Arendt, democracy, and judgment

ReviewEssay

Arendt,democracy,andjudgment

JulenEtxabe

HelsinkiCollegiumforAdvancedStudies,UniversityofHelsinki,00014Helsinki,Finland.

Arendt’sJudgment:Freedom,Responsibility,Citizenship

JonathanPeterSchwartz

UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,Philadelphia,2016+259pp.,

ISBN:9780812248142

ADemocraticTheoryofJudgment

LindaM.G.Zerilli

UniversityofChicagoPress,Chicago,2016+380pp., ISBN:9780226397849

ContemporaryPoliticalTheory (2018) 17, S171–S180.https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296017-0127-x;publishedonline22June2017

AtthetimeofHannahArendt’sdeathin1976,asinglesheetofpaperwiththetitle ‘‘Judging’’andtwoepigraphswasfoundinhertypewriter.‘‘Judging’’wastobethe thirdandconcludinginstallmentto TheLifeoftheMind,ofwhichArendthad alreadywrittenthefirsttwovolumes,‘‘Thinking’’and‘‘Willing.’’WhileArendt neverlivedtocompleteit,scholarsagreethatJudgingmayhaveprovidednotonly themissinglinkbetweenthetwo,butalsooneofhermostoriginalcontributionsto politicaltheory(Beiner, 1992;BeinerandNedelsky, 2001;Ferrara, 2008).Two recentbooksreassessArendt’stheoryofjudgmentinrelationtoourmodern predicament:JonathanSchwartzseekstoretracejudgmentintheArendtianoeuvre; LindaZerilliaimstodevelopanArendtiantheoryofdemocraticjudgment.Despite theirsimilarities,thetwobooksdifferconsiderablyinaimandapproach.Iwill beginwiththereconstructiveeffortsofSchwartzandthenmoveontoZerilli, offeringafewcommentsaddressedtoeach(andboth).

In Arendt’sJudgment,JonathanSchwartzundertakesthechallengeofreconstructingArendt’stheoryofjudgmentinconnectiontoherforemostintellectual project,namelyreestablishingpoliticaljudgmentinaworldfromwhichithadbeen evacuated(p.5).Thisentailsadoubletask:firstly,Schwartzmustexplainhowthe worldaroseas‘‘aproblem’’forArendt;secondly,hehastoreconstructArendt’s viewsonjudgmenttomatchthepredicament.Astothefirst,Arendtemergesasan

original,albeitimpressionistic,thinker,whosemainaimwasnottodemolishthe traditionofpoliticalthought,buttoreinvigorateitoutofthe‘‘pearls’’shehad herselffound(ed).Astothesecond,however,Schwartz’scaseforArendt’sreappropriationofKantianaestheticjudgmentmaystillbeinsufficient.The shortcomingstrikesmenotsomuchasaproblemoftheauthor,whodoesan excellentjobofre-creatingArendt’suniverse,butrestsinherentlywiththeKantian framework.Perhaps,agoodexampleofjudgmentwouldhavehelpedtoupendthis impression.

Turningtothestructureandmainarguments,thefirstchapterexplainsthe genealogicalmethodthatArendtcalled‘‘pearldiving,’’whichaimedto‘‘bringthe originalmeaningofvitalwordsback tolifethroughthoughtandimagination’’ (pp.22–23).SchwartznotestheseminalinfluenceofHeidegger,fromwhomshe borrowednotonlyamethodbutaconceptionofhumanbeingsasessentially historical.Inaddition,ArendtadoptedseveralfundamentalHeideggerianconcepts: theideathathumansare thrown intoaworldthatconditionstheirexistence(which inArendtbecame worldliness)and being-in,theabilitytoengagewithworldly situations(whichinArendtbecame commonsense).Thischapteralsoengages Arendt’scrucialunderstandingof‘‘action’’tobeaccomplishedjointlyinthepublic realm,wherewordscanbeheard,deedscanbeseen,andeventsdiscussedand remembered.

