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ISSN: 2772-9486
FOREWORD BY MR. BENJAMIN ECKHOLM
Lecturer in International Security at the Safety and Security Management Studies Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences
As an educator, certain moments stay with you for different reasons. Amid the usual rhythm of work, you sometimes find yourself paying attention to something else entirely. Often, it is those moments when students pursue ideas on their own initiative, beyo nd what was asked. This publication grew out of one of those moments. It reflects students who chose to invest their time in questions they found worth asking, creating something that no curriculum required of them.
What makes this edition particular is twofold. First, it grew out of a collaboration that was not immediately obvious. Centuria is part of the Safety and Security Management programme; ILSA is part of International and European Law. These are two disciplin es that, beyond the university walls, are in constant exchange. Still, bringing students from these two programmes together around a single publication was not something that naturally suggested itself, yet it is precisely for that reason that the result i s meaningful. An idea that began as a conversation became, in a remarkably short time, a shared undertaking shaped entirely by the students themselves.
Second, there is something meaningful about seeing that effort take physical form. This work in print adds a dimension that is easy to underestimate. So much of what we write today passes through screens and into archives to which we rarely return. A print ed publication behaves differently. It gives shape to a moment, holds it still, and offers the reader something to which they can return with the same attention that the writers gave it.
Looking through these pages, it becomes clear that they are only part of the story. What appears here is the visible result of something larger: the willingness to engage seriously with ideas and with one another. That is worth being proud of.
The five (co-authored) pieces that follow take up the Panama and Suez Canals, the Strait of Hormuz, Fukushima, Venezuela, and Greenland. Together, they show law and security thinking in genuine conversation. I hope these pages are met with the same curiosity and care that brought them into being.
JOINT EDITOR-IN-CHIEF’S NOTE
On behalf of the HHS ILSA Law Journal, and the Centuria Journal : The Safety and Security Review, it is our distinct pleasure to officially present you the first edition of the ILSA and Centuria Collaborative Journal of 2026.
First launched in 2016 under the auspices of the Hague Chapter of the International Law Students Association (HHS ILSA), the HHS ILSA Law Journal aims to promote scholarly reflection on current and emerging topics of International and European law.
Centuria Study Association, founded in 2014, created its blog in 2019, which was then transformed into the Centuria Journal: The Safety and Security Review in late 2025. Although its purpose and publications have varied over the years, the Centuria Journal : The Safety and Security Review currently serves to publish in-depth research articles on matters of safety and security, interviews with professionals in the field, current affairs analysis, and student -life tips. Additionally, the collaborative journal between ILSA and Centuria is the latter's first step into printed media.
This special edition focuses on contemporary challenges involving both legal and security perspectives. With rapidly evolving legal, political, and security problems we felt that fostering such discussions between students was vital. The premise of the articles is to expand the discussion to several viewpoints. Law does not exist in a vacuum and neither does security. In fact, one is almost always influenced by another, in addition to political, economic and social perspectives. Which is why this publication presents two legal analyses, and three co -written comparative articles , allowing students to dive deeper into topics outside of the classroom environment, and develop collaborative research skills into prevalent topics occurring worldwide.
We are pleased to present you with a great selection of contributions that illustrates the diversity and pertinence of the issues explored in this publication. We hope that you enjoy this issue, and find its contents curious, stimulating, and thought -provoking. On behalf of both editorial teams, we wish you a pleasant read!
Ms. Aurelie Levesque and Ms. Anna Vlugt ,
2025-2026 Editor-in-Chief of the HHS ILSA Law Journal, and 2025-2027 Editor-in-Chief of the Centuria Journal: The Safety and Security Review
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The ILSA Law Journal and Centuria Journal: The Safety and Security Review , would first like to thank the authors who shared their outstanding contributions in this issue, and contributed to its peer review. We are incredibly grateful for the unwavering trust, patience, and enthusiasm they showed towards the realization of this pu blication.
We would also like to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation to Mr. Benjamin Eckholm, the Centuria Advisor, for his foreword to this first edition. We are deeply thankful for the continuous support and guidance he has provided us in this project.
The Centuria Journal would like to thank the Centuria Management Board for its support in our newest project, and encouraging us to pursue new endeavours outside of our standard scope of research. We would like to extend our gratitude to President Ms. Noa Blum, Vice-President Mr. Chris Boyarin, Treasurer Ms. Lauren van Genuchten, Event Manager Mr. Josh Bosman, PR Manager Ms. Lora Fekete, and Editor-in-Chief of the Centuria Journal Ms. Anna Vlugt.
The ILSA Law Journal would also like to thank the 2025 -2026 ILSA Management Board for its unparalleled support and encouragement. We would like to extend our gratitude to President and Treasurer Konstantinos Karlos, Vice -President and Head of Social Events Ms. Kiahara Fleming, Head of Main Events Ms. Amal Mohamed, Head of Marketing Ms. Melisa Yusufova, and Editor-in-Chief of the ILSA Journal Ms. Aurelie Levesque.
Legal Analysis of the Strait of Hormuz
By Vin Stosio*
Abstract
The Strait of Hormuz has become a focal point in discussions surrounding international relations, particularly following Iran's blockade due to tensions with the U.S. and Israel.
Located between Iran and Oman, it is a crucial route for global trade, with 2 0-30 per cent of it, primarily oil, passing through. Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), Iran can claim 12 nautical miles, allowing it significant control. However, the Strait functions as a shared global corridor, and UNCLOS outlines duties for vessels and coastal states to ensure smooth navigation. Iran has not ratified UNCLOS due to disagreements on transit passage and operates as a persistent objector, which limits its obligations under customary international law. It prefers enforcing a regime of innocent passage, which provides more control. This situation highlights the complexities of applying international law to vital maritime routes amid strategic and political tensions.
* L.L.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
I. Introduction
In recent weeks, the Strait of Hormuz has taken a central position in several conversations related to international law. The blockade imposed by Iran due to the attacks from the United States and Israel sparked concerns, particularly regarding global trade and security. With the rapidly evolving circumstances reflected by the constantly changing newsfeed, the geopolitical significance of the Strait is called into question. This piece will highlight the significance of the Strait of Hormuz, explain the legal framework go verning it, and bring forward a few pressing issues associated with the Strait's unique location and the approach and interests of the global community.
II. Location and Significance of the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow stretch of water, located between Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. It connects the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea together. 1 It is 50 kilometres wide at its entrance and approximately 33 kilometres wide at its most narrow point. Its depth allows for the passage of the world's largest vessels, particularly crude oil tankers. Oil is most frequently transported within the Strait, given its location and the Middle East being a major global producer 2
An estimated 20-30 per cent of the global oil trade passes through the strait 3 According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), in 2025, about 20 million barrels of oil and oil products passed through the strait daily, amounting to around EUR 500 billion in annual energy trade. 4 Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, along with Iran are among the countries that supply oil passing through it. 5
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) is another substance frequently transported across the Gulf. In 2024, Qatar (the largest supplier of LNG among the Gulf countries) exported about
1 Butler G, ‘Iran War: What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Why Does It Matter?’ ( BBC News , 8 April 2026) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno> accessed 18 April 2026.
2 Butler G, ‘Iran War: What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Why Does It Matter?’ ( BBC News , 8 April 2026) <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno> accessed 18 April 2026.
3 ibid
4 ibid
5 ibid
9.3 billion cubic feet per day through the Strait. 6 The United Arab Emirates exported about 0.7 billion cubic feet. 7
In addition to exports, the Strait of Hormuz is a vital route for vessels importing food, medicine, and technological components to the Middle East, particularly crucial in times of increased military activity in the region. 8
Oil is one of the most important natural resources used today and serves as the world's top source of energy, a key ingredient of fuel that enables road and air travel daily. 9 Oil refined products are used as a component in nearly all chemical products . Common examples include fertilizers, medicines, plastic and items of daily use, such as credit cards, contact lenses, CDs and paint. 10 The impact of the strait is not limited to a game of numbers and the global budget; its presence stretches to civil society on all possible levels.
III. The Legal Framework
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states are allowed to claim up to 12 nautical miles of territorial sea 11 Thus, when applying this rule to the Strait of Hormuz, its entirety falls under the territories of Iran (north) and Oman (south). Normally, the states would have near-complete control over the passage's security, navigation, natural resources, airspace directly above, and the seabed below, which would enable I ran or Oman to deny passage if they deemed it necessary. 12 However, as the strait connects two major maritime zones and is used by several states in addition to Iran and Oman, it is treated as a shared global corridor and serves a collective international function . 13
Nonetheless, this does not absolve Iran and Oman from sovereignty over the waters completely. UNCLOS establishes a compromise between the state desire for control and the interests of the international community. 14 Article 34 of the UNCLOS entails that coastal states (Iran and Oman) retain sovereignty over the waters, the airspace above and the seabed below,
6 ibid
7 ibid
8 ibid
9 ‘Why Oil Is Important’ (UKOG) <https://www.ukogplc.com/page.php?pID=74> accessed 18 April 2026 .
10 ibid.
11 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force
16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, art 3.
12 ibid, art 21.
13 ibid, art 37.
14 Donald R. Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2016).
however, the sovereignty is subject to transit rights, established in article 38 . 15 According to article 38, every state can enjoy the right of free passage through the Strait. 16 This right applies to commercial ships, warships, submarines and military and civilian craft and it "shall not be impeded", meaning Iran and Oman are forbidden from blocking the passage, suspending it or making it conditional in any way. 17 Article 36 includes an exception to the right of passage, which is revoked when there is an equally convenient, alternative route. 18 Given the lack of such route in the case of the strait, this clause is completely excluded, making this waterway integral to international trade. 19
Aside from Article 36, UNCLOS takes more limitations into consideration, shielding the waters from potential exploits or actions threatening the sovereignty and safety of the coastal states.20 Article 39 lays down the duties of the passing vessels. The vessels must move without delay, prohibiting them from remaining idle in the Strait for any purposes, strategic or commercial. 21 Vessels shall not display any threats or use of force during the passage, meaning , inter alia, they must not intimidat e, commit military aggression, or conduct strategic exercises in the premises of the Strait. 22 Ships are only allowed activities necessary for passage; they cannot partake in fishing, conduct research, or gather intelligence. 23 Additionally, ships must strictly comply with other global safety rules due to the geopolitical importance of the Strait its operations, which can be jeopardized due to narrow shipping lanes. 24 Naturally, vessels are also obligated to fulfil their environmental obligations by following international environmental rules.25
15 UNCLOS (n 12), art 38.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
18 UNCLOS (n 12), art 36.
19 Ellyatt H, ‘Oil Exporters Scramble for Routes beyond Hormuz - but There Are No Easy Options’ (CNBC, 23 April 2026) <https://www.cnbc.com/2026/04/23/strait-hormuz-closure-alternative-routes-middle-east-oil-gaspipelines.html> accessed 25 April 2026.
20 UNCLOS, art 39
21 ibid.
22 ibid.
23 ibid.
24 ibid.
25 ibid.
Additionally, the UNCLOS imposes duties on the coastal states . 26 For example, Iran and Oman are forbidden from hampering the transit passage. They must refrain from obstructing or suspending transit passage. 27
IV. Legal Challenges over the Strait of Hormuz
Despite the collective agreement of the international community regarding the importance of the strait, as well as the UNCLOS being a sufficient legal basis for its purpose, Iran, one of the two coastal states of the Strait, holds a different position on t he subject. 28
Despite signing the UNCLOS in 1982, Iran has never officially ratified the convention, as it does not accept the rule regarding transit passage.29 According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a state is not obliged to follow the rules of a treaty it did not ratify. 30
However, a large portion of the rules included in the UNCLOS are widely regarded as customary international law, which does not require treaties to be enforceable. 31, Iran's conduct indicates its position as the persistent objector. 32 According to the "persistent objector" principle, a state may be excluded from following specific new customary law if it has persistently shown its objections against it. 33 Iran has shown consistent, public, and clear disapproval over the rule of transit passage through the Strait since its signature of the UNCLOS, which also introduced the rule of transit passage 34 An example of said disapproval is the declaration submitted by Iran at the time of UNCLOS signature, where it clarified its understanding of “transit passage” as applicable only to the parties of the convention. 35 To this
26 ibid, art 44.
27 ibid.
28 Kudrin B, ‘The Strait of Hormuz and the Limits of Maritime Law’ ( Default, 23 March 2026) < https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/the -strait-of-hormuz-and-the-limits-of-maritime-law?> accessed 26 April 2026.
29 Jamshidi M, ‘Only One Side Has Clearly Broken the Law in the Strait of Hormuz’ ( The Nation, 17 April 2026) <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz -international-law/#> accessed 18 April 2026.
30 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331, art 34.
31 Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 33 UNTS 993, art 38(1)(b).
32 Jamshidi M, ‘Only One Side Has Clearly Broken the Law in the Strait of Hormuz’ ( The Nation, 17 April 2026) <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz -international-law/#> accessed 18 April 2026.
33 Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) [1951] ICJ Rep 116.
34 Santos EA, ‘Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Closure under International Law’ ( Diplomacy and Law , 3 April 2026) <https://www.diplomacyandlaw.com/post/iran-s-strait-of-hormuz-closure-under-international-law> accessed 26 April 2026.
