Private Education Matters
EMPLOYEES
Contributors:
Grace Chan
Partner | San Francisco
Casey Williams
Partner | San Francisco
Jordan Carman
Associate | San Francisco
Hannah Dodge
Associate | San Francisco
Christopher Fallon
Partner | Los Angeles
Stephanie Lowe
Senior Counsel | San Diego
Madison Tanner
Associate | San Diego
Joshua Sarsfield
Associate | San Diego
Tax-Exempt StaTus
Judge Rejects Push To Allow Tax-Exempt Organization To Endorse Political Candidates.
Four nonprofit organizations, including two churches and two religious broadcasters, filed suit challenging the “Johnson Amendment,” the portion of Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) that restricts tax-exempt organizations from participating in certain political activities. In particular, the Johnson Amendment provides that organizations qualifying for tax-exempt status may not participate or intervene in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to candidates for public office. Violation of this restriction can result in loss of tax-exempt status and the loss of tax-deductibility for donor contributions. The plaintiffs alleged that this framework effectively forced them to self-censor and violated their First Amendment rights.
The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Johnson Amendment is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the IRS from enforcing it. The government ultimately agreed to a narrower interpretation of the Johnson Amendment as applied to the plaintiff churches. Specifically, the IRS took the position that internal communications by a house of worship to its congregation, made in good faith through customary religious channels and in connection with religious services, do not constitute participation or intervention in a political campaign within the meaning of the statute. The parties jointly sought to have this interpretation memorialized in a consent judgment, which is a court-approved settlement entered as a binding judgment.
In ruling on whether to agree to this proposed consent judgment, the Court first examined whether it had jurisdiction to grant such relief.
The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) and the tax exception to the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), which prohibit federal courts from issuing orders that would preemptively restrain the assessment or collection of taxes or declare rights with respect to federal taxes, respectively. The Court explained that the Johnson Amendment operates as a condition of receiving tax benefits, namely income tax-exempt status for the nonprofit and deductible contributions for donors, and that enjoining its enforcement would directly affect how taxes are assessed. Even though the plaintiffs framed their claims in constitutional terms, the Court emphasized that the requested relief would still interfere with tax administration and therefore fell within these jurisdictional bars.
The Court also rejected the parties’ attempt to resolve the case through a consent judgment, explaining that subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e., the court’s authority to hear a certain type of case) cannot be created by agreement. Because the jurisdictional limitations are statutory and mandatory, the Court could not approve a settlement that it otherwise lacked authority to enter.
Finally, the Court declined to apply a narrow judicially created exception that sometimes permits preenforcement challenges to tax laws. To qualify for that exception, a plaintiff must both show that (1) under no circumstances could the government possibly prevail on the merits; and (2) the irreparable harm would occur absent an injunction because plaintiff lacks any adequate alternative remedy. The Court found that neither requirement was satisfied. It explained that the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were at least debatable, meaning the government could potentially prevail, and therefore the first prong was not met. The Court also found that alternative avenues for review exist, including refund actions after a tax is assessed or a statutory procedure allowing nonprofits to challenge the IRS’s determinations regarding tax-exempt status, before paying the tax. Because these remedies provide a path to judicial review, the Court concluded that the exception did not apply.
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, without reaching the merits of the constitutional claims as to the Johnson Amendment.
Nat'l Religious Broads. v. Bessent (E.D.Tex. Mar. 31, 2026, No. 6:24-cv-00311) 2026 LX 179375.
Note:
This case has drawn national attention because the IRS agreed, in the proposed consent judgment, to a narrower interpretation of the Johnson Amendment as applied to the two plaintiff churches, suggesting that endorsing candidates by a religious organization would not constitute prohibited political activity. While the consent judgment was limited to those two churches, this case was already being cited as a potential basis for broader arguments by religious nonprofits, and possibly other nonprofits (including schools), seeking greater latitude to take positions for or against political candidates. Because the court rejected the settlement on jurisdictional grounds, the Johnson Amendment remains unchanged for now.
Orders Restraining
Restraining Order Granted Against Father Whose Son Had Made Credible Threats Of Violence.
The Anaheim Police Department (APD) sought the Gun Violence Restraining Order under Penal Code section 18175 (GVRO) after John Adams Crockett Jr.’s adult son, Tyler Crockett, who lived with him, made credible threats of a mass shooting at Savanna High School in Anaheim. Tyler had a documented history of multiple mental health holds and was subject to a lifetime prohibition on possessing firearms. After sending text messages threatening to “shoot up” the school and referencing his access to large quantities of ammunition, the APD obtained a GVRO against John Adams Crockett, who owned numerous firearms and thousands of rounds of ammunition.
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court found the requisite clear and convincing evidence that John Adams Crockett failed to adequately secure his firearms from his son Tyler, and that Tyler posed a significant danger of carrying out gun violence. The trial court determined that John Adams Crockett’s conduct to allow Tyler access to firearms, despite Tyler’s lifetime prohibition and mental health history, created a substantial risk of personal injury to others. The trial court issued a threeyear GVRO, and Crockett appealed.
In the California Court of Appeal, John Adams Crockett argued there was insufficient evidence to support the GVRO and he challenged Penal Code section 18175 on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violation of his Second Amendment rights. The Court rejected these arguments and affirmed the order.
