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last month of the French campaign, another army-in-exile was to arise on French soil: immediately after the German invasion, the Belgian authorities mobilized all serviceable men (especially the younger ones) and sent them to areas in the rear where they were trained to become replacement units for the casualties suffered by the regular Belgian army. After the collapse of Belgium they were transported to southern France. The intention was to train them in order that they would form the core of a new, future army, which would work alongside French military forces.10 Armies-in-Exile in France, June 1940
army-in-exile Polish Czechoslovak Belgian
incomplete large units under formation
of the total number, airmen
divisions
brigades
divisions
brigades
85,000
7,000
2
1
2
2
11,500
950
–
–
1
–
100,000
?
–
–
1
–
total numbers (circa)
full-scale large units
Regarding the building of the armies-in-exile, it is interesting that the Poles negotiated the establishment of their first division in France even before the start of the war.11 In addition, at the last moment before the outbreak tary Archive – Military History Archive] (henceforth VÚA – VHA Prague), collection Náhradní těleso – Velká Británie [Depot Centre – Great Britain, henceforth NT – VB], f. 50, No. 164, Číselný přehled čs. zahraniční armády za roky 1939–1940 [Numerical Overview of the Czechoslovak army-in-exile during 1939–1940]. However, when assessing the mobilization efforts of Poles and Czechoslovaks and their contribution to the cause of the Allies, we have to consider that about one half of the men were recruited from compatriot communities in France (approximately 44,700 Poles and 7,600 Czechoslovaks). These men could therefore also have been mobilized by the French army. Thus, the real assets were “only” the refugees from the occupied countries (approximately 38,000 Poles and 3,500 Czechoslovaks). Nevertheless, these men included experienced officers and trained specialists, including highly regarded airmen. 10 The new recruits were incorporated into the so-called Centres de recrutement de l´armée belge (C.R.A.B.). A total of 100,000 men represented a significant potential but, due to lack of time, it was not possible to organize and train them as valuable field units. Indeed, if the French Army had managed to hold the front, the Belgian Army would have been of far greater value than its Polish and Czechoslovak counterparts. For details, see Service historique de la Défence à Vincennes (henceforth SHD), sign. 7 N 2731, effectifs des troupes belges en France (4 juin); 7 N 2744, documents concernant les troupes belges stationnés en France; 7 N 2476, dossier 3, constitution d‘une division belge (5 juin 1940), tableaux des effectifs des militaires belges stationnés en zone non occupée à la date 1er août 1940. 11 SHD, sign. 7 N 2476, dossier 1, accord entre le gouvernement français et le gouvernement polonais concernant la création d‘une division polonaise en France. The negotiations took place during the visit of high-ranking Polish military officers to France in May 1939. Witold Biegański, Wojsko Polskie we Francii 1939–1940 [Polish Army in France, 1939–1940] (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
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of hostilities, towards the end of August 1939, the Polish Navy made the very significant decision to send its three large destroyers to Britain.12 Both steps later proved to be the foundation for developing the further organization of the Polish armed forces in exile (Polskie Siły Zbrojne). It is however true that these remarkable and (seemingly predictive) prewar steps represented only unsystematic exceptions.13 Neither Poland nor any other country had a detailed plan of action in the event of its territory being completely occupied. The building up of the exile forces took place in an improvised manner in response to developing circumstances. After the defeat of France, new governments-in-exile were established in addition to the Polish and Czechoslovak governments, and thus a “family” of exile representations was established on British soil (besides the Poles and Czechoslovaks, the Dutch, Norwegian, Belgian and Luxembourg governments, as well as the Free-France-movement were already set up during the summer of 1940). All of them tried to create as strong an army as possible as one of the most visible aspects of their statehood.14 The political importance of the units-in-exile was indisputable. However, from a purely military point of view, they had no practical value for the Allies unless they were fully operational. This meant that they had to be compatible and able to operate together with standard allied formations or within their structure. Any unit could be useful to a given superior commander only if it could be deployed in a similar manner to any other unit, i.e., when it had the same structure and organization as the British formations. Paradoxically, from this perspective, the army branch that satisfied these requirements most was the most complex strand of the armed forces, the air force. The Allies managed to incorporate almost flawlessly all the airmen into the overall structure of the Royal Air Force, either by forming “national” squadrons or by directly shifting individual pilots to British units, thus utilizing the potential of every single airman as much as it was physically pos-
Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, 1967), p. 55. For an overview of the negotiations about forming Polish units in France during the entire inter-war period, see PSZ, Vol. 1, p. 90. 12 Their deployment against the Germans in the Baltic Sea by the Poles would not have made any sense but they represented a real, valuable and welcome reinforcement for the Royal Navy. In the early years of the war, Britain suffered from a critical lack of smaller escort- and anti-submarine vessels. The acquisition of “only” three destroyers with experienced crews should thus not be underestimated. 13 According to the original intent from May 1939, the Polish division in France was not supposed to constitute a basis for the army-in-exile. On the contrary, the Polish Command considered the division to be, more or less, a symbolic demonstration of the common struggle of the Western Allies and the Polish army, defending its own country on its own front in Poland. 14 Very good general overviews of the particular armies are contained in the above mentioned books by Martin Conway and José Gotovitch and Matthew Bennett and Paul Latawski. Thus there is no need to repeat the basic facts here.