35 Martin Wählisch, ‘The Iran-United States Dispute, the Strait of Hormuz, and International Law’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 22.
day, Iran does not agree with the position that passage of vessels through the strait is a part of the international custom. 36
Given Iran's abstention from ratifying the UNCLOS and from making its articles binding, some questions arise regarding its other provisions. Particularly, whether Iran can exercise sovereignty over the 12 nautical miles of waters, if it has not ratified th e treaty including the rule enabling it to do so.37 The difference lies in the conduct of the state and the source of the rule itself. As noted above, the transit passage rule was first established by UNCLOS and was rejected by Iran from the outset. 38 Later, as it developed into an international custom, Iran maintained its position, making itself the persistent objector to transit passage. 39
Article 3 of UNCLOS was based on the pre-existing international custom of states claiming up to 12 nautical miles of waters. 40 Iran's claim to the 12- nautical-mile limit has a legal basis not in the unratified UNCLOS but in an older international custom. 41
What Iran is willing to enforce is a less restrictive rule, namely the regime of innocent passage.42 The difference between innocent passage and transit passage is the application of each principle. Transit passage corresponds with international waters, innocent passage with territorial waters, which reflects Iran's position on its shared claim over the territories . 43 In this case, applying the regime of innocent passage would allow Iran to temporarily suspend innocent passage if it deems it necessary. 44 This right extends to warships, as is the case with transit passage, the state would be allowed prior notification or authorization before being let through the Strait. 45 While very similar to transit passage, this rule allows Iran a subtly wider degree of control over the passage, which the state may deem crucial during the military aggression against it from the United States and Israel. 46
36 Jamshidi M, ‘Only One Side Has Clearly Broken the Law in the Strait of Hormuz’ ( The Nation, 17 April 2026) <https://www.thenation.com/article/world/iran-strait-of-hormuz -international-law/#> accessed 18 April 2026.
37 UNCLOS (n 12), art 3.
38 Santos EA, ‘Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Closure under International Law’ ( Diplomacy and Law , 3 April 2026) <https://www.diplomacyandlaw.com/post/iran-s-strait-of-hormuz-closure-under-international-law> accessed 26 April 2026.
39 ibid.
40 Serita K, The Territory of Japan (Springer 2023).
41 ibid.
42 ibid.
43 UNCLOS (n 12), art 17.
44 ibid, art 25.
45 ibid, art 21.
46 Said Mahmoudi and others, ‘Transit Passage’ in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2021).
V. Conclusion
The Strait of Hormuz is not only an essential maritime region but also a clear example of the legal tensions that arise when state sovereignty conflicts with the interests of the international community. While Iran retains sovereignty over their territoria l seas, this sovereignty is limited by the regime of transit passage, which should guarantee continuous and unobstructed navigation. Iran’s reliance of the regime of innocent passage reflects an attempt to assert greater control over the Strait. However, as demonstrated, this position contrasts with the broader international understanding of the Strait as a shared corridor subject to less restrictive rules. The distinction between the two regimes is central to determining the legality of restricting access to the Strait. Ultimately, the situation highlights the difficulty of enforcing a uniform, legal framework where states adopt fundamentally different interpretations of their obligations. The Strait illustrates both the importance of international law in r egulating critical maritime routes and its limitations
Historical analysis of Greenland through the lens of geopolitics, international law and international relations
By Sabina Tilici* and Daria Hasan*
Abstract
This article examines the legal and geopolitical evolution of Greenland and explains how Denmark retained sovereignty despite repeated foreign interest, particularly from the United States. It argues that Greenland’s current status is not the product of Da nish sovereignty alone, but of a broader legal transformation from colonial possession to a territory whose people are recognised under international law as possessing the right to self -determination. The article traces the consolidation of Danish title th rough colonial administration and the landmark Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, before analysing the impact of the Second World War, Cold War defence arrangements, and the constitutional development of Greenland within the Danish Realm. Particular attention is given to American military involvement, including Project Iceworm, and the legal significance of consent -based defence cooperation. The article concludes that contemporary geopolitical interest in Greenland does not reopen questions of territorial title. Instead, Greenland’s legal position is governed by a framework combining Danish sovereignty, Greenlandic self -government, and the internationally recognised right of the Greenlandic people to determine their own future.
* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences .
* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences
I. Introduction
Greenland has long stood as a territory over which competing powers have asserted strategic, political, and legal interest, yet it has remained within the Kingdom of Denmark. This raises a central question of how and on what legal basis did Denmark retain Greenland despite repeated foreign interest and shifting geopolitical pressure. The issue is not merely historical. It engages core principles of international law, including sovereignty, self -determination, jurisdiction, and the limits of extraterritorial authority. This article examines Greenland’s legal and geopolitical development through the lenses of international law, international relations, and geopolitics, with the particular attention to the interest the United States presented over the territory. The core of this article lies in the idea that Greenland’s present status cannot be explained solely by Danish territorial sovereignty but must instead be understood as the result of a longer legal evolution. This evolution is a process coming from colon ial possession to judicially confirmed Danish title which got its people to be now recognised under international law as holding the right to self-determination.
To get to this understanding, the article traces back the historical consolidation of Danish sovereignty, the significance of the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case . Additionally, it goes alongside big historical block such as the wartime and Cold War expansion of U.S. military involvement, and Greenland’s subsequent constitutional transformation within the Danish Realm. In the end, it further argues that increasing foreign interest in Greenland highlights the significance of the current legal framework of sovereignty, consent, and selfdetermination rather than reopening the title dispute.
II. Formation and consolidation of Danish sovereignty over Greenland
Greenland holds a unique position in international legal and geopolitical debate. The island sits at the intersection of colonial history, territorial sovereignty, and modern geopolitical competition. 1 As a result, its legal status has long sparked considerable worldwide interest. Greenland's current legal situation cannot be properly understood without first considering how Danish control over the island was obtained and consolidated. Greenland is curr ently an autonomous territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. 2 Its legal relationship with Denmark,
1 Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon Rahbek -Clemmensen (eds), Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic: Postcolonial Paradiplomacy between High and Low Politics (Routledge 2019). 2 ibid.
on the other hand, evolved because of a lengthy colonial process rather than a modern act of self-determination. 3
Greenland's history highlights mostly its association with Denmark. It was first inhabited by Indigenous peoples before the arrival of Norse settlers. 4 However, later colonial expansion and the strengthening of Danish sovereignty have contributed to its current legal relationship with the Kingdom of Denmark, rather than its medieval existence. 5
Greenland was first colonised by Denmark in 1721, and it remained a Danish colony until 1953, when modifications to the Danish Constitution effectively abolished its colonial status within the Kingdom. 6 In classical international law, Denmark's claim to sovereignty over Greenland was founded on a mix of effective possession, continuous administration, and international recognition. 7 Danish power was eventually established through settlement, trade monopolies, and governmental administration. 8 In that regard, Greenland exemplifies a traditional structure of territorial title development, in which persistent governmental effort was deemed sufficient to maintain sovereignty.
Denmark’s claim to sovereignty over Greenland did not go uncontested throughout history. A dispute arose from the contrast between Denmark’s established colonial administration and its relatively limited direct state presence in parts of eastern Greenland. By the twentieth century, Norwegian hunting, trapping, and commercial activity in the region had expanded considerably. 9 Following Norway’s independence in 1905, these historical and economic links were increasingly used to question whether Denmark exercised sufficient authority over the whole island. 10
3 ibid.
4 Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon Rahbek -Clemmensen (eds), Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic: Postcolonial Paradiplomacy between High and Low Politics (Routledge 2019) 3; Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 53 (1933) 22.
5 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 53 (1933) 22; Uffe Jakobsen, 'The Development of Greenland's Self-Government and Independence in the Shadow of the Unitary State' (2024) 47 Polar Geography 1, 2.
6 Uffe Jakobsen, 'The Development of Greenland's Self -Government and Independence in the Shadow of the Unitary State' (2024) 47 Polar Geography 1, 2; Denmark’s Riges Grundlov [Danish Constitutional Act] 1953 (Den).
7 ibid.
8 ibid.
9 The Dispute Between Denmark and Norway Over the Sovereignty of East Greenland' (1933) 27 American Journal of International Law 732.
10 ibid.
Norway challenged the extent of control Denmark exercised over Greenland in 1905. 11 The claim relied in part on historical arguments connected to earlier Norse presence. 12 However, Norway’s stand was diminished by the Ihlen Declaration in 1919 13. This strengthened Denmark’s position, and the dispute was later culminated in 1933 in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case before the Permanent Court of International Justice 14. The judgement later confirmed Danish sovereignty over the entire island. As for today, it remains a leading authority on territorial sovereignty in remote regions and established that Denmark had demonstrated sufficient authority and administration to su stain its title. 15
The legal significance of the Eastern Greenland judgment extends beyond the resolution of a bilateral territorial dispute. The decision has frequently been cited as an important authority concerning the evidentiary requirements for sovereignty over sparsel y populated and geographically remote territories. Rather than requiring intensive physical occupation across every part of the territory, the Permanent Court accepted that sovereignty could be demonstrated through a combination of governmental authority, administrative activity, and the intention to act as sovereign. The case therefore contributed to the development of a more flexible understanding of effective occupation in international law, particularly in regions where geography and climate make contin uous state presence difficult to maintain. Greenland consequently occupies an important place within the broader jurisprudence of territorial sovereignty beyond its immediate historical context. 16
As a result, the main interstate title dispute had been resolved by the middle of the 20th century. From then on, the constitutional status of Greenland, the consequences of decolonization, and ultimately the right of Greenlanders to self -determination became the main topics of discussion in the legal debate instead of whether Denmark had sovereignty over Greenland. 17 During that later stage, the legal assessment of Greenland's position became more dependent on larger post-war decolonization concepts, such as those found in UN General
11 ibid.
12 Nils Claus Ihlen, declaration to the Danish Minister (22 July 1919), reproduced in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 53, 71 -73.
13 Nils Claus Ihlen, declaration to the Danish Minister (22 July 1919), reproduced in Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 53, 71 -73.
14 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 53 (1933) 36.
15 ibid.
16 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 53, 45 –54.
17 Uffe Jakobsen, 'The Development of Greenland's Self -Government and Independence in the Shadow of the Unitary State' (2024) 47 Polar Geography 1; Thorsten Borring Olesen, 'Between Facts and Fiction: Greenland and the Question of Sovereignty 1945–1954' (2013) 7 New Global Studies 117.
Assembly Resolution 1514.18 The resolution adopted in 1960, titled The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, marked a decisive turn in international law by affirming that all colonial peoples possess a right to self -determination and that colonialism must be brought to a speedy and unconditional end 19. The emergence of selfdetermination also produced a broader conceptual transformation in the law of sovereignty itself. Whereas classical international law primarily concerned itself with identifying which state possessed valid title over a territory, po st-war international law increasingly examined the legitimacy of authority exercised within that territory. As Besson observes, sovereignty gradually evolved from a concept centred upon exclusive state authority towards one increasingly connected with democratic participation and the political will of peoples. 20
This development is particularly relevant to Greenland because, once Danish title had been judicially confirmed, the principal legal issue ceased to concern competing interstate claims and instead became the relationship between Danish authority and Greenl andic political aspirations. The legal significance of decolonisation therefore lies not in reopening the question of sovereignty over Greenland, but in altering the normative framework through which that sovereignty would thereafter be exercised and justified.
III. Greenland before the Second World War: settled title and legal transition
Following the 1933 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland decision, Denmark's sovereignty over Greenland was established on a firm interstate legal foundation. 21 As a result, by the outbreak of World War II, Greenland was no longer characterised by an unresolved title dispute, but rather a Danish colonial possession whose main legal concerns were starting to move from sovereignty itself to governance, constitution al status, and, eventually, decolonization. The significance of the pre-war position lies in the fact that Danish title had already been judicially confirmed before Greenland became a site of heightened strategic interest. 22 As sovereignty was already settled, any later foreign presence in Greenland had to rest on Danish consent or
18 UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 December 1960).
19 ibid.
20 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) paras 31–34.
21 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 53 (1933) 22; Uffe Jakobsen, 'The Development of Greenland's Self-Government and Independence in the Shadow of the Unitary State' (2024) 47 Polar Geography 1, 2.
22 Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v Norway) PCIJ Reports Series A/B No 53 (1933); Thorsten Borring Olesen, 'Between Facts and Fiction: Greenland and the Question of Sovereignty 1945 –1954' (2013) 7 New Global Studies 117, 120.
legal arrangement, instead of an independent claim to title. 23 In this regard, the events occurring during World War II did not readdress the legal question of sovereignty over Greenland but instead focus on the extent to which foreign military presence could operate within a territory whose title already belonged to Denmark 24
In April 1940, Germany invaded Denmark, cutting Greenland off from the Danish government's effective administration in Copenhagen 25. In the extraordinary circumstances that followed, Greenland became increasingly crucial to both the Allied nations, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, and Nazi Germany 26 Considering this, the Danish envoy to Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, signed the 1941 Agreement Relating to the Defence of Greenland, allowing the US to set up military bases and defensive zones on the island. 27 Importantly, Kauffmann operated without the permission of the Danish administration in occupied Copenhagen, which eventually rejected the agreement even though it served as the effective legal basis for the United States' military presence in Greenland 28
Although Greenland was not transformed into a formal United States protectorate, it did come under American protection during the w ar.29 At the same time, its seclusion from Denmark provided a relatively wide degree of practical autonomy during the war years . 30
IV. Greenland in the Cold War legal order
During the Cold War, Greenland became more strategic as part of the larger Arctic and North Atlantic security architectur es.31 The island's location between North America and Europe made it crucial for surveillance, military logistics, and early warning systems . 32 Additionally, it also confirmed the United States' interest in keeping a long -term defence presence there 33 However, this increased strategic relevance did not override Danish
23 Agreement relating to the Defense of Greenland (United States –Denmark) 9 April 1941, 55 Stat 1245 (EAS 204), art I.
24 ibid.
