International Research Journal of Engineering and Technology (IRJET) e-ISSN: 2395-0056 Volume: 11 Issue: 05 | May 2024
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p-ISSN: 2395-0072
Mitigating Replay Attacks in Autonomous Vehicles Govindarajan Lakshmikanthan1, Sreejith Sreekandan Nair2 1,2 IDPro Member
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Abstract - A new approach to secure self-driving cars from
retransmitted or "replayed" at a later time, misleading the recipient into believing the replayed data is fresh and authentic.
replay attacks is proposed in this paper. Traditional methods rely on timestamps or sequence numbers, but these can be manipulated by hackers. The authors suggest using "selfvalidating nonces" which are unique codes linked to a specific vehicle's data like location or sensor readings. This makes it harder for hackers to copy and resend messages. The paper explores ways to generate and use these nonces while considering limitations in V2X communication. Further research is needed to find the best way to implement this and ensure it works well with other security measures.
The consequences of successful replay attacks in V2X systems can be severe, ranging from disruptions in traffic management and route optimization to compromised safetycritical applications like emergency braking or collision avoidance systems. Therefore, implementing effective countermeasures against replay attacks is crucial for ensuring the secure and reliable operation of V2X networks. Traditional methods for mitigating replay attacks often rely on the use of timestamps or sequence numbers. In a timestamp-based approach, each data packet is assigned a unique timestamp indicating its generation time. Recipients can then filter out replayed packets by comparing the timestamp with a predefined validity window. However, this method requires strict time synchronization between all nodes in the V2X network, which can be challenging to maintain in dynamic and distributed environments.
Keywords: V2X, replay attack, self-validating nonce, autonomous vehicle security.
1.INTRODUCTION Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication systems enable real-time data exchange between vehicles, infrastructure, and other connected entities, revolutionizing transportation networks. However, the widespread adoption of V2X technology hinges on robust security measures to protect against various cyber threats, including replay attacks.
Sequence number-based solutions, on the other hand, assign monotonically increasing sequence numbers to data packets. Recipients keep track of the latest sequence number received and reject any packets with duplicate or out-oforder sequence numbers. While this approach eliminates the need for time synchronization, it introduces complexities in managing sequence number spaces, particularly in scenarios with intermittent connectivity or frequent node joining and leaving.
Replay attacks involve the malicious capture and retransmission of legitimate data packets, disrupting system operations and compromising safety-critical applications. Traditional countermeasures, such as timestamps and sequence numbers, have limitations in dynamic V2X environments with intermittent connectivity and time synchronization challenges.
Nonce-based solutions have been proposed as an alternative to address the limitations of timestamps and sequence numbers. A nonce (number used once) is a random or pseudo-random value that is intended to be used only once in a cryptographic communication. By incorporating nonces into data packets, recipients can detect and discard replayed packets containing previously used nonces.
This white paper introduces the concept of self-validating nonces as an innovative solution for enhancing replay attack resilience in V2X systems. Self-validating nonces are cryptographic values that inherently validate their own freshness and uniqueness, eliminating the need for external verification mechanisms. By seamlessly integrating selfvalidating nonces into V2X communication protocols, we can significantly mitigate the risk of replay attacks and strengthen the overall.
However, existing nonce-based solutions often rely on centralized or distributed nonce generation and verification mechanisms, introducing additional overhead and potential single points of failure. Moreover, these existing approaches may fail under certain threat models, such as when adversaries possess the capability to predict or maliciously influence the nonce values employed.
2. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK Replay attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity and reliability of V2X communication systems. In a replay attack, an adversary intercepts legitimate data packets transmitted between vehicles, infrastructure, or other entities within the V2X network. These captured packets are then maliciously
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