivity, whichindeedeveninHegelisthegeneralandthetotalidentity,isdeified.Therebyhoweverthe oppositeisachieved aswell,theinsightintothesubjectasaself-manifesting objectivity.The construction of the subject-object has an abyssal double character. It not only ideologically falsifies theobject inthefreeactoftheabsolutesubject,butcognizesalsointhesubjectthat which represents itself as objective and thereby restricts the subject anti-ideologically. Subjectivity astheexistent reality ofthesubstance doesindeedlayclaim topreeminence,but wouldbeasan“existing”,realized[entäussertes]subjectjustasmuchobjectivityasappearance. This however would also affect the relationship of subjectivity to concrete individuals. If objectivityisimmanenttothemandatworkinthem;ifittrulyappearsinthem,thenthesortof individuality which is related to the essence is far more substantial, than where itismerely subordinated to the essence. Hegel falls silent before suchconsistency.Hewhoattempted to liquidate Kant’s abstract concept of form, drags along nevertheless theKantianandFichtean dichotomyofthe–transcendental–subjectand–empirical–individuated.Thelackofconcrete determinacyoftheconceptofsubjectivityisexploitedtotheadvantageofthehigherobjectivity ofasubjectpurifiedofcontingency;thisfacilitatestheidentificationofthesubjectandobjectat theexpenseoftheparticular.ThereinHegelfollowstheusageoftheentiretyofidealism,atthe same time however he undermines his assertion oftheidentity offreedomandnecessity.By
180Hegel,WW7,ibid.pg234.
meansofitshypostasisasSpirit,thesubstrateoffreedom,thesubject,isdissociatedsofarfrom livingexistinghumanbeings,thatthefreedominnecessity doesnotatallbearfruitforthem. Hegel’slanguagebringsthistolight:“Inthatthestate,thefatherland,comprisesacommunityof existence,inthatthesubjectivewillofhumanbeingssubmitstothelaw,theoppositionbetween freedomandnecessitydisappears.”181 Noteventhemostartfulinterpretationcouldarguethefact away that the word submission means the opposite of freedom. Its alleged synthesis with necessitybowstothelatterandrefutesitself.
DialecticsandPsychology344-347
Hegel’sphilosophyoutlinestheperspectiveofthelossinvolvedintheriseofindividualityinthe nineteenth century until well into the twentieth: that of committalness [Verbindlichkeit], that powertowardsthegenerality,inwhichindividualitywouldfirstcometoitself.Themeanwhile evident decayofindividuality iscoupledtosuchaloss;theindividuated, whichdevelopsand differentiates itself, by separating itself from the generality more and more emphatically, threatens thereby to regress to the contingency, which Hegel reckoned against it. Only the restorative Hegelhadhimselfneglectedlogicandcoercionintheprogressofindividuation,for thebenefit ofanideal modeled onGreekmaxims,asifforeshadowingthemostdireGerman reaction ofthetwentiethcentury,justasmuchastheforceswhichfirstcometomaturityinthe disassembly ofindividuality182 Eventherein hedoesaninjusticetohisowndialectic.Thatthe generality is not anything merely thrown over individuality but would be its innervated substance, is not to be reduced to the platitude of the encompassing nature of valid human morality,butwouldneedtobetracedtothecenteroftheindividualmodeofconduct,especially in the character; in that psychology, which Hegel, as one with popular bias, accuses of a contingencywhichFreudmeanwhilerefuted.CertainlytheHegeliananti-psychologismachieves the cognition of the empirical precedence of the social generality, which Durkheim later expressedsturdilyanduntouchedbyanydialecticalreflection.183 Psychology,seeminglyopposed tothegeneral,yieldsunderpressure,allthewaytothecellsofinnervation,tothegeneral,andto this extent is a real constitutum [Latin: what is constituted].184 However the positivistic objectivism, like the dialectical one, is as short-sighted against psychology as superior to it. Because the dominating objectivity is objectively inadequate to individuals, it realizes itself solely through the individuals, psychologically. Freudian psychoanalysis does not so much weave the appearance [Schein] of individuality, as thoroughly destroy it as much as the philosophical and social concept. If the individuated shrinks according tothedoctrine ofthe unconscious down into a scanty number of repetitive constants and conflicts, the former disinterests itself indeed with contempt for humanity in the concretely developed ego,butis remindedbyitofthefrailnessofitsdeterminationsincontrasttothoseoftheidandtherebyof itsthinandephemeral essence. Thetheoryoftheegoasasummationofdefensemechanisms
andrationalizationsisaimedagainstthesamehubrisoftheself-masteringindividuated,against the individuated as ideology, demolished by more radical theories of the primacy of the objective.Whosoeverpaintstherightcondition,inordertoanswertheobjection,thattheywould not know whattheywant,cannotdisregardthatprimacy,evenoverthemselves. Eveniftheir imagination were capable of representing everything asradically different,thenitwouldstill remain chained to them and their contemporary moment as static points of reference, and everythingwouldgowrong.Eventhemostcriticalpersonwouldinastateoffreedombetotally different,justlikethosetheywishtochange.Probablyeverycitizenofthewrongworldwould findtherightoneintolerable,theywouldbetoodamagedforit.Thisoughttoimpartameasure oftolerance totheconsciousness ofintellectuals whodonotsympathizewiththeworld-spirit, amidsttheirresistance. Whoeverwillnotallowthemselvestobedeflectedfromdifferenceand critique isnonethelessnotentitledtoputthemselvesintheright.Suchamomentofindulgence wouldofcoursebedenouncedasdecadentthroughoutthewholeworld,underwhateversortof politicalsystem.Theaporiaextendseventotheteleologicalconceptofahappinessofhumanity, which would be that of individuals; the fixation of one’s own needs and one’sownlonging disfigurestheideaofahappiness,whichwouldonlyarise,whenthecategoryoftheindividual nolongersealeditselfofffromitself.Happinessisnoinvariant,solelyunhappinessiswhathas itsessenceinmonotony.Whateverhappinesstheexistenttotalityintermittentlypermitsorgrants, bearsthemarksinadvance ofitsownparticularity.185 Allhappinesstothisdaypromiseswhat neveryetwas,andthebeliefinitsimmediacygetsinthewayofitscomingtobe.Thislendsthe passagesoftheHegelian philosophyofhistorywhicharehostiletohappinessmoretruth,than was intended in their time and place: “…one names thoseashappy,whofindthemselves in harmonywiththemselves.Onecanalsohavehappinessasapointofviewintheconsiderationof history;buthistoryisnotthesoilforhappiness.Thetimesofhappinessareemptypagesinthem. Verylikelythereisinworld-historyalsosatisfaction;butthisisnotwhatiscalledhappiness:for it is the satisfaction of such ends, which stand over particular interests. Ends, which have significance inworld-history,mustbeheldfastbymeansofabstractwilling,withenergy The world-historicalindividuals,whohavepursuedsuchends,haveindeedsatisfiedthemselves,but they have not wished to be happy.”186 Certainly not, but its renunciation, to which even Zarathustra confesses,expressestheinsufficiency ofindividualhappinessincontrasttoutopia. Only the resurrection of the particularity as the general principle would be happiness, irreconcilablewithindividualhumanhappinesshereandnow.WhatisrepressiveintheHegelian position towards happiness is however not, after his own manner, to be treated from a presumably higher standpoint as a quantité négligeable [French: negligible quantity]. As insistentlyashecorrectshisownhistoricaloptimismthroughthesentence,historywouldnotbe the soil for happiness, so much does he transgress against it, by attempting toestablish that sentenceastheideabeyondhappiness.Nowhereisthelatentaestheticismofsomeone,towhom realitycannotberealenough,sostrikingashere.187 Ifthetimesofhappinessaresupposedtobe theemptypagesofhistory–bythewayadubiousassertioninviewofsomewhathappierperiods ofhumanity,suchasthoseoftheEuropeannineteenthcentury,whichneverthelessdidnotlack forhistorical dynamics–thenthemetaphor signifies, asifinabookinwhichthegreatdeeds would be recorded, an unreflective concept of world history, borrowed from conventional
education,aswhatisgrandiose.Onewhoasanobserverisintoxicatedonbattles,thetopplingof regimes and catastrophes, is silent as to whether the emancipation, which they advocate in bourgeois fashion, ought to emancipate itself from precisely that category. Marx had this in mind:hedesignatedthesphereofgreatnesswhichissetupasanobjectofconsideration,thatof politics, asideologyandastransient. Thepositionofthoughttowardshappinesswouldbethe negation ofeachandeveryfalseone.Itpostulates,instarkcontrasttotheprevailingintuition, theideaoftheobjectivityofhappiness,asitwasnegativelyconceivedinKierkegaard’sdoctrine ofobjectivedespair.
“NaturalHistory”347-351
Theobjectivity ofhistorical lifeisthatofnatural history.MarxrecognizedthatagainstHegel, andindeedstrictlyinthecontextofthegeneralitywhichrealizesitselfovertheheadsofsubjects: “Eventhoughsocietyisbecomingawareofthenaturallawofitsmotion–anditistheultimate end-goalofthiswork,torevealtheeconomiclawofmotionofmodernsociety–itcanneither leapovernaturally-proceeding[naturgemässe]developmentalphasesnordecreethemaway…I bynomeansshowtheformofcapitalistandlandlordinarosylight.Butitisaquestionhereof persons only insofar as they are the personification of economic categories, carriers of determinateclass-relationshipsandinterests.Mystandpoint,whichtreatsthedevelopmentofthe economic social formation as a natural-historical process, can less than any other make individuals responsible for relationships, whose creature theysocially remain, howevermuch they may subjectively riseabovethem.”188 Whatismeant iscertainly nottheanthropological concept ofnatureofFeuerbach,againstwhichMarxaimeddialecticalmaterialism,inthesense of a reprise of Hegel against the Left Hegelians.189 The so-called law of nature, which nevertheless wouldonlybeoneofcapitalistsociety,isthereforetermedmystificationbyMarx: “Thelawofcapitalist accumulation, mystified intoalawofnature,expressesthereforeinfact onlythatitsnatureexcludeseverysuchdecreaseinthedegreeofexploitationoflabororevery suchincreaseofthepriceoflabor,whichcouldseriouslyendangerthecontinualreproductionof the relationships of capital and its reproduction on a constantly expandedlevel. Itcannotbe otherwiseinamodeofproduction,whereinthelaboreristhereforthenecessityofvalorization ofextant values,insteadconverselyoftheobjectivewealthforthedevelopmentalneedsofthe laborer.”190 Thatlawisnature-likeduetothecharacterofitsinescapabilityunderthedominating relationshipsofproduction.Ideologydoesnoteclipsesocialbeinglikeadetachablelayer,butis inherent inthelatter.Itisgroundedintheabstraction,whichcountsasessentialfortheprocess ofexchange. Therewouldnobenoexchange withoutdisregardinglivinghumanbeings.This impliesthenecessarilysocialappearance[Schein]intherealprocessoflifetothisday.Itscoreis valueasathinginitself,as“nature”.Thenatural-rootednessofcapitalistsocietyisrealandat thesametimethatappearance[Schein].Thattheassumptionofnaturallawsisnottobetakenà lalettre[French:literally],leastofalltobeontologizedinthesenseofahoweverstylizeddraft ofso-calledhumanity,isconfirmedbythestrongestmotiveofMarxisttheoryofall,thatofthe potentialabolitionofthoselaws.Wheretherealmoffreedomhadbegun,theywouldnolonger apply. The Kantian distinction ofarealm offreedomfromoneofnecessity istransposed,by
meansofthemobilizationoftheHegelianmediatingphilosophyofhistory,ontothesequenceof phases. Only such an inversion of the Marxist motives as that of Diamat [Eastern bloc state-approved “dialectical materialism”], which prolongs the realm of necessity with the assertionthatitwouldbethatoffreedom,coulddegenerateintofalsifyingthepolemicalMarxist concept ofnaturallawfulnessfromaconstructionofnaturalhistoryintoascientificdoctrineof invariants.InthemeantimetheMarxisttalkofnaturalhistorylosesnothingofitstruth-content, namely that of its critical one. Hegelstillmadedowithapersonifiedtranscendental subject, which indeed already fell short of the subject. Marx denounces not only the Hegelian transfiguration,butthematter-at-handwhichitexperienced.Humanhistory,progressivenatural domination, continuestheunconsciousoneofnature,ofdevouringandbeingdevoured.Marx wasironicallyasocialDarwinist:whattheSocialDarwinistspraisedandwishedtoactaccording to,isforhimthenegativity,inwhichthepossibilityofitssublationawakens.Apassagefromthe OutlineofPoliticalEconomyleavesnodoubtastothecriticalessenceofhisinsightintonatural history:“Nowasmuchasthewholeofthismovementappearsasasocialprocess,andasmuch astheindividualmomentsofthismovementproceedfromtheconsciouswillandparticularends ofindividuals, somuchdoesthetotality oftheprocessappearasanobjective context, which originates naturally [naturwüchsig]; indeed proceeds out of thereciprocal effectofconscious individuals, butneither liesintheirconsciousness,norissubsumedunderthemasawhole.”191 Such a social concept of nature has its own dialectic. The natural lawfulness of society is ideology,totheextentitishypostasizedasanimmutablegivenfactofnature.Naturallawfulness isrealhoweverasalawofmotionofunconscioussociety,asitispursuedinCapitalfromthe analysis ofthecommodity formdowntothetheoryofeconomiccrisisinaphenomenologyof theanti-Spirit. Thechangesineachconstitutiveeconomicformtookplacelikethoseofanimal species,whichariseandgoextinctovermillionsofyears.The“theologicalquirks[Mucken]of the commodity” in the fetishism chapter scorn the false consciousness, which the social relationshipofexchangevaluereflectsinitselfasthecharacteristicofthingsinthemselvestothe contractingparties.Buttheyarealsoastrue,asformerlythepraxisofbloodyidolatrywasinfact practiced.Fortheconstitutiveformsofsocialization,ofwhichthatmystificationisone,maintain their unconditional supremacy over human beings, as if they were divine providence. The sentenceaboutthetheorieswhichwouldbecomearealforceiftheyseizedthemasses,isalready applicable toallthestructures, whichprecede thefalseconsciousness ofall,whichassurethe socialhegemonyofitsirrationalnimbus,ofthecharacterofthecontinuingtaboos,ofthearchaic bane,tothisday.SomethingofthisflashedinHegel:“Aboveallhoweveritissimplyessential, thattheconstitution,althoughproducedintime,isnotseenassomethingartificiallymade;forit isratherthesimplyexistent inandforitself,whichforthatreasonistobeconsideredasthe divineandenduring,andasbeyondthesphereofthatwhichismade.”192 Hegeltherebyextends theconceptofwhatwouldbethephysei[Greek:bynature],ontothatwhichformerlydefinedthe counter-concept of the thesei [Greek: thesis]. The “constitution”, the name of the historical world,whichmediatesallimmediacyofnature,determinesconverselythesphereofmediation, precisely thehistorical one,asnature.TheHegelianphraseisbasedonMontesquieu’spolemic against the old-fashioned theories of the time, alien to history, of the social contract: the state-juridical institutions were not created by any conscious act of willofthesubjects. The SpiritassecondnaturehoweveristhenegationoftheSpirit,andindeedallthemorethoroughly, themoreitsself-consciousnessdeceivesitselfaboutitsnatural-rootedness.Thisfulfillsitselfin
Hegel.Hisworld-spiritistheideologyofnaturalhistory.Henamesittheworld-spiritbyvirtue ofitspower.Dominationbecomesabsolute,projectedontobeingitself,whichwouldtherebethe Spirit.Historyhowever,theexplicationofsomething,whichitisalwayssupposedtohavebeen, acquiresthequalityofwhatisdevoidofhistory.InthemidstofhistoryHegeltakesthesideof whatisunchanging,ofmonotony,oftheidentityoftheprocess,whosetotalitywouldbehealthy. Heisthustobechargedunmetaphoricallywithhistoricalmythology.Hegarbstheasphyxiating mythos with the words Spirit and reconciliation: “What by nature is accidental, is what experiences the accidental, andjustthisfateisthusthenecessity,justastheconcept andthe philosophycausethepointofviewofthemerecontingencytodisappearandcognizesinit,as theappearance[Schein],itsessence,necessity.Itisnecessarythatwhatisfinite,thepossession andlifebepositedasaccidental,becausethisistheconceptofthefinite.Thisnecessityhason the one hand the form of a force of nature and everything finite is mortal andtransient.”193 NothingelsehasbeentaughttohumanitybytheWesternmythsofnature.Hegelcitesnatureand theforceofnatureasmodelsofhistory,accordingtoanautomatism,whichthephilosophyofthe Spirit can do nothing about. They assert themselves however in philosophy, because the identity-positing Spirit,bydenyingthebaneofblindnature,isidenticalwiththelatter.Gazing intotheabyss,Hegelbecameawareoftheworld-historicalmaineventandaffairofthestateas secondnature,butglorified therein thefirst,inghastlycomplicity withit.“Thesoiloflawis aboveallthatwhichisoftheSpirit,anditscloserlocation andpointofdeparture isthewill, whichisfree,sothatfreedomcomprisesitssubstanceanddetermination,andthesystemoflaw istherealmofrealizedfreedom,whichtheworldoftheSpiritproducedoutofitself,asasecond nature.”194 Second nature, first philosophically taken up once again in Lukacs’ theoryofthe novel,195 remainshoweverthenegativeofthatwhichcouldsomehowbethoughtofasthefirst. Whatistrulythesei[Greek:thesis],somethingwhich,ifitisnotproducedbyindividuals,then surelybytheirfunctionalcontext,usurpstheinsigniaofwhatcountstobourgeoisconsciousness asnatureandnatural.Tothatconsciousness,nothingwhichwouldbeoutsideappearsanymore; inacertainsensethereisinfactnothingmoreoutside,nothingunaffectedbythetotalmediation. That is why what is ensnared therein turns into its own otherness: the Ur-phenomenon of idealism. The more relentlessly socialization masters all moments of human and interhuman immediacy,themoreimpossibleitistorecallthehistorically-becomebeingoftheweb;themore irresistibletheappearance[Schein]ofnature.Thedistancingofthehistoryofhumanityfromthe latter reinforcesit:natureturnsintoanirresistible allegory ofimprisonment. TheyoungMarx expressedtheunceasingly interpenetration ofbothmomentswithapowerofextremity,which must irritate the dogmatic materialists: “We know only one science, the science of history. Historycanbeconsideredfromtwosides,dividedintothehistoryofnatureandthehistoryof humanity. Both sides are meanwhile not to be separated; solongashumanbeingsexist,the history of nature and the history of human beings condition each other reciprocally.”196 The traditionalantithesisofnatureandhistoryistrueandfalse;true,insofarasitexpresseswhatthe moment of nature experienced; false, insofar as it apologetically repeats, by virtue of its conceptual post-construction, theconcealmentofthenatural-rootednessofhistorybythislatter itself.