25 Kristian Søby Kristensen and Jon Rahbek -Clemmensen (eds), Greenland and the International Politics of a Changing Arctic: Postcolonial Paradiplomacy between High and Low Politics (Routledge 2019).
26 ibid.
27 Agreement Relating to the Defence of Greenland , signed 9 April 1941, 55 Stat 1245.
28 ibid.
29 Trap Greenland, ‘The war years and subsequent decolonisation’ < https://trap.gl/en / > accessed 31 May 2026.
30 ibid.
31 Thorsten Borring Olesen, 'Between Facts and Fiction: Greenland and the Question of Sovereignty 1945 –1954' (2013) 7 New Global Studies 117, 119; Uffe Jakobsen, 'The Development of Greenland's Self -Government and Independence in the Shadow of the Unitary State' (2024)
32 ibid.
33 ibid.
sovereignty. Rather, it established a legal regime in which US military operations in Greenland were structured around agreements with Denmark 34 These agreements were closely interconnected with Greenland's steady constitutional transition . 35
The 1951 Agreement for the Defence of Greenland provided the primary legal foundation for that military presence 36 Its significance stems from the fact that it placed US action in Greenland on a treaty basis . 37This helped maintaining the formal position that American stations and operations existed through defensive cooperation with Denmark rather than a transfer of sovereignty 38. In a legal sense, Greenland remained Danish territory, but it had unique strategic relevance within the Cold War order.
V. Project Iceworm and the limits of consent
Controversially, these consent-based agreements were tested by a secret U.S. military initiative which later came to be known as ‘Project Iceworm’. 39 The project was publicly presented as Camp Century, established in 1959 as a scientific and engineering installation beneath the Greenland ice sheet. It was much later revealed that the project in fact served as a feasibility test for a far more ambitious military plan . 40It was a vast tunnel network under the ice capable of supporting the deployment of hundreds of nuclear missiles directed at the Soviet Union.41 Its legal relevance originates not from a challenge to Danish sovereignty over Greenland, but from the extent to which US military involvement may have extended beyond the boundaries of Danish agreement under current defence relations. 42 The project eventually proved unfeasible because the changing ice sheet made long -term subsurface deployment unsustainable, and Camp Century was closed in the mid -1960s 43 Nonetheless, the episode has kept modern relevance. Concerns have lingered over the waste and abandoned infrastructure
34 Agreement relating to the Defense of Greenland (United States –Denmark) 9 April 1941, 55 Stat 1245 (EAS 204); Agreement between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Denmark pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, Regarding the Defence of Greenlan d, 27 April 1951, 2 UST 1485 (TIAS 2445).
35 Thorsten Borring Olesen, 'Between Facts and Fiction: Greenland and the Question of Sovereignty 1945 –1954' (2013) 7 New Global Studies 117, 124
36 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the Defence of Greenland, signed 27 April 1951, 12 UST 908, TIAS 4792.
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
39 Petersen, N. (2008), The Iceman that never came: ‘Project Iceworm ’, the search for a NATO deterrent, and Denmark, 1960–1962. Scandinavian Journal of History , 33(1), 75–98.
40 ibid.
41 Nikolaj Petersen, ‘The Iceman that never came. “Project Iceworm”, the search for a NATO deterrent, and Denmark, 1960-62’ (2008) 33(1) Scandinavian Journal of History 75.
42 ibid.
43 ibid.
left beneath the ice. NASA stated in 2024 that radar data had revealed structural remains of Camp Century beneath the Greenland Ice Sheet, highlighting the Cold War project's long -term environmental and legal consequences. 44 What sparked debates about this episode is the fact that Denmark was not aware of Camp Century’s actual military purpose until 30 years after the abandonment of the site, in 1996. The permission had been granted to the U.S. for what was thought to be a scientific research base. In reality, the project was a military plan to assess the feasibility of deploying nuclear missiles on Danish sovereign territory. 45
Project Iceworm did not lead to a public judicial dispute, but it did raise a serious legal and political question as to whether the United States have exceeded the scope of Danish consent under the Greenland defence framework. 46 If framed as an inter-state legal issue, the relevant treaty framework would have been the 1951 Defence Agreement itself. 47 Additionally, any forces-related claims could also have engaged the NATO Status of Forces Agreement. 48
As Greenland's historical and legal development progressed, a further constitutional shift occurred in 1979, when the country gained Home Rule. 49This marked the process of the territory becoming a largely self-governing part of the Kingdom of Denmark, even though sovereignty and key matters such as foreign affairs, defence, and monetary policy remained with Denmark. 50 This increased autonomy was further reflected when Greenland withdrew from the European Communities after a referendum and was granted Overseas Country and Territory status in 1985. 51 This established its increasingly unique constitutional and external standing within the Danish Realm. 52
VI. Greenland in the contemporary legal order
44 Michala Garrison and others, ‘New View of the “City Under the Ice”’ (NASA Earth Observatory, 25 November 2024) <https://science.nasa.gov> accessed 31 May 2026.
45 Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, ‘Greenland and the Legacy of Camp Century: Melting ice sheet could release frozen Cold War-era waste’ (GEUS, 4 August 2016) < https://www.geus.dk/ > accessed 31 May 2026.
46 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the Defence of Greenland, signed 27 April 1951, 12 UST 908, TIAS 4792.
47 ibid.
48 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, signed 19 June 1951, 199 UNTS 67 (entered into force 23 August 1953).
49 The Greenland Home Rule Act, Act No 577 of 29 November 1978 (entered into force 1 May 1979) (Denmark).
50 ibid.
51 Council Decision 2006/526/EC of 17 July 2006 on relations between the European Community, Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark [2006] OJ L 208/28.
52 ibid.
Greenland currently holds a distinct legal position within the Kingdom of Denmark. Although it is still part of the Danish Realm, the Self -Government Act of 2009 recognises the people of Greenland as a people pursuant to international law with the right to selfdetermination. 53 From the perspective of contemporary international law, this recognition is significant because it reflects the increasingly accepted distinction between sovereignty and self-determination. Although these principles are sometimes presented as competing no rms, modern scholarship has increasingly viewed them as mutually reinforcing. Sovereignty provides the legal framework through which authority is exercised, while self -determination contributes to the legitimacy of that authority by linking governance to t he wishes of the population concerned. Greenland therefore presents an example of a territory in which internationally recognised self-determination operates within, rather than against, an existing sovereign framework.54 The recognition of Greenlanders as a people under international law consequently strengthens the legitimacy of constitutional decision -making concerning the territory without automatically displacing Denmark’s continued sovereignty under international law. 55 Greenland's contemporary situation must be defined in terms of both Danish sovereignty and Greenlandic political agency.
Considering contemporary foreign claims, the renewed interest from the United States in Greenland does not reopen the question of title. The framework limits the claims of ‘acquisition’ as they were defined long ago. Regarding this, any future change in Greenland’s status would have to proceed through a lawful process. This would have to be grounded in selfdetermination and not unilateral acquisition or external pressure. 56 This conclusion reflects a wider development in contemporary international law concerning the nature of territorial sovereignty. Historically, territorial transfers were often understood primarily as transactions between states, evidenced by examples such as the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of Alaska. Modern international law, however, increasingly recognises that territory cannot be treated merely as an object of interstate exchange detached from the population residing upon it. The growing influence of self-determination has fundamentally altered this position by requiring consideration of the wishes and political status of the people concerned. In Greenland’s case, the recognition of Greenlanders as a people possessing the right to self -
53 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act No 473 of 12 June 2009 (Denmark).
54 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge University Press 1995) 101 –119.
55 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) paras 59-63
56 Act on Greenland Self-Government, Act No 473 of 12 June 2009 (Denmark).
determination means that contemporary discussions concerning acquisition, transfer, or changes in constitutional status cannot be analysed exclusively through the traditional law of territorial sovereignty. Rather, they must also account for the political agency of the Greenlandic people themselves. Consequently, geopolitical interest in Greenland may generate political pressure, but it does not provide an independent legal basis for altering the territory’s status under international law.57
Legally speaking, the current constitutional framework also sharpens the function of sovereignty. 58 The Kingdom of Denmark still has sovereignty over Greenland, but it is no longer used in a strictly colonial way. Rather, it is moderated within a system of territorial autonomy whereby Greenlandic institutions have significant control over domestic issue s, but the Realm retains jurisdiction over foreign affairs, defence, and security. As a result, the legal situation is one of divided competence rather than divided title: Greenland has broad internal authority, while Denmark maintains foreign sovereignty. Any examination of foreign participation in Greenland today must take this discrepancy into consideration. In addition to operating within Danish sovereignty's bounds, external players must adhere to a constitutional framework that acknowledges Greenland' s political agency and right to choose its own future.
The Self-Government Act further demonstrates that Greenland possesses a limited but real international legal capacity. 59 At the same time, the Act makes clear that foreign and security policy remain affairs of the Danish Realm. 60 Greenland therefore does not possess full external sovereignty, but it does possess a functionally defined external competence within the broader framework of Danish statehood. This point is central to any contemporary discussion of jurisdiction and foreign involvement in Greenland, because external relations concerning defence and security cannot be separated from Danish sovereignty, whereas matters exclusively concerning Greenlandic competences may increasingly involve Greenlandic participation and representation.
At the same time, climate change, Arctic accessibility, and growing interest in natural resources have boosted Greenland's geopolitical importance . 61 These developments have no
57 Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford University Press 2012) paras 55-63
58 The Constitutional Act of Denmark 1953; Act No 473 of 12 June 2009 on Greenland Self -Government.
59 Self-Government Act 2009.
60 ibid.
61 Marc Jacobsen, Ole Wæver and Ulrik Pram Gad (eds), Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze (University of Michigan Press 2024).
bearing on its legal standing, but they raise concerns about governance, regulatory control, and the balance between Greenlandic autonomy, Danish sovereignty, and foreign strategic interests.
62
Climate change also introduces a new legal dimension. In its 2025 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice confirmed that nations have legal obligations in relation to actions that harm the climate system and may incur legal responsibility. 63 In the context of Greenland’s territory, this matters because climate change is not merely a background geopolitical fact. It shapes the island’s strategic importance, affects its environmental vulnerability, and sharpens the legal significance of state co nduct relating to Arctic governance, regulation, and extraction.
Greenland's current significance is not just strategic and economic, but also environmental and juridical. 64 The contemporary legal debate must accordingly be framed not solely by sovereignty and self-determination, but also by evolving obligations of prevention, regulation, and responsibility under international law. 65
Additionally, recent statement from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization underlines this distinction between strategic concern and legal title. The Secretary General, Mark Rutte, has treated Greenland as part of a broader Arctic security challenge requir ing stronger allied coordination, while avoiding any suggestion that NATO could serve as a basis for revisiting Greenland’s sovereignty or legal status.66
VII. Conclusion
The evolution of Greenland's legal system demonstrates how territorial status is dynamic in international law. What began as a colonial partnership based on Danish expansion and administration evolved into a constitutional arrangement shaped by decolonisat ion, Home Rule, and self-government. Greenland's legal ties to Denmark persisted throughout each phase, but their foundation and significance evolved. The biggest change in contemporary times has been the recognition of Greenland as a territory whose people have a right to self-determination
62 ibid.
63 Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, Advisory Opinion, 23 July 2025, General List No 187.
64 Marc Jacobsen, Ole Wæver and Ulrik Pram Gad (eds), Greenland in Arctic Security: (De)securitization Dynamics under Climatic Thaw and Geopolitical Freeze (University of Michigan Press 2024).
65 ibid.
66 Reuters, ‘Rutte says Greenland framework deal means NATO allies must step up on Arctic security’ (22 January 2026) < https://www.reuters.com >
under international law, rather than only as an object of sovereignty. Given the ongoing interest from other countries, especially the United States, that development is extremely significant. The historical record demonstrates that Greenland's strategic i mportance frequently prompted outside intervention, from defence agreements during the conflict to military initiatives during the Cold conflict to current geopolitical rivalry. However, the current legal position is much more transparent than the surrounding politics. No external power may legitimately perceive Greenland as a territory whose destiny can be determined solely by geopolitical ambition, and it is not legally eligible for unilateral conquest. The current constitutional and international legal framework, Danish sovereignty, Greenlandic self -government, and the right of the Greenlandic people to choose their own destiny, must be followed for any future changes to Greenland's status.
Maritime
Chokepoints
and Geopolitical Tension: A comparative analysis of the Legal, Security, and Economic Implications Surrounding the Panama and Suez Canals.
By Aurelie Levesque* and Anna Vlugt*
Abstract
Maritime chokepoints are among the most strategically significant waterways in trade, commerce, and geopolitics. The following article focuses on the Suez Canal and the Panama Canal, and their role in security, geopolitics, international law, and global tr ade. Fundamentally, these artificial waterways are located within sovereign territory, are central to global commerce, and the transport of gas and oil. However, they are increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts and political in stability.
The article provides a comparative analysis of legal, security and economic implications of both canals. First, the paper explores interactions between maritime law and notions of sovereignty, neutrality and how geopolitical implications affect the functio nality of the canals in practice. The second part examines the security implications of both canals, including the importance of political control and the presence of organized crime and trafficking, resulting in vulnerabilities in maritime supply chains.
