HeyJ LIII (2012), pp. 51–60
KIERKEGAARD ON THE METAPHYSICS OF HOPE ROE FREMSTEDAL
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway
This article deals with hope – and its importance – by analysing the little-known analysis of hope found in Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard presents hope as essential to moral agency, arguing that hope should never be given up, even if it is not supported by experience. This article gives an interpretation of the strong claims about the necessity of hope found in Kierkegaard which tries to reconstruct some of Kierkegaard’s central claims, arguing that Kierkegaard can be used to sketch a distinction between justified and unjustified hope.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
While there has been renewed interest in hope in many disciplines, from medicine to theology, this interest is largely absent in contemporary philosophy.1 I believe this fact explains why scholars have overlooked the central role of hope in Kierkegaard. This article remedies this omission by showing how Kierkegaard analysed hope. I show that, in line with some of the contemporary research on hope, Kierkegaard argues that hope plays a crucial role in moral agency. I also show how it might be possible to apply some of Kierkegaard’s points to contemporary research by sketching a distinction between justified and unjustified hope and reinterpreting the widespread distinction between general and specific hopes. Kierkegaard scholars have discussed religious faith and despair at length; however, there has been little research dedicated to Kierkegaard’s analysis of hope. This is surprising, given the relevance of hope for understanding both despair and religiousness (the latter taken in a wide sense that encompasses faith, hope, and love). The fact that Kierkegaard wrote a book on despair (Anti-Climacus’s Sickness unto Death), but did not write a book devoted to hope, should not be taken to mean that he believed the latter to be of lesser importance.2 On the contrary, Sickness unto Death describes despair as hopelessness (SKS 11:133f, cf. 153; SUD 18, cf. 37f).3 However, Kierkegaard’s reflections on hope are scattered throughout his different writings – especially the upbuilding writings that philosophers have tended to ignore. Although this paper relies mainly on the writings Kierkegaard published under his own name (as well as Sickness unto Death), I believe these writings to a large extent are coincident with the pseudonymous works when it comes to hope. I do not deny that there are important points of difference between the different pseudonyms and Kierkegaard, but my focus is on the important points in which the pseudonymous and self-published works present essentially the same view, or supplement one another. My argument requires only that there be some overlap or agreement between the different books in Kierkegaard’s authorship, not that the pseudonyms should be taken to represent the same voice or perspective. Kierkegaard appears to rely on a traditional Christian understanding for the generic features of hope. To hope is to expect the good, whereas to fear is to expect evil. Hope is based on the possibility of progress towards good in the future. Fear is based on the possibility of decline into evil in the future (SKS 9:249; WL 249).4 Although Kierkegaard does not say so explicitly, it © 2011 The Author. The Heythrop Journal © 2011 Trustees for Roman Catholic Purposes Registered. Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.