missile defence systems became a destabilizing factor in the Soviet-American arms race, initiating the development of strategic offensive weapons. Soviet military experts gradually started to realize the close relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. For example, Provorov (1972: 92) emphasized: ‘The share of aerospace defence in the overall balance of military efforts … is becoming increasingly significant.’ That was the logic that underlied the ABM Treaty, one of the key outcomes of the first round of SALT. Representing a widespread opinion, Shoumikhin (2011: 104) stressed that SALT was a turning point which clearly signalled that MAD became the ‘dominant’ strategic paradigm, yet only on an unofficial level, in US-Soviet relations. However, there likely remained doubts in the US about whether the Soviets fully and sincerely accepted the logic of MAD. Effective missile defences could obviously undermine MAD. In 1985 the Reagan administration expressed concern that the USSR was preparing a nationwide defence against missiles. Moscow made a similar charge against the US (Gwertzman 1985).
4.3 The Circle Closes: The Role of the USSR in Nuclear Arms Control During the 1950s to early 1980s, the Soviet Union continued to take systematic steps to curb the arms race and facilitate arms control discussions and disarmament understandings. It means that even at the height of the nuclear revolution in Soviet military affairs, as discussed above, the USSR did not abandon the idea of nuclear – as well as general and complete – disarmament. Anureev (1963: 6) clearly articulated the USSR’s unchanged position in one of his articles published in Voennaya Mysl’: ‘The Soviet Union firmly and resolutely advocated and continues to advocate for the complete ban of nuclear weapons, the cessation of production and the destruction of their stockpiles, and complete and general disarmament.’ The USSR stayed true to these objectives from the very beginning because, according to Zemskov (1969b: 57), it continued to promote the policy of ‘preventing a world war, including a nuclear one’. However, the Soviets’ motivation in pursuing this course was based primarily on self-interest rather than on moral commitment. There were strategic and budgetary issues. First, the Soviets feared losing their competitive position as they recorded the beginning of a whole new round in the never-ending spiral of their arms race with the US. In particular, they 98