June 2025
Education Matters
Table Of Contents 03 Liability
13 Employees
05 First Amendment
15 Time To Update Your EEO Plans (CCDs) Legal Updates
06 Constitutional Law
18 Firm Victory
08 Disability 10 First Amendment Discrimination 11 Constitutional Law
19 Business And Facilities 21 Benefits Corner 23 Consortium Call of the Month
Contributors:
Amy Brandt Partner | San Francisco Jordan Carman Associate | San Francisco Christopher Fallon Partner | Los Angeles
Stephanie J. Lowe Senior Counsel | San Diego Reece Martin Summer Associate | San Diego Madison Tanner Associate | San Diego
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June 2025
liability
Court Upholds $1 Million Verdict Against School District For Failing To Protect Student From Bullying. E.I. was a student at El Segundo Middle School during the 2017–2018 school year. She was friends with two other students, Kate and Skyler. E.I told Kate that she liked a boy who Kate had recently dated. Kate told E.I. “no worries.” When Skylar discovered E.I. was talking to Kate’s ex-boyfriend, she sent E.I. social media messages calling her a “b**ch,” “wh**e,” “slut,” “liar,” and “cheater.” She began insulting E.I. at school, sometimes screamed at her, flipped her off, and even slapped her. Teachers witnessed some of these incidents but did not intervene or report it. E.I. reported the behavior to a school counselor, who arranged a group meeting with E.I., Skylar and Kate on October 20, 2017. The counselor did not prepare for the meeting, did not share the school’s anti-bullying policies, and did not take follow-up steps. Afterward, Skylar’s behavior intensified. On October 24, E.I. emailed the counselor requesting another meeting “as soon as possible.” The counselor met with E.I. but did not investigate or take further steps. The harassment escalated despite repeated complaints by E.I. and her parents to school officials. E.I. showed the counselor harassing message that Skylar had sent her, the counselor told her “girls will be girls” and “this is just girl drama.” E.I. began eating lunch alone in the nurse’s office and engaging in self-harm. Throughout the remainder of the school year, Skylar continued bullying E.I. online and in person. In June, the students took a class trip to Knott’s Berry Farm, where Skylar and other students yelled at, taunted, and cursed at E.I. and made her cry. A teacher saw E.I. crying and did not say anything. The following day, students circulated a petition titled “Petition to END [E.I.]’s Life,” which included messages like “KKK” and “she is a whore.” Although the principal suspended the students involved, she did not notify E.I.’s parents and they learned of the petition from another family. The principal later admitted to having “dropped the ball.” Skylar was still permitted to attend the school’s promotion ceremony the next day. E.I. later transferred out of the District and was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, and anxiety caused by the bullying. Her psychologist testified that her condition was enduring and would require years of therapy. In April 2019, E.I. sued the El Segundo Unified School District, alleging negligence under Education Code section 44807 and Government Code sections 815.2, 815.6, 820, and 835. She claimed that District staff failed to protect her from peer bullying and did not follow established safety policies despite repeated complaints. Although she initially asserted a second cause of action for negligent hiring, supervision, and training, she dismissed that claim at trial and proceeded solely on a general negligence theory. The District argued that its employees’ responses to bullying reports involved discretionary decisions protected by Government Code section 820.2. It argued that decisions about how to address student misconduct and whether to intervene or investigate involved professional judgment insulated from liability. The jury found the District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in noneconomic damages, $700,000 for past and $300,000 for future harms. The trial court denied the District’s motions for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The District appealed.
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The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. It rejected the District’s argument that E.I. had relied on Education Code sections 48900 et seq., which deal with suspension and expulsion procedures, to create a duty of care. The Court of Appeal explained that E.I. did not base her claim on those statutes or argue they created a private right of action. Instead, her negligence claim rested on a duty recognized under common law and Education Code section 44807 to supervise students and protect them from foreseeable harm. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that this duty includes protecting students from other students. The Court of Appeal also held that the District was not entitled to immunity under Government Code section 820.2. That statute shields only basic policy decisions, not routine decisions made in implementing existing policy. The Court of Appeal found that staff did not make policy choices but simply failed to follow established safety procedures, such as investigating bullying reports, notifying parents, and offering support to students. Because these duties were already set out in the District’s and school’s safety plans, failing to carry them out did not qualify as protected discretion. Finally, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. E.I. testified that she repeatedly reported the bullying but the school ignored her. Her psychologist linked her PTSD and depression to the school’s failure to act. The Court of Appeal also found that the District waived its challenge to causation by failing to address key evidence in its opening brief. The Court of Appeal held that all other alleged errors were either harmless and forfeited. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s judgment and upheld the $1 million damages award in favor of E.I. E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (June 13, 2025, No. B325733) ___Cal.App.5th___.