The Court emphasized that section 18175 is preventative and forward-looking, and that a person may “cause” a danger of injury under this law by giving another person, who poses a credible threat, access to firearms. The Court further held that the law was sufficiently clear, and that Crockett forfeited several claims by failing to raise them in the trial court.
Anaheim Police Dept. v. Crockett (2026) CalApp.LEXIS 101.
Note:
LCW attorneys regularly win Workplace Violence Restraining Orders on behalf of employers and schools who need to protect employees. The law governing Workplace Violence Restraining Orders is Code of Civil Procedure section 527.8. Similar to Penal Code section 18175, an employer must show a credible threat of violence by clear and convincing evidence to receive the Workplace Violence Restraining Order.
religious rights
U.S. Supreme Court Holds That California Parental Notification Policies Likely Violate Parents’ Religious Rights.
In 2023, two California public school teachers, Elizabeth Mirabelli and Nicholas Williams, sued their school district in federal district court, to seek exemptions from district policies governing students’ gender identity. The teachers alleged that the policies required them to use students’ preferred names and pronouns and to withhold information from parents about a student’s gender transition at school, which they argued conflicted with their religious beliefs.
During the litigation, the school district asserted that California law required schools to follow these practices. The teachers then added state officials as defendants, and several parents of California public school students joined the lawsuit as plaintiffs.
The parent plaintiffs included John and Jane Poe and John and Jane Doe, who alleged that the policies prevented them from learning about their children’s gender transition at school. The Poes alleged that their daughter began presenting as a boy and using a male name and pronouns at school during seventh grade. The Poes only discovered this after their child was hospitalized for a suicide attempt and a doctor informed them that the child had gender dysphoria and had been presenting as a boy at school. At a new school during ninth grade, the Poes’ child again began identifying as a boy. Contrary to the parents’ instructions, teachers and school officials continued to use a male name and pronouns for their child, citing obligations under California state law.
The Does object to gender transitioning. However, since fifth grade their daughter has sometimes identified as a boy. When the child was in seventh grade, the Does confronted the school principal because they believed the school was using a male name and pronouns for their child without informing them. The principal explained that state law prohibited the school from sharing information about a student’s gender identity or transitioning with parents without the student’s consent. The Does believed that the risk
of leaving their child at that school was too great, but sending her to a private school was financially and logistically infeasible. They transferred their child to another public school and placed them in therapy.
After discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction. The injunction prevents schools from “misleading” parents about their children’s gender presentation at school and their social transitioning efforts. It also requires schools to follow parents’ directions regarding their children’s names and pronouns.
Defendants appealed, and the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction pending appeal. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the trial court may not have conducted the rigorous analysis required for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and suggested that the injunction appeared overly broad. The Ninth Circuit also expressed doubts about the trial court’s decision on the merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The parents and teachers then applied to the United States Supreme Court to vacate the Ninth Circuit’s stay.
The Supreme Court concluded that the parent plaintiffs who sought religious exemptions were likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim. The Supreme Court explained that California’s policies substantially interfered with the right of parents to guide the religious development of their children, a principle recognized in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Supreme Court also relied on its recent decision in Mahmoud v. Taylor, 606 U.S. 522 (2025), which held that failing to provide parents with an opportunity to opt out of having their children exposed to LGBTQ+ inclusive books placed a burden on parents’ religious rights. According to the Supreme Court, California’s nondisclosure policies imposed an even greater burden because they permitted schools to facilitate aspects of a child’s gender transition without parental knowledge or consent.
The Supreme Court stated that California’s policies would not survive the strict scrutiny that Mahmoud demands, because the policies were not narrowly tailored. The Supreme Court opined that California’s
interest in safety could be served by a policy that allows religious exemptions while precluding gender-identity disclosure to parents who would engage in abuse.
The Supreme Court also determined that the parents were likely to succeed on their due process claim. The Court explained that longstanding precedent recognizes parents’ fundamental rights to direct the upbringing and education of their children. The Court stated that this right includes parents’ right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children’s mental health, and that gender dysphoria is a condition that has an important bearing on a child’s mental health. Therefore, the Court argued that California’s policies likely violate parents’ rights to direct the upbringing and education of their children.
The Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s stay with respect to the parent plaintiffs but left it in place with respect to the teacher plaintiffs.
Mirabelli v. Bonta (2026) ___U.S.___ [___L.Ed.2d___].
Note:
For California schools, this decision highlights the tension between state guidance on student privacy and emerging federal constitutional concerns regarding parental notification rights. While private schools have greater flexibility than public schools, we recommend that schools review their policies on parental notification and student support to ensure they are clearly articulated and consistently applied in light of these evolving legal standards.
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discrimination
Court Rejects Discrimination Claims Brought By University Administrator Fired Weeks After Hire Due To Past “Zionist” Tweets.
Aneesa Johnson, a newly hired administrator in Georgetown University’s Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) program, filed suit after she was terminated less than a month into her role when years-old social media posts resurfaced and sparked significant campus backlash. Johnson, an African American Muslim woman of Palestinian origin, alleged discrimination under Title VII based on race, religion, and national origin, along with retaliation, hostile work environment, and numerous tort claims.
