Transforming Conflict: Former Combatants and Community Healing in Bosnia and Herzegovina

POLICY BRIEF

Transforming Conflict: Former

Combatants and Community Healing in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Sarina Fereydooni * , Andy Gu * , Youssef H. Ibrahim * ,

Rita Malallah * , Hanifah Ouro-Sama * , Merat Semma * ,

Kayla Sohn*, Velma Šarić, Tatjana Milovanović, Cara K. Fallon, Catherine Panter-Brick

*co-first authors

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, persistent social and institutional barriers continue to limit the reintegration of former combatants and undermine community mental health in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• Segregation in education, limited youth engagement, and persistent stigma toward veterans represent not only social challenges but also policy failures that constrain long-term peacebuilding outcomes.

• Case studies from the United States, Sierra Leone, and Northern Ireland indicate practices that can be applied to post-conflict transformation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

• This policy brief proposes three interventions directed toward the efforts of municipal authorities, civil society organizations, scholars, and international donors: the integration of moral injury-informed mental health services for former combatants; structured youth-former combatant mentorship programs at the municipal level; and community-based engagement initiatives that link reintegration to visible public benefit.

• Research and policy proposals examined herein emphasize the importance of continued efforts to address longstanding barriers and develop conditions to enable former combatants to contribute to community healing and positive mental health outcomes in post-conflict Bosnia.

BACKGROUND

Introduction

Nearly three decades after the 1992–1995 war, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to navigate a post-conflict landscape marked by institutional fragmentation, divided narratives, and uneven progress toward reconciliation. These conditions affect not only political life, but also the emotional and social environments in which former combatants attempt to return to civilian roles. Assessing how reintegration succeeds or fails is essential for building durable peace and improving community mental health outcomes. This brief examines a central question: What conditions enable former combatants to contribute productively to community healing and mental health in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina?

Drawing on comparative case studies, survivor and youth narratives, and existing reintegration models, the brief analyzes where current approaches fall short and proposes a multi-layered framework for reintegration. The final section offers actionable policy recommendations for practitioners, civil society actors, and policymakers.

Figure 2 - Framework demonstrating the multi-layered components involved in reintegration of former combatants. Three key elements are shown: moral injury, open dialogue, and a national-scale community reintegration.

A Multi-layered Framework for Reintegration: This framework, shown through Figure 2, aims to foster healing and unity by building trust and encouraging engagement with “the other” across religious and ethnic boundaries. It begins with repairing the moral injury of the individual, followed by fostering dialogue through youth and ex-combatant engagement, and ultimately implementing national initiatives for ex-combatant reintegration.

Historical Context

Bosnia and Herzegovina—home to Bosniaks (mostly Muslim), Bosnian Serbs (Orthodox Christian), and Bosnian Croats (Catholic)—entered a period of political and economic instability in the early 1990s as ethnonational mobilization and economic decline increasingly polarized political life (Heinemann-Grüder et al., 2004). These dynamics precipitated the 1992–1995 war, producing mass displacement, uneven return, and persistent discrimination in housing and employment, leaving a post-war “frozen conflict” rather than social reintegration (Effron & O’Brien, 2004; HDR, 2002). The 1995 Dayton Peace Accords ended violence but institutionalized fragmentation by dividing authority across entities and cantons, embedding ethnonational power-sharing and weak coordination (Heinemann-Grüder et al., 2004).

Post-Dayton Fragmentation and Contemporary Barriers to Reconciliation

Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to operate under a fragmented governance system that structures political behavior and limits progress toward reconciliation. Ethnonationalist parties—including the SNSD in Republika Srpska, the SDA among Bosniaks, and the HDZ among Croats—remain dominant and mobilize support around identity-based grievances rather than cross-community cooperation (Driessen, 2024). Attempts at constitutional reform have repeatedly stalled since 2006, leaving the country without a coordinated state-level framework for reconciliation or transitional justice. Population return remains uneven, and many communities remain mono-ethnic, limiting opportunities for inter-group interaction (Driessen, 2024; Dahlman & Ó Tuathail, 2005).

Dayton’s institutional design continues to govern everyday life, especially in education and public services (Mulalić & Korkut, 2009; Owen-Jackson, 2008). Canton-level control of curricula has produced three parallel school systems, each promoting different nar-

ratives of history and identity (Owen-Jackson, 2008; Plasto & Blagojević, 2023). In some mixed areas, the “two schools under one roof” model physically separates students even within shared buildings, reinforcing social division from an early age.

