Sheldon Wolin's theoretical practice

SheldonWolin’stheoreticalpractice

RobynMarascoa,*,JasonFrankb,JoanTrontoc, AntonioY.Va ´ zquez-Arroyod andNicholasXenose aHunterCollege,CUNY,NewYork,NY10065,USA.

E-mail:rmarasco@hunter.cuny.edu bCornellUniversity,Ithaca,NY14853,USA.

E-mail:jf273@cornell.edu cUniversityofMinnesota-TwinCities,Minneapolis,MN55455,USA.

E-mail:jctronto@umn.edu dRutgersUniversity-Newark,Newark,NJ07102,USA.

E-mail:a.vazquez@rutgers.edu eUniversityofMassachusetts-Amherst,Amherst,MA01003,USA.

E-mail:xenos@polsci.umass.edu

*Correspondingauthor.

ContemporaryPoliticalTheory (2017).doi:10.1057/s41296-017-0090-6

TheEpicasForm

RobynMarasco

Asastarting-pointitisnecessarytorejecttheclassicalandmodern conceptionthatascribestodemocracy‘a’properorsettledform.–Sheldon Wolin(2004,p.601).

SheldonWolindiedon21October2015,athishomeinnorthwestOregon.Hewas 93yearsold,survivedbyhistwodaughtersandtwograndchildren.Ididnotknow ProfessorWolinpersonally.Imethimonlyonce.Itwasabriefintroductionwhile waitingfortheelevatorinBarrowsHallonthecampusoftheUniversityof California,Berkeley.Thiswasseveraldecadesafterthehistoricbattleshewaged thereinthe1960s.Butevenatthattime,Berkeleywasaspecialplacetostudy politicaltheoryandtheEastBayanidealplaceforageneralpoliticaleducation. WeallknewthattobepartofWolin’stremendouslegacy.Heissurvivedby generationsofscholars,scatteredacrosstheacademyandbeyond,whosethinking andwritingisdirectedtothebasicquestionsofdemocracy.

2017MacmillanPublishersLtd.1470-8914 ContemporaryPoliticalTheory www.palgrave.com/journals

Wolinwastheteacherofmyteacher.Ilearnedfrombothofthemwhatcritique lookslikethatisunafraidofitsownconclusions,toborrowaphrasefromMarx’s lettertoArnoldRuge.Politicaltheoryisnotanexerciseinedification,nordoesit participateinamandatoryoptimism.AndspeakingofMarx,Iwasinstructedto alwayskeephimcloseathandandtokeepcapitalistpowersquarelyinview, withoutbeingblindedbyorthodoxyorblindsidedbyhistory.Politicscannotbe reducedtoeconomicsoradministration,whichiswhyameaningfulequality requiresademosthatcanthinkandact.

Aboveallelse,Iwasschooledinadistinctivewayofassemblingahistorical canonaroundacontemporarypoliticalproblem.Iunderstoodthisscholarlypractice torepresentacoherentalternativetotheavailable‘‘methods’’inpoliticaltheory, developedinthetwoCambridgesandChicago,thoseinspiredbyRawlsorSkinner orStrauss.Politicaltheory,forWolin,wasneithertheinvestigationintoperennial problemsliftedoutofhistory,northeantiquarianpursuitofpoliticalideas.Theory meantminingthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtforaclearerpictureofourpresent.It meantthatthehistoryofideaswouldchangeaspoliticalconditionsand circumstanceschanged.Itmeantmappingtraditions–‘‘multipleandsometimes conflictingbirthrights,’’asJasonFrankputsitinhiscontributionbelow–sothatwe mightbetteraccountforourownhabitsandconventions.Theideaofa‘‘tradition’’ wasimportanttoWolin,asitwasforStrauss,butitwasnotaveneratedobject,nor wasitpassedbetweenthelinesofgreatbooks.1 Wolinwascommittedtodoing justicetothehistoricalshapeofpoliticaltraditions,muchlikeSkinner,buthe rejectedanycontextualismthattacitlydepoliticizedthinkinganddiminishedthe roleofpoliticalpracticeintheformationofpoliticalideas.LikeRawls,herecovered andreworkedtheutopianpromiseinpoliticaltheory,butthiswouldentailwhathe famouslydescribedasthe‘‘journeyfromliberalismtodemocracy’’(Wolin, 2004,p. xv).Unlikeallofthem,Wolinamplifiedavoiceofradicalprotestinpoliticaltheory andencouragedatheoreticalpracticeattunedtothefutureandfateofthedemos.For myself,Idon’thesitatetocallthisanti-methodbythename,Berkeley.2 PoliticsandVision remainsmysurestcompanionthroughthehistoryofWestern politicalthought. TocquevilleBetweenTwoWorlds isthestandardbywhichI measurethemonographstudyofasinglethinker.AntonioVa ´ zquez-Arroyorightly describesthemastwomasterpieces,anditisworthpausingonhowsubstantially differentthesetwogreatworksare. PoliticsandVision istheestablishmentofa Westerntraditionofpoliticaltheory; TocquevilleBetweenTwoWorlds isthe portraitofapoliticaleducationanditstheoreticalpractice.Botharebooksfor endlessre-reading.Hisshort-livedjournal, democracy,offersatreasureofcontents andanalternativemodelfortheacademicperiodical.IturntoWolinforsomany things–toseehowrealismandutopiamightbecutfromthesamecloth,for guidanceonhowtoengageMachiavellipoliticallyandrhetorically,inpursuitof theparodicelementinMontesquieu’s PersianLetters,todiscernthefascist tendenciesincontemporarypower(thoughIamnotsurehewouldhaveusedthe

f-wordasreadilyasIdo).Hisextraordinarybodyofworkisaninvitationintoan adventure,wherethehistoryofpoliticaltheorypresentsitselfaspossibleitineraries intothepresent.Histextsarenotonlyourcompanionsandguidestospecific thinkersandhistories,buttheyarealsodispatchesfrom his excursions.Wolin invitesustotreatdemocracyaspracticeworthyofourtheoreticalconsiderations andtheoryaspracticeworthyofourdemocraticcommitments.

MytitleisinreferencetowhatWolintermed‘‘epictheory’’inthecelebrated essayfrom1969,‘‘PoliticalTheoryasaVocation’’(Wolin, 1969).Hehadalso developedtheideaofepictheoryinanearlylectureonHobbes(Wolin, 1970).Epic theory,forWolin,istheoryofacertainexplanatorypower,theorydrivenbyreal concernsandproblems,andtheorythataimstograspthepoliticalwhole.Mytitle alsoalludestoAdorno,totheauthorof‘‘TheEssayasForm’’(oneofAdorno’s mostimportantstatementsonpoliticalthinkingandwriting)andtheco-authorof DialecticofEnlightenment (whereAdornomostlyrepudiatestheepicasaprotobourgeoisform).BringingWolinandAdornotogetherisobviousanddifficult,at once.Obvious,forthesethinkerswereroughcontemporaries,broadlytrainedina Europeanphilosophical,scientificandliterarytradition,secularJews,andmenof anantiorthodoxLeft.Bothsawliberalismasafeebleresponsetothesuddenthreat offascismandthecreepingeffectsoflatecapitalism.Bothperceivedtotalitarian powersinplaceswehadnotknowntolookforthem.Still,Adornowasmore deeplysuspiciousofthedemosandpoliticalappealstothem.Hisattitudestoward democracyweremorereservedandlessclearlydeveloped,thoughhehasmoments ofrealdemocraticclarityandcommitment(Adorno, 1998;Mariotti, 2016).One wasaGermanandtheotheranAmerican.

Andeventhatgetscomplicated–andpointstoabasicdisagreementbetween them.Wolincriticizedwhathesawasananti-politicalimpulseinAdorno’swork,a permanentinnerexilethatpersistedevenbeyondhisreturntoFrankfurt.‘‘Exileis theworstoffatesforatheorist,’’saysWolin,‘‘becauseitdecontextualizes theoreticalactivity,freeingitofpoliticaltiesandreferents’’(Wolin, 1993,p.185). Wolin’sinspirationonthisfrontwasnoneotherthanSocrates,forwhomdeathwas preferabletoexileandphilosophywasineluctablyboundtothepolis.Others, notablyEdwardSaid,woulddrawverydifferentconclusionsaboutAdorno’s philosophyinexileanditspoliticalimplications(Said, 2002).Withoutproposingto settleaquestionattheheartofthe Crito,Iwouldsaythatthe location ofpolitical theory–withinthepolityanditsparticularproblems–isaconstantthemeinWolin. WhathesaysofTocquevillemightalsobesaidaboutWolinhimself:‘‘The metaphoroflocationwasalsoameansofposingorarrangingtheselfwhilehe repositionedhistheory’’(Wolin, 2001,p.374).Wolinresistedanymovementaway fromthepolity,evenasheencouragedself-distancingfromwithinit.Hesawin

Adornoadecisiveturnawayfromthepolity,amovethatwasitselflocatedina particulartimeandplace,butwhichthephilosopherinpermanentexileneverreally permittedhimselftoavowashisown.3

Ontheotherhand,Wolin’stheoryoffugitivedemocracyisinfusedwithan Adorniannotionofremembrance.Andhisinvestmentsinthelocalshapeof fugitivitymightbeseen,notonlyasareiterationoftheimportanceoflocationfor eventhemostproteanofforces,butalsoasanextensionofAdorno’scommitment tothatwhich‘‘fellbythewayside cross-grained,opaque,unassimilatedmaterial, whichassuchadmittedlyhasfromthestartananachronisticquality,butisnot whollyobsoletesinceithasoutwittedthehistoricaldynamic’’(Adorno, 1978, p.151).Wolincitesthisaphorismfrom MinimaMoralia atlengthwhenaccounting forhisideaofpoliticaltheoryasinvocation(Wolin, 2000,p.4).Wolin’seventual nameforthis‘‘historicaldynamic’’wasSuperpower.Thetheoryoffugitive democracywashispursuitofitsunassimilatedmaterial.

Thoughcentraltohisearlyaccountofthevocation,‘‘epictheory’’largely vanishedfromWolin’slaterterminology.IntheVocationessay,epictheorystood opposedtotraditionaltheory,methodism,andpositivistpoliticalscience.Epic theorywasakindof criticaltheory –andnotjustinthesensethatepictheory alloweditselftobemotivated,tostakeoutapositionandaperspective,andto commititselfpolitically(Fraser, 1989).Epictheorywasakindofcriticaltheoryin theveryold-fashionedsense:itaimedtobringa totality intoview.Wolin’stermwas ‘‘magnitude.’’Andhereishowheputit:‘‘Byanactofthought,thetheoristseeksto reassemble thewholepoliticalworld.Heaimstograsppresentstructuresand interrelationships,andtore-presenttheminanewway’’(Wolin, 1969,p.1078). Politicaltheoryistherepresentationofacomplextotalityinitsmanyparts.But totalityisnotacategorybelongingtoabstractthought.ForWolin,asforLuka ´ csand Adorno,theconceptoftotalityiscalledforthbytheobjectiveorderofthings.Epic theorypostulates–andhereareWolin’swords–‘‘thepossibilitythatthefactual worldistheoutcomeofa systematicallydisorderedwhole’’(Wolin, 1969,p.1080, italicsmine).Or,Adorno: DasGanzeistdasUnwahre (Adorno, 1978).Thewholeis thefalse.ItwasentirelyappropriatethatWolinnamethisenterprise–theorythat aimstograspasystematicallydisorderedwhole–epictheory.Itwas1969,afterall. Thestakeswereveryhighandtheplatformwasappropriatelyambitious.

ButWolinmostlydropstheterm,notwithstandingtheoccasionalreferencetothe epicinlaterwork,forexample,inconnectionwithMarx’svalorizationofthe workingclass.OneexplanationissuggestedinJoanTronto’scontributionbelow, though,admittedly,thisisnotthefocusofherargument.Trontospeaksofashiftin Wolin’sworkfromaviewofpoliticaltheoryasvocationtoa‘‘chastened’’viewof politicaltheoryasinvocation.Anditmightbethatthedisappearanceoftheepic reflectsthishumbledreinterpretationoftheoreticalwork.Itmightalsobethatthe turnawayfromepictheorywasthepreparationforamoresubstantialturntoward thedemos,thatthejourneyfromliberalismtodemocracywasalsoajourneyfrom

theorytopractice,frompoliticaleducationtopoliticalexperience,frommagnitude tolocalism,andfromtotalitytofugitivity.

Butwhatiftheproblemwithepictheorywasneveritsambitionoritsaudacity, butitsnarrowness?Whatifepictheoryturnedouttobeaformunsuitedtothe timesorunabletograsptheconstellationofpoliticalforces?Whatifthedifficulty withepictheorywasnotitshubrisbutitstendency–alreadypresentinHobbes,the originalepictheorist–totakeflightfromthepoliticalworldanditschallenges? Whatifepictheoryunwittinglyparticipatesinthedisplacementofpolitics?I believeWolin’sdefinitionoftheorywasconsistentacrosshiswork: repicturization, atermheusesintheTocquevillebook,butwhichmighthaveappearedinanyof hismajorworks(Wolin, 2001,p.38).Seeingthewholedifferently.Re-assembling thefactualworldandre-presentingitanew.Seeingthefactualworldasa systematicallydisorderedwhole.Coulditbethatepictheoryturnedouttobemore blindingthanvisionaryintheseefforts?

ManyofhisreadershaveremarkedonWolin’sexceptionalliteraryeducationand sensibility(Va ´ zquez-Arroyo, 2015).IntheWesternliterarytradition,theepicpivots onthelonelyfigureatitscenter:thehero.InhisearlylectureonHobbes,Wolinshows howepictheoryplacesthe‘‘theorist-creator’’inthatrole.Andasignificantpartofthis earlyinterpretationofHobbesturnsontherelationshipbetweentheliteraryandthe scientifictechniquesfoundinthe Leviathan.Va ´ zquez-Arroyo’scontributiontothis CriticalExchangeoffersacarefulconsiderationofWolin’searlyportraitofHobbes. WhatVa ´ zquez-Arroyosoexpertlyshowsishowtheepictheoristbecomes,by Wolin’sconclusiontothatearlylecture,anantihero.Heisquiterightthatthisinsight ‘‘couldeasilybethepointofdeparturetoawholedifferentinterpretationofHobbes,’’ butIwouldaddthatitmightalsobethepointofdepartureforawholenew understandingofepictheoryanditsrelationshiptopolitics.

Oftheliteraryfigureoftheepichero,IamremindedofLuka ´ cs’sinsistencethat theepicjourneyisneverreallyabout him:

Theepicherois,strictlyspeaking,neveranindividual.Itistraditionallythought thatoneoftheessentialcharacteristicsoftheepicisthefactthatitsthemeisnot apersonaldestinybutthedestinyofacommunity(Luka ´ cs, 1971,p.66).

Luka ´ csisunderscoringthefeatureofepicpoetrythatmakesitseemverydifferent frommodernnarrativeforms,thelattertakingsubjectivityasaprincipletheme.From aLuka ´ csianperspective,itcouldbesaidthatepictheorywas always atheoryofthe demos,alwaysameditationoncollectivefateandpurpose,andalwaystheworkofthe collective.(Someclassiciststakealiteraltackontheargument,seeing‘‘Homer’’as onlythepropernameforanoraltraditionandsharedauthorship.) TheTheoryofthe Novel pitstheepicagainstacultureofpossessiveindividualism,butthistextwas

composedbetween1914and1916,beforeLuka ´ csbecameaMarxist.Atthispoint,he isinterestedinhowepicnarrativestirsadifferentsetofpassions–passionsthatpoint thehumanbeingoutsideofhimself,toaworldofothersandobjects.Theepichero knowsnolonelinessbecausetheepicjourneyisneverhisalone. TheTheoryofthe Novel isamourningpoemforthisvanishingaffectivehorizon.

‘‘Thenovelistheepicofanageinwhichtheextensivetotalityoflifeisnolonger directlygiven,’’hesays,‘‘inwhichtheimmanenceofmeaninginlifehasbecomea problem,yetwhichstillthinksintermsoftotality’’(Luka ´ cs, 1971,p.66).Iquote fromLuka ´ csheretoemphasizethattherelationshipbetweentheepicandthenovel, forhim,isnotoneofsimpleopposition.4 Indeed,thepointisthattheelemental ingredientsofepic–totality,community,history,fate–alsomakeupthenovel.The historicalformhaschanged,becausehistoricalconditionshavechanged.Thenovel istheepicofadisenchantedage.Itistheinteriorizationofepicheroism‘‘whenthe distinctionsbetweenmenhavemadeanunbridgeablechasm whentheworldof deedsseparatesitselffrommen.’’Injustafewyears,withthepublicationof History andClassConsciousness,hewouldtradeaWeberianideaofdisenchantmentand whathelaterdismisseda‘‘romanticanticapitalism’’foraMarxistconceptof reification.Hisconversiontohistoricalmaterialismwouldyieldaverydifferent presentationoftheEuropeanliterarytraditionin TheHistoricalNovel,written twentyyearslater.FrancoMorettihasremarkedthat‘‘TheoryoftheNovel belongs tothesmallcircleofmasterpieces–Baudelaire’s tableaux,Flaubert’snovels, Manet’spaintings,Ibsen’splays,or,indeed,Weber’slastlectures–wheretherules ofbourgeoisexistenceareatonceineluctableandbankrupt.Itsounds,often,likethe workofan exile’’(Moretti, 2014,p.39).Morettiremarksespeciallyonitsstylistic ambitionsandhowLuka ´ cs’ssociologyofliteraturegetselaboratedasahighly stylizedexperimentintheoreticalform.

Adornoseesepicdifferently,notastheunionofpersonalandcollectivefate,but asthemythicoriginsofarationalityofdomination.Epicisthepoeticexpressionof anascentpositivism,alreadyaudibleinHomer.Thisistheargumentdevelopedin TheDialecticofEnlightenment,whereOdysseusprefiguresthebourgeoismanof reasonandwherebourgeoisreasonfindsitstrueoriginsinamythicfearofnature (HorkheimerandAdorno, 2002). TheOdyssey istheearlyportraitofarationality thatsetsouttosubduenaturebymasteringandovercomingit.Homericpoetryis thearchaicimageofourselves,thepremonitionofasocietyheldunderaspell,and theformalanticipationofa systematicallydisorderedwhole.

ButthatisonlyhalfofAdorno’sargumentaboutepic.Theotherhalfhastodo withhow‘‘acritiqueofbourgeoisreasondwellswithinepicnaivete ´ ’’(Adorno, 1991a,p.26).Adornoalsoseesepicnarrative,withitsfocusonsmalldetails,its investmentinsingularity,even‘‘thenarrator’sstupidityandblindness–[and]itis notaccidentthattraditionhasitthatHomerwasblind’’–asapoeticrevoltagainst anadministeredtotality(p.27).Epicnaivete ´ standsbetweenmythandreason,

betweenthe‘‘eternallyinvariant’’andtheorderingofexperiencebytheruleof rationality,butitalsostandsapartfromboth.Epicopposesmythinthat‘‘itwantsto reportonsomethingworthreportingon,somethingthatisnotthesameas everythingelse,notexchangeable’’(p.24).Butitisalsoherethatepicopposes bourgeoisrationality,forthelatterwantstosubsumeepicsingularityunderthe abstractuniversalityofthought.Epicisfidelityto‘‘whatoccurredonceandonly once’’–andinsolimitingitself,theepictranscendsthelimitsofabstractthought (p.25).Epicpreservesasingleexperiencethatrefusesassimilationtoabadreality. Butitalsoharborsadreamwishfor‘‘somethingreal’’thatbreakswiththelogicof socialdomination,evenifthatsomethingrealhappened justonce Ithinkthisepicdreamwish,whichAdornoglossedasitsnaivete ´ ,isagoodway tounderstandWolin’slaterpursuitofarchaismsandmarginaliaandfugitive experiencefortherenewalofradicaldemocracy.Thatistosay,Wolin’spursuitis precisely not anepisodeinmythicrage,‘‘whichbordersonthenihilistic,the merelydestructive,witheithernocontentoronlyapretextforcontent,’’asGeorge Kateballeges(Kateb, 2001,p.45).Itisfidelitytothesurprisingandsometimes unlikelyformsinwhichdemocraticcontentsmaketheireverydayappearance.

