Private Education Matters
EMPLOYEES
Contributors:
Grace Chan
Partner | San Francisco
Casey Williams
Partner | San Francisco
Jordan Carman
Associate | San Francisco
Hannah Dodge
Associate | San Francisco
Christopher Fallon
Partner | Los Angeles
Stephanie Lowe
Senior Counsel | San Diego
Madison Tanner
Associate | San Diego
Joshua Sarsfield
Associate | San Diego
Riley Jacobs
Associate | San Diego
BACK TO SCHOOL
Back
to School:
Five Things For California Private Schools To Think About For The Upcoming School Year.
For California’s private schools, the 2026-2027 school year is around the corner. Implementing updated policies to address recent changes in the law, being prepared for evolving expectations from families and employees, and the upcoming election are all influencing how schools govern, manage risk, and care for their communities. Schools that plan ahead and respond strategically will be best positioned to lead with confidence.
1. Senate Bill 848: Expanded Child Safety and Compliance Obligations
Several key provisions under SB 848 took effect on July 1, 2026, meaning schools should now ensure they have implemented the required policies and procedures.
Effective July 1, 2026, schools must adopt an updated Professional Boundaries Policy for both employee and student handbooks. Schools must adopt a written facilities and supervision plan, and this plan needs to be tailored to the school's specific physical campus and facilities. SB 848 also imposes new mandated reporter training requirements for employees, certain volunteers, board members, and covered contractors. The training must be completed within six weeks of beginning service or within six weeks of the start of the school year, and annually thereafter. The training must be done by using state-provided or insurer-approved training and schools must report completion to the California Department of Education.
As schools begin the new school year, now is an excellent time to confirm that these policies have been adopted, required training has been completed or scheduled, and employee and student handbooks have been updated to reflect SB 848's new requirements.
LCW is offering an SB 848 model policy package. More information can be found here.
2. Politics, Speech, and Controversial Topics
In an election year and amid ongoing global conflicts, schools are navigating complex conversations on campus and on social media. Clear expectations for employee and student speech, including providing faculty with guidelines for classroom discussions, and policies that align institutional values with legal obligations can help maintain trust and consistency.
3. Governance and Bylaws
Strong governance begins with current and compliant bylaws. Many schools operate under outdated documents that no longer match their board’s structure or California nonprofit law. With July 1 marking the start of many schools’ fiscal year, it is an opportune time for a governance review. Doing so ensures clarity in authority, decision-making, and fiduciary responsibilities before problems arise.
4. Managing and Documenting Employee Performance
Effective performance management remains one of the best ways to support employees and reduce legal risk. Consistent feedback and timely documentation reinforce accountability and growth, and if performance concerns arise, schools are often in a better position if they document these concerns early. The start of a new school year is an ideal time to strengthen systems and expectations around performance communication.
5. Employee and Student Handbooks
Updating handbooks over the summer is the best way to incorporate new laws and best practices before faculty and families return for the new school year. To note: SB 848 requires updates to both the student and employee handbooks this year.
Start the School Year Prepared
The beginning of a new school year is more than a fresh start for students, it is also an opportunity for schools to strengthen their
policies, practices, and governance structures that support their communities throughout the year. Taking time now to review new legal obligations, update handbooks, and train employees can help schools avoid unnecessary issues once campus is busy again.
DONORS
Supreme Court Holds That Government Demands For Donor Information Can Immediately Burden First Amendment Rights.
A recent United States Supreme Court decision provides important guidance for nonprofits, including private schools, regarding compelled disclosure of donor information. In First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport, the Court considered whether a nonprofit may immediately challenge a government demand for donor information or whether it must wait until a court orders compliance with the demand.
First Choice Women's Resource Centers (“First Choice”) is a New Jersey nonprofit organization that provides counseling and resources to pregnant women. In 2023, the New Jersey Attorney General, Matthew J. Platkin, served a subpoena to First Choice seeking numerous categories of records. Among other things, the subpoena demanded documents identifying many of the organization's donors, including names, addresses, phone numbers, and places of employment. The subpoena also warned that failure to comply could result in contempt proceedings and other penalties.
The New Jersey Attorney General later explained that his office sought donor information in connection with an investigation into whether donors may have been misled about the organization's mission and operations.
In response to the subpoena, First Choice filed suit in federal court under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, arguing that the demand for donor information violated its First Amendment rights. First Choice alleged that donors could be discouraged from supporting First Choice if there was no guarantee of donor anonymity and that the subpoena interfered with First Choice’s ability to recruit and retain supporters.
Before a federal court can decide a case, a plaintiff must have "standing," which means the plaintiff must show that it has suffered, or is about to suffer, a real injury that the court can address.
The key question in this case was whether the subpoena itself caused a sufficient injury to First Choice, such that First Choice had standing to sue. First Choice argued that the subpoena’s issuance alone burdened its First Amendment associational rights. The New Jersey Attorney General argued that no injury existed yet because no court had enforced the subpoena and ordered the nonprofit to produce the information.
The federal district trial court dismissed the case, concluding that First Choice had not yet suffered an injury because no court had compelled production of the requested donor information. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The Court explained that the First Amendment protects not only speech but also the right to associate with others to advance shared political, religious, charitable, and social goals.
Relying on decades of precedent addressing compelled disclosure of donor and membership information, the Court reiterated that privacy often plays an important role in protecting freedom of association. Government demands for donor information can discourage individuals from supporting organizations and can pressure organizations to modify their activities or advocacy.