The OHR continues to play a major role through its authority to impose laws and remove officials. While intended to maintain stability, many citizens see these interventions as signs that Bosnia’s institutions cannot function autonomously (Galić & Woelk, 2023). Experts have argued that the agreement was written under emergency conditions and never intended to become a permanent constitution (Basic, 2015). Meanwhile, civil society groups have promoted dialogue but faced institutional fragmentation like the state, and donor-dependence has attached reconciliation initiatives to a sense of external imposition (Driessen, 2024).

Problem Context: Limits of Reintegration Models and the Conditions Shaping Reconciliation

Although post-war policies in Bosnia have focused on institutional reconstruction, far less attention has been given to the social reintegration of former combatants, who remain key figures in shaping community trust, narratives of violence, and local perceptions of security. Many combatants returned to communities still marked by displacement, loss, and unresolved grievances, yet no coordinated state-level strategy existed to support their reintegration or address moral injury. Situating the position of former combatants within this fragmented post-war environment is essential for assessing how they can contribute to community healing.

Standard Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) models assume that ex-combatants can safely return home, that disarmament reduces insecurity, and that economic reintegration leads to social reintegration (Sharif, 2018). In Bosnia’s fragmented post-war landscape, these assumptions do not hold. Three structural mismatches are especially relevant. First, DDR frameworks presume cohesive “home communities,” but Bosnia’s ethnically sorted territories, and persistent grievances mean that return often reopens wounds rather than repairing them. Second, they assume dissolving wartime units prevents remobilization, even though wartime bonds can stabilize individuals, and dispersal can heighten insecurity or create informal networks (Daly, 2016). Third, DDR models treat ex-combatants as a uniform

group, overlooking differences in gender, rank, trauma, age, and wartime roles that require differentiated reintegration pathways.

These unresolved dynamics undermine the social environment needed for the possibility of future healing. Reintegration in Bosnia is limited not only by institutional barriers but also by the moral and emotional conditions under which communities are willing to accept former combatants. Survivor testimony shows that reconciliation requires recognition of wrongdoing, justice for victims, and visible expressions of remorse (Basic, 2015). Narrative conditions also influence how younger generations understand the conflict, as shown in Figure 3. As Palmberger (2016) shows, youth often describe themselves as the “unspoilt generation,” emotionally removed from wartime hatred yet still living with its consequences. War is rarely discussed at home or in school, but its effects remain visible in segregated classrooms, missing peers, and quiet reminders of trauma. The contradiction is that young people reject the hostility of the past while still being constrained by the structures the war left behind. Accounting for these intertwined institutional, moral, and generational barriers is essential for answering our research question.

CASE STUDY ONE

Moral Injury and Veteran Reintegration in the U.S. Military Healthcare System

Barriers to reintegration for former combatants begin at the individual level, and often with mental healthcare. The U.S. military healthcare system serves as a reference and source of clinical research to examine the transferable principles underlying moral repair, rather than a structural example of delivering care. The clinical frameworks addressing moral injuries, and an understanding of clinical nuance distinguishing moral injury from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), will guide proposed recommendations in this area.

Mental healthcare in Bosnia is delivered through community mental health centers and certain specialized PTSD treatment centers. Although care delivery of the community health centers allows for high accessibility, observational studies have found that current approaches to PTSD treatment have proven ineffective, with only a 15% reduction of PTSD rates in the observed group after 12 months (Priebe et al., 2010). With PTSD linked to various co-morbidities, such as depressive disorders and substance use disorders, addressing this clinical gap will be a foundational step towards reintegrating former combatants into the community. Institutional standards on defining and treating moral injury, a concept coined by U.S. military psychologists in the 1990s, may prove a more effective target as failures persist despite access to conventional psychiatric care.

Moral injury arises from the exposure to or participation in a transgression that deviates from one’s moral schemas (including ideals, ethics, attachments), primarily in traumatic contexts such as armed conflicts. This deviation produces an internal conflict, and consequently shame and guilt. Once the event and these feelings obtain internal, stable, and global attributions, the person experiencing moral injury begins to isolate and withdraw from social contexts. Without intervention, the person finds not only that their actions were unforgivable, but that they themselves are unforgivable. This reinforces the feelings of shame and guilt, creating a cycle of reinforcement which forms a persistent barrier for reintegration. Although the experience of moral injury is highly individualized, societal barriers exacerbate the issue. A lack of socially legitimate spaces in society to discuss moral violence and ethical conflicts prevents engagement in open conversation, creating an atmosphere

where former combatants have no opportunity to process or correct ethical and moral dilemmas faced in the midst of traumatic stressors. Even clinicians who observe moral injury may find current guidance on therapy and treatment lacking, as the focus of former combatant mental health tends to focus primarily on PTSD and other psychiatric conditions.