Fromadifferentdirection,BertoltBrechtpositedthat‘‘epictheater’’couldawaken thecriticalcapacitiesofthespectator,byrevealingtheconstructednatureofreality andrefusingtoofferacatharticconsolationforinjustice(Brecht, 1964).Forits ‘‘alienationeffect’’(Verfremdungseffekt)andthereflexivedistanceitestablishes betweenthespectatorandspectacle,Brechtsawepictheaterasapoliticaland revolutionaryaesthetic.Epictheateraimedatrepresentationoftotality,buta deliberatelycontrivedandartificialtotality.Brechtanticipatedthatsuchatheatrical encounterwithartificewouldawakenasenseofagencyintheaudience.Epictheater meantempowermentandanalertnesstoinjustice.IhavenoindicationthatWolinhad Brechtinmindinhiselaborationsonepictheory,butbothinvoketheepiconbehalfof acertaintypeofpoliticaleducation.Inherbrilliantandchallengingcontributionto thisCriticalExchange,JoanTrontowondersaboutthefateoftheory‘‘inatimewhen neitherpoliticsnoreducationaregivenmuchintrinsicvalue.’’‘‘Whatarewesaying, evenasradicaldemocrats,’’sheasks,‘‘ifwesayepictheoryis passe ´ ?’’Arewesaying thatwe’veabandonedtheprojectofbuildinganddefendingthekindsofpolitical, social,andculturalinstitutionsthatmakedemocraticeducationpossible?

Withthesereflectionsonform,itmaybethatIhavedoneexactlywhatWolin cautionsagainst:Ihavemistakena‘‘problem-in-a-theory’’fora‘‘problem-in-theworld.’’ButIthinkAdornoisrightthatexperimentsinformarealsowaysof approachingproblemsintheworld(Adorno, 1991b).AndIthinkWolinbelieved this,too.ConsiderwhathesaysaboutMontesquieuintheearlypagesofthe Tocquevillebook:

VirtuallyallofMontesquieu’scontemporariesaswellaslatercommentators haveagreedthatthecomplex,unrationalizedqualitiesheascribedtopolitical formationswerereflectedintheshapelessnessofhistheory.Thelatterwasas sprawling,ill-digested,andevenonoccasioninchoateastheformer….Itwas madeforapoliticsofindirectionandobliqueness… Montesquieu’stheory offeredfewformulasforpoliticalactionandmanyforinaction…thewhole temperofhispoliticaltheoryrancountertothemoderncultureofpowerwe havebeentracing(Wolin,p.43).

IbelieveMontesquieuisimportanttoWolinforawholebunchofreasons:because heperceivedthefundamentallinkbetweenindividualismanddespotism,because heappreciatedthatpoliticsisalearnedpracticeandasocio-historicalachievement, notanaturalnecessity.Inthispassage,WolinistalkingaboutMontesquieu’s practiceoftheory,notonlyapracticeapartfromepictheorybutalsosquarely opposedtothe‘‘modernprojectoftheoryaspragmatics.’’Thistheoreticalpractice –shapeless,sprawling,ill-digested,inchoate–isbuiltforinaction.Montesquieu offersfewformulasandnoprogram.Theforceshesawinthepoliticalworldgot reflectedinhisowntheory.Montesquieu’stheoreticalpracticeisatoncea reflectionofitstimesandanexerciseinuntimeliness.

Montesquieu’sexperimentswithformviolatetheunwrittenrulesofanexchange society.Wolincallsitanexercisein‘‘studiedimpracticality’’anddescribes Montesquieu’stheoreticalpracticeas‘‘themostcomplexeffortinthehistoryof Westerntheorytosabotagetheaccumulationofpowerandtomakeitsexerciseso exhaustingastoleaveitseverelyhobbled.’’Montesquieuhimselfdescribed PersianLetters as‘‘akindofnovel,’’butwhat’sremarkableaboutWolin’s interpretationisthattheentiretheoreticalpracticeiscastintheseterms.Allthe theoreticaldetoursamountto‘‘novelistic’’exercisesintheinterruptionofpower. HereWolinisopeningupawholenewwayofapproachingMontesquieu’spolitical thought,justasVa ´ zquez-ArroyoshowshecouldofferseveraldifferentHobbes eveninasingleessayandFrankexplainshowWolinsidestepsentirelythedebates thatdominateearlyAmericanhistoriographytoopenupanalternatedemocratic tradition.WhatWolinidentifiesinMontesquieu’stheoreticalpracticeisnota scienceofhumansocietyorasystemofpoliticalclassification,butanantisystematicsubversionofrapidlydiversifyingandconsolidatingforces.‘‘He encouragedmetaphorsofasocialtopographyfullofsomanycreases,turns, obstacles,andentrenchedbastionsastobewilderpowerandleaveitunableto imposeanyarchitectonicvision,’’WolinsaysofthepoliticsofMontesquieu’s theoreticalform(p.44).Montesquieu’stheorytakesindirectaimatpowerthrough theartsoffatigueandconfusion.Italsooffersanalternatepoliticsof individualism,groundedina‘‘conceptionoftheindividualasavectoralpoint wheredifferentnormsconvergedtuggedsothattheindividual–diversifiedbutnot atomized–couldneverbethewhollyreliableinstrumentofrulersordominant

groups’’(p.44).ButnolessthanHobbesianscience,itisatheoreticalpracticeof repicturization.

Tocquevilleisdifferentbecauseheperceivedthefundamentallinkbetween‘‘theory aspragmatics’’andademocraticcultureinAmerica,whichistosayheperceivedthe tensionbetweenepictheoryandademocratictheoreticaltradition,between‘‘a nondemocraticformoftheorythatcouldconstitutethefactsdifferently’’anda pragmaticformthatrestrictsitselftothefactsastheyaregiven(p.359). Democracyin America –atleast,itssecondpart,afterTocquevillehad‘‘discoveredtheCartesian mindinAmerica’’andcould‘‘discriminateamongvarioustypesoftheory’’–isa meditationonthefateoftheoryinademocracyandthefateofdemocracyunderthe distinctivetheoreticalcultureitnurtures(p.357).Tocqueville’saristocraticgaze,for Wolin,islessabouthiselitismthanhiseffortstopreserveatheoreticalpracticethat wouldnotbecompletelyengulfedbydemocraticnorms.Anaristocraticconceptionof theoryofferedthedistancenecessarytomaintainacriticalperspectiveondemocracy. WolincitesaclarifyingremarkfromTocquevilletohisEnglishtranslator:‘‘Ihave writteninacountryandforacountrywherethecauseofequalityhasnowtriumphed, leavingnopossiblereturntoaristocracy.Inthisstateofaffairs,Ihavefeltduty-bound togivespecialemphasistothebadtendencieswhichequalitycannourishandthereby seektopreventmycontemporariesfromsurrenderingtothem’’(p.359).Thiswriting, too,oftensoundsliketheworkofanexile.

ThecontributionscollectedinthisCriticalExchangeoffertestimonytoSheldon Wolin’sextraordinarytheoreticalpractice.Eachtakeshisworkchieflyasan occasiontospeaktocentralquestionsinourpolitics:Whataretheresourcesforthe renewalofradicaldemocracy?Whatarethetasksofpoliticaltheoryina democracy?Whatisthemeaningofthepastforourpresentandinchartingfutures? Whatistherelationshipbetweendemocracyandtotalitarianism?Theyare interventionsintheembattledfieldofpoliticalinquiryanddemocraticknowledge and,inthisway,participateinatraditionthatWolininheritedandbequeathedtous.

InhiscontributiontothisCriticalExchangeJasonFrankreconstructsa‘‘highly distinctiveviewofradicaldemocracyasatradition’’outofWolin’sessaysofthe 1980s,theessayspublishedin democracy andthoseanthologizedin ThePresence ofthePast.‘‘InhiswritingsonAmericanpoliticsintheageofReagan,andinhis simultaneousengagementwithearlyAmericanpoliticalthought,’’Frankwrites, ‘‘Wolincametoviewradicaldemocracy(asopposedtodemocratictheory)asa distinctivekindoftradition,onethatdistinguisheditincontentfromthereigning ideologicalparadigmsofliberalismandcivicrepublicanism,butthatalso,andthis hastobeemphasized,leadtoadifferentunderstandingofwhatconstitutesa traditioninthefirstplace’’–thatistosay,democracyisdistinctiveincontent and form.Frankelaboratesthatthisisanunderstandingofpoliticaltraditionas

‘‘formativeexperienceandpopularpracticeratherthantheoreticalarticulationor ideologicalexpression,’’whichcanresultinsomesurprisingaffirmationsand affinities.Frankdiscussesthe‘‘oddfeudalism’’thatWolinfoundinearlyAmerican politicalthought,showinghowitprovidedacertainresourcefortherenewalofa radicaldemocratictradition.Frankalsooffersanessentialretorttoamisreadingof Wolinthatallegesheindulgedadangerouspreoccupationwithtransgressiveand rupturaldemoticmovements,orwhatGeorgeKatebcriticizedasthe‘‘Sorelian coloration’’inWolin’sconceptofdemocracy.5 FrankshowsinsteadthatWolin’s traditionofradicaldemocracyjoins‘‘theextraordinarywiththeordinary,the revolutionaryandthequotidian,’’andfindsinspirationinlocaldemocraticorganizing forbetterschoolsorsafedrinkingwaterasmuchasmasssocialmovements.

JoanTronto’sessayrevisitsWolin’sportraitoftheepictheoristin‘‘Political TheoryasaVocation’’inlightofhis‘‘laterandmuchchasteneddescriptionofhis ownroleasatheorist’’toask:whatneeddoesdemocracyhavefortheepictheorist, ‘‘orperhaps,foranytheoristatall?’’TrontopressesthisquestionbeyondPlatoand theprophetsoftheOldTestament,forsheisnotonlyconcernedwithwhetherthe peopleare‘‘listening’’tothetheorists,butalsowiththefundamentaltaskofpolitical theoryinademocracy.‘‘Letusask,’’saysTronto,‘‘otherthanpoliticaleducation, whatcouldbethetaskofpoliticaltheory?’’Shecontraststhispreceptintheearly Wolinthatpoliticaltheoryisthepursuitofaformofpoliticaleducation,withthe CambridgeSchoolontheonehandandWolin’slaterreticenceaboutthepowersof theoryontheother.‘‘ItisnotthatSkinnerobjectedtopoliticaleducation,’’Tronto notes,buthedid‘‘seemtoobjecttotheideathat politicaltheory wasawaytoa broaderpoliticaleducation.’’Skinnerbalkedatthemagnitudeofepictheory, defendinginsteadintellectualconstraintandthelimitsimposedbycontext.‘‘This wasnotapoliticaleducationfromstudentrebellions,itwasnotapoliticaleducation forthedispossessed,’’butanargumentformoderatingandscalingbackour ambitions.Indeed,itwasthetransformationofpoliticalknowledgeintocareerism. ‘‘PartofthecontinuingexcitementoftheCambridgeSchoolisthatitwonfor politicaltheoryaroomofitsowninthegreathallofpoliticalsciencetoo’’–atthe expenseofthepossibilitythatarealpoliticalliteracyrequiresmorethanafew‘‘little chambers’’withinaprofessionalacademicdiscipline.Inhisownway,though, Wolinalsoretreatedfromthedemandsofbuildingpoliticalliteracy,especiallyto theextentthathebelievedtheoryitselfwascomplicitintheconsolidationofmodern power.Yet,‘‘Wolinstillwantedtheorytoofferusakindofpoliticaleducation’’and thiswouldmeanattendingto‘‘thewaysinwhichtheoryisalsotemptedby,and implicatedin,servicetopower.’’Trontopressesagainstthe‘‘despairing’’voicein Wolinthatabandonstheideaofpoliticaltheoryaspoliticaleducation.Andshe amplifiesavoice,whichresoundsthroughouthiswork,whichspeaksofour responsibilitytoandforourdemocracy.Trontoconcludeswithaclarioncallforthe renewalofepictheory:‘‘Thetaskforpoliticaltheoristswhostillconsider themselvesdemocratsisnottofindsomehiddengeminthehistoryofpolitical

thoughttopolish,nortoshedlightonsomesmallpocketsoflifethatappear democratic,nortofleefromthetrappingsofpower,asifthiswerepossible.Itis instead,totakeontheratherepictaskoftryingtocreateaformofpoliticaleducation inatimewhenneitherpoliticsnoreducationaregivenmuchintrinsicvalue.’’

AntonioA.Va ´ zquez-ArroyoconsidersWolin’swritingsonHobbesasopportunitytoclarifythepoliticsofinterpretationanddefineaninterpretativepractice thattreatspoliticaltheory‘‘firstasacivicactivityand,onlysecondarily,asan academicendeavor.’’Va ´ zquez-Arroyosees‘‘continuityandinnovation’’asthe guidingprinciplesofthisinterpretivepractice:continuity,thetermthatcapturesthe ‘‘convictionthatthestudyofpoliticaltheoryconstitutedacrucialcomponentinthe politicaleducationofcitizens’’andinnovation,thetermthatannouncestheneed foraninterpretivepracticeresponsivetochangesinthepoliticalworld.Thehistory ofpoliticalthoughtwasnotasingulartradition,despiteoccasionalremarks otherwisein PoliticsandVision.AsVa ´ zquez-Arroyoseesit,Wolin‘‘increasingly zonedinonthechallengesinthemeaningandnatureof‘theory’andhowthereare genresofpoliticaltheorizingbeyond‘philosophy’and‘theory’asclassically understood,aswellasdifferentconceptionsofhistory,thusfullyacknowledging thetheoreticalcomplexityofhistoricalinquiry,itsmultiple,oftencontested, meaningsandforms.’’Putdifferently,Wolin’sattunementtothehistoricityof theory,inthediversityofitsforms,reflecteda political engagementwiththe historyofpoliticalthought.WhatissoimportantaboutHobbes,saysVa ´ zquezArroyo,isthatWolin,inthespanofthirtyyears,‘‘craftedthreemajor interpretationsofthisthinkerthatarestrikingdissimilar,’’and,therefore,point tothepoliticsofinterpretation.Thedissimilaritiesbetrayacertaincontinuityin Wolin’spoliticalthoughtconcerningthehistoricityofpoliticalconceptsandthe roleoftheoryin‘‘tendingthepoliticalliteracyofcitizens.’’Buttheinnovationsin thesethreedifferentinterpretationsofHobbes’spoliticalthought–asthenew science,asepictheory,asthecultureofdespotism–alsoconfirmtherichnessof Wolin’sperspectivalapproachthehistoricityofpoliticalthinking.Twothingsare especiallynoteworthyaboutVa ´ zquez-Arroyo’sinterventionhere.First,heinvokes T.S.Eliotinordertoassertthe‘‘dialectical’’characterofWolin’sperspectivalism: ‘‘thepresenceofapastalwaysmediatedbutneverdeterminingthepresent;anda presentthatwouldmediateanyprefigurationofthefutureandafigureofthefuture thatcouldonlyhaveafightingchanceifthepresentisaddressed.’’Second, Va ´ zquez-Arroyoclarifiesthe politics ofinterpretingHobbespolitically,whichisto saythatthequalitiesof‘‘sensitiveness,erudition,senseoffactandsenseofhistory, andgeneralizingpower’’arenot, pace Eliot,‘‘putattheserviceofcultural hierarchyandelitism,’’butdevelopedinpursuitofavanishingdemocraticpresent. Politicaltheory,forWolinandVa ´ zquez-Arroyo,‘‘isnotpromptedbecause somethingiswrongwiththeoriesaboutpolitics,butbecausesomethingis fundamentallywrongwiththepoliticalworld.’’

InhiscontributionNicholasXenosreturnstotheideaoftotalitariandemocracy, putforthbyJacobTalmoninhisinfluentialbookpublishedin1952, TheOriginsof TotalitarianDemocracy,inordertoclarifysomeofthedistinctivefeaturesof Wolin’spoliticalthought.XenosnotesthatWolincitesTalmonfavorablyinthe firsteditionof PoliticsandVision throughtotheexpandedsecondedition,butthat hisjourneyfromliberalismtodemocracyalsomeantasubstantialreorientationto theideaoftotalitariandemocracy.Intheexpandedsecondedition,Wolincriticizes Talmonfortheinventionof‘‘anewandominousregime-form,‘totalitarian democracy,’’’whichhereadsintermsof‘‘adeepsuspicionofcollectiveaction.’’ WhatTalmonofferedupindefenseagainstthismenacingformoftotalitarian democracywas,saysWolin,‘‘anattenuateddemocracydissociatedfrompolitical actionandinsteadidentifiedwithprotectingindividualrightsandpromoting economicgrowth.’’Xenosprovidesanindispensiblegenealogyoftheconceptof totalitariandemocracy,fromTalmontoGeorgeH.SabineandE.H.Carr,evento FredrichA.HayekandBenjaminConstant.Healsoshowstheimportanceofa particularunderstandingofRousseauandtheJacobinstothedevelopmentofthis concept.XenosalsoconsiderstheworkofGuidoDeRuggiero,whodrawsfrom Tocquevilleforaconceptof‘‘democraticdespotism’’andendorsesaliberalvision to‘‘neutralizethevenom’’ofdemocracy,andtheworkofhisSpanish contemporary,Jose ´ OrtegayGasset,asfurthervariationsonthethemeof totalitariandemocracy.XenosremindsusthatWolin’stouchstonesforthe developmentofaradicaldemocratictraditionare‘‘ThomasPaine,William Godwin,andKarlMarx,notRousseau’’andthateventhevisionofconstituent powerinWolinlooksmorelikeSpinoza’s‘‘conatus’’thanRousseau’s‘‘general will.’’Still,andinapowerfulconclusion,XenosshowshowWolin‘‘arrivesata curioussymbiosisofhisown’’inthetheoriesoffugitivedemocracyandinverted totalitarianism.‘‘Aboundary-defyingdemocracybecomestheonlyopponentofa boundarydefyingSuperpower’’–thatistosay,analternateimageoftotalitarian democracy.

Isradicaldemocracyatradition?

‘‘Theideaofdemocracy,’’SheldonWolinoncewrote,‘‘comestous…primarily throughhostileinterpreters.Thepoliticsofthedemoshasnotbeenlosttomemory butispreserved,thoughhalf-buried,inthepoliticaltheoriesofdemocracy’s critics’’(Wolin, 1994a,p.55).Takingthisclaimseriouslymeansthatreconstructingatraditionoftheoreticalreflectionondemocracy–atraditionofdemocratic theory–requiresadistinctiveformofinterpretiveworkablelaybareorexcavate whatlay‘‘half-buried’’inthewritingofdemocracy’stheoreticallyarticulatecritics.

Thedifficultyofthishermeneuticenterpriseiscomplicatedbytheproblemof theoreticalform,bythefactthat,accordingtoWolin,whatwehavecometoexpect ofpoliticaltheoryexistsinadeeptensionwithdemocraticpractice.Ademocratic theoristworthyofthenamecannotproclaimepistemicauthorityandpresumeto makeaone-time‘‘gifttothedemos,’’asWolinputitinhisreviewofRawls’ PoliticalLiberalism ,neglectingthecentraldemocraticimportanceoftheformative collectivestruggletoachieveequalrightsbythepeoplethemselves(Wolin, 1996b, p.98).

