Ethical Methodology in Metz s Theory of Ubuntu Dylan B. Futter University of the Witwatersrand, Department of Philosophy Keywords/phrases African ethics; Ancient Greek philosophy; excellence; σ morality; ubuntu; virtue
σ ν ; sub-Saharan
ABSTRACT In this article I argue that Thaddeus Metz’s application of the method of reflective equilibrium does not properly delineate the conceptual role of ubuntu in African moral language because it fails to determine whether ubuntu is one of a plurality of fundamental virtues, the fundamental virtue, or a term for virtue itself. 1. )n an influential article entitled Toward an African Moral Theory (2007a), Thaddeus
Metz argues for a theoretical interpretation of ubuntu by application of the Rawlsian method of reflective equilibrium (Metz 2007b).1 In the scholarship emerging in response to this paper, some commentators, notably M.B. Ramose (2007: 54), have objected to Metz s reliance on a strictly analytic methodology (Metz 2007c: 376) in the
formulation of an African moral theory. In this paper I shall attempt to support this line
of objection by showing that Metz s methodology does not properly delineate the conceptual role of ubuntu in African moral language.
1 Although Metz has developed his view extensively in further writings, the core of his account appears to
remain much the same as that given in (2007a).
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