Johnson was hired in October 2023 as the Assistant Director of Academic and Faculty Affairs in the MSFS program, a student-facing administrative role that required her to serve as the primary point of contact for MSFS students on academic matters and to work closely with faculty, staff, and alumni. Her offer letter made clear that her employment was at-will and subject to a six-month probationary period.
Within days of her start date, a Georgetown student searched Johnson online and the second result was from Canary Mission, a controversial organization that creates online profiles of students and professors on college campuses who have been critical of Israel. Through Canary Mission, the student located a profile containing social media posts Johnson had made approximately eight years earlier as an undergraduate. Those posts included statements expressing a “deep seeded hate” for “Zionists,” referring to them as “dogs,” and reposting an image of an Orthodox Jewish man with a caption referencing Jews being “hated” and likened to a “devil.” The student shared screenshots of the posts on social media.
The situation escalated almost immediately. The posts went viral and by the next morning, Georgetown instructed Johnson not to report to campus due to
safety concerns and placed her on administrative leave. Around the same time, the dean circulated a school-wide email stating that the University had learned of “hateful, antisemitic” social media commentary by a newly hired staff member, that the University had not been aware of the posts at the time of hiring, and that the matter was under investigation.
Johnson alleged that she was subjected to online harassment and doxing following the posts’ circulation. During the University’s investigation, she did not deny authoring the posts but declined to substantively engage with the allegations or address their impact, instead asserting that Canary Mission was itself biased. On November 27, 2023, Georgetown terminated Johnson’s employment. The termination letter cited unprofessional conduct, the significant disruption caused to the program, and concerns about her ability to interact effectively with students and other constituencies given the nature of her role.
Johnson filed suit, asserting that Georgetown’s response was discriminatory and that other individuals who had made controversial statements were not similarly disciplined.
The Court dismissed her claims in full. In addressing her discrimination claim under Title VII, the Court explained that while Johnson belonged to protected classes and suffered an adverse employment action, she was required to plausibly show that her termination occurred because of those protected characteristics. Johnson argued that the timing of events, comments made at a welcome luncheon about her background and the war in Gaza, and what she characterized as a rushed and biased investigation supported an inference of discriminatory intent. The Court disagreed, pointing instead to an “obvious alternative explanation” supported by the facts: the content of her social media posts, the widespread reaction they generated, and the resulting concerns about her ability to perform a highly interactive, student-facing role.
The Court also rejected Johnson’s argument that she was treated differently than similarly situated
employees. It explained that, even at the pleading stage, a plaintiff must provide enough factual context to allow a meaningful comparison, such as similarities in job duties, decisionmakers, and circumstances of the conduct. Johnson pointed to faculty and administrators who had made controversial or offensive statements, including one individual who had previously drawn significant criticism for a social media post. But the Court found these comparisons insufficient. The individuals held different roles, were subject to different supervisory structures, and were evaluated by different decision makers. Those differences, the Court held, were significant enough to undermine any inference that Johnson was treated differently because of her protected characteristics.
The Court also rejected Johnson’s attempt to characterize the University’s investigation as evidence of discrimination. While she alleged that the investigation was rushed and overly reliant on external sources, the Court noted that the University did engage with her during the process and that the relevant inquiry was not whether the investigation was ideal, but whether the ultimate decision was motivated by unlawful bias.
Johnson’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims were dismissed both because they were not properly exhausted through the administrative process and because the alleged conduct, which included conversations at a welcome lunch, the dean’s school-wide email, and the University’s disciplinary response, did not meet the legal standards for those claims. The Court emphasized that a hostile work environment requires conduct that is severe or pervasive, and that adverse employment decisions alone do not satisfy that standard.
The Court also rejected Johnson’s breach of contract claim, noting that her at-will, probationary status allowed the University to terminate her if her conduct was deemed unacceptable or inconsistent with job expectations.
Johnson v. Georgetown University. (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026) 2026 WL 879522.
Note:
This case underscores the importance of responding to employee social media issues with a clear, well-documented, and rolespecific analysis. When concerns arise, schools should focus on the impact of the conduct on the employee’s ability to perform their duties, conduct a prompt and fair review, and ensure that similarly situated employees are treated consistently. Careful documentation of the decision-making process and the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for any action remains critical.
LCW Welcomes
Corrigan Lewis
Corrigan is a new Associate whose practice focuses on complex litigation, civil rights, and disability law. She brings experience in state and federal courts, advising and litigating on behalf of individuals with disabilities, and supporting compliance with state and federal civil rights laws.
misconduct
Principal’s Failure To Report Own Criminal Charges About Shoplifting Leads To Dismissal Of Discrimination Claims.
Amy Necaise, the longtime principal of Bay High School, sued the Bay St. Louis-Waveland School District after she was asked to resign following multiple shoplifting charges. Necaise had worked for the District for over twenty years and served as principal for more than a decade. She alleged that the District discriminated against her based on sex in violation of Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause.
The dispute arose in August 2023, when Necaise was accused of shoplifting at a Walmart. The District’s Employee Handbook states: An employee who is arrested or charged with a felony or misdemeanor is required to notify his or her immediate supervisor and the Superintendent as soon as possible but not later than within 24 hours. Failure to report such incidents may result in disciplinary action up to and including termination.”