ForWolin,politicaltheory’sfocusonrulesandnorms,proceduresand principles,organizationandinstitutionalform,existsinsustainedtensionwith democracy’segalitarianprotestagainstthereductionofpoliticstorule,its transgressiveoppositiontonormsandforms,andtotheinstitutionalizationand routinizationofpoliticalaction.Politicaltheory’stypicaltendencytoward abstractionisitselfatoddswiththehistoricallyembeddedandpower-sensitive conceptionofdemocracyWolinemphasized.Politicaltheory‘‘typicallyadvances bygeneralizations.Weclassifyandcategorize,wesimplifyandwequantify…we regularizephenomenonsothatwecansubsumethemundergeneralstatementsor hypothesis.Intheveryformofourtheoryweduplicatethemodernadministrative outlookwhichseekstofitindividualcasesundergeneralrulesandabhors exceptionsasascientistdoesanomalies’’(Wolin, 1989,p.136).

Democracyalwaysbearsthemarkofitsdiverseandlocalizedoriginsand struggles,sotheproblemofidentifyingaunitarytraditionoftheoreticalreflection ondemocracyisnotonlyaproblemofcontentbutalsooftheoreticalform.What formcouldademocratictheory–aradicaldemocratictheory–possiblytake? Wolinexposedthepoliticalcontentofseeminglyneutraltheoreticalforms, revealingtheirquietimplicationsinmodernformsofstateandcorporatepower–whathewouldeventuallycometocallSuperpower–inimicaltodemocracy.In doingso,Wolinchallengednotonlyself-congratulatoryunderstandingsof democracy,butalsoself-congratulatoryexpectationsofthetasksandgoalsof politicaltheory.Aradicaldemocratictheorywouldbeaformoftheoreticalinquiry attendanttothetransgressive,radicallyegalitarian,historicallysituated,andpower ladendimensionsofdemocracyitself.Itcouldnotremaindemocraticifitwas premisedonanattempttotranscendthosedefiningconditions.Wolin’ssustained engagementwithTocqueville,andbeyondhimMontesquieu,allowedhimto exploretheseideasinmostdetail.Forexample,theissue‘‘centralinTocqueville’s formulationofhisideas,’’Wolinwrotein BetweenTwoWorlds,was‘‘whether theoristswouldassumethetaskofnormalizingtheappearanceandpresenceof [modernity’s]hugepowers,preservingtheirimpressiveandtriumphalcharacter whilerenderingthemfamiliarand,aboveall,demonstratingtheirmanageability,or whetherthepowerswouldberevealedtohavecertainunsettlingandunnatural qualitiesthatportendedacontinuousdiscontinuityinthehumancondition’’ (Wolin, 2001,p.133).

Wolin’s‘‘journeyfromliberalismtodemocracy’’occurredduringhisperiodof politicalactivisminthe1960s,butitwasinhisremarkablewritingduringthe 1980s–forthejournal democracy,whichheedited,andonearlyAmerican politicalthought,anthologizedin ThePresenceofthePast –wherehebeganto morefullydevelopthesethemes(Wolin, 2004,p.xv).Therearenotablecontinuities acrossWolin’swork,forexample,hiscritiqueofpluralismandinterestgroup politicsandhislargerthematicofthedisappearanceofthepolitical(althoughhe eventuallycametoseethepoliticalassocloselyrelatedtotheideaofdemocracyas tobe‘‘almostsynonymous’’)(Wolin, 1994a,p.290).InhiswritingonAmerican politicsintheageofReagan,andinhissimultaneousengagementwithearly Americanpoliticalthought,Wolincametoviewradicaldemocracy(asopposedto democratictheory)asadistinctivekindoftradition,onethatdistinguisheditin contentfromthereigningideologicalparadigmsofliberalismandcivicrepublicanism,butthatalso,andthishastobeemphasized,ledtoverydifferent understandingofwhatconstitutesapoliticaltraditioninthefirstplace.Thisisan aspectofWolin’sworkthathasyettobefullyrecognizedanddeveloped.Itwasa viewofpoliticaltraditionthatcontrastedsharplywiththereigningscholarly paradigmsofpost-linguisticturnhistoriographyassociatedwiththeCambridge Schoolandthatwasfocusedonformativeexperienceandpopularpracticerather thantheoreticalarticulationorideologicalexpression(inthis,Wolinmighthave beenquietlydrawingfromArendt’s OnRevolution).AsfarasIknow,Wolinleft noclearmethodologicalstatementonthesequestions–perhapsunsurprising, consideringhisdismalviewof‘‘method’’–butahighlydistinctiveviewofradical democracyasatraditioncannonethelessbepiecedtogetherfromhiskeywritings fromtheperiod.

Inthefirstessayhewrotefor democracy –entitled‘‘ThePeople’sTwoBodies’’ –Wolinofferedanearlyindicationofwhatthisrefiguredsenseofdemocratic traditionmightmean,atleastintheUnitedStates.InAmerica,Wolinargued,the peoplehavealwayshadtwobodies.Oneoftheseimaginedformsemergedfromthe politicallyactivecollectivityenvisionedbytheRevolution,acollectivebeingwho would‘‘notjustparticipateinpolitics,butwouldjoininactuallycreatinganew politicalidentity,to‘institute,’‘alter,’or‘abolish’government,tolaya ‘foundation’andtoorganizepower’’(Wolin, 1980,p.15).Wolincalledthisthe bodypolitic.Theotherdominantcollectiveimaginary,whichWolindubbedthe politicaleconomy,wasenshrinedintheUSConstitutionanddefinedbyapassive formofsovereignlegitimationofthestate,thedepoliticizingdisaggregationofthe collectiveagentintoindividualconsumers,andtheconversionofthecollective deliberationovermattersofcommonconcernintosublimatedregulationsofan impersonalmarket.Longbeforecontemporarypoliticaltheoristsbecamepreoccupiedwithneoliberalism’sdissolutionofthedemos,Wolinhadindicatedthe democraticcostsofimaginingandinstitutionalizingpoliticalsubjectivityalong economiclines(Brown, 2015).

Wolin’sincreasinglytrenchantcritiqueofliberalism,alreadyforcefullyarticulatedinthe NewYorkReviewofBooks essaysheco-authoredwithJohnSchaarin the1960s,takesonanewforceinthesewritingsemphasizingliberalism’smyriad formsofdepoliticizationandoftheimaginaryandinstitutionaldisaggregationof thecollectivity,thedemos,thatitentails(WolinandSchaar, 1970).Wolin’s understandingofdemocracyassumedamoredefiniteoutlineinoppositionto liberalismoverthecourseofthesewritings.Oneofthemoststrikingaspectsofthis developingunderstandingofdemocracywasWolin’sfocusonthecollectiveactor asbothagentandobjectofaction.Thisoddlyself-referentialdynamicofdemotic agencyandpowerisalreadytherein‘‘ThePeople’sTwoBodies’’andremains constantacrossthesewritingsandbeyondtotheradicaldemocraticworksofthe 1990sfocusedonancientGreece–‘‘NormandForm:TheConstitutionalizingof Democracy,’’‘‘FugitiveDemocracy,’’and‘‘Transgression,Equality,Voice’’ (Wolin, 1994a; 1996a, 1996c).

TherearediscontinuitiesinWolin’sturntotheGreekmaterial,ashecameto takeamoreradical‘‘fugitive’’viewofdemocraticaction,butthefocusonthe collectiveactorworkingonandenablingitsownemergenceandthecreationof demoticpowerremainsconstantacrosstheselaterworks.‘‘Thecontinualself fashioningofthedemos,’’hewrites,isself-referential‘‘becauseitaimsto transformthepoliticalsysteminordertoenableitselftoemerge,tomakepossiblea newactor,collectiveinnature’’(Wolin, 1996c,p.64).Evenaslateas Democracy Inc.Wolinwouldwritethat‘‘thesurvivalandflourishingofdemocracyinthefirst instancedependsuponthepeople’schangingthemselves,sloughingofftheir politicalpassivityandacquiringthelostcharacteristicsofthedemos…Tobecome democratic–toembracepoliticalfreedomunderthreatonsomanysidesinthe modernworld–istochangeone’sself,tolearnhowtoactcollectively,asa demos’’(Wolin, 2008,p.289).Theseareprovocativeformulations,figuringthe demosasbothactorandactedupon,agentandobject.Itisalsonotablethatinthese descriptionsofdemoticemergence,Wolindoesnotengagewiththetheoretical languageofrepresentationalclaims,performativity,anddynamicsofpopular identification.Wolindidnotenvisiondemocraticenactmentthroughtheframework ofagonisticclaimsofpopularauthorization(Frank, 2010).

Wolin’sargumentsaboutdemoticpowertakingitsownemergenceasits politicalgoalhasalsoledtosomestrikingmisinterpretationsofhisworkasbeing toopreoccupiedwiththerupturalandtransgressivequalityofdemocracy,even dangerouslyaestheticizingactioninthecelebrationoftherevolutionaryemergence ofdemoticpower.‘‘Therearenolimits,’’asGeorgeKatebwritesalongtheselines, ‘‘toWolin’spraiseoflimitlessness’’(Kateb, 2001,p.55).ReadingWolin’swork fromthe1980sand1990salongsideotherradicaldemocratictheoryfromthe period–whethertheagonisticpopulismofErnestoLaclauandChantalMouffe,the deeppluralismofWilliamConnolly,orresurgenttheoriesofpopularconstituent power,likeAntonioNegri’s–whatismoststrikingisnottheneo-Schmittian

themesofexistentialantagonism,ontheonehand,ortheextraordinaryor revolutionaryenactmentsofconstituentagainstconstitutedpower,ontheother,so muchasWolin’sdistinctivecombinationoftheextraordinaryandtheordinary,the revolutionaryandthequotidian.Inthesewritings,democracy’santagonismtothe ‘‘state,’’‘‘unum,’’‘‘Superpower,’’cansometimesappearintheformofinsurgent praxisandsometimesasorganizingforbetterschoolsandsafedrinkingwater. Democracy,Wolinwrites,‘‘livesintheebb-and-flowofeverydayactivities, responsibilities,andrelationships’’(Wolin, 2004,p.604).

Nowhereisthisproductivetensionbetweentheinsurgenteventandquotidian practicemoreclearlyelaboratedthaninanotherfamousessayfrom democracy, appropriatelytitled‘‘WhatRevolutionaryActionMeansToday’’(Wolin, 1982).In thisessay,Wolincalledforarenewedandradicalizedconceptionofcitizenship,‘‘a fullerandwidernotionofbeingwhosepoliticalnesswillbeexpressednotinoneor twomodesofactivity–votingorprotesting–butinmany’’(Wolin, 1982,p.27). Wolinarguedthisfullerpracticeofcitizenshipwasrevolutionaryinthecontextof consolidatingSuperpower,andthatitsradicalismwasdefined,inpart,byits inhibitionoftheseeminglylimitlesspowersoftechnological,economic,and scientificprogress:the‘‘newTrinitarianism’’ofcapital,statebureaucracy,and science(Wolin, 1983).Incontrasttootherprominenttheoristsofradical democracy,Wolin’skeywordsweredeeplyconservative:‘‘inheritance,’’‘‘birthright,’’‘‘tending,’’‘‘remembrance,’’and‘‘renewal.’’Wolinoccasionallyhad positivethingstosayaboutThomasPaine,butIthinkhehatedthefamously Prometheandictumof CommonSense –‘‘Wehaveitinourpowertobeginthe worldoveragain’’–asmuchasRonaldReaganlovedit.Wolinclearlysawhowthe Americanembraceoffuturityandradicalindependencehelpedconstructthe foundingmythoftheNewWorldasnature’snation,‘‘freshlandseeminglywithout limitsorboundariesandinnocentofpastinequities’’(Wolin, 1989,p.75).Wolin fearedthedespotismofconstantinnovationmorethanhedidthedespotismof tradition.

Wolin’srevolutionarycitizensdidnottreattradition,inheritance,andbirthright assomanyheteronomicfetterstoovercome,asa‘‘nightmarewhichweighsupon thebrainoftheliving,’’butascrucialsourcesofdemocraticpowerandrenewal. ‘‘Theroleofthecitizenrywastotendanddefendthevaluesandpracticesofa democraticciviclife’’(Wolin, 2004,p.598),hewritesinonetypicalformulation. ‘‘Democraticpowerdependsonanhistoricalaccumulationofdispositions.’’Wolin arguedthatdemocratshadtodisenthrallthemselvesoftheirdangerousfantasiesof sovereignautonomy.‘‘Transgressive,changeable,andforgetfulmanisheteronomousman,’’Wolinwrote,‘‘thesubjectofavarietyoflaws.Heisbynaturenot themalleableobjectofasingleandsovereignlawmaker.Instead,heistheobjectof multipleclaimsandthesubjectofmultipleconstitutions’’(Wolin, 1989,p.105). Wolinnotonlyurgedreaderstothinkdemocracybeyondthestate,butalsobeyond theconceptualtrapsoftheircommitmenttopopularsovereignty.Radical

democracyisatraditionforWolin,butitisonethatcontrastswith,ratherthan springsfrom,moderntheoriesofpopularsovereignty(here,too,theparallelswith Arendt’s OnRevolution aresuggestive).

Notoneconstitution,butmany.Notonesinglelineofauthoritativeinheritance, butmultipleandsometimesconflictingbirthrights.Wolin’sessaysonearly Americanpoliticalthoughtfromthe1980sareremarkable,inpart,forthe prominentscholarlypreoccupationstheydonotengage.Wolinisnotprimarily focusedontraditionsofpoliticaldiscourse,orwithtracingthecontinuitiesand discontinuitiesofdifferenttheoreticalparadigmsorideologies.Hehasverylittleto sayaboutthehistoriographicaldebatesbetweendefendersofliberalconsensusor therepublicanrevival,andwhathedoessayismostlycritical.Ofthenewcivic republicansWolininsightfullyargues:‘‘theircategoriesservetoobscurequestions ofpowerandauthorityandtoseverpoliticalactivityfromspecificlocalities, therebyproducingtheabstractcategoryparticipation’’(Wolin, 1989,p.5).The republicanrevivalists’focusonatraditionofpoliticalthoughtabstractedfrom socialconflictsandpowerstruggles‘‘hastheeffectofmutingthetensionsbetween republicanism,withitsstronghistoricalattractionstoelitism,anddemocracy,with itsirreduciblypopuliststrain’’(Wolin, 1989,p.5).Wolinprescientlyanticipated criticismsoftherepublicanrevivalinpoliticaltheorythatwouldcometodominate criticaldiscussionstwodecadeslater(McCormick, 2011).

WolinsoughtdemocraticresourcesinAmerica–sourcesofrenewal–thatwerenot reducibletoanisolatedtraditionofpoliticalthought,discourse,orideology,butrather drewfrompracticalrepertoiresofpoliticalactionandassociation.Inthis,asinso muchelse,hefollowedTocqueville.Wolindidnotseektorecoverradicaldemocracy asanothertraditionofpoliticaldiscoursealongsideliberalismandrepublicanism,but torevealitasatraditionofadifferentkind.WolinhadbeenastudentofLouisHartz, andoneofWolin’smostprovocativeengagementswiththedebatesbetweenliberals andcivicrepublicanswasadistinctiveandrevealingcriticismoftheHartzthesis. Wolin’sobjectiontotheliberalconsensusparadigmwasnotprimarilythatit neglectedalternativepoliticaldiscoursesthatthrivedbeyondtheparametersof Lockeanliberalism.Hiscriticismwasmorefundamental:thattherehadbeen ‘‘feudalism’’inAmerica.Ratherthanconstruingfeudalismaspartoftheoldregime theAmericanrevolutionariesfoughtagainst,Wolinfigureditasthelocaland decentralizedpoliticalculturethattheyfoughttopreserve.ForWolin,feudalismhad averydifferentmeaninginthecolonialAmericancontext.Hedescribesitasthe ‘‘systeminwhichinheritance,withitsimplicithistoricity,isthemasternotion’’ (Wolin, 1989,p.74).Feudalism‘‘servesasametaphorforhistoricizedpolitics,’’‘‘a politicsthatovertimeinevitablyproducesinheritedprivilegesandunequalpowers. Theresultisasocialspacecrowdedwithpriorclaimstounequalownershipandstatus andthetransformationofamanifoldofinjustices(unlawfulconquestsandforcible seizures)fromthedimpastintovestedrightsofthepresent’’(Wolin, 1989,p.75). DrawingontheworkofTocquevilleandMontesquieu,Wolinfiguresfeudalismasthe

archaicresourceofrenewalforapoliticalculturethatisdemocratic,participatory, localistand,overall,moreegalitarianthanelitistinideology(althoughonecould certainlyarguewiththislatterclaim).

Wolin’sattempttolocateradicaldemocraticresourcesofrenewalinthisarchaic remnantwasalsoanattempttogive‘‘feudalism’’atheoreticalarticulationitnever had.‘‘Itdidnotgelintoacoherenttheory,’’Wolinwrites,primarilybecausethere wasnoavailabletheoreticallanguagetogiveadequateexpressiontoadistinctive blendofideasthatseemedatonceprogressiveandatthesametimeregressivein thesenseofemphasizingvaluesofplaceandlocality’’(Wolin, 1989,p.132). Wolinacknowledgedthattheselivingarchaismshavenotalwaysbeenradically egalitarian,emancipatory,orinclusive;theyhavenotalwaysbeenpolitical movementsoftheleft.‘‘Religiousfundamentalism,‘moralism,’andracial, religious,andethnicprejudices,’’hewrites,‘‘belongtothesamehistoricalculture astraditionsoflocalself-government,decentralizedpolitics,participatorydemocracy’’(Wolin, 1989,p.79).AnyattempttoassesWolin’slegacyforradical democratictheorizing–andforconceptualizingadistinctiveradicaldemocratic tradition–mustconfronttheseargumentsdirectly.

ThisAmericanarchaismandoddfeudalismwasoneofWolin’ssourcesof democraticrenewal,butitwasnottheonlyone.Hewouldalsoturntothe pamphletsoftheEnglishCivilWar,theOldOligarch’sConstitutionofthe Athenians,thesurprisingandfugitiveappearancesofdemocracyinthemarginsof thetraditionsofWesternpoliticaltheory.NicholasXenosisrighttosaythatWolin attemptedtoarticulateforusintheorywhatwasessentialtothe‘‘experienceof democracy’’(Xenos, 2001,p.36).TheincrediblebodyofworkWolinleftbehind willbeacontinuedsourceofprovocationandinspirationfordemocratictheorists anddemocraticactors.Wolinarguedthat‘‘democracyhasneverproduceditsown word-smiths’’(Wolin, 1996c,p.84).Thisisanexaggeration,butitisan exaggerationthatrevealsanimportanttruth;itiswhatAdornooncecalledatrue exaggeration.Wolin’sworkpowerfullydemonstratesthetruthofthatexaggeration whilealsobeingitsmosteloquentrefutation.

Politicaltheory:avocationfordemocrats?

JoanTronto

ThiscontributionrevisitsWolin’sargumentsin‘‘PoliticalTheoryasaVocation’’ (1969)(hereafter,PTV)inlightofhislateworkasatheoristofcontemporary democracy.Onsomelevel,theseworksseeminconflictwithoneanother: ‘‘PoliticalTheoryasaVocation’’introducesustothecharacterWolincalled‘‘the epictheorist.’’Butwhatneedwoulddemocraticcitizenshaveforanepictheorist, orperhaps,foranytheoristatall?

Wolinsomewhatanticipatedthisquestion.Headdresseditintheprefacetothe expandededitionof PoliticsandVision (Wolin, 2004)(hereafter,PV2).Therehe wrotethathisownviewsandcommitmentsasatheoristhadchanged:

This,then,isnotarevisionbutanenvisioningofstrikinglydifferentformsof politicsandtheorizingfromthosediscussedintheoriginal.Itisalso, however,anattempttobringtobearuponcontemporarypoliticswhatIhave learnedfromstudyingandteachingaboutthehistoryofpoliticaltheory.Far frombeingahandicap,afamiliaritywiththevariedformsthat,historically, politicaltheoryhastakenmayaidintherecognitionofradicallydifferent recentandcontemporaryconceptionsofthepoliticalandpoliticswhenthey emerge(PV2,p.xv).