ChaptertworetracesArendt’sarchaeologyofWesternpoliticalthoughtwitha viewtoretrieving‘‘thehumanfacultiesnecessarytofoundandmaintainanewpublic realm’’(p.65).FromtheGreeks,sheretrieved isonomia,translated‘‘literallyasnorule’’(p.67),wheremeninteractwithoneanotherwithoutcompulsion,asequals amongequals,commandingandobeyingonlyinemergencies.FromtheRomans,she retrievedauthorityasfreelygivenobedience,whichrevolvedaroundthepreservation andcarryingforwardoftheoriginalfoundationofthecity.TheRomansconstituted theWesternworldas world,whichbegantocrumbleoncethehumanists,the Reformation,andseventeenth-centurypoliticaltheoristsattackedreligion,the church,andtradition.Bytherevolutionaryperiod,theolderworldwaslonggone.

Chapterthreereversestheperspectiveandaddressesphilosophy’sestablishment ofthetraditionofpoliticalthoughtasanattemptto‘‘laydowntherulesforthe lunaticasylum’’(Pascal).Plato’sallegoryofthecaveestablishedaninfluential pattern,whichAristotleandthesubsequenttraditioncontinued.Schwartzisnotso muchinterestedindisputingparticularreadingsbyArendt,buttoconsider ‘‘whethershehasapoint’’(p.105).Forthemostpart,thisaimallowshimtostay clearof,andcircumvent,pedanticcriticisms.However,sometimesafurther argumentwouldbeneeded:forexample,torestatethemeaningof isonomia as ‘‘literallyno-rule’’isinaccurate,giventhatthetermactuallycontainstherootfor law:‘‘nomos.’’(Iwillcomebacktothislater.)

Chapterfourresumesthehistoricalnarrativeandexplainshow‘‘necessity’’ (ratherthanfreedom)cametoreigninhumanaffairs.Thefirstthreadofthestory

followstheriseofmodernscientismandtheinventionofthe‘‘Archimedean point,’’a‘‘viewpointoutsidetheconditionofhumanlife’’whichhasledtotheloss ofconfidenceincommonsense.Asecondthreadexploresthemodernworld’s alienation,wherethepublicrealmhasceasedtoperformitsfunctionunambiguously.Varioushistoricalprocesses(includingtherevolutionaryinabilitytorevive action)ledto‘‘ideologicalthinking,’’whichshieldedindividualsfromeverhaving topassjudgmentandisrelatedtoapervasivesenseofnihilism.InSchwartz’sview, thecrisiscannotbecompoundedbyliberalism’saspirationtotranscenddivisions, for‘‘thoseaspirationswillbethwartedsolongasthisnihilisticcommonworld persists’’(p.128).

Havingpresentedthediagnosis,inChapterfiveSchwartzreconstructsArendt’s theoryofjudgmentasherparticularresponse.Initially,Arendtseemedtosharea classichermeneuticviewoftheinterpretivecircle,butherviewsappeartohave shiftedafterreadingKant’sthirdcritique.SchwartzsurmisesthatArendtappearsto haveconcludedthathermeneutictheoriesultimatelycannotexplainhowcommon sensecanbethesourceofbetterorworsejudgment,giventheirrelianceona communitarianstandard(endoxa)(p.161).Kantiancategoriesofferedarefinement: whilethefeelingofpleasureinthebeautifulissubjective,thefeelingmustbe communicabletoothers,forIamassertingthateveryone should alsofindit beautiful.Iappealtoastructureofjudgment,‘‘enlargedmentality,’’thattakesinto accounthowotherjudgeswould(hypothetically)judgeourfeeling.Indoingso,‘‘I havenotlefttheworldinsearchoftheobjectivityoftheArchimedeanpoint; insteadIhavegainedanother‘‘impartialstandpoint’’thatseesmorebroadlythana privateindividual’’(p.175).

Schwartzthinksthataestheticjudgmentisapplicabletopolitics,forit incorporatesanelementofcultivationthatprioritizestasteovergenius(p.171), wherethinkingandjudgingareinterrelated(pp.177ff).Inmattersofpolitical judgment(‘‘thiswarisunjust’’),itmaybedangeroustoappealtoamore ‘‘objective’’criterion,butwecanappealtopoliticalcommonsense‘‘byconsidering agivenissuefromdifferentviewpoints[and]makingpresenttomymindthe standpointsofthosewhoareabsent’’(p.181).InSchwartz’sestimation,Arendt’s accounthasanumberofcontributionsthatanytrulydeliberativepoliticswouldhave topresuppose:acommonworld,theintersubjective(ratherthanuniversal)validity ofpoliticalopinion,public-spiritedness,openness,andcosmopolitanism(p.189).