Accordingly, Necaise promptly reported the first charge to her supervisor. However, within a week, the police department called Necaise to let her know that she was charged with two additional shoplifting offenses stemming from separate incidents at Walmart on different dates. Necaise did not report the additional charges within the required timeframe because she was under the impression that they were all part of the same case and charge.
The situation escalated quickly as media coverage intensified, eventually reaching national outlets. The Superintendent learned of the additional charges not from Necaise, but from a reporter seeking comment. Shortly thereafter, the District concluded that Necaise had violated its reporting policy and asked her to resign in lieu of termination. Necaise later pled no contest to one of the charges, while the others were dismissed.
Necaise filed suit under Title VII, arguing that male employees who engaged in misconduct were treated
more favorably and that her resignation was the result of sex discrimination. The District moved for summary judgment.
The Court evaluated Necaise’s Title VII claim under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Under this framework, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing, among other things, that she suffered an adverse employment action and was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside her protected class. If that showing is made, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, after which the plaintiff must demonstrate that the stated reason is a pretext for discrimination.
Applying this framework, the Court found that Necaise could establish a prima facie case based on being replaced by a male principal. However, her claim failed at the comparator stage. The Court emphasized that comparators must be “nearly identical” in role, conduct, and circumstances. Necaise’s proposed comparators, who were teachers and coaches, held significantly different positions and responsibilities and had not engaged in comparable conduct, such as receiving multiple criminal charges and failing to report them. For example, the Court noted that as the principal, Necaise was responsible for the safety of students, personnel on campus, curriculum, and supervising and leading a leadership team, responsibilities that were notably different than the teachers and coaches she offered as comparators.
The Court further found that the District had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action: Necaise’s violation of the reporting policy. Necaise admitted she was aware of the policy and failed to comply with it. The Court noted that such a violation is particularly significant for a principal, who serves as a highly visible leader and must maintain public trust. The widespread media attention surrounding the charges further distinguished her situation from that of other employees.
At the final stage, the Court concluded that Necaise failed to show that the District’s stated reason was
pretextual. Her evidence of disparate treatment was limited and lacked specificity, and she could not identify similarly situated male employees who were treated more favorably. The Court also noted that the decisionmaker was female, which weakened any inference of discriminatory intent, and that Necaise had previously discussed transitioning roles before the incidents occurred.
Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the District.
Necaise v. Bay St. Louis Waveland Sch. Dist. (S.D. Miss. Mar. 31, 2026) 2026 WL 881221.
Note:
Although this case involves a public school district, it was decided under Title VII, which applies to private schools. This case provides useful guidance on how courts assess comparator evidence and evaluate whether a stated reason for discipline is pretextual.
employee references
Court Rejects Title VII Claims Based On Former School’s Disclosure Of Teacher Misconduct to New School.
Richard Schlesinger, an openly gay teacher, filed suit against Fenwick High School, a private Catholic school, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII, along with several state law claims. Schlesinger was hired in December 2022 and alleged that beginning in August 2023, his direct supervisor made disparaging comments about his sexual orientation. He reported the conduct to school administrators in early 2024 and later escalated his concerns to human resources. Although human resources allegedly acknowledged that the conduct was inappropriate, Schlesinger claimed the School failed to investigate or take corrective action, and that the comments intensified after his complaints.
In April 2024, Schlesinger accepted a position with a local public high school and began preparing to transition employment. At that time, Fenwick completed a required disclosure form indicating that there were no allegations of sexual misconduct against him. Shortly thereafter, Schlesinger became aware of rumors circulating about alleged misconduct attributed to him, which he reported to human resources. According to Schlesinger, the School determined the rumors were unsubstantiated but again took no action to address them. He left Fenwick at the end of the school year and began his new position in August 2024.
Schlesinger alleged that following a change in Fenwick’s administration, the School revisited his prior complaints and the previously dismissed allegations. In September 2024, Fenwick informed his new employer that Schlesinger had engaged in sexual misconduct, without first notifying him or providing an opportunity to respond. Schlesinger claimed this disclosure led his new employer to recommend his termination, prompting his resignation shortly thereafter. He alleged that both his sexual orientation and his prior complaints of discrimination were motivating factors in Fenwick’s actions.
Schlesinger brought claims for discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. To state a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took a materially adverse employment action because of a protected characteristic. The Court found that Schlesinger failed to plausibly allege such an action attributable to Fenwick. Although Schlesinger pointed to his resignation from his new employer, the Court emphasized that Title VII liability generally requires an employment relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time of the alleged adverse action. Because Fenwick no longer employed Schlesinger and did not control the decision-making of his new employer, the Court concluded that the alleged harm could not be attributed to Fenwick. The Court also declined to adopt an “interference theory” of liability, under which a former employer could be held liable for negatively affecting a plaintiff’s employment with a third party, noting that such a theory has not been
recognized in the Seventh Circuit and would in any event require a showing of control over the employment relationship.