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sible.15 Similarly, the incorporation of the naval forces was also successful by and large. However, the most difficult challenge proved to be the integration of the ground forces. Thus, already in the fall of 1940, British army circles faced the problem of how they should incorporate the relatively small exile armies of their allies, which mostly had just a few thousand troops available. After lengthy negotiations, it was decided to organize them in the form of independent brigades, with an ideal number of 5,500 soldiers prescribed.16 From a propaganda point of view, and also from a purely military perspective, this was a convenient solution since a brigade represented a so-called Large Field Unit – on the same level as full-scale field divisions with more than 15,000 soldiers. From an organizational point of view, the concept of brigade groups was flexible, in terms of the “ideal” Tables of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), and thus allowed a smaller number of battalions, batteries, and the like to be established, according to recruitment possibilities in the individual armies. It also enabled the quick expansion of brigades to the prescribed number or above if required (or better to say if possible). A further advantage of such a solution was the fact that British divisions were used to conducting their combat operations with brigade groups of various strengths. This meant that the operational integration of the exile brigade groups into the structure of the British armed forces posed no theoretical problem. This basic organizational 15 An interesting counterpoint to the utilization at very short notice of foreign airmen in the RAF is offered by Alan Brown in his article in the Conway, Gotovitch book, pp. 167–182. Brown pointed out the serious objections expressed by British military figures to absorbing Polish and Czechoslovak airmen in the ranks of the RAF Even in the very critical period of summer 1940, many British officers at various levels raised doubts about the skills these men had as airmen and soldiers, as well as their level of training: “We don’t know if there are any pilots worthy of the name,” wrote Archibald Boyle, then Director of Intelligence. Ibid, p. 169. In terms of choice, some British politicians and soldiers mistrusted Czechoslovaks even more then the Poles: “Anthony Eden told the War Cabinet on 19 June that, although he was prepared ‘to take off any Czechoslovak troops who wished to leave’ [France after its defeat in June 1940], he would ‘much prefer to embark Polish troops’.” Ibid, p. 168. Behind these opinions were fears of weaker Czechoslovak integrity owing to their multinational character, as well as the alleged strong influence of communist propaganda among Czechoslovak units. 16 The all-embracing aspect of this act has usually been neglected by individual national historiographies. However, the exile authorities at that time were aware of the complexity of the British approach, as could be demonstrated by the Czechoslovak example. On 8 December 1940, the Czechoslovak exile Ministry of Defence received a British proposition for organizing ground forces. In addition, on 5 April 1941, the relevant Tables of Organization & Equipment (TO&E) were provided. Czechoslovak officers closely monitored British negotiations with the other governments-in-exile during the winter and spring of 1941 and, on 5 April 1941, they reported: “The Brigade Headquarters received a new regulation of how the structure of the Czechoslovak ground forces shall look like. This new structure has to be achieved by about May. Such organized Brigade Groups will be formed by all allied armies apart from the Polish army, which will have an Army Corps.” For details, see VÚA – VHA Prague, coll. Ministerstvo národní obrany – Londýn [Ministry of Defence – London], f. 3, No. 23, Válečný deník MNO–II./3.odd., 1940–41 [War Diary of the 3rd Section of the Department II of the Ministry of Defence, 1940–41].
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