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First Amendment Ninth Circuit Rules Against School Trustee For Blocking Parents On Social Media. In the March edition of Education Matters, we reported on the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in O’Connor-Ratcliff v. Garnier and Lindke v. Freed. In those decisions, the Supreme Court held that public officials engage in state action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 when they block users or delete comments on social media only if they both (1) possess actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf on a particular matter and (2) purport to exercise that authority when speaking on social media. The Supreme Court remanded the O’Connor-Ratcliff case to the Ninth Circuit to apply this two-part test. The Ninth Circuit has now issued its decision on remand. Christopher and Kimberly Garnier are parents of students in the Poway Unified School District. They frequently posted lengthy, repetitive comments on the Facebook and Twitter pages maintained by District Trustees Michelle O’Connor-Ratcliff and T.J. Zane. The Trustees used those pages to communicate about Board activities, promote District events, share meeting information, and encourage public input. In late 2017, after two years of increasingly frequent criticism from the Garniers, Trustee O’Connor-Ratcliff blocked both parents from her Facebook page and blocked Christopher Garnier from her Twitter account. Trustee Zane also blocked the Garniers from his Facebook page. The Garniers sued under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, alleging that the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights by excluding them from what they argued were public forums. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in the Garniers’ favor and issued injunctive relief. The district court found that the Trustees acted under color of state law and that the indefinite blocking was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Trustees appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision and remanded with instructions to apply the two-part test announced in the Lindke decision. On remand, the Ninth Circuit first addressed whether the case against Zane, who had left office. Both parties agreed the case was moot. Because Zane no longer served on the Board and showed no intent to return to public office, the Ninth Circuit remanded the claim against Zane with instructions to dismiss. Next, the Ninth Circuit applied the first step of the Lindke test to the claims against O’Connor-Ratcliff. The Ninth Circuit found that O’Connor-Ratcliff did possess actual authority to speak on behalf of the State. State law authorizes school boards to inform the public about educational programs. PUSD’s bylaws allow Trustees to use electronic communications, including social media, to share District information. The bylaws also identify the Board president—O’Connor-Ratcliff ’s role at the time—as someone authorized to speak publicly for the Board. The court rejected her argument that she lacked authority because the District had not approved her pages as official platforms. The Lindke test focuses on the official’s authority, not on whether the account is labeled official. The court also rejected her claim that the pages remained campaign sites, finding no requirement that social media pages be converted or reauthorized. The court concluded that O’Connor-Ratcliff had actual authority to speak on PUSD’s behalf. At step two, the court found that O’Connor-Ratcliff purported to exercise that authority when she posted. Her social media pages identified her as “President, Poway Unified School District Board of Education” and labeled her • www.lcwlegal.com •
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a “Government Official.” She used the pages almost exclusively for District business and provided her official PUSD email address. She included no disclaimers and maintained a separate personal Facebook page. The court cited posts where she announced the firing and hiring of the PUSD superintendent—one of which came before any official District announcement. She also posted Board meeting dates, shared agenda materials, and invited community participation in budget and hiring processes. Because she blocked the Garniers from the entire page, and they sought to comment on posts made in her official capacity, the court held that the blocking satisfied Lindke’s second prong. The Ninth Circuit held that O’Connor-Ratcliff acted under color of state law when she blocked the Garniers. It affirmed the district court’s ruling that she violated their First Amendment rights. It remanded the claim against Zane with instructions to dismiss it as moot. Garnier v. O’Connor-Ratcliff, 136 F.4th 1181 (9th Cir. 2025).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Court Blocks School District From Enforcing Ban On Critical Race Theory. In December 2022, the Temecula Valley Unified School District Board adopted Resolution No. 2022-23/21 (Resolution), which prohibited district educators from using “Critical Race Theory or other similar frameworks” to guide instruction on race-related topics. The Resolution characterized critical race theory (CRT) as a “divisive ideology” that promotes racial guilt and moral fault based solely on race. It barred the teaching of thirteen concepts: five “elements” of CRT and eight “doctrines derived from CRT,” such as the belief that racism is ordinary, that individuals are inherently racist based on their race, or that meritocracy is a tool of oppression. The Resolution allowed limited instruction about CRT only if it played a subordinate role in the course and focused on “the flaws in CRT.” It did not contain definitions or examples and did not define enforcement procedures for policy violations. In August 2023, the Board adopted Policy 5020.01. The policy required school staff to notify parents in writing within three days if a student requested to be identified or treated as a gender different from their sex assigned at birth. The policy applied to requests to use different names, pronouns, or gender-specific facilities such as bathrooms or locker rooms. In October 2023, the Temecula Valley Educators Association, along with individual students, teachers, and parents, filed suit against the District and five members of the Board. Plaintiffs brought ten causes of action under the California and U.S. Constitutions and the California Education Code. They alleged that the CRT Resolution was unconstitutionally vague, chilled protected classroom speech, and conflicted with state instructional mandates. They also alleged that the gender identity policy violated students’ constitutional rights, including equal protection and privacy rights. In November 2023, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the District from enforcing the CRT Resolution and Policy 5020.01. The trial court denied the motion and Plaintiffs appealed. While the appeal was pending, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 1955, which prohibits schools from requiring staff to disclose a student’s gender identity without the student’s consent. In response, the Board rescinded Policy 5020.01. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as to the gender identity policy as moot, but proceeded to evaluate the constitutionality of the CRT Resolution.
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June 2025
The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s denial of a preliminary injunction against the CRT Resolution. It held that the Resolution was unconstitutionally vague and that the balance of harms favored granting relief. The Court of Appeal found that Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claim that the Resolution was unconstitutionally vague. The Resolution banned “Critical Race Theory or other similar frameworks” without explaining what those terms meant. It listed five “elements” and eight “doctrines” derived from CRT but failed to clarify how teachers should apply those prohibitions in practice. The Resolution gave no examples, no definitions, and offered no guidance about how it intersected with the state-mandated curriculum. Teachers submitted evidence that they could not tell whether their lessons violated the Resolution, especially when teaching topics that California’s education standards require, such as systemic racism, civil rights history, and implicit bias. The Court of Appeal also noted that the Resolution contained no enforcement procedures. It did not explain how the District would handle reports of violations or what penalties might apply. Teachers testified that they feared being disciplined, even fired, for unintentionally violating the policy. To avoid that risk, many had censored or removed content, abandoned core texts, or avoided answering student questions about race and inequality. The Court of Appeal found that this uncertainty chilled classroom speech and denied teachers fair notice of what the policy prohibited. The Court of Appeal also found that the trial court ignored strong evidence of harm to Plaintiffs. Teachers described ongoing confusion, stress, and fear about how to comply with both state standards and the Resolution. They said they had changed how they taught or avoided topics entirely. The trial court refused to weigh those harms and relied instead on a general rule that enjoining a government policy causes irreparable harm. The Court of Appeal rejected that reasoning. It found no evidence that the District would suffer harm if the trial court issued an injunction, especially since the District had not shown that any of the banned concepts had ever been taught in its schools. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed it to issue a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the CRT Resolution. It dismissed the appeal involving the gender identity policy as moot. Mae M. v. Komrosky, 111 Cal. App. 5th 198 (2025).