The Court also rejected Schlesinger’s alternative theory that he experienced a hostile work environment while employed at Fenwick. To state such a claim, a plaintiff must allege harassment that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment. The Court found that Schlesinger’s allegations were too vague to meet this standard. He did not describe the content, frequency, or severity of the alleged comments, and the complaint did not plausibly connect the alleged rumors to any actionable conduct by Fenwick. Without specific factual allegations, the Court concluded that Schlesinger failed to plausibly allege conduct rising to the level required under Title VII.
The Court reached the same conclusion on Schlesinger’s retaliation claim. Although he alleged that he engaged in protected activity by reporting discrimination, the Court found that he failed to plausibly allege a materially adverse action caused by Fenwick. The alleged workplace conduct was too vaguely pleaded to support an inference of retaliation, and the later disclosure to his new employer could not be attributed to Fenwick for the same reasons discussed in the discrimination claim. The Court also noted that the several-month gap between Schlesinger’s complaints and the alleged disclosure further undermined any inference of causation.
The Court dismissed both the discrimination and retaliation claims.
Schlesinger v. Fenwick High Sch. (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10, 2026) 2026 WL 673485.
Note:
This case highlights considerations for private schools when responding to requests for information about former employees, particularly where disclosures may impact future employment. In California, the newly enacted SB 848 requires private schools to provide certain information regarding employee misconduct. Schools should ensure that any such disclosures are accurate, supported by appropriate investigation, and consistent with statutory requirements.
Don't
admissions
Court Dismisses Challenge To Boston Exam School Admissions Policy Based On Prior First Circuit Ruling.
Boston Parent Coalition for Academic Excellence Corporation, a nonprofit organization, filed suit against the Boston School Committee and the Superintendent of Boston Public Schools, alleging that the admissions policy for Boston’s selective “exam schools” (Boston Latin School, Boston Latin Academy, and John D. O’Bryant School of Science and Mathematics) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Coalition challenged the School Committee’s current “Tier System” for admissions, asserting that it discriminates against white and Asian American students.
The challenged policy replaced an earlier “Zip Code Plan” that had been adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic. Under that prior plan, students were admitted based on grade point average and geographic distribution across Boston zip codes. That plan had already been upheld by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected claims that it unlawfully discriminated against white and Asian American students.
The current Tier System, implemented beginning in the 2022–2023 admissions cycle, groups applicants into socioeconomic tiers based on factors such as household income, parental education, and housing stability. Students compete within their assigned tier based on academic performance, and additional “bonus points” may be awarded based on factors such as attending a high-poverty school or experiencing homelessness.
The School Committee moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the Coalition’s claims were foreclosed by the First Circuit’s prior decision upholding the earlier admissions framework. The Court agreed. It explained that although the Tier System differs in structure from the Zip Code Plan, both systems rely on similar underlying principles and are facially race-neutral. The Court further noted that the First Circuit had already rejected arguments that such policies produce unlawful disparate impacts when measured against the appropriate comparator, namely the broader population of school-aged children rather than the applicant pool.
Applying that precedent, the Court held that the Coalition failed to state a legally viable equal protection claim. Even assuming the Coalition had alleged sufficient facts in the absence of binding precedent, the Court concluded that it was required to follow the First Circuit’s prior ruling addressing substantially similar claims. Accordingly, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.
The Court emphasized that its decision was based solely on the binding effect of existing appellate precedent and did not reach other arguments raised by the parties. The plaintiffs’ ability to appeal the dismissal remains intact.
Bos. Parent Coal. for Acad. Excellence Corp. v. Bos. Sch. Comm. (D.Mass. Mar. 19, 2026, No. 25-12015-WGY) 2026 WL 776160.
Note:
Although this case arises in the public school context, it reflects broader legal scrutiny of admissions policies that rely on socioeconomic factors to promote diversity. Courts continue to treat facially neutral policies as permissible where they are not intentionally discriminatory and are evaluated against appropriate population benchmarks.
discrimination
After Class-wide Backlash And Mass Emails, Court Rejects Student’s Claims Over Lost Scholarship And Expulsion.
Michael Newman, a former student at Howard University School of Law, brought suit against the University and several administrators following the loss of his academic scholarship and his eventual expulsion. Newman, a white student at a historically Black university, alleged that the School interfered with his scholarship agreement, discriminated against him on the basis of race under 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and defamed him during disciplinary proceedings.
Newman enrolled in 2020 with a scholarship that would renew only if he ranked in the top 50 percent of his class after his first year. During his first semester, Newman struggled academically, missing assignments, dropping a required legal writing course, and earning low grades. At the same time, he became increasingly engaged in debates with classmates, posting political and racial commentary in group chats and on class communication platforms. Newman’s statements such as his critique of the “Black community” and later references to classmates having a “hive mind” prompted strong reactions from peers, who expressed offense and began distancing themselves from him.
Newman reported feeling ostracized and complained to faculty and administrators that he was being subjected to racial discrimination. Although he was referred to the School’s internal complaint processes, he chose not to pursue formal grievances. Instead, he continued to engage classmates through lengthy group messages and emails, including a series of letters addressing race and politics. These communications further escalated tensions, resulting in additional complaints from students and intervention by University administrators. At one point, the dean convened a town hall meeting to address the situation, during which students publicly criticized Newman’s conduct.