Thetoneofthispassageisalmostapologeticandcertainlyconditional.What,if anything,canwelearnaboutdemocracybyputtingtheepictheoristofthe ‘‘Vocation’’essayintensionwithWolin’slaterandmuchchasteneddescriptionof hisownroleasatheorist,andwhatcanthatmeanfortherestofusinpursuingthe vocationofpoliticaltheory?

Wolin’smainpointinPTVwastosuggestthatthefascinationwith‘‘method’’ hadledtoa‘‘crisisinpoliticaleducation,’’aclosingoffofpoliticalstudiesfroma richerstartingpointofa‘‘cultivatedmind’’thatthereforeresultedin‘‘aworld impervioustotheory’’(p.1081).Ifanything,theconcernabouttheabsenceof cultivatedmindshasbecomemoreseriousthanitwasfiftyyearsago,as universitieshavedivestedthemselvesoftheirresponsibilitytobepreserversand conveyorsofculture,decidinginsteadtobecomepartofaneoliberalregimeof corporategovernance.Studentsmightnowevenobjecttohavingtofollowa ‘‘method,’’sinceitsoconstrainsthemfromtherestoftheirtoo-busylives.Butlet usinsteadfocusonlyonwhatWolinactuallywroteaboutthepassingawayofa worldthathadnotbeen‘‘impervioustotheory.’’Thecrisisisoneofthepolitical education.Whatcanthatmean?

Thetheorists’lament,thatdespitetheirsageideasthattheywillnottobeheard, isanoldone.Weencounteritintheopeninglinesof Republic wherehis interlocutorsaskSocrates‘‘supposewewon’tlisten?’’andintheprophetsofthe OldTestament,whoobservehowfarthepeoplehavefallenfromtheirrighteous ways.ButWolinwasnotonlylamentingthefactthatthepeoplearenotlisteningto thetheorists,asmuchasthatistrue.TheproblemanticipatedinPTVismore serious,andbecomesclearifweputthequestionadifferentway.Letusask,other thanpoliticaleducation,whatcouldbethetaskofpoliticaltheory?

Putthisway,Iwanttosuggest,severalaspectsofWolin’sideasbecomemore cleartous.Hisdisputeswithothertheoristsmakemoresense,hisnever-ending hostilitytopoliticalsciencebecomesmorelegible.PTVwasnotwithoutitscritics atthetime;Wolin’sownstudentsLarrySpenceandJohnGunnelltookaimatthe text,albeitfordifferentreasons.Andthefirstparryofwhatwe’vecometocallthe

‘‘CambridgeSchool’’wasabouttoappear:QuentinSkinner’s‘‘Meaningand UnderstandingintheHistoryofIdeas’’appearedinthesameyearasPTV.For Skinnerandhisfollowers,thede-historicizedstudyofpoliticalideassimply providedthosewhobelievedinanyparticular‘‘ideas’’awaytotoottheirown horns,maketheirownpoliticalarguments,andtodoitundercoverofbeing intelligentandlearned.Thatis,itcouldconferafalseauthoritytosomebadideas. Itwas(touseafavoritetermofWolin’s)anexerciseindebunkingthepretensions ofmoreambitiouspoliticaltheorists,Straussians,Marxists,andparticipant–observersofpoliticallifesuchasWolin,alike.

ItisnotthatSkinnerobjectedtopoliticaleducation,hedid,however,seemto objecttotheideathatpoliticaltheorywasawaytoabroaderpoliticaleducation. Theonlythingonecouldlearnfromstudyingthehistoryofideaswasmoremodest: thegoalwastorecognizethatevengreatpoliticaltheoristsandwould-bepolitical actorsfacedconstraintsshapedbythepoliticallanguageavailabletothem.Asa typeofpoliticaleducation,suchanapproachpresumedfirst,bettertostudyhistory thattodoit.But,ifonewantedtodoit,thencertainpresumptionswerealreadyin place:thatonewasabletoact,i.e.,agency,andthatconstraintswereasimportant asboldness.Thiswasnotapoliticaleducationfromthestudentrebellions,itwas notapoliticaleducationforthedispossessed.Ithadmoremodestgoals,toallow thosewhoalreadyknewsomethingabouttheworldtomanagetheirgoalsbetter.

PartofthecontinuingexcitementoftheCambridgeSchoolisthatitwonfor politicaltheoryaroomofitsowninthegreathallofpoliticalscience.Political theory,too,couldhaveamethod.Itcould,infact,haveseverallittlechambers. Anothercouldgotothe‘‘HarvardSchool’’ofrealistpoliticaltheory,forexample, wholearnedtoavoidallformsofsystem(Sabl, 2011),except,ofcourse,the systematicthoughtthataroomofone’sowninacontemporaryacademicdiscipline issomehowenough.

Wolin’sconcernsweredifferent.Itisimportanttogobacktoandlookatthe precisekindofdismissalthathasoccurredtopoliticaltheory.Ithastodonotwith method’sfailure,butitssuccess.AworldsubjecttoBaconian‘‘knowledgeis power’’hasbecomeaworldofremarkablygreaterpowerthancouldpreviouslybe imagined.Hereisapassagefrom1969,ayearnowconsideredtosometobeamong oneofthemorechaoticperiodsinrecentAmericanhistory:

Inafundamentalsense,ourworldhasbecomeasperhapsnopreviousworld has,theproductofdesign,theproductoftheoriesabouthumanstructures deliberatelycreatedratherthanhistoricallyarticulated.Butinanothersense, theembodimentoftheoryintheworldhasresultedinaworldimperviousto theory.(PTV,p.1083)

NowthequestionIraisedbeforebecomesmorecomplex:whathappenswhenthe purposeofpoliticaltheoryisbutakindofpoliticalknowledge,andwhenthegoal

ofknowledgeistoproducepower?Howandwhatkindofpoliticaleducationis thenpossible?

Wolinreturnedtothisthemeoftheoryaspower,ofknowledgeaspower,over andagain.IthadappearedintheinitialworkonHobbesinthefirsteditionof PoliticsandVision (1960,pp.248–249)(hereafter,PV1)andinPTV.Notonlyhad methodmadetheworldimpervioustotheory,butithasalso‘‘renderedepictheory superfluous,’’as‘‘leadersofthebehavioralrevolutionclaim,theirrelevanceofepic theory’’(PTV,p.1081).YetWolinresistedthisclaim,andarguedthat‘‘theworld showsincreasingsignsofcomingapart,’’andyetitdidnot.Whynot?

WolinreturnedtothisquestioninhisbookTocqueville BetweenTwoWorlds (Wolin, 2001).There,hecarefullytraceda‘‘paradoxofpower,’’where,though Tocquevillethoughtthat‘‘themoststrikingcharacteristicofthetimesisthe powerlessnessofbothmenandgovernmentstodirectthecourseofpoliticaland socialchanges,’’(p.13)Wolinobservedthat‘‘theexerciseofpowerwasnolonger associatedwithruling.’’(p.14)Instead,Wolinwrites,‘‘Bythenthepreoccupation oftheoristshadshiftedfromtheacquisitionofpowertoitsproduction.’’Creating power,andtoomuchpower(e.g.,whenMarxandEngelsdescribethecollapsing bourgeoissysteminthe CommunistManifesto as‘‘toomuchcivilization,toomany goods,toomuchindustry,toomuchcommerce’’(Carver, 1996,p.6)requiredthat the‘‘modernprojectwasnottorenouncethecommitmenttoincreasingpowerbut tofindasavingformulawherebyitcouldberenderedevermorepredictable,ever moreobedient’’(p.18).Wolincontinued,‘‘Theoryis,uniquely,modernity’swayof constitutingpower,conversely,modernpowerhas,uniquely,atheoretical constitution’’(p.20).Theincapacitytoseethattheoryhasnarroweditsfocusto beingapartofthedevelopingsystemofpoweriswhatcausedittogoawry. SurveyingBacon,Descartes,andHobbesasthefoundersofthisnewtheoretical regime,Wolinaverred‘‘Atheorythatcouldnotbetranslatedintopracticalworks wasadjudgedincoherentaccordingtomodernity’snewstandardformental activity’’(p.24).

(Thereis,ofcourse,anotherstoryofthiskindofoverarchingpowerofhumans thatcomesfromamethod:thecommonalityoflanguagethatprecededthebuilding oftheTowerofBabel.Wolin’sinsistenceoftheroleofscienceandacommitment toprogressasapartofthestoryofproductivepowerowessomething,perhaps,to thisearlierversionofthestory.)

Superpower,whichappearsinWolin’swritingsinthenewmillennium,in DemocracyInc. (Wolin, 2008)andinPV2,allowsustoaddanotherglosstothis theme.WhatispeculiaraboutSuperpoweristhatithasnowamassedsomuch powerthatitneednolongerworryaboutitslimits.Itisallencompassing,andin part,isabletokeepgoingforwardbecauseitisnotakindofflexiblepower.Wolin wrote

Thepoliticaleconomyembodiesawidespreadconsensusofanironical sort….Thedemoshasbeenhammeredintoresignation,intofearful acceptanceoftheeconomyasthebasicrealityofitsexistencesohuge,so sensitive,soramifyingititsconsequencesthatnogroup,partyorpolitical actorsdarealteritsfundamentalstructure(PV2,p.578).

ThisdespairingmomentinWolin’swritinginformedmuchofhiswritinginthe 2000s.Hedescribedthechastenedtheorist’sbestwaytounderstandhisroleinhis 1999essayas,‘‘PoliticalTheory:FromVocationtoInvocation’’(Wolin, 2000). Nevertheless,whileitispossibletodwelluponthesadstateofdemocracy,ifwe returntothequestionofpoliticaleducation,anotherpossibilitypresentsitself.

Whilemostpeopleturntothelanguageofneoliberaleconomicstodescribethis switch,Wolindoesnot.Hesurelyunderstandsthatthisiswhathashappened;he notesthatasearlyastheeighteenthcentury,thegoalwasto‘‘fashionthedemosto fiteconomyratherthancitizenship’’(PV2,p.405).Wemightreadthisas stubbornnessonhisparttoholdontoapoliticalvocabulary.Butsomethingelseis goingon,torepeattheframingofthiscontribution.Wolinstillwantedtheoryto offerusakindofpoliticaleducation.Todoso,wehavetoknowthewaysinwhich theoryisalsotemptedby,andimplicatedin,servicetopower.Whatwouldtheory, intheserviceofSuperpower,looklike?Ithinkthisisthewaytounderstand Wolin’scritiqueofpostmodernisminPV2.

Thevocabularyofpostmodernism,withitsantipathiestowardsessentialism, centereddiscourse,foundationalism,andhistoricalnarrative,hasservedto disableitstheoristsfromconfrontingthebasiccharacteristicsofcontemporarypowerformationswhoseprecisecharacteristicsaretobe:centralizedyet quicktoreact,essentiallyeconomic,foundedoncorporatecapital,global,and bestunderstoodindevelopmentsovertime.Thecascadesof‘‘criticaltheory’’ andtheirposturesofrevolt,andtheappetitefortheoreticalnovelty,function assupportratherthanopposition .(PV2,p.567).

Thedangeristhatallofthenewandcreativeformsofpoliticaltheorizingthathave ariseninrecentyearsarenoguaranteeagainstthishegemonicformoftheoryas power.

Wolinintroducestwonewcategoriesinhis2000sbooks:Superpowerand terrorism,InvertedTotalitarianismandfugitivedemocracy.Atfirstthesecategories seeminapt,theyseemtofollowaframingofinternationalv.nationallevelsof analysis.Theyarepolitical,noteconomic,categories.Indeed,thoughWolinnever madethepointpreciselythisway,terrorismastheresistancetosuperpowerseems tooperateanalogouslytofugitivedemocracy’s‘‘escape’’frominvertedtotalitarianism.Itseemsironicthatthehopeof‘‘powertothepeople’’becameinstead, anotherpartofanewblob,here,notthesocial,butlipservicepaidtodemocracy.

InPV2,Wolinmadethecaseforfugitivedemocracy,amongotherways,by declaringthatthedemoswouldnotwanttorule.(‘‘Thetruequestionisnotwhether democracycangoverninthetraditionalsense,butwhyitwouldwantto.Governing meansmanningandaccommodatingtobureaucratizedinstitutionsthat,ipsofacto, arehierarchicalinstructureandelitist,permanentratherthanfugitive–inshort, anti-democratic’’(p.602).)

Politicaltheory’sgreathope,democracy,hasbecomepusillanimous,its conceptualframeakindoftheoreticalsourgrapes.Wolinendedthebooknoting that‘‘changeistheessenceofpostmodernsocieties,yetdecisionsabouttheforms ofchangehavebeenpre-emptedbygovernmental,corporate,and(toalesser extent)academicelites’’(p.605).Andsohecalledfor,‘‘not reconciliation’’but ‘‘dissonance,notaboutdemocracy’ssupplyinglegitimacytototalitybutabout nurturingadiscordantdemocracy discordantbecause,inbeingrootedinthe ordinary,itaffirmsthevalueoflimits’’(pp.605–606).

Is‘‘discord’’theonlyformthatcontemporarypoliticaleducationallows?Ifwe readWolinasdespairing,thenIthinkwereadhimashavingsurrenderedthe commitmenttopoliticaleducationtooquickly.Therightquestiontoaskrequiresus togobackandask:whatmightpoliticaleducationlooklikeinanageof Superpower?

Wolindidnotusetheterm‘‘epictheory’’inPV1orPV2.Thisbold(toobold?) claimof1969specifiedtwoaspectsofsuchepictheory.‘‘Thefirstfeatureshared byepictheoristshastodowithmagnitudes.Byanactofthought,thetheoristseeks toreassemblethewholepoliticalworld’’(PTV,p.1078).‘‘Thesecondaspectof epictheorycanbebroughtoutifwelookupontheorynotonlyasastructureof formalfeatures,butalsoasastructureofintentions.’’ForWolin,themost importantofthese‘‘controllingpurposes’’weretofocusonthecommonpurposeof people,andtorecognizecrisisasasystematicderangement.

PerhapsepictheorynolongerappealedtoWolinbecausetheassociationof theorywithakindofpowerpoisonedthenotionofan‘‘epictheorist’’forhim.But inclosing,letmesuggestanalternativewaytoreadPV2,onethatcanbepowerful andnonethelessresistthegravitationalpullofSuperpower/invertedtotalitarianism.

Tomakethepoint,IreturntoapassagefromJohnDeweythatWolindescribedasa ‘‘properlyrespectfulepigraph’’forDewey’sthought:

…thedemocraticroadisthehardonetotake.Itistheroadwhichplacesthe greatestburdenofresponsibilityuponthegreatestnumberofhumanbeings (p.519).

Itisworthnotingthattheword‘‘responsibility’’entersEnglisharoundthesame timethatWolindescribedtheshiftfrompowerassomethingtoacquiretopoweras somethingtoproduce,inthemid-seventeenthcentury.Therecanbeno responsibilitywithoutpower.Whilepowerisbeingproduced,itisalsoproducing, asDeweygraspsandyetmisunderstands,greaterresponsibilities.Thatthese

responsibilitiesareoverwhelmingifwetakethemseriouslyissurelyoneofthe lessonsofthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury.Whatwoulditmean,though,for democracynottofleeandbecomefugitive,buttotakeuptheyoke,this‘‘burdenof responsibility,’’genuinely,thatis,fordemocraticcitizenstocareaboutallothersas wellasthemselves?

Politicaltheory’spowercannolongercomefromitssimplerehearsal,expecting eitherthat‘‘thetruthwillsetyoufree’’orthatreadingPlatoautomaticallytranslates intoknowinghowtoliveagoodlife.Itcannolongercomefromitsoppositional place,becauseitisdifficult,Wolinadvised,toknowwhetheroneisinagenuine placeofoppositionoranotherendlesslycontestable‘‘critical’’node.Aswiththe ancientprophets,perhapsourtaskastheoristsisnottofindthenew,buttobegina processofcallingbacktomorefoundationaldemocraticprocessesinwhich,from thegroundup,wetrytorethinkthenatureofresponsibilitiesforourselves,our past,ourfuture,andtheworldinwhichwelive.

Evenwhendemocracy’sbestmomentsarethus‘‘fugitive,’’thisisnojustification forpoliticaltheorytobecomefugitiveaswell.Thetaskforpoliticaltheoristswho stillconsiderthemselvesdemocratsisnottofindsomemoregemshiddeninthe historyofpoliticalthoughttopolish,nortoshedlightonsomesmallpocketsof politicallifethatappeardemocratic,nortofleethetrappingsofpower,asifthis werepossible.Itis,instead,totakeontheratherepictaskoftryingtocreateaform ofpoliticaleducationinatimewhenneitherpoliticsnoreducationaregivenmuch intrinsicvalue.Inanageinwhichcorporatizedcollegesanduniversitiesextola typeof‘‘civicengagement’’(e.g.,McCartney etal, 2013),weseeanotherexample ofwhatWolindeemedSuperpower’s‘‘flexibility’’astheveryideaofpolitical educationisrenderedinnocuous.

McIvor(2016),afterhiscarefulreadingofWolin’swork,suggestsausefulplace tobeginare-workingofcontemporarypoliticaleducationiswiththeconceptof citizenship,developingwhatWolincalledthe‘‘multiplecivicself.’’Buthowcan wedoso,whenwearelivinginatimethatisdeeplyantagonistictoallformsof ambiguity,tocomplexasopposedtosimplisticsolutions,toanyformofthought thathasnofinancialpayoff?ItisherethatIwanttoreturntothepromiseofepic theoryfromsomeonewhoappreciatedwhatsuchlearningcouldbring.AsWolin wrote,methodism(andwemightaddhere,eventheoreticalmethodism)‘‘threatens themeditativeculturewhichnourishesallcreativity.Thatcultureisthesourceof thequalitiescrucialtotheorizing:Playfulness,concern,thejuxtapositionof contraries,andastonishmentatthevarietyandsubtleinterconnectionofthings’’ (PTV,p.1073).Wemightwellask,whatkindofpolitical,social,economic,and culturalinstitutionsareneededtomakesuchameditativeculture(toinvokeAudre Lorde)‘‘notaluxury’’(Lorde1984)?Whatarewesaying,evenasradical democrats,ifwesaythatepictheoryispasse ´ ?Thatthetaskaheadismadewell-

nighimpossiblebythecultureinwhichwenowliveisnoexcusenottotryto remaincommittedtothisdifficultformofpoliticaleducation.

OninterpretingHobbespolitically

AntonioY.Va ´ zquez-Arroyo

PoliticalTheorydoesn’thave‘‘implications’’forpolitics;ratherpoliticshas implicationsfortheory. …politicaltheorizingisnotpromptedbecause somethingiswrongwiththeoriesaboutpolitics,butbecausesomethingis fundamentallywrongwiththepoliticalworld.SheldonS.Wolin,‘‘History andMethod’’(Wolin, 1986,p.50).

OneofSheldonS.Wolin’sbest-knownpreceptsishisunderstandingofpolitical theoryfirstasacivicactivityand,onlysecondarily,asanacademicendeavor;an orderingofprioritiesthatplacedhimatoddswiththeincreasingprofessionalization ofthepoliticaltheorysubfieldduringthelastthirtyyears.6 Wolinsteadfastly assertedthispriorityeveninhismostintellectuallydemandingwork, Tocqueville BetweenTwoWorlds (2001),inwhichtheoreticalandintellectualcontextsare carefullydelineated,construed,andthuscarefullyadduced,aspartofasupremely politicalinterpretationofTocqueville’spoliticaltheory,hisgenresofreflection,his predicamentsofpowerandours.Andasthissecondmasterpiecemakesobviousto anyonewhocarefullyreadsit,thisorderofprioritiesneverledWolinto tendentious,letalonearbitrary,interpretations.Rather,itbecamepartofhissui generisapproachtotheinterpretationofthehistoryofpoliticaltheory,a perspectivalapproachdefinedbyabi-directionalitythatfocusedonboththe sourcesnourishingtheoreticalformulationinagivensituationandtheiraftermaths (seeVa ´ zquez-Arroyo, 2015,pp.146–163).

PoliticsandVision articulatesWolin’sperspectivalapproachnotonlyinthe recurrenceofthetermthroughoutthebookbutalsoinitsform.Notacomprehensive historyofpoliticalthought,thebooktacitlyseverstheoryfromthealtogetherlooser categoryofthought,andfocusesontheformerbyofferinga‘‘historicalperspective;’’ a‘‘historicalapproach’’concernedwiththenatureoftheoryandthepoliticalby zoninginonparticularthinkers,seismichistoricalmomentsandpoliticalchanges,in ordertoreflectonthemeaningofthesetwoterms(Wolin, 2004,p.xxiii).Thus,what hasstrucksomereadersastheoddarchitectureofthevolumerespondedtothis impulse:separatechaptersonLutherandCalvinandLiberalism;Churchfathers occupyingmorespacethanAquinas;andDurkheimandSaintSimonanalytically dislodgingMarx,Tocqueville,andRousseau.Retrospectively,Wolincharacterized PoliticsandVision assimultaneouslyenactinganddefending‘‘ahistoricalapproach tothepracticeofpoliticaltheory’’(Wolin, 1986,p.50).

ButtospeakofWolin’sapproachinthesingularalreadyobfuscatesmorethanit enlightens.Despitetheobviouscontinuitiesinhisformulationofpoliticaltheory anditsvocation,therearediscernableandverysignificantshiftsinhisapproachto thehistoryofpoliticaltheoryoveracareerthatspannedsixdecades.Ifin Politics andVision Wolinonoccasionspeaksofthehistoryofpoliticaltheoryinthe singular,subsequentreflectionsledhimtoentertainthepossibilityof‘‘apolitical andtheoreticalhistoryofpoliticaltheory,’’whichultimatelyamountedto ‘‘historiesoftheories’’(Wolin, 1994c,p.19).Fromtheseventieson,he increasinglyzonedinonthechangesinthemeaningandnatureof‘‘theory’’and howtherearegenresofpoliticaltheorizingbeyond‘‘philosophy’’and‘‘theory’’as classicallyunderstood,aswellasdifferentconceptionsofhistory,thusfully acknowledgingthetheoreticalcomplexityofhistoricalinquiry,itsmultiple,often contested,meaningsandforms(Wolin, 1986,p.64).

Yetifthereisonecontinuousthemeitisfoundintermsalreadyannouncedinthe subtitleof PoliticsandVision,‘‘continuityandinnovation.’’Withoutundue simplification,onecansuggestthatthecontinuityresidesintheaforementioned orderofprioritiesandtheconvictionthatthestudyofpoliticaltheoryconstituteda crucialcomponentinthepoliticaleducationofcitizens.Innovationsemergeasa corollaryofthesetwocoretenets.Stateddifferently,asthepoliticalsituationsto whichWolinwasrespondingcontinuedtoevolve,sodidthewaysinwhichhe wouldapproachthehistoryofpoliticaltheory,andthedifferentintellectual currentswithinthisreceivedtradition.

Reflectingtheoreticallyandpoliticallyaboutthepresent,accordingly,always assumesahistoricalperspective.Thecentralityofthisisconveyedinseveralverses ofT.S.Eliot’s FourQuartets,whicharepartlyquotedin PoliticsandVision and characterizedasbearing‘‘themoral’’ofWolin’sconceptionofpoliticaltheoryasa traditionofdiscourse:

Timepresentandtimepast

Arebothperhapspresentintimefuture

Andtimefuturecontainedintimepast.

Neitherfromnortowards;atthestillpoint,therethedanceis, Butneitherarrestnormovement.Anddonotcallitfixity, Wherepastandfuturearegathered.Neithermovementfromnor towards,

Neitherascentnordecline(Eliot, 2004,pp.171,173).

Neitherascent,nordecline;instead,reflectionoutofareceivedtradition,amoment ofthinkingthatisconceivedasanintervalofstillness,ofreflection.LikeEliot’s dance,itisanactofimaginationthatgathersthepastashistoricityandprefiguresa futuremediatedbythepresentinordertoreflectaboutapresentsituationandits historicallyconstitutedpredicaments,asituationsuggestingthatsomethingis

fundamentallywrongwiththepoliticalworld,with whatis,itsorderingsand imperatives.Butitisthedialecticalbi-directionalityfiguredinEliot’spoemthat ultimatelycapturesthegistofitall:thepresenceofapastalwaysmediatingbut neverdeterminingthepresent;andapresentthatwouldmediateanyprefiguration ofthefutureandafigureofthefuturethatcouldonlyhaveafightingchanceifthe presentisrecoveredandredressed.

Theimportanceofhistoricalperspectivismthusresidesinitsroleinthepolitical educationofpresent-daycitizensandwould-bepoliticalactors.Itroughlyconsists ofthreedimensions:first,thatoffamiliarizingoneselfwithavocabularydeployed withcriticalandintellectualrigorinthepastinordertobettermakesenseofone’s ownpoliticalpresent,notinordertofindsolutionstopresent-dayproblems,butto ratherapprehendingitmoreadequatelyandcritically;second,familiarityofthis relativelystablevocabularyandthewaysinwhichpriorthinkershavetransformed, sometimeseventransmogrified,itsmeaningforpoliticalandintellectualreasons,is aconditionofpossibilityforpoliticalliteracy–namely,foramorerigorousand realistapprehensionandconceptualization,graspingandassessment,ofthestakes involvedincontemporarycontroversies,andhowthesecontroversiesmaybe relatedtothefundamentalorsystematicnatureofthequestionsandproblemsthese reflectuponorsymptomatize;third,asanillustrationofhowtothinkaboutpolitics andpoliticallifeinatheoreticallydemandingway.

ThelatterisoffundamentalimportanceforWolin,aspoliticalphenomenahave becomeincreasinglydecenteredanddispersed–Wolin’sforemostexamplein PoliticsandVision was‘‘thecorporation’’anditsconscriptionandsublimationof thelanguageofparticipationandresponsibility–butsohasthetheoretical vocation,atleastfromtheonsetofReaganismon(Wolin, 2004,pp.338–339). PoliticsandVision thusconstitutesthefirstformulationofWolin’sarresting critiqueofboththeoriesandmovementsthatneglectpoliticalphenomenaasa distinctivesetofproblemsandthusconsiderstheseaseitherepiphenomenaloras occasionalsubjectmatterintheever-expandingworldofTheory;aworldinwhich Theoryhasimmediateimplicationsforpoliticsratherthanpolitics,quaanexternal historicalreality,interrogatingtheory.

Recently,CoreyRobinhasdrawnattentiontohowWolininterpretationsof figuresinthehistoryofpoliticalthoughtexhibitauniquecombinationof contextualismandclosereading(Robin, 2015,p.166).7 Thehistoricisminvolved inprovidingpolitical,theoretical,andintellectualcontextsisfrequentlyfoundin thedeepscene-settingfoundinWolin’sfinestessays,whereintellectualand theoreticalcontextsfrequentlytakeprecedenceagainstthebackgroundofanacute historicalsenseoftheepochthetheoristinquestionwaslocated.Theclose readings,incontrast,areparticularlymemorableintheiradeptnessatporingover themeaningofsilencesinatext,oftenfoundatthelevelofthesentenceandits cadences,andtherhetoricaldevisesaparticularthinkerdeploystothink

theoreticallyaboutherpoliticalpresent,andtodraw,evenlure,hisaudienceinto herthought-worldandthepoliticalpracticesandprinciplesitupholds.

Yetthesearetwoapproaches,eachdemandingitsownskillset,thatmany interpretershaveperforcekeptthemapart:whereasclosereadersoftextsoften neglectanydeepscene-settingintheirinterpretations,orsimplylackthenecessary historicalsense,historiansofpoliticalthoughtmostlyserveastechniciansof politicalthoughtthatdiligentlyreconstructcontextsbutseldomdwellonthe rhetoricallayersandliterarycadencesofaformulationanditsplaceinabroader diachronictraditionofpoliticaldiscourse.PartofWolin’soriginalityasan interpreterwashisinimitableabilitytobringthetwointoasinglefieldofvision.

Wolin’sperspectivalapproachtothehistoryofpoliticaltheoryanditshistoricity ismostclearlyseeninhisseveralengagementswithThomasHobbes’spolitical thought.Overaspanofthirtyyears,hecraftedthreemajorinterpretationsofthis thinkerthatarestrikinglydissimilar.Buttheunlikenessoftheseengagements betraysamomentofcontinuityinwhatareotherwisearestrikinglydifferent interpretations,acontinuityofapproachtothehistoricityofpoliticalthought,and thevocationofpoliticaltheoryanditsroleintendingthepoliticalliteracyof citizens.ThiscontinuityisintimatelyrelatedtothemultivalentcontextsinWolin’s practice,oncehermeneuticallyunderstood.EachengagementwithHobbeswas situatedinaparticularcontext–Wolin’s,hisintellectualpreoccupations,andthe increasingdesiretoreflectonthedespairingpoliticalsituationoftheUnitedStates –thatledtoaproductiveengagementwithHobbes,histhoughtformsandliterary cadences,inrelationtodifferenttheoretical,intellectual,andpoliticalcontexts.

In PoliticsandVision,forinstance,Hobbesiscontextualizedinrelationshipto thetraditionofdiscoursethebookpresents,especiallyashecontinuesalongmotif withinthattradition:theneedtorespondtocrises.AlongsideMachiavelli,Wolin argues,Hobbesstandsatthecenterofa‘‘revivalofpoliticalcreativity’’inthe sixteenthandseventeenthcenturies(Wolin, 2004,p.216ff.).AndlikeMachiavelli, Hobbespostulatedanautonomizationofpoliticalphenomena.Evenso,Hobbes’s defenseoftheautonomyofpoliticalphenomenaismoreradicalthanthe Florentine’sinatleastonerespect.Itdiremptspoliticalthoughtfromthe intractabilityofhistoryandculturebywayofhisdeploymentofanewscience whosede-historicizedabstractionsconstitutethebasisuponwhichHobbes’s passionfororderisexpressed.Aseveranceofpoliticalthoughtfromthethickness ofpasttraditions,itsresourcesandencumbrances,whichsetsHobbesapartfrom notonlyMachiavelli,butalsofromradicalinnovatorslikeCalvinandLuther: ‘‘WhereMachiavelli’sthoughthadcontainedonlysomestrikinganticipationsof thecomingmodesofscientificthoughtandcouldthereforecombinemodernity withacultofantiquity,andwhileLutherandCalvinmightskirttheMiddleAgesto recapturethewisdomofAugustineandthesimplicityofApostolicteachings, Hobbeswrotefromthemidstofascientificrevolutionthatseemedtosnapthe continuitybetweenthepresentandthepast,exposingthewisdomoftheancientsas

convenienttargetsforsarcasm’’(Wolin, 2004,p.217).Hobbesisthuscontextualizedintermsofthetraditionofdiscoursethatispoliticaltheoryandhis innovationisbroughttoreliefbywayofacontrastwithotherradicalinnovators whoneverthelessretainsedimentsofthepastinwaysthatHobbes’sautonomizationofpoliticalthoughtfromhistoryandtraditiondidnot.

ItisalongtheselinesthatHobbesispresentedasthefigureinauguratingthe socialcontracttradition,whichWolincharacterizedas‘‘acreativeactofpolitical imagination,’’aprocessofcreativedestructionakintoFrancisBacondictum:‘‘On waxentabletsyoucannotwriteanythingnewuntilyourubouttheold.Withthe minditisnotso;thereyoucannotrubouttheoldtillyouhavewritteninthenew’’ (Wolin, 2001,p.32).Andthenewwouldbewritteninthelanguageofscience, althoughalanguagenotentirelyexfoliatedofrhetoricandmetaphor.Thelinguistic orderconjuredupbythis‘‘sardonicmoralist,’’therefore,constitutesaradical attempttoanchorauthoritybywayofaconceptionofthestateofnatureasa permanentpossibilityallegorizingtheever-presentthreatofanarchyandthe breakdownofpublicauthority(Wolin, 2004,p.235ff.).

AlthoughWolinregisteredthemomentouschangesthatHobbesintroducedto thetraditionofpoliticaltheory,thechapterof PoliticsandVision hardlydwellson itspowereffects,nordidhedwellontheroleofrhetoricandmetaphorinthe constructionofHobbesimposingbutultimatelyveryfragileconstruction.Indeed, evenwhenhegraspedthewaysinwhichHobbesdislodgedanyideasofan ‘‘engagedcitizen,’’WolinunderstatesthesourcesofpowerinHobbes’sconceptualizationofpoliticallife(Wolin, 2004,p.246).Indeed,inopencontrasttohislast sustainedengagementwithHobbes,theessay‘‘HobbesandtheCultureof Despotism,’’wheretheabstractionsandrusesofdeviceslikeastateofnatureare sharplycriticized,in PoliticsandVision theactualcontentofthescientific revolution,itsexactcontoursandtheformsofpoweritreliedonoraimedat producing,remainunspecified.TheemphasisisratherplacedonhowHobbes creativelybuiltupontheseintellectualdevelopmentstofundamentallytransform thenatureofpoliticaltheorizing.ButamidsttheradicaltransformationsHobbes’s politicaltheoryemblematized,thereremainsomerecurrentthemes,suchasthelink betweenchaosandcreativity,andthedrivetorestoremeaninginatimeofcrises, whichstillsituatedhiminthetraditionofwesternpoliticalthought.

Roughlyadecadelater,WolinreturnedtoHobbesinadifferentpoliticaland intellectualcontext.If PoliticsandVision wasconceivedandwrittenduringthe Eisenhowerera,atimeinwhichpoliticaltheorywasconsidereddefunctorsimply historyofideas,‘‘HobbesandtheEpicTraditionofPoliticalTheory’’wascrafted atthetailendofthesixtiesandinthecontextofBehavioristascendance.Inthese newcontexts,theideaof‘‘crisis’’isreemphasized,asistheliteraryandrhetorical qualityofpoliticaltheory,butwiththegoalofrecapturing‘‘whattendstogetlost intheageofanalysis:thehumanexcitementwhichmovesthetheorist’’(Wolin, 1970,p.4).Attheveryoutof‘‘HobbesandtheEpicTraditionofPoliticalTheory’’

Wolinestablishestherelevantcontextforhisinquiry,aswellasitsform.Notonly heaimedat‘‘theinformingintentionwhichgovernedHobbes’spoliticalthought,’’ butunlikerecentcommentators–andhelistsStrauss,Oakeshott,Polin,and Macpherson–Wolinfocusedonintentionalityhadadifferentcriticaledge:‘‘the wayinwhichintentionaffectsstyleandsubstance’’(Wolin, 1970,p.4).The upshot:themostliteraryofallofWolin’sinterpretations,oneadeptattheformal qualitiesofHobbes’spoliticalthought,hisstyle,eventhecadencesofhis sentences,andhowallofitbearuponthecontentofhispoliticalthought.Inthis essay,thescene-settingismostlyintellectualandliterary,withparticularfocuson theepicasaliteraryform.

Hobbesisthencastintermsof‘‘anepictraditioninpolitical,’’whichWolin systematicallyunveilsintheessay.Indeed,afterannouncinghisintention,Wolin devotesthenextninepagesofhisessaytolayingoutthebroadcontoursofthis currentwithinwesternpoliticalthought.Unlikeheroicpoetry,Wolinwrites,which celebratestheherowhosedeedsitrecounts,theherooftheepictraditionof politicaltheoryisthetheorist.Ratherthanaself-effacingfigure,thetheoristdraws attentiontohimself,‘‘thetheorist-creator’’(Wolin, 1970,pp.19,29).

Afterestablishingthisintellectualcontextfromeneminentliteraryperspective, Wolinproceedstomakehiscasebycarefullybringingtogethertheseveral instancesinHobbes’swritingsinwhichheexpresseshisambitionsandstakesout hisclaimoforiginality.AsHobbes’smetaphorsclearlysuggest,Wolinargues, Hobbeshadmonotheisticambitions,whichaccountfor Leviathan’s‘‘fullnessof scopeandboldnessofexecution’’(Wolin, 1970,p.23).Hethuswrotetheepic workofpoliticaltheory,ifthereeverwasone,while‘‘combiningthepictorial vividnessoftheepicwiththerelentlessprecisionoflogic’’(Wolin, 1970,p.24).Of course,thecombinationofthesetwomotifswasnotalwaysstableandWolingoes ontosuggestthatoncereadimmanentlytheliteraryarchitectureofthebookmostly hadtheupperhand.Here’sWolin’swonderfulformulation:

Leviathan itselfisametaphor,whiletheargumentsupportingitisbutan extendedmetaphor,asuperbandsustaineddisplayofimaginationandfancy andnotalwaysrestrainedby‘‘judgment.’’Recallthevividimageryofthe stateofnature;ortheextravagantdiscussionofthehumanpassions;orthe translationofthestateintothelanguageofmechanism;orthefancifulact wherebymencovenantthemselvesintosociety;orthemock-heroicassaulton theKingdomofFairies.NofurthercommentisneededexceptthatHobbes hadbeenmorehonestinhis Autobiography,wherehehadwrittenthathislife hadbeenspentservingpeaceand‘‘hercompanions,theMuses’’(Wolin, 1970,p.38–39).

Wolin’sinterpretationestablishestheconnectionsbetweentherhetoricalstructure oftheworkandtheclaimsofHobbes’sAutobiography,andadducestheseto supporthisinterpretationoftheactualcontentofHobbes’spoliticaltheorytogreat

effect.Oneofitsunexpectedresultsistheemphasisplacednotonthe architectonicsofsovereignty,butonhowin Leviathan Hobbesaimedatnothing lessthan‘‘transformingthepoliticalcultureofhissociety’’(Wolin, 1970,p.49).

YetWolindoesnotstopthere.Rather,thisinterpretationof Leviathan leadshim toreturntohisearlierquestionofthetheoristashero.Butthistimehereads Hobbes’sheroicdeedsagainstthebackgroundofhisownroleinthedefining politicalepisodeofHobbes’slifetime:theEnglishCivilWar.Withatouchof causticity,WolinquicklyremindsthereaderofHobbes’slessthanheroicactions duringthecivilwaranditsimmediateaftermath.Andinamovethatstrikesthe readerastangentialtowhatprecedesit,WolinunexpectedlysuggeststhatHobbes’s prudentialactionsactuallycomplementtheepicdriveofhistheory.Theconclusion atonceclinchesWolin’sinterpretationandalsoopensupawholenewproblematic thatcouldeasilybethepointofdeparturetoawholedifferentinterpretationof Hobbes.Wolin’sconcludingparagraphismemorable:

Thesocietyof Leviathan istheantihero’sutopia:asocietyofformalequality, whereallsubjectshavebeenhumbledandmadedependentuponthe sovereignforthesecurityoftheirlives,goods,rights,andstatus.Itisautopia forthosewhowishtoberidoftheanxietiesproducedbypoliticalinstability sothattheymayconcentrateupon‘‘industry’’and‘‘cultureoftheearth’’and alloftheothergoodsof‘‘commodiousliving,’’which‘‘naturalphilosophy’’ andmathematicsmakepossible.Thepoliticalepicoftheantiheroproves,in theend,tobeanattemptedepitaphtopolitics,anotherdenialoftheancient hopeofapublicsettingwheremenmayactnoblyinthefurtheranceofthe commongood,anotherwayofabsolvingmenofcomplicityandguiltfortheir commonpredicaments(Wolin, 1970,p.50).