Accordingly, the Court held that First Choice had adequately alleged a present injury. The Court explained that the injury arose when the government demanded donor information and continued for as long as that demand remained outstanding. Accordingly, First Choice did not need to wait for a court order
compelling disclosure before challenging the demand.
The Court also rejected arguments that there was no injury because some donors could still contribute anonymously through certain channels or because the New Jersey Attorney General represented that donor information would remain confidential. The Court emphasized that demands for donor information may burden First Amendment rights even when the information is not publicly disclosed.
The Court sent the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings. Importantly, the Court did not decide whether the subpoena ultimately violates the First Amendment. The Court held only that First Choice had standing to pursue its constitutional challenge.
First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc. v. Davenport (2026) 224 L. Ed. 2d 672.
Note:
This case reinforces that donor information deserves careful protection. The Supreme Court recognized that government demands for donor identities can affect an organization's ability to attract and retain supporters. Schools should carefully review subpoenas and other government requests for donor information with legal counsel before responding.
dei
University May Modify Donor Scholarship Restricted To Black Students, But Court Rejects “First-Generation” Substitute.
In In re Ezra L. Totton Scholarship, the Iowa Supreme Court considered whether the University of Iowa could modify the terms of a scholarship established nearly three decades ago for Black students pursuing degrees in the physical sciences.
The scholarship was created through the will of Dr. Ezra L. Totton, a distinguished Black chemist who had been denied admission to the University of Tennessee's graduate chemistry program during the Jim Crow era because of his race before later earning a graduate degree from the University of Iowa. In his will, Dr. Totton left 40% of his estate in equal shares to five organizations he described as his “favorite charities,” including the University of Iowa, the University of Wisconsin, Knoxville College, North Carolina Central University, and his church. While each educational institution received scholarship funds supporting students in the sciences, only the University of Iowa and University of Wisconsin scholarships were expressly restricted to Black students.
When the University received the bequest in 1997, the attorney administering Dr. Totton's estate advised that if the University could not comply with the terms of the gift, it should return the funds. The University nevertheless accepted the gift, which established the Ezra L. Totton Scholarship for “Black students majoring in the physical sciences, preferably chemistry.” Over time, the endowment grew to approximately $58,000 and funded annual scholarships for Black students studying chemistry.
Following the United States Supreme Court's 2023 decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, the University concluded that continuing to administer a race-restricted scholarship presented significant legal concerns. Invoking Iowa's version of the Uniform Prudent Management of Institutional Funds Act (“UPMIFA”), the University petitioned the court for permission to modify the gift by replacing the requirement that recipients be Black students with a preference for first-generation students while otherwise preserving the scholarship.
The trial court dismissed the University's petition, reasoning that no court had conclusively held that Students for Fair Admissions prohibited privately funded scholarships administered by public universities. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed.
The Court explained that UPMIFA permits a court to modify a charitable gift when its original purpose or restrictions become “unlawful, impracticable, or impossible to fulfill.” Importantly, the Court emphasized that the University did not need to prove the scholarship had already been declared unlawful. Rather, it was sufficient that administering the scholarship had become impracticable in light of the changed legal landscape.
The Court concluded that Students for Fair Admissions significantly altered that landscape. Although the Supreme Court's decision directly addressed race-conscious admissions, the Iowa Supreme Court observed that its reasoning broadly condemned race-based governmental decision-making outside of narrow exceptions. The Court also noted that lower courts, federal agencies, and the U.S. Department of Justice had since interpreted Students for Fair Admissions as extending beyond admissions decisions to other race-based educational programs, including scholarships. The Court further observed that the U.S. Department of Education had already opened investigations into universities offering race-restricted scholarships. Taken together, these developments made it impracticable for the University to continue administering the scholarship under its existing terms.
Nevertheless, the Court rejected the University's proposed modification. Although the University argued that replacing the racial restriction with a preference for first-generation students would preserve Dr. Totton's broader goal of assisting historically underrepresented students, the Court found no evidence supporting that conclusion. Instead, the record demonstrated that Dr. Totton specifically intended to benefit Black students in light of his own experiences overcoming legally enforced racial segregation. The Court emphasized that substituting a new eligibility criterion effectively created a new restriction rather than preserving the donor's charitable intent. The Court further noted that Dr. Totton's estate had expressly anticipated the possibility that the University might someday be unable to administer the scholarship as written, directing the University to return the gift if it could not comply with the donor's conditions. That instruction reinforced the Court's conclusion that any modification should adhere as closely as possible to Dr. Totton's original intent.
The Court therefore remanded the matter for further proceedings. It instructed the trial court to consider other potential modifications that more faithfully reflected the donor's intent, including removing the racial restriction entirely or directing the scholarship funds to another institution better able to carry out Dr. Totton's original charitable purpose. The Court also emphasized that future proceedings should include meaningful participation by an advocate for the donor’s intent and that the trial court could consider the donor's entire will and relevant extrinsic evidence concerning his charitable objectives.
In re Ezra L. Totton Scholarship (June 5, 2026, No. 25-0462) 2026 WL 1614078.
Note:
This decision illustrates the increasing number of challenges following the Students for Fair Admissions decision involving raceconscious scholarships and donor-restricted gifts. Private schools that administer restricted scholarships should consider reviewing existing scholarship criteria to assess whether changes in federal law affect their continued administration while also remaining mindful of their fiduciary obligation to honor donor intent whenever possible.
discrimination
Student Complaints About Course Content Defeat Professor’s Discrimination, Retaliation, And First Amendment Claims.