The article concludes by demonstrating that regulating maritime chokepoints, conserving foundational legal principles, and ensuring security of the passageways remain a significant issue for international law and geopolitics. As modern disruptions are seen to cause global economic and security consequences, the protection of strategic interests, particularly at the national level, increases, often leading to abuse of power and blockages.
* Editor-in-Chief of the HHS ILSA Law Journal 2025-2026, and LL.B. Candidate of the International and European Law Programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
* Editor-in-Chief of the Safety and Security Review 2025-2027, and Bachelor’s Candidate of the Safety and Security Management Studies Programme at The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
I. Introduction
Each encompassing 12 per cent and 6 per cent of global trade, the Suez and Panama canals are crucial trade arteries and maritime corridors. 1 Though both are artificial, located within sovereign territory and therefore not subject to international laws, they serve vital international economic, security, and trade functions, in addition to providing access to countries.
Due to their importance, geopolitical tensions between national control, and risk of state interference are created. Modern international maritime law seeks to balance key principles including freedom of navigation and transit, state sovereignty, neutrality, whilst ma intaining efficiency to safeguard the global economy. For artificial waterways such as canals, their governance is managed through treaties, customary law, involvement of international organizations and political power dynamics between states. However, des pite formal legislative protection and codified governance of the canals through governments, both canals have historically shown that maritime chokepoints remain deeply political, particularly during conflict periods and, recently, geopolitical rivalries.
The legal analysis in section III therefore analyses the modern framework governing maritime law, and legal implications of maritime chokepoints including their strategic importance, as well as how ‘neutrality’ exists de facto
However, the implications for the strategic importance of the canals extend beyond legal perspectives . Section IV thus explores the security implications of the Suez and Panama canals, providing a comparative analysis of both. Whilst they are both vital for international security in terms of trade and land access, a major weak point faced is the presence of organized crime and various forms of trafficking, which is increasingly difficult to detect and regulate. Furthermore, despite their similar geopolitical origins, the analysis demonstrates the vast differences behind the reasons why countries are seeking control of t he canals, and where larger problems of organized crime exist.
1 Nayana Ruke, ‘Red Sea Disruptions, Panama Canal Constraints, and Their Long -Term Effects on Global Trade Routes’ (Global Trade, 18 February 2026) <https://www.globaltrademag.com/red -sea-disruptions-panama-canalconstraints-and-their-long-term-effects-on-global-trade-routes/> accessed 15 May 2026.
II. Overview
A. Panama Canal
The Panama Canal is an artificial waterway whose construction began in 1881 by the French, who later relinquished control to the United States (U.S.) in 1904. Ten years later, in 1904, the Panama Canal was completed and opened for maritime trade and traffi c. By 1999, the U.S. fulfilled the conditions of the treaty signed in 1977 and gave control of the canal to the Republic of Panama. Following this change in control, Panama began to expand the canal, completing the endeavour in 2016 2
Covering 50 miles (or 80 kilometres) in length , 3 the Panama Canal quickly became a vital aspect of global trade, with 6% of maritime trade transits passing through the canal . 4 In addition to its general involvement in the economy, the Panama Canal played a key role in the U.S.’s foreign policy as it connects the Pacific and Atlantic (via the Caribbean) oceans . 5
The role of the Panama Canal in politics and economics is only one part of the canal’s significance. Using a lock-based system, the Panama Canal became an innovative piece of maritime architecture as the locks lifted the ships above sea level with zero rel iance on pumps. For a ship to pass through the canal, it must be lifted 26 meters (or 85 feet) with water filling the three locks to move the ship over the mountains 6
The engineering genius that resulted in the Panama Canal has withstood over 100 years of weather damage, normal wear-and- tear, and technical issues 7 This resilience, in addition to the canal’s political and economic importance, has cemented its status as an invaluable maritime chokepoint within the Americas.
2 Chmielewski, K. (n.d.). Timeline and Map of the Panama Canal | Britannica . Www.britannica.com. https://www.britannica.com/story/timeline -and-map-of-the-panama-canal
3 Chmielewski, K. (n.d.). Timeline and Map of the Panama Canal | Britannica . Www.britannica.com. https://www.britannica.com/story/timeline -and-map-of-the-panama-canal
4 Lucq, R. (2025, March 12). Panama Canal: A Coveted Space at the Heart of the US -China Rivalry - IRIS. IRIS. https://www.iris-france.org/en/panama-canal-a-coveted-space-at-the-heart-of-the-us-china-rivalry/
5 Šerić, M. (2023, September 27). The Geopolitical Significance Of The Panama Canal – Analysis. Eurasia Review. https://www.eurasiareview.com/27092023 -the-geopolitical-significance-of-the-panama-canal-analysis/
6 Panama Ship Service. (2026, April 17). How the Panama Canal Was Built: A Technical and Operational History
- Panama Ship Service . Panama Ship Service. https://panamashipservice.com/how -the-panama-canal-was-builta-technical-and-operational-history/
7 Panama Ship Service. (2026, April 17). How the Panama Canal Was Built: A Technical and Operational History
- Panama Ship Service . Panama Ship Service. https://panamashipservice.com/how -the-panama-canal-was-builta-technical-and-operational-history/
B. Suez Canal
The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway, connecting the Mediterranean Sea and the Red Sea. 8 The canal is located in Egypt, and runs north -south across the Isthmus of Suez, separating Africa from Asia. 9 It provides the shortest maritime route between Europe and Asia, shaving off around 8,900 kilometres from the journey and avoiding a detour around the Cape of Good Hope.10 With a length of 193 kilometres, and a width of 225 meters at its narrowest point, it is one of the most strategic and vital waterways for global trade and the worldwide economy. 11
First opened in 1869, the canal had very few transits, around 2 per day. 12 Transits peaked in 2023 at 26,434 annually, and around 5 million barrels of oils per day were transported through the canal. 13 It facilitates around 12 to 15 per cent of global trade, and nearly 30 per cent of global container traffic. 14 As the canal is nationalized, it serves as Egypt’s third largest source of national income, behind overseas labour remittance and tourism, representing around 10 per cent of its national GDP. 15
However, the canal’s strategic significance has led to dispute. Regional conflicts and political instability in Yemen, Sudan, and more recently the Strait of Hormuz, poses threats to transits through the canal, despite no formal closures. 16 Consequently, conflicts in the region and attacks on container ships risking the safety of seafarers pose threats to maritime security, disrupt trade flows, and increase transit risks. 17 Given the importance of this waterway, the UN
8 Ferat Kaya, ‘The global fragility of international trade routes: Suez and beyond’ [2026] 11 Bulletin of Economic Theory and Analysis 203.
9 William Fisher, ‘Suez Canal’ (Britannica, 6 May 2026) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Suez -Canal> accessed 15 May 2026.
10 Mohammed Haddad and Alia Chughtai, ‘The world's most strategic straits and channels’ (Aljazeera, 18 March 2026) <https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2026/mapping -oil-hormuz-chokepoint/> accessed 15 May 2026.
11 ibid.
12 Fisher (n 8).
13 ibid; Haddad (n 9).
14 Kemal Yildirim, ‘BRICS and the Red Sea -Suez-Indian Ocean Corridor: Egypt’s Strategic Gateway Role’ (Diplomatist, 30 April 2026) <https://diplomatist.com/brics -and-the-red-sea-suez-indian-ocean-corridor-egyptsstrategic-gateway-role> accessed 16 May 2026.
15 Ezzat Kenawy, ‘The Economic Impacts of the New Suez Canal’ ( IEMed) <https://www.iemed.org/publication/the -economic-impacts-of-the-new-suez-canal/> accessed 15 May 2026.
16 ibid.
17 ibid.
has repeatedly called for “cessation of hostile activity” and the need for “regional and international efforts for peaceful resolution” and protecting the global economy. 18
III. International Maritime Law
International maritime law, also referred to as admiralty law, refers to an ius commune area of law, specifically law applicable to more than one jurisdiction. 19 Maritime law is composed of maritime customs, codes, conventions, treaties and practices, 20 and regulates maritime organizations, create training and safety standards, govern dispute resolution and jurisdiction, and prevents pollution. 21 Today, modern maritime and commercial law must balance sovereignty, with international and commercial interests, and freedom of navigation, 22 and ensure that key global shipping lanes remain undisrupted and avoid interruptions in the global supply chain. The Suez and Panama canals demonstrate the tension between these principles and interests, despite formal legal commitments.
The following section outlines general maritime law frameworks, institutional governance and jurisdiction including relevant International Organizations (IOs), dispute resolution mechanisms, and finally, specific legal implications of the Suez and Panama c anals.
A. Historical development
The origins of maritime law date back to the 7 th Century with Rhodian Sea Law and Roman maritime rules. 23 These rules established foundational principles for maritime trade and conflict settlement reflected in modern rules today. The Middle Ages marked a turning point in maritime law, where new guidelines addressing rights of merchants, dispute resolution, an d obligations of crew and shipmasters were defined. 24 Finally, early modern legal frameworks and practices were primarily influenced by the respective Dutch and English maritime golden
18 Arsenio Dominguez, ‘Applying the Law of the Sea to Protect International Shipping’ ( UN Chronicle, 28 February 2024) <https://www.un.org/en/un-chronicle/applying-law-sea-protect-international-shipping> accessed 15 May 2026.
19 William Tetley, 'The General Maritime Law - The Lex Maritima' (1994) 20 Syracuse J Int'l L & Com 105, 108. 20 ibid.
21 “International Maritime Law” (Maritime Injury Center , 10 October 2024) <https://www.maritimeinjurycenter.com/maritime -rights/international-maritime-law/> accessed 28 March 2026.
22 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3 (UNCLOS), arts 37 and 87.
23 Rajiv Mazumder, Foster M., ‘Navigating Change: The Evolution of Maritime Law and Its Influence on International Shipping Regulations’ (2024) 11 IJIRT 2603.
24 ibid, pp. 2606.
periods.25 Notably, the early concept of lex mercatoria, or the law of merchants, was developed during the Dutch Golden Age, as the Dutch legal system “placed an emphasis on commercial norms and practices within the maritime sector”, modern dispute resolution mechanisms, and innovative maritime insurance procedures.26
With the expansion of global trade, maritime rules evolved to reflect new, large -scale commercial realities resulting from colonial empires, linking Europe with Asia, Africa and the Americas. 27 Whilst maritime rules were present and numerous, they were yet to be codified, creating confusion between varying national legal requirements. 28 In response, the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law pertaining to Bills of Lading (hereinafter the Hague Rules) was founded in 1924. The Hague Rules was the first international convention governing rights and obligations for the carriage of goods at sea.29 The rules established fundamental principles that carriers could not contract out of, including ‘seaworthiness’ and duties of care when carrying goods, and were subsequently revised in 1968 into the Hague-Visby rules. 30 However, these were deemed inadequate due to the rapidly increasing number of commercial shipping vessels, and thus, under the direction of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Hamburg rules were adopted in 1978. These rules extended obligations for carriers, who were now held under higher levels of duty of care to protect cargo on the ships. 31 Lastly, in 2008, the Rotterdam Rules were adopted, unifying the Hague-Visby rules and the Hamburg rules creating a consolidated, upto-date legal framework.
B. Legal framework for modern maritime and commercial law
Modern maritime law consists of treaties (i.e. codified legal norms and principles), customary international law, institutional regulations, and state practice. Strategic waterways, such as the Panama and Suez canals have a unique legal position, because t hey are
25 ibid, pp. 2607.
26 ibid, pp. 2608.
27 ibid.
28 ibid.
29 Mark Russell, “The Hague Rules – 100 years old and still standing” (Gard, 2 September 2024) <https://gard.no/en/insights/the-hague-rules-100-years-old-and-still-standing/> accessed 22 April 2026.
30 ibid.
31 Mazumder (n 11), pp. 2610.
geographically located within sovereign territories, but are international in terms of economic and political functions.32
1. Treaties
Maritime law functions with a ‘layered’ treaty framework, which regulates navigation, jurisdiction, environmental obligations, transit rights, and commercial shipping. Both canals are governed through differ ent legal agreements.
(a) UNCLOS: Foundational framework of maritime law
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as the foundation for all legal and security -related maritime regimes. 33 It serves as the ‘ constitution of the sea’ and outlines jurisdiction, sovereignty and usage rules and principles that States must abide by. 34 Its key provisions include the freedom of navigation, 35 the right to innocent passage,36 transit passage, 37 resources and deep seabed mining, 38 and defines maritime zones. 39 Importantly, both canals are an exception to these rules. As artificial waterways within sovereign territories, the UNCLOS does not fully govern them in the same way as natural straits, creating legal ambiguities and political implications for competing i nterests over the canals.
The Corfu Channel Case defined a ‘strait’ as a “geographical situation as connecting two parts of the high seas and the fact of its being used for international navigation”. 40 However, a ‘canal’, like a Strait, connects two high seas together, but their function is determined by the volume of international traffic and the multiplicity of countries that use them, including the Suez and Panama canals. 41 It is important to note that, due to their artificial nature,
32 Treaty Concerning The Permanent Neutrality And Operation Of The Panama Canal (adopted 1 September 1977, entered into force 1 October 1979) UNTS 18342.
33 Sam Bateman, ‘UNCLOS and Its Limitations as the Foundation for a Regional Maritime Security Regime’ [2007] 19 The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 27, pp. 28.
34 ibid.
35 UNCLOS (n 10) art 38.
36 ibid, arts 17 and 45.
37 ibid, arts 38 and 87.
