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A police officer was injured on the job. He returned to temporary light-duty work with a lifting restriction of no more than 20 pounds. Although the city’s policy limited light-duty assignments to 90 days, with a one-time 90-day extension, the officer remained in a modified assignment for about five months.
The city determined that continued light duty was no longer feasible due to operational needs and informed the officer of his leave rights. The city also initiated and conducted several interactive process meetings and identified several vacant non-sworn positions as potential accommodations. The officer declined those non-sworn positions due to concerns about his retirement benefits. The officer sued for disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and related claims.
Partner Jennifer Rosner and Associate Attorney Jessica Neighbors moved for summary adjudication. They showed that the officer could not establish any triable issues as to whether he could perform his essential police officer functions with or without reasonable accommodation. They also established that the city fully satisfied its obligations regarding the interactive process. The city provided multiple reasonable accommodation options, including a modified desk assignment for five months, paid and unpaid leave, and consideration of alternative vacant positions. The Superior Court found that the officer was not entitled to permanent light duty and ruled in the city’s favor, leaving only two claims to be resolved.
A police officer sued his city employer. He alleged various vague and undefined adverse actions, including issues related to a medical leave and the handling of a retired K9 partner, along with other alleged workplace grievances.
LCW Partner Jesse Maddox and Associate Attorneys
Emanuela Tala and Selena Farnesi convinced the Superior Court to dismiss the case at the pleading stage. They filed a series of successful demurrers on behalf of the city. The court ultimately sustained the city’s demurrer to the officer’s Third Amended Complaint without leave to amend, which terminated the case.
The court concluded that the officer did not allege sufficient facts to support any claim. As to the whistleblower retaliation claim under Labor Code section 1102.5, the court found no factual allegations pinpointing any protected activity or disclosure of wrongdoing. The court determined that the Fair Employment and Housing Act retaliation claim was deficient because the protected activity was either not adequately pleaded or too attenuated in time to support a causal connection.
The court also sustained the city’s demurrer to: 1) the discrimination claim because the officer failed to allege facts showing differential treatment or discriminatory motive; and 2) the harassment claim because the officer did not identify a protected classification or allege conduct sufficient to constitute harassment. The court determined that further amendment would be futile and denied leave to amend.


Jessica Le is joining Liebert Cassidy Whitmore as an Associate Attorney. Prior to joining LCW, she worked as a law clerk with the Los Angeles Superior Court, where she assisted with a range of motions and conducted in-depth research on employment matters, contract drafting, and redlining.
Partner Mark Meyerhoff, Senior Counsel David Urban, And Associate Morgan Johnson
Two sight-impaired students sued a California community college district under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in the U.S. District Court. They alleged they were denied equal access to educational resources and accommodations. The jury ruled in the students’ favor and ordered that they be paid money for the harm done to them. After trial, the district court issued limited injunctive relief and significantly reduced the damages based on its opinion that: 1) emotional
distress damages were unavailable in ADA Title II cases; 2) the students had only minimal out-of-pocket losses.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed that emotional distress damages could not be recovered under Title II of the ADA, and confirmed this in a published decision. Nevertheless, it ultimately held that the District Court erred by failing to consider other permissible forms of damages, including compensation for lost educational opportunities. The Ninth Circuit found that the jury’s award was supported by the evidence and consistent with the jury instructions, and held that the District Court should not have reduced the damages.
As to the injunction, however, the Ninth Circuit accepted the district’ arguments and acknowledged the evidence submitted after trial that the district had improved its technology and processes since the time period at issue. In an unpublished opinion, it affirmed the existing injunctive relief and did not order that the injunction be expanded.
County employees on the Teamsters bargaining team received release time to bargain for successor agreements. Once the negotiations were completed, the Teamsters asked that the release time hours be counted toward overtime due to Government Code section 3505.3(a). That law states that employers must release a reasonable number of employee representatives for collective bargaining “without loss of compensation or other benefits [emphasis added].” The County responded that it would follow the parties’ Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), which stated that release time did not count as actual hours worked when establishing eligibility for any type of overtime compensation.
After the Teamsters filed its unfair practice charge, the PERB’s Office of General Counsel issued a complaint. The County answered on the merits and also argued that the Teamsters waived its claims by agreeing to the MOA language that release time did not count toward eligibility for overtime. The parties submitted the case on joint stipulated facts and evidence. PERB addressed two issues: 1) the meaning of the phrase “without loss of
compensation or other benefits” in Government Code section 3505.3; and 2) the County’s waiver defense.
First, PERB decided that the phrase in Section 3505.3 —“without loss of compensation or other benefits”— means that the release time and associated benefits must be at least equal to what the employees would have earned had they not been released for bargaining. PERB found that not counting release time hours toward overtime caused a decrease in compensation for employees who would have met the applicable overtime standard.
Second, PERB reviewed the County’s waiver defense. The County asserted that the MOA language waived any right to have release time credited toward eligibility for overtime. PERB found that such a waiver would be illegal and unenforceable. PERB described Section 3505.3 as a non-waivable minimum statutory guarantee that is not negotiable.
PERB ordered the County to count release time toward overtime in the future and to make whole those employees who would have received overtime but for the fact that the County did not count their release time hours.
County of San Diego (2026) PERB Dec. No. 3006-M.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California (ACLU) requested the City of Fresno provide public records relating to the use of police canines, including: “all records relating to the report, investigation, or findings of a K-9 incident involving use of force resulting in death or great bodily injury…”. The ACLU’s request was based on Penal Code 832.7(b), which uses the term “great bodily injury” and which expanded the scope of disclosable peace officer records in public records requests.
The City provided over 900 pages of records, but did not disclose use-of-force records that did not result in “great bodily injury,” which the City narrowly defined as “serious bodily injury.” The City contended that “great bodily injury” should have the same meaning as “serious bodily injury” in Government Code section 12525.2(d)(4): “a bodily injury that involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, protracted and obvious disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member or organ.”
The ACLU filed a petition for writ in the superior court and won. The court found that the City had a duty to
provide every record regarding a canine deployment that resulted in “great bodily injury” as broadly defined in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1). The court noted that: 1) Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(A)(ii) expanded the scope of disclosable public records to include those involving peace officers’ use of force that causes “great bodily injury”; and 2) the phrase “great bodily injury” should be defined as broadly stated in Penal Code section 12022.7(f)(1) as a “a significant or substantial physical injury.” The City appealed.
The California Court of Appeal found that “serious bodily injury” and “great bodily injury” were already long-standing and well-defined terms of art at the time the Legislature expanded the scope of disclosable public records in Penal Code section 832.7. The Legislature chose the term “great bodily injury.” It could have, but did not, choose the term “serious bodily injury.” Because the Legislature chose a term with a familiar and wellestablished legal meaning, in place of a different term with its own familiar and well-established meaning, the Court concluded that the Legislature’s choice of term most accurately reflected its intent. The Court found in favor of the ACLU.
City of Fresno v. Superior Court (ACLU), No. F089987 (Cal. Ct. App. March 23, 2026).

Randy Monroe was a parole agent for the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). He received notice that he was under investigation for on-duty misconduct and that he would be interviewed. He applied for a CalPERS service retirement pending disability retirement. CalPERS retired Monroe for service effective March 1, 2022.
On March 23, 2022, Monroe received a Notice of Adverse Action from CDCR that he would be terminated effective April 1, 2022. Monroe attended his Skelly meeting on March 23, 2022. The Skelly officer upheld Monroe’s termination. On April 8, 2022, CDCR learned that Monroe had retired from service on March 1, 2022. The regional parole administrator determined that Monroe’s retirement was “under unfavorable circumstances.” CDCR withdrew Monroe’s Notice of Adverse Action.
On May 13, 2022, CalPERS sent Monroe a notice that he was ineligible for disability retirement because his employment ended for reasons not related to a disabling medical condition. Monroe appealed, but the administrative law judge upheld CalPERS’s determination. Monroe then filed a petition for a writ of mandate, but the trial court also agreed with CalPERS that Monroe was barred from applying for disability retirement.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that disability retirement requires the possibility of reinstatement if and when the employee is no longer disabled. By voluntarily retiring from service while under investigation, Monroe effected a “complete severance” of his employment relationship and eliminated any possibility of reinstatement. It was immaterial whether Monroe's service retired or was terminated for cause. He departed under unfavorable circumstances, with no right to return to his employment. The Court affirmed the judgment for CalPERS.
Monroe v. California Public Employees’ Retirement System, No. B345865 (Cal Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2026).
Whether you are looking to impress your colleagues or just want to learn more about the law, LCW has your back! Use and share these fun legal facts about various topics in labor and employment law.
• Unions for California Highway Patrol officers and Cal Fire firefighters are asking the state for a new retirement option that would complement their CalPERS pensions. These unions are supporting legislation (AB 1054: Public employees’ retirement: deferred retirement option program) that would create a supplementary savings program to allow state law enforcement officers and firefighters to leave public service with a payout.
Members of Liebert Cassidy Whitmore’s employment relations consortiums may speak directly to an LCW attorney free of charge regarding questions that are not related to ongoing legal matters that LCW is handling for the agency, or that do not require in-depth research, document review, or written opinions. Consortium call questions run the gamut of topics, from leaves of absence to employment applications, disciplinary concerns and more. This feature describes an interesting consortium call and how the question was answered. We will protect the confidentiality of client communications with LCW attorneys by changing or omitting details.
Can our agency seek criminal conviction history for a peace officer before making a conditional offer?
Yes. Government Code section 12952(a) prohibits inquiring or considering conviction history before making a conditional offer. However, section 12952(d)(2) states that this law does not apply if the employer is hiring for a position with a criminal justice agency. Penal Code section 13101 defines a criminal justice agency as “those agencies at all levels of government which perform as their principal functions, activities which …(a) Relate to the apprehension, prosecution, adjudication, incarceration, or correction of criminal offenders….” A local police or sheriff’s department would qualify as a criminal justice agency.
LCW is pleased to welcome Andrew Dorado as Senior Counsel. Andrew’s addition expands the firm’s ability to advise clients on complex benefits, tax, and retirement plan issues across all sectors we serve.
Andrew counsels employers on a wide range of retirement plans, including defined contribution and defined benefit plans, deferred compensation arrangements, and 403(b) and 457 plans, as well as ERISA and fiduciary compliance. He also advises on IRS and Department of Labor reporting obligations, correction of operational errors, and payroll-related issues that may impact plan compliance or tax status.

His practice is particularly valuable in helping organizations navigate compliance challenges such as late or incorrect contributions, plan administration errors, and reporting requirements, as well as in guiding clients through correction programs, audits, and plan changes.
With Andrew’s arrival, LCW further strengthens its ability to provide comprehensive, practical guidance on employee benefits and payroll compliance issues that increasingly intersect with day-to-day operations.
We are excited to have Andrew join the firm and look forward to the value he will bring to our clients.