Schwartz’sreconstructionassemblesanimpressivearrayoftextsandpresents themwithcommendableclarity.InSchwartz’elegantprose,Arendt’soriginality andcontinuedrelevanceshinedistinctively,andheanswerssomeofthecriticisms againsthertheoryofjudgment(e.g.,Bernstein, 1986;Steinberger, 1990; Beiner,1992).Mycommentsaddress,first,thelimitsofreconstructionand, second,relianceontheKantianframework.

Concerning‘‘pearldiving,’’generalizationsofthekind‘‘theGreeksbelieved,’’ or‘‘theRomansthought,’’raisequestionsabouttheconcreteGreeksorRomans

whobelievedthisorthat,andthespecificcircumstancesinwhichtheydid. Arendt’s‘‘idiosyncratic’’etymologiesdonothelp.Ihavementionedthat isonomia cannot‘‘literally’’betranslatedasno-rule.Moreimportantly, isonomia ‘‘doesnot onlystandforequality;italsorepresentsatypeofbalanced order thatiscreated’’ (Lombarbini, 2013,p.413).Infact,it‘‘maybelaidclaimtobyoligarchsnoless thanbydemocrats,dependingonwhichcitizensarebeingcountedasrelevantly equal(isoi)andtowhat(powerorpowers)theequalityonofferisbeingapplied’’ (Cartledge, 2016,p.75).

TofindfaultinArendt’sgenealogyiseasy,butperhapsfutile,foritisnotinthe detailswhereherstrengthlies.Whatinitselflooksrough,imprecise,andsketchy beginstotakeshapeinthecontrasts,justasthelinesofanimpressionistpainting canbeseenonlyfromadistance.Aimingperhapstoconstructadifferentsenseof realitythan,say,arealistpaintingofaVela´zquez,theresultistobejudgednotby itsaccuracy,butbyhowwellitbringstolightandvivifieslostaspectsofthe tradition.SchwartzdecidestopresenttheArendtiantableauwithout‘‘modifications,’’whichforthemostpartsucceeds(hisrecoveryofHeideggerbeingacasein point).Butthechoicehasitslimitations:forexample,findingmuchtolearninthe Romanidealoffoundations,Romehasbeensaidtohavebeenfoundednotoncebut atleasttwice(Beard, 2015,pp.74–75),whichunsettlesanyuncomplicatednotion offoundations.Acloserscrutinywouldhaveallowedcriticalquestionstoemerge foracontemporaryaudience,too,giventhatdebatesonthe‘‘truemeaningofthe constitution’’andthe‘‘originalintentoftheFramers’’stilldominateAmerican politicallife.

ThesecondcommentconcernsArendt’sjudgment.Asapreliminaryquestion,I donotdoubtthatArendtfoundmuchinspirationinKant’sthirdcritique,butcanwe besocertainthatArendtabandonedthehermeneutictradition?Schwartzargues thathermeneutictheoriesaredeficientbecausetheycannotexplainrational deviationsfromcommunitystandards—thoughIcouldthinkofmanywaysto explainthese,giventhatacommunity’sunderlyingvaluesareneverperfectly consistentwitheachotherandofferinfinitevariation.Letusconcede,however, thathermeneutictheoriesaredeficientinthewaydescribedandthatArendt effectivelyabandonedthem.InwhatsensedoesKantianformalizationfarebetterin confrontingtheverysameproblem?AshardasItry,Icannotgetpastthepointof departure:Kantarguesthatthefeelingofpleasureinthebeautifulissubjective,but whenIclaimsomethingtobebeautifulIamassertingthateveryoneshouldalso finditso.Butisthiswarranted?Whatdifferencesofsensibility,oflifeexperience, ofpersonalhistorywouldIneedtoignorebeforemakingsuchanassumption?We willcomebacktothiswithZerilli,buttheKantianframeworkurgesustoabandon aculturallyrooted,contextualformofjudgment,foraformalabstraction.

Moreimportantly,Icannotseehow sensuscommunis helpsArendtovercome thedeepcrisisshediagnosed.Kantian sensuscommunis may‘‘solve’’theproblem ofthevalidityofintersubjectivejudgments,buttheproblemArendtidentifiedwas

notoneoflackofvalidity,butthemoreradicalproblemofhowwecanevenmake judgmentsintheabsenceofacommonworld,andafterthedisintegrationofthat world—adilemmathatcannotbebridgedbyahypothetical‘‘enlargedmentality’’ ascapacityforautonomousjudgment.