Dr. Larry Chavis, a non-tenured clinical professor at the University of North Carolina’s business school, sued the University and the Dean of the Business School (Mary Margaret Frank) after UNC declined to renew his annual teaching contract in 2024. Dr. Chavis alleged that the decision was motivated by race discrimination, retaliation for his internal complaints about diversity and equity issues, retaliation for publicly criticizing UNC's handling of diversity initiatives, and retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights.
Dr. Chavis had been employed by UNC in various faculty roles since 2006. During his tenure, he was outspoken on issues relating to diversity, equity, and inclusion, frequently posting on social media, writing emails to university leadership, and making internal complaints alleging a lack of diversity and inequitable treatment within the business school. Despite these public criticisms, UNC appointed him as interim and later permanent director of the American Indian Center, nominated him for a national fellowship, and promoted him to full clinical professor in 2022.
The events leading to the non-renewal began during the 2023-2024 academic year. Several graduating students complained to business school administrators that Dr. Chavis's undergraduate international development course differed substantially from its catalog description and syllabus. According to the students, class sessions frequently became discussions of Dr. Chavis's personal employment disputes with UNC and his views on diversity-related issues, rather than the advertised course content. Students also reported that Dr. Chavis sometimes humiliated students in class, required them to comment on his personal circumstances as part of graded participation, and created an atmosphere in which students feared retaliation if they disagreed with him or complained about the course. Some students specifically expressed
concern that he might publicly identify them, citing an earlier instance in which Dr. Chavis had posted a negative student evaluation on LinkedIn.
In response to those complaints, school administrators initially arranged to record several class sessions after obtaining approval from Human Resources. They did not tell Dr. Chavis in advance that these recordings would occur. When Dr. Chavis learned about the recordings, he protested, and publicly criticized the decision through news interviews and social media, claiming that they violated UNC policy. Thereafter, the University agreed instead to conduct in-person classroom observations as part of a formal teaching evaluation.
The resulting evaluation concluded that Dr. Chavis had significantly altered the course content without obtaining required approval, failed to revise the syllabus or course description, devoted substantial class time to his own employment disputes with UNC, and created a classroom environment in which students feared embarrassment or retaliation. The evaluation also acknowledged that many students had submitted positive evaluations, but nevertheless concluded that the concerns regarding course content and classroom climate warranted corrective action.
After reviewing the evaluation, Dean Frank decided not to renew Dr. Chavis's contract. She testified that her decision was based on the findings that he had taught material inconsistent with the approved curriculum and that student safety and classroom climate concerns weighed heavily in her decision.
The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the University and Dean Frank on all claims.
With respect to the retaliation claims under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, the Court assumed that Dr. Chavis had engaged in protected activity by publicly criticizing the University and raising concerns about diversity issues. However, the Court concluded that UNC articulated legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for the non-renewal: namely, the findings contained in the
teaching evaluation, and that Dr. Chavis failed to produce evidence that those reasons were pretextual. The Court emphasized that disagreement with the evaluation did not establish retaliation, nor did the close timing between his public criticism and the non-renewal overcome the substantial evidence in the teaching evaluation, supporting UNC's stated reasons.
The Court likewise rejected Dr. Chavis's race discrimination claim under Title VII. Although he argued that racial bias motivated some of the student complaints and that a similarly situated white professor received more favorable treatment, the Court found no evidence that any of the decisionmakers harbored racial animus or that race played any role in Dean Frank's decision. The Court further observed that UNC had repeatedly promoted and supported Dr. Chavis throughout the same period in which he publicly criticized the institution's diversity efforts, undermining any inference of discriminatory intent.
Finally, the Court dismissed Dr. Chavis's First Amendment retaliation claim. The Court recognized that public university faculty possess First Amendment protections but explained that Dr. Chavis still had to demonstrate that his protected speech caused the adverse employment action. The undisputed evidence showed that Dean Frank based her decision on the teaching evaluation rather than on Dr. Chavis's social media activity or public criticism of the University. The Court also noted that the decision to record his classes was made by other administrators (not Dean Frank) and therefore could not support his claim against her.
Accordingly, the Court entered summary judgment for both defendants on all claims.
Chavis v. Univ. of N. Carolina-Chapel Hill (M.D.N.C. June 30, 2026) 2026 WL 1875746.
Note:
For schools conducting investigations into faculty performance, this case highlights that relying on multiple sources of information, including student complaints, classroom observations, written evaluations, and documented review processes, can support a school’s employment decisions.
Religious Accommodations
Ninth Circuit Upholds Denial Of Religious Exemptions To COVID-19 Vaccination Requirement.
Legacy Health operates eight hospitals in Oregon and Washington. In August 2021, as the COVID-19 Delta variant spread and hospitalizations increased, Legacy adopted a vaccination policy requiring individuals who worked at its hospitals to become vaccinated or obtain a medical or religious exemption. Nine employees at Legacy's Salmon Creek Medical Center, including nurses, respiratory therapists, technicians, and a physician
assistant, requested religious exemptions. Legacy denied the requests, placed the employees on administrative leave, and ultimately terminated all but one employee, who later chose to receive the vaccine and returned to work.
The employees sued Legacy Health and Northwest Acute Care Specialists, asserting religious-discrimination claims under Title VII and Washington law. They alleged that the employers failed to accommodate their religious objections to vaccination. Legacy moved for summary judgment and argued that granting religious exemptions would impose an undue hardship on its healthcare
operations. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in Legacy's favor. The employees appealed.
