A History of Ancient Greek Military Doctrines
A textbook composed by,
Alexander “Buzz” Tertius de Klerk, Julia Parente, Morgan Miller, Zach Hampu & William
Marty
Buzz wrote the introduction and section on heavy infantry, and found many of the sources we used. Zach wrote the section on light infantry. Will wrote the section on cavalry. Morgan wrote the conclusion. Julia designed and formatted the project into the textbook format.
Nobody used AI to assist in creating the project.
Introduction
Warfare in ancient Greece is often understood as a strange, ritualistic affair in which two opposing formations of heavy infantry would meet in a predetermined place and try to display military dominance over the other through a controlled bout of combat. This may seem difficult to believe- and you’d be right to doubt
In reality, the strategies and tactics of Ancient Greek Militaries were no less pragmatic than any of their contemporaries. While there was a clear preference towards decisive engagements utilizing heavy infantry formations, the Ancient Greeks were fully capable of utilizing other types of units and other strategies. The unique character of ancient Greek warfare, which is by no means a complete misunderstanding and did exist to a certain extent, was the result of doctrinal preferences brought about by the material realities faced by the ancient Greek city-states. This chapter will go over the tactical and strategic roles of the three main types of military units of ancient Greek armies, those being heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry. However, before that, two troublesome words must be dealt with.
Heavy Infantry in Ancient Greece
You would be hard-pressed to find a work on ancient Greek armies without hearing the words hoplite and phalanx. However, neither of these words will be used outside of this short section. To explain this, these words will be defined.
A hoplite was not an ancient Greek heavy infantryman, as this term is used by Herodotus and Xenophon to refer to not only Greeks, but Persians, Assyrians and Egyptians. This means that analysing the hoplite as a bespoke aspect of Greek military doctrine is pointless, as the term was applied to foreign units, and as such the term hoplite itself is pointless. Heavily armed and armoured Greek soldiers will be referred to as (Greek) heavy infantry for this reason.
A phalanx was not a specific formation, either. The term is often used to refer to a shield wall formation, wherein each soldier stood shoulder to shoulder so they could protect the one next to them with their large shield. However, the term is used inconsistently by contemporary sources to refer to any formation of soldiers, including a particularly egregious instance wherein the term was used while referring to mounted cavalry.
(Konijnendijk et al., 2021 pp. 2, 72) This means that analysing the phalanx as a bespoke aspect of Greek military doctrine is pointless as well- unless one was to argue that only the Greeks were enlightened enough to assume battlefield formations.
For these reasons, a formation of Greek heavy infantry will be referred to in the Heavy Infatry section as exactly that, and not as a hoplite phalanx. Special terms only serve to further mythologise ancient Greece as something which existed in a vacuum.
The heavy infantryman is perhaps the most iconic symbol of ancient Greece. Such was their armament that the seventh-century BC poet Tyrtaios referred to them as panoploi- “all armed”. Compared to the heavy infantry, the light infantry appeared so underequipped that they were described as gymnetes- “naked men”. While they were by no means the sole force on the battlefield, and different city-states had varying doctrinal preferences, ancient Greek heavy infantry were nonetheless an imposing and effective force. Prior to the 8th century BCE, armour was made primarily soft armour, made out of perishable materials[1]. This changed as cuirasses, which provided hard armour to the chest, became the favoured armour for heavy infantry. These were likely adopted from Greece’s European neighbours, who had been using such armour for centuries prior. The 8th century BCE saw other significant changes in Greek warfare. Archery was less valued- while arrowheads were still seen as important enough to be valid religious offerings, they ceased to be used as burial goods. Archery was still common in literature and art, though. This showed an increasing focus on heavy infantry in Greek martial culture. The scale of warfare also increased, which may have been related to the increased importance of heavy infantry in Ancient Greece.
By the seventh century BCE, battles had more casualties and cities had become better fortified. Heavy infantry must have been useful in the more intense warfare of the era.
