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1.1 The Goals of China’s Engagement in Africa China’s engagement in Africa serves several goals. Most scholars classify these goals in the following three categories: (1.) economic interest in resource endowment and access to markets for exports, (2.) political interest in cultivation of political alliances in order to enhance China’s position at the world stage, and (3.) diminishing the influence of Taiwan.288 Prof. Brautigam from the American University mentions the same objectives, but in a slightly different classification: search for resources, reputation of a responsible power (including the competition with Taiwan over recognition) and coping with the challenges of globalization (access to new markets and development of multinational corporations).289 There are also several theories that interpret the intensity of China’s engagement in Africa. According to prof. Adelaja from the Michigan State University, among the most extreme schools of thoughts is the one that argues that China’s behavior is altruistic, as it brings capital, expertise and investments to a continent that has been neglected for a long time; and the other one that argues that China’s behavior in Africa is neo-colonial as it seeks to secure resources to sustain its rapid economic development. Adelaja suggests that these theories actually capture the objectives of most countries: to secure necessary resources and offer help in exchange. He adds that such theories are too simplistic to explain the nature of China’s engagement in Africa.290 Chris Alden from the London School of Economics presents three main interpretations of China’s activities in Africa. The first one describes China as a development partner whose actions are driven by its economic needs as well as by its desire to transmit its development experience in orAugust 2013, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-08/29/c_132673093.htm, last access August 15, 2016. 288 This enumeration is provided e.g. by the following scholars/officials: David H. Shinn, “Africa: The United States and China Court the Continent,” 39–40, Johan Lagerkvist, “Chinese Eyes on Africa: Authoritarian Flexibility versus Democratic Governance,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, No. 2 (April 2009): 125; Statement of Thomas J. Christensen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, presented during the Hearing Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate – China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy, June 4, 2008, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg /CHRG-110shrg45811/html/CHRG-110shrg45811.htm, last access August 15, 2016. 289 Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift, The Real Story of China in Africa, 78. 290 Soji Adelaja, a speech at the panel “Africa’s Interest: What the U.S. and China mean for Africa’s Development” (presented at the conference “The Eagle & the Dragon in Africa: Stability and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, November 3–4, 2011).
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der to build a cooperative partnership across the developing world. The second one sees China as an economic competitor interested in a shorttime resource grab, which undermines African economic development by the export of cheap goods to the continent. The third one considers China a colonizer aimed at pushing Western countries away from Africa, noting that this process might result in some form of political control over African territories.291 However, this latter interpretation is being rejected by most of today’s scholars. As prof. Shinn from the George Washington University suggests, China is by no means neo-colonial, since its concept of foreign policy is not based on any sort of political control of territories overseas.292
1.1.1 China’s Economic Growth In the last decades, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been increasingly based on economic performance. As continued economic growth is necessary for social stability, it is also crucial for the survival of the CCP. China’s rapid growth293 enormously increases its demand for resources. From the 1990s, it became necessary for China to rely on overseas resources. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil. This trend accelerated in the new millennium. Between 2000 and 2005, China’s energy consumption rose by 60 percent, accounting for almost half of the growth in world energy consumption.294 In addition to the ever growing export-oriented production, another major driver of energy consumption has been the growth in car ownership which has followed China’s acceptance to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and resulting reduction of tariffs on car imports.295, 296 291 Chris Alden, China in Africa. African Arguments, 5–6. 292 David Shinn, a speech at the panel “U.S. and China in Africa: Advancing the Diplomatic Agenda” (presented at the conference “The Eagle & the Dragon in Africa: Stability and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, November 3–4, 2011). 293 During the last 20 years, China’s GDP growth regularly exceeded 10 percent. Only in the late 1990s and in the years following the world economic crisis after 2008, the growth decreased to up to slightly below 8 percent and to app. 9 percent, respectively. See: “GDP growth (annual %),” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, last access June 16, 2014. 294 Hong Zhao, “China’s Oil Venture in Africa,” East Asia 24 (2007): 400. 295 Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa, 38. 296 While in 2003, 15 people out of 1000 owned a car in China, in 2010 this number was 58. See: “Motor vehicles (per 1,000 people),” The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator /IS.VEH.NVEH.P3?, last access May 8, 2013.
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To avoid dependence on volatile international markets as well as possible disruption of energy supplies by the U.S., China has relied on acquiring equities in overseas oil fields. As a latecomer to the world energy market, China directed its attention primarily to Africa,297 especially to some of its risky places or “rogue states” where there was minimal competition from the West. Large African oil reserves with a prospect of new discoveries give China a chance to diversify its oil supplies and become less dependent on the unstable Middle East dominated largely by Western countries. China has also become interested in other minerals, such as zinc, copper, steel or, aluminum, whose import is necessary for sustaining China’s economic growth.298 Sarah Raine argues that even if China moves towards production of more high-tech products, it will still need to import metals such as cobalt, tantalum and niobium.299 As of 2011, 86 percent of China’s total imports from Africa were natural resources, whereas oil made up 64 percent and other minerals the remaining 22 percent.300 Finally, China also needs more land to feed its growing population, especially as agricultural land has been lost to industrialization and environmental changes. Chinese firms have already leased large portions of agricultural land in Africa, e.g. in Tanzania, Zambia or Zimbabwe.301 Besides resources, the Chinese are interested in Africa’s markets. Africa’s fast growing population constitutes a convenient target for cheap Chinese goods. Similarly, African governments are seen as a target for substantial arms sales. In addition, China plays a crucial role in infrastructure building in Africa. Given the size of the continent, its growing population and increasing resource exploitation, vast amounts of infrastructure are needed. 297 Besides Africa, China also seeks to acquire stakes in oil equities in Central Asia and Latin America. For details on China’s overseas joint ventures in the oil sector see: Julie Jiang and Jonathan Sinton, “Overseas Investment by Chinese National Oil Companies,” International Energy Agency, February 2011, 17–20, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kgglrwdrvvd .pdf?expires=1373790560&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2DAF1ABFBF22CA0624CBEE9 ABB3709E2, last access August 24, 2016. 298 The importance of other than oil resources is highlighted by: John C. K. Daly, “Feeding the Dragon: China’s Quest for African Minerals,” in Arthur Waldron, ed., China in Africa (The Jamestown Foundation, 2008), 77–85. 299 Sarah Raine, China’s African Challenges (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Routledge, 2009), 37. 300 Larry Hanauer, and Lyle J. Morris, “Chinese Engagement in Africa. Drivers, Reactions, and Implications for U.S. Policy,” RAND, 2014, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs /research_reports/RR500/RR521/RAND_RR521.pdf, last access August 15, 2016. 301 J. Peter Pham, “China’s African Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Interests,” 244.
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