38 ibid, Part VII Section 2.
39 ibid, art 55.
40 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4.
41 Benny Spanier, ‘Freedom of Navigation in the Suez Canal and the Channels: Law of the Sea’ in Carmela Lutmar and Ziv Rubinovitz (eds.) The Suez Canal: Past Lessons and Future Challenges (Palgrave Macmillian 2023).
the Suez and Panama canals are not subject to the UNCLOS, as it only governs natural waterways. However, areas surrounding the canal are subject to its jurisdiction.
(b) The Suez Canal and the 1888 Constantinople Convention
The Suez Canal, an artificial and man - made waterway, is located entirely within Egyptian territory. International law states that “canals are in principle subject to the territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction of the state or states which they separate or traverse”. 42 The UNCLOS thus does not govern the canal, but does govern the surrounding waterways, including the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, both connecting to the Suez Canal. 43 Specifically, both these waterways must guarantee the right of innocent passage in territorial waters, and the right to transit passage “in straits used for international navigation”, and freedom of navigation within EEZs. 44
Due to its location and nature, the Suez Canal is therefore solely regulated by the 1888 Constantinople Convention which protects the right to free passage in times of peace and war within the Canal. 45 Furthermore, the principles of neutrality and non-discrimination apply and must be upheld by Egypt. 46 The Canal is owned, maintained and operated by the state -owned Suez Canal Authority (SCA). 47
(c) Panama Canal Treaties
The Panama Canal evolved from quasi- imperial governance to sovereign national control, whilst enforcing international customary obligations of neutral passage. Opened in 1914 after ten years of construction, the Panama Canal revolutionized global trade and shipping.48 It connects the Atlantic and Pacific oceans together, significantly reducing shipping times. Before construction, Panama was part of Colombia, so negotiations for building a canal
42 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law , (9th ed. OUP 2019), 325.
43 UNCLOS (n 10), art 45.
44 Dominguez, (n 20).
45 1888 Constantinople Convention Respecting the Free Navigation of the Suez Maritime Canal (signed 29 October 1888) (1909) 3 AJIL Supp 123.
46 Robbie Sabel, ‘International Law and Freedom of Navigation Through the Suez Canal’ in Carmela Lutmar and Ziv Rubinovitz (eds.) The Suez Canal: Past Lessons and Future Challenges (Palgrave Macmillian 2023).
48 Clifford F. Thies, ‘A Brief History of the Panama Canal’ ( The Daily Economy , 25 March 2025) <https://thedailyeconomy.org/article/a-brief-history-of-the-panama-canal/> accessed 10 May 2026.
took place between the United States (US) and Colombia. 49 Initially, the Hay-Herrán Treaty was signed, but was rejected by the Colombian senate, which ultimately set up the Panamanian separation movement, and resulted in a subsequent treaty, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty. 50 The Treaty was signed by the French plenipotentiary ambassador for Panama in Washington, and in 1904, the US bought out the French interests in Panama for USD 40 million. 51
The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty led to decades of conflict between the US and Panama. The Treaty itself granted the US the rights “in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of [the canal zone] for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of [the] Canal”. 52 In addition, the Treaty grants the US the “rights, power and authority” within the canal zone to possess and exercise as “if it were the sovereign of the territory”. 53 The Treaty gave rise to 75 years of conflict between the two states, and caused vast socioeconomic issues. The ‘canal zone’ divided the country geographically, in addition to causing high unemployment after the canal construction was finalized, causing Panama’s first economic crisis. 54 Furthermore, the treaty did not allow for Panama to have a share in revenue or receive financial benefits from the canal. 55 These inequalities fuelled political uprisings in 1964, leading to death and injuries of dozens of Panamanian nationals. 56 After lodging a complaint with the Organization of American States, then -US President Lyndon B. Johnson acknowledged Panama’s claims, stating that “it is [their] obligation as allies and partners to review these claims and to meet them [...] when just and possible”. 57 Ten years later, the Torrijos-Carter Treaties on canal operations and permanent neutrality was signed in 1977. These treaties ended the concept of perpetuity, abolished the ‘Canal Zone’ and set the hand -over and full control of the canal to the Republic of Panama in 1999. 58 Today the Canal is managed by the Panama
49 NU. CEPAL. División de Recursos Naturales e Infraestructura, FAL Bulletin: The Panama Canal turns 100: history and possible future scenarios (Issue 334, UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean, 2014).
50 ibid.
51 ibid.
52 Convention for the Construction of a Ship Canal (Hay -Bunau-Varilla Treaty),18 November 1903, art 2.
53 ibid, art 3.
54 CEPAL (n 51).
55 ibid.
56 ibid.
57 ibid.
58 ibid.
Canal Authority, an autonomous entity separate from the Panamanian Government, and remains under exclusive Panamanian sovereignty. 59
C. Legal implications of key maritime chokepoints
Maritime chokepoints, according to the UN Conference on Trade and Development, are defined as “critical points along transport routes that facilitate the passage of substantial trade volumes, [serving] as vital arteries for global commerce”. 60 As alternative routes are often limited, “disruptions can lead to negative impacts in supply chains and to systemic consequences that affect food security, energy supply and the global economy”. 61 Both the Suez and Panama demonstrate how maritime chokepoints impact legal principles, and change when geopolitical influence, economic, and strategic interests are involved.
(a) Strategic importance of maritime passageways in global trade
The Suez and Panama canals, both narrow and key access points, serve as strategic maritime passageways in global trade. The Suez Canal links Asia and Europe, and cuts approximately 6,000 kilometres, around 9 to 14 days, from a ship’s journey between Singapore and Rotterdam, as opposed to ships circumnavigating Africa. 62 The Panama Canal links the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and reduces maritime distances by 13,000 kilometres, and the New York to Los Angeles route by 60 per cent 63
The Suez canal is both a maritime chokepoint and a key access point for global trade and energy security. 64 Around 12 to 15 per cent of global trade, equivalent to over 1 trillion USD in goods transiting through the waterway annually. 65 In terms of oil, around 9.2 million
59 Romane Lucq, ‘Panama Canal: A Coveted Space at the Heart of the US -China Rivalry’ (iRiS, 10 March 2025) <https://www.iris-france.org/en/panama-canal-a-coveted-space-at-the-heart-of-the-us-china- rivalry/> accessed 10 May 2026.
60 United Nations Conference On Trade And Development, 2024 Review of maritime transport: Navigating maritime chokepoints (United Nations Publications 2024).
61 ibid.
62 ‘Suez Canal Shipping: Transit Times and Its Effect on Global Trade’ ( MyDello, 15 December 2025) <https://mydello.com/suez-canal-shipping/> accessed 13 May 2026.
63 Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Geographical Impacts of the Suez and Panama Canals (6th ed., Routledge 2024).
64 Racha Helwa and Perrihan Al-Riffai, ‘A lifeline under threat: Why the Suez Canal’s security matters for the world’ (Atlantic Council, 20 March 2025) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in -depth-research-reports/issuebrief/a-lifeline-under-threat-why-the-suez-canals-security-matters-for-the-world/> accessed 13 May 2026.
65 ibid.
barrels per day pass through the canal. 66 Furthermore, its toll revenue serves as a major economic stream of income for Egypt. 67
Concurrent disruptions of both canals are currently causing significant disruptions impacting the global supply chain. 68 This can, subsequently, undermine economic growth, significantly drive up costs, and upend the flow of energy and food, which puts vulnerable economies at risk. 69 Due to growing challenges in both canals, the UN Commission on Trade and Development, in its Review of Maritime Transport, stated that these key chokepoints are “increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, conflicts and climate change”, disrupting shipping routes and supply chains.70 As over 80% of world trade volume is carried out by sea, the UNCTAD called for “swift and coordinated actions to safeguard global trade” and mitigate effects of chokepoint vulnerabilities. 71 The centrality of both chokepoints to the global economy can magnify geopolitical and legal tensions , impacting consumers worldwide.
In the same report, UNCTAD calls for addressing the need to build “more resilient and reliable supply chains”.72 Building resilient supply chains for maritime trade includes reducing risks by relying on diversified sourcing and manufacturing locations and increasing inventory. 73 Furthermore, given the disruptions in both the Panama and Suez canals, there is a clear need to enhance resilience to ensure “unhindered global maritime trade flows”, though inter alia, diversified shipping routes, enhanced cooperation among shippers, logistics providers and ports to optimize efficiency, and particularly improving international collaboration. 74 By strengthening trade pacts, diplomatic relations, and alliances, maritime trade flows will be smoother and more predictable, and states can collaborate together to manage risks and disruptions in supply chains. 75
(b) Neutrality in practice
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 ‘Suez and Panama Canal disruptions threaten global trade and development’ (UNCTAD, 22 october 2024) <https://unctad.org/news/suez-and-panama-canal-disruptions-threaten-global-trade-and-development> accessed 13 May 2026.
69 ibid.
70 UNCTAD (n 62).
71 ibid.
72 ibid, 24.
73 ibid.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
Despite its obligations of neutrality, the Suez Canal Authority and the State of Egypt have been repeatedly criticized for failing to uphold this principle. Notably, from 1948 onwards, Egypt prevented Israeli ships from using the canal, as the state claime d it was at war with Israel and that it was entitled to maintain the security of the canal. 76 Raising these claims to the UN Security Council, Egypt asserted its right to self -defence. 77 Despite involvement of the UN, resolutions failed and blockades continued. The 1979 Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel and its signature subsequently stopped interferences with the passage of Israeli ships through the Canal. 78 However, actions during the Arab-Israeli wars were evidently dictated through strategic commercial interests. 79 Legal neutrality, despite its presence in black - letter law, thus does not eliminate geopolitical leverage of States.
Today, the Suez Canal faces contemporary concerns regarding Red Sea security. The canal lost significant momentum after a series of Houthi attacks from 2023 onwards in the Red Sea.80 The Red Sea is a key corridor for maritime shipping, connecting the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea, via the Suez Canal. 81 The area handles around 12 to 15 per cent of international maritime trade. 82 However, attacks involving missiles, drone strikes, and armed groups have led to significant security risks for transits through the area. 83 In early 2026, tentative returns to the Red Sea and transits through the Suez Canal began, mostly from small container ships. 84 However, a broad return to transits through the area requires significant improvement of safety conditions for crew, and sustained stability. 85 As ships avoid the Red Sea area and divert to the Cape of Good Hope, revenue for the Egyptian Government has decreased, in addition to causing global supply chain and economic disruptions.
As the Red Sea and surrounding maritime waterways such as the Bab al -Mandab Strait, and, more prevalently the Strait of Hormuz, grow in tension and conflict, geopolitical problems
76 Sabel (n 48).
77 UN Doc. S/PV 688 13 January 1955 paras. 89, 90, 96.
78 Sabel, 142, 143.
79 ibid, 143.
80 Eve Barre, ‘Houthi attacks in the Red Sea: why maritime trade is (still) not smooth sailing’ ( Coface, 29 December 2025) <https://www.coface.com/news -economy-and-insights/houthi-attacks-in-the-red-sea-whymaritime-trade-is-still-not -smooth-sailing> accessed 13 May 2026.
81 ‘Red Sea Security’ (World Shipping Council, January 2026) <https://www.worldshipping.org/red-sea-security> accessed 14 May 2026.
82 ibid.
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
85 ibid.
test the effectiveness of international maritime law. 86 Despite the Suez Canal not being governed by the UNCLOS, and no current closures of the canal, surrounding conflicts in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz evoke the Convention nonetheless. For example, attacks by Houthi rebel groups in the Red Sea limit accessibility towards the Suez Canal, despite no formal closures and formal entitlement to freedom of passage. 87 This causes shipping companies to re-route around Africa, causing delays and raising costs, causing de -facto suspension of the freedom of navigation. 88
The extent to which the UNCLOS serves as an effective legislative tool to ensure maritime security is heavily debated by scholars. Several examples can be found from noncompliance of states or contestation of certain principles of the Convention. For inst ance, China’s ‘9-dash line’ claims a significant portion of the South China Sea, beyond the 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone it is entitled to under the Convention. 89 Moreover, a key international actor, the United States has yet to ratify the Convention, due to oppositions on key seabed mining provisions and lack of veto power. 90 As a proactive security partner, its influence is heavily limited by its non -ratification. 91 It has a severely restricted role within maritime dispute settlement bodies, such as the South China Sea arbitration, or Russia’s extended stakes of the Arctic seabed. 92 Thus, protection of its collective security and economic interests are reduced. 93
Regarding tensions and conflict in the Red Sea and Strait of Hormuz regions where the US is a primary actor, the effectiveness of the Convention is further reduced by its lack of ratification. Therefore, despite efforts of other state actors, the freedom o f navigation risks being undermined, not due to formal closures, but armed threats from non -state actors. 94 As these groups are not signatories, state liability for attacks of ships by third -parties creates an accountability and enforcement gap. 95 Due to these threats, ships re-route, impacting the global
86 Samir Kenaza and Mohammed Kenaza, ‘Geopolitical Conflicts and Their Repercussions on Cargo Movement in Vital Chokepoints - A Case Study: Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz’ [2026] 11 JEL 118.
87 ibid 127.
88 ibid.
89 The South China Sea Arbitration (Philippines v. China) (Award) PCA Case N 2013-19 (12 July 2016).
90 John Kraus, ‘Unmoored from the UN: The Struggle to Ratify UNCLOS in the United States’ ( The SAIS Review of International Affairs , 26 June 2023) <https://saisreview.sais.jhu.edu/unmoored -from-the-un -the-struggle-toratify-unclos-in-the-united-states/> accessed 13 May 2026.