(Konijnendijk et al., 2021 pp 39-40)
Light Infantry
Light infantry in Ancient Greece represent a unique and understudied force in warfare that evolved with the frequent influence of class associations, equipment, and effectiveness. Archers and javelin throwers were the most common and most effective types of soldiers in this category, but there were also hurlers, who were the least effective and largely disappeared in the Archaic Age. While the skill and specialization of archers and javelin-throwers could often make them extremely valuable, the frequent lack of organization and cohesion in these ranks also frequently limited their effectiveness. They would not engage heavy-infantry directly, but instead roamed between the shields of heavy infantrymen and operated from the periphery of battle.
The concept of light infantry emerged in the Early Iron Age and Archaic Age, and at this point, light infantry was often associated with the nobility. Archery was a skill that required leisure time for practice. Thus, light infantrymen were respected; ornate burials were given for warriors with their bows, and characters like Odysseus and Paris are referenced as skilled with a bow in the Homeric epics (Konijnendijk, et al., 2021 p. 210211). However, this changed distinctly in the seventh century. New equipment spread, and elites armed themselves with ornate, heavy armor, and joined the front lines. The distinction between heavy and light infantry came more clearly into focus, and martial glory was associated with the heavy infantry because the elites fought there. References to light infantry in art and literature became very rare in the sixth century. This should be taken not as a sign of their disappearance or lack of importance, but as a reflection of this bias (Konijnendijk, et al., 2021 p. 215). Large quantities of arrowheads have commonly been found at excavations of battlefields from this period, and where estimates were made in literary sources, light infantry usually outnumbered hoplites. In literature, light infantry were often chastised for not having the courage to fight on the front lines, and they often figure in narratives as an obstacle for heavy infantry to overcome.
The role and attitude toward light infantry again changed shortly thereafter. The process of army industrialization likely occurred during the sixth century, and greater distinctions between ranks of soldiers were made. In more organized armies, the roaming light infantry were less effective, and groups of trained specialists became prominent in the fifth century. These groups served important and varied roles, such as acting as a sort of shock force to clear a path (Konijnendijk, et al., 2021 p. 226). At this point, the class bias against light infantry began
to dissipate. The most common form of light infantryman became the peltast, a soldier without armor, equipped with a light shield and javelins for throwing. These soldiers became a key component of military strategy, and these and other trained specialists took the place of the former low-class light-infantry.
At various points in Thucydides’ The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides alludes to the importance of light infantry. Perhaps the most notable instance came during the Aetolian expedition, in which Thucydides describes the Aetolians gaining the high ground on the Athenians and repeatedly harassing them with javelins. The Athenian heavy infantry was ill-equipped to retaliate in kind, and Thucydides blames Demosthenes for not waiting for the Locrian reinforcements “who were to have supplied him with the lightarmed darters in which he was most deficient” (Thucydides, 2013 p. 182). With this phrasing, it is clear that light infantry had become a very necessary and expected part of military forces.
Cavalry and the True Dynamics of Ancient Greek Warfare
Classical Greek warfare is typically portrayed as exclusively dominated by the hoplite phalanx, however evidence from research demonstrates the significant strategic role that cavalry played on the battlefield. Across the broader Greek landscape, cavalry is an underestimated and often indispensable component in victories. Greek commanders understood the unique capabilities that mounted troops possessed in shaping a victory or defeat in battle. The presence of cavalry in combat could determine whether a defeated army would escape intact or be annihilated in the aftermath of a battle. On the opposite side of things, cavalry could decide whether an army’s victory produced real gains or merely pushed back the enemy temporarily, and whether your forces could invade and live off enemy territory freely. This dynamic can be seen in Sicily when Syracusan horsemen prevented Athenian forces from escaping battle or gathering supplies, a major reason for Athens’ failure in this expedition during the Peloponnesian War. Cavalry units in Classical ancient Greece served a similar purpose to later light infantry, with roles such as screening, pursuit, and territorial defense. Their mobility enabled them to guard vulnerable spots of army formations and quickly respond to enemy scouts or probing attacks. Cavalry also had the ability to essentially “herd” enemies by following them closely. This “shadow” effect could force enemies to halt, retreat, or move in directions that were unintended, shaping entire campaigns and preventing enemy forces from advancing. Thucydides and other ancient historians frequently stress that armies without cavalry were unable to forage, travel safely, or retreat from combat without significant losses. Hoplites alone were heavy and slow; without cavalry to keep enemy forces back, they struggled to retreat in order or to pursue defeated forces before they fled. The pursuit after victory was what decided wars, not
the initial clash between phalanxes—therefore making cavalry the deciding factor in overall Greek warfare. Their offensive role was matched by their defensive utilization, as cavalry shielded their own territory and prevented enemies from spreading out to plunder effectively.