Theseparation ofnatureandhistoryunreflectively expressesatthesametimethatdivisionof labor,whichtheinescapableoneofscientificmethodsheedlesslyprojectsontotheobjects.The unhistoricalconceptofhistory,whichthefalselyresurrectedmetaphysicsharborsinwhatitcalls historicity, would demonstrate the understanding of ontological thinking with the naturalistic one,whichtheformersoeagerlydelimitsitselffrom.Ifhistoryturnsintotheontologicalbasic structureoftheexistent,orindeedintothequalitasocculta[Latin:secretquality]ofbeingitself, thenitismutabilityasimmutability,copiedfrominexorablenaturalreligion.Thisthenpermits thetransposition ofwhatishistorically determined atwillintoinvariance andphilosophically cloaks the vulgar insight which in modern times presents historical relationships, formerly God-given, as natural ones:oneofthetemptations oftheessentialization oftheexistent. The ontological claim, to be beyond the divergence of nature and history, is smuggled back in. Historicity, abstracted from the historically existent, glides past the pain of the antithesis of natureandhistory,whichforitspartisjustaslittletobeontologized.Theretoomodernontology is crypto-idealistic, constraining whatisunidentical overandoveragaintoidentity,removing whateverstrivesagainsttheconceptbymeansofthesuppositionoftheconceptofhistoricityas onewhichbearshistoryinitsplace.Ontologyismotivatedtotheideologicalprocedurehowever, the reconciliation in the Spirit, because the real one failed. Historical contingency and the conceptofhistorycontradictoneanotherallthemoremercilessly,themoreseamlesslytheyare interwoven. The accident is the historical fate of the individual, meaningless, because the historical processitselfremained whatusurpedmeaning. Nolessdeceptive isthequestionof natureasanabsolutefirst,assimplyandpurelyimmediateincontrasttoitsmediations.Itsetsup whatithuntsafter,inthehierarchicalformoftheanalyticjudgement,whosepremisescommand everything whichfollows,andtherebyrepeatsthedelusion,whichitwouldliketoescape.The distinction betweenthesei[Greek:thesis]andphysei[Greek:bynature],onceposited,canbe evaporated by the reflection, not sublated. Unreflected, to be sure, that dual division would rendertheessential historical processharmlessasamereadditionandwouldevenhelp,forits part,toenthronewhathasnotbecome asessence.Instead,itwouldbeuptothoughttoseeall nature,andwhateverinstallsitselfassuch,ashistoryandallhistoryasnature,“tocomprehend thehistorical beinginitsuttermost historical determinacy,there,whereitismosthistorical,as itselfanature-likebeing,ortocomprehendnature,there,whereitisapparentlymostprofoundly rooted as nature, as a historical being.”
197 Themoment however,inwhichhistoryandnature becomecommensurable,isthatoftransience;BenjamincentrallycognizedthisintheOriginof the German Tragedy-Play. Nature hovers beforetheBaroquepoets,runsthetext,“aseternal transience, in which the Saturnine glance ofthatgeneration alonerecognized history.”198 Not onlyoftheirs;natural historywaseverinthecanonoftheinterpretation ofthephilosophyof history:“Whenhistorymadeitsentranceontothestageinthetragedy-play,itdidsoasscript.On thecountenance ofNaturestood‘History’asthesignifyingtextoftransience. Theallegorical physiognomyofNaturalHistory,whichwasintroducedtothestagethroughthetragedy-play,is truly present as ruin.”199 This is the transmutation of metaphysics into history. It secularizes
*41*[Footnotepg315]Theimaginary socialcontract wassowelcome totheearlybourgeois thinkers, because it grounded bourgeois rationality, the exchange-relationship, as a formal-juridicalapriori;itwashoweverjustasimaginary,asthebourgeoisratiowasitselfinthe impenetrablerealsociety.
*42*[Footnotepg320]
Among the positivists Emile Durkheim held fast to the Hegelian decision in favor of the generalityinthedoctrineofthecollectivespiritandifpossibleeventrumpedthis,insofarashis schematadidnotgrantanyroomtoadialecticofthegeneralandparticular,noteveninabstracto [Latin:intheabstract].Inthesociologyofprimitivereligionshehadsubstantivelycognized,that what the particular laid claim to, the characteristic, was inflicted on it bythegenerality.He designatedthedeceptionoftheparticularasmeremimesistothegeneralityjustasmuchasthe power, whichmakestheparticular intooneinthefirstplace: “Theveil(whichisusedinthe courseofcertainceremonies)isnotanaturalmovementofprivatesensibility,injuredbyacruel loss;itisadutyimposedbythegroup.Onemourns,notsimplybecauseoneissad,butbecause oneisexpectedtomourn.Itisaritualattitudewhichoneisobligedtoadoptbyrespectforthe usage,butwhichis,toalargeextent, independentoftheeffectivestateoftheindividual.This obligation is moreover sanctioned by mythical punishments as well as social ones.” (Emile Durkheim,Theelementary formsofreligious life:ThetotemicsysteminAustralia,Paris1912, Travauxdel’AnneeSociologique,pg.568.)
*43*[Footnotepg324]
Kantalreadycriticizedthecliché“onlyanidea”.“ThePlatonicrepublichasbecomeproverbial as a presumably strikingexample ofadreamt-of perfection, whichcanhaveitsseatonlythe brainoftheidlethinker…Yetonewoulddobetter,toapproachthisthoughtmoreclosely,and (wheretheexcellent manpermitsuswithoutassistance) toshedlightonitbymeansofanew effort,ratherthansettingitasideasuselessunderthequitewretchedandharmfulpretextofits unfeasability.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,WWIII,AcademyEdition,pg.247)
*44*[Footnotepg325]
“Timedoesnotproceedinitself,buttheexistenceofwhatischangeableproceedsinit.Time, which is itself unchangeable and lasting, therefore corresponds in the appearance to what is unchangeable in existence, i.e. the substance, and only in it can the sequence and the simultaneityoftheappearancesoftimebedetermined.”(Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,ibid.pg 137)
*45*[Footnotepg325]
“More closely now, the real I belongs itself to time, with which it, if we abstract from the concrete content oftheconsciousnessandself-consciousness,coincides,insofarasitisnothing but this empty movement of positing itself as another and sublating this transformation, i.e. preservingitself,theIandonlytheIassuchtherein.TheIisintime,andthetimeisthebeingof thesubjectitself.”(Hegel,WW14,ibid.,pg151)
*46*[Footnotepg338]
Hegel’sdoctrineoftheidentityoftheaccidentalandthenecessary(seetext,pg.350)retainsits truth-content beyond his construction. Under the aspect of freedom, necessity remains heteronomous, however designated by the autonomoussubject.TheKantianempirical world, whichthesubjectivecategoryofcausalityissupposedtounderwrite,ispreciselytherebyoutside of subjective autonomy: what iscausally determined fortheindividual subjectisatthesame time absolutely accidental. Insofar as the fate of human beings proceeds in the realm of necessity, it is blind to them, “over their heads”, contingent. Exactly the strict deterministic character of the economic laws of motion of society condemns its members, if their own determination were truly respected as acriterion, totheaccidental. Thelawofvalueandthe anarchy of commodity production are as one. Contingency is thus not only the form of the non-identical,ruinedbycausality;italsocoincidesitselfwiththeidentity-principle.Foritspart thislatter hides,asthemerelyposited,aswhatisimposedonexperience,whichdoesnotarise fromwhatisnon-identical,theaccidentalinitsinnermostcore.
PartIII.Models.MeditationsonMetaphysics
AfterAuschwitz354-358
Itcannolongerbeassertedthattheimmutablewouldbethetruthandwhatmoves,thetransient, would be appearance [Schein],theindifferenceofwhatistemporal andeternal ideastowards each other is no longer tobemaintained, notevenwiththedaringHegelian explanation that temporalexistencewouldservetheeternal,bymeansoftheannihilationinherentinitsconcept, which would portray itself in the eternity of annihilation. One of the mystical impulses secularizedindialectics,wasthedoctrineoftherelevanceoftheinnerworldly,thehistorical,to what traditional metaphysics delineated as transcendence, or at least, less gnostically and radically, for the position of consciousness to the questions which the canon of philosophy assignedtometaphysics.ThefeelingwhichafterAuschwitzresistseveryassertionofpositivity ofexistence assanctimonious prattle, asinjustice tothevictims; whichisreluctanttosqueeze anymeaning, beiteversowashed-out,outoftheirfate,hasitsobjectivemomentafterevents which condemn the construction of a meaning of immanence, which radiates from an affirmativelypositedtranscendence,toamockery.Suchaconstructionwouldaffirmtheabsolute negativity and ideologically aid its continued existence, which really lies in any case in the principle oftheexistentsocietydowntoitsself-destruction.TheearthquakeofLisbonsufficed tocureVoltaire oftheLeibnizean theodicy,andthevisiblecatastrophe ofthefirstnaturewas insignificant, compared with the second, social one, which defies the human imagination by preparingarealhelloutofhumanevil.Thecapacityformetaphysicsiscrippled,becausewhat occurred, smashed the basis of the compatibility of speculative metaphysical thought with experience. The dialectical motif of the recoil of quantity into quality triumphs once more, unspeakably Withthemurderofmillionsthroughadministration,deathhasbecomesomething which has never yet been so feared. No possibility anymore, that it could enter into the experienced lives of individuals as something somehow concordant with its course. The individuatedisexpropriatedofthefinalandmostimpoverishedthingwhichremainedtoit.That theindividual[Individuum]nolongerdiedintheconcentrationcamps,butrathertheexemplar, has to affect the dying of those who escaped the administrative measures. Genocide is the absolute integration, which is everywhere being prepared, wherehumanbeingsaremadethe same,polished,asthemilitary callsit,untiltheyareliterallycancelledout,asdeviationsfrom theconcept oftheircomplete nullity.Auschwitzconfirmsthephilosophemeofpureidentityas death. The most provocative dictum from Beckett’s Endgame:thattherewouldnolongerbe anythingtoreallybeafraidof,reactstoapraxis,whichdelivereditsfirsttestcaseinthecamps and in whose once honorable concept already lurks teleologically the annihilation of the non-identical.Absolutenegativityisinplainview,isnolongersurprising.Fearwasboundtothe principium individuationis [Latin: principle of individuation] of self-preservation, which abolishes itself out of its own consistency. What the sadists in the campstoldtheirvictims: tomorrowyouwillbesmokerisingfromthesechimneysintothesky,namestheindifferenceof thelifeofeveryindividual, whichhistoryismovingtowards:already intheirformalfreedom theyareasfungibleandreplaceableasunderthebootsoftheliquidators.Becausehoweverthe
individual,intheworldwhoselawistheuniversalindividualadvantage,hasnothingelseexcept this self, which has become historically indifferent, the carrying out of the tried-and-true tendency isatthesametimewhatismosthorrifying;nothingleadsbeyondthisanymorethan beyond the electrified barbed wirefencesaroundthecamps.Perennial sufferinghasasmuch righttoexpressitselfasthemartyrhastoscream;thisiswhyitmayhavebeenwrongtosaythat poetry could not be written after Auschwitz. What is not wronghoweveristhelesscultural question of whether it is even permissible for someone who accidentally escapedandbyall rightsoughttohavebeenmurdered,togoonlivingafterAuschwitz.Theircontinuedexistence already necessitates thecoldness,ofthebasicprincipleofcapitalistsubjectivity,withoutwhich Auschwitzwouldnothavebeenpossible:thedrasticguiltofthespared.Asiftomakeupforthis theyaresecretlyhauntedbydreamsinwhichtheynolongerlive,butweregassedin1944,asif theirentireexistenceafterthatwaspurelyimaginary,emanationofthevagrantwishofsomeone whowaskilledtwentyyearsago.