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the undue hardship standard. Title VII requires employers to reasonably accommodate employees' religious beliefs unless doing so imposes an undue hardship on the employer's business. The Ninth Circuit explained that, under Groff v. DeJoy, a recent Supreme Court case, an employer establishes undue hardship by showing that a proposed accommodation would impose a substantial burden in the overall context of its business. The Ninth Circuit also explained that undue hardship may include health and safety risks and operational burdens, not just financial costs.
The Ninth Circuit considered whether Legacy established undue hardship. The employees argued that Legacy improperly denied their requests for religious exemptions. Legacy argued that exempting unvaccinated frontline healthcare workers during the Delta-variant surge would create significant risks to patients, staff, and hospital operations.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Legacy. The Ninth Circuit found that Legacy presented unrebutted expert evidence showing that vaccination reduced transmission risks and that alternative safety measures, such as masking, testing, and other protective equipment, were not effective substitutes for vaccination in the healthcare setting. The Ninth Circuit also found that granting the requested exemptions would create three related risks: infected employees could miss work and create staffing shortages, infected employees could expose coworkers needed to care for patients, and infected employees could transmit COVID-19 to vulnerable patients. The Ninth Circuit concluded that those risks created a substantial burden on Legacy's business of providing safe and effective healthcare.
The employees argued that other hospitals granted religious exemptions and that later data suggested accommodating a small number of unvaccinated employees would not create significant risks. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the undue-hardship inquiry focuses on the circumstances facing the particular employer at the time of the decision. Because Legacy relied on the scientific and medical information available during the Deltavariant surge, and because the employees offered no evidence rebutting Legacy's expert testimony, the Ninth Circuit found those arguments unpersuasive.
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the employees' argument that Legacy failed to consider alternative accommodations in good faith. The employees argued that Legacy could not rely on an undue-hardship defense because it denied exemption requests without individualized consideration of alternative accommodations. The Ninth Circuit rejected that argument. The Ninth Circuit explained that an employer may rely on undue hardship as a complete defense if no reasonable accommodation would avoid the hardship. The Ninth Circuit further found that Legacy's evidence established that no effective alternative to vaccination existed for employees who worked in close contact with patients and staff. Because the employees offered no evidence creating a factual dispute on that point, the Ninth Circuit concluded that no reasonable jury could find that a workable accommodation existed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that Legacy established undue hardship as a matter of law because granting religious exemptions to unvaccinated frontline healthcare workers during the COVID-19 Delta-variant surge would have imposed substantial health, safety, and operational burdens on its healthcare system.
Williams v. Legacy Health (9th Cir. 2026) 174 F.4th 1201.
Note:
Although this case involves a hospital setting during the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ninth Circuit's analysis provides useful guidance for schools evaluating religious accommodation requests. The decision reinforces that employers may establish undue hardship for religious accommodation requests through health, safety, and operational risks, not just financial costs, and that courts will assess those risks in light of the employer's particular operations and the information available at the time of the decision.
discrimination pregnancy
Sixth Circuit Upholds $205,000 Pregnancy Discrimination Verdict Against University.
Dr. Peng Guo, a Chinese-born accounting professor at Michigan Technological University, sued the University and the Dean of its College of Business, alleging discrimination based on pregnancy, sex, race, and national origin, along with retaliation and Equal Pay Act violations. Dr. Guo and her husband, who was also hired by the University as a tenure-track accounting professor, began employment at the same salary in 2015. Although they initially progressed through the tenure process together, Dr. Guo alleged that after she became pregnant and took maternity leave, she received lower merit raises, was expected to perform service work during leave, lost professional opportunities, and was treated less favorably than her husband and other faculty members.
Michigan Tech's parental leave policy allowed tenuretrack faculty to take either one semester of paid leave while remaining responsible for only 50% of their research obligations, or six weeks of paid leave while being relieved of all duties. The policy was silent as to service requirements. Dr. Guo selected the first option. Nevertheless, during her maternity leave, Dr. Guo continued receiving committee emails requesting that she organize academic seminars, attended her annual review shortly after giving birth by emergency C-section, and testified that the Dean remarked she had "lots of free time" because she had been relieved of teaching responsibilities. The Dean also criticized her service during the leave period, despite the Dean having been advised by the Provost that faculty taking this type of leave should not be expected to perform service obligations.
Following her return, Dr. Guo received a merit raise of 1.13%, while her husband received 2.24%. When she asked the Dean why her increase was significantly lower, Dr. Guo testified that he responded it was because she "took maternity leave" and "didn't do enough service." Afterward, she sent the Dean an email memorializing
that conversation and asking him to correct her if she had misunderstood his comments. He never responded.
Dr. Guo also alleged that the University discriminated against her in other ways, including providing lower compensation than her husband, assigning additional responsibilities, canceling research database subscriptions, replacing her as the recipient of a faculty fellowship, criticizing her performance, and retaliating after she complained internally about discrimination. The trial court dismissed those claims on summary judgment, leaving only her pregnancy discrimination claims for trial. A jury ultimately found in her favor on her pregnancy discrimination claim under Michigan law, awarding $5,000 in economic damages and $200,000 in emotional distress damages, while rejecting her Title VII pregnancy discrimination claim. Both sides appealed.
The Sixth Circuit first affirmed dismissal of Dr. Guo's Equal Pay Act claim. Although she established that she and her husband performed substantially equal work while he ultimately received higher merit raises, the Court concluded that the University demonstrated the pay differential resulted from factors other than sex. The evidence showed that Dr. Guo's husband had significantly more publications, published in higherranked journals, and consistently received stronger teaching evaluations. Dr. Guo failed to produce sufficient evidence that those explanations were pretextual.