Itispreciselythequestionofpoliticalcultureandhowitrelatestotheabsolution ofcomplicityandresponsibilityforcommonpredicamentsthatWolintookupin 1988,twentyyearsafterhisunveilingofanepicHobbes.But‘‘Hobbesandthe CultureofDespotism’’doesmorethanpickingupandexpandinguponthesetimes. Inthisessay,WolincontextualizesHobbesintermsoftherelationshipbetween knowledgeandpower,theformsofelitismaparticularconfigurationofthis relationshipsanctionsinthecontextof‘‘ahigh-techsociety,’’andtheprinciplesin whichsuchruleislegitimized.Andalongtheselines,Wolinexploresthewaysin whichtechnocraticruleisincreasinglyexercisedandnormalizedinthenameof scienceandexpertise.

ThissetofconcernsisframedinrelationshiptoKarlPopper’sfamouspolemic againstPlatoin TheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies.Wolin,however,turnsthe tablesonPopperandwhileshowingthetendentiousnatureofPopper’sdiatribehe alsorevealssomethingelse:byplacingthedebateagainstthebackgroundofthe emergenceanddominanceoftheso-called‘‘TechnologicalSociety’’inadvanced

capitalistsocialforms,Wolinshowshow‘‘rule-by-knowledge’’isaPopperian conceitthatisevenmoredespoticthanPlato’sfigurationofthePhilosopherKing. Itamountstoanovelformofthe‘‘tyrannyofreason’’whoseantidemocratic implicationsresultednotfromtheobviouselitisminvolved;rather,these‘‘owe moretocertainpoliticalviewsembeddedinconceptionsoftechnicalknowledge thantoaconsciouslyelitistconceptionofpolitics’’(Wolin, 1990,p.12).Wolin offersthefollowingformulation:

Whatgoesunnoticedisthepeculiarityoftheassumptionthat‘‘principlesof knowledge’’should‘‘rule,’’thatthenatureoftheoneisfittedtothenatureof theother,thattruthandpowerhavenotonlycomplementarystructuresbut mimeticones,thatthereisapower-structuretotruthandatruth-structureto power.Thesenseinwhichelitismisa‘‘necessary’’featureofadvanced societiesmayhavelesstodowithatheoryofpoliticsthanwithanimperative whosepoliticalcharacterisnolongerrecognized.Theimperativeisto organizepoliticalpowerinordertobestexploitthestructuralcharacterof truthwhileconcealingfromexploitersandespeciallytheexploitedthe politicalelementsthathavehelpedtoconstitutetheunderstandingoftruth andshapeditsstructure(Wolin, 1990,pp.12–13).

ForWolin,thispoliticsofknowledge,andthe mentalite ´ itfosters,canalreadybe seenatworkintheEnlightenment,especiallyinthewritingsoftheD’Alambert, Turgot,and,lateron,Condorcet,withafterlivesinComteandtheshadowhis positivismcastuponthetwentiethcentury.ThisiswhatWolincallsthe‘‘cultureof despotism;i.e.,asocialmentalityandpracticethatenablepowertooperate unhindered’’(Wolin, 1990,p.17).

BaconandHobbesdeeplyinfluencedtheemergenceofthismentality,especially Hobbesinwhosepoliticaltheory,Wolinargues,severalofthestrandsassociated withthisculturefirstfoundsystematicexpression;indeed,Hobbesispresentedas ‘‘thefirstmoderninwhomadespoticmentalitywasatwork’’(Wolin, 1990,p.19). Bythussettingthescene,Wolinproceedstoofferhismostcriticalinterpretationof Hobbes,aninterpretationinwhichsomeofthequestionspreviouslyposedinaless criticallightemergedinsharperrelief,say,hisconceptionofarationalizedpolitical culture,theabstractdepersonalizationofruling,andtheupendingofany participatoryunderstandingofpoliticalrule.

Butwhilebreakingnewgroundinthisessay,thisnewHobbesisnotentirely severedfromsomeofWolin’searliestconcerns.Think,forinstance,ofthe organizationaldriveatworkinthetheoreticalarchitectureof Leviathan andhow forWolinitcorrelatesandfosterstheformsofdepoliticizationandexpert-rule.Itis aproposofthisconcernthatperhapsthemostremarkableinsightofWolin’s interpretationofthedespoticimpulseemerges:thewaysinwhichthecultureof despotismmanagesthefeatofoperatingunhindered.Organizationasatermdoes notappearin Leviathan,Wolinargues,becauseHobbescouchedhisargumentsfor

a‘‘politicalsocietyasasocialscientificconstructionbytransformingolderpolitical language,’’thustheradicaltransformationhisproposedorderentailedcouldbe rhetoricallypresentedaslessso(Wolin, 1990,p.23).

ThisinterpretationofHobbes’sdespoticdrive,however,ishardlyjustan exerciseofunveilinganddenouncingahiddenmotifinthehistoryofpolitical thought.ByinterpretingHobbesalongtheselines,heshedslightonthestructureof Hobbes’spoliticaltheoryandoriginallyrecastsoneofitsbasicassumptions: equality,somethingthathasledsomeinterpreterstosuggestthatHobbeswassome sortofproto-democrat.Againstanyvindicationoftheegalitarianmomentof Hobbes’spoliticalthought,Wolinshows‘‘equalityistheconsequenceofa methodologicalneedratherthananormativeclaim’’(Wolin, 1990,p.32).Forthere isa‘‘refractory’’qualitybetweentheHobbesianconstructionofsovereigntyand the‘‘abstractsubjectofadespotictheory,’’andthe‘‘naturalequalitywhichallows forthecovenantthatmakessocietypossiblealsomakesabsolutismnecessary’’ (Wolin, 1990,pp.31,33).Equalityisatheoreticalnecessitywhosepositingcannot beslicedanddicedfromtheinnercoherenceof Leviathan’soverarchingargument.

Atatimewhentheendofthecoldwarwasinsight,andalongwithitthetriumph ofcapitalistmodernity,Wolin’sconcernwith‘‘thecultureofdespotism’’first articulatedbyHobbeswasasprescientasitwasunwelcomed.Itdecentered despotism,severeditfromfantasiesabouttotalitariandespots,anddrewattention tostricturesofpowerandtheculturalpatternssustainingthem.

OneHobbes,oneinterpreter,yetthreemarkedlydifferentinterpretations:what accountsforsuchvariation?InlightofWolin’sperspectivalapproachtothe historicityofpoliticalthought,Wolin’sthreeverydifferentinterpretations correspondtothreedifferentperspectiveswhosecommondenominatoristhetask ofinterpretingHobbespolitically.Indoingso,Wolin’sinterpretationsembodya uniquecombinationoftheattributesT.S.Eliotassociatedwithcriticismatitsbest: ‘‘sensitiveness,erudition,senseoffactandsenseofhistory,andgeneralizing power’’(Eliot, 1975,p.57).Wolin’sinterpretationsofHobbesexhibitallofthese qualitiesbut,unlikeEliotandhisidealizedcritic,thesearenotputattheserviceof culturalhierarchyandelitism.Intheseessays,contextualizationthusemergesasa corollaryofinterpretation,asaneminentlypoliticalandtheoreticaldecisionthat Wolinponderedintermsoftheintellectual,historical,andpoliticalcontextsof bothtextandinterpreter.Yetaprocessofcontextualizationboundtobe perspectival,asin PoliticsandVision,thebookthatinaugurated,clearlystaged anddemonstratedthisapproach.Eachessayopensupanewperspective,anew vistaonHobbesfromtheperspectiveofWolin’sowntheoreticalandpolitical concerns,which,inturn,werearesponsetohispoliticalsituation.

In‘‘TraditionandIndividualTalent,’’Eliotwritesabouthowtobecapableofthe ‘‘greatlabor’’requiredto‘‘obtain’’thetradition,thepoetneeds‘‘ahistoricalsense’’ that‘‘involvesaperception,notonlyofthepastnessofthepast,butofits presence;’’furthermore,‘‘heisnotlikelytoknowwhatistobedoneunlesshelives

inwhatisnotmerelythepresent,butthepresentmomentofthepast,unlessheis conscious,notofwhatisdead,butofwhatisalreadyliving’’(Eliot, 1975,pp.38, 44).Wolin’scriticalinheritanceofpoliticaltheory,quatraditionofdiscourse, combinesthesequalities,includingthehardlaborrequiredtogenuinelyinheritit, anacutesenseofthepresent,andofthepresenceofthepast,buttheseareplacedat theserviceofrecoveringthepresent.Thetaskofthepoliticaltheoristsisthatof ‘‘retrievingarecedingdemocraticpresent,’’whilecriticallymappingtheformsof powerandcollectivementalitiesdepletingit(Wolin, 2001,p.9).

TotalitarianDemocracyReditio

NicholasXenos

Itiseasytosaythatwefightagainstthetotalitarianidea;itislesseasyto admitthattofightagainstitsuccessfullymeansrunninggraverisksof becominglikeourenemy.HaroldJ.Laski, ReflectionsontheRevolutionof OurTime (1943,p.179)

Intheoriginal,1960editionof PoliticsandVision,SheldonS.Wolinreferred approvinglyontwooccasionstoJacobTalmon’sonceinfluentialstudy, The OriginsofTotalitarianDemocracy.Writtenintheimmediatepost-WorldWarTwo periodandpublishedin1952,TalmonexplainedinhisIntroductionthathisbook was‘‘anattempttoshowthatconcurrentlywiththeliberaltypeofdemocracythere emergedfromthesamepremisesintheeighteenthcenturyatrendtowardswhatwe proposetocallthetotalitariantypeofdemocracy .Thetensionbetween[these twocurrents]hasconstitutedanimportantchapterinmodernhistory,andhasnow becomethemostvitalissueofourtime’’(Talmon, 1970,p.1).Wolinhimself struggledtodistinguishbetweenwhathetermedliberalismand‘‘radical democracy,’’andhisfirstreferencetoTalmonwasonthisdistinction(Wolin, 2004,p.263andn.9,p.657).However,intheexpandedsecondeditionofhis book,whichmarks,inWolin’swords,his‘‘journeyfromliberalismtodemocracy,’’ theonlyreferencetoTalmonispejorative,claimingthatTalmon‘‘proceededto inventanewandominousregime-form,‘totalitariandemocracy,’andendowedit withagenealogystretchingbacktoRousseau’s‘generalwill’andtheFrench revolutionaryTerror.’’Wolinfurtherpointedouttheparadoxthatwhiledemocracy andtotalitarianismhadbeentakentobeoppositesduringthewar,initsaftermath ‘‘totalitarianismwasnowbeingdepictedasaversionofdemocracy.’’Heconcludes that,‘‘Totalitariandemocracy,then,wasacriticalconstruction,reflectiveofadeep suspicionofcollectiveaction.Itjustifiedtheideaofanattenuateddemocracy dissociatedfrompoliticalactionandidentifiedinsteadwithprotectingindividual rightsandpromotingeconomicgrowth’’(Wolin, 2004,p.521andnote129,

p.722).Andintheprefacetotheexpandededitionof PoliticsandVision,Wolin deploystheterm‘‘invertedtotalitarianism’’todescribewhatheseesasthe antidemocraticspawnofliberalismweddedtothemodernstate.

Inthiscontribution,IwillrecountTalmon’snotionoftotalitariandemocracyand brieflydescribeseveralaccountsprecedinghisoftherelationshipbetweena particularunderstandingofdemocracyanditsthreattoliberty.Iwillthencontrast Wolin’sinterpretationofdemocracyandtotalitarianismtotheseinorderto highlightcertainfeaturesofhispoliticaltheory.Further,IwillaskhowWolin’s notionof‘‘fugitivedemocracy’’correspondstotheformofpowerrepresentedin the‘‘regimeform’’ofinvertedtotalitarianism.

AlongwithTalmon,WolincitesanessaybyGeorgeH.Sabineinreferenceto thedistinctionbetweenliberalismandradicaldemocracy.Sabine,inturnfollowing theleadofE.H.Carr,tracestwotrajectoriesofwhathecallsdemocratictheory. OneisassociatedwiththePuritanRevolution,findsitsphilosopherinJohnLocke, andemphasizesthefreedomofminorities,principallyreligiousminoritiesinthe formofProtestantchurches.TheotherisassociatedwiththeFrenchRevolution, followsthepoliticaltheoryofRousseau,whichpredatesit,andplacestheequality ofcitizensatitscenter.Sabinethusattributesthefamiliardistinctionbetween libertyandequalitytotworelativelydistincttraditionsofdemocraticthought.The apparenttensionbetweenthesehadoftenbeennoted,especiallyafterTocqueville, andso,‘‘intheaccusationsofitsenemies,bothconservativeandradical,the democraticargumentseemedtobecaughtinadilemma:themorelibertytheless equality,andthemoreequalitythelessliberty.Itsmoreliberalfriends,likeJohn StuartMill,weremorethanhalfafraidthattheaccusationwastrue’’(Sabine, 1952, p.452).ButSabineshowsthattheevolutionofdemocraticgovernmentinthe nineteenthcenturycombinedbothtraditions,withtheBritishintroducingan egalitarianexpansionofthesuffragewhiletheFrenchtookmeasurestoprotect freedomofassociation.Hislargerintentionistodemonstratethatdemocracy consistsinapracticeaimingataninstitutionalstructurethatrecognizesboththe individualityandequalityofcitizensandthegroupsandassociationsbeneaththe levelofthestatewithwhichcitizenswillinglyidentify.Sabine’spoliticalpurpose wastodrawattentiontoinformalinequalitiesamongandbetweengroupsthat resultsin‘‘whatisineffectsecond-classcitizenship’’forindividualsofvariously definedminoritiesofraceorreligion(Sabine, 1952,p.473).

Inthecourseofhisargument,Sabinemakesseveralobservationsofparticular relevancehere.HenotesthatinRousseau’sschema,theindividual’s‘‘personal will,whenproperlyunderstood,isidenticalwiththeGeneralWillofthesociety, thisWillisidenticalwithmorality,isinfalliblyright,andquiteexhauststhe citizen’swillwhenhehascontributedtoformingaconsensusofthegroup.Ifhe imagineshisinteresttobeotherwise,heismistaken,andifheiscoerced,heis ‘forcedtobefree’’’(Sabine, 1952,p.464).AndforRousseau,allprivateinterests

areathreattothepublicinterestbyvirtueofsimplybeingprivate.Sabineconcludes that‘‘Rousseau’sversionofdemocracy,therefore,isnotinanyfundamentalsense incompatiblewithabsolutegovernment,providedabsolutismcanclaimtospeakfor ‘thepeople’’’(Sabine, 1952,p.464).WhileSabinenotesthatothershavepointed outthiscompatibility,itwasunanticipatedbyRousseau,thoughlogicallyconsistent withhisvisionofindividuality.‘‘Theabsolutelysovereignandomnicompetent state,’’Sabineobserves,‘‘isthelogicalcorrelateofasocietywhichconsistsof atomicindividuals’’(Sabine, 1952,p.467).Andinsuchacontext,devoidofall otherformsofsocialdistinction,Sabinefindsitunsurprisingthatpropertyassumed thecrucialroleitdidindefiningpropertyrightsinnineteenth-centuryFrance,thus justifyingtheMarxistcriticismofbourgeoisdemocracyasplutocracy.‘‘The individualistradicalismoftheRevolution,’’hewrites, gaveplacetotheclassradicalismofthenineteenthcenturyandthepresent. Whatthetwotypesofradicalismhadincommonwasaformofindividualism thatflatteneddownindividualityintomerelikenessofkind,intheonecaseof manintheabstractorcitizenship,intheotherofmembershipinasocial class… Theidentificationofsocietywithmass,andofdemocracywiththe actionofindividualsinthemass,isnotatheoreticalerroronlybutawellauthenticatedpartofthemechanicsofdictatorship.Thatitspellsthedeathof politicaldemocracyisnotamatterofspeculation(Sabine, 1952,p.467).

Asproof,SabineofferstherecenthistoryofGermany,wheretheNational Socialistsdestroyedindependentlaborunionsandthehistoryofsingle-partystates ingeneral.

Inafootnote,SabinementionsthatthesuggestionofE.H.Carr’s,whichhad inspiredhisownreflections,hasbeendevelopedbyTalmoninabookpublished afterthecompletionofhisessay(Sabine, 1952,p,451). TheOriginsofTotalitarian Democracy wasoriginallyintendedasthefirstpartofatrilogy.Thesecond volume,publishedin1960andentitled PoliticalMessianism:TheRomanticPhase, takesupTalmon’snarrativewherethefirstbookleavesoff. Origins tracesitstheme inFrenchthoughtfromthemid-eighteenthcenturythroughtheBabouvist conspiracyof1796. PoliticalMessianism carriesthestoryforwardfromSaint Simontoincorporatethe1848revolutionsinWesternEurope,thoughitseemsthe originalintentwastoextendthestorythroughtheeventsoftheParisCommune, afterwhich‘‘theheirsoftheJacobintraditionabandonedviolenceandbeganto competeforpowerbylegalmeans.Theyenteredparliamentsandgovernmentsand wereincorporatedbydegreesintothelineofthedemocracies.TheRevolutionary spiritnowspreadeastwardsuntilitfounditsnaturalhomeinRussia,whereit receivedanewintensityfromtheresentmentcreatedbygenerationsofoppression andthepre-dispositionoftheSlavstoMessianism’’(Talmon, 1970,pp.252–253). Theunwrittenthirdvolumewouldthushavebeendevotedtodemocratic totalitarianisminEasternEurope.

Severalthingsareclearfromthisplananditsmainthemes.UnlikeSabine, Talmonisclearlyinvolvedinaregressiveenterprise,workingbackwardfromthe RussianRevolutionandtakingaformofso-calledtotalitarianismasboththe startingpointandtheoutcomeofhisinvestigation.Secondistheintertwiningofthe conceptsofdemocracy,totalitarianism,messianism,andrevolution.Thirdisthe claimthatwhathadbeenonestrandofwesternpoliticalthoughtandactionhad becomeseparatedoutandwasnowinexternalopposition,representedbythe SovietBloc,toatriumphantstraindevoidofitsdangersanderrors.

Talmonhaslittletosayabouttheliberalformofdemocracyhechampions.Itis ‘‘empirical’’andlimitedinitsscope,whereasthetotalitarianform‘‘maybecalled politicalMessianisminthesensethatitpostulatesapreordained,harmoniousand perfectschemeofthings,towhichmenareirresistiblydriven,andatwhichtheyare boundtoarrive.Itrecognizesultimatelyonlyoneplaneofexistence,thepolitical’’ (Talmon, 1970,p.2).OntheliberalsidestandBenjaminConstant,Mme.deStae ¨ l, JohnStuartMill,LordActon,andReinholdNiebuhr;ontheother,Rousseau, Robespierre,Babeuf,Hegel,andMarx.TheshadowsofTocquevilleandBurkeare castthroughout.ButTalmonfindsacommonroottothetwokindsofdemocracyin theconceptofliberty,ratherthaninaTocquevillianopposition(alsosharedby ActonandNiebuhrandothers)betweenlibertyandequality.Thedifferenceliesin theapproachtoliberty,withtheliberaltrendfindingit‘‘inspontaneityandthe absenceofcoercion,’’while‘‘theotherbelievesittoberealizedonlyinthepursuit andattainmentofanabsolutecollectivepurpose’’(Talmon, 1970,p.2).Itisthe absolutequalityofthelatterthatcausesTalmontocharacterizeitasMessianic. Talmon’sBurkeansideismanifestedinhisclaimthatinthesecondhalfofthe eighteenthcenturyanepochalchangeoccurred.‘‘Menweregripped,’’hewrites, ‘‘bytheideathattheconditions,aproductoffaith,timeandcustom,inwhichthey andtheirforefathershadbeenliving,wereunnaturalandhadalltobereplacedby deliberatelyplanneduniformpatterns,whichwouldbenaturalandrational’’ (Talmon, 1970,p.4).Talmon’scombinationofalaissez-fairenotionofspontaneity withaToryadmirationoftime,custom,andfaithindicatesahybridconceptionof liberalismdefinedmorebywhatitisnotthanbyacoherentlypositivedoctrine.