Despite these conflicts, Newman’s academic performance improved somewhat in the spring
semester, but not enough to meet the scholarship requirement. At the end of his first year, he ranked in the bottom half of his class and lost his scholarship. Newman remained enrolled for his second year, but conflicts with the administration resurfaced. In early 2022, after a classmate’s death, Newman sent a mass email to more than 200 students linking the death to potential risks associated with COVID-19 vaccines and urging the University to delay its booster requirement. This message prompted further complaints from students, who described it as inappropriate and distressing.
The dean initiated disciplinary proceedings, charging Newman with harassment and misuse of University communication systems. Following a hearing process that included an appeal and a second hearing, a disciplinary panel found Newman responsible and recommended expulsion. The University adopted that recommendation and expelled him.
Newman’s breach of contract claims focused on the theory that the University prevented him from satisfying the scholarship’s academic requirements. The Court rejected this argument. It found that the scholarship agreement clearly required a top-half class rank, and the record showed that Newman failed to meet that requirement due to his academic performance. The Court closely examined Newman’s factual assertions, including his claim that administrators manipulated grading, allowed bias to influence peer evaluations, or otherwise interfered with his academic standing, but found no evidence supporting those allegations. Instead, the record showed missed assignments, poor grades early in the semester, and academic difficulties that independently explained his ranking.
The Court also rejected Newman’s argument that the School’s response to peer conflict and campus tension interfered with his ability to succeed academically. Although the record reflected that Newman experienced significant conflict with classmates, including criticism during the town hall and exclusion from group communications, the Court found no evidence that these events affected grading or ranking
decisions. The Court emphasized that the scholarship agreement did not guarantee a particular learning environment and that the University followed its established procedures in responding to Newman’s concerns.
Newman’s Section 1981 claim similarly failed because he could not show that race was a “but-for” cause of his scholarship loss. The Court noted that while some of Newman’s classmates made racially charged comments, there was no evidence that decision makers relied on race in evaluating his academic performance or scholarship eligibility. Newman also failed to identify similarly situated students of a different race who received more favorable treatment. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the same evidence that defeated his contract claims, namely, his academic record, also defeated his discrimination claim.
The Court reached a different conclusion on certain defamation claims arising from the disciplinary proceedings. It held that the dean’s statement accusing Newman of “harassment” was substantially true given the volume of student complaints about his communications. However, the Court allowed two defamation claims to proceed. First, whether the dean’s characterization of Newman’s email about a deceased classmate was “defamatory” raised factual questions, particularly given the context of a formal disciplinary proceeding. Second, the Court found a factual dispute as to whether Newman’s “hive mind” comment referred broadly to African Americans or only to a smaller group of classmates, meaning the dean’s statement could be interpreted as false.
The Court also found sufficient evidence for a jury to consider whether the dean acted with malice, pointing to her prior interactions with Newman and the broader context of conflict between him and the School community. Accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the University on the contract and discrimination claims and most of the defamation claims, allowing two defamation claims and a separate Section 1981 claim related to Newman’s expulsion to proceed.
Newman v. Howard University Sch. of Law (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2026) 2026 WL 820694.
Note:
This case reflects a rise in discrimination claims brought by individuals outside historically targeted groups. Even where schools appropriately enforce academic and conduct standards, they should be mindful of how decisions are documented and communicated, particularly when sharing information about students, as these statements may create defamation or privacy concerns.
accommodations
Medical School’s Insurance Requirement Leads To ADA Challenge And Emergency Court Intervention.
Jordan Braun, a medical student enrolled in St. George University School of Medicine’s Doctor of Medicine program, filed suit alleging that the School violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by failing to accommodate his disability. Braun, who has ADHD, had been receiving treatment for years and previously received testing accommodations from the School. At the time of the dispute, Braun was approximately six months away from completing his medical degree and beginning clinical training.
The dispute arose after the School implemented a new policy requiring students to enroll in a school-sponsored insurance plan. Braun had long been covered by Medicaid, which allowed him to maintain consistent care with his treating physician and access to prescribed medication. He requested a waiver from the new insurance requirement, supported by a letter from his physician explaining that any disruption in coverage would interrupt his treatment and could significantly impair his cognitive functioning, academic performance, and ability to complete the program.
Braun initially believed the School had approved his waiver request. However, in January 2026, the School placed an insurance hold on his account, preventing him from participating in required clinical rotations. Over the following weeks, Braun submitted additional documentation, sought reconsideration, and filed a
complaint with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. Despite these efforts, the School denied his request and recommended him for dismissal, setting an administrative withdrawal date that would terminate his enrollment before he could complete his degree.
Braun filed suit and sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent his removal from the program and allow him to complete his clinical training while the case proceeded. The Court evaluated his request under the standard for injunctive relief, which requires a showing of likely success on the merits, irreparable harm, a balance of equities in the plaintiff’s favor, and that relief is in the public interest.