Thisleadstoafinalobjectioninthewayjudgmentisexemplifiedinstatements suchas‘‘thiswarisunjust’’(curiously,anexamplethatbothSchwartzandZerilli employ).Bythetimeyoucansay‘‘thiswarisunjust,’’allthatisimportantabout this judgmentappearstohaveconcluded,sothatitisimpossibletoassessitby attendingsolelytothepropositioncrystallizingit.Theconfusionbetweenthe judgmentandthepropositionstatingitleadstothinkingthattheissueisoneof validity(i.e.,isthisjudgmentcorrectoraccurate?),ratherthanoneofperformance: howcanwemakeproficientjudgmentswhentheelementsoftradition,andthe commonworldthatsustainthattradition,failus?Schwartzwouldhavebeenbetter servedbyprovidingconcreteexamplesofArendt’sjudgment,sothatthereader couldvisualizehowthisactivityismeanttobeperformed,proficiently,inpractice.

WhileSchwartzsinglesoutArendtsothathervoicecanbecomeaudible,Linda Zerilli’s ATheoryofDemocraticJudgment placesArendtinthemidstof contemporarydebates.Inthecourseofthebook,however,Arendt’svoicefades away,or,rather,itisaugmentedbyWittgensteinasreadbyCavell;JamesConant onperspective;PeterWinchonunderstandingaliencultures;ErnestoGrassion rhetoric,andothers.Zerillidoesnotpursueonesingleideainalinearand systematicmanner;everychapteraddsoneadditionallayer,adifferent perspective onthecentraltopicofjudginginademocraticsociety—andofjudgmentitselfasa democraticpractice.Notsurprisingly,thestructureisnotairtight:forexample, Chapter7seemstointerrupt,ratherthancontinue,theargument.Additionally,the bookcouldhavebenefitedfromcloserattentiontotheactivityofjudgment:for example,Arendt’sassessmentofMay’68ispraisedwithoutmuchargumentto sustainit,whileNussbaum’sjudgmentontheprohibitionoftheMuslimveilis criticizedasfaultybutwithoutofferinganalternativetoimproveuponit.The readerhopingtofindablueprintforatheoryofjudgmentmaybedisappointed, Zerilliadmits.Andyetshemayhaveprovidedsomethingmorereal,andperhaps morevaluable,indeepeningthekindofissuesthatanysuchtheorywouldhaveto address.Indoingso,Zerillihaswrittennotjustanengagingandintellectually sophisticatedbook,butaprofoundone,uncompromisinginitsambitiontoreorient anentirefieldofstudy.

BeforesuggestingwhereIthinkherideascouldbefurtherelaborated,letme introducethevariouschapters.InChapter1,ZerilliclaimsthatArendtovercomes thedebatesbetweendeliberativedemocracytheorists—forwhomtheproblemof judgmentistofindpropercriteriatoadjudicatevalueconflictsintheabsenceofa universalconceptionofthegood—andpoliticalaffecttheorists—whoregardthe idealsofpublicreasonaswishfulthinking.Bothapproachesare‘‘captivetoa picture,’’where,inordertobeobjectiveandrational,judgmentwouldhaveto

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conformtoamodelofrulefollowing.RelyingonJamesConant’selucidationof perspectiveinRenaissancepainting(wheredistortionsarecorrectedbyother perspectives,ratherthanbysomethingextra-perspectival),andCavell’s‘‘projectingawordintonewcontexts’’(wheretheabilitytoprojectawordintonew contextsdemonstratesunderstanding),Zerillidefendsthethesisthatitisnotrules, butourmasteryofspeakinginparticularpubliccontexts,whichguaranteesmutual intelligibility.

InChapter2,Zerillianalyzestheso-calledaestheticturn,beginningwith Hume’sinabilitytoprovideanindependent‘‘standardoftaste.’’Zerillianalyzesthe Kantianresponseinourjudgmentofthebeautiful:‘‘[i]nalljudgmentsbywhichwe declaresomethingtobebeautiful [wedo]notsaythateveryone will concurwith ourjudgmentbutthateveryone should agreewithit’’(p.61).Thegroundisour own feeling,nolongerprivatebutcommon,andwherethedemonstrationhasno apodictic,butexemplarynature.Thisjudgmentoftasteisnotaclaimaboutthe object,butaboutthevalidityofthesubject’sself-referentialpleasure,whichleaves uswonderingabouthowjudgingconnectswithobjectsofempiricalexperience(p. 62).ZerillithusmovesontoWittgenstein’srejectionofstandardsofthebeautiful, infavorofhistoricallyandculturallysensitive‘‘aestheticappreciation.’’Inthis view,utterancessuchas‘‘thisisbeautiful’’areonlyintelligiblewithinthebroader networkofhumanmeanings(p.73).Infact,anaestheticquarrelworksby persuasionofthekind‘‘don’tseeitlikethat.Trytoseeitlikethis’’(p.77),making it‘‘perceptualistratherthanlogicalorcausal’’(p.77,citingShusterman).

Shiftingfromaestheticstohistory,Chapter3engagesLeoStrauss’scritiqueof historicistvalue-relativismandliberalism.AwareofStrauss’sdifficultreception, Zerillireadshimagainstthegrainofinterpretationsthatseehimaslocatingthe weaknessofliberalisminitsunwillingnesstodeclareitsownvaluesastrue(p.85). Instead,shetakeshimtoaimforatherapeuticcritique,wherebyliberalismistobe extricatedfromtheillusionofneutralityblindtoitsowndogmatism.

Chapter4revisitsArendt’saccountoftherelationshipbetweentruthandpolitics andslightlyadjustsherearlierviews(Zerilli, 2005).Inpoliticalmatters,Arendt defendedthe‘‘truthofopinion’’intheSocraticmanneroftrying,bymeansof publicdebate,tofindwhat,intheopinionsoftheinterlocutors,wastrue.The contemporary‘‘assault’’ontruthcannotbeshunnedbyformsofdiscoursebeyond ourcurrentpractices,fortheproblemisnotoneofknowledge,butof acknowledgement:whattodointhepoliticalrealmonthebasisofthatknowledge. InChapter5,ZerillidisputesRawls’demandtosetasidecomprehensivevisionsof thegoodasa‘‘methodofavoidance,’’whichdoesnothelpcitizenstojudge.Zerilli buildsonclaimssuchasFrederickDouglass’s,whicharenotexpressionsofpublic reason,butliterally‘‘unreasonable.’’Sherecoversrhetoricnotasaninstrumentof persuasion,butasthe‘‘framework[tropes,figures,images]withinwhichproofcan comeintoexistence’’(p.155,citingGrassi).

Chapter6respondstoneo-universalistfeministssuchasSeylaBenhabiband MarthaNussbaum,forwhomclaimsofcultureshouldbeadjudicatedaccordingto universalnormativecriteria(p.169).Zerillisees‘‘theproblemofrelativism’’asa strawmanandasks:whatkindofworkmighttheproblemofrelativismbedoing, orwhatothersortofproblemmightrelativismconceal?(p.173).Shefurther questionstheassumptionthatonlythosewithfirst-handexperiencecanjudge,and defends‘‘outsidedness’’asanenablingcondition.Forevenifweshouldtrytosee theworldthroughtheeyesofothers,wethenneedtojudgeit‘‘fromtheplace wherewestand,fromoursocial,historical,andculturallocation’’(p.179).

Chapter7defendsArendt’sviewofdemocracyfromHabermas’critiqueand praisesArendt’sobservationsaboutMay’68,concerningtheexaltationofviolence beingtheresultoffrustrationofthefacultyofpoliticalaction.Zerilliconcludes withtheideaof‘‘principles’’asexamplesthatguideactionandaremanifested concurrentlywithit.Chapter8posesthestarkquestionofincommensurable worlds,namelyworldssoradicallydifferentfromourownthatthereisnominimal sharedsenseofreality.Shoringupargumentsthatwouldpreventthecasefrom gettingofftheground(Davidson),Zerilliclaimsthattounderstandanaliensociety isnotreducibletojudgingtheextenttowhichtheirconceptionoftheworldisright orwrong;rather,itistolearn‘‘stylesofreasoning,’’initiallygraspedthroughanact oftheimaginationandlaterthroughnewpracticaleffortstorecreatetheirthought.