Cavalry was especially important in protecting territory. Raids required troops to disperse across wide expanses of farmland to burn crops, steal livestock, and seize food. This spreading of troops made enemy forces vulnerable without the protection of phalanxes, which cavalry exploited. They could ride quickly across farmland and strike scattered raiders, forcing them back to fortified camps or tight formations where they could no longer devastate the land. Without burning or stealing food, enemy invasions became largely ineffective. A clear example is Athens’ cavalry reducing Spartan devastation in Attica by offering a mobile shield where hoplites could not respond.
For armies that lacked cavalry, securing their own land and preventing enemy armies from living off it was nearly impossible. Without mounted forces, enemies retained freedom to plunder and could withdraw from battle without fear of pursuit.
Cavalry presence also determined where hoplites could fight. Plains favored cavalry, leading hoplite armies without mounted support to avoid them entirely and instead march through hills and ravines. Without access to open plains, armies could not utilize the most strategically valuable terrain in warfare.
Conclusively, cavalry’s strategic importance in Classical Greek warfare was profound. Mounted forces ensured victories mattered, defeats became survivable, and territory was defended. Greek militaries without cavalry were at a severe disadvantage through a lack of ability to pursue, protect, and control the movement of warfare.
Conclusion
In the end, studying Ancient Greek warfare reveals more complex military tactics than the common portrayal of it as a rigid, ritualized contest between heavy infantry formations. This chapter covered three main types of military units of ancient Greek armies, how they differed from one another and what military strategies and tactics they used. As seen throughout the chapter, although the Greeks did use heavy infantry formations, they also incorporated several other tactics such as light infantry and cavalry.
Heavy infantry held significant importance in many Greek armies. Although there were other strong forces on the battlefield, ancient Greek heavy infantry were without a doubt a powerful force.
On the other hand, light infantry in ancient Greece is often understudied and neglected. Archers, javelin throwers, and hurlers were all different types of soldiers in this category. Initially linked to the nobility, they transitioned into crucial, if often underappreciated, elements like the peltast. Their vital roles, such as acting as a shock force or specialized skills in archery or javelin-throwing prove that the ancient Greek military goes beyond the use of heavy infantry. Equally important was the role of calvary, a force that could determine the fate of many battles. The mobility of cavalry was an advantage many other strategies did not have. Cavalry screened armies, protected valuable territory, and often determined the outcome of pursuits and retreats. Considering these factors, Greek armies without a cavalry were often at a significant disadvantage in comparison to those without.
When taken together, heavy infantry, light infantry, and cavalry prove ancient Greek military history to be far more complex than it may appear. Ancient Greek warfare is more than a ritualistic battle dominated by heavy infantry, but includes more complexities such as screening cavalries and specialized light infantry soldiers. By recognizing the more unfamiliar aspects of Greek warfare, we gain a more accurate understanding of how ancient Greek armies fought and found success on the battlefield.
Bibliography
Konijnendijk, R., Kucewicz, C., & Lloyd, M. T. (2021). Brill’s companion to Greek land warfare beyond the phalanx. Brill. (Konijnendijk et al., 2021)
Thucydides. (2013). The History of the Peloponnesian War (R. Crawley, Trans.) [e-book]. (Original work published ca. 400 BCE).
