A Brief Theory of the Market Ethically Focused Ulrich Thielemann Published 2000 in: International Journal of Social Economics; Vol. 27, Iss: 1, pp.6 – 31. Available online for German Citizens after registration here: http://finden.nationallizenzen.de/
The philosophical reflection on the essence of what we call the market has largely disappeared from the textbooks of the economic discipline. This paper intends to contribute to a renewal of this discourse by explicitly looking on basic concepts of mainstream market theory from an ethical point of view. There are not so much new information given; rather, a different, ethically conscious light is shed on the information we already have on the market. With its philosophical emphasis on the frame of reference, which is always normative in nature, the paper contributes to the new emerging approach of Aintegrative economic ethics@ (integrative Wirtschaftsethik), introduced by Peter Ulrich.1 After touching the interrelationship of (descriptive) theory and (normative) ethics, the outlines of a brief and, as I claim, complete theory of the basic structure of the market are sketched. Central to this theory is the view of the market as a system. This systemic view allows to explain phenomena like economic growth or unemployment as well as to discover ethical problems and to raise normative questions that are often overlooked and passed over.
Introduction What is a market? As any question of definition, this question is normative in nature. If the notion should have meaning and should lead to meaningful descriptions of empirical phenomena, it cannot be Avalue-free@. Otherwise, the notion would be pointless; at least, it would demand further examination.2 Descriptions are always normative in nature. Authors who use notions want to show something; they have something meaningful to say. Meaning has its roots in public discourse, and public discourse deals with normative questions, with judgements. The normative or ethical character of science, especially of social sciences, is often overlooked. This normativity can be seen in the potential diversity of describing social phenomena. There is always the question how to label things. About what is called Athe market@, one could ask: Is the market the Aobvious and simple system of natural liberty@ [Smith 1976b, 208], or is it a Amasterless slavery@ [Weber 1978, 1186]?3 Obviously, there are good and bad descriptions, and the appropriateness of a qualification does not only relate to some pure truth of an empirical identification. Then the only question would be whether a specific subject is a market or something different. But what is a market, and how can we discern it or its opposite? For example, from the viewpoint of a certain, and by no means uncommon theory of the market one 1 Cf. Ulrich (1998a), (1998b). 2 Of course, so called Avalue-free@ descriptions are not without meaning. Instead, they offer an apologia of the phenomenon in question. 3 Regarding the notion of Ascarcity@, for example, one could ask: Are goods Ascarce@, or are they distributed unjustly?
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