Chapter9exploresthe‘‘affectiveturn,’’whichemphasizesembodied‘‘knowing how’’asdistinctfromthepropositional‘‘knowingthat’’(Ryle).Whileacknowledgingthesignificanceofthisliterature,shepartswaysfromthe‘‘layer-cake’’view whereaffectnolongersupports,butundermines,rationaljudgment(p.247).Zerilli suggestsinsteadaviewofaffectivepropensitythatis‘‘conceptualistbutnonintellectualist’’(p.252),andreliesonWittgenstein’sduck/rabbit Gestalt,whichreveals theirreducibleconceptualcharacterofembodiedexperience(p.269).Chapter10 questionsformsofjudgmentthatpresupposethat‘‘oncewehaveourpoliticaland ethicalprinciplesinplace then [i]tisamatterofapplyingtheprinciplesgiven bythetheory’’(p.265).Judgingpoliticallyisdifferent,saysZerilli,forwearenotjust givingayes/noanswertoclaimsofvaliditywithconceptswecurrentlygrasp;weare learningnewwaysinwhichobjectscanbedisclosed.

Zerillitakesfinalaimatviewsthatjudgingrepresentsaretreatintothe‘‘lifeof themind’’anda‘‘moralfaculty’’(p.275).ForZerilli(asforArendt)judgmentis political,notmoral:itdoesnotstartwithmen‘‘astheyideallyshouldbe’’(p.278) anddealsnotwithMan,butwiththeworld.Sheconcludeswiththedeteriorationof thecommonworldasthemainthreattodemocracy:whilenoguaranteeexiststhat moreperspectiveswillyieldamorerealisticaccount,shearguesfortheneedof theoriesthatdonotshirkthetaskofprovidingasubstantivecritiqueofreal-world powerrelations(280).

Itrustthatthis(notso)briefsummaryalreadyshowstherangeandscopeof Zerilli’sargument.Inevitably,therearepointswhereonecoulddivergefrom

particularchoices.Forinstance,whileZerilli’stherapeuticreadingofStraussis convincing,IremaindoubtfulastowhetherStraussisthebestconduitforthe ‘‘anti–anti-relativist’’(Geertz, 1984)positionsheseemstoespouse.Nevertheless, herdiagnosisabouttherealproblemofjudgment—aswellasthe false problemof judgment—iscompelling.Shewrites:‘‘[t]herealthreatofnihilismisnotthelossof standardsassuchbuttherefusaltoaccepttheconsequencesofthatloss.Theidea thatbyholdingfasttouniversalcriteriaweshallavoidacrisisofcriticaljudging neglectstherealpossibilitythatsuchrulescanfunctionasamentalcrutchthat inhibitsourcapacitytojudgecritically’’(p.177).

MycommentaryconcernsrelianceonKantianaestheticjudgment,stillattached toconcernswithvalidity.ZerillifollowsKantwhensuggestingthatitwouldbe ridiculoustosaythispaintingisbeautiful forme,forthejudgmentofbeautyposits or,moreprecisely,anticipatestheagreementofothers(p.176,citingKant).Butthe ideathatIamrighttoexpectsuchanagreementseemstocontradictoureveryday experience,whereIamperfectlycontentifothersdonotsharemysame enthusiasm;infact,agreementseemshardlythepointofthediscussion.

AnadditionalreasontoleaveKantbehindisintimatedbyZerilli’smovetowards Wittgenstein’saestheticappreciation:Theimpression,afterZerilli’sbrilliant expositionoftheHume/Kantdiscussion,isthatthetwophilosopherslackattention toanyjudgmentofsubstantialcomplexity,leavingtheirmindstowanderfreelyin therealmofobjectlessthought.Mypointisnotthatweneedmorepractice instead oftheory,butthattotheorizeisitselfanembeddedpracticethatrequires engagementwiththephenomenonunderinvestigation.Toputitsuccinctly,we needphilosophyofaestheticstobecomemorelikeartcriticism.