91 ibid.
92 ibid.
93 ibid.
94 Kenaza (n 88), 127.
95 ibid, 128.
economy. Therefore, the Convention shows a clear gap that the original drafters did not consider, namely non-state actor involvement in conflicts, such as rebel groups. 96 This creates ambiguity, raising questions on the effectiveness of the UNCLOS in managing geopolitical tensions and legal gaps within current conflicts.
The Panama Canal, in comparison, has seen a historically US -based dominance, repeatedly testing its neutrality obligations due to regional conflicts. However, US influence continues today, with escalating tensions between the US and China, the two biggest users of the canal. 97 The current Trump administration has repeatedly declared intentions to ‘retake ’ control of the canal, citing excessive tolls imposed on US ships and that these unfairly penalised US economic interests. 98 China, on the other hand, has gradually increased investments in multiple sectors of the Panamanian economy and expanded its influence, particularly under its Belt and Road Initiative. 99 Panama now exists in a delicate diplomatic position, as it attempts to balance the interests of two global superpowers attempting to control a vital maritime asset.
100
IV. Security Implications
A. The Politics of Security
Both the Panama and Suez Canals are considered to be (artificial) maritime chokepoints, 101 narrow passageways that connect two major bodies of water, which are vital in trade routes and military strategy 102 If a single country is in control of a major chokepoint (canals, straits, valleys, etc.), 103 that country would be in the possession of significant military and economic power. Control over chokepoints like the Panama and Suez Canals holds the utmost importance concerning the politics of security, specifically in relation to the motivations behind such control, and its geopolitical basis. The following section will identify and analyse
96 ibid.
97 CEPAL (n 51); Lucq (n 61).
98 ibid.
99 ibid.
100 ibid.
101 Federal Maritime Commission. (2025, March 18). FMC Launching Examination of Global Maritime Chokepoints - Federal Maritime Commission . Federal Maritime Commission. https://www.fmc.gov/articles/fmclaunching-examination-of-global-maritime-chokepoints/
102 Misachi, J. (2019, April 12). What Is The Significance Of A Choke Point? WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-significance-of-a-choke-point.html
103 Misachi, J. (2019, April 12). What Is The Significance Of A Choke Point? WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-significance-of-a-choke-point.html
why control over the aforementioned canals is instrumental in state security, as well as the specifics of each canal.
1. Political and Security Interests in the Control of Military Chokepoints
When a country has control over a chokepoint, it grants them the ability to limit access or close the canal (or strait) entirely 104 In more recent history, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz may serve as a prime example of the implications of such actions . 105 The Strait, which falls under the control of Iran, has been a point of tension since the start of the U.S. -Israeli war on the Gulf State. 106
In a form of retaliation against the U.S. and Israel, Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz, effectively cutting off 20% of oil and gas supplies that the world relies on. As a result of this action, gas, energy, and oil prices reached historic highs, affecting the global economy as a whole, including Americans and Israelis. 107
Iran’s control over and closure of the Strait have provided it with significant leverage over its adversaries. In peace talks between the states at war, Iran agreed to reopen the Strait under the condition of a ceasefire, a clear show of force and power th at Iran was only capable of because of their control over a chokepoint. 108 By having this control, Iran is/was able to protect their national security, as those who are attacking it need the Strait to remain open, lest it cause severe economic distress to their own country.
This concept of control over chokepoints as vital to a state’s security is an old, geopolitical concept introduced by U.S. naval historian Alfred Thayer Mahan. 109 Mahan’s theory, coined as navalism, emphasizes a country’s navy and marine power in relation to its
104 Mehadi Amin Miah, Md., Saief Uddin Ahmed, S. M., & Sultana, K. S. (2019, January). Control over Maritime Chokepoints an Assurance of Secure Lifeline . Bangladesh Maritime Journal; Bangladesh Maritime University. https://bmu.edu.bd/public/files/econtents/5eb7a6476e3a5bmj -03-01-07.pdf
105 Ahn, A., & Chutel, L. (2026, April 21). Iran War Timeline: Key Moments and Attacks In U.S. and Israel’s Campaign. Nytimes.com; The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/article/iran -war-trump-us-oil-hormuzkey-dates-events.html
106 Sands, L. (2026, April 30). Iran’s Supreme Leader Signals Plan to Maintain Control Over Strait of Hormuz . Nytimes.com; The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/30/world/middleeast/iran -war-supremeleader-mojtaba-khamenei-strait-hormuz.html
107 Humeyra Pamuk. (2026, April 30). US seeks international help to reopen Strait of Hormuz as crude prices surge. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us -seeks-international-help-reopen-strait-hormuzcrude-prices-surge-2026-04-30/
108 Butler, G. (2025, June 23). What Is the Strait of Hormuz and Why Does It Matter? BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c78n6p09pzno
109 Bodovitz, P. (2026). The Forgotten Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan Who Shaped Modern Naval Warfare | TheCollector . TheCollector. https://www.thecollector.com/alfred -thayer-mahan/
status as a state. 110 The theory of navalism was based upon Great Britain’s strength as an empire, attributing most of the success to its control over the seas, large population (and subsequently a large navy), and access to stepping stones and chokepoints. In Mahan’s writing, he analysed Great Britain’s success through a maritime -based lens and sought to adapt this theory to be relevant for the United States. 111 Mahan’s theory of navalism was later applied to U.S. military strategy, ultimately leading the country to its current place as the number one naval power in the world 112, and, to many, the most powerful country overall. 113
After its application to U.S. military strategy, it became clear that navalism was a theory with merit, and that success as an empire/state is inextricably linked to that of a strong sea presence and navy.114 If one continues to operate under the assumption that Mahan’s theory is true, for a country to become politically powerful and secure, that country must become a strong naval power as well. To become a said naval power, the country must meet the previously mentioned requirements, one of which is access to and control over chokepoints, like the Panama and Suez Canals.
Control over military chokepoints is vital for a country when it comes to its political and security-based interests, thus explaining why countries often fight for control over canals like those of Suez 115 and Panama. 116
2. Political and Security Interests of the Suez Canal
In addition to the general interests countries might have in controlling chokepoints, each specific chokepoint has specific qualities that motivate countries to try to gain control
110 Office of the Historian. (2019). Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s . State.gov. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan
111 Office of the Historian. (2019a). Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History: Securing International Markets in the 1890s . State.gov. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1866-1898/mahan
112 Global Naval Powers Ranking . (2022). Www.wdmmw.org. https://www.wdmmw.org/ranking.php
113 World Population Review. (2022). Most Powerful Countries 2020 . Worldpopulationreview.com. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/most-powerful-countries
114 Bodovitz, P. (2026). The Forgotten Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan Who Shaped Modern Naval Warfare | TheCollector . TheCollector. https://www.thecollector.com/alfred -thayer-mahan/
115 Office of the Historian. (2019b). The Suez Crisis, 1956. State.gov. https://history.state.gov/milestones/19531960/suez
116 Hale, E. (2026, April 29). US, Latin America countries criticise China’s retaliation over Panama Canal . Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/29/us -latin-america-countries-criticise-chinas-retaliation-overpanama-canal
over it. The Suez Canal is in a particularly coveted geographical location, which has resulted in greater economic dependency and further political interest. 117
Sitting at the intersection of the European continent and the Asia -Pacific, 118 The Suez Canal serves as an integral part of the route that 12% of all traded goods pass through, proving the vitality of this chokepoint. 119 Additionally, nearly two million barrels of oil pass through the canal each day, including crude oil moving primarily towards Asia, although a significant amount moves towards Europe 120 as well. In addition to the Suez Canal being of the utmost importance to the oil trade, large amounts of consumer goods, manufacturing goods, agricultural products, and more also pass through the canal, furthering its importance in global trade. 121
The Suez Canal has solidified its status as a vital aspect of the economy, which only deepens its political and security purposes. As previously mentioned in the example of the Strait of Hormuz, control over chokepoints serves as a strong leverage point in security conflicts. The same theory remains true when applied to the Suez Canal, especially in relation to its economic importance. Additionally, the canal plays a key role in India’s maritime strategies122 as well as the overall security of Egypt. 123
3. Political and Security Interests of the Panama Canal
Despite the geographical distance between the two chokepoints, the Panama Canal is of the utmost political importance, as is its Egyptian counterpart. That being said, the Panama
117 Picheta, R. (2021, March 26). Why the Suez Canal is so important – and why its blockage could be so damaging CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/26/africa/suez -canal-importance-explainer-scli-intl
118 Picheta, R. (2021, March 26). Why the Suez Canal is so important – and why its blockage could be so damaging CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/26/africa/suez -canal-importance-explainer-scli-intl
119 Myers, J. (2021, March 25). What is the Suez Canal? World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/03/the -suez-canal-in-numbers/
120 Reuters Staff. (2021, March 26). The Suez Canal: a vital oil transit route with an ancient history. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/suez-canal-vital-oil-transit-route-with -an-ancient-history-2021-0326/
121 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2021, April 18). The Importance of the Suez Canal to Global Trade - 18 April 2021. New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/mfat-market- reports/the-importance-of-the-suez-canal-to-global-trade-18april-2021
122 Fortune IAS Circle. (2024). Fortuneiascircle.com. https://fortuneiascircle.com/backgrounder/suez_canal 123 Winter, O. (2019, November 25). The Suez Canal: A Route for Cultivating the Peace with Egypt . INSS. https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-suez-canal-a-route-for-cultivating-the-peace-with-egypt/
Canal is under a consistent amount of stress due to its strained connections with the U.S., as well as China’s regular use of the canal. 124
Upon the start of U.S. President Trump’s second term, the newly inaugurated head of state declared that the U.S. would ‘reclaim’ the Panama Canal, having given up control to the Republic of Panama in 1999. 125 This newfound interest in the canal stems from the administration’s fear of Chinese influence and expansion into the Western Hemisphere. 126 Although China has expressed interest in the canal, the validity of President Trump’s claims 127 that the former is in control lacks substantive evidence and is highly debated. 128
Assuming the U.S.’s fear of China’s control of the canal is warranted, this points to a major national security issue for the former. If the Republic of Panama were to seize power and control of the vital canal from the U.S. to China, not only would this a llow the Chinese to control major aspects of the U.S. economy, but it would also give the Chinese geographical access to the States that the former has never previously possessed. 129 Geographical access as direct as the Panama Canal would allow China to have access to the U.S., which may cause major repercussions for the two countries' fragile, complex relationships. 130
Controversy of the claims aside, the U.S. government has publicly declared that it will reclaim control of the Panama Canal 131, despite the Republic of Panama and its Latin American allies stating that under no conditions would the canal become part of the U.S. again. 132 Although there have been no tactics or strategies on the retaking of the canal 133, it would not
124 Gantz, D. (2024). Adverse Consequences of US Threats to Retake the Panama Canal | Baker Institute . Baker Institute. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/adverse -consequences-us-threats-retake-panama-canal
125 Panama Canal Embassy of Panama. (2014). Embassy of Panama. Embassy of Panama. https://www.embassyofpanama.org/panama -canal
126 Gantz, D. (2024). Adverse Consequences of US Threats to Retake the Panama Canal | Baker Institute . Baker Institute. https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/adverse -consequences-us-threats-retake-panama-canal
127 Yuan, S. (2025, January 22). Does China “operate” Panama Canal, as Trump says?. BBC https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1km4vj3pl0o
128 Curley, G. (2025, January 9). The US Is Right to Be Concerned about China’s Influence over the Panama Canal. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new -atlanticist/right-to-be-concerned-aboutchinas-influence-over-the-panama-canal/
129 Curley, G. (2025, January 9). The US Is Right to Be Concerned about China’s Influence over the Panama Canal. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new -atlanticist/right-to-be-concerned-aboutchinas-influence-over-the-panama-canal/
130 CFR Editors. (2017, April 27). U.S.-China Relations . Cfr.org; Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/articles/us -china-relations
131 Service, M. R. (2025, May 13). The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat? Epthinktank. https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/13/the-panama-canal-panamas-sovereign-rights-under-threat/
132 Jordan, D. (2025, January 20). Donald Trump: Panama rejects Trump vow to “take back” Panama Canal . https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2egwzvp080o
133 Wendling, M. (2024, December 22). Trump threatens to try and regain control of Panama Canal https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c98l9wj67jgo
be unreasonable to assume that the use of force would be under consideration, due to the President’s take on Greenland. 134
The strained U.S.-China relationship aside, the Panama Canal is still a vital aspect of international security. Similar to the Strait of Hormuz and Suez Canal, closure of the chokepoint may serve as a leverage point in altercations between states. This is especially true in the case of the U.S., and 70% of goods going through the canal are either going to or from the country. 135 However, Trump’s interest in the canal exceeds security concerns, as the sitting president claims that the country is being overcharged for the goods passing through the canal and that the Republic of Panama has been treating the U.S. unfairly, thus provi ding another motivator for regaining control. 136
From a geopolitical perspective, control over chokepoints, such as the Panama and Suez canals, may be vital for the countries that hold such control as well as the countries that aspire for that control. Additionally, the canals in question play major role s in the global economy; a blockage of either would likely cause substantial economic backlash to any country that receives or sends goods through the canals. The creation of such backlash may serve as a leverage piece in controversial or tense internation al security matters, demonstrating how intertwined politics and security are with maritime chokepoints.
B. Organized Crime
Organized crime networks span the globe, encompassing crimes such as trafficking, robberies, and various financial crimes. 137 When one focuses on the trafficking aspect of organized crime, the transportation of goods, people, wildlife, and more are central to the process.138 As such, different networks have utilized several forms of transportation, including maritime trafficking. Maritime trafficking, or maritime smuggling , 139 involves any sort of body
134 Sharma, Y. (2026, January 10). What are potential “hard ways” Trump could try to take Greenland? Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/10/what -are-potential-hard-ways-trump-could-try -to-take-greenland
135 Service, M. R. (2025, May 13). The Panama Canal: Panama’s sovereign rights under threat? Epthinktank. https://epthinktank.eu/2025/05/13/the-panama-canal-panamas-sovereign-rights-under-threat/
136 Hughes, S. (2025, March 11). Why the Panama Canal is on President Trump’s agenda . Harvard.edu. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/faculty-research/policy-topics/international-relations-security/why-panama-canalpresident-trumps
139 What Is Maritime Smuggling? (2026, January 6). Windward. https://windward.ai/glossary/what -is-maritimesmuggling/
of water being used as a method of transportation for the illegal activities of the responsible organized crime groups.140
The following sections will focus on various forms of trafficking that occur via maritime routes globally. That being said, human trafficking will not be addressed due to only 1% of human trafficking cases having been done via maritime routes, whereas drug , weapon, and wildlife trafficking are extremely prominent on the seas. 141 Additionally, this chapter will include a comparative analysis between the Panama and Suez canals and the types of trafficking that are primarily found in the chokepoints.
1. Drug Trafficking
Drug trafficking and smuggling are crimes that cover the entirety of the globe as the drugs are taken from their point of origin, transported, and distributed 142 across multiple countries, regions, and continents from Asia to the Americas. 143 Trafficking via the seas is the primary form of transportation for drug smugglers, where the primary drug being transported is cocaine. 144 In addition to cocaine, drug traffickers also commonly smuggle heroin and methamphetamine via the sea. 145
Smuggling drugs via the sea is one of, if not the, most common pathways for organized crime groups. 146 That being said, the image of a secret ship attempting to sail to an unprotected shore would be wildly incorrect. The primary transporter of illegal drugs to their country of consumption is unknowingly commercial ships that enter through all of the legal channels and are subject to searches upon arrival. 147 Alternatively, some organized crime groups may use more innovative, less detectable strategies. For example, some organizations have been able to
140 Explainer: What is maritime crime? (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2025/June/explainer_ -what-is-maritime-crime.html
141 Maritime Industry Resources to Counter Human Trafficking | US Department of Transportation . (2025). Transportation.gov. https://www.transportation.gov/stop-human -trafficking/maritime-ports
142 Interpol. (n.d.-a). Drug Trafficking. Www.interpol.int. https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Drug-trafficking
143 Explainer: What is maritime crime? (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2025/June/explainer_ -what-is-maritime-crime.html
144 Explainer: What is maritime crime? (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2025/June/explainer_ -what-is-maritime-crime.html
145 DEA on the Sea. (n.d.). Museum.dea.gov. https://museum.dea.gov/exhibits/online -exhibits/dea-air-land-andsea/dea-sea
146 DEA on the Sea. (n.d.). Museum.dea.gov. https://museum.dea.gov/exhibits/online -exhibits/dea-air-land-andsea/dea-sea
147 Preventing the Smuggling of Illegal Narcotics by Sea . (2025). Ics-Shipping.org. https://www.icsshipping.org/supporting-shipping/preventing-the-smuggling-of-illegal-narcotics-by-sea/
obtain or build submarines, or narco-subs, making the transportation of their contents nearly undetectable while carrying up to 25 million USD worth of cocaine. 148
An additional, alternative method is that of parasitic attachments or “parasite smuggling”. This rather dangerous technique involves a diver attaching a metal ‘torpedo’ to a ship before or while in transit, which can then be removed by a diver once the shi p (or the drugs) has reached its destination. 149 Although incredibly difficult to detect, at least one diver has died in the attempt to remove the torpedo, and another has gone missing, along with the cocaine. 150
In recent years, cocaine trafficking into Europe, originating in Latin America, has reached an all-time high. 151 This increase of product into the continent sits on the shoulders of evolving tactics to minimize such trafficking ;152 however, the traffickers are evolving as well, consistently discovering new ways to move the illegal substances. 153 One key way that organized crime groups are involved in the trafficking of drugs is through advanced concealment techniques. 154 Cases such as this include placing the contraband into industrial equipment or machinery. Additionally, the use of food as a ‘drug mule’ has become a wellknown and fairly common tactic.
In 2024, U.S. border control famously seized five million USD of methamphetamine while in transit. The methamphetamine’s storage during transportation, however, is what caught the public's eye. Having been wrapped in green, painted plastic, the drugs were
148 Abi-Habib, M., & Volpe, D. (2025, October 22). Drug -Smuggling Submarines on Display at Latin American Naval Base. The New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/22/world/americas/drug -smugglingsubmarines.html
149 Daly, M. (2023, July 27). The Deadly Rise of Underwater “Parasite” Cocaine Smuggling . VICE. https://www.vice.com/en/article/the -deadly-rise-of-underwater-parasite-cocaine-smuggling/
150 Daly, M. (2023, July 27). The Deadly Rise of Underwater “Parasite” Cocaine Smuggling . VICE. https://www.vice.com/en/article/the -deadly-rise-of-underwater-parasite-cocaine-smuggling/
151 Europol. (2026, January 27). Europol report: evolving tactics in maritime cocaine trafficking operations Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media -press/newsroom/news/europol-report-evolving-tactics-inmaritime-cocaine-trafficking-operations
152 NCA. (2019, December 23). Drug Trafficking - National Crime Agency . Nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk; National Crime Agency. https://www.nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/what -we-do/crime-threats/drug-trafficking
153 Europol. (2026, January 27). Europol report: evolving tactics in maritime cocaine trafficking operations Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media -press/newsroom/news/europol-report-evolving-tactics-inmaritime-cocaine-trafficking-operations
154 Europol. (2026, January 27). Europol report: evolving tactics in maritime cocaine trafficking operations Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media -press/newsroom/news/europol-report-evolving-tactics-inmaritime-cocaine-trafficking-operations
attempted to be disguised as watermelons. Despite mixing the fake watermelons in with several real ones, the working U.S. border agents were not fooled. 155
This example, however, is one of the lucky times that the illegal substances were caught before reaching their destination. It is impossible to know exactly how many times organized crime groups have slipped through the cracks without detection. This is es pecially true when the new concealment tactics are also combined with recent technological advancements and alternative routes. 156
These, in addition to many other techniques and strategies, are alleged to be behind the drop in cocaine seizures at the Port of Rotterdam. 157 In the case of drug smuggling, lower seizures do not mean fewer drugs entering a country; it simply means fewer drugs are being detected upon entering a country, allowing more to cross the border.
2. Firearms Trafficking
No matter a country’s policy on the purchase and possession of firearms, the illegal transfer of firearms (or parts of firearms) poses a threat to that country’s national security and international security as a whole. 158 Upon a firearm entering a country, it can threaten security in several ways, including providing firearms to a community of people who may be unable to purchase them legally due to criminal records, affiliations (particularly to gangs), or mental health conditions. 159 Additionally, trafficked firearms may enter warzones, allowing armed groups to engage in additional violence. Finally, terrorism is often exacerbated by arms trafficking, as it provides a channel for extremist groups to purchase weapons without alerting the government to said purchase. 160
155 Buschschlüter, V. (2024, August 22). Meth haul disguised as watermelons fails to fool US border agents Bbc.com; BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5ydjdzl74po
156 Europol. (2026, January 27). Europol report: evolving tactics in maritime cocaine trafficking operations Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/media -press/newsroom/news/europol-report-evolving-tactics-inmaritime-cocaine-trafficking-operations
157 Briceño, D. (2026, January 8). Maritime cocaine smuggling – a European perspective . Gard.no; Gard AS. https://gard.no/en/insights/maritime-cocaine-smuggling-a-european-perspective/
158 Firearms Trafficking Explained: 10 Key Questions and Answers . (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/November/firearms -trafficking-explained_-10-keyquestions-and-answers.html
160 Firearms Trafficking Explained: 10 Key Questions and Answers . (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/frontpage/2025/November/firearms -trafficking-explained_-10-keyquestions-and-answers.html
As far as maritime-specific trafficking goes, seized vessels carrying illegal firearms have been known to hold 5 times the amount of firearms as trafficking done by plane, road, or other transportation methods.161 Due to the size of the seizures, the rare occurrence of seabased arms trafficking is easily dismissed, as they still account for 6% of illegal firearms seized. Of course, these numbers do not account for the number of firearms that were not intercepted, indicating that a significant amount of firearms are moving cross -border without law enforcement’s knowledge. Despite trafficking by sea being a less common method of transportation than the alternative, 162 bulk shipments of arms are done primarily by sea, motivating investigators to reframe their search and priorities toward the ‘big fish ’. 163
During the trafficking of firearms itself, detection is unlikely as traffickers have become skilled in storing the arms amongst other goods in transit without alerting the captain and a significant portion of the ship's crew.164 However, there have been several reported cases of the aforementioned captains and crew being involved in the trafficking. As a result of this, inspection of ships upon their arrival to its port of destination.
3. Wildlife Trafficking
The final type of trafficking that will be addressed in relation to the sea is wildlife trafficking. Despite being lesser known than its counterparts, wildlife trafficking is the fourth largest type of trafficking, generating over 200 billion U.S. dollars a year, 165 up to 90% of which is trafficked by sea. 166 Even with the knowledge of wildlife trafficking’s prominence, only 2% (at a maximum) of shipping containers are inspected, allowing the crime to flourish. Given the sheer amount of shipping containers containing various illegal wildlife products compared to
161 Global Maritime Crime Program. (2023). JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (p. 8). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
162Norton-Taylor, R. (2012, January 30). Sea trafficking report reveals how ships move guns and drugs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/30/sea -trafficking-report -guns-drugs
163 Global Maritime Crime Program. (2023). JURISDICTION IN RELATION TO ILLICIT ARMS TRAFFICKING AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (p. 8). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
164 Norton-Taylor, R. (2012, January 30). Sea trafficking report reveals how ships move guns and drugs. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/30/sea -trafficking-report -guns-drugs
165 Combatting Illicit Wildlife Trade and Corruption in Maritime Transport . (2018). Imo.org. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/Pages/IllicitWildlifeTrade -default.aspx
166 Red Flag Compendium. (2026). Wwf.org.hk. https://apps5.wwf.org.hk/red-flag-compendium/
the number of containers that are inspected, it is unsurprising that billions of dollars in illegal contraband are going undetected. 167
Unlike drug trafficking, it is not possible to disguise the products within legally shipped products. However, the illegal wildlife products are still hidden within the legal trade, and traffickers utilize bribery to avoid detection, often with the intent of gaining falsified documents declaring the products to be legal. 168
Due to the diverse amounts of products in the illegal wildlife trade, the country of origin of the products often differs, making tracking the patterns increasingly difficult. Products in the trade span from the traditional elephant tusks and pangolin scal es,169 to lesser-known products, including sea turtle shells and rare trees (tropical wood, for example ).170
4. Trafficking in the Suez Canal
Maritime chokepoints used as pathways for global trade will all, to some extent, fall victim to some sort of trafficking. In the case of the Suez Canal, the three addressed types of trafficking all appear, however, not as much as one may think.
As far as drug trafficking goes, the global cocaine trade often utilizes the Suez Canal to gain access to the EU and Turkey via the Mediterranean Sea. 171 Additionally, drugs originating from Lebanon are directed to the port of Aqaba, located in Jordan, and must pass through the Suez Canal to do so.172
Even less information is available regarding firearms trafficking; however, it has nonetheless been identified as one of the forms of trafficking that passes through the Suez Canal. One particular case involves two Israeli warships that passed through the canal on their
167 From Algorithms to Action: Disrupting Wildlife Trafficking in Maritime Supply Chains . (2025). Panda.org. https://asiapacific.panda.org/?390375/From-Algorithms-to-Action-Disrupting-Wildlife-Trafficking-in -MaritimeSupply-Chains
168 Red Flag Compendium. (2026). Wwf.org.hk. https://apps5.wwf.org.hk/red-flag-compendium/
169 From Algorithms to Action: Disrupting Wildlife Trafficking in Maritime Supply Chains . (2025). Panda.org. https://asiapacific.panda.org/?390375/From-Algorithms-to-Action-Disrupting-Wildlife-Trafficking-in -MaritimeSupply-Chains
170 Illegal wildlife trade and poaching explained . (2019). World Wildlife Fund. https://www.worldwildlife.org/our-work/wildlife/wildlife-crime/
171 EU Drug Market: Heroin and other opioids Trafficking and supply | www.euda.europa.eu . (2024). Europa.eu. https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/eu -drug-markets/heroin-and-other-opioids/trafficking-andsupply_en
172 Crabtree, B. (2016). The Nexus of Conflict and Illicit Drug Trafficking: Syria and the Wider Region . Global Initiative. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/the -nexus-of-conflict-and-illicit-drug-trafficking-syria-and -thewider-region/
way to the Red Sea to stop the trafficking of firearms into Palestine. The success of the mission has not been shared publicly, nor has Israel commented on the mission. However, the Egyptians confirmed that most weapons smuggled into Palestine are smuggled via this route. 173
The 2021 blockage of the Suez Canal played a role in revealing the rampant illegal wildlife trade that passes through the chokepoint. This specific case primarily demonstrated the number of live animals being trafficked. For example, thousands of sheep and hundreds of cattle were stranded within the canal. 174 At a minimum, 20 of the ships containing livestock during the blockage were operating under illegal conditions. 175 Additionally, nearly 3,000 bulls became stranded on the canal a few months before the blockage, all of which suffered for months at sea, before being killed when they finally arrived in their country of origin. Even with the flagrant and publicised abuse of animal rights in this case, the trade continued. 176
All in all, various forms of trafficking can be found within the Suez Canal; however, the greater issues the canal faces are geopolitical, rather than related to organized crime.
5. Trafficking in the Panama Canal
When compared to the Suez Canal, the trafficking of various illegal goods within the Panama Canal is astronomically higher than its eastern counterpart. Concerning drug trafficking, the Panama Canal is a hotspot for the transfer of drugs originating in Col ombia moving towards the U.S.177 More specifically, cocaine trafficking flourishes in cartels with easy access to the chokepoint. Within Panama, Colombian and Mexican cartels are primarily in control of drug trafficking. These cartels utilize the Panama Canal to distribute their product to not only the U.S, but also Africa, Asia, and Europe. 178 In 2025, 68 tons of illegal drugs
173 Reuters Staff. (2009, July 14). Two Israeli warships cross Suez Canal. Reuters https://www.reuters.com/article/world/two-israeli-warships-cross-suez-canal-idUSTRE56D4IM/ 174 VIER. (2021, May 4). Tragedies at Sea – Cartagena and Suez Canal. FOUR PAWS International - Animal Welfare Organisation; VIER PFOTEN International – gemeinnützige Privatstiftung. https://www.fourpaws.org/our-stories/blog-news/year-2021/tragedies-at-sea-cartagena-and-suez-canal
175 Safi, M., & Kevany, S. (2021, March 26). At least 20 livestock ships caught in Suez canal logjam . The Guardian; The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/mar/26/at -least-20-livestock-ships-caught-insuez-canal-logjam
176 VIER. (2021, May 4). Tragedies at Sea – Cartagena and Suez Canal. FOUR PAWS International - Animal Welfare Organisation; VIER PFOTEN International – gemeinnützige Privatstiftung. https://www.fourpaws.org/our-stories/blog-news/year-2021/tragedies-at-sea-cartagena-and-suez-canal
177 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Panama Summary - United States Department of State. (2021, May 11). United States Department of State. https://2021 -2025.state.gov/bureau-of-internationalnarcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/panama-summary/ 178 Adelita Coriat. (2025, March 22). Panama’s ports, a booming route for cocaine trafficking . EL PAÍS English. https://english.elpais.com/international/2025-03-22/panamas-ports-a-booming-route-for-cocainetrafficking.html
moving through, towards, or out of the Panama Canal were confiscated during the first six months of the year. 179 As such, the Panama Canal had been deemed a ‘critical logistical gateway’ within the world of drug trafficking. 180
In addition to the extreme amount of drugs that illegally pass through the Panama Canal, the trafficking of firearms is also fairly commonplace. One of the best -known cases of firearms trafficking in the Panama Canal occurred in 2013, involving a North Kor ean ship carrying 25 containers of various Cuban weapons. The traffickers attempted to hide the weapons under bags of sugar. 181 Seven months after the initial seizure of the ship, a large fine was paid by North Korea, and the ship was able to return to its point of origin. The crew, however, was kept in the country to be charged with weapons trafficking in the Republic of Panama. Three crew members (including the captain) remained behind to face charges, while the other 32 were eventually sent home. 182
This, however, is only one example of weapons trafficking within the canal. 183 In addition to the trafficking by cartels or foreign adversaries, security officials in Panama have also been involved in weapons trafficking. In this case, the perpetrators were accused of bringing various weapons into Panama via the canal from the U.S., then selling the firearms for increased prices to local merchants. 184
Similar to the other two types of trafficking addressed, wildlife trafficking is a common occurrence within the Panama Canal. In some cases, biologists and veterinarians were able to release animals that were intended to be trafficked back into the wild after intens ive care and rehabilitation. A common example of this is that of black -handed spider monkeys. 185 Many
179 Tico Times. (2025, August 27). Panama Sees Record Cocaine Flow Through Ports Bound for Europe : The Tico Times | Costa Rica News | Travel | Real Estate . The Tico Times | Costa Rica News | Travel | Real Estate. https://ticotimes.net/2025/08/27/panama -sees-record-cocaine-flow-through-ports-bound -for-europe
180 Balletin, R. (2022, December 9). Panama Became Logistics Hub for Drug Trafficking “Super Cartel.” InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/panama -logistics-hub-drug-trafficking-super-cartel/
181 N Korean ship seized with Cuban weapons “free to leave” Panama. (2014, February 9). BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-26103467
182 Panama to release 32 crew members of seized North Korean ship. (2014, January 30). BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-25972782
183 UNODC Strengthens Panama’s Response to Illicit Firearms Trafficking . (2021). United Nations : Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/firearms -protocol/news/2025/unodc-strengthens-panamasresponse-to-illicit-firearms-trafficking.html
184 Asmann, P. (2018, October 15). Panama Security Officials Implicated in International Arms Trafficking Network. InSight Crime. https://insightcrime.org/news/brief/panama -security-officials-international-armstrafficking/
185 Panama confronts illegal trafficking of animals . (2022, November 29). AP NEWS. https://apnews.com/article/science -health-caribbean-covid-animals-7a543a0df21cafc53b9c7dec9fc2e8d
animals, however, are unable to be rescued. There is significant proof of Chinese -owned and operated ports in Latin America being involved in wildlife trafficking, specifically the trafficking of shark fins and other marine life. 186 Although there is no concrete proof of the trafficking of shark fins in the Panama Canal, there is a risk of the subcategory developing in the canal if President Trump’s claims are found to be true. 187
Simply put, the amount of trafficking within the Panama Canal greatly surpasses that in the Suez Canal. Although it is impossible to prove the exact amount of trafficking going through a chokepoint, due to the goal of the business being to avoid detection, the evidence points towards a significant amount of trafficking that passes through the Panama Canal, whereas the Suez Canal faces other significant problems, not rooted in organized crime.
V. Conclusion
The Suez Canal and the Panama Canal are similar in that both serve as significant artificial waterways, or ‘chokepoints’, central to global trade, geopolitics, and security, bound by maritime law. However, the principles underpinning this legal framework, including those of neutrality, state sovereignty, and freedom of navigation, despite being enshrined in treaties and black-letter law, do not exist in a vacuum; geographic, economic, and political interests interfere. Consequently, both canals regularly be come involved in tense geopolitical and security dilemmas 188
This tension is only exacerbated by the governance of the strategic waterways. For example, the Trump administration’s claims over the Panama Canal, or the geopolitical conflicts impacting the Suez Canal, only add to the tension by making all disputes poli tically charged. As a result, maritime disputes are rarely purely legal. They often involve economic pressure from states, diplomatic relations, and geopolitical rivalries between superpowers (such as the US and China).
Despite the similarities in the legal frameworks, they are subject to, the two strategic chokepoints fundamentally differ when it comes to security and the motivations behind
186 Hernandez-Roy, C. (2024). Are Chinese Ports in Latin America Preferred by Organized Crime? Csis.org. https://www.csis.org/analysis/are -chinese-ports-latin-america-preferred-organized-crime
187 Yuan, S. (2025, January 22). Does China “operate” Panama Canal as Trump says?. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1km4vj3pl0geopolitical
188 Misachi, J. (2019, April 12). What Is The Significance Of A Choke Point? WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-significance-of-a-choke-point.html
geopolitical interests. Being in vastly different environments, the canals serve different purposes. For the Panama Canal, trafficking runs rampant, and trade mostly stays within the Americas. 189 Conversely, the Suez Canal facilitates trade between Europe, Asia, and Africa, often falling victim to Middle Eastern tensions 190
As tensions have intensified throughout the last decade, the future regulation of strategic waterways and the conservation of foundational principles including neutrality and freedom of passage, remain a central issue for international law and geopolitics. Ultimately, the Suez and Panama canals demonstrate that maritime treaties and international law operate as a mechanism through which states exercise power and sovereignty and protect their strategic interests globally. The protection of such strategic int erests, however, often comes to the forefront of the global stage when multiple states become involved, leading to blockages and the abuse of power, creating security threats of a detrimental caliber. 191
190 Myers, J. (2021, March 25). What is the Suez Canal? World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/stories/2021/03/the -suez-canal-in-numbers/
191 Misachi, J. (2019, April 12). What Is The Significance Of A Choke Point? WorldAtlas. https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/what-is-the-significance-of-a-choke-point.html
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Panama Ship Service. (2026, April 17). How the Panama Canal Was Built: A Technical and Operational History - Panama Ship Service. Panama Ship Service. https://panamashipservice.com/how -the-panama-canal-was-built- a-technical-and-operationalhistory/
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Preventing the Smuggling of Illegal Narcotics by Sea . (2025). Ics-Shipping.org. https://www.ics-shipping.org/supporting-shipping/preventing- the-smuggling-of-illegalnarcotics-by-sea/
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Analysis on Legal and Health, Safety, and Environmental aspects of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident
By Lilu Chkhartishvili* and Lora Fekete*
Abstract
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident was a catastrophic event caused by a combination of multiple natural hazards, engineering failures, communication and legal framework flaws. This essay analyses the Japanese nuclear liability system, critical safety vulnerabilities, communication issues as well as the consequences on society and environment.
In the following, we will discuss how the tsunami hazard was a greatly underestimated risk by TEPCO and Japanese regulatory agencies as well as predictions from independent research and computer simulations. Furthermore, the technical issues will be addres sed. The natural disaster caused a power shortage, which disabled the core cooling systems and safety relief valves. This led to multiple system failures, including cladding meltdowns, massive hydrogen gas production, system detonations, and highly dangero us manual operating conditions for workers. The evaluation of the crisis communication management will highlight key issues such as failed communication actors, unofficial communication routes, failure of technological tools as well as the desire for corpo rate self-defence over public information sharing. The significant environmental and social consequences will be examined, with a focus on the expanding of radioactive waste throughout the marine food chain and the issues affecting the citizens such as mental disorders, so cial discrimination and economic hardships.
From a legal perspective, this article will examine the legal and regulatory consequences of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. By exploring the weaknesses of Japan’s pre-Fukushima nuclear regulatory framework, it will highlight regulatory capture, outdated safety standards, and the absence of effective mechanisms to prevent severe accidents, all of which contributed to transforming a natural disaster into a nuclear crisis. The paper will further evaluate the liability and compensation regimes establis hed under Japanese nuclear law, focusing on the responsibilities of Tokyo Electric Power Company and the Japanese government, as well as the approaches to victim compensation and redress adopted in the
* LL.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
* Bachelor’s Candidate, Safety and Security Management Studies Programme , The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
aftermath of the accident. In addition, it will discuss transnational litigation arising from the accident, examining it in relation to international nuclear liability conventions and the broader impact of Fukushima on global nuclear safety governance.
Ultimately, the article will argue that robust oversight, transparent regulation, and proactive safety measures are essential to preventing large -scale nuclear disasters and ensuring effective victim protection.
I. Introduction
The Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March 2011 hit coastal Japan, alongside a tsunami, which reached heights of more than ten meters on the north - eastern coast. 1 Resulting in 15 000 people killed, over 6 000 injured, and around 2 500 reported to be missing, the natural disaster caused widespread devastation in the country. 2 Innately, buildings and infrastructure were also damaged along the coastline. 3 Multiple Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) were affected to different degrees by the earthquake and tsunami. 4 However, the Fukushima Daiichi NPP sustained substantial destruction of the operational and safety infrastructure because of the damage to the electric power supply lines. The loss of on -site and off-site electrical power resulted in the wreckage of the cooling function at three operating reactor units.5
Today, what is known as the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster involved hydrogen explosions and radiation leaks into the air, sea and soil, resulting in the evacuation of thousands of residents within and beyond a 20 km radius and restrictions on food and water consumption. 6
The legal significance of the Fukushima Daiichi disaster is multifaceted. This piece explores regulatory shortcomings that turned a natural disaster into a nuclear one, delving into the pre-Fukushima legal framework and the Tokyo Electric Power Company’s ( TEPCO) legal obligations, as well as the thin line between corporate and government responsibility in cases that erupted. The accident also raised questions regarding existing compensation regimes and victim redress mechanisms. Additionally, to place this disaster on the map of events with an international impact, the relation with applicable international nuclear law is examined. The ultimate aim is to discover how sufficient oversight and regulatory compliance are vital t o evade large-scale crises with domestic and global implications.
II. Legal framework before the Fukushima Disaster
The nuclear disaster that occurred in Fukushima provoked much reflection on the applicable legal framework and regulatory regimes of Japan’s nuclear power industry. Many critics argued that regulatory and institutional failures resulted in the catastrophe, besides the
1 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘The Fukushima Daiichi Accident’ (IAEA 2015) 19.
2 ibid.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
earthquake and the tsunami. 7 Before Fukushima, nuclear safety oversight was rather fragmented and influenced by the relationship between regulators and commercial actors. 8 Furthermore, legal mechanisms lacked enforceability and failed to catch up with new standards.9
A. Regulatory Capture
Regulatory capture refers to the specific ways regulated companies and/or interest groups influence the formulation and enforcement of laws that govern their activities, weakening regulators' oversight and often sidelining rules