Reflectivepeople,andartists,notseldomhavethefeelingofnotquitebeingthere,ofnot playingalong;asiftheywerenotatallthemselves,butasortofspectator.Inmanycasesothers findthisrepugnant;Kierkegaardbasedhispolemicagainstwhathecalledtheaestheticsphereon this. What in the meantime the critique of philosophical personalism speaks to, is that this positiontowardstheimmediate,whichdisavowsallexistentialattitudes,arrivesatitsobjective truthinamomentwhichleadsbeyondthedelusionoftheself-preservingmotive.Inthe“itisn’t allthatimportant”,whichforitspartindeedishappytoallyitselfwithbourgeoiscoldness,the individual [Individuum]cansoonestofall,yetwithoutfear,becomeconsciousofthenullityof existence. Thatwhichisinhumaninthis,thecapacitytodistanceoneselfandriseabovethings by being a spectator, is in the end precisely what is human, whose ideologues react so vehementlyagainst.Itisnotentirelyimplausible,thatthatpart,whichconductsitselfso,would be the immortal one. The scene in which Shaw on the way to the theater showed his identificationtoabeggarandhurriedlysaid“press”,hidesunderthecynicismsomethingofthe consciousness of this. It would help to explain the matter-at-hand, which astonished Schopenhauer: thattheemotionsinsightofthedeathnotonlyofothersbutalsoourown,are manytimesoversoweak.Verylikelyhumanbeingsarewithoutexceptionunderabane,none capableoflove,andforthatreasoneachandeveryonefeelsnotlovedenough.Buttheattitude ofbeingaspectatorexpressesatthesametimethedoubtastowhetherthiscouldbeallthereis, whilenonethelessthesubject,sorelevantinitsdelusion,hasnothingotherthanthatpovertyand ephemerality, which is animalistic in its impulses. Under the bane living beings have the alternative betweeninvoluntary ataraxy –anaesthetic ofweakness–andtheanimality ofthe involved. Both are false life. Something of each however belongs to a right désinvolture [off-handedness]andsympathy.Theguiltypressureofself-preservationhaswithstood,perhaps even strengthened itself on the unceasing contemporary threat. Only self-preservation must suspect,thatthelifeinwhichitfortifiesitself,isbecomingwhatitshuddersat,intoaghost,a piece oftheworldofspirits,whichthewakingconsciousnessseesthroughasnotexistent.The guiltoflife,whichaspurefactum alreadyrobsanotherlifeofbreath,accordingtoastatistics, whichcomplements anoverwhelming numberofmurderedwithaminimalnumberofrescued, asifthiswereforeshadowedinthecalculationofprobability,isnolongertobereconciledwith life. That guilt reproduces itself unceasingly, because it cannot be completely present to the consciousness at any moment. This, nothing else, compels one to philosophy. This latter experiencesthereintheshock,thatthedeeper,themorepowerfullyitpenetrates,thegreaterthe suspicionthatitwouldbedistancing itselffromhowthingsare;thatthemostsuperficial and
trivial intuitions would like, were the essence once revealed, to beintherightagainstthose whichaimattheessence. Therein aharshrayoflightfallsontruthitself.Speculationfeelsa certain duty to concede the position of the corrective to its opponent, “common sense” [in English].Lifefeedsthehorroroftheapprehension,thatwhatmustbecognizedwouldresemble whatisfoundtobe“downtoearth” [inEnglish],ratherthanwhatraisesitselfup;itcouldbe, thatthisapprehensionisconfirmed evenbeyondthepedestrian, whilenonethelessthethought hasitshappiness,thepromiseofitstruth,solelyintheelevation.Ifthepedestrianhadthelast word, if it were the truth, then truth would be debased. The trivial consciousness, as it is theoretically expressed in positivism and unreflective nominalism, may be nearer to the adaequatio reiatquecogitationis [Latin: makingthethingequalwithwhatisthought]thanthe sublimeone,truerinitsgrotesquemockeryofthetruththantheaugustone,unlessaconceptof truth different from that of the adaequatio is supposed to succeed. The innervation, that metaphysicswouldliketowinsolelybythrowingitselfaway,appliestosuchadifferenttruth.It isnottheleastofthemotivationsofthetransitiontomaterialism.Thetendencytodothiscanbe followedfromtheHegelianMarxdowntotheBenjaminicrescueoftheinduction;theworkof Kafkamightformitsapotheosis. Ifnegative dialecticsdemandstheself-reflectionofthinking, thenthisimpliesintangibleterms,thatthinkingmust,nowadaysatanyrate,inordertobetrue, also think against itself. If it does not measure itself by the extremity, whichfleesfromthe concept,thenitiscastinadvanceinthesamemoldasthemusicalaccompaniment,withwhich theSSwaswonttodrownoutthecriesoftheirvictims.
2
MetaphysicsandCulture358-361
Hitlerhasimposedanewcategoricalimperativeuponhumanityinthestateoftheirunfreedom: to arrange their thinking and conduct, so that Auschwitz neverrepeatsitself,sothatnothing similar ever happen again.Thisimperative isasunmanageable vis-à-visitsfoundationasthe givenfactformerlywastotheKantianone.Totreatitdiscursivelywouldbeheinous:initthe moment of the supplementary in what is moral can be bodily felt. Bodily, because it is the abhorrence,becomepractical,oftheunbearablephysicalpaininflictedonindividuals,evenafter individuality,asanintellectual formofreflection, isonthepointofdisappearing.Onlyinthe unvarnished materialistic motive does morality survive. The course of history compels metaphysics, whichwastraditionallytheunmediatedoppositeofmaterialism,towardsthislast. WhattheSpiritonceboastedofdeterminingorconstruingassimilartoitsown,movestowards whattheSpiritisnotthesameas;whatescapesitsdominationandwhatneverthelessrevealsthe former as absolute evil. The somatic layer of living beings, distant from meaning, is the staging-grounds of suffering, which burned everything assuaging of the Spirit and its objectification, culture,withoutconsolationinthecamps.Theprocessbywhichmetaphysicsis irresistibly borne to what it was once conceived against, has reached its vanishing-point. Philosophy since the young Hegel, to the extent it did not sell out to the approved way of thinking,hasnotbeenabletorepresshowverymuchithasslippedintothequestionsofmaterial existence. Somethingofthisisapprehendedinthechildhoodfascination,whichemanatesfrom thezoneoftheknacker,ofcarrion,fromtherepulsively sweetsmellofputrefaction,fromthe notoriousexpressionsforthatzone.Thepowerofthatrealmintheunconsciousmaybenoless
thanthatoftheinfantile sexualone;bothintermingle intheanalfixation,butarescarcelythe same. Unconscious knowledge whispers to the child, that what is repressed by civilized education over there, is what it is all about: the impoverished physical existence sparks the greatest interest, whichisscarcely lessrepressed,intotheWhatisthatandWheredoesitgo. WhoevercouldmanagetorecollectwhatonceoccurredtotheminthewordsLuderbach[proper name, meaning roughly “Baitwater”] and Schweinstiege [proper name, meaning roughly “Pigsteps”] wouldprobablybeclosertoabsoluteknowledgethantheHegelian chapter which promisesittothereader,inordertohaughtilywithholdit.Theintegrationofphysicaldeathin culture would need to be theoretically repealed, yet not for the sake of theontological pure essence of death, but for the sake of what the stench of the cadaver expresses andwhatits transfigurationintotheburialcorpsecoversover.Ahotelowner,calledAdam,inviewofachild whowasfondofhim,strucktheratspouringfromtheholesinthecourtyarddeadwithaclub; thechildcreated inhisimage thatofthefirsthumanbeing.Thatthisisforgotten;thatoneno longer understands, what one sensed once before the dog-catcher’s wagon,isthetriumphof cultureanditsfailure.Itcannottoleratethememoryofthatzone,becauseitdoesthesameasthe oldAdam,andexactly thisisincompatible withitsconcept ofitself.Itperhorrescesastench, becauseitstinks;becauseitspalace,asamagnificentlinefromBrechtputit,isbuiltofdogshit. Yearsafterthatlinewaswritten,Auschwitzirrefutablydemonstratedthefailureofculture.That itcouldhappeninthemidstofallthetraditionsofphilosophy,artandtheenlighteningsciences, says more than merely thatthese,theSpirit,wasnotcapable ofseizingandchanginghuman beings.Inthosebranchesthemselves,intheemphaticclaimoftheirautarky,dwellsuntruth.All culture afterAuschwitz, including itsurgentcritique, isgarbage.Byrestoringitselfafterwhat transpiredinitslandscape withoutresistance, ithasturnedentirely intothatideologywhichit potentially was,eversinceittookituponitself,inoppositiontomaterialexistence,tobreathe lifeintothislatterwiththelight,whichtheseparationoftheSpiritfrommanuallaborwithheld fromsuch.Whoeverpleadsforthepreservationofaradicallyculpableandshabbycultureturns into its accomplice, while those who renounce culture altogether immediately promote the barbarism, which culture reveals itself to be. Not even silence canbreakoutofthecircle; it merelyrationalizesone’sownsubjectiveincapacitywiththestateofobjectivetruthanddebases this once more into a lie.IftheEasternstates have,inspiteoftheirtwaddletothecontrary, abolishedculture andtransformeditasapuremeansofdominationintojunk,thisiswhatthat culture, which moans about this, only deserves, and to what for its part, inthenameofthe democratic rightofhumanbeingstowhatalreadyresemblesthem,itzealouslytends.Itisonly thattheadministrativebarbarismofthefunctionariesoverthere[intheEast],bypraisingitselfas culture and proclaiming its bad state of affairs as a precious and sacred legacy, convicts its reality,theinfrastructure, tobeasbarbaric foritspartasthesuperstructure theydemolish,by takingitundercontrol.IntheWest,itisatleastpermittedtosayso.–Thetheologyofthecrisis registered, what it rebelled against abstractly and for thatreasoninvain:thatmetaphysics is fused with culture. The absoluteness of the Spirit,aureole ofculture, wasthesameprinciple whichuntiringlydidviolencetowhatitpretendedtoexpress.AfterAuschwitz,nowordintoned fromonhigh,noranytheological one,hasanyrightinitsoriginalform.Thechallengeofthe words handed down by tradition; the test, as to whether God would permit this and not wrathfullyintervene,oncemorecarriedoutthejudgementonthevictims,whichNietzschehad passedlongbeforeontheideas.SomeonewhowithstoodAuschwitz andothercamps,witha powerwhichistobeadmired,remarkedheatedlyagainstBeckett:ifhehadbeeninAuschwitz, hewouldwritedifferently,namely morepositively,withthetrench-religionofasurvivor.The
Thislendsthedemandtobeginatthebeginningor,astheyputit,toradicallyputinquestion,to scrapeawayattheappearance[Schein],withwhichafailedculturewouldpaintoveritsguiltand thetruth,itssuggestivepower.Butassoonasthatpresumeddemolitionyieldstotheurgeforan unspoiledfundament,ittherebyconspireswiththeculturewhichitboastsofdemolishing.While the Fascists thundered against destructive cultural Bolshevism, Heidegger made destruction respectable astheinstitution ofpenetrating intobeing.Cultural critique andbarbarismarenot without a certain understanding. It was quickly tried out in practice. Metaphysical considerations,whichseektogetridoftheelementswhicharemediatedasculturetothem,deny therelationshipoftheirpresumablypurecategoriestosocialcontent.Disregardingsociety,they encourage itscontinuedexistenceintheexistingforms,whichfortheirpartbartherecognition oftruthalongwithitsrealization. TheidolofpureUr-experience gibbersasmuchaswhatis culturallyprepared,theout-of-datestockpileofcategories,whichisthesei[Greek:thesis].What solelycouldleadbeyondthisiswhatdeterminesbothinitsmediatedness:cultureasthelidon trash,nature,evenwhereitturnsintothecapstoneofbeing,astheprojectionofthebadcultural demand, that things must nevertheless stay the same throughout all changes. Not even the experience ofdeathsufficesaswhatisultimateandbeyonddoubt,asametaphysicssimilarto theoneDescartesoncededucedfromtheuntenableegocogitans[Latin:cognizingego].
Thatthemetaphysicsofdeathdegeneratedeitherintoadvertisingfortheheroicdeathor intothetrivialityofthepurerepetitionofwhatisunmistakable,namelythateveryonehastodie, itsentire ideological badstateofaffairs,isverylikely basedontheenduringfrailtyofhuman consciousnesstothisday,whichcannotstanduptotheexperienceofdeath,perhapscannoteven acceptitatall.Nohumanlife,whichconductsitselfopenlyandfreelytowardsobjects,suffices tocomplete whatisextant intheSpiritofeveryhumanbeingaspotential; itanddeathyawn fromeachother.Thereflectionsondeathwhichgivemeaningareashelplessasthetautological ones.Themoretheconsciousnessescapesanimalityandbecomeswhatissolidifiedandlasting initsforms,themoreobdurately doesitresistanythingwhichmakesitsowneternitysuspect. Coupledwiththehistorical enthroningofthesubjectasSpiritwasthedeception,thatitcould neverbelost.Ifearlierformsofpropertymeshedwithmagicalpractices,whichbanisheddeath, thentheratioexorcisesthelatterastenaciouslyasonlytheritesoncedid,themorecompletely allhumanrelations aredetermined byproperty.Atafinalstage,indespair,ititselfturnsinto property.Itsmetaphysical exaltation isunleashedfromitsexperience.Thecurrentmetaphysics of death is nothing but the powerless solace of society over the fact that through social transformations, humanbeingscame tobedeprivedofwhatwasoncesupposedtohavemade deathbearabletothem,thefeelingofitsepicunitywiththeroundedlife.Butitmayhaveonly
transfiguredthedomination ofdeathbytheweariness oftheelderly andthosesatedwithlife, whoforthatreasonbelieveitrighttodie,becausetheirtoil-filledpreviouslifewasindeednolife atallandstolefromthemthepowerofresistingdeath.Inthesocializedsocietyhowever,inthe inescapablydensewebofimmanence,humanbeingsperceivedeathsolelyassomethingexternal andalientothem,withoutillusionsastoitscommensurabilitywiththeirlife.Theycannotabsorb thefactthattheymustdie.Anoblique,severedpieceofhopeclingstothis:preciselybecause deathdoesnot,asinHeidegger,constitutetheentiretyofexistence,oneexperiences,solongas oneisnotsenile,deathanditsemissaries,illnesses,asheterogenous,ego-alien.Onemayground this, quick-wittedly, in the fact that the ego would be nothing other than the principle of self-preservationopposedtodeathandincapableofabsorbingitwiththeconsciousness,whichis itselfego.Buttheexperienceoftheconsciousnessyieldslittletosupportthisview;itdoesnot necessarily have,inthesightofdeath,theformofcontrariness,whichonewouldexpect.The Hegelian doctrine, thatwhatis,perishesbyitself,ishardlyconfirmedbythesubject.Thatone hastodie,appearseventotheelderly,whoareconsciousofthesignsofvenerability,ratherlike anunfortunate accident causedbyone’sownphysique,withtracesofthesamecontingencyas thenowadaystypical external accidents. Thisstrengthens thespeculation,whichcounterpoints theinsightofthepreponderance[Vorrang]oftheobject:astowhethertheSpiritwouldnothave amomentofwhatisindependent,ofwhatisnotmixeduptogether,whichbecomesfreeexactly whenitisnotforitspartdevouringeverythingandreproducingitselfinthralltodeath.Inspite ofthedeceptiveinterestofself-preservation,thepowerofresistanceoftheideaofimmortality, as Kant still harbored it, could scarcely be explained without this moment. Admittedly that powerofresistance appearstobesinkinginthehistoryofthespecies,asmuchasindeclining individuals. After the downfall of the objective religions, secretly ratified long ago, which promisedtotakeawaythestingofdeath,thelatterhasturnedintosomethingentirelyalientoday throughthesociallydetermineddownfallofcontinuousexperienceatlarge.
Thelesssubjectsliveanymore,themoreabrupt,frightening,thedeath.Inthatthelatter literally transformstheformerintoathing,itmakesthemawareoftheirpermanent death,of reification, of the form of their relations, which they are partly culpable of. The civilized integration of death, without power over it and ridiculous before it, which it covers up cosmetically, is the reaction-formation to something social [Gesellschaftliche], the awkward attempt ofexchange-society toplugthelastholesstillleftopenbytheworldofcommodities. Deathandhistory,particularlythecollectiveoneofthecategoryoftheindividual[Individuum], formaconstellation.Iftheindividual,Hamlet,oncededuceditsabsoluteessentialityoutofthe dawningconsciousnessoftheirrevocabilityofdeath,thenthedownfalloftheindividualbrings downtheentire construction ofbourgeoisexistence alongwithit.Whatisannihilatedinitself andperhapsalsoforitselfissomethingnugatory.Hencetheconstantpanicinthesightofdeath. It is no longer tobeplacated except throughitsrepression.Deathassuch,orasabiological Ur-phenomenon, is not to be extracted out of the coils of history;200 the individuated [Individuum],whichcarriestheexperienceofdeath,isfartoomuchofahistoricalcategoryfor that.Thestatement, thatdeathwouldalwaysbethesame,isasabstractasuntrue;theform,by whichtheconsciousnesscomestogripswithdeath,variesalongwiththeconcreteconditionsof howonedies,downtothephysicalaspect.Deathintheconcentrationcampshasanewhorror: sinceAuschwitz thefearofdeathmeans,tofearthingsworsethandeath.Whatdeathdoesto whatissociallycondemned,isanticipatedbiologicallyinbelovedhumanbeingsofgreatage;not onlytheirbodiesbuttheirego,everything whichdetermines themashumanbeings,crumbles
without illness and violent intervention. The remnants of confidence in their transcendental durationdisappearasitwereintoearthlylife:whatisitsupposedtobeinthem,anyway,whichis notdying.Thecomforting faith,thatinsuchdisintegration ormadnessthecoreofthehuman beingwouldcontinuetoexist,has,initsindifferencetowardsthatexperience,somethingfoolish andcynical aboutit.Itprolongsthesnotty,philistine[Spiessbuerger]truism–thatoneremains always what one is – into infinity. Whoever turns away from what negated their possible fulfillment,pullsafaceatthemetaphysicalneed.