Secondly,ifjudgingisrightlyanactivitythatconstitutesthespaceinwhichthe objectsofjudgmentcanappear(p.267),whatistheformofvisibilitythatjudgment adopts?Howdoesjudgmentmanifestitselfandhowcanwesenseitspresence?As alreadyintimated,partofthedifficultyisthatstatementslike‘‘thisisbeautiful’’or ‘‘thiswarisunjust’’arepoorexemplarsofwhatjudgmententails.Theseare judgmentswithoutextensionorduration,whichdeclaresomethingtobethecasein propositionalform.Theriskhereistomistakethepropositionforthejudgmentasa whole,whichprobablyhasalonghistoryinthemakingandwhichleavesatracein itsutterance.To(mis)takethepropositionfortheentireactivitymissestheprecise senseinwhichajudgmentmightbeappropriatetocontext,timelyinregardtoits momentofutterance,dexterousinnavigatingcomplexcircumstances,nuancedin itselaboration,ortheoppositeofallthesethings,careless,insensitive,andrushed. Alltheseareconstitutiveelementsofjudgment,withoutwhichitwouldmakelittle sensetodiscusswhetherthejudgmentis,allthingsconsidered,betterorworse.In ordertoassessanyjudgment—aswellastoproperlyreachit—weneedtotakea moreextendedviewofwhatitentails.

Zerilliisontosomethingwhenarguingthat‘‘weneedtokeeptheessential relational,both‘subjective’and‘objective,’characteroftasteinviewatonce’’(p.

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67).ButIwouldreorientthefocusawayfromtheallegedsubjectiveorobjective characterofjudgment,towardsthe relationship establishedbetweenthesubject(s)andobject(s)ofjudgment.Thus,Zerillisuggeststheenablingconditionof outsidenessess—arguing,intermsreminiscentofBakhtin,thattheoutsidercansee somethingthatmayeludeaninsider.Inturn,sherefusestolimitjudgmenttothose withfirst-handexperience,althoughtosayjudgment must takeplacefromourown standpoint(p.179)istoconferuponitanormativedimensionthatitprobably lacks.Still,‘‘outside’’and‘‘inside’’areinsufficientlynimble,forinthecourseof judgmentsuchpositionsundergodisplacementsandmayactuallyshift.Inother words,ourstandpoint(or place ofjudgment)maynotbethesameatthebeginning andattheendoftheprocess,fortheactivitydemandssubjectsto position themselvesdifferentlyinrelationto thevariousobjectsofjudgment.

Inthisfluidworld,wemaynotbeabletowalkonfirmerground,butwecanat leastlearntoswim(White, 1985,p.696).ElsewhereIhavetriedtofleshout variousdisplacementsandmotionsentailedbyajudgmentofsubstantial complexity(Etxabe, 2013),thatis,ajudgmentthatquestionsourpointsof departure,basicassumptions,orready-madeanswers—andhencematches Arendt’sconcerns.Forexample, immersion intoanaliencontextforcesusto entertaindifferenthabitsofmindand,occasionally,to(dis)identifywithour ordinaryways;formsof(dis)identificationarecounteractedwiththeopposite distancing effect.Wemayalsobecalleduponto embody differentrolesandtake noticeofourownpositionality reflexively. Judgingincludestemporalmotionssuch as projecting thepresentintothefutureor anticipating thefutureinthepresent,or even arresting thought.Anexperientialtheoryofjudgmentaimstodescribe,and accountfor,theseoscillationsinthefullestwaypossible.

Thisleadstoanunderstandingofjudgmentasanactivity—assomethingthatwe doinspaceandtime—andnotasaproposition,statement,orasa faculty.Zerilli objectstoseeingjudgmentasa‘‘moralfaculty,’’althoughtheaccentisplacedon the moral aspect.Theproblemoftalkingaboutjudgmentasa‘‘faculty’’(aproblem thatArendtdoeslittletodispel)isthatdoingsogivestheimpressionthatjudgment issomethingthatsomepeoplepossesswhileothersdonot,ordosoindiminished capacity—thusdetractingfromits democratic potential.Moreimportantly,talking aboutjudgmentasa‘‘faculty’’putstheemphasisinthewrongplace,fordebating judgmentintermsofafacultyislikediscussingmattersof‘‘visibility’’intermsof sight.Howtogainvisibilitywhentheotherpartyrefusestoseeyou?Howarethe questionsandtermsofdebateframedandbywhom?Whatarethestructural limitationsofdominantwaysofseeing?Howcantheybeovercome?Itisinthe stage(ing)thatjudgmentbecomespolitical,wherethequalityofourjudgmentsis notassessedbyaprioricriteriaofcorrectness,butonthemeritsoftheperformance, enactedbeforemultipleaudienceswhocanassessitforthemselves.

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