Talmonmakesafurtherdistinction,betweenRightandLefttotalitarianisms, totalitariandemocracybeingrepresentativeofthelatter.Lefttotalitarianism, despiteitsculminationinacollectivepurpose,beginswiththeindividualandwith reason,Talmonclaims,whilethatoftheRighttakesgroups,‘‘historic,racialand organicentities,’’asitsmaterial.TheresultisthattotalitarianismoftheRightdoes notgeneratethe‘‘universalcreeds’’thatareasignatureelementoftheLeft.Instead, totalitarianismoftheRightaimsatstirringtheindividualtoward‘‘whatis nowadayscalledawhollysatisfyingexperienceinacollectivee ´ lan,quickenedby massemotionandtheimpactofimpressiveexploits;inbrief,themyth.’’Further, whiletotalitariandemocracyrestson‘‘theessentialgoodnessandperfectibilityof humannature[,t]heRightdeclaresmantobeweakandcorrupt.’’Consequently,the

Rightviewscoercionasapermanentandcontinuousinstrumentofsocialcontrol, whilefortheLeft,‘‘forceisusedonlyinordertoquickenthepaceofman’s progresstoperfectionandsocialharmony.Itisthuslegitimatetousetheterm democracyinreferencetototalitarianismoftheLeft.Thetermcouldnotbeapplied tototalitarianismoftheRight’’(Talmon, 1970,p.4).

Wolin’sdescriptionofthetrajectoryofTalmon’snarrative,quotedabove,is accurate.ThekeyconstituentsareRousseauandtheJacobins.Talmon’sentire conceptualedificerestsonthecentralityofRousseau’snotionsofthegeneralwill andpopularsovereignty.TalmonimplicitlytakesRousseautobethetheoreticianof democracyandexplicitlyastheprogenitoroftotalitariandemocracy.Theproblem isRousseau’sformulationofthegeneralwill.‘‘Rousseau’ssynthesis’’ofthe generalwillwithpopularsovereignty,heclaims,

isinitselftheformulationoftheparadoxoffreedomintotalitarian democracyintermswhichrevealthedilemmainthemoststrikingform, namely,inthoseofwill.Thereissuchathingasanobjectivegeneralwill, whetherwilledornotwilledbyanybody.Tobecomearealityitmustbe willedbythepeople.Ifthepeopledoesnotwillit,itmustbemadetowillit, forthegeneralwillislatentinthepeople’swill(Talmon, 1970,p.43).

ThepostulatesofunanimityandunityunderlayRousseau’sformulation.The generalwillcanonlybetheunified,singlewillofthecollective.Talmonseesin thisaprecursorofthenotionofthehomogeneousnation.Butwhattroubleshim more,itseems,isthenotionofanactive,participatorycitizenryRousseaudeemed necessarytothegenuineexpressionofthegeneralwill.Talmon’scritiqueof RousseauonthispointhingesontheGenevan’sadorationofantiquityandonhis livingin‘‘thepre-democraticage.’’Rousseau,hesays, wasunawarethattotalandhighlyemotionalabsorptioninthecollective politicalendeavouriscalculatedtokillallprivacy,thattheexcitementofthe assembledcrowdmayexerciseamosttyrannicalpressure,andthatthe extensionofthescopeofpoliticstoallspheresofhumaninterestand endeavour,withoutleavinganyroomfortheprocessofcasualandempirical activity,wastheshortestwaytototalitarianism.Libertyissaferincountries wherepoliticsarenotconsideredallimportantandwheretherearenumerous levelsofnon-politicalprivateandcollectiveactivity,althoughnotsomuch directpopulardemocracy,thanincountrieswherepoliticstakeeverythingin theirstride,andthepeoplesitinpermanentassembly(Talmon, 1970,p.47).

However,itisnotclearinTalmon’sexpositionwhetherhetakesthelast propositionseriously.Heimmediatelynotesthatinrealitytheappearanceofthe peopleassembledtodecideissimplyanappearance.‘‘Thetruth,’’hewrites,‘‘really isthat,althoughallseemtobeengagedinshapingthenationalwill,andaredoingit withasenseofelationandfulfillment,theyareinfactacceptingandendorsing

somethingwhichispresentedtothemasasoletruth,whilebelievingthatitistheir freechoice….Thecollectivesenseofelationissubjecttoemotionalweariness.It soongiveswaytoapatheticandmechanicalbehaviour’’(Talmon, 1970,p.47.See alsoTalmon, 1970,p.207).Andthusthegeneralwillcomestoberepresentedby anelite,JacobinorBolsheviks,thatenforcesitagainstapopulationthathasnotyet cometorecognizeit.Thereensuesaneducationaldictatorship.

ThefinalelementofTalmon’sconceptualizationistheextensionofthe egalitarianimpulsewithindemocracybeyondthepoliticalsphere,atransformation thatoccurredduringtheFrenchRevolution.Talmontreatstheideaofa‘‘purely formalpoliticaldemocracy,withoutsocialleveling,’’asalaterdevelopment unknowntotheeighteenthcentury,whichwasundertheinfluenceofanantique modelofdemocracy(Talmon, 1970,p.63).HencetheimportanceinTalmon’s narrativeofBabeuf,whoservesasabridgebetweenRousseauandMarx.

Talmon’saccountoftotalitariandemocracyisalongvariationonasinglenote. Hissingularcontributionwastocointhe term.AswesawinSabine’scomments, andaswillbemadeclearerbelow,the possiblelinkagebetweendemocracyand dictatorshiphadbeenmadebyothersinvariousformulations.Andthedeploying ofthenewlymintedconceptoftotalitari aninconjunctionwithdemocracywas notreallynew,havingbeenarticulateds omeyearsbeforebyFriedrichA.Hayek inhisassessmentoftheconsequenc esofdemocraciesundertakingsocial planning.

Thebasesforthetheoreticaldistinctionbetweenliberalismanddemocracycan beattributedtoBenjaminConstant,ascanthecritiqueofRousseau’sconceptofthe generalwill.Inhis1819speechtotheAthe ´ ne ´ eRoyalinParis,‘‘TheLibertyofthe AncientsComparedwiththatoftheModerns,’’Constantfamouslyarguedthatthe ideaoffreedomthatstructuredandanimatedtherepublicsofantiquitywas fundamentallydifferentfromthemodernnotionoflibertyandthat,therefore, representativeratherthanparticipatorypoliticalinstitutionswerethebestand appropriateformsformodernstates.Thepopularsovereigntyoftheancients,he said,wenthand-in-handwiththetotalsubjectionoftheindividualtothe collectivity:‘‘Thusamongtheancientstheindividual,almostalwayssovereignin publicaffairs,wasaslaveinallhisprivaterelations’’(Constant, 1988,p.311).By contrast,‘‘Amongthemoderns theindividual,independentinhisprivatelife,is, eveninthefreestofstates,sovereignonlyinappearance.Hissovereigntyis restrictedandalmostalwayssuspended.If,atfixedandrareintervals,inwhichhe isagainsurroundedbyprecautionsandobstacles,heexercisesthissovereignty,itis alwaysonlytorenounceit’’(Constant, 1988,p.312).Individuallibertyisthus placedinoppositiontopoliticallibertyandConstantarguesforthesuperiorityof theformer,withthelattermerelyasitsguarantee(Constant, 1988,p.323).Political libertydoesnotprovidethepleasureforthemodernindividual,lostinthe multitude,whichitdidfortheancient,whotrulysharedintheadministrationofhis

polity(Constant, 1988,p.316).Instead,thatpleasureisprovidedbycommerceand theexerciseofpersonalindependence.

ThecritiqueofRousseaufollowsfromthis,sinceRousseau,‘‘bytransposinginto ourmodernageanextentofsocialpower,ofcollectivesovereignty,which belongedtoothercenturies,thissublimegenius,animatedbythepurestloveof liberty,hasneverthelessfurnisheddeadlypretextsformorethanonekindof tyranny’’(Constant, 1988,p.318).Inhisearlier PrinciplesofPolitics (1815), ConstantdescriedRousseau’snotionsoftheabsolutealienationoftheindividual’s rightsandofunlimitedandindivisiblesovereignty.‘‘Whensovereigntyis unlimited,thereisnomeansofshelteringindividualsfromgovernments,’’ Constantargued.‘‘Itisinvainthatyoupretendtosubmitgovernmentstothe generalwill.Itisalwaystheywhodictatethecontentofthiswill,andallyour precautionsbecomeillusory’’(Constant, 1988,p.179).

Constant’scritiqueofRousseauandadvocacyofaliberalismbasedona withdrawalofdirectpoliticalactionhasreverberatedthroughthesubsequent centuries.InItaly,in1925,threeyearsaftertheFascistMarchonRome,GuidoDe Ruggierolookedtotheoriginsofwhathe,followingTocqueville,called democraticdespotism.ButDeRuggieroechoedConstantinseeingtherootsof thisdespotisminRousseau’sinfalliblegeneralwill,thenotionofpopular sovereignty,andtheinfluenceofGreekandRomanmodelsontheeighteenth century.AndlikeTalmonafterhim,DeRuggieroalsocountedcommunismamong theoutcomesofthisdemocratic,asopposedtoliberal,tradition(DeRuggiero, 1959,pp.61–64).ButwhileTalmonsawatriumphoftheliberalformof democracyinthewest,hispredecessorhopedforafusionoftheliberalandthe democraticinordertooffsettheworsteffectsofthelatter.‘‘Sincetheadventof democracyisinevitable,andhasindeedalreadytakenplace,wemustneutralizeits venombymeansofalltheantidoteswhichlibertycanafford,’’heargued.

Yetnotaskcanbeharderthanthatwhichdemocracyatoncenecessitatesand impedes.Itdestroysallthebarrierswhichoughttorestrainit,andparalyses theindividualenergieswhichoughttoresistit.Inthisstateofthingsthe schooloflibertyisahardschool,whiledespotismisrichinattractions, offeringitselfasthecureofallevils,thesafeguardofrights,thechampionof theoppressed,andthesourceoforder.Nationssinkintoslumberamidthe prosperitywhichitbringsinitstrain;whentheyawake,theyrecognizetheir wretchedness.Freedom,onthecontrary,comesintobeingforthemostpart amidstorms,isestablishedpainfullyamidcivildiscords,andyieldsits benefitsonlywhenithasgrownold(DeRuggiero, 1959,p.190).

TheTocquevillianantidotetothisdemocraticdespotismissystematicoppositionin theformofstrugglesforfreedomsofopinion,education,association,andreligion. AndthusDeRuggieroendorsesaliberaldemocracytoneutralizethevenom.If

powerissingularatitssource,inpopularsovereignty,itmustbe‘‘dividedinits application’’(DeRuggiero, 1959,p.65).Inliberaldemocracy,

theadjectiveLiberalhastheforceofaqualification,andservestoemphasize thedemandforspecificationanddifferentiationwhichmakesitselffeltwithin theoppressiveanddeadeninguniformityofdemocraticsociety.Thepartisans ofthistendencyareaimingatademocracyoffreemen:atinstillingasenseof autonomyintothemasses,fosteringaspiritofspontaneousassociationand cooperationtobreakuptheirshapelessbulk,andatpavingthewayforthe self-governmentoftheStatebymeansofvariedandindependentformsof particularandlocalself-government(DeRuggiero, 1959,p.379).

Inretrospect,onecanseethatDeRuggiero’sliberalprogramwasthoroughly trumpedbyFascistcorporatism.

InsofarasDeRuggiero’sanalysisreliesuponTocqueville,andthereforeupon whatwemaycallthecultureofdemocracy,itbearssimilaritytohisSpanish contemporarywhowasalsofearfulofthemasspoliticsoftheday,butthereare importantdifferences,aswell.In1930,Jose ´ OrtegayGassetwarnedoftheeffects ofwhathecalled‘‘hyperdemocracy’’uponcontemporaryEurope.Heusedtheterm todistinguishthisformofdemocracyfrom‘‘theolddemocracy,’’which‘‘was temperedbyagenerousdoseofliberalismandofenthusiasmforlaw.’’ Hyperdemocracy,bycontrast,ismanifestedbythefactthat‘‘themassacts directly,outsidethelaw,imposingitsaspirationsanditsdesiresbymeansof materialpressure.Itisafalseinterpretationofthenewsituationtosaythatthemass hasgrowntiredofpoliticsandhandedovertheexerciseofittospecializedpersons. Quitethecontrary.Thatwaswhathappenedpreviously;thatwasdemocracy’’ (OrtegayGasset, 1993,p.17).MoreclearlythanDeRuggiero,Ortegathuslooksto aculturalunderpinningtothepoliticaltransformationsoftheday.Heisemphatic onthepointthatpoliticalactivitiesarethemostvisibleproductof‘‘moreintimate, moreimpalpable’’facts(OrtegayGasset, 1993,p.67).ButwhereasTocqueville andDeRuggieroemphasizethethreatposedbytherelationshipbetweenthe democraticmassesandthestate,whichresultsinthedangerofthetyrannyofthe majority,amongothers,itistheactivemassthatworriesOrtega.Inhisview,the massmanhasemergedinEuropeoutofthesuccessesofmodernity,the consequenceofrapidpopulationgrowthinthenineteenthcenturyresultingfrom advancesinindustry,science,andtechnology.Themassmanenjoysthefruitsof theseadvanceswithouthavingattainedasenseoftheirculturalunderpinnings.He experiencesanunprecedentedlifeofpotentialityandpowerandtheabsenceof necessarylimits.Thisproducesaself-confidenceinone’sownopinions.Theresult isanewpoliticalform:‘‘UnderthespeciesofSyndicalismandFascismthere appearsforthefirsttimeinEuropeatypeofmanwhodoesnotwanttogivereasons ortoberight,butsimplyshowshimselfresolvedtoimposehisopinions.Thisisthe

newthing:therightnottobereasonable,the‘reasonofunreason’’’(Ortegay Gasset, 1993,p.73).Acceptingnoauthorityoutsideitself,themassturnsto‘‘direct action.’’Thisturntoviolenceasafirstoption,asaprincipalmeansofexpression, emergesas‘‘thenormwhichproposestheannulmentofallnorms,which suppressesallintermediateprocessbetweenourpurposeanditsexecution.Itisthe MagnaChartaofbarbarism’’(OrtegayGasset, 1993,p.75).

Ortega’salternativeisagainliberaldemocracy,which‘‘cariestotheextremethe determinationtohaveconsiderationforone’sneighborandistheprototypeof ‘indirectaction.’’’Liberalism,inOrtega’srendering,is‘‘anti-natural’’insofarasit representsadecisiontoconcederightstoaminority,toshareexistencenotonly withanenemy,butalsowithanenemythat,asaminority,isweak.Buthishopes foritssurvivalaredim.‘‘Themass doesnotwishtosharelifewiththosewhoare notofit.Ithasadeadlyhatredofallthatisnotitself’’(OrtegayGasset, 1993, pp.76–77).

Inabibliographicnote,TalmoncitesCarlSchmitt’sbooksonHobbesandon dictatorshipassourcesforthetotalitarianRight’snotionofhumannature,and commentsthat‘‘SchmittwasthemaintheoreticianoftheNationalSocialist philosophyoflaw’’(Talmon, 1970,p.263).ButSchmitt’sowndistinctions betweenliberalismanddemocracycloselyparallelTalmon’s,albeitmovinginthe oppositedirection,sotospeak.Inthe1920s,SchmittsawsomethingofwhatDe RuggieroandOrtegasaw,buthissentimentsputhiminthecampofOrtega’s nemeses,themenofdirectaction.

In TheCrisisofParliamentaryDemocracy ,originallypublishedin1923,andin hisprefacetothesecondeditionof1926,Schmittanalyzesthecurrentstateof parliamentaryliberalismandmassdemocracy.Observingthatdemocracywas originallyconstruedinoppositiontomonarchy,thedeclineofthelattermeantthat ‘‘democracyitselflostitsubstantiveprecision’’andbecameidentifiedwitha varietyofpoliticalmovements.‘‘Atfirst,democracyappearedinanentirely obviousalliance,evenidentity,withliberalismandfreedom.Insocialdemocracyit joinedwithsocialism.ThesuccessofNapoleonIIIandtheresultsofSwiss referendademonstratethatitcouldactuallybeconservativeandreactionary,justas Proudhonprophesied,’’Schmittnoted.‘‘Ifallpoliticaltendenciescouldmakeuse ofdemocracy,thenthisprovedthatithadnopoliticalcontentandwasonlyan organizationalform;andifoneregardeditfromtheperspectiveofsomepolitical programthatonehopedtoachievewiththehelpofdemocracy,thenonehadtoask oneselfwhatvaluedemocracyitselfhadmerelyasaform’’(Schmitt, 1985,p.24). Thestructureofthisform,accordingtoSchmitt,isgiveninaseriesofidentities, beginningwiththenotion,commontobothRousseauandLocke,thatthewillof theminorityisidenticaltothewillofthemajority.Thus,thecitizen‘‘neverreally giveshisconsenttoaspecificcontentbutratherinabstractototheresultthat evolvesoutofthegeneralwill,andhevotesonlysothatthevotesoutofwhichone canknowthegeneralwillcanbecalculated’’(Schmitt, 1985,p.26).Schmittthen

repeatsthebynowcommonobservationthattheJacobinruleofaminorityinthe nameofthegeneralwillisentirelyconsistentwiththisformalstructure.Other identitiesinthedemocraticseriesincludethosebetweengovernorsandgoverned, sovereignandsubject,thepeopleandtheirrepresentatives,andsoon.But democracycanneverrealizeanactualidentitybetweentheserespectiveterms,and thatmeansthattheformationofthesingle,unifiedwillistheinternalproblemof democracy.Acertainlimitisreachedatthepointwheredemocraticformmight resultintheauto-destructionofdemocracy.Then,adecisionmaybereachedto create‘‘adictatorshipthatsuspendsdemocracyinthenameofatruedemocracy thatisstilltobecreated.Theoretically,thisdoesnotdestroydemocracy,butitis importanttopayattentiontoitbecauseitshowsthatdictatorshipisnotantithetical todemocracy’’(Schmitt, 1985,p.28).Schmittthencontraststhisconceptualization ofdemocracywiththeprinciplesofparliamentarismwhichcenteronthenotionof aharmonyorbalancethatresultsfromtheexchangeofopinions.Inaddition,the liberalnotionofadivisionofpowerscontradictsthefoundationsofdemocracyin identity.

Schmittisclearestonthesedistinctionsinhis1926preface,whichperhapsalso reflectsthedegenerationoftheWeimarpoliticalcontext.HereSchmitt,anticipating,butnotnecessarilysharing,Ortega’slament,suggeststhat,‘‘perhapstheageof discussioniscomingtoanendafterall’’(Schmitt, 1985,p.1).Itisendingbecause modernmassdemocracydependsuponinterestsratherthanargumentsandso publicdiscourseisinauthentic.Propagandareplaces‘‘genuine’’discussion (Schmitt, 1985,p.6).AndhereSchmittrepeatshisclaimthatdemocracyrequires identity,inthiscaseformulatedashomogeneity.‘‘Everyactualdemocracy,’’he writes,‘‘restsontheprinciplethatnotonlyareequalsequalbutunequalswillnot betreatedequally.Democracyrequires,therefore,firsthomogeneityandsecond–iftheneedarises–eliminationoreradicationofheterogeneity’’(Schmitt, 1985, p.9).SchmittadducestheexamplesofAustralia’sselectiveimmigrationpolicyand theTurkishexpulsionofGreekresidents.Butwhatevertheconcreteexample, Schmitt’spointisthatdemocracyrestsonsomesubstantivenotionofequalityand thereforeentailstheexclusionofthosewhodonotmeetthatsubstantivecriterion. WhileSabinewouldlaterpointtothosewithsecond-classcitizenshipasa contradictionfordemocracy,Schmittseesthegoverningofheterogeneous populationsofnoncitizensbydemocraciesaslogicallyconsistent.Thenotionof universalequalitywithoutasubstantivefoundationisnotademocratic,butrathera liberalidea(Schmitt, 1985,pp.10–11,13).