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DISABILITY U.S. Supreme Court Rules ADA And Rehabilitation Act Claims Require The Same Standard In Education And Other Settings. A.J.T. is a teenage girl with a rare form of epilepsy that significantly impairs her physical and cognitive abilities. Her seizures occur frequently in the morning, which prevents her from attending school before noon. However, she is alert and able to learn from noon until about 6:00 p.m. In A.J.T.’s early school years, her school accommodated her by excusing her from morning activities and providing evening instruction at home. In 2015, her family moved to Minnesota. A.J.T.’s new school district, the Osseo Area Public Schools, Independent School District No. 279, denied her parents’ repeated requests to include evening instruction in her Individualized Education Program (IEP). From 2015 to 2018, A.J.T. received only 4.25 hours of daily instruction, compared to the 6.5 hours school day that the District provided to other students. In 2018, as A.J.T. transitioned to middle school, the District proposed further reductions to her instructional time. Her parents again requested evening instruction and a longer school day. The District denied both requests and refused to maintain A.J.T.’s previous schedule. A.J.T.’s parents filed a complaint under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) with the Minnesota Department of Education. After a fiveday hearing, an Administrative Law Judge found that the District had violated the IDEA and ordered it to provide several hundred hours of compensatory education, including at-home instruction from 4:30 to 6:00 p.m. The District sought judicial review. A federal district court affirmed, concluding that the District had prioritized administrative convenience over A.J.T.’s educational needs. The Eighth Circuit affirmed that ruling. A.J.T. and her parents then brought claims under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against the District and school board. They asked the trial court to issue a permanent injunction, award reimbursement of
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certain costs, and grant compensatory damages. The District moved for summary judgment. The trial court sided with the District, granting summary judgment and holding that A.J.T. had failed to show school officials acted with “bad faith or gross misjudgment.” The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiffs must show “‘either bad faith or gross misjudgment,’ which requires ‘something more’ than mere noncompliance with the applicable federal statutes.” A.J.T. and her parents appealed. The U.S. Supreme Court held that public school students bringing disability discrimination claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are not required to show “bad faith or gross misjudgment” in order to establish liability. The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that such education-related claims are governed by the same legal standards that apply in non-education contexts. The U.S. Supreme Court began by noting that outside the school context, plaintiffs may establish violations of the ADA and Section 504 and obtain injunctive relief without proving intent to discriminate. For compensatory damages, courts typically require proof of intentional discrimination. Most courts of appeals find that standard satisfied by showing the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” “Deliberate indifference” means the defendant disregarded a strong likelihood that its conduct would violate federally protected rights. This standard does not require ill will or animus. The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that nothing in the text of Title II or Section 504 supports applying a distinct or more demanding standard in the educational services context. Both statutes apply broadly to “qualified individual[s]” with disabilities and authorize suits by “any person” subjected to discrimination. Their remedial provisions do not distinguish between educational and non-educational settings. The U.S. Supreme Court traced the heightened “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard to the Eighth Circuit’s 1982 decision in Monahan v. Nebraska. There, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that such a standard was necessary to harmonize the Rehabilitation Act with the IDEA and to respect the technical judgments of school
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June 2025
officials. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected that reasoning in light of a subsequent act of Congress: 20 U.S.C. section 1415(l), which Congress added to the IDEA in 1986. Section 1415(l) provides that nothing in the IDEA shall be construed to “restrict or limit the rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the [ADA], [Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act], or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children with disabilities,” except that plaintiffs must first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures if they seek relief that is also available under the IDEA. The U.S. Supreme Court viewed section 1415(l) as an unambiguous instruction from Congress that the IDEA does not displace or limit students’ independent rights under other federal disability statutes. By requiring a higher bar for education-related claims under the ADA and Section 504, the Eighth Circuit effectively curtailed those independent rights, in direct conflict with section 1415(l). Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider the District’s new argument that the “bad faith or gross misjudgment” standard should apply to all ADA and Section 504 claims, not just those in the education setting. The U.S. Supreme Court noted that the District had not raised this argument previously or presented it in the petition for certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Sch. (2025) ___U.S.___ [___L.Ed.2d___].
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First Amendment U.S. Supreme Court Split Leaves Oklahoma Ban On Religious Charter Schools Intact. On May 22, 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a split 4–4 decision in St. Isidore of Seville Catholic Virtual School v. Drummond, leaving in place the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s ruling that the state cannot approve a religious charter school. While this decision settles the matter in Oklahoma, for now, the Supreme Court did not answer the broader constitutional question of whether states may approve religious charter schools. Given growing interest in faithbased charter models, similar applications are likely to emerge in other states, potentially bringing the issue back to the U.S. Supreme Court. You can read more about the case in LCW’s Special Bulletin.
DISCRIMINATION U.S. Supreme Court Decides “Reverse Discrimination” Case. On June 5, 2025, in a unanimous opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court prohibited a higher standard for ‘reverse discrimination claims. The Court decided Ames v. Ohio Department of Youth Services, 605 U.S. ____ (2025), ruling that members of a majority group are not required to show “background circumstances” to support allegations of “reverse discrimination”. The ruling rejects the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which held that plaintiff Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman, could not support an allegation of reverse discrimination without evidence of “background circumstances.” You can read more about the case in LCW’s Special Bulletin.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW California School District Prevails In Student Mask Mandate Lawsuit. Jessica Reynolds and two minor plaintiffs, D.E. and L.E., filed suit after D.E., L.E., and Reynold’s child L.R., were removed from classroom instruction and marked as unexcused for refusing to wear face masks in early 2022 at Foothill Ranch Elementary School in the Saddleback Valley Unified School District (District). During that time, the District was enforcing mask mandates consistent with state and local public health guidelines, and the plaintiffs claimed that they were falsely imprisoned, bullied, coerced, pressured, and humiliated for choosing not to give informed consent to wear a mask at school per the masking policy. In particular, the plaintiffs claimed that school officials, including the school principal, responded to the students’ noncompliance by removing them from classrooms, seating them outside or in enclosed courtyards, and denying access to recess and teacher-led instruction unless they wore masks. Plaintiffs also alleged that the District reported the absences to the Orange County District Attorney, which resulted in truancy letters being issued to the students’ parents. The plaintiffs filed a pro se lawsuit raising several claims, most notably under the First Amendment, alleging that the children’s refusal to wear masks was a form of political protest that should be protected as free speech. They also raised due process claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, and claims under California civil rights, tort, and constitutional law. First Amendment Claim The federal district court evaluated the First Amendment claim under the test for expressive conduct established in Spence v. Washington, which requires: (1) an intent to convey a particularized message, and (2) a great likelihood that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. If a law restricts conduct that is not expressive then the conduct is not protected by the First Amendment, and the law is reviewed under rational basis scrutiny. Rational basis review is the least rigorous form of scrutiny used by courts; it only requires that the law or action be rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Here, the plaintiffs argued that their refusal to comply with the mask mandate conveyed a message opposing government overreach and skepticism about the effectiveness of masks. However, the district court found that the plaintiffs’ conduct failed both prongs of the Spence test. First, the reasons cited by the plaintiffs and their children for refusing to wear masks were inconsistent and personal in nature. For example, L.R. reportedly found the mask uncomfortable and expressed confusion about why masking was necessary if he was not sick. Another child, D.E., said the mask made her feel tired and distracted. These explanations lacked a clear intent to communicate a particular political or social message. Second, the district court concluded that even if the students intended to protest, their refusal to wear masks was not likely to be understood as a form of protest by observers. Teachers and classmates did not interpret the conduct as expressive speech but rather as rule-breaking behavior that endangered the health and safety of others. Teachers labeled unmasked students as potential health risks, and other children were reportedly frustrated with the noncompliant students.
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The district court compared the case to Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, where the U.S. Supreme Court upheld students’ right to wear black armbands in silent protest of the Vietnam War. The district court emphasized that Tinker involved deliberate, passive expression that did not disrupt school order. In contrast, the district court found that refusing to comply with a health mandate during a global pandemic posed a tangible risk to the safety and well-being of others and disrupted the School’s orderly operation. The district court also cited Morse v. Frederick, where the U.S. Supreme Court allowed school officials to restrict student expression that promoted illegal drug use, holding that the state has a compelling interest in preventing speech that undermines core safety policies. Applying the rational basis standard, the district court held that the District mask mandate served a legitimate government interest, protecting students and staff from COVID-19 transmission, and that requiring masks was a reasonable and constitutionally permissible condition for attending in-person instruction. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims. Fourteenth Amendment Claim The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any person of “life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” Under this amendment, there are two types of due process: procedural due process and substantive due process. The plaintiffs did not specify whether they raised a procedural or substantive due process claim, so the district court addressed both. Procedural due process requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and an impartial trial. Here, the district
court found no violation because the mask mandate was a general policy, not an individual decision, and it was applied uniformly. Further, plaintiffs failed to identify a protected liberty or property interest. Courts have consistently held that temporary in-school suspensions or placement changes do not trigger due process protections if students are not excluded from school. The district court emphasized that the District made efforts to continue students’ education and maintain safety, including through supervised outdoor learning spaces. For substantive due process, the first inquiry is whether a fundamental right is at stake. Here, the district court emphasized that there was no fundamental constitutional right to attend school without a mask during a pandemic. Parental rights to control children’s education do not extend to overriding school safety measures. The district court cited longstanding precedent to affirm the government’s authority to enact reasonable public health regulations during an emergency. Because the plaintiffs failed to plausibly plead any violation of fundamental rights, the claim was reviewed under rational basis scrutiny and again failed. After dismissed the federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. Reynolds v. Saddleback Valley Unified School District (C.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83605. Note: This case reaffirms that not all student conduct, such as refusing to wear a mask, is protected speech under the First Amendment, particularly when it disrupts school operations or public health measures.
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June 2025
Employees Court Allows Lecturer’s Race Discrimination And Retaliation Claims To Proceed. Booker Cook is an African American man in his seventies who worked as a lecturer at a CSU Sacramento in the Ethnic Studies Department. Early in his employment, Cook perceived hostility from Elvia Ramirez, a Chicanx/ Latinx Studies professor, whom he described as acting “cold and cruel” and failing to welcome him. Cook alleged that Ramirez frequently closed her office door when African American colleagues, including Cook, were present. In 2018, Cook claimed to have overheard Ramirez questioning why the department had hired “that old Black man” to lecture, suggesting that he did not represent the student body. Cook also alleged that Ramirez routinely made derogatory comments about Black faculty and the Pan-African Studies Program during faculty meetings, including repeatedly asking, “[w]hy do we keep hiring all these Black people?” and mischaracterizing African American staff hires as solely Pan-African Studies hires. In November 2020, Cook filed an internal complaint with the University’s Office of Equal Opportunity alleging race and age discrimination. In 2021, he applied for a newly created tenure-track faculty position in Pan-African Studies, created in response to new educational requirements under AB 1460. The University formed a five-person hiring committee and added Ramirez to the committee after another member withdrew. Each committee member created a “top list” of candidates to interview. Cook applied but the committee did not select him for an interview. All applicants, including those who advanced, were African American. Two candidates, both African American, were ultimately hired. Cook alleged that Ramirez intentionally excluded him from her top list to prevent his selection. Other committee members did rank Cook among their top choices. Cook filed suit against CSU Sacramento, the CSU Board of Trustees, the State of California, and Ramirez. Defendants removed the case to federal court. Cook’s claims included racial discrimination and harassment under Title VII and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), age discrimination and harassment under FEHA, and retaliation under FEHA. Cook argued that Ramirez’s conduct, including disparaging comments, discriminatory assumptions, and opposition to hiring African Americans, demonstrated racial animus that contributed to his exclusion from the tenure-track position and created a hostile work environment. He also argued that Ramirez retaliated against him for filing internal complaints. Defendants contended that Cook could not establish a prima facie case of race or age discrimination because the successful candidates were also African American, and there was no evidence of age-based animus. They asserted that Cook was not selected for interview based on his academic qualifications, specifically his lack of a doctorate and peer-reviewed publications. They further argued that any harassment was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. Racial Discrimination In racial discrimination cases under Title VII and FEHA, courts employ the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework under which the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination then the defendant may show that the action was taken for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and then the plaintiff may rebut the defendant’s evidence by showing the reasons offered by the defendant are a pretext for discrimination. This prima facie case is typically satisfied, and the inference of unlawful discrimination is established when a plaintiff shows: (1)
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he belongs to a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was subject to an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals outside his protected class were treated more favorably. The district court acknowledged that Cook could not meet this standard because all applicants were African American. However, it applied Ninth Circuit precedent allowing a plaintiff to establish an inference of discrimination without rigidly satisfying all four elements. The district court found that Cook presented enough evidence, particularly Ramirez’s alleged racially hostile remarks and her singular decision to exclude him from the top candidate list, to allow a jury to reasonably infer racial animus played a role. The district court therefor denied summary judgment on Cook’s race discrimination claim. Racial Harassment Similarly, the district court found triable issues of fact regarding Cook’s racial harassment claim. To prevail on a hostile workplace claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct of a racial nature; (2) that the conduct was unwelcome; and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the plaintiff ’s employment and create an abusive work environment. Although Ramirez’s conduct was arguably less severe than in some other cases, the district court noted that repeated negative statements about African Americans, differential treatment in faculty meetings, and racially derogatory remarks could be sufficient for a jury to find an abusive work environment. Age Discrimination and Harassment The district court granted summary judgment on Cook’s age discrimination claims. It found that the only agerelated comment, a 2018 remark by Ramirez referring to Cook as “that old Black man”, was isolated, stale, and insufficiently severe to support a harassment claim. Further, Cook provided no evidence that younger candidates were treated more favorably in the hiring process. Retaliation The district court denied summary judgment on Cook’s FEHA retaliation claim. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under FEHA, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he was engaging in a protected activity, (2) the employer subjected him to an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal link between the protected activity and the employer’s action. Here, the district court held that factual disputes existed over whether Ramirez knew about Cook’s prior complaints and whether she acted with retaliatory intent in excluding him from her top candidate list. Ramirez’s statement during the Pan-African Studies hiring investigation that she was being “attacked again” could reasonably be interpreted by a jury as evidence of retaliatory animus. The district court granted in part and denied in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Cook’s race discrimination, race harassment, retaliation, and related failure-to-prevent claims will proceed to trial. However, it dismissed his age discrimination, age harassment, and negligent supervision claims. Cook v. Board of Trustees of California State University (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2025) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70176. Note: While the successful candidates in this case were also African American, the case is a reminder that discriminatory intent can still be inferred from biased statements or conduct.
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June 2025
TIME TO UPDATE YOUR EEO PLANS (CCDs) As we look ahead to the 2026 Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Plan cycle, now is the time for Community College Districts to begin reviewing and updating their existing EEO Plans. The California Community Colleges Chancellor’s Office requires districts to submit updated plans every three years, and summer 2025 provides an ideal window to begin this work. Districts should ensure their plans align with the latest regulatory requirements, reflect current hiring practices, and incorporate updated workforce data and analysis. Early preparation will support smoother approvals and demonstrate your district’s ongoing commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion in employment practices. Need assistance with your EEO Plan update? LCW is here to help you navigate the legal requirements and develop a plan that meets both state expectations and your institution’s goals!
Legal Updates Weekly Executive Order Roundups. Since taking office, President Trump has issued a series of executive orders, several of which have direct implications for public agencies, including institutions of public education. In light of the volume and rapid issuance of executive orders, beginning in early February, LCW launched a weekly roundup of new executive orders that may impact public agency clients, including those in public education. Our Week 16 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple EOs, including the following, which are likely to be of particular interest to educational institutions: • Executive Action: Department of Justice Announces Civil Rights Fraud Initiative (May 19, 2025). On May 19, 2025, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche issued a memorandum announcing the establishment of the Civil Rights Fraud Initiative within the Department of Justice. The Initiative will utilize the federal False Claims Act to investigate and, as appropriate, pursue claims against any recipient of federal funds that knowingly violates federal civil rights laws. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 3729 et. seq., generally makes it unlawful to knowingly submit a false or fraudulent claim for payment to the federal government or use a false statement to get a claim paid. The Trump administration’s position is that the False Claims Act is implicated “whenever federal-funding recipients or contractors certify compliance with civil rights laws while knowingly engaging in racist preferences, mandates, policies, programs, and activities, including through diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) programs that assign benefits or burdens on race, ethnicity, or national origin.” By way of example, the memo states that “a university that accepts federal funds could violate the False Claims Act when it encourages antisemitism, refuses to protect Jewish students, allows men to intrude into women’s bathrooms, or requires women to compete against men in athletic competitions.” • www.lcwlegal.com •
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Notably, the memo emphasizes that the False Claims Act includes a private right of action and encourages private individuals to both file lawsuits and to report discriminatory practices by federal funding recipients to the appropriate federal authorities. The Initiative may lead to an increase in enforcement actions against recipients of federal funding that operate allegedly unlawful DEI-related programs. • Update: Judge Blocks Trump Administration from Closing the Department of Education (May 22, 2025). On Thursday, a federal judge in Massachusetts issued a preliminary injunction blocking President Trump and Secretary of Education Linda McMahon from carrying out the March 20, 2025 executive order calling for the secretary to close the Department of Education. The injunction states that the administration cannot shut down the Department without Congress’s approval. The judge also directed the administration to reinstate the roughly 1,300 Department of Education employees who were told in March that they would lose their jobs as part of a reduction-in-force (RIF). The judge noted that the administration did not show that the RIF accomplished their stated goal of making the Department more efficient. To the contrary, the evidence in the record showed that the RIF impeded the Department’s ability to carry out its statutory functions. The Trump administration plans to appeal the injunction. Our Week 17 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple education-related updates, including the following: • Executive Action: Department of Justice Launches Title IX Investigation Based On California’s Transgender Student Athlete Policies (May 28, 2025). On May 28, 2025, the Department of Justice (DOJ) launched an investigation to determine whether California’s laws and practices regarding transgender student participation in athletics violate Title IX. The investigation will focus on the effects of California’s Assembly Bill 1266 , a 2013 law that requires K-12 school districts to allow students to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, including sports, and use facilities that are consistent with their gender identity. According to the DOJ, the investigation was directly prompted by a transgender Jurupa Unified School District student’s qualification for three women’s track and field events at the upcoming state championships. Our Week 18 Executive Order Roundup describes multiple education-related updates, including the following: • Trump Considering Large-Scale Funding Cuts to California. According to a June 6, 2025 CNN report, President Trump is preparing large-scale federal funding cuts to California, including the cancellation of grant funding for the University of California and California State University systems based on their handling of campus antiSemitism. CNN’s sources stated that federal agencies have been directed to identify grants that the administration can withhold from California. The White House has not confirmed the report. • Executive Order: Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and other National Security and Public Safety Threats (June 4, 2025). On June 4, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order that reinstates and expands upon travel restrictions for certain foreign nationals implemented during President Trump’s first term. The Order emphasizes national security concerns and certain countries’ exploitation of the U.S. visa system. The Order suspends entry into the U.S. for nationals of specific countries including: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. The Order partially suspends entry for nationals of Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela. This Order may impact California employers to the extent they employ nationals of the listed countries who are seeking work authorization renewals, or who plan to travel to and from the listed countries.
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June 2025
• Executive Order: Enhancing National Security by Addressing Risks at Harvard University (June 4, 2025) . On June 4, 2025, President Trump issued an Executive Order imposing a six-month moratorium on student visas and exchange programs that allow international students to study at Harvard University. The Order also directs the Secretary of State to determine whether foreign nationals who currently attend Harvard University pursuant to F, M or J visas should have their visas revoked.
CalPERS Issues Circular Letter Reminding Public Agencies To Comply With Retired Annuitant Restrictions And Requirements Or Face Steep Penalties. On June 4, 2025, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) issued Circular Letter No. 200021-25 (Circular Letter) reminding Public Agencies to ensure compliance with the Public Employees’ Retirement Law (PERL) and the Public Employees’ Pension Reform Act of 2013 (PEPRA) when employing retired annuitants or face steep penalties. The Circular Letter mostly conforms to existing requirements, but many of those requirements are misunderstood and technical. The Circular Letter follows increased auditing and scrutiny of retired annuitant appointments. You can read more in LCW’s Special Bulletin.
U.S. Department Of Energy Rulemakings Narrow Nondiscrimination Requirements For Federally Funded Programs. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued several direct final rules that will take effect July 15, 2025, unless significant adverse comments are received by June 16, 2025. These regulations mirror recent policy shifts at the Department of Education and may affect colleges and universities that receive DOE funding, such as for research, facilities, or STEM programming. • Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Sports Programs (10 CFR Section 1042.450): DOE rescinded a requirement that students of the opposite sex be allowed to try out for single-sex sports teams when no comparable team is available. The change aligns with Executive Order 14201, “Keeping Men Out of Women’s Sports.” • Rescinding Regulations Related to Nondiscrimination (10 CFR Part 1040): DOE eliminated several Title VI and Section 504 regulations that it determined were outdated, duplicative, or lacked statutory support. The rescinded regulations include those requiring information in multiple languages, applying employment nondiscrimination beyond programs where employment is a funding objective, and prohibiting facially neutral practices that result in disparate impact. • Rescinding New Construction Requirements Related to Nondiscrimination (10 CFR Section 1040.73): DOE rescinded the mandate that newly constructed or altered facilities funded by DOE be designed to meet specific accessibility standards. DOE concluded that general nondiscrimination rules already prohibit intentional exclusion and that prescriptive design requirements are no longer necessary.
U.S. Department Of Health And Human Services And U.S. Department Of Education Find Columbia University Violated Title VI After The October 7, 2023 Attack On Israel. On May 22, 2025, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Office for Civil Rights (OCR) and the U.S. Department of Education OCR announced that Columbia University violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. OCR found that the University acted with deliberate indifference toward student-on-student antisemitic
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harassment from October 7, 2023, to the present. The findings are based on witness interviews, internal university documents, contemporaneous media reports, and Columbia’s own Task Force on Antisemitism. The two agencies found that Columbia failed to: (1) establish effective reporting and remediation mechanisms for antisemitism until the summer of 2024; (2) follow its own procedures when addressing Jewish students’ complaints; (3) enforce its student misconduct policies in response to antisemitic conduct; (4) investigate or address classroom vandalism involving swastikas and other hate symbols; and (5) enforce protest restrictions on campus since October 7, 2023.
U.S. Department Of Education Notifies Accreditor That It Found That Columbia University Violated Antidiscrimination Laws. On June 4, 2025, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) announced that it had notified the Middle States Commission on Higher Education that Columbia University is in violation of federal antidiscrimination laws and no longer meets accreditation standards. OCR’s announcement follows the May 22, 2025, finding by the Department of Healht and Human Services OCR and the Department of Education OCR that Columbia violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by acting with deliberate indifference to antisemitic harassment. Under federal regulations, the accreditor must now ensure Columbia takes corrective action or face potential consequences.