The Court likewise affirmed dismissal of Dr. Guo's race, national origin, sex discrimination, and retaliation claims. It concluded that many of the alleged adverse actions either lacked appropriate comparators or failed to establish a causal connection to her protected activity. The Court further held that the individual Dean was entitled to qualified immunity because Dr. Guo failed to identify clearly established constitutional law prohibiting the conduct she alleged.
The Court reached a different conclusion regarding the jury's pregnancy discrimination verdict. Under Michigan law, pregnancy discrimination constitutes sex discrimination. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict, the Court held that sufficient evidence supported the finding that the University's decision regarding Dr. Guo's 2017 merit raise was motivated by her pregnancy and maternity leave. Most significantly, the jury was entitled to credit Dr. Guo's testimony that the Dean explicitly told her that her lower merit raise resulted from taking maternity leave and failing to perform service work during that leave—even though the University's own policy did not require faculty on parental leave to perform service obligations and the provost informed the Dean that Guo was to be relieved of her service duties on leave. The Court concluded that this testimony alone provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find pregnancy discrimination.
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed both the dismissal of Dr. Guo's other claims and the jury's pregnancy discrimination verdict.
Peng Guo v. Mich. Tech. University (6th Cir. 2026) 2026 LX 344362.
Note:
This case illustrates that managers should exercise caution when discussing the impact of protected leave on performance evaluations, compensation, or advancement. Comments directly linking an employment decision to pregnancy leave may provide compelling evidence of pregnancy discrimination.
Students
negligence
Church Not Liable For Teen’s Injury During Youth Group Because Horseplay Was Not Foreseeable, Court Holds.
In Schafer v. Oakwood Community Church, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment in favor of a church after a fourteen-year-old student suffered a serious head injury during a youth group gathering. The lawsuit arose after W.S. and another teenager, C.K., began playing a game to see who could kick each other the hardest while waiting for the youth meeting to begin. After each student kicked the other once, W.S. began following C.K., fell forward, and struck his head on the concrete floor. In the months following the incident, W.S. experienced headaches, dizziness, blurred vision, and was diagnosed with postural orthostatic tachycardia syndrome (POTS), which his parents alleged resulted from the incident.
At the time of the incident, approximately seven or eight teenagers were present, along with three adult youth leaders. One adult was preparing the lesson in the auditorium, another was working in an adjacent
kitchen, and the pastor was moving between the lobby and auditorium greeting students. According to the record, the kicking game lasted roughly ninety seconds, and neither student sought adult assistance or otherwise drew attention to what they were doing.
W.S.'s parents sued the church for negligence, alleging that the adults failed to adequately supervise the students and that proper supervision would have prevented the injury. They also offered expert testimony opining that the church failed to exercise ordinary care, although the trial court ultimately excluded that testimony.
The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of the case because the church did not owe a legal duty to protect W.S. from this particular injury. The Court explained that negligence requires, among other things, the existence of a duty of care, and that duty is limited by the foreseeability of the harm. While organizations supervising minors must exercise ordinary care, they are not insurers of student safety and are not required to constantly monitor every student movement or anticipate every impulsive act of horseplay.
Applying Minnesota precedent governing supervision of students, the Court concluded that this incident
was not reasonably foreseeable. Unlike prior cases where schools had notice of ongoing bullying, racial tensions, or repeated misconduct between particular students, there was no evidence that W.S. and C.K. had a history of conflict or that the adults had reason to anticipate the kicking game. The two boys had known each other for more than a year through youth group, and nothing suggested they posed a heightened risk to one another.
The parents argued that the church should have provided closer supervision because students sometimes roughhoused during youth group meetings. They also asserted that the students were effectively unsupervised at the time of the incident. The Court rejected those arguments, explaining that Minnesota law requires reasonable supervision, but not constant, eyes-on observation. The presence of three adult leaders supervising approximately eight teenagers constituted ordinary supervision under the circumstances, even though no adult happened to observe the brief kicking game before the injury occurred.
Accordingly, the Court affirmed summary judgment for the church on all claims.
Schafer v. Oakwood Cmty. Church (July 13, 2026, No. A25-1568) 2026 WL 2018644.
Note:
This case may have resulted in a different outcome under California law. Nonetheless, for private schools, this case serves as a reminder that negligence claims can hinge on foreseeability. Maintaining appropriate supervision ratios, training staff to intervene when unsafe conduct is observed, and documenting prior incidents can all be important in defending claims arising from student injuries.
Religious Schools
Texas Court Distinguishes Between Faith-Based School Policies And Neutral Athletic Safety Obligations.
Fort Bend Christian Academy, a private Christian school in Texas serving students from pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade, sought a writ of mandamus after a trial court refused to dismiss claims brought by the parents of a former student, B.H. The parents alleged that B.H. suffered a traumatic brain injury after a teammate violently head-butted him during football practice while coaches allegedly failed to intervene. According to the complaint, B.H. displayed concussion symptoms after the incident, but the coaching staff failed to implement the School's concussion protocol or emergency medical plan. B.H. allegedly experienced lasting cognitive impairments, and his parents ultimately withdrew
him after they claimed the Academy failed to provide appropriate academic accommodations.
The parents asserted a negligence claim on B.H.'s behalf and also brought individual claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"). Those individual claims alleged that the Academy breached obligations contained in the Enrollment Agreement and Student and Family Handbook concerning academic accommodations, bullying and harassment, student discipline, and concussion management.