On the merits, the Court found that Braun had raised at least serious questions, and likely demonstrated a likelihood of success, on his ADA claim. The Court concluded that Braun sufficiently alleged he was a qualified individual with a disability, supported by medical documentation and the School’s prior recognition of his ADHD through earlier accommodations. The Court also found that the medical school qualified as a place of public accommodation subject to the ADA. With respect to the requested accommodation, the Court determined that Braun had plausibly shown that an insurance waiver was necessary to maintain uninterrupted access to essential treatment and medication for his disability, and that the request was reasonable given that the School had an existing waiver process and Braun had previously maintained his coverage without issue. The Court further concluded that allowing Braun to remain on his existing insurance would not fundamentally alter the nature of the program, as it would not affect academic standards, clinical requirements, or the School’s operations.
The Court also found that Braun would suffer irreparable harm absent relief. Without an injunction, Braun faced imminent administrative withdrawal, which would prevent him from completing his medical degree and could permanently impact his ability to pursue a medical career. The Court concluded that these harms could not be fully remedied through monetary damages.
Balancing the equities, the Court determined that the harm to Braun outweighed any potential burden on the school, particularly because the requested accommodation would maintain the status quo and would not alter academic or clinical requirements. The Court further found that the public interest favored enforcement of federal disability laws and ensuring equal access to educational programs.
Based on these findings, the Court granted the temporary restraining order, requiring the school to maintain Braun’s enrollment and allow him to continue participating in coursework and clinical rotations pending further proceedings.
Braun v. St. George University. Sch. of Med. (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2026) 2026 WL 496991.
Note:
This case highlights that courts will closely scrutinize whether requested accommodations are necessary and reasonable, and that sweeping policy changes, even if applied uniformly, still require schools to consider accommodation requests on a case-bycase basis.
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• Partner Mark Meyerhoff, Senior Counsel David Urban, and Associate Morgan Johnson Persuade U.S. Court of Appeals To Affirm Existing Injunctive Relief In Response To Students’ Challenges And To Limit Damages Available Under Federal Disability Law.
Two sight-impaired students sued a California community college district under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in the U.S. District Court. They alleged they were denied equal access to educational resources and accommodations. A jury found for the students and awarded compensatory damages. After trial, the district court issued limited injunctive relief, and significantly reduced the damages based on its opinion that: 1) emotional distress damages were unavailable in ADA Title II cases; 2) the students had only minimal out-of-pocket losses.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that emotional distress damages could not be recovered under Title II of the ADA, and confirmed this in a published decision. Nevertheless, it ultimately held that the District Court erred by failing to consider other permissible forms of damages, including compensation for lost educational opportunities. The Ninth Circuit found that the jury’s award was supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury instructions, and held that the District Court should not have reduced the damages.
As to the injunction, however, the Ninth Circuit accepted the district’ arguments and acknowledged the evidence submitted after trial that the district had improved its technology and processes since the time period at issue. In an unpublished opinion, it affirmed the existing injunctive relief and did not order that the injunction be expanded.
• An Ohio jury awarded $22.5 million to a former employee who was denied a request to work remotely during a high-risk pregnancy, despite medical instructions to limit activity. The employee was required to return to the office and later placed on unpaid leave, and shortly thereafter gave birth prematurely; the child died within hours. The jury found that the employer’s refusal to reasonably accommodate the request contributed to the outcome.
• IBM agreed to pay $17 million to resolve allegations by the U.S. Department of Justice that it violated the False Claims Act by implementing DEI initiatives that allegedly tied hiring, promotions, and bonuses to demographic targets. The government also alleged that IBM adjusted interview criteria and offered certain training and leadership opportunities based on race, sex, or gender. Although IBM denied wrongdoing, it agreed to modify or discontinue the challenged practices. The settlement marks the first resolution under the Trump administration’s initiative to use the False Claims Act to target DEI programs by federal contractors.
cases we are watching
• UC Berkeley has agreed to settle a lawsuit alleging it was deliberately indifferent to antisemitism on campus, including claims that certain student organizations adopted bylaws excluding speakers who support Israel or Zionism. As part of the settlement, the University will rescind those bylaws, revise its policies, implement mandatory antisemitism and anti-discrimination training, and clarify that discrimination based on Jewish identity, including certain anti-Zionist conduct used as a proxy, may violate anti-discrimination laws. The agreement also requires Cal to establish a Title VI officer, improve complaint procedures, conduct annual campus climate surveys, and take responsive action based on the results. Cal denied wrongdoing as part of the settlement and agreed to pay $1 million in legal fees.
• On February 24, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a lawsuit against the Regents of the University of California in federal court. The DOJ alleges that UCLA violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act by failing to address a hostile work environment affecting Jewish and Israeli employees following the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and subsequent campus protests. The complaint alleges that UCLA ignored threats, antisemitic harassment, and other discriminatory conduct directed at faculty and staff, and failed to adequately investigate or respond to internal complaints. The DOJ seeks injunctive relief requiring UCLA to revise and enforce its anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation policies, as well as damages for affected employees.
• The lawsuit arises from broader federal scrutiny of UCLA’s response to antisemitic incidents following the October 7, 2023 attack. In July 2025, the DOJ determined that UCLA violated Title VI and the Equal Protection Clause by acting with deliberate indifference to harassment of Jewish and Israeli students during campus protests, particularly in connection with a 2024 protest encampment that allegedly restricted some students’ access to campus spaces. The February 2026 complaint extends the government’s focus to alleged discrimination affecting faculty and staff under Title VII.
• A Texas Tech law student has sued the university after its Honor Council recommended a written reprimand for allegedly “celebrating” the death of conservative figure Charlie Kirk during classroom and clinic discussions. The student claims she was singled out for discipline while other students and faculty engaged in similar conversations and alleges race discrimination and First Amendment violations. The complaint also raises concerns about the investigation process, including disputed witness accounts and the School’s response to a racial incident involving the student during the same period. If finalized, the reprimand would be reported to bar examiners and could impact her legal career.
lcw best timeline
APRIL
The budget for the next school year should be approved by the Board.
Issue contracts to existing staff for the next school year.
Issue letters to current staff who the School is not inviting to come back the following year.
Assess vacancies in relation to enrollment.
Post job announcements and conduct recruiting.
• Resumes should be carefully screened to ensure that the applicant has necessary core skills and criminal, background and credit checks should be done, along with multiple reference checks.
Summer Program.
• Advise staff of summer program and opportunity to apply to work in the summer, and that hiring decisions will be made after final enrollment numbers are determined at the end of May.
• Distribute information on summer program to parents and set deadline for registration by end of April.
• Enter into Facilities Use Agreement for Summer Program, if not operating summer program.
Transportation Agreements.
• Assess transportation needs for summer/next year.
• Update/renew relevant contracts.
MAY
Schools with more than 100 employees: submit annual pay data to the California Department of Civil Rights (due 5/13/26).
Complete hiring of new employees for next school year.
Complete hiring for any summer programs.
If service agreements expire at the end of the school year, review service agreements to determine whether to change service providers (e.g., janitorial services, if applicable).
• Employees of a contracted entity are required to be fingerprinted pursuant to Education Code Section 33192, if they provide the following services:
School and classroom janitorial.
School site administrative.
School site grounds and landscape maintenance.
Pupil transportation.
School site food-related.
• A private school contracting with an entity for construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, or repair of school facilities where the employees of the entity will have contact, other than limited contact, with pupils, must ensure one of the following:
There is a physical barrier at the worksite to limit contact with pupils.
practices
Each Month, LCW presents a monthly timeline of best practices for private and independent schools. The timeline runs from the fall semester through the end of summer break. LCW encourages schools to use the timeline as a guideline throughout the school year.
There is continual supervision and monitoring of all employees of that entity, which may include either:
◆ Surveillance of employees of the entity by School personnel; or
◆ Supervision by an employee of the entity who the Department of Justice has ascertained has not been convicted of a violent or serious felony, which may be done by fingerprinting pursuant to Education Code Section 33192. (See Education Code Section 33193).
If conducting end of school year fundraising:
• Raffles:
Qualified tax-exempt organizations, including nonprofit educational organizations, may conduct raffles under Penal Code Section 320.5.
In order to comply with Penal Code Section 320.5, raffles must meet all of the following requirements:
◆ Each ticket must be sold with a detachable coupon or stub, and both the ticket and its associated coupon must be marked with a unique and matching identifier.
◆ Winners of the prizes must be determined by draw from among the coupons or stubs. The draw must be conducted in California under the supervision of a natural person who is 18 years of age or older.
◆ At least 90 percent of the gross receipts generated from the sale of raffle tickets for any given draw must be used to benefit the school or provide support for beneficial or charitable purposes.
50/50 raffles may only be conducted by major league sports nonprofits.
• Auctions:
The School must charge sales or use tax on merchandise or goods donated by a donor who paid sales or use tax at time of purchase.
◆ Donations of gift cards, gift certificates, services, or cash donations are not subject to sales tax since there is not an exchange of merchandise or goods.
◆ Items withdrawn from a seller’s inventory and donated directly to nonprofit schools located in California are not subject to use tax.
◊ For example, if a business donates items that it sells directly to the School for the auction, the School does not have to charge sales or use taxes. However, if a parent goes out and purchases items to donate to an auction (unless those items are gift certificates, gift cards, or services), the School will need to charge sales or use taxes on those items.
Consortium Call Of The Month
LCW has four private education consortiums across the State! Consortium members enjoy access to quality training throughout the year, discounts on other LCW products and events, and unlimited, complimentary telephone and email consultation with an LCW private education attorney on matters related to employment and education law questions (including business & facilities questions and student issues!) We’ve outlined a recent consortium call and the provided answer below. Client confidentiality is paramount to us; we change and omit details in the Consortium Call of the Month.
Question:
A human resources professional asked for LCW's recommendation on how long to retain personnel records for former employees.
Answer:
The LCW attorney recommended retaining personnel records for four years after the end of an employee’s employment. Labor Code section 1198.5 requires that personnel records be kept for a period of not less than three years after termination of employment. Additionally, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code section 12946(a)) requires that employers retain personnel files for four years after the records/files were initially created or received, and to maintain personnel files of applicants or terminated employees for a minimum period of four years after the termination or decision. Therefore, to be compliant with FEHA, the attorney recommended retaining personnel records for four years after the employee’s employment ends. The attorney also advised that longer retention periods are required by law for other employment type records. For example, medical records are required to be kept 30 years after the end of employment.
Liebert Cassidy Whitmore