Firm Victory Partner Alysha Stein-Manes And Associate Madison Tanner Convince ALJ To Uphold Reduction In Force Of Classified Management Position. A Community College District successfully defended its decision to layoff a classified management position at one of its colleges. The classified manager requested a hearing on the District’s decision before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH). LCW appeared before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) at OAH and argued that the District had good cause to lay off the position as the Education Code lists a bona fide reduction in services as sufficient cause to eliminate a position. At the hearing, LCW explained through the presentation of witness testimony that due to one of the college’s physical expansion and corresponding increase in custodial staff, the college needed to reorganize its Facilities Department. As part of the reorganization, the college intended to replace the Assistant Custodial Manager position with a higher level Custodial Manager position. There was not enough work to justify maintaining both the Assistant Custodial Manager position and the Custodial Manager position. Because the Custodial Manager position contained additional responsibilities not within the scope of the Assistant Custodial Manager’s job duties, the District could not legally place the employee in the new Custodial Manager position without first going through a recruitment process, as required by Title 5. LCW and the District explained that the layoff was solely based on the on the business needs of the District. The ALJ found that the District’s decision to eliminate the Assistant Custodial Manager position was based solely on the welfare of the District, the college, and its students due to a bona fide reduction in services. The ALJ issued a proposed decision in favor of the District, which the Board of Trustees subsequently adopted.
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June 2025
Business and Facilities Supreme Court Issues Decision On Limiting Limitation Of Liability Clauses. The California Supreme Court recently issued a decision in New England Country Foods, LLC v. Vanlaw Food Products, Inc. (Case No. S282968) that clarifies how businesses should draft limitation of liability clauses. New England Country Foods (NECF), a Vermont-based supplier of specialty food products, had long provided its “TJ’s Bold & Smoky Kansas City Style Barbecue Sauce” to the grocery store Trader Joe’s. In 2015, NECF contracted with Vanlaw Food Products, Inc. to manufacture the sauce. Their agreement included a limitation of liability provision that included a cap on each party’s liability. The agreement also included a critical provision prohibiting Vanlaw from reverse-engineering the recipe. Despite this restriction, NECF alleged that Vanlaw reverse-engineered the sauce and began selling a similar product directly to Trader Joe’s, effectively cutting NECF out of the supply chain. NECF brought claims including tortious interference against Vanlaw in federal court. The district court dismissed the action, citing the limitation of liability clause in the manufacturing agreement between NECF and Vanlaw. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit asked the California Supreme Court to determine whether such a clause could limit damages for intentional wrongs under California law. The Court considered whether a contractual provision that substantially limits damages for an intentional wrong, but does not entirely exempt liability, is enforceable under California Civil Code section 1668, which prohibits contracts from exempting a party from responsibility for their own fraud or willful injury to the person or property of another. The California Supreme Court ruled that under Civil Code section 1668, any contract provision that limits liability for “willful injury to the person or property of another” is invalid. The Court emphasized that public policy prohibits shielding parties from the consequences of their intentional misconduct, even if a limitation clause technically leaves some minimal damages available. The Court therefore deemed that Vanlaw’s attempt to use a limitation of liability clause to avoid responsibility for alleged intentional wrongdoing was unenforceable. The Court’s decision strengthens the principle that businesses must remain accountable for intentional wrongful acts, regardless of contractual attempts to limit exposure. Note: This ruling is a reminder that limitation of liability clauses should be crafted carefully to ensure that they do not attempt to restrict liability for intentional wrongdoings.
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Court Of Appeal Clarifies When Work Truly “Ceases” For Public Works Bond Claims. In Tarlton & Sons, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Company, a California Court of Appeal found that, absent formal notice of cessation or clear termination, the statute of limitations on a bond claim may be indeterminate. Oxnard Union High School District (District) hired Fast Track Construction Corporation (Fast Track) to perform heating and air conditioning work. Fast Track obtained a public works payment bond from Great American Insurance Company (GAIC) and subcontracted with Tarlton & Sons, Inc (Tarlton) to handle the framing and drywall work. Tarlton began working on the project in April 2021. A dispute arose between Fast Track and the District in August 2021. During the dispute, the District hired Viola, Inc. to “perform general contractor duties” on the project. Tarlton entered a subcontract with Viola and continued its work on the project. Tarlton alleged it never received formal notice that the District terminated Fast Track’s contract. In April 2022, Tarlton submitted a $688,353.66 claim to GAIC against the $19,100,000.00 public works payment bond in connection with its work under the Fast Track subcontract. After failed negotiations, Tarlton sued GAIC, the District, Fast Track, and others for payment. GAIC alleged the bond claim was barred by the statute of limitations because Tarlton’s cessation of labor began when it stopped working for Fast Track in November 2021. The trial court agreed, concluding that Tarlton’s statutory period to commence an action to enforce a bond claim begins when the claimant ceases to provide work, but must be filed not later than six months after the period in which the claimant may give a stop payment notice. The trial court found that Tarlton’s stop payment notice period expired and affirmed its claim was time barred. Tarlton appealed. In a public works project, if the owner records a notice of completion or cessation, claimants may serve the general contractor a stop payment notice within 30 days of the record date. If notice is not recorded, claimants may serve a stop payment notice within 90 days of the earlier date of completion of the work or cessation of labor. The six-month statute of limitations on bond claims begins when the applicable stop payment notice period ends. Thus, even if no stop payment notice is provided, the statute of limitations to file a bond claim begins either 30 days after the recording date of a notice of completion or cessation, or if no such notice was recorded, 90 days after completion of the work or cessation of labor. The Court of Appeal considered whether a cessation of labor occurred on the District’s project and found that the date of cessation of labor was the date all work under the bonded contract concluded, not just the date that Tarlton stopped doing work under the Fast Track subcontract. The Court emphasized that in the absence of a formal notice of cessation or clear project termination, the statutory clock to file a claim on a bonded contract may not begin. The Court’s holding demonstrates how the statutory period may be an issue of fact in disputes over public works projects lacking formal notice of cessation or completion. Further, Tarlton highlights how a cessation of labor is not solely based on a claimant’s individual work. Rather, it must be determined by the date all work under the bonded contract was completed or subject to continuous cessation. Tarlton & Sons, Inc. v. Great American Insurance Company (Case No. B336550). Note: This decision serves as a reminder that ambiguity in project status and contractor transitions may open the door to extended liability periods and disputes. Districts involved in public works projects should review procedures to ensure clarity and timely communication.
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June 2025
benefits corner Retaliation Claim For Termination of Health Benefits During FMLA Leave Fails Due To Employee Not Paying Health Premiums. Carol Kliskey was a Program Assistant at a non-profit corporation called Making Opportunity Count (MOC) in Massachusetts. On March 15, 2022, Kliskey flew to Oklahoma to care for her daughter who had attempted suicide. A few weeks later, Kliskey requested Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). MOC approved her request to take 12 weeks of FMLA leave effective April 2, 2022. Kliskey initially elected to use accrued sick leave to cover her FMLA leave. Kliskey also communicated that she was interested in requesting benefits under Massachusetts Paid Family Leave program (Massachusetts PFL). Kliskey never ultimately completed her application for Massachusetts PFL. On June 17, 2022, Kliskey informed MOC that she would be unable to return to work at the conclusion of her FMLA leave. According to Kliskey, her supervisor told her that she would not be allowed to take any more time off and denied her request to use sick leave to extend her leave after she exhausted FMLA leave. Kliskey alleges her supervisor gave her an ultimatum to either return to work on July 1, 2022 or be terminated without the opportunity for rehire. A few days later, Kliskey checked her bank account and realized she had not been paid during all of her FMLA leave. MOC had provided her with paid sick leave for some, but not all of her FMLA leave. Kliskey also claimed MOC terminated her health benefits June 27, 2022, during her FMLA leave. While it was undisputed that Kliskey failed to pay any health insurance premiums during her FMLA leave, MOC contended it did not cancel her health insurance during her FMLA leave. On June 30, 2022, Kliskey submitted a resignation letter. Thereafter, Kliskey filed a lawsuit alleging MOC had retaliated against her for exercising her FMLA rights. Amongst her many claims, she alleged that MOC terminated her health benefits during her FMLA leave. MOC denied cancelling her health benefits during her leave. The U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts determined Kliskey’s claim failed as a matter of law because Kliskey failed to pay her health plan premiums, which was an obligation she bore during her FMLA leave. Under the FMLA, employees are required to continue paying for their share of health insurance premiums while on leave. Kliskey did not dispute that she did not pay her share of her health insurance premiums. The district court found that even if Kliskey’s health benefits were terminated during leave, it would not rise to the level of an adverse employment action for a retaliation claim if she failed to make the required premium payments. Kliskey also contended that she was denied paid sick leave during her FMLA leave because MOC did not apply her sick leave. The district court found that MOC had provided Kliskey with at least 40 hours of paid sick leave during her FMLA leave, which met the requirements of Massachusetts paid sick leave law. Even though • www.lcwlegal.com •
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MOC did not provide Kliskey with more paid sick leave to cover the rest of her FMLA leave, the district court found that since Kliskey had indicated she wanted to apply for the Massachusetts PFL benefit on April 29, 2022, MOC was prohibited from compelling Kliskey to use more sick leave under Massachusetts state law. Although Kliskey did not ultimately complete her Massachusetts PFL application, the state law’s prohibition on requiring her to use sick leave was triggered when she initially requested Massachusetts PFL benefits since it signaled her intent to pursue that avenue of compensation during her otherwise unpaid FMLA leave. The district court determined MOC was entitled to rely on Kliskey’s expressed intent to seek Massachusetts PFL instead of providing her with more sick leave pay. Kliskey v. Making Opportunity Count, Inc. (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 2025, No. 22-cv-40123-MRG) 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60328; 2025 WL 959257.
BENEFITS COMPLIANCE QUESTION Question: If our public agency does not provide Social Security coverage to some or all of our employees, does our agency have to give new hires Form SSA-1945 even after the Social Security Fairness Act (SSFA) repealed the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) and the Government Pension Offset (GPO)? Answer: Yes, public agency employers must continue providing Form SSA-1945 to new employees when the agency does not provide Social Security coverage for those employees. Form SSA-1945’s main purpose is to inform new hires that their employment is not covered by Social Security. Even though the SSFA repealed the WEP and GPO so that public agency employees who qualify for both Social Security and a government pension will no longer have their Social Security benefits reduced, the SSFA did not repeal the law that requires an employer to provide Form SSA1945 (42 USCS section 1320b-13(d)). In March 2025, the Social Security Administration updated Form SSA-1945 to acknowledge that the WEP and GPO no longer reduce Social Security benefits. The updated form is located here: https://www.ssa.gov/forms/ssa-1945.pdf.
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LCW’s Layoff Bootcamp: Public Education Staffing Reductions September 9, 2025 9:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. Visit the above links for more information. 22
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June 2025
Consortium Call Of The Month Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s consortiums are able to speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge to answer direct questions not requiring in-depth research, document review, written opinions or ongoing legal matters. Consortium calls run the full gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, student concerns to disability accommodations, construction and facilities issues and more. Each month, we will feature a Consortium Call of the Month in our newsletter, describing an interesting call and how the issue was resolved. All identifiable details will be changed or omitted.
Question: A Community College District client reached out to LCW with questions about the timeline for classified layoffs. The client asked what the effective layoff date would be if they were to lay off a classified employee after going through all of the necessary steps identified in AB 438. If the employee receives a notification of layoff following the March board meeting and by March 15th, will their effective date of layoff be the end of March or at the end of the academic or fiscal year?
Answer: The LCW attorney explained that under the changes to classified layoffs, the date of layoff would generally be July 1st, and the last day of work would be June 30th. The attorney noted that this was explained in Education Code section 88017. The attorney also outlined the steps of a classified layoff: preparation; resolution; letters/notices on or before March 15th; possible hearings in April; final adoption by the board in May; and final notices by May 15th. The attorney also noted that there were differing date requirements for expirations of specially funded programs which required at least 60 days notice.
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Liebert Cassidy Whitmore