The Academy argued that the parents' individual claims were barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. The doctrine arises from the First Amendment's Religion Clauses and generally prevents civil courts from resolving disputes that would require them to interpret religious doctrine or interfere with a religious
organization's internal governance. At the same time, courts may resolve disputes involving religious institutions if they can do so by applying "neutral principles of law" that do not require inquiry into religious beliefs or church governance.
The Texas Court of Appeals agreed with the Academy in part. First, it held that the parents' claims relating to academic accommodations could not proceed. The Student Handbook explained that the Academy offered a biblically based college-preparatory curriculum and described the limited circumstances under which accommodations might be provided to students with learning differences. The Court concluded that determining whether the Academy should have modified its curriculum or provided additional accommodations after B.H.'s injury would necessarily require a court to second-guess how the school applied its educational policies within the context of its Christian mission. Because those decisions were intertwined with the Academy's religious educational philosophy, the claims fell within the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
The Court reached the same conclusion regarding the parents' claims based on the Academy's bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies. The parents alleged that Academy officials had promised B.H. would be protected from bullying and that the School maintained a "zero-tolerance" approach, yet failed to prevent the assault that ultimately caused his injuries. The Court observed, however, that the Handbook described discipline as "Bibliocentric" and emphasized discipleship, spiritual growth, and resolution of student misconduct according to God's Word. Because evaluating whether the Academy properly enforced those policies would require judicial review of religiously grounded disciplinary decisions, the Court held that these claims were also barred by the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine.
The Court rejected the parents' argument that any claim involving student health or safety automatically falls outside the doctrine. Instead, it explained that the critical question is not whether the dispute involves safety, but whether resolving the claim would require the court to interfere with religious governance. The Court emphasized that its ruling did not insulate the Academy from all civil liability arising from the incident. Indeed, the negligence claim brought on B.H.'s behalf remained pending because it arose from duties imposed by law, independent of the parties' contractual relationship or the School's religious policies.
The Court reached a different result with respect to the parents' claims based on the School's concussionmanagement obligations. The Student Handbook incorporated by reference the Bylaws of the Texas Association of Private and Parochial Schools ("TAPPS"), a private athletic association whose membership includes both religious and nonreligious schools. TAPPS requires member schools to maintain concussionmanagement policies, train coaches annually, remove athletes exhibiting concussion symptoms from play, and obtain appropriate medical clearance before return to participation. The Academy's athletic trainer testified that the School maintained such a protocol but that no coach reported B.H.'s symptoms immediately following the incident, delaying his evaluation until the following day.
Unlike the Academy's internal educational and disciplinary policies, the Court concluded that the alleged concussion-management obligations arose from the Academy's voluntary membership in a secular athletic organization rather than from religious doctrine. Because all TAPPS member schools, religious and nonreligious alike, must comply with these safety rules, the Court held that the claims could be resolved using neutral principles of contract and tort law without requiring interpretation of religious doctrine or interfering with the Academy's internal governance. Accordingly, the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine did not bar those claims.
The Court therefore conditionally granted relief in part, directing the trial court to dismiss the parents' claims based on the Academy's academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and disciplinary policies, while allowing the claims premised on alleged violations of TAPPS concussion-management requirements to proceed.
In re Fort Bend Christian Acad. (Tex.Ct.App. June 23, 2026) 2026 WL 1791151.
Note:
This decision provides important guidance for religious private schools regarding the limits of the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine. While courts generally will not secondguess educational, disciplinary, or student-support decisions that are grounded in a school's religious mission or policies, schools may still be held accountable for obligations arising from secular commitments, such as athletic association rules, state safety requirements, or other voluntarily assumed standards, that can be evaluated under neutral principles of law.
disabilities
PPP Funding And Religious Status Become Key Issues In Disability Discrimination Suit Against Private Christian School.
C.M., a former student at Dayspring Christian Academy, a private Christian school in Pennsylvania, sued the school and several administrators after allegedly enduring years of disability-based bullying, harassment, and physical abuse while enrolled from approximately 2018 through 2025. C.M., who has hydrocephalus, autism, and ADHD, attended a classroom designated for students with disabilities. He alleged that another student repeatedly subjected him to verbal harassment, physical assaults, inappropriate touching, and other mistreatment, and that school administrators were repeatedly notified that disabled students in the classroom were being targeted but failed to take adequate corrective action.
The complaint asserted claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RA"), negligence, breach of contract, and assault and battery against the former student. C.M. alleged that Dayspring participated in Pennsylvania's Educational Improvement Tax Credit ("EITC") and Opportunity Scholarship Tax Credit ("OSTC") programs and also received Paycheck Protection Program ("PPP") funds during portions of the relevant time period.
Dayspring moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things, that it was exempt from Title III of the ADA as a religious organization, that C.M. lacked standing to seek injunctive relief because he had already graduated, and that the School was not subject to Section 504 because it did not receive qualifying federal financial assistance during the relevant period.
The Court first addressed the ADA claim. Title III exempts "religious organizations or entities controlled by religious organizations" from its coverage. Dayspring argued that its Christian mission, curriculum, admissions materials, and governing documents established that it fell within this exemption. C.M. responded that discovery was necessary because Dayspring was governed by an independent board rather than a church and participated in certain government-funded educational programs. The Court observed that determining whether an organization qualifies for the religious exemption requires a fact-intensive analysis under the Third Circuit's LeBoon factors, including the School's purpose, governance structure, affiliation with organized religion, religious instruction, and how religion permeates its operations. Although the Court acknowledged that Dayspring had presented substantial evidence of its religious character, it concluded that dismissal based solely on the religious-organization exemption would be premature at the pleading stage because of the fact-intensive analysis required.