Nevertheless the thought that death would be the simply and purely ultimate is unthinkable. Attempts toexpressdeathinlanguage,areinvainallthewayintologic;whoever would be the subject, of whichitispredicated, thatitishere,now,dead.Notonlypleasure, which, according to Nietszsche’s luminous word, wantseternity,recoilsagainsttransience. If death were that absolute, which philosophy positively conjured in vain, then everything is nothingatall,everythoughtisthoughtintothevoid,nonecouldbesomehowtrulythought.For itisamomentoftruth,thatitwouldendurealongwithitstemporalcore;withoutanyduration, therewouldbenoneatall,evenitslasttracewouldbedevouredbyabsolutedeath.Itsideadefies thinkingnolessthanthatofimmortality.Butwhatisunthinkableindeathdoesnotrenderthe thought immune against the unreliability of every metaphysical experience. The context of delusion,whichencompassesallhumanbeings,hasashareinwhattheyimaginetoteartheveil with.InplaceoftheKantianepistemologicalquestion,astohowmetaphysicswouldbepossible, steps the one from the philosophy of history, as to whethermetaphysical experience iseven possibleatall.Thislatterwasneversofarbeyondwhatistemporalasinthescholasticusageof the word metaphysics. It has beenobservedthatmysticism, whosenamehopestorescuethe immediacyofmetaphysicalexperienceagainstitslossthroughinstitutionalconstruction,formsa socialtradition foritspartandstemsfromtradition, acrossthedemarcation linesofreligions, whichareheresiestoeachother ThenameofthecorpusofJewishmysticism,Kabbalah,means tradition.Metaphysicalimmediacy,whereitdaredtoventurethefurthest,didnotdenyhowvery mediateditis.Ifitappealshowevertotradition,thenitmustalsoconfessitsdependencyonthe historicalconditionoftheSpirit.InKantthemetaphysicalideaswereindeedremovedfromthe existential judgements of an experience, which was to be fulfilled in the material, but were supposedtobelocated inspiteoftheantinomiesintheconsistencyofpurereason;todaythey wouldbeasabsurdastheonesnamed,byazealouslyclassifyingdefense-mechanism,aswhat their absence expresses. The consciousness however, which refuses to deny the fall in the philosophyofhistoryofmetaphysicalideas,andyetcannotbearthislatter,ifitisnotsupposed toalsodenyitselfasconsciousness,tendstherebyinmorethanamerelysemanticconfusionto elevate thefateofmetaphysical ideasstraightaway tosomethingmetaphysical. Despairinthe world, which nevertheless hasitsfundament inthethinganditstruthandisneither aesthetic weltschmerz norafalseconsciousness worthyofdamnation, wouldalreadyguarantee,soruns thefalseconclusion,theexistenceofwhatishopelesslyrelinquished,eventhoughexistencehas turnedintotheuniversalcontext ofguilt.Ofallthedisgrace,whichtheologyexperiencedwith goodreason,theworstofallisthehowlofjoyinwhichthepositivereligionsbreakout,overthe despairoftheunbelieving.TheyvoicetheirTeDeumatvirtuallyeverydenialofGod,because theyatleastusethenameofGod.Justasthemeansusurpedtheends,intheideologyswallowed bytheentirepopulationoftheEarth,sotoohastheresurrectedmetaphysicsoftodayusurpedthe need,forwhatitlacks.Thetruth-content ofwhatisabsentbecomesindifferent;theyassertit, becauseitwouldbegoodforhumanbeings.Thesolicitorsofmetaphysicsargueasonewiththe pragmatism which they detest, whichdissolvedmetaphysics apriori.Likewise, despairisthe
latest ideology,ashistorical andhistorically conditioned, asthecourseofthecognitionwhich has gnawed at the metaphysical ideas, whichisnottobestoppedbymeansofanycuibono [Latin:whobenefits].
HappinessandWaitinginVain366-368
What metaphysical experience would be, to those who eschew the reduction of this to presumablyreligiousprimal experiences, isclosesttohowProustimaginedit,inthehappiness promisedbythenamesofvillageslikeOtterbach,Watterbach,Reuenthal,Monbrunn.Youthink thatifyougothere,youwouldbeinwhatisfulfilled,asifitreallyexisted.Ifyoureallygothere, thatwhichispromisedrecedeslikearainbow.Neverthelessyouaren’tdisappointed;rather,you feelthatyouaretooclose,andthat’swhyyoudon’tseeit.Thisispresumablywhythedifference betweenlandscapes andthedistricts,whichdeterminetheworldofimagesofchildhood,isnot thatgreat.WhatProustexperienced atIllierswassomethingmanychildrenofthesamesocial stratasharedatdifferentplaces.Butforthisgenerality,whatisauthenticinProust’sportrayal,to form,onemustbeenrapturedatthatonespot,withoutsquintingatthegenerality.Tothechildit isobviousthatwhatdelightsitaboutitsfavoritelittletownistobefoundthereandonlythere, and nowhere else; it errs,butitserrorconstitutes themodelofexperience, thatofaconcept, whichultimately wouldbethatofthethingitself,notthepovertyofthatwhichisshornaway fromthings.Themarriage,duringwhichtheProustiannarratorgazesasachildforthefirsttime attheDuchessdeGuermantes,mayhavetakenplacejustso,andwiththesamepoweroverhis later life,atanothertime andanotherplace. Solelyinviewofwhatisabsolutely,indissolubly individualizedistobehoped,thatthisishowitalreadywasandwouldbe;onlybyapproaching this,wouldtheconceptoftheconceptbefulfilled.Itclingshowevertothepromiseofhappiness, whiletheworldwhichdeniesit,whichisthatofthedominating universality,iswhatProust’s reconstruction ofexperience opposesentêtiert[French:obstinately].Happiness,theonlyaspect ofmetaphysicalexperiencewhichismorethanpowerlessneeding,grantstheinteriorofobjects aswhatissimultaneously removedfromsuch.Whoevermeanwhilenaïvelyenjoysthissortof experience, as if they heldwhatitsuggestsintheirhands,succumbstotheconditionsofthe empiricalworld,whichtheywantedtoescapefrom,andwhichneverthelessgrantsthemtheonly possibilitythereof.Theconceptofmetaphysicalexperienceisstillantinomic,inotherwaysthan thetranscendental dialecticofKanttaught.Whatisannouncedinwhatismetaphysicalwithout recourse to the experience of the subject,withoutitsimmediate being-present [Dabeisein], is helplessbeforethedesireoftheautonomoussubject,topermitnothingtobefoistedonit,which wouldnotbecomprehensibletoit.Whatisimmediatelyevidenttoithoweverailsfromfallibility andrelativity.
That the category ofreification whichwasinspiredbythewishfulimage ofunbroken subjective immediacy no longer deserves that key character to which apologetic thinking, absorbingthematerialistic oneearlyon,overzealouslyaccordsit,hasareciprocalinfluenceon everythingwhichgoesundertheconceptofmetaphysicalexperience.Theobjectivetheological categories, whichphilosophyattacked asreifications sincetheyoungHegel,arebynomeans onlyremains,whichdialecticswouldeliminate.Theystandcomplementarilytotheweaknessof theidealisticdialectic,whichasidentity-thinkinglaysclaimtowhatdoesnotfallintothinking,
which nevertheless, as soon as it is contrasted to that asitsmereother,loseseverypossible determination.Whatisprecipitatedintheobjectivityofmetaphysicalcategoriesisnotsolely,as existentialismwouldhaveit,hardenedsociety,butjustasmuchthepreponderance[Vorrang]of theobjectasamomentofdialectics.Theliquefactionofeverythingthinglywithoutaremainder regressed to the subjectivism of thepureact,hypostasized themediation asimmediacy.Pure immediacy and fetishism are equally untrue. The insistence on theformeragainstreification relinquishes, asHegel’sinstitutionalism descried,themoment oftheothernessindialectics,as arbitrarily asthisinturn,according tothepractice ofthelater Hegel,isnottobedetainedin something solidified beyond it. The surplus over the subject, however, which the subjective metaphysical experience doesnotwishtobetalkedoutof,andthetruth-momentinthethingly are extremes, which touch in the idea of truth. For this latter would be solittle withoutthe subject,whichescapesfromtheappearance[Schein],aswithoutthatwhichisnotthesubjectand inwhichthetruthhasitsUr-image.–Puremetaphysicalexperiencebecomesunmistakablypaler and more desultory in the course of the process of secularization, and this softens the substantiality oftheolderone.Itconductsitselfnegatively inthat“Isthatall?”,whichcomes closest tobeingrealized aswaitinginvain.Arthasdemonstratedthis;inWozzeckAlbanBerg ranked thosebarsashighest,whichexpress,asonlymusiccan,waitinginvain,andcited its harmonyatthedecisivecaesurasandconclusionofLulu.Nosuchinnervationhowever,nothing ofwhatBlochcalledsymbolicintention,isimmunetoadulterationbymerelife.Waitinginvain does not vouchsafe what the expectation aims at, but reflects the condition, which has its measureinthedenial.Thelessoflifewhichremains,themoretemptingfortheconsciousness, to take the wretched and abrupt remains of living beings for thephenomenal [erscheinende] absolute.Nevertheless nothingcouldbeexperiencedassomethingtrulyalive,whichwouldnot alsopromisesomethingtranscendentaltolife;noexertionoftheconceptleadsbeyondthis.Itis and is not. The despair in that which is, overshadows the transcendental ideas, which once commanded ittohalt.Thatthefinite worldofunendingmiserywouldbecircumscribed bya divineworld-plan,turnsforeveryone,whoisnotengagedinthebusinessoftheworld,intothat madness, which comports itself so well with the positive normal consciousness. The unsalvageability of the theological conception of the paradox, a last, starved-out bastion, is ratified by the course of the world,whichtranslates theskandalon[Latin: scandal],atwhich Kierkegaardtarried,intoopenprofanation. 5
“Nihilism”369-374
The metaphysical categories live on, secularized, in what the vulgar higher urge calls the questionofthemeaningoflife.Theringoftheword,reminiscentofaworld-view,condemnsthe question.Almostirresistiblyitconjoinsuponitselftheanswer,thatthemeaningoflifewouldbe theonethequestionergivesit.NoteventheMarxismdebasedintoanofficialcredo,asinthe lateLukacs,willanswermuchdifferently.Theanswerisfalse.Theconceptofmeaninginvolves an objectivity beyond all making; as something made it is already afiction, duplicating that subject,beiteversocollective,andswindlesitoutofwhatitseemstogrant.Metaphysicsdeals with something objective, without however being permitted to dispense with subjective reflection.Thesubjectsrunintothemselves,their“constitution”:itisuptometaphysicstoreflect
on how far theyarenevertheless capable ofseeingbeyondthemselves. Philosophemes which dispensewiththisdisqualifythemselves ascounsel.Theactivityofsomeoneconnectedtothat sphere was characterized decades earlier: he travels around and gives lectures to employees aboutmeaning.Whoeversighswithrelief,whenlifeshowsaresemblancetolifeforonceandis not, as per the cognition of Karl Kraus, set in motion solely for thesakeofproductionand consumption, eagerly and immediately reads thepresenceofsomethingtranscendental outof this.Thedepravation ofspeculative idealismintoaquestionofmeaningretrospectivelydamns the one which even at its zenith proclaimed suchameaning, althoughwithslightlydifferent words,theSpiritastheabsolute,whichcannotgetridofitsoriginintheinadequatesubjectand placates its needinitsmirrorimage. ThisisanUr-phenomenonofideology.Thetotal ofthe questionitselfexertsabane,whichamidstallaffirmativeposturingbecomesnugatorybeforethe real catastrophe. If someone indespair,whowantstokillthemselves, askedsomeonewhois tryingtotalkthemoutofit,whatthemeaningoflifeis,nonecouldbenamedbythehelpless helper; assoonastheytry,theyarerefuted,theechoofaconsensusomnium[Latin:universal consensus],whichformsthekerneloftheproverb,thattheKaiserafterallneedssoldiers.Alife whichhadmeaning wouldnothavetoaskaboutsuch;thelatter fleesfromthequestion.The oppositehowever,abstract nihilism, wouldhavetofallsilentbeforethecounter-question:why doyouliveyourself.Tosizeupthewhole,tocalculatethenet-profitoflife,ispreciselythedeath whichtheso-calledquestionofmeaningwishedtoescape,eventotheextentthelatter,without anyotherexit,preferstoenthuseoverthemeaning ofdeath.Whatwouldhaveaclaimonthe nameofmeaningwithoutdisgrace,isinwhatisopen,notinwhatisclosedinitself;thethesis, thatlifewouldhavenone,wouldbeasapositiveonejustasfoolish,asitsoppositeisfalse;the former is true only as a blow against the asseverating phrase. Not even Schopenhauer’s inclination to identity the essence oftheworld,theblindwill,aswhatisabsolutely negative under the humane view, befits the state of consciousness any longer; the claim of total subsumption, all too analogous to the positive one of the contemporaries he detested, the idealists.Naturalreligionflickersuponcemore,thefearofdemons,againstwhichtheEpicurean enlightenment once painted the wretched idea of disinterested observing gods as something better. IncontrasttoSchopenhauerian irrationalism, themonotheism whichheattacked inthe Spiritoftheenlightenment alsohasitstrueaspect.Schopenhauer’smetaphysicsregressestoa phase,inwhichthegeniushasnotyetawokenamidstwhatismute.Hedeniesthemotive of freedom which, for the time being, and perhaps even in the phase of complete unfreedom, humanityremembers.Schopenhauergetstothebottomoftheillusoryappearance[Scheinhafte] ofindividuation,buthisrecipeforfreedominthefourthbook,therepudiationofthewilltolife, is just as illusory [scheinhaft]: as if what is ephemerally individualized could havetheleast poweroveritsnegativeabsolute,thewillasathinginitself,couldstepoutofitsbaneotherwise thaninself-deception, withouttheentire metaphysics ofthewillescapingthroughthebreach. TotaldeterminismisnolessmythicalthanthetotalsoftheHegelianlogic.Schopenhauerwasan idealist malgré lui-même [French: in spite of himself], spokesperson of the bane.Thetotum [Latin:thewhole]isthetotem.Theconsciousnesscouldnotdespairatalloverwhatisgrey,ifit did not harbor the concept of a different color, whose scattered trace is not lacking in the negative whole.Italwaysstemsfromthepast,hopefromitscounter-force[Widerspiel],from whatmustfalloriscondemned; suchaninterpretation wouldverylikely accordwiththelast sentenceofBenjamin’stextontheElectiveAffinities,“Onlyforthesakeofthehopelessarewe given hope.” It is tempting nevertheless, to seek meaning not in lifeatlargebutinfulfilled moments. These compensate in this world’s existence for the fact that it no longer tolerates
anything outsideit.Incomparable poweremanates fromthemetaphysician Proust,becausehe gave himself over to this temptation with an unbridled demand for happiness like no other, withoutwishingtoretain hisego.Butthroughtheprogressofthenoveltheincorruptibleone reinforcedthefactthateventhatfullness,themomentrescuedbymeditation,wouldnotbeit.As close as Proust was to Bergson’s circle of experience, which raised the conception of the meaningfulness oflifeinitsconcretion toatheory,somuchmorewasProust,inheritorofthe Frenchnovelofdisillusionment, atthesametime thecritic ofBergsonianism. Thetalkofthe fullnessoflife,alucusanonlucendo[Latin: theforestisso-called becausethereisnolight] evenwhereitilluminates,isrenderedidlebyitsimmeasurablediscrepancywithdeath.Ifthisis irrevocable, then the assertion ofameaning whicharisesinthelightofafragmentary,albeit genuineexperience,isideological.Proustthushelped,inoneofthecentralpassagesofhiswork, thedeathofBergotte,thehopefortheresurrectiontowardsitsgropingexpression,contrarytoall philosophyoflife,yetnotunderthecoverofthepositivereligions.Theideaofthefullnessof life,eventheonewhichthesocialistconceptionsofhumanitypromise,isforthatreasonnotthe utopiaforwhichitismistaken,becausethatfullnesscannotbeseparatedfromthegreedwhich theJugendstilcalled“livingtothefull”,ofaneedwhichhastheactofviolenceandsubjugation initself.Ifthereisnohopewithoutthesatingofdesire,thenthislatterisstillenmeshedinthe notorious context of like for like, of what is precisely hopeless. No fullness without power-jousting. Negatively, by virtue of the consciousness of nullity,theologyisintheright againstthosewhobelieveinlifeonearth.Thatmuchistrueinthejeremiadsontheemptinessof existence. Onlyitisnottobecuredfromwithin,inthesensethathumanbeingswouldhavea change of heart, butsolelythroughtheabolition oftheprinciple ofrenunciation. Withit,the cycleoffulfillmentandappropriationwouldintheendalsodisappear:sodeeplyaremetaphysics andthearrangementoflifeinterwoven.
Nihilism isassociated withthekeywordsofemptiness andmeaninglessness.Nietzsche adopted the expression, which Jacobi first used philosophically, presumably from the newspapers, which reported on Russian atrocities. With an irony, for which the ear has meanwhilegrowntoodull,heemployeditforthedenunciationoftheoppositeofwhattheword meantinthepraxisofconspirators,ofChristianityastheinstitutionalizedrepudiationofthewill tolife.Philosophyneednotdowithoutthewordanylonger.Conformistically,intheopposite direction of Nietzsche, it has refunctioned it into the epitome ofacondition, whichiseither accused oforaccuses itselfofnullity.Forthethought-habit, towhichnihilism isinanycase something bad, that condition awaits an injection of meaning, indifferent as to whether the critique of this, which one ascribed to nihilism, is well-founded or not. In spite of its non-committalness [Unverbindlichkeit], suchtalkofnihilismabetsdemagoguery.Itdemolishes howeverastraw-man,whichititselfsetup.Thestatement,thateverythingwouldbenothing,is asemptyasthewordbeing,whichtheHegelianmovementoftheconceptidentifieditwith,not in order to hold fast to theidentity ofbothbutrather,advancing pastandonceagainfalling behindtheabstractnihility,inordertoplacesomethingdeterminateinbothplaces,whichalone by virtue of its determinacy would be more than nothing. That human beings would want nothingness,asNietzscheoccasionallysuggests,wouldberidiculoushubrisforeachdeterminate individual will,eveniforganizedsocietyshouldsucceedinmakingtheearthuninhabitableor blowingitupsky-high.Tobelieve innothingness–underthisisscarcely moretobethought thanunderthatofnothingnessitself;thesomething,which,legitimatelyornot,ismeantbythe word belief, is according to its own meaning not any nothingness. The naïve belief in nothingnesswouldbeasfatuousasthenaïvebeliefinbeing,thepalliativeoftheSpirit,which
proudlyfindsitssatisfaction,inseeingthroughtheswindle.Sincetheindignationovernihilism oncemorebeingladledoutthesedaysscarcelyappliestothatmysticism,whichstilldiscoversin nothingness,asthenihilprivativum[Latin:emptyobjectofaconcept],thatsomethingwhichis negatedthere,andwhichcomestopassinthedialecticsunleashedbythewordnothingness,then whatisinalllikelihoodsupposedtobemorallydefamed,bymeansofthemobilizationofaword whichiseverywheredetestedandincompatiblewithuniversalgoodcheer,arethosewhorefuse to accept the Western inheritance of positivity and do not subscribe to any meaning of the existent. Iftheyprattle onaboutthenihilismofvalues,thattherewouldbenothingwhichone couldholdonto,thenthiscriesoutfortheovercoming,nativetothesamesubalternsphereof language.Whatiscoveredupistheperspective,astowhethertheconditioninwhichonecould no longer hold on to anything might be the only one worthy of human beings; one which permittedthethoughttoatlastbehaveasautonomously,asphilosophyhadalwaysmerelyasked them to do and in the same breath prevented them from doing.Overcomings, eventhoseof nihilism alongwiththeNietzschean kind,whomeantitotherwiseandyetdeliveredslogansto Fascism, areatalltimesworsethanwhatisovercome. Themedieval nihilprivativum [Latin: empty object of a concept], which recognized the concept of nothingness asthenegation of somethinginsteadofsomethingauto-semantic,isasfaraheadofthezealousovercomingsasthe imagoofNirvana,ofnothingasasomething.Thosetowhomdespairisnotaterminusmayask, astowhetheritwerebetter,thattherebenothingatallratherthansomething.Eventhisadmitsto nogeneralanswer Forahumanbeinginaconcentrationcamp,ifsomeonewhohadescapedin time couldatalljudgeoverthis,itwouldbebetteriftheyhadnotbeenborn.Neverthelessthe idealofnothingnesswouldevaporatebeforethemomentaryquiverofaneye,indeedbeforethe feebletail-waggingofadog,whichonehasjustgivenatreat,whichitpromptlyforgets.Tothe question, as to whether one is a nihilist or not, a thinking personwouldverylikely haveto answerwiththetruth:toolittle,perhapsoutofcoldness,becauseone’ssympathywiththatwhich suffers is too slight. In nothingness culminates the abstraction, and the abstract is what is reprehensible. Beckett reacted to the situation oftheconcentration-camps, whichhedoesnot name,asiftherewereabanonsuchlikethatofthegravenimage,intheonlybefittingmanner. Whatis,isliketheconcentration-camp.Oncehespeaksofalifelongdeath-sentence.Theonly hope,faintly dawning,isthattherewouldbenothinganymore.Thistooherejects.Outofthe fissureofinconsistency formedbythis,theimage-world ofnothingnessappearsassomething whichtethershispoetry.Inthelegacyofitstreatment,oftheapparentlystoicalcarrying-on,what isnoiselesslyscreamedisthatthingsoughttobedifferent.Suchnihilismimpliestheoppositeof the identification with nothingness.Gnostically,itregardstheworldasithasbeencreated as radicallyevilanditsrepudiationthepossibilityofadifferent,notyetexistentone.Solongasthe worldisasitis,thenallimagesofreconciliation,peaceandquietresemblethoseofdeath.The smallestdifferencebetweennothingnessandthatwhichhascometorest,wouldbetherefugeof hope, the no-man’s-land between the border-posts of being and nothingness. From thatzone needstobeextricated, insteadofovercoming, theconsciousnessofwhatthealternativewould have no power over. Nihilists are those, who oppose nihilism with their more and more washed-outpositivities, conspiringbymeansofthesewithallexistent maliceandfinallywith thedestructiveprinciple.Whathonorsthought,isdefendingwhatnihilismiscastigatedas.
Kant’sResignation374-377
TheantinomicstructureoftheKantiansystemexpressedmorethancontradictions,inwhichthe speculation on metaphysical objects would necessarily beentangled: somethingindeedinthe history of philosophy. The powerful effect of the critique of reason, far beyond its epistemological content, istobeascribedtothefaithfulnesswithwhichtheworkdemonstrated the state of the experience of consciousness. The historiography of philosophy regards the achievement of the text primarily in the conclusive separation of valid cognition and metaphysics. In fact it first appears as the theory of scientific judgements, nothing more. Epistemology, logic understood in a broader sense, is concerned with the investigation of empirical world according to laws. Kant intends however more. Through the medium of epistemological reflection, he issues the by no means neutral answer to the so-called metaphysicalquestions,thattheseactuallyoughtnotbeasked.TothisextenttheCritiqueofPure ReasonanticipatestheHegeliandoctrine,thatlogicandmetaphysicswouldbethesame,asmuch asthepositivisticone,whichcircumventsthequestions,onwhicheverythingwoulddepend,by means of their abolition, andmediately [mittelbar] decidesthemnegatively.Germanidealism extrapolated its metaphysics from the fundamental claim of epistemology, which makes the attempt to carry the whole. Thought to the end, the critique of reason, which disputes the objectively valid cognition of the absolute, exactly thereby judgesitselftheabsolute.Thisis whatidealismemphasized.Neverthelessitsconsistencybendsthemotifintoitsoppositeandinto what is untrue. Kant’s objectively much more modestdoctrine –read:theoryofscience –is accordedathesis,whichtheformerfightsagainst,inspiteofitsinescapability,withgoodreason. Kantisexpanded,againsthimself,beyondthetheoryofsciencebymeansofconclusionswhich are stringently drawn from him. By means of its consistency idealism violates Kant’s metaphysical reservation; pure consistency-thinking turnsirresistibly intotheabsolute.Kant’s confession, that reason would necessarily entangle itself in those antinomies, which he then dissolved through reason, was anti-positivistic.*1* Nevertheless he does not disdain the positivisticsolace,thatonecouldsettleintothenarrowrealm,whichthecritiqueoftheproperty ofreasonleavesbehindtothislatter,satisfiedwiththefirmsoilunderfoot.Hejoinsinwiththe eminently bourgeois affirmation of one’s own narrowness. According to Hegel’s critique of Kant,theissueofwhetherthejurisdictionofreasonhasoversteppedtheboundariesofpossibility of experience and whether it may do so, already presupposes a position beyond the realms divided on theKantianmap,athirdcourtofappeals,asitwere.*2*Asthepossibility ofthe decision, Kant’s topological zeal insinuates, without giving an account of this, exactly that transcendenceincontrasttotherealmoftheunderstanding,overwhichhedisdainstopositively judge.Thiscourtofappealsbecame theabsolutesubjectofGermanidealism, “Spirit”, which would first produce the dichotomy subject-object andtherebythebordersoffinite cognition. Oncehoweversuchametaphysical viewoftheSpiritlosesitspotency,thentheonlythingthe border-settingintentionstillrestrictsiswhatcognizes,thesubject.Thecriticaloneturnsintothe renouncingone.Nolongertrustingtheinfinityoftheessencewhichanimatesit,itsecuresitself contrarytoitsownessenceinitsownfinitudeandinwhatisfinite.Itwishestobeundisturbed allthewayintothemetaphysicalsublimation,theabsoluteturnsintoanidleconcernforit.This istherepressivesideofcriticism;theidealistswhofollowedwereasfaraheadoftheirclass,as they were in rebellion against it. In the originsofwhatNietzsche stillpraisedasintellectual
honesty,lurkstheself-hatred oftheSpirit,theinnervatedProtestantrageatthewhoreReason. Therationalitywhicheliminatestheimagination,stillheldinhighesteembySt.Simonandthe enlighteners, which,complementarily tothis,driesupbyitself,isirrationalistically corrupted. Evencriticismchangesitsfunction:thechangeofthebourgeoisiefromarevolutionaryclassinto aconservativeoneisrepeatedinit.Theechoofthisphilosophicalmatter-at-handisthemaliceof thesoundhumanunderstanding,proudofitsownnarrowprovincialism, whichfillstheworld today.Itsays,econtrario[Latin:tothecontrary],thattheborders,inwhosecultvirtuallyallare united, are not to be respected. It is “positive”, marked by that selfsame caprice of what is subjectively instituted, for which the “common sense” [in English] embodied in Babbitt denouncesspeculation. Kant’sallegory ofthelandoftruth,theislandintheocean,objectively characterizes theintellectual happinesssquirreledawayinthecornerasaRobinsonade:justas the dynamic of the productive forces quickly enough destroyed the idyll, in which the small-towncitizen[Kleinbürger],justifiablymistrustfulofdynamics,wouldgladlyhavetarried. TheKantianpathosoftheinfinitecrasslyconflictswiththehome-bakednatureofhisdoctrine.If the practical reason has primacy over the theoretical one, then this latter, itself a mode of conduct, would have to reachintowhatitssuperiorispresumablycapable of,unlessitsown concept shouldbecomeuntenablebymeansofthecutbetweenunderstandingandreason.Kant ispushedhoweverpreciselyinthatdirectionbyhisconceptionofscientificity.Hemaynotsayit andyetmustsayit;theinconsistency,whichissoeasilyenteredintotheledgerofthehistoryof theSpiritasarelicofoldermetaphysics,isrealizedbythething.Theislandofcognitionwhich Kantboastedofmeasuring,endsupforitspartthroughself-righteousnarrownessinthatwhich isuntrue,whichheprojectedontothecognitionofwhatisunlimited.Itisimpossibletoendow the cognition of the finite with a truth, which is for its part deducedfromtheabsolute–in Kantian terms: from reason – inwhichthecognition wouldnotreach.TheoceanofKantian metaphorthreatenstoswallowuptheislandateverymoment.
7
DesireofSalvationandBlock377-382
Thatmetaphysicalphilosophy,asitessentiallycoincidedhistoricallywiththegreatsystems,has more glamour than the empiristic and positivistic ones, is not, as theinanewordconceptual poetry would have usbelieve, somethingmerely aesthetic, alsonotanysortofpsychological wish-fulfillment. The immanent quality ofathought–whatmanifests itselftherein inpower, resistance,imagination,astheunityofthecriticalwithitsopposite–is,althoughnoindexveri [Latin:indexoftruth],thenatleastaclue.ThatCarnapandMieseswouldbetruerthanKantand Hegel,couldnotbethetruth,evenifitwereso.TheKantofthecritiqueofreasonsaidinthe doctrine of ideas, that theory would not be possiblewithoutmetaphysics. Thatithoweveris possible,impliesthatrightofmetaphysics,towhichthesameKant,whosmasheditthroughthe effectofhiswork,heldfast.TheKantianrescueoftheintelligiblesphereisnotonly,aseveryone knows,Protestantapologetics,butwouldalsoliketointerveneinthedialecticofenlightenment there,wherethislatterterminatesintheabolitionofreason.HowmuchdeepertheKantiandesire oftherescueisgroundedthansolelyinthepiouswish,toholdsomethingofthetraditionalideas in hand in the midst of and contrary to nominalism, is attested to by the construction of immortality asapostulate ofpracticalreason.Itcondemnstheintolerabilityofwhatexistsand
reinforces the Spirit, which cognizes it. Thatnoinnerworldlybetterment wouldsufficetodo justice tothedead;thatnonewouldtouchupontheinjustice ofdeath,iswhatmovesKantian reason to hope against reason. The secret of his philosophy is the unthinkability of despair. Compelled by the convergence of all thoughts into an absolute, he does not leave it at the absoluteborderbetweentheabsoluteandtheexistent,whichhewasnolesscompelledtodraw. He held fast to the metaphysical ideas and forbade nevertheless the thoughtoftheabsolute, whichmightonedayberealizedjustlikeeternalpeace,fromjumpingtotheconclusionthatthe absolutewouldforthatveryreasonexist.Hisphilosophycircles, probablyjustaseveryother onedoes,bytheway,aroundtheontologicalproofofGod.Withmagnificentambiguity,heleft hisownpositionopen;themotifofthe“AneternalFathermustdwell”[linefromSchiller’sOde to Joy], which Beethoven’s composition of the Kantian hymn to joy [i.e. Beethoven’sNinth Symphony]puttheemphasis,intrueKantianspirit,onthe“must”,standsincontrasttopassages inwhichKant,thereinasclosetoSchopenhauerasthislatterlaterclaimed,rejectedmetaphysical ideas,especiallythatofimmortality,asensnaredintheconceptionsofspaceandtime,andthus fortheirpartdelimited.Hedisdainedthetransitiontoaffirmation.
TheKantianblock,thetheoryoftheboundariesofpossiblepositivecognition,derives, alsoinkeepingwithHegel’scritique,fromtheform-contentdualism.Thehumanconsciousness wouldbe,sorunstheanthropologicalargument,condemnedtoeternalarrest,asitwere,inthe formsofcognition whichitwasoncegiven.Thatwhataffectstheselatterwouldescapeevery determination,itwouldreceiveonlyfromtheformsofconsciousness.Buttheformsarenotthat ultimate, which Kant described them as. By means of the reciprocity between them andthe existent content they also develop in their own right. Thishoweverisincompatible withthe conceptionoftheindestructibleblock.Oncetheformsaremomentsofadynamic,whichwould intruthbefitthetreatment ofthesubjectasanoriginaryapperception,thentheirpositiveform cansolittle bestipulated forallfuturecognitionthananyothersortofcontent,withoutwhich they are not and with which they transform themselves. Only if the dichotomy offormand content were absolute, could Kant maintain that the dichotomy would reject every content comingfromtheforms,notfromthematerialone.Iftheformsappropriatethismaterialmoment themselves,thentheblockshowsitselftobesomethingcreatedbypreciselythesubject,whichit inhibits.Thesubjectbecomesasmuchexaltedasdebased,whenthebordersarelocatedinit,in its transcendental-logical organization. The naïve consciousness, to whichverylikely Goethe inclinedaswell:thatonesimplydoesnotyetknow,butperhapsonecouldstillsolvethepuzzle, is closer to the metaphysical truth than Kant’s ignoramus. His anti-idealistic doctrine of the absolutelimitandtheidealisticoneofabsoluteknowledgearenotatallsohostiletoeachother, as they said of each other; the latter too amounts to this, thatinkeepingwiththecourseof thoughtoftheHegelianPhenomenology,theabsoluteknowingwouldbenothingbutthecourse ofthoughtofphenomenologyitself,thusbynomeanswouldtranscend.
Kant, who frowned upon the precipitate rush into intelligible worlds, equates the subjective side of Newtonian science with cognition, the correspondingly objective onewith truth. The question of how metaphysics would be possible as a science is thus to be taken precisely: as to whether it satisfies the criteria of a cognition oriented towards the ideal of mathematicsandso-calledclassicalphysics.TheKantianposingoftheproblem,whichbearsin mind the metaphysics he assumes to be a natural predisposition, refers to the “how” of the generalizedandnecessarilysupposedcognition;butreallymeansits“what”,itspossibilityitself. Herepudiates this,according tothemeasureofthatideal.Science,whichisreleasedfromany furtherreservationsduetoitsimposingresults,ishowevertheproductofbourgeoissociety.The
rigidlydualistic basicstructureofKant’srational-critical modelduplicatesthatofarelationof production, in which commodities fall out of machines like his phenomena fall out of the cognitivemechanism;wherethematerialanditsowndeterminacyareasindifferentinrelationto their profit as in Kant, who has it stenciled in. The end-product, whichhasexchange-value, resemblestheKantianobjects,whicharesubjectivelyproducedandacceptedasobjectivity.The permanent reductio adhominem [Latin: reduction totheperson]ofeverything whichappears equipscognition fortheendsofinternal andexternal domination; itshighestexpressionisthe principleofunity,borrowedfromthatofcompartmentalizedproduction,dividedintopartialacts. WhatmakestheKantiantheoryofrationalitygrandioseisthatitisreallyinterestedonlyinthe realm of authority of scientific propositions. The delimitation of the Kantian posing of the question to the organized natural-scientific experience, the orientation to validity and epistemologicalsubjectivismaresointerwoventhatonecouldnotbewithouttheother.Aslong asthesubjectiveinquiryissupposedtobethetestofvalidity,solongarecognitionswhichare notscientifically sanctioned, namely non-necessary andnon-universal,inferior; thatiswhyall efforts to emancipate the Kantian epistemology from the natural-scientific realm had to fail. Insidetheidentifyingapproach,onecannotcompletelymakeupforwhattheformereliminates accordingtoitsownessence;atmost,theapproachistobetransformedoutofthecognitionof itsinadequacy.Thatithoweverdoessolittlejusticetothelivingexperience,whichiscognition, indicates its falsehood, the incapacity to achieve what it setsbeforeitself,namely toground experience.Forsuchafoundationinsomethingfixedandinvariantcontradictswhatexperience knowsaboutitself,whichindeed,themoreopenitisandthemoreitrealizesitself,isalways changingitsownforms.Theincapacityofdoingthisistheincapacityofexperienceitself.One canaddnocognitivetheoremstoKant,whicharenotexplicatedbyhim,becausetheirexclusion iscentraltohisepistemology;thesystematicclaimofthedoctrineofpurereasonisregisteredin the exclusion unmistakably enough. Kant’s system is one of stop signals. The subjectively arranged constitutional analysis does not transform the world, as it is given to the naïve bourgeoisconsciousness,butisproudofits“empiricalrealism”.Toit,however,theheightofits claimtovalidityisasonewiththelevelofabstraction.Ittendentiallystampsout,obsessedwith the a priority of its synthetic judgements, everything in cognition whichdoesnotfitintoits ground-rules.Thesocialdivisionoflaborisrespectedwithoutreflectionalongwiththedefect, whichbecame flagrant inthetwohundredyearssincethen:thatthesciences,organizedbythe divisionoflabor,illegitimatelyseizedamonopolyoftruthinthemselves.Theparalogismsofthe Kantian epistemology are, put in bourgeois and very Kantian terms, the uncovered bills of exchange, which went to protest with the development of science into one of a mechanical bustle.TheauthorityoftheKantianconceptoftruthbecameterroristicwiththebanonthinking the absolute. Irresistibly it drives towards the ban on thinkingpureandsimple.TheKantian block projects the self-mutilation of reason on truth, which it inflicts on itself as theriteof initiation of its scientificity. That is why what happens in Kant as cognition is so scanty, compared with the experience of living beings, towhichtheidealistic systems,beiteverso invertedly,wishedtodojustice.
Kant would scarcely have disputed the factthattheideaoftruthmocksthescientific ideal. But the discrepancy is revealed by no means onlyinviewofthemundusintelligibilis [Latin: intelligible world]butineverycognition achievedbytheunconstrainedconsciousness. TothisextenttheKantianblockisanappearance[Schein],whichblasphemesintheSpirit,what inthehymnsofthelateHoederlinisphilosophicallyaheadofphilosophy.Thiswasnotforeign totheidealists,butwhatwasopentothemendedupunderthesamebane,whichforcedKantto
contaminateexperienceandscience.Whilemanyanimpulseofidealismwantedtoaimatwhat isopen,itwouldpursueitbytheextensionoftheKantianprinciple,andthecontentsbecame even less free in it than in Kant.Thisinturniswhatlendshisblockitsmoment oftruth:it preventedthemythologyoftheconcept.Thesocialsuspicioniswell-foundedthatthatblock,the limitbeforetheabsolute,wouldbeonewiththeprivationoflabor,whichreallydoesholdhuman beings in the same bane, which Kant transfigured into philosophy. The imprisonment in immanencetowhichhe,ashonestlyasbrutally,damnstheSpirit,isthatinself-preservation,asit is imposed upon human beings inasociety,whichconservesnothingbutthedenial whichit wouldnolongerneed.Ifthebeetle-likenatural-historicalcare[Sorge]wereoncebrokenthrough, then the position of consciousness towardsthetruthwouldbetransformed.Itscurrentoneis dictated bytheobjectivity,whichconstrains themintheircondition.IftheKantiandoctrineof the block was a piece of social appearance [Scheins], then it is nevertheless just as firmly grounded,asthefactual ruleoftheappearance[Schein]overhumanbeings.Theseparationof sensibility and understanding, the nerveoftheargumentfortheblock,isforitspartasocial product; sensibility is designated by means of the chorismos as thevictim ofunderstanding, becausethearrangementoftheworld,inspiteofallinstitutionstothecontrary,doesnotsatisfy it.Withitssocialcondition,thedivisionwouldinalllikelihoodbeallowedtodisappearoneday, whiletheidealistsareideologues,becausetheyglorifythereconciliationinthemidstofwhatis unreconciled as achieved or ascribe it tothetotality ofwhatisunreconciled. Theireffortsto explicatetheSpiritastheunityofitselfwithwhatisnon-identicaltoit,wereasconsistentasin vain.Suchself-reflectionovertakesthethesisoftheprimacyofpracticalreason,whichreaches fromKantviatheidealistsstraightawaytoMarx.Thedialecticofpraxiswouldalsodemand:the abolition of praxis,ofproductionforproduction’ssake,oftheuniversalcoverofafalseone. Thatisthematerialisticbasisforthetraits,whichrebelinnegativedialecticsagainsttheofficial doctrinal concept of materialism. The moment ofindependence, ofirreducibility intheSpirit may very likely concord with the preponderance [Vorrang] of the object. Where the Spirit becomes autonomous here and now, as soon as it names the fetters in which itendsup,by putting others into fetters, it, and not the entangled praxis,anticipates freedom.Theidealists madeaheavenoftheSpirit,butwoebetidewhoeverhadone.
8
MundusIntelligibilis382-386
Theconstruction oftheblockfacesoppositeinKanttothepositiveoneofmetaphysicsinthe PracticalReason.Hewasbynomeanssilentaboutwhatisdespairinginit:“Unlessmeanwhilea transcendental propertyoffreedomisaddedin,inordertobegintransformationsoftheworld, then this property would nonetheless have to be at the very least only outside of the world (thoughitalwaysremainsaboldpresumption,toassumeanobjectoutsideofthesummationof allpossibleintuitions,whichcannotbegiventoanypossibleperception)”.201 Theparenthesisof the“boldpresumption” registers Kant’sskepticism abouthisownmundusintelligibilis[Latin: intelligible world].Thatformulation fromthefootnotetotheantithesisoftheThirdAntinomy comes quite close to atheism. What was later zealously demanded, is called heretheoretical presumption; Kant’s desperate fear of imagining that the postulate would be an existential
judgement,isstrenuouslyevaded.Accordingtothepassage,whatoughttobeabletobethought asanobject ofpossibleintuition, attheveryleast,iswhatmustsimultaneouslybethoughtas something removed from every such intuition. Reason would have to capitulate to the contradiction, be it only for prescribing itself borders through hubris, irrationalistically delimiting itsownrealmofvalidity,withoutbeingobjectivelytied,asreason,tothoseborders. But if intuition too was incorporated into infinite reason, as in the idealists and also the neo-Kantians,thentranscendencewouldbevirtuallycashieredbytheimmanenceoftheSpirit.–WhatKantbrieflyhintsatwithrespecttofreedom,wouldapplyfirstandforemosttoGodand immortality.Forthesewordsdonotrelatetoanypurepossibilityofconduct,butare,according totheirownconcept,postulatesofanexistent,howeverstylized.Thislatterrequiresa“matter” andwoulddependinKantcompletelyonthatintuition,whosepossibilityheexcludesfromthe transcendental ideas. The pathos of what is intelligible to Kant is the complement of the difficultyofassuringitselfofanything,evenifitwereonlyinthemediumoftheself-sufficient thought,whichthewordintelligibledesignates.Itmaynotnameanythingreal.Themovementof the Critique of Practical Reason meanwhile proceeds towards a positivity of the mundus intelligibilis[Latin:intelligibleworld],whichwasnotenvisionedinKant’sintention.Assoonas theought-to-be[Seinsollende], emphatically separated fromtheexistent, isexemplified asthe realmofitsownessenceandendowedwithabsoluteauthority,ittakesonthroughtheprocedure, beiteversoinvoluntarily,thecharacterofasecondexistence.Thethoughtthatdoesnotthink any something, isnoneatall.Ideas,thecontent ofmetaphysics, maynomorebegraphically clear than mirages; otherwise they would be robbed ofeveryobjectivity Whatisintelligible would be swallowed up by exactly that subject, which the intelligible sphere issupposedto transcend.AcenturyafterKanttheflattening oftheintelligibleintotheimaginarybecamethe cardinal sin of neo-Romanticism and the Jugendstil, and of their tailor-madephilosophy,the phenomenologicalone.Theconceptoftheintelligibleisneitheroneofsomethingrealnoroneof somethingimaginary Ratheraporetic.Nothingonearthandnothingintheemptyheavensisto be saved, by defending it.The“yesbut”retorttothecritical argument,whichdoesnotwish somethingtobetornawayfromit,alreadyhastheformofthestubbornlyinsistentexistent,of the clinging, irreconcilable with the idea of salvation, inwhichthecrampofsuchprolonged self-preservationwouldrelax.Nothingcanbesaveduntransformed,nothing,whichhasnotmade itswaythroughthedoorofitsdeath.IfsalvationistheinnermostimpulseofeverySpirit,thenis therenohopeexceptthatofunreservedabandonment:ofwhatistoberescuedaswellasofthe Spirit, which hopes. Thegestusofhopeisthatwhichholdsontonothingofwhatthesubject itself wishes to hold onto, by which the latter promises itself, that it would endure. The intelligible,inthespiritofKant’ssettingofboundariesnolessthanthatoftheHegelianmethod, would be to gobeyondthese,tothinksolelynegatively.Paradoxically,theintelligible sphere envisagedbyKantwouldbeoncemore“appearance”[Erscheinung]:whatreturnstothatwhich ishiddenfromthefinite Spirit,whatitiscompelled tothinkandbyvirtueofitsownfinitude deforms.Theconcept oftheintelligible istheself-negationofthefiniteSpirit.Whatmerelyis becomes,intheSpirit,awareofitsdefect;thefarewellfromtheexistenceobdurateinitselfisthe originofthatintheSpirit,whichseparatesitfromtheprincipleinit,whichexploitsnature.This turnofphrasewishes,thatnotevenititselfwouldturnintotheexistent:otherwisethemonotony wouldrepeatitselfendlessly.WhatishostiletolifeintheSpiritwouldbenothingbutheinous,if itdidnotculminateinitsself-reflection.Theasceticismwhichitdemandsfromothersisfalse, gooditsown:initsself-negationitgoesbeyonditself;thiswasnotsoalientothelaterKantian MetaphysicsofMorals,asonemightexpect.InordertobetheSpirit,itmustknowthatitdoes
notexhaustitselfinwhatitreaches;norinthefinitude,whichitresembles.Thatiswhyitthinks whatwouldbebeyondit.Suchmetaphysical experience inspiredKant’sphilosophy,onceitis broken out of the mythical armor [Panzer] of the method. The consideration, as to whether metaphysics wouldbeatallstillpossible,mustreflectthenegationofwhatisfinite,whichthe finite demands. Its enigma animates the word intelligible. Its conception is not entirely unmotivated thanks to that moment of independence, which the Spirit lost through its absolutizationandwhichthislatterobtainsforitspartaswhatisnotidenticalwiththeexistent, as soon asthenon-identical isinsisted upon,thatnoteverything existent isevaporated inthe Spirit.TheSpiritparticipates,inallitsmediations,inexistence,whichsubstitutedforitsalleged transcendental purity. It isinthemoment oftranscendental objectivity init,whichcanbeno moresplitoffthanontologized,thatthepossibilityofmetaphysicshasitsinconspicuouslocale. Theconceptoftheintelligiblerealmwouldbethatofsomethingwhichisnotandyetisnotonly not.Inkeepingwiththerulesofthesphere,whichnegatethemselvesintheintelligibleone,these wouldhavetobeunresistinglyrejectedasimaginary.Nowhereelseistruthsofragileashere.It can degenerate into a hypostasis of something thought up for no reason at all,inwhichthe thoughtimaginestopossesswhatislost;theeffort,tocomprehendit,iseasilyconfusedinturn withtheexistent. Thethoughtisnugatorywhichconfuseswhatisthoughtwithwhatisreal,in the false conclusion, demolished by Kant, of the ontological proof of God. The mistaken conclusion is aresulthoweveroftheimmediate elevation ofnegativity,ofthecritique ofthe merelyexistent,intosomethingpositive,asiftheinsufficiencyofthatwhichis,wouldguarantee, thatwhatis,wouldberidofthatinsufficiency Eveninextremitythenegationofthenegationis nopositivity Kantcalledthetranscendentaldialecticalogicofappearance[Schein]:thedoctrine of the contradictions, in which every treatment of thetranscendental assomethingpositively cognizablewouldinevitablyentangleitself.HisverdictisnotrenderedobsoletebyHegel’seffort tovindicatethelogicoftheappearance[Schein]asthatofthetruth.Butthereflectiondoesnot breakoffwiththeverdictonappearance[Schein].Becomeconsciousofitself,itisnolongerthe oldone.Whatissaidbyfinite beingsabouttranscendence,isthelatter’sappearance[Schein], however,asKantwellknew,anecessaryone.Thatiswhythesalvationofappearance[Schein], theobjectofaesthetics,hasitsincomparablemetaphysicalrelevance.
9
Neutralization386-391
InAnglo-SaxoncountriesKantisofteneuphemisticallycalledanagnostic.Aslittleofthewealth of his philosophy this leaves, the horrid simplification is not completely nonsensical. The antinomicstructureoftheKantiandoctrine,whichsurvivesthedissolutionoftheantinomies,can be crudely translated into the injunction upon thinking, to refrain from idle questions. It excessively increases the vulgar form ofbourgeoisskepticism, whosesoliditytakesseriously onlythatwhichisheldsafelyinhand.Kantwasnotentirelyfreeofsuchamentality.Thatinthe categorical imperative andalready intheideasoftheCritiqueofPureReason,headdsinthat denigrated sublimity with raised forefinger, a bonus, which the bourgeoisie is as loathe to dispensewithasitsSunday,theparodyoffreedomfromlabor–thissurelyreinforcedKant’s authority in Germany, far beyond the effect of the thoughts themselves. The moment of non-committal[unverbindlicher]conciliationinrigorismfitswellwiththetendencytowardsthe neutralization of everything intellectual in décor,whichafterthevictoryoftherevolution or,
where this did not occur, through the imperceptible bourgeoisification which ended up prevailing, conquered the entire scenery of the Spirit andalsothetheoremswhichbourgeois emancipation previously employed asaweapon.Sincetheinterests ofthevictoriousclassno longerneededthem,theybecame,asSpenglerastutelyenoughnotedinRousseau,uninteresting in a double sense. The function of the Spirit is subordinated in society, although the latter ideologically praisestheformer.TheKantiannonliquet [Latin: notproven]contributedtothe transformation of critique of the religions allied to feudalism into that indifference, which donnedaveilofhumanityunderthenameoftolerance.TheSpirit,asmetaphysicsnolessthan asart,neutralizesitselfthemorethatwhatsocietyisproudofasitsculture,losesanyrelationto possiblepraxis.IntheKantianmetaphysicalideasthislatterwasstillunmistakable.Withthem bourgeoissocietywantedtoescapeitsownrestrictedprinciple,tosublateitself,asitwere.Such aSpiritbecomesunacceptable andculture intoacompromise betweenitsbourgeoisutilizable formand,aftermodernGermannomenclature,whatisinsupportableinit,whichitprojectsinto the unattainable distance. The material circumstances render anadditional service.Underthe compulsiontoexpandedinvestment,capitalbecomesmasteroftheSpirit,whoseobjectifications arebyvirtueoftheirownandunavoidablehypostatizationspurredtoturnthelatterintoproperty, into commodities. Thesatisfaction ofaesthetics, devoidofinterest, transfigures theSpiritand debasesit,inthatitissatisfiedtoconsider,toadmire,intheendtoblindlyanddisconnectedly revereeverythingwhichwasoncecreatedandthoughtthere,regardlessofitstruth-content.With objective mockery, the increasing commodity character aestheticizes culture for the sake of utility Philosophy turns into the manifestation of the Spirit as a showpiece. What Bernard Groethuysentracedbackinreligiontotheeighteenthandseventeenthcenturies:thatthedevilis nolongertobefearedandGodisnolongertobehopedfor,expandsbeyondmetaphysics,in whichtherecollectionofGodandthedevilliveson,evenwhereitcriticallyreflectsonthatfear and hope. What disappears, is what ought to be most urgent to human beings in a highly unideological sense;objectivelyithasbecomeproblematic;subjectivelythesocialwebandthe permanent overtaxing through the pressure to conform grants them neither the time nor the poweranylongertothinkaboutit.Thequestionsarenotsolved,noteventheirinsolubilityis referredto.Theyareforgotten,andwheretheyaretalkedabout,theyarelulledonlythatmuch deeperintotheirbadsleep.Goethe’sfataldictum,thatEckermannneednotreadKant,because hisphilosophyhashaditseffect,hascrossedoverintothegeneralconsciousness,hastriumphed inthesocializationofmetaphysicalindifference.
Theindifferenceoftheconsciousness towardsmetaphysicalquestions,whicharebyno means resolved through satisfaction in thisworld,isbynomeansamatter ofindifferenceto metaphysics itself.Hiddenthereinisahorror,which,ifhumanbeingsdidnotrepressit,would take their breath away. One could be led to anthropological speculations, as to whether the developmental-historicalrecoil,whichendowedthehumanspecieswiththeopenconsciousness andtherebythatofdeath,contradictsaneverthelessongoinganimalconstitution,whichdoesnot permit ittobearthatconsciousness.Thepossibilityofthecontinuationoflifewouldentailthe priceofarestriction ofconsciousness, whichprotectsitfromwhatitneverthelessisitself,the consciousness of death. Inconsolable the perspective, that the narrow provincialism of all ideologies couldbetraced backbiologically,asitwere,toanecessityofself-preservationand wouldbynomeansdisappearwitharightarrangementofsociety,thoughindeeditisonlyinthe rightsocietythatthepossibility oftherightlifewouldarise.Thepresentonestillspreadslies about how death is not to be feared, and sabotages the reflection on this. Schopenhauer’s pessimism tooknoticeofhowlittlehumanbeingsmediainvita[Latin:inthemidstoflife]are
wont to concern themselves with death.*3* He read this indifference, just like Heidegger a hundredyearslater,astheessenceofhumanbeings,insteadofreadinghumanbeingsasproducts of history. The lack of metaphysical meaning turns into a metaphysicum [Latin: something metaphysical] forboth.Bythisatanyratethedepthsaretobemeasured,whichneutralization, anexistential inbourgeoisconsciousness,plumbs.Thisdepthawakensthedoubtastowhether things,asaromantictraditionwhichsurvivedallromanticismhasdrilledintotheSpirit,wereall that different in the times allegedly overflowing with metaphysics, which the young Lukacs called the ones of plenitude [sinnerfüllten]. The tradition drags along a paralogism. The enclosureofcultures,thecollectivecommittalness[Verbindlichkeit]ofmetaphysicalintuitions, their power over life, does not guarantee their truth. Rather the possibility of metaphysical experience isthesiblingofthatoffreedom,andonlythedevelopedsubject,whichhastornthe bondspraisedasholy,iscapableofit.Thesociallysanctioned,dull-wittedintuitionofallegedly blissful times is by contrast related to the naïve positivistic belief infacts.Theegomustbe historically strengthened, inordertoconceiveoftheimmediacyoftherealityprinciplebeyond theideaofwhatismorethantheexistent. Thesocialorder,whichshrinksitselfdownintoits ownmeaning,alsosealsitselfoffagainstthepossibilitybeyondthesocialorder.Metaphysicsis incontrasttotheologynotmerely,asperpositivisticdoctrine,ahistoricallylaterstage,notonly the secularization of theology into the concept. It preserves theology in its critique ofit,by uncovering to human beings the possibility of what theology imposed on them and thereby violated.Theforcesexplodedthecosmosofthespirit,whichboundthem;thelatterreceivedits justdeserts.TheautonomousBeethoven ismoremetaphysical thanBach’sordo[Latin:social order]; therefore truer Subjectively emancipated and metaphysical experience converge in humanity Everyexpressionofhope,whichemanatesfromgreatworksofartmorepowerfully thanthetheologicaltextshandeddownbytraditionevenintheerawhentheformerarefalling silent, is configured with that of human beings; nowhere more unambiguously than in the moment of Beethoven. What signifies that not everything is in vain, is theself-reflection of natureinsubjects,throughthesympathywiththatwhichishuman;solelyintheexperienceofits own natural base [Naturhaftigkeit] does thegeniusescapefromnature.ItistoKant’slasting honor that he, like no other philosopher, registered the constellation of the human and the transcendentalinthedoctrineoftheintelligible.Beforehumanityopeneditseyes,humanbeings exhaustedthemselvesundertheobjectivepressureoflife-and-deathnecessityinthedisgraceof theirneighbors,andthelife-immanence ofmeaning isthecoveroftheirprejudice.Eversince something like organized society arose at large, as a solidly buttressed, autarkic context, the pressuretoleaveitwasonlyweak.Thechildwhichwasnotalreadyprepared,couldnothelpbut bestruckbyhowimpoverishedandthinthesectioninitsProtestantsong-bookis,whichbears thetitleTheLastThings,comparedwithallthepracticedrillsofwhatthebelieversaretobelieve andhowtheyaretobehave.Thelong-standingsuspicion,thatmagicandsuperstitioncontinueto flourishinreligion, hasasitsflipside,thatthecoreofthepositivereligions,thehopeofthe beyond, was scarcely ever so important as its concept demanded. Metaphysical speculation unites with the one of the philosophy of history: it has faith in the possibility of a right consciousness evenofthoselastthingssolelyinafuturewithoutlife-and-deathnecessity.The curse of the latter is that they do not drive beyond mere existence so much as disguise it, solidifyingitasametaphysical authority.The“all isvanity”, withwhichthegreattheologists sinceSolomonbethoughtimmanence,istooabstracttoleadbeyondimmanence.Wherehuman beingsareassuredoftheindifferenceoftheirexistence,theyraisenoobjections;aslongasthey donotchangetheirpositiontowardsexistence,anyotheroneisidleforthem.Whoeveraccuses
theexistentofnullitywithoutdistinctionandwithoutaperspectiveofwhatispossible,furnishes assistance tothedullbustle.Theanimalitytowardswhichsuchtotalpraxistendsisworsethan thefirst:itbecomesitselfaprinciple.TheCapucinsermonofthevanityofimmanencesecretly liquidates the transcendence as well, which was once fed from experiences in immanence. Neutralization however, deeply complicit with that indifference, has still survived the catastrophes,whichaccordingtothefanfaresoftheapologistsaresupposedtohavethrownback humanbeingsontowhatradicallyconcernsthem.Forthefundamentalconstitutionofsocietyhas not changed. It damns the theology and metaphysics resurrected out ofnecessity,inspiteof many brave Protestant attempts to resist, to the passport of the mindset of conformity. No rebellion of mere consciousness leads beyond this. Even in the consciousness of subjects, bourgeois society would rather choose total destruction, its objective potential, rather than bringingitselftoreflectionswhichmightthreatenitsfoundations.Themetaphysicalinterestsof humanbeingsrequiretheundiminished perception oftheirmaterial ones.Aslongastheyare veiled from them, they live under the veilofMaya.Onlywhen,whatis,ischanged,isthat, whichis,noteverything.
10
OnlyanAllegory391-394
In a commentary published decades after his composition of George’s Rapture, Arnold Schoenberg praised the poem as the prophetic anticipation of the feelings of astronauts. By naivelyreducingoneofhismostsignificantworkstothelevelof“sciencefiction”[inEnglish], heinvoluntarily acted outoftheprivation ofmetaphysics.Doubtlessthematerialcontentisin the neo-Romantic poem, the face of someone who steps on “other planets”, the allegory of somethinginternalized, ofecstasy andelevation reminiscent ofMaximinus. Theecstasyisnot anyinspace,wereiteveninthecosmicexperience,althoughitmustborrowitsimagesfromthis latter.Butexactly thisbetraystheobjective groundofthefartooearthlyexegesis.Totakethe promiseoftheologyliterally wouldbeasbarbaric asthislatter.Onlyhistoricallyaccumulated respect inhibits the consciousness of that. And the poetic elevation is purloined from the theologicalrealmlikethesymboliclanguageofthatcyclegenerally.Religionàlalettre[French: literally]wouldindeedresemble“sciencefiction”[inEnglish];spacetravelwouldleadintothe real promised heaven. The theologists could not refrain from childish reflections on the consequences of rocket travel for their Christology, while conversely the infantilism of the interest in rocket travel brings the latent one of tidings of salvation to light. If these were howeverpurifiedofallmaterialcontent,utterlysublimated,thentheywouldencounterthemost excruciating embarrassment at having to say, what they stand for. If every symbol only symbolizes another one, something once more conceptual, then its core remains empty and therebythereligion. Thisistheantinomy oftheological consciousnesstoday.TheTolstoyan–anachronistic–Ur-Christianitywouldgetalongwithittheeasiest,thesuccessorChristihereand nowwithoutanyreflection,withclosedeyes.Somethingoftheantinomyisalreadyhiddeninthe constructionofFaust.Withtheverse,“Ihearthetidingsindeed,butIlackthefaith”heinterprets his own depth of emotions, which preserves him from suicide, as the return of deceptive consoling traditions from childhood. Nevertheless he ascends into theMarianist heaven.The poemdoesnotdecide, astowhetheritsprogressivecoursewouldrefutetheskepticismofthe
maturethinkerorwhetheritslastwordwouldbeoncemoreasymbol–“onlyanallegory”–and transcendencesecularized,inwell-nighHegelianfashion,intotheimageofthewholeoffulfilled immanence. Whoevermakestranscendence thingly-solid [dingfest],canbejustifiablycharged, asbyKarlKraus,withlackofimagination,hostilitytotheintellect,andinthesethebetrayalof transcendence. Ifbycontrastthepossibility ofredemption intheexistent,beiteversodistant andweak,istotally cutoff,thentheSpiritwouldturnintoanillusion,ultimatelydeifyingthe finite, conditioned, merely existent subjectasthecarrier oftheSpirit.Thisparadoxofwhatis transcendenthadananswerinRimbaud’svisionofahumanityemancipatedfromoppressionas the true deity. Later the Old-Kantian Mynona undisguisedly mythologized the subject and rendered idealism manifest as hubris. With these sorts of speculative consequences, “science fiction”androcketryeasilycametoanunderstanding.Ifinfacttheearthwastheonlyheavenly body inhabited by rational beings, then that would be a metaphysicum [Latin: something metaphysical], whose idiocy would denounce metaphysics; in the end human beings would really bethegods,onlyunderthebane,whichpreventsthemfromknowit–andwhatgods!–indeed without domination over the cosmos, whereby such speculations are fortunately once againrenderedvoid.
Allmetaphysical oneshoweverarepushedfatally intotheapocryphal. Theideological untruth in the conception of transcendence is the separation of body and soul, reflex of the divisionoflabor.Itleadstotheidolizationoftherescogitans[Latin:thinkingsubstance]asthe principlewhichexploitsnature,andtothematerialdenial,whichwoulddissolveintheconcept ofatranscendencebeyondthecontextofguilt.Hopehoweverclings,asinMignon’ssong,tothe transfiguredbody Metaphysicsdoesnotwanttohearanythingofthis,doesnotwanttodemean itselfwithwhatismaterial.Thatiswhyitcrossesthelinetotheinferiorbeliefinspirits.Thereis nodifferencebetweenthehypostasisofanoncorporealandneverthelessindividualizedSpirit–forwhatindeedwouldtheologyhaveleftinitshandswithoutit–andthefraudulentassertionof existing purely spiritual beings through spiritism, than the historical dignity,whichgarbsthe conceptoftheSpirit.Socialsuccess,socialpowerturnsthroughsuchdignityintothecriterionof metaphysical truth. Spiritualism, in German the doctrine of the Spirit as the individual-substantial principle, is,withoutitsfinalletters, theEnglishwordforspiritism.The equivocation restsupontheepistemologicalprivation,whichoncemotivatedtheidealiststogo beyondtheanalysisoftheindividualconsciousnesstowardstheconstructionofatranscendental orabsoluteone.Individual consciousness isapiece ofthespatio-temporalworld,withoutany prerogativeoverthisandnottobeconceivedofasdetachedfromtheworldofbodiesaccording toahumanfaculty.Theidealistic construction however,whichintendstoeliminatetheearthly remains,becomesdevoidofessence,assoonasittotallystampsoutthategoity,whichwasthe model for the concept of the Spirit. Hence the assumption of an insensible egoity, which is neverthelesssupposedtomanifestitselfasexistence,contrarytoitsowndetermination,inspace andtime.Accordingtothecurrentstateofcosmology,heavenandhellasexistentsinspaceare simple archaisms. This would relegate immortality tothatofthespirits,lendingitsomething ghostlyandunreal,whichmocksitsownconcept.TheChristiandogmatics,whichthoughtofthe awakening of soulsascoinciding withtheresurrection oftheflesh,wasmetaphysically more consistent –moreenlightened, ifyouwill–thanspeculative metaphysics; justashopemeans corporealresurrectionandknowsthroughitsintellectualizationthatithasbeenrobbedofwhatis best. With that meanwhile the unreasonable demands of metaphysical speculation increase unbearably.Cognitionweighsheavilyonthesideofabsolutemortality,whichisintolerabletoit, beforewhichitturnsintosomethingabsolutelyindifferent.Thisiswhattheideaoftruthdrives
Theontological proofofGodis,inspiteoftheKantiancritiqueand,asitwere,absorbingthis latterintoitself,resurrectedintheHegeliandialectic.Howeverinvain.InthatHegelconsistently dissolvesthenon-identical intopureidentity,theconceptbecomestheguarantorofwhatisnot conceptual, transcendence is captured by the immanence of the Spirit and is so much as abolished into its totality The more transcendence is subsequently disassembled through enlightenmentintheworldandintheSpirit,themoreitturnsintosomethinghidden,asifithad concentrateditselfintoanextremepointbeyondallmediations.Tothisextenttheanti-historical theologyoftheutterly divergenthasitshistoricalindex.Thequestionofmetaphysicssharpens itself, as to whether this wholly thin, abstract, indeterminate thingwouldbeitsultimate and already lostdefensiveposition,orwhethermetaphysics survivesaloneinwhatisslightestand shabbiest, in the state of complete inconspicuousness [Unscheinbarkeit], which brings the high-handedreason,whichtakescareofbusinesswithoutresistance andwithoutreflection,to reason.Thethesisofpositivism isthatofthenullityofmetaphysics,eventhatwhichfledinto profanity.Eventheideaoftruthissacrificed,forwhosesakepositivismwasinitiated.Tohave establishedthis,isWittgenstein’sachievement,howeverwell,incidentally,hisvowofsilencefits with the falsely resurrected, dogmatic metaphysics, no longer to be distinguished from the wordlessly ecstatic naïve faith in being. What would not be affected by demythologization, without apologetically making itself available, would be no argument – whose sphere isthe antinomical pureandsimple–buttheexperience, thatthethought,whichdoesnotcutoffits ownhead,culminatesintranscendence,downtotheideaofaconstitutionoftheworldinwhich not only existent suffering would be abolished, but would revoke even the sort which is irrevocably past.Theconvergenceofallthoughtsintheconceptofsomething,whichwouldbe differentfromtheunspeakableexistent,theworld,isnotthesameastheinfinitesimalprinciple withwhichLeibnizandKanthadthoughttorendertheideaoftranscendencecommensurableto ascience, whoseownfallibility,theconfusionoftheexploitationofnatureandbeing-in-itself, motivates the correcting experience of convergence. Theworldisworsethanhellandbetter. Worse, because not even the nihility of that absolute would be, as which it ultimately still appears in Schopenhauerian Nirvana as reconcilable. The inescapably closed context of immanencedenieseventhatmeaning,whichtheIndianphilosophemeoftheworldasthedream ofanevildemonglimpsesinsuch;Schopenhauerthinksmistakenly,becausehedeclaresthelaw,
which preserves immanence in its own bane, unmediated tothatwhichisessential, whichis barredfromimmanenceandcouldnotatallbeconceivedotherthanastranscendent.Theworld isbetter,becausetheabsoluteconclusiveness whichSchopenhauercreditstothecourseofthe worldisborrowedforitspartfromtheidealisticsystem,pureidentity-principleandasdeceptive asany.Thedisturbedanddamaged courseoftheworldis,asinKafka,alsoincommensurable with the sense of its own sheer senselessness and blindness, not to be stringently construed accordingtotheirprinciple.Itconflictswiththeattemptofthedespairingconsciousness,toposit despairasanabsolute.Thecourseoftheworldisnotcompletelyconclusive,alsonotabsolute despair;thislatter isonthecontraryitsconclusiveness.AsuntenableasthetracesoftheOther areinit;asmuchasallhappinessisdistortedbyitsrevocability,theexistentisneverthelessshot through,inthegapswhichstampidentityasalie,withthepromises,constantlybrokenagain,of thatOther.Everyhappinessisafragmentofthetotalhappiness,whichhumanbeingsaredenied andwhichtheydenythemselves. Convergence,thehumanlypromisedOtherofhistory,points unswervingly to what ontology illegitimately resettles beforehistoryorexemptsfromit.The concept is not real, as the ontological proof would have it, but it could not be thought, if something in the thing did not press towardsit.Kraus,who,armoredagainsteverytangible, imaginatively unimaginative assertion oftranscendence, preferredtoreadthislatter longingly ratherthancancel itout,wasnoromanticliberalmetaphorist.Thoughmetaphysicsisnottobe resurrected–theconceptofresurrectionbelongstocreatures,nottosomethingcreated,andis,in intellectualforms,theindexoftheiruntruth–butperhapsitonlyoriginateswiththerealization ofwhatisthoughtinitssign.Artanticipatessomethingofthis.Nietzsche’sworkoverflowswith invectiveagainstmetaphysics.Butnoformulationdescribesthelattermorefaithfullythanthatof Zarathustra:purefool,purepoet.Thethinkingartistunderstoodtheunthoughtart.Thethought, whichdoesnotcapitulate beforethemiserably ontic,turnsbythelatter’scriteriaintonothing, truthintountruth,philosophyintofolly Neverthelessitcannotabdicate,leststupiditytriumphin realizedunreason.Auxsotsjepréfèrelesfous[French:Topigs,Ipreferfools].Follyistruthin the form, with which human beings are stricken, assoonastheydonot,inthemidstofthe untrue, let go of truth. Even in its highest achievements art is appearance [Schein]; the appearance [Schein],however,whatisirresistible init,itreceives fromwhatdoesnotappear [Scheinlosen]. Byrefraining fromjudgement, itsays,especially theonesscornedasnihilistic, thateverything wouldnotbejustnothing.Otherwise,whatalwaysis,wouldbepale,colorless, indifferent. There is no light on human beings and things, in which transcendence is not reflected. Inextinguishable, theresistance againstthefungibleworldofexchangeinthatofthe eye,whichdoesnotwantthecolorsoftheworldtobedestroyed.Inappearance[Schein]isthe promiseofwhatdoesnotappear[Scheinlose].
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Self-reflectionofDialectics397-400
Atquestionis,whethermetaphysics,astheknowledgeoftheabsolute,wouldatallbepossible withouttheconstructionofabsoluteknowledge,withoutthatidealism,whichlendsitstitletothe lastchapteroftheHegelianPhenomenology.Doesn’titsay,thatwhoeverdealswiththeabsolute, would necessarily be the thinking organ, capable of doing this, precisely thereby itself the absolute;wouldnotdialectics,ontheotherhand,inthetransitiontoametaphysics,whichisnot
simplythesameasdialectics,violateitsownstrictconceptofnegativity?Dialectics,theepitome ofnegativeknowledge,wouldlikenoneotherbesideit;evenasthenegativekind,itdragsalong withitselfthecommandment ofexclusivity fromthepositivekind,fromthesystem.Itwould havetonegate,accordingtosuchreasoning,non-dialecticalconsciousnessasfiniteandfallible. Inallitshistoricalformsithasrefusedtostepoutofit.Itmediatedconceptually,whetherwilled orno,betweentheunconditionalandthefinitespirit;thismadetheologyintermittentlytimeand againintoitsenemy.Althoughitthinkstheabsolute,thelatterremains,assomethingmediated bytheformer,inthralltoconditionedthought.IftheHegelianabsolutewasthesecularizationof thedeity,thennevertheless precisely thatofitssecularization; asthetotality oftheSpiritthat absoluteremainedenchainedtoitsfinitehumanmodel.Ifthoughthoweverintheundiminished consciousnessofthisreaches,gropingly,beyondanythingofthissort,inthatitnamestheOther assomethingutterlyincommensurabletoit,whichitneverthelessthinks,thenitwillfindshelter nowhereelsethaninthedogmatic tradition. Thinkingisinsuchthoughtsalien toitscontent, unreconciled,andnewlycondemnedtotwosortsoftruth,whichwouldbeincompatiblewiththe idea of the true. Metaphysics depends upon whether one can get out of this aporia without underhanded trickery. To do this, dialectics, at once the imprint of the universal context of mystification and its critique, must turn in one last movement against itself. The critique of everything particular,whichpositsitselfabsolutely,isthatoftheshadowofabsolutenessover thecritiqueitself,ofthefactthatit,too,againstitstendency,mustremaininthemediumofthe concept.Itdestroystheidentity-claim,byhonoringitinitstesting.Thatiswhyitonlyreachesso farasthislatter Thelatterstampstheformerasthemagiccirclewiththeappearance[Schein]of absoluteknowledge.Itisuptoitsself-reflectiontocancelitout,exactlythereinthenegationof thenegation,whichdoesnotcrossoverintoaposition.Dialecticsistheself-consciousnessofthe objectivecontextofdelusion,notsomethingalreadyescapedfromthislatter Tobreakoutofthe latterfrominside,isobjectivelyitsgoal.Thepowertobreakoutgrowsinitfromthecontextof immanence; whatwouldapplytoit,oncemore,isHegel’sdictum,thatdialecticswouldabsorb thepoweroftheopponent,turningitagainstthelatter;notonlyinwhatisdialecticallyindividual but in the end in the whole. It grasps, with the means of logic, this latter’s character of compulsion,hopingthatitwouldyield.Theabsolutehowever,asithoversbeforemetaphysics, would be the non-identical, which would only emerge until after the identity-compulsion dissolved.Withouttheidentity-thesis dialectics isnotthewhole;butthereforealsonocardinal sin,toleaveitinadialecticalstep.Itliesinthedeterminationofnegativedialectics,thatitdoes not come to rest within itself, as if it were total; that is its form of hope. Kant indicated somethingofthisinthedoctrineofthetranscendentalthinginitselfbeyondthemechanismof identification.Howeverstringentthecritiqueofthatdoctrinebyhissuccessors,theyregressively reinforcedthebanethatmuchmore,justlikethepost-revolutionarybourgeoisieasawhole:they hypostasized the compulsion itself as the absolute. To be sure Kant, for his part, in the determinationofthethinginitselfasthatofanintelligibleessence,conceivedoftranscendence as the non-identical, but equated it with the absolute subject, bowing nonetheless to the identity-principle. Theprocessofcognition, whichissupposedtoapproachthetranscendental thingasymptotically,slidesitaheadofitself,asitwere,andremovesitfromconsciousness.The identifications of the absolute transpose it onto the human beings, from whom the identity-principle derives; they are, as they at times confess and as the enlightenment can strikinglydemonstratetothemeverytime,anthropomorphisms.Thatiswhytheabsolute,which the Spirit approaches,meltsawaybeforeit:itsapproachisamirage. Howeverthesuccessful eliminationofeveryanthropomorphism,withwhichthecontextofdelusionwouldberemoved,
very likely coincides in the endwiththislatter,withabsoluteidentity.Todenythesecretby identification,byconstantlytearingmorechunksoutofit,doesnotsolveit.Rather,asthoughin play,itstampsthecontrolofnatureasalie,bymeansofthemementoofthepowerlessnessofits power.Enlightenmentleavesasgoodasnothingleftofmetaphysicaltruth-content,presquerien [French:almostnothing]afteramodernmusicalterm.Whatshrinksbackbecomeseversmaller, justasGoetheportrayedintheparable ofthelittleboxoftheNewMelusine,whichnamesan extremity; ever more inconspicuous [unscheinbarer]; this isthereasonthat,inthecritique of cognition as much asinthephilosophyofhistory,metaphysics migrates intomicrology.This latter is the place of metaphysics as the refuge fromwhatistotal. Nothingabsoluteistobe expressedotherwisethaninthesubject-matterandcategoriesofimmanence,whilenevertheless thislatterisnottobedeifiedeitherinitsconditionalityorasitstotalsummation.Metaphysicsis, accordingtoitsownconcept,notpossibleasadeductivecontextofjudgementsovertheexistent. Justaslittlecanitbethoughtaccordingtothemodelofthatwhichisabsolutelydivergent,which fearsomelymocksthinking.Consequentlyitwouldbepossiblesolelyasthelegibleconstellation of the existent. From this latter it wouldreceive itsmaterial, withoutwhichitwouldnotbe, wouldnothowevertransfiguretheexistenceofitselements,butwouldbringtheminsteadintoa configuration in which the elements assemble into a script. To that end it must be good at wishing.ThatthewishwouldbeabadfathertothethoughthasbeensinceXenophanesoneof the general theses of the European enlightenment, and still applies undiminished against the ontologicalattemptsatrestoration.Butthinking,itselfaconduct,containstheneed–atfirstthe life-and-death necessity –initself.Onethinksoutofneed,evenwhere“wishfulthinking”[in English] is dismissed. Themotoroftheneedisthatoftheeffort,whichthinkinginvolvesas activity Theobjectofcritiqueisthereforenottheneedinthinkingbuttherelationshipbetween both. The need in thinking wishes, however, that there would be thinking. It demands its negationthroughthinking,itmustdisappearintothinking,ifitisreallysupposedtobesatisfied, andinthisnegation itliveson,representing intheinnermostcellsofthought,whatisnotthe sameasthelatter Thesmallestinnerworldlymarkingswouldberelevanttotheabsolute,forthe micrological glance demolishes the shells of that which is helplessly compartmentalized according to the measure of its subsuming master concept and explodes its identity, the deception,thatitwouldbemerelyanexemplar.Suchthinkingissolidaristicwithmetaphysicsin themomentofthelatter’sfall.
AsteriskedNotesPages354-400
*1*[Footnotepg375]
“Adialectical thesisofpurereasonmustaccordingly havethisdistinction fromallsophistical suppositionsinitself,thatitdoesnotconcernanarbitraryquestion,whichisdrawnuponlyina certainrandomintent,butonewhicheveryhumanreasonmustnecessarilyrunintoinitscourse; and second, that it along with its opposite would not merely leadtoanartificial appearance [Schein],which,onceperceived,promptlydisappears,butanaturalandunavoidableappearance [Schein],whichitself,ifoneisnolongerfooledbyit,stillcontinuestodeceive,thoughdoesnot defraud,andcanthusindeedberenderedharmless,butnevercancelledout.”(Kant,Critiqueof PureReason,WWIII,AcademyEdition,pg290)
“Thehumanbeingalonecarriesthecertaintyofitsdeathalongwithitselfinabstractconcepts: theselattercannevertheless,whichisquitestrange,frightenitonlyatparticularmoments,where anoccasionconcretizes itinitsimagination. Againstthemightyvoiceofnaturethereflection candolittle.Eveninitself,asinanimals,whichdonotthink,anenduringconditionprevailsas thatassurance, whichoriginates outoftheinnermostconsciousness, thatitisitselfnature,the world,byvirtueofwhichnohumanbeingisnoticeablytroubledbythethoughtofcertainand neverdistantdeath,buteachlivesthere,asiftheywouldliveeternally;whichgoessofarasto say, that none would have an actual living conviction of the certainty of their death, since otherwise there could be no great difference between their moodandthatofthecondemned criminal;otherwiseeachwouldindeedcognizethatcertaintyinabstracto[Latin:abstractly]and theoretically, but would put it aside, as other theoretical truths, which are not applicable to praxis, without accepting it in any fashion in its living consciousness.” (Schopenhauer, The WorldasWillandIdea,SWW,ed.Frauenstädt,II.Volume,Leipzig1888,pg332).