TheconfusionofliberalanddemocraticideasiscontainedwithinRousseau’s SocialContract,Schmittargues.Theliberalelementrestswiththenotionofafree contract,thedemocraticwiththeconceptofthegeneralwill,whichrecognizesthat ‘‘atruestate… onlyexistswherethepeoplearesohomogeneousthatthereis essentialunanimity.’’Whateverdividespeoplemustbesuppressed.Acontract,by contrast,makessenseonlyinacontextof‘‘differencesandoppositions’’(Schmitt,

1985,pp.13–14).Withtheemergenceofmassdemocracy,theelementofwill overcomesthepossibilityofdiscussionbasedondifferences.Againnotingthat dictatorship,whileantiliberal,isnotnecessarilyantidemocratic,Schmittpointsto bothBolshevismandFascismasexamplesofmovementsthatattempttocreate homogeneity.AndSchmittconcludeshisdiscussionoftheconflictbetween liberalismanddemocracyintermsthatOrtegawouldlaterabhor:‘‘Comparedtoa democracythatisdirect,notonlyinthetechnicalsensebutalsoinavitalsense, parliamentappearsanartificialmachinery,producedbyliberalreasoning,while dictatorialandCaesaristicmethodsnotonlycanproducetheacclamationofthe peoplebutcanalsobeadirectexpressionofdemocraticsubstanceandpower’’ (Schmitt, 1985,pp.16–17).

TalmonreferstotheJacobinplanfordirectdemocracyacrossarangeof institutionsandactions,onlypartlyrealizedinthe1793Constitution,asa ‘‘democraticperfectionism’’:‘‘Thisdemocraticperfectionismwasinfactinverted totalitarianism.Itwastheresultnotofasincerewishtogiveeveryshadeofopinion achancetoassertitself,buttheoutcomeofanexpectationthatthefruitof democraticsovereigntystretchedtoitslimitwouldbeasinglewill.Itwasbasedon afanaticalbeliefthattherecouldbenomorethanonelegitimatepopularwill.The otherwillsstoodcondemnedaprioriaspartial,selfishandillegitimate’’(Talmon, 1970,p.104).

ThereisnoindicationthatSheldonWolinisawarethatTalmonusedthephrase ‘‘invertedtotalitarianism’’todescribetheJacobinmodel.Wolinwritesthathe coinedthephraseinordertodescribeapost-warconstellationoftendenciestoward thecentralizationofgovernmentalpower,ontheonehand,andaseriesofliberaldemocraticmeasuresthatbothempowervariousgroupsandeffectivelyfragment theirpotentialcollectiveoppositiontothatcentralizingpoweratthesametime. WolinsuggeststhatthisconstellationhasitsrecentoriginsintheColdWar,the struggleagainsttotalitarianismhavinginsomewayeffecteda‘‘regimechange’’ amongthevictors.Wolincallsthisnewregime‘‘Superpower’’(Wolin, 2004,p. xvi).Thus,theinstrumentalitiesofinvertedtotalitarianismhaveledtoSuperpower. BothconceptsaremeanttooperateasWeberianidealtypesinordertohighlight tendenciesratherthantodescribecompletedorfullyrealizedphenomenaandare thereforesomewhattentative,butWolinclearlybelievesthattheyservetoreveal actualchangesinthepoliticalcharacteroftheUnitedStates,inparticular.

WolinshareswithTalmonthenotionthatinvertedtotalitarianismhassomething todowithdemocracy,butthesimilaritydoesnotextendveryfar.Thedemocratic elementinWolin’sconceptualizationresidesinthelegitimatingfunctiondemocracyprovidesforSuperpower.Onlythestatecanprovidethatlegitimacyanditis neededinordertoeffectthe‘‘symbiosisofnon-politicaldefactopowerswiththe dejurepoliticalauthoritythatformsSuperpower’’(Wolin, 2004,p.xvii).That symbiosisaccounts,inpart,forthedynamicofcentralizationanddisaggregationof powerthatcharacterizesSuperpower.Whilethisseemstorepresentaperversionof

democracyratherthanitsperfection,wewillseethattherearewaysinwhich democracypavesthewayfortheemergenceofSuperpower.

AfewcharacteristicsofWolin’streatmentofthemesthatemergedinthe precedingdiscussionofearliertheoristsareclearlydiscernable.Inboththeoriginal andtheexpandededitionsof PoliticsandVision,andindeedthroughouthis writings,Wolindoesnotconceptualizedemocracyintermsofageneralwill. Rousseau,inparticular,playsaveryminorroleinWolin’sworkascomparedwith otherfiguresintheso-calledcanonofwesternpoliticaltheory.In Politicsand Vision,heistreatedinrelationtotheoriesofcommunitythathaveadepoliticizing effectandwhicharetherefore,inWolin’scontext,extensions,orconsequencesof theessentiallyliberalsubstitutionofthesocialforthepolitical(Wolin, 2004, pp.330–336).AlthoughWolinlocatesthetraditionofradicaldemocracyin referencetotheFrenchRevolutioninthefirsteditionof PoliticsandVision,the figuresheidentifieswiththistraditionareThomasPaine,WilliamGodwin,and KarlMarx,notRousseau.

InanessayinwhichWolinattemptstodevelopanappropriateconceptionfor capturingtheprocessbywhichacollectiveactorisformed,focusingprincipallyon theancientdemos,hereferencesRousseau’sconceptofthegeneralwillas signifyingthefirsttimethatcollectiveactionassumedacentralroleinpolitical theory.ButWolinrejectsRousseau’sformulationoftheproblem,notingthat, ‘‘Rousseaucouldnotconceiveofaself-fashioningpeoplesoheinvents,literally,a deusexmachina,aGreatLegislatorwhoistotransformhumannaturebygivingit acollectivecastandthenprescribetheframeworkofbeliefsandpracticethat ensurestheproperoperationofthevolonte ´ ge ´ ne ´ ral.Exceptforrareelections,the ideaofademocraticpractice,ofhowordinarypeoplemightactuallycultivate politicalskills,remainedundevelopedbyRousseau’’(Wolin, 1996c,p.73).Instead ofRousseau,WolinthenturnstoHobbes’descriptionofthebourgeoisindividualas amodelandtoSpinozafortheconceptsofthemultitudeandconatusfromwhichto constructanalternativeformulation.Thisformulationrestsonthenotionthatthe demosascollectiveactorformsoutofresistancetoanexternalforceand constitutesitsidentitythroughstrivingtoremaininexistence.Thatstriving,in Spinoza’saccountthatistakenupbyWolin,isnottheproductofageneralwill (Xenos, 2001,p.31).

ArelateddifferencebetweenWolinandtheearliertheoristsisthathisconcernis notwiththedangerofmasspoliticalactionbutratherwiththeconsequencesof politicalapathy.BenjaminConstant’sdefenseoftheindividualistretreatfromthe politicalspherestandsasrepresentativeoftheliberaltrajectoryforWolin(2004, p.252).Inthissense,thedifferencesbetweentheanalysesofConstantand TocquevillearecentrallyimportanttounderstandingWolin’sinterpretationof theseissues.Wolin’sunderstandingofinvertedtotalitarianismowesagreatdealto hisinterpretationofTocqueville’sconceptofdemocraticdespotism:

Whetherthesocietywasdepoliticized(post-political)ormerelyapolitical,in eitherconditionitwascomplementarytothecentralizingtendenciesofstate power.Thusifstateandcivilsocietybecomesmoothlycontinuous,if manners,moeurs,andbeliefsshapesocialrelationshipsandattitudessoasto discourageactivepoliticalinvolvementbythecitizenrywhilesimultaneously encouragingstatepower,thenthematrixexistsforanewformofdespotism. Despotismwouldchangeitsphysiognomyandceasetobeanalienpower violentlysuperimposedonastunnedandresentfulsociety.Itbecomes, instead,institutionalized,groundedinacongenial–becausedepoliticized–cultureandcamouflagedbymodernity.Itisa‘‘democratic’’despotismwhose theoreticalpossibilitywassignaledbyTocqueville’ssilenteliminationof ‘‘theNewEnglandfactor.’’Withoutitsparticipatoryelements,otherelements ofdemocracy’sculturecanbereassembled–thenonresistantones,asitwere –tobecomesupportsforpoliticaldemocracy’sopposite(Wolin, 2001, p.345).

ThissummarycapturesWolin’ssensethatcertainaspectsofdemocracycan contributetoitsevisceration,anotionthatiscontainedinhisdescriptionof Superpower’sabilitytosimultaneouslyempower,fragment,anddepoliticize potentiallyoppositionalgroups.AndthislineofargumentinWolin’sworkextends hiscritiqueofliberalism’ssubstitutionofthesocialforthepolitical.Itwasinthis veinthatWolinconcludedthefirsteditionofPoliticsandVisionwithacallto transcendwhathecallednonpoliticalgroupsandtoaddressareasofcommon concern.Theconceptofthepoliticalonlyhasmeaninginrelationtowhatis common,whattranscendsbutdoesnotobliterateheterogeneity.HereWolin recognizedthattheappealtoarevivalofthepoliticalinthissense‘‘seemsan invitationtototalitarianism.’’Andheobservedthat,‘‘Therecanbenodenyingthat totalitariansystemshavere-assertedthepoliticalwithavengeance,’’destroyingthe autonomyofgroupsandusingpropagandaandplebiscitestoorganizeandmobilize supportandanidentificationwiththestate.Nevertheless,theriskneededtobe takentoovercomethe‘‘groupism’’andapathyofwesternliberaldemocraciesand torestoretocitizenshiptheonethingspecifictoit;namely,‘‘anintegrative experiencewhichbringstogetherthemultiplerole-activitiesofthecontemporary personanddemandsthattheseparaterolesbesurveyedfromamoregeneralpoint ofview’’(Wolin, 2004,p.389).

Inadifferent,butperhapsnotcontradictoryway,Wolin’slaterwritingsoften displayaTocquevillianmomentintheiremphasisuponparticipationandlocal activismastheantidotetoapathyandtowardtheretrievalofthepolitical.Theseare whathecallsthearchaic,democraticmomentsthatcultivatemultiplicityintheface ofthecentralizingaspectsofSuperpower(Wolin, 2004,pp.603–604).Thepolitical nowbecomesidentifiedwiththedemocraticandthedemocraticwithamultiplicity offorms.Indevelopingthelineofthoughtderivingfromhisanalysisofthedemos

ascollectiveactor,Wolincoinstheterm‘‘fugitivedemocracy’’todescribethe proteancharacterofdemocracy.Asopposedtothosewhoreducedemocratic theoryandpracticetoarationalistprojectaimingatrealizinghappinessinthehere andnow,thestockintradeoftheantidemocraticliberals,Wolinseesdemocracyas historicallyconstitutedinmomentsofan‘‘evanescenthomogeneity’’experienced againstabackdropofheterogeneity.Assuch,itisfugitiveandtransgressive, unabletoinstitutionalizeitself,aformof‘‘rationaldisorganization’’(Wolin, 1996a, p.34).

‘‘Rationaldisorganization’’mightaswelldescribeSuperpowerorinverted totalitarianism.Andthisbringsmetoatentativeconclusion.Thetotalitarianthreat isnot,assomeoftheearlierwritersexperiencedit,andasWolinhimselfsuggested atanearlierstage,anextremecentralizationcombinedwithmassmobilization. Againstthisthreat,onecouldperhapshopeforafusionofliberalismand democracyasSabineorDeRuggierosuggested.Itisinsteadaproductofthevery successesofliberalism,aninvertedmirrorofthetotalitarianismsofthefirsthalfof thetwentiethcentury.Inthiscontext,theonlymodeofappearanceofdemocracy, andtheonlymodeitshouldaspireto,isfugitive,transitory.Thismeansthat democracyandSuperpowerarebothproteanincharacter.Thus,Wolinarrivesata curioussymbiosisofhisown.Democracyistransgressive,whileSuperpoweris‘‘an expansivesystemofpowerthatacceptsnolimitsotherthanthoseitchoosesto imposeonitself’’(Wolin, 2004,p.xvi).Aboundary-defyingdemocracybecomes theonlyopponentofaboundary-defyingSuperpower.

Notes

1Wolin’sreviewofHans-GeorgGadamer’s PhilosophicalApprentices capturesthispointabout ‘‘tradition’’beautifully,evenifStraussonlymakesaminorappearanceinthereview.Onpre-and postwarGermanuniversitylifeandthe‘‘tightlyenclosedworld’’thatGadamerdescribes,Wolin concludes:

Irresistiblythemetaphorofacirclesuggestsitself,notonlybecauseofthefamousparadoxofthe hermeneuticalcircle(whatistobeunderstoodmustalreadybeknown),butalsobecauseofthe oppressivenessinherentinanyenclosure.Mr.Gadamer’schronicleshowsgreatteacherscreating small,seeminglyautisticcoteriesandexclusiveloyalties:Heidegger’sfollowerswerecontemptuousofHusserlites,admirationforReinhardtmeantskepticismtowardWernerJaeger.’’Welive intraditions,’’Mr.Gadamerasserts,andyeteventhevaunteddialoguewiththepastappearsso narrowlyconceivedastobemerelyself-justifying(Wolin, 1985).

Wolingoesontodescribeanintellectualpracticethathasvirtuallynothingsubstantialtosayin responsetothepoliticalandethicalquestionsofitstime.Hechallengesanideaoftraditionthat altogetherexcludesdebatesaboutscienceand‘‘itsbroadlypoliticalbearing,’’anideaoftradition morephilologicalthanpolitical,anideaoftraditionsetinoppositiontomodernityassuch.Andhe opposesaphilosophicalpracticebentonthecultivationofexclusivecoteriesmorethanthepursuitof criticalwisdom.WolinmakesexplicitthereasonStrausswasnevertoreturntotheGerman

university(thoughGadamer‘‘couldnotbringhimselftostatethereason’’):StrausswasaJew. Nonetheless,Strauss’sconceptoftraditionwasalsoGermanic.

2Thoughitdoesstrikemethatoneverygoodreasontoavoidpropernames(andthe‘‘methods’’that followfrompropernames)wouldbetoreject‘‘thesystematicthoughtthataroomofone’sownin contemporaryacademicdisciplineissomehowenough’’(toborrowabitofperfectionfromJoan Tronto’scontributionhere).

3IhavearguedelsewhereforaspontaneousreceptivitytoeverydayexperienceinAdorno’swork,vital topoliticalthinkingandinhiscaseoccasionedbyexile(Marasco, 2015).Iseethisspontaneous receptivitytoeverydayexperiencerepeatedinFanon’swork,aswell,whichIwouldalsodescribeas criticaltheoryinexile.Fanon’sradicalizationinAlgeria,hisalliancewithapeoplewithwhomhedid notsharealocallanguageortraditionbutaneverydaylifeofviolenceandafeltneedforfreedom,is therefutationofacertainSocraticconceitinWolin.

4MikhailBahktin’s1941essay‘‘EpicandNovel’’doestendtopittheepicagainstthenovel,arguing thattheformerisstaticandself-referentialandthelatterisporousandcitational(Bahktin, 1981). Theepicclosesonahomogeneoustotality,whilethenovelopenstoheteroglossia.Butreturningto Wolin’sproject,hewasneverterriblyinterestedinheterogeneousforcesassuch,butasthecondition forthe‘‘evanescenthomogeneity’’thathecalleddemocracy.(NicholasXenosnicelydistillsthis elementoffugitivedemocracyinhiscontributionhere.)Democracy,forWolin,isafleeting experienceofunityindeepdiversity,anoccasionofsharedpowerthatreconstitutesthedemosfrom below.‘‘Heretogeneity,diversity,multipleselves,’’saysWolin,‘‘arenomatchformodernformsof power,’’and,itturnsout,norealbasisforradicaldemocracy(Wolin, 1993,p.24).Butdemocracyis alsoessentiallyformless.Or,moreaccurately,democraticformsandformsofdemocraticlifearenot giveninadvance.

5IamashadetooclosetoSorel,perhaps,butitseemstomeKatebiswrongonanothercount.Hesees Wolin’smaturetheoryofdemocracyintermsofamovetowardmyth,aSorelianmythofthedemos, fueledbypassion(‘‘afocusedrage’’)(Kateb, 2001,p.45).IseethedevelopmentofWolin’spolitical thought,bycontrast,asadecisivemove away frommyth,awayfromepic.Ihaveconsideredthis moveinconnectionwiththeoreticalpractice,butIthinkitalsoappliestoWolin’sapproachto democraticpolitics.Ithinkthisisnot,paceKateb,because‘‘thedeathofthestudentmovementofthe 1960s[had]sharpenedhisdespairlastingly,’’butbecausedemocracyisprecisely not whereherosare bornbutwhereordinarypeopleexperimentinsharingpower(Kateb, 2001,p.40).

6Thisorderofpriorities,asNicholasXenoshasnoted,isalsoexplicitlyformulatedinhis1998essay, ‘‘PoliticalTheory:FromVocationtoInvocation,’’whenWolinlistshisformativeexperiences–the GreatDepression,WWII,thesixties–inpoliticalnotacademicterms.Xenoswrites,‘‘Thislistof experiencesistelling.Itdoesnotincludeanyofthepresumedmilemarkersofhisacademiclife. ThereisnomentionofOberlinorHarvardorOxford.Berkeleyfiguresnotastheprofessorial positionheoccupiedwhen PoliticsandVision (1960)madehimfamousamongpoliticalscientists butastheunstatedbattlegroundinwhichheemergedas‘‘anactivist’’afewyearslaterandbeforehis vocationessaythrewdownthegauntletinadifferentdisciplinarybattleground’’(Xenos, 2015, p.180).

7CoreyRobin’sdepictionofWolinasareaderoftextsiscompellingandaccuratelyconveysthe literarysensibilitythatisoneofthesignaturesofWolin’sinterpretations.Yet,withoutfurther unpacking,thecharacterizationofWolinasreading‘‘likeaNewCritic’’needsqualification.For NewCriticism, pace Rene ´ Wellek,overwhelminglyconsistedofaratherformalistapproachto literarycriticismthattreatedtextsasreifiedwholes,asobjectsinthemselves.AlthoughNewCritics contendedthatliteraryworksincludedrealitywithin,paradoxically,interpretationofsuchworks remainedinsulatedfromtheirhistoricalandpoliticalcontexts.Literature,especiallypoetry,istreated asasortofpalliativeforthealienationfromearthlyexistence.Furthermore,outofthemany figuresassociatedwithNewCriticism,itisnotI.F.Richards,butKennethBurkeandT.S.Eliotwho resonateinWolin’spracticeofreading.YetBurke,whosereadingoftherhetoricaldimensionof

Machiavellihecites,wasmostlymarginaltoNewCriticism;Eliot’sinfluenceismoresubstantial. Evenso,incontrasttoWolin’sinterpretations,Eliot’scriticismhadarathercavalierattitudetoward thecontentoftheliteraryworksheexamined,andtheactualthinkingfiguredinit,anddoggedly focusedonlanguageandfeeling,imageryandexperience.Andeveniftheworkwascontextualized inrelationtoasharedcultureandatradition,Eliothaslittletosayabouttheactualcontentofthat whichisshared.Needlesstosay,despitetheresonancesbetweenWolinandEliot,noneofthelatter’s conceitsarefoundinWolin’sinterpretativepractice,whichhasadecidedlyearthly(irdisch)texture.

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CriticalExchange

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