Nevertheless, the Court dismissed the ADA claim on a different ground. The Court explained that Title III authorizes only prospective injunctive relief, not compensatory or punitive damages. Because C.M. had already graduated from Dayspring and did not plausibly allege any real and immediate threat of future discrimination, he lacked standing to pursue the only relief available under Title III. His speculation that he might attend future school events was insufficient to establish standing. Accordingly, the ADA claim was dismissed with prejudice.
The Court reached a different conclusion under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Unlike Title III, Section 504 permits monetary damages where a plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination through deliberate indifference. Dayspring argued that any PPP funding had been received and forgiven before the alleged events and therefore could not establish Section 504 coverage. The Court concluded that at this stage, it could not resolve factual disputes regarding the timing or effect of the School's receipt of federal financial assistance. Accepting the allegations as true, the Court held that C.M. had plausibly alleged that Dayspring received federal financial assistance during portions of the relevant period, allowing the Rehabilitation Act claim to proceed.
The Court also held that C.M. sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference. The complaint asserted that administrators received repeated notice over multiple years that C.M. and other students in the disability classroom were being bullied and physically mistreated yet failed to implement effective corrective measures. Although Dayspring argued that these allegations reflected, at most, imperfect responses rather than deliberate indifference, the Court concluded that those factual disputes could not be resolved at the pleading stage.
In addition, the Court rejected Dayspring's argument that C.M. failed to allege discrimination because of his disability. The complaint alleged that the harassment specifically targeted students in the disability classroom because of their disabilities and perceived vulnerabilities, and that School officials knew disabled students were being targeted but failed to intervene. These allegations were sufficient to plausibly allege disability discrimination under Section 504.
Finally, the Court allowed C.M.'s negligence and breach of contract claims to proceed, concluding that they arose from duties independent of the federal disability statutes.
CM v. Dayspring Christian Acad. (E.D.Pa. June 12, 2026) 2026 WL 1707161.
Note:
Relief under Title III of the ADA is limited to injunctive relief rather than monetary damages. Religious schools should also note that the ADA's religious exemption does not automatically resolve disability discrimination claims, particularly where factual disputes exist regarding the school's structure or operations.
Start the school year strong with LCW’s dynamic and practical professional development sessions, customized for the unique and evolving needs of California private schools.
Essential training topics include:
• Harassment & Discrimination Prevention (Supervisory and NonSupervisory)
• Maintaining Professional Boundaries
• California Mandated Reporter Training
• The Art of the Performance Evaluation
• Leading from the Middle
• Board Governance 101
• And many more! Available Live or On-Demand.
Schedule Now at info@lcwlegal.com
lcw best timeline
MID-JUNE THROUGH END OF JULY
Update Professional Boundaries Policy.
• Effective July 1, 2026, schools must adopt a written policy applicable to employees, volunteers, and contractors addressing appropriate conduct in adultstudent, student-student, and adult-adult interactions, including electronic communications.
Adopt Facilities and Supervision Plan:
• Effective July 1, 2026, schools must adopt a written plan designed to promote visibility, ensure adequate supervision, and reduce the risk of unsupervised contact between students and adults.
Update Employee and Student/Parent Handbooks:
• The handbooks should be reviewed at the end of the school year to confirm that the policies are legally compliant, consistent with the employment agreements and enrollment agreements that were executed, and current with the latest best practice recommendations. The school should also add any new policies that it would like to implement upon reflection from the prior school year and to prepare for the upcoming school year.
Conduct review of the school’s Bylaws (does not necessarily need to be done every year).
Review of insurance benefit plans:
• Review the school’s insurance plans, in order to determine whether to change insurance carriers. Insurance plans expire throughout the year
depending on your plan. We recommend starting the review process at least three months prior to the expiration of your insurance plan.
• Workers Compensation Insurance plans generally expire on July 1.
• Other insurance policies generally expire between July 1 and December 1.
AUGUST
Conduct staff trainings, which may include:
• Sexual Harassment Training:
A school with five or more employees, including temporary or seasonal employees, must provide sexual harassment training to both supervisory and nonsupervisory employees every two years. Supervisory employees must receive at least two hours and nonsupervisory employees must receive at least one hour of sexual harassment training. (California Government Code Section 12950.1.)
• Mandated Reporter Training:
Effective July 1, 2026, all mandated reporters to complete the training within the first six weeks of each school year, within the first six weeks of that person’s employment, or within six weeks of commencing volunteer services.
Prior to commencing employment, all mandated reporters must sign a statement to the effect that they have knowledge of the provisions of the Mandated Reporter Law and will comply with
practices
Each Month, LCW presents a monthly timeline of best practices for private and independent schools. The timeline runs from the fall semester through the end of summer break. LCW encourages schools to use the timeline as a guideline throughout the school year. those provisions. (California Penal Code Section 11166.5.)
• Maintaining Professional Boundaries
• Risk Management Training such as Injury and Illness Prevention and CPR.
Conduct Board / Governance Training, which may include:
• Fiduciary Duties
• Legal Compliance & Risk Management
• Governance Best Practices
Distribute Parent/Student Handbooks and collect signed acknowledgement of receipt forms, signed photo release forms, signed student technology use policy forms, and updated emergency contact forms.
Premium Perks
did you know...?
