a science in the precise meaning of the word, then it would never occur to it to change the world. We need not pause for long at the kind of developmental laws as represented by Herbert Spencer with his law of integration and differentiation and by Emanuel Chalupný42 with his ‘law of isolation’, about which the author declares that it is ‘not so much a sociological, biological, or psychological law, but rather the universal law of natural philosophy’. We explain development using laws of this type much in the same way as we explain the motion of a locomotive if we say that its wheels turn. The developmental theories that are closest to natural science are Lamarckism and Darwinism, or respectively – in a newer form – neo-Lamarckism and neo-Darwinism. We can, therefore, expect that these will contribute the most to clarifying our question. The thing that is especially valued about them is their ‘naturalness, clarity, and simplicity’. If we go on to ask what exactly makes them natural, clear, and simple, we will find that this is the minimum of demands that they make on a person’s ingenuity. Sufficient for these theories is the common and superficial human experience that can be expressed in these words: adaptation to given circumstances, the struggle for existence, chance. In principle, the two theories are mutually exclusive; however, when necessary, they have complemented each other. For a certain time Darwin himself explained the emergence of some new characteristics in a Lamarckian way, when he entrusted their selection and survival to the ‘struggle for existence’; however, other than this, Darwinism attributes a decisive role in the emergence of new characteristics to mere ‘chance’ – that is, to factors that have nothing in common with the struggle for existence and with the survival of animal species. In contrast to this, in many cases Lamarckism is understood only as the current opinion known as so-called psycho-Lamarckism – that is, the idea that psychological 42 Czech sociologist (1879–1958).
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factors have an active role in the formation of new characteristics. Neither Lamarckism nor Darwinism formulates any developmental laws; both of them simply appeal to our sober experience. If you systematically and recurrently use a hammer or an axe, then you will develop your arms; however, some of your other organs or limbs will atrophy. If you devote yourself to intensive study, your mind will become more powerful, but your muscles will atrophy. In such a way – so Lamarckism teaches – entirely new organs, characteristics, and capabilities can arise; even entirely new ‘species’ can arise, while respectively others can become extinct through this process. However, the main thing in this is the question of whether and how all these new characteristics are transferred to offspring. Today, Darwinism denies that characteristics acquired through this Lamarckian process – that is, acquired through the body (soma) or the psyche of the individual to whose benefit they serve – can be inherited. It emphasizes that many new characteristics – and possibly even a majority of them – are not beneficial for an animal species, but rather detrimental; that precisely through the ‘struggle for existence’ these unfavourable characteristics are eliminated, and the surviving tried-andtested characteristics then support the deceptive Lamarckian idea that all new characteristics are ‘purposeful’, beneficial – that is, they arise either from the psychological effort of an animal, or through the adaptive reaction of its body (soma) to the environment. According to Darwinism, therefore, individual effort, or respectively adaptation, is worthless for development. However, if an individual cannot change his innate faculties through his own exertions, then it is more logical if he also views the fruits of his own exertions as the refinement of his innate faculties, and not as the acquisition of something new. In this way, the price of individual effort even for an individual himself is reduced to the mere refinement of innate faculties. The Darwinist Sir Arthur Keith professes: ‘I, for one, believe with Huxley that the government which rules within the body of the human embryo proceeds along its way altogether uninfluenced by oc99 Ukázka elektronické knihy, UID: KOS282536
currences or experiences which affect the body or brain of its parents. In short, man has come by his great gifts — his brain, his upright posture, his strange foot, and his nimble hand — not by any effort of his own, but, like a favoured child of the present day, has fallen heir to a fortune for which he has never laboured.’43 And of course, for which none of his ancestors has laboured either. So where, then, does this richness come from? Darwinism replies: wherever it comes from, the creature that makes use of it cannot seek in it anything other than pure chance. For instance, a giraffe has not acquired a long neck because it needed it for its subsistence and has through its own efforts contributed in some way to its lengthening; only a Lamarckian or the bicyclist G. B. Shaw (see the preface to Back to Methuselah) could assert such a simple-minded judgement. The truth is that its neck has grown longer by pure chance. So be it! But, if I were a giraffe, then I would believe in Providence. Similarly, when the ancient lakes and seas dried up, it was those aquatic creatures who at an appropriate moment by a happy accident had acquired lungs and legs who were also able to survive on dry land; or a horse has managed to survive up until the present day not because through its own exertions it has developed its ability to escape the claws of predators, but rather only because a number of purely accidental changes have perfected its capabilities for running. So, where do these changes come from? What is the source of the decision about what we are and what we look like? About the ways in which we resemble our ancestors and descendants, and the ways in which we differ from them? The science of heredity offers us some instruction on this question. ‘There is not even the smallest part in the anatomy of a fruit fly, not even one single feature of its activity, that cannot be demonstrated to be governed in some way by all-important genes.’ Each of us is assembled from these building blocks by someone about whom we must judge that he has less responsibil43 Sir Arthur Keith, Concerning Man‘s Origin (London: Watts, 1927), p. 31.
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