Moral injury differs from these disorders in a number of ways. While PTSD primarily affects victims and witnesses, moral injury also explains disturbances to perpetrators. Unlike PTSD, which is rooted in fear and helplessness, moral injury centers on shame, guilt, and perceived moral failure. Addressing experiences that cause moral injury requires more than symptom management. It calls for reconstruction of a coherent moral identity and reintegration of the individual into meaningful social roles (Litz & Walker, 2025). Clinical studies show that while standard PTSD treatments may reduce hyperarousal or avoidance, they do not reliably reduce core moral emotions such as shame, guilt, or self-condemnation—symptoms most strongly associated with social withdrawal and reintegration failure. Empirical work by Henning and Frueh (1997) shows that guilt alone accounts for approximately 30% of the variance in re-experiencing and avoidance symptoms, underscoring the central role of moral emotions in persistent distress.

Recognizing these limitations, it becomes clear that a distinct framework is needed—one that addresses the relational and moral dimensions of injury often overlooked in conventional psychiatric care. Moral repair offers such a pathway, targeting not only psychological suffering but also the restoration of identity, trust, and moral coherence.

Within a post-conflict U.S. military context, clinically-effective moral repair models have primarily been delivered through a clinician-led one-on-one format (Litz et al., 2009; Litz & Walker, 2025). This trauma-informed format acknowledges the unique barriers to disclosure caused by shame and self-condemnation. Although reintegration into group dynamics is necessary to cement later healing, initial engagement is most successful in individualized settings where the therapeutic relationship can foster emotional safety and non-judgmental presence. By meeting former combatants in a private, protected space, this format increases the likelihood of disclosing transgressive experiences, an essential element for initiating the moral repair process (Litz et al., 2009).

Evidence from clinical trials indicates that individ-

ualized moral repair interventions are associated with meaningful reductions in shame, guilt, and self-blame, alongside improved capacity for self-forgiveness and re-engagement with valued social roles. Recent randomized evidence shows that such adaptive exposure approaches led to clinically significant functional improvement in an additional 21% of patients compared to active control treatment (Litz et al., 2025). The following section outlines a six-stage framework tailored for navigating moral injury among former combatants.

In the first phase, the clinician and veteran collaboratively establish norms of safety, trust, and confidentiality. This is the “Connection” phase, designed to counter shame-driven withdrawal by building a foundation of psychological safety (Litz et al., 2009). The second phase clarifies moral injury as a concept distinct from PTSD, helping the veteran understand their suffering as an ethical injury rather than a psychiatric disorder. Clinicians normalize the presence of guilt while reframing shame as evidence of an intact moral compass.

During guided emotional disclosure, the third phase, the veteran recounts morally injurious events in a controlled, supportive setting. Drawing on exposure principles, the goal is not retraumatization, but emotional processing and the surfacing of meaning. The fourth phase focuses on attribution and integration. Here, clinicians assist the veteran in contextualizing their actions, replacing global self-condemnation with more realistic moral interpretations that acknowledge both harm and capacity for repair.

In the fifth phase, the veteran engages in an imaginary conversation with a benevolent moral authority—such as a fallen comrade, spiritual figure, or respected mentor. This exercise facilitates forgiveness, accountability, and reconnection with core values. Finally, the sixth phase supports the veteran in designing a personal reparation act aligned with those values. These might include mentorship, community service, or restorative engagement with others. Through this moral action, the veteran transitions from passive guilt to active responsibility, reinforcing a sense of agency and moral reintegration.

This one-on-one model retains the relational and restorative goals of moral repair while optimizing for accessibility, emotional safety, and individualized care. However, individual moral repair, although necessary, is not sufficient for community healing. The steps that occur beyond individual therapy – forming or reforming

connections with important people through healing relationships – are necessary to solidify the healing moral groundwork established in individual therapy.

CASE STUDY TWO Youth-Former Combatant Mentorship Program in Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland

Studies show program evaluation of youth participation in peacebuilding efforts especially in promoting open dialogue, supporting conflict management, and strengthening community (Gaston, 2025). Reintegration programs in Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone serve as successful models for youth and ex-combatant reintegration in post-conflict regions.

Sierra Leone’s Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP)

Sierra Leone’s YRTEP program, led by the United Nations (UN), was implemented after the civil war to bring together 40,000 participants—50% ex-combatants and 50% youth affected by the war. The program has a multi-modal structure focused on non-formal education such as vocational training, agricultural skills development, and civic education (Fauth, 2001). It was implemented through existing social networks, such as religious groups. The program achieved a strong impact, with 99% of participants reporting that they were better able to manage conflict because of the training. There are many testimonials from youth and ex-combatants reflecting on their growth and mutual understanding after participating in the YRTEP program, shown in Figure 4.

The YRTEP model can be adapted in Bosnia and Herzegovina because of the similar post-conflict context, with adjustments based on the types of training and needs in society. YRTEP is a model that brings together two different groups: ex-combatants (who played an active role in the war) and youth (who grew up in the consequences of the war), who may not otherwise interact in meaningful ways. This program shows that. with intentionality and training design, bringing individuals from different perspectives of the war together is both possible and necessary for building a united future.

Figure 4 - Narrative testimonials from participants of the YRTEP program, as written in Fauth et al. (2001).

Northern

Ireland: From Prison to Peace Program

From Prison to Peace is an educational program developed to educate youth about the consequences of conflict and to support the reintegration of ex-prisoners who were imprisoned due to the Troubles (1960–1998). Political ex-prisoners were invited into schools and youth spaces to share their experiences about the Troubles, prison life, and their reintegration process (Ganiel, 2019). The program targets 14-16-year-old students and is structured around facilitated encounters between students and vetted ex-prisoners. The sessions are organized into three blocks: why people became involved in the conflict, the prison experience and its impact on individuals, and how ex-combatants have engaged in conflict transformation and community engagement (Community Foundation for Northern Ireland & NIACRO, n.d.).

The aim of From Prison to Peace, shown in Figure 5, is to prevent young people from becoming involved in conflict by presenting the realities of violence and its long-term effects on ex-prisoners. This case study informs the design of the mentorship intervention

proposed later in policy recommendations. The Northern Ireland case informs the design principles of the proposed mentorship model in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This education-centered program can be implemented in this context on a smaller scale, such as through mentorship programs mentioned in the implementation section. Implementing a full program in a fully segregated schooling system will be difficult but adapting the narrative-sharing and reflection components can be effective for fostering trust and understanding between youth and ex-combatants. The goal of the mentorship program would be to normalize engaging with “the other side,” especially for youth, and to expose them to perspectives different from their own—uniting people across ethnic and religious boundaries through the power of dialogue.

5

Figure 5. Northern Ireland Case Study: This infographic exemplifies how the Northern Ireland case study to be easily visualized. The flow of this study is similar to the model that will be explained in the encouraging open dialogue intervention section of policy recommendations. We hope to present this model as one to be learned from and applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina to be used towards peacebuilding.

CASE STUDY THREE

From Individual Healing to Cumulative Community Integration

This case study shifts from individual and dialogue-based interventions toward everyday community practices that rely on low-stakes, repeated interaction between former combatants and civilians. Rather than pursuing overtly political or juridical reconciliation, these interventions operate through routine social engagement such as education programs, storytelling initiatives, and shared public activities that gradually rebuild trust, norms, and perceptions at the local level.

Importantly, this model does not claim to produce national reconciliation on its own. Here, integration refers to cumulative local effects that, when sustained across multiple communities and supported by coordinated policy frameworks, can contribute to broader narrative change and institutional alignment. The goal is not consensus across Bosnia and Herzegovina’s deeply divided society, but the creation of durable social infrastructures that make coexistence, dialogue, and cooperation more feasible over time.

Bosnia and Herzegovina as the Primary Reference Point

Bosnia and Herzegovina provides the central empirical grounding for this approach. Nearly three decades after the Dayton Peace Agreement, social life remains fragmented along ethno-national lines, with segregated schools, divided municipalities, and contested historical narratives, particularly surrounding genocide and responsibility for wartime violence (Shared Futures, 2021). In this context, large-scale unifying interventions are often politically infeasible and socially resisted, especially among Serb and Croat communities where denial and distrust persist (Shared Futures, 2021; Youth Initiative for Human Rights / NDC, 2010).

Thus, Bosnian civil society organizations such as the Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC) and the Centre for Nonviolent Action (CNA) have adopted a pragmatic strategy. They engage former combatants in localized, non-confrontational roles that do not require agreement on historical interpretation as a precondition for participation. Former fighters contribute as educators, mentors, and storytellers, particularly in youth-focused programs, where their lived experience carries credibility without demand-

ing moral convergence (Shared Futures, 2021; Youth Initiative for Human Rights / NDC, 2010).

Insights from Community Violence Reduction (CVR) Programs

Sierra Leone and UN peacekeeping missions show that veteran-led, community-based activities can reduce fear and restore a sense of shared citizenship. In Sierra Leone, the community reconciliation organization Fambul Tok (“family talk”) organized village-level processes in which survivors and perpetrators met in public forums and bonfire ceremonies to tell their stories, seek forgiveness, and plan joint community projects (United States Institute of Peace, 2010). A randomized evaluation of Fambul Tok in 200 villages found that participating communities reported higher levels of forgiveness, greater social capital, and more participation in local groups than comparison communities that did not participate (Cilliers et al., 2016). UN Community Violence Reduction (CVR) projects in Mali and other settings reinforce this logic. In Mali, the CVR portfolio led by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) has implemented labor intensive projects such as reforestation, infrastructure repair, and small public works that deliberately mix ex-combatants, youth at risk, and other community members around shared goals. Lessons learned reviews note that these projects create short-term jobs, reduce opportunities for re-recruitment into armed groups, and strengthen community support for broader DDR processes (MINUSMA / UN DPO, 2022).

Applying CVR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Building on these examples, we propose a CVRstyle model in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which mixed teams of veterans, unemployed youth, and local residents repair small pieces of shared infrastructure such as park benches, school playgrounds, local paths, or community gardens. This approach adapts the CVR model to Bosnia by focusing on visible but nonpolitical tasks that benefit everyone, rather than symbolically charged monuments or memorials. Similarly, former combatants and local youth could cohost regular communal cooking nights, rotating across neighborhoods and ethnic lines. They would prepare regional dishes from different communities and invite residents to sit together for extended conversations over food. This

model builds on Bosnia’s strong café and coffeehouse culture, where sitting together at a table already carries deep social meaning, and on existing youth centers that aim to create “alternative spaces” beyond ethnic prejudice.

The policy mechanism here is not persuasion, but constant exposure and normalization. Repeated, structured contact, especially when framed around education, shared memory, or community learning, has been shown to reduce fear and stigma while allowing young people to encounter former combatants outside of politicized narratives (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These routines create spaces where moral injury, trauma, and responsibility can be acknowledged indirectly, without forcing premature reconciliation or collective agreement (United States Institute of Peace, 2010; Cilliers et al., 2016).

From Local Routines to Policy-Relevant Scale

While these interventions operate at the community level, their policy relevance emerges through coordination rather than expansion. Scaling does not mean enlarging individual programs, but aligning multiple local initiatives through shared funding streams, evaluation frameworks, and training standards. When supported by national or international donors, these networks of practice can influence public narratives about veterans, mental health, and responsibility, even in the absence of political consensus.

This layered approach acknowledges real constraints. Not all communities will participate. Not all veterans will be accepted. And not all actors are willing to engage across ethnic lines. Yet, by focusing on principles of repetition, credibility, and youth-centered engagement, this model offers a realistic pathway for incremental social repair in a deeply divided society.

The following section translates this framework into concrete policy recommendations, outlining funding pathways, mentorship structures, and psychosocial support mechanisms that can strengthen former combatants’ capacity to act as agents of healing without overstating their integrative reach.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommendations are organized across three levels of action:

• Level 1: Individual-level interventions focused on moral injury and personal reintegration.

• Level 2: Community-level interventions centered on youth–former combatant engagement and dialogue.

• Level 3: National and municipal-level interventions that institutionalize reintegration through routine community activities and public engagement.

The central idea is to enable former combatants to contribute productively to community healing and mental health in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. These recommendations will work in tandem with the Post-Conflict Research Center, as well as set strong groundwork for peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Moral Injury Interventions

Moral injury interventions must be designed not only for therapeutic efficacy but also for sustainable delivery within real-world institutional contexts, with the three foundational portions as shown in Figure 6. The basis for moral injury interventions relies on a strong infrastructure, which should be developed in accordance with the 6-stage previously described. Establishing this therapy approach as a national standard will provide clinicians structured training in trauma-informed care and moral injury dynamics (distinguishing moral injury from PTSD), supported by ongoing supervision and mental health resources. Once a standardized approach is set, programmatic integration into military and veteran health systems is essential to expand reach and legitimacy. In post-conflict contexts such as Bosnia, pilot programs could be supported through partnerships with the PCRC and financed by European Union (EU) reconciliation grants, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, private foundations, and regional corporate social responsibility (CSR) contributions. Finally, veterans who have undergone moral repair interventions will move to creating personalized reparation acts and link these acts to community-based engagement as discussed in later recommendations, reinforcing the dual goals of individual healing and public contribution.

Encouraging Open Dialogue Intervention

Our recommended intervention for encouraging open dialogue builds on the Sierra Leone and Northern Ireland case studies presented in this brief and responds to the need for community-level mechanisms that enable trust-building across divided social groups. We propose a Youth-Former Combatant Mentorship Program designed to humanize “the other,” disrupt entrenched ethnonational narratives, and provide rehabilitated former combatants with a constructive, socially valued role within their communities. The intervention follows a structured flow that moves from careful recruitment and preparation to facilitated engagement and community-oriented outcomes.

Drawing on evidence from Sierra Leone’s Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP), trauma-informed artistic and educational methodologies, and reintegration initiatives in Northern Ireland, the program creates local spaces where dialogue, shared work, and skill-building function as vehicles for social repair rather than as abstract reconciliation exercises. Government funding for knowledge and youth exchange programs between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, for example, would also support the development of these programs.

The program would target youth aged 15–18 across Bosniak, Serb, and Croat communities, recruited through schools and youth centers, alongside former combatants from all sides of the conflict who volun-

tarily undergo screening, psychoeducation, and training in mentorship and trauma-informed communication. Former combatants with experience in trades such as mechanics, woodworking, agriculture, or logistics would mentor youth with similar interests, anchoring interaction in practical collaboration. This vocational focus lowers political sensitivity, establishes relationships on more equal footing, and allows trust to develop organically through shared tasks. In parallel, the program incorporates guided narrative-sharing in controlled settings, where mentors reflect on experiences of war, moral injury, and post-conflict reintegration not as confessions or justifications, but as humanizing accounts that expose youth to plural, lived histories of the conflict. It seeks to reframe social perceptions of former combatants as capable contributors to peace rather than as ongoing sources of division. It also aims to strengthen youth resilience by offering alternatives to inherited, single-story narratives of the war, an intergenerational dynamic powerfully illustrated in the Uspomene 677 produced by the PCRC.

Because of the ethical sensitivities involved in pairing youth with former combatants, the program is designed to operate within a clearly defined safeguarding and oversight framework. Table 1 outlines the core vetting, trauma-informed safeguarding, and gender sensitivity requirements that must accompany implementation. Implementation responsibility would rest primarily with local civil society organizations (CSOs) and youth centers, supported by municipal partners for access to neutral spaces and local legitimacy. PCRC would play a central role in providing technical guidance, training in trauma-informed practice, and ethical oversight, while funding and evaluation support could be drawn from EU reconciliation instruments, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, and municipal social cohesion budgets. Additionally, support for knowledge and youth exchange programs between Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina could be provided by government funding from the Republic of Ireland or the United Kingdom. By embedding dialogue within routine, skill-based interaction and clarifying institutional responsibilities, this intervention translates comparative evidence into a feasible policy pathway for fostering intergenerational trust and community healing in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 1

Safeguarding, Vetting, and Gender Sensitivity Framework for the Youth–Former Combatant Mentorship Program

Multi-step Vetting Process

Trauma-Informed Safeguarding

Gender Sensitivity Requirements

• Coordination with local CSOs, municipal authorities, and mental health professionals to identify combatants who have no history of unresolved legal cases and who demonstrate a commitment to nonviolence.

• Survivors’ representatives were included in the advisory committee, not to “approve” individuals but to develop criteria and boundaries.

• Mentors receive training in harm reduction and recognizing trauma cues

• No youth is required to discuss personal or family war experiences.

• Sessions monitored by trained psychosocial facilitators to avoid re-traumatization

• Ensure the participation of women former combatants where possible, as well as women facilitators, to counter the male-dominated framing of combatant identity.

• Protect confidentiality for survivors following lessons from global artsbased survivor initiatives

Table 1: This table summarizes the minimum ethical and operational conditions required for the safe implementation of youth–former combatant mentorship, including participant vetting, trauma-informed safeguards, survivor-aware governance, and gender-sensitive design principles.

Cumulative Community Integration and Engagement Intervention

Our recommended intervention for cumulative community reintegration adapts CVR models from Sierra Leone and UN peacekeeping contexts described in our third case study to Bosnia’s cultural landscape and institutional fragmentation. We propose a community-based program that creates routine, low-stakes contact between former combatants, youth, and community members through collaborative infrastructure projects and cultural activities, with outcomes documented and transformed into public art that depoliticizes reconciliation narratives. This intervention

targets unemployed youth (ages 18-30), former combatants seeking meaningful community roles, and residents across all three ethnic groups. Municipal governments will recruit mixed teams through partnerships with veteran associations and local CSOs, with deliberate rotation across ethnic territories. Our intended outcomes include reducing stigma by reframing former combatants as community contributors, creating safe contact that builds familiarity without requiring participants to defy family expectations, generating visible community benefits that demonstrate cooperation’s practical value, and providing depoliticized “third spaces” for reflection through collaborative art rooted in lived experience. A summary graphic is shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: A graphic showing the participants, goals, and outcomes involved in a successful cumulative community engagement intervention.

The intervention operates through three complementary activities which create routine, low stakes contact and involve deliberate rotation across ethnic territories. First, municipal public works departments will lead collaborative infrastructure activities that bring mixed groups together around labor-intensive, visible, but non-political tasks (park renovations, playground construction, community center repairs) that generate tangible community benefits and demonstrate cooperation's practical value. Second, CSO facilitators will organize shared cultural experiences that create safe contact through food preparation and communal meals, building familiarity without requiring participants to defy group expectations, with rotation across neutral spaces ensuring perceived fairness. Third, trained art facilitators will guide collective documentation and artistic expression, transforming participants' experiences into accessible public art (murals, photo exhibitions, community installations) that provides depoliticized spaces for broader community reflection and dialogue.

Successful delivery requires coordination across multiple institutional levels. Municipal governments will identify priority infrastructure sites, secure necessary permissions, and allocate public works staff for coordination. Veteran associations will support recruitment of former combatants and provide cultural advisors for trauma-sensitive design. Existing youth employment programs will help ensure long-term sustainability by integrating participants into broader workforce development pathways. CVR project managers and art facilitators must receive training in conflict-sensitive implementation, trauma-informed documentation, and crisis de-escalation, with PCRC

providing ongoing supervision and mental health support. Municipalities must establish safeguarding protocols with clear codes of conduct prohibiting political symbols and nationalist rhetoric, with trained observers monitoring early sessions and voluntary opt-out mechanisms respecting individual comfort levels. Long-term sustainability depends on PCRC and local CSOs maintaining institutional continuity beyond the pilot phase, diversified funding through EU reconciliation grants, the UN Peacebuilding Fund, private charities, and municipal public works budgets, and integration with Bosnia's existing social cohesion frameworks to ensure political buy-in. By grounding reintegration in shared labor, cultural exchange, and collaborative creativity, this intervention shifts reconciliation toward tangible cooperation that produces real community benefits.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This policy brief was produced through a collaboration between the Global Health Studies Program at the Yale Jackson School of Global Affairs and the Post-Conflict Research Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At Yale, the project was produced by Sarina Fereydooni, Andy Gu, Youssef Ibrahim, Rita Malallah, Hanifah Ouro-Sama, Merat Semma, and Kayla Sohn, under the guidance of Professor Catherine PanterBrick and Dr. Cara Fallon. At the Post-Conflict Research Center, the core team included Velma Šarić and Tatjana Milovanović, who were instrumental in providing feedback and editorial support for the project.

HOW TO CITE

Fereydooni S1, Gu A1, Ibrahim YH1, Malallah R1, Ouro-Sama H1, Semma M1, Sohn K1, Šarić V2, Milovanović T2, Fallon C1, Panter-Brick C1 (2025). Transforming Conflict: Former Combatants and Community Healing in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Policy Brief, Global Health Studies Program, Jackson School of Global Affairs, Yale University.

Co-author’s affiliation:

1Global Health Studies Program, Jackson School of Global Affairs, Yale University

2Post-Conflict Research Center (PCRC), Bosnia and Herzegovina

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