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“Nihilism” Entry for International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013) Richard Joyce TITLE: nihilism WORD COUNT: 1912 “Nihilism” (from the Latin “nihil” meaning nothing) is not a well-defined term. One can be a nihilist about just about anything: A philosopher who does not believe in the existence of knowledge, for example, might be called an “epistemological nihilist”; an atheist might be called a “religious nihilist.” In the vicinity of ethics, one should take care to distinguish moral nihilism from political nihilism and from existential nihilism. These last two will be briefly discussed below, only with the aim of clarifying our topic: moral nihilism. Even restricting attention to “moral nihilism,” matters remain indeterminate. Its most prominent usage in the field of metaethics treats it as a synonym for “error theory,” therefore an entry that said only “Nihilism: see ERROR THEORY” would not be badly misleading. This would identify moral nihilism as the metaethical view that moral discourse consists of assertions that systematically fail to secure the truth. (See Mackie 1977; Joyce 2001.) A broader definition of “nihilism” would be “the view that there are no moral facts.” This is broader because it covers not only the error theory but also noncognitivism (see NONCOGNITIVISM). Both these theories deny that there are moral facts—the difference being that the error theorist thinks that in making moral judgments we try to state facts (but fail to do so, because there are no facts of the type in question), whereas the noncognitivist thinks that in making moral judgments we do not even try to state facts (because, for example, these judgments are really veiled commands or expressions of desire). (In characterizing noncognitivism in this way, I am sidelining various linguistic permissions that may be earned via the quasi-realist program (see QUASI-REALISM).) While it is not uncommon to see “nihilism” defined in this broader way, few contemporary noncognitivists think of themselves as “nihilists,” so it is reasonable to suspect that the extra breadth of the definition is often unintentional. Both these characterizations see moral nihilism as a purely metaethical thesis. The term is also widely associated with various first-order moral views that make recommendations about how we ought to act. Suppose one is an error theorist, holding all moral language to be deeply flawed (like the attitude that the atheist takes towards religion). One then faces a practical decision concerning what to do with the flawed moral language, for eliminating the vocabulary (in the way that the atheist usually eliminates positive religious utterances) is not a forced choice. One might instead become a fictionalist—maintaining moral language with the status of a kind of useful fiction (see ERROR THEORY). There is, then, the possibility of using “moral nihilist” as a synonym for “moral eliminativist”: as holding that we should stop using positive moral language. (Moral eliminativists include Hinckfuss 1987 and Garner 2010.) Such a theorist would be nihilistic twice over: endorsing a metaethical nihilism (in virtue of being an error theorist) accompanied by a kind of practical nihilism (in virtue of being an eliminativist). “Moral nihilism” is also often associated—though somewhat vaguely—with thoughts about how we should act in the more everyday sphere: as advocating a policy of “anything goes,” as holding that with the removal of the moral framework restrictions on our behavior are lifted. It is true that if the error theorist is correct then there are no moral restrictions on our behavior, but what effect this would have on our overall practical lives (if we all believed it) is far from obvious. The idea that there would be nothing to stand in the way of our immediately becoming antisocial wantons requires the implausible premise that morality is