•The IRS increased the standard mileage reimbursement rates effective July 1, 2026, in response to rising fuel costs. The business mileage rate increased from 72.5 cents to 76 cents per mile, and the medical and moving expense rate increased from 20.5 cents to 23.5 cents per mile; the charitable mileage rate remains 14 cents per mile because it is set by statute. Schools should ensure they are using the correct reimbursement rate for the applicable period and review their expense reimbursement policies to confirm continued compliance with California reimbursement requirements and IRS accountable plan rules.
•The California Civil Rights Department (CRD) recently published a new "Disability Accommodations at Work" fact sheet summarizing employees' rights to request reasonable accommodations and employers' obligations under California law. While the fact sheet is informational only and does not need to be distributed or posted, it offers practical guidance on engaging in the interactive process, requesting appropriate medical documentation when necessary, and evaluating common workplace accommodations, such as modified schedules, remote work, job restructuring, and reassignment. It also reminds employers that accommodation requests may be denied only in limited circumstances, such as when the requested accommodation would create an undue hardship.
•The EEOC recently adopted its new National Enforcement Plan (NEP) for Fiscal Years 2025-2029, replacing the agency's prior Strategic Enforcement Plan. The NEP serves as the EEOC's roadmap for directing its enforcement, litigation, outreach, and education efforts, identifying the types of cases the agency believes will have the greatest nationwide impact. Among its priorities, the EEOC will focus on intentional discrimination (rather than disparate impact claims), facially discriminatory employment policies, certain DEI-related employment practices, protections for vulnerable workers, religious accommodation, the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, and cases involving the application of recent Supreme Court decisions.
•The U.S. Treasury Department and IRS have announced that proposed regulations implementing the new federal Section 25F scholarship tax credit program are expected by the end of September 2026. Created by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, the program allows states that opt in to offer taxpayers a federal tax credit for contributions to scholarship-granting organizations that provide K-12 scholarships to eligible students attending participating public, private, religious, or other qualifying schools. The forthcoming guidance is expected to address key implementation issues, including scholarship-granting organization requirements, multistate participation, eligible K-12 schools, student eligibility verification, fraud prevention measures, and use of scholarship funds. Although California has not opted into the program, LCW will monitor these developments, as the regulations could influence whether additional states choose to participate.
cases we are watching
• Twenty-six Meta employees filed suit alleging the company unlawfully relied on AI-assisted tools to help select employees for a reduction in force. The employees claim the system evaluated productivity and performance data without accounting for protected leave or workplace accommodations, causing employees who took medical, pregnancy, family, or disability-related leave to receive lower scores and be disproportionately selected for layoff. The employees seek to halt their terminations while their claims proceed in arbitration.
• The U.S. Department of Justice has launched a Title IX compliance review of four California school districts to examine their policies regarding instruction on sexual orientation and gender identity, parental notice and opt-out rights, and access to sex-segregated facilities and athletic teams. Citing the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Mahmoud v. Taylor and Mirabelli v. Bonta, the DOJ stated that it will assess whether the districts are complying with federal law.
• The U.S. Department of Justice reached a settlement with the Jersey City Board of Education following a Title IV investigation into admissions practices at Dr. Ronald E. McNair Academic High School, a college preparatory magnet school with a competitive admissions process. The DOJ concluded that the school's admissions process unlawfully reserved seats for applicants based on race and national origin and, under the settlement, the District agreed to eliminate the quota system, adopt race-neutral admissions policies before the 2027-2028 admissions cycle, train staff on nondiscriminatory admissions practices, and report on its compliance through 2029.
Consortium Call Of The Month
LCW has four private education consortiums across the State! Consortium members enjoy access to quality training throughout the year, discounts on other LCW products and events, and unlimited, complimentary telephone and email consultation with an LCW private education attorney on matters related to employment and education law questions (including business & facilities questions and student issues!) We’ve outlined a recent consortium call and the provided answer below. Client confidentiality is paramount to us; we change and omit details in the Consortium Call of the Month.
Question:
A school HR administrator contacted LCW with a question about a private lactation room. The administrator said the School has a private office that is not shared and can be locked, and asked LCW if that office could be used as a lactation space or if the School needed a separate lactation space that is only used for that purpose. The administrator said that the School has very limited space on campus and it is difficult for the School to hold a space that may only be needed for one or two individuals per year. The administrator noted that the School has over 50 employees.
Answer:
The LCW attorney advised that because the School has 50 or more employees, it is subject to California’s requirements for lactation spaces under the Labor Code.
Those requirements are that:
1. The room must be private.
2. The room cannot be a bathroom.
3. The room must be close to the employee’s work space, shielded from view, and free from intrusion while the employee is using it to express milk.
4. The room needs to be clean, safe, and free of hazardous materials.
5. The room needs to have a surface upon which personal items and a breast pump can be placed.
6. The room should have access to electricity for the employee’s breast pump.
7. There must be a functional sink and a refrigerator where milk can be stored close to the employee’s workspace. If it is not possible to provide a refrigerator, another cooling device like a cooler can be provided by the School to store milk.
8. If the room is used for other purposes, lactation must take priority over other uses of the room while the room is in use for lactation.
9. A room could be temporarily designated for lactation purposes due to operational, financial, or space limitations. 10. The space can be the same space where the employee works if it meets the requirements above.
Therefore, if a private office meets these requirements, the attorney advised that it could be used as a lactation space. The attorney recommended that the School keep in mind that privacy should include that the office windows can be covered. The attorney advised that even if there is only one lactating employee, CA law requires that the School adhere to these requirements to afford that employee with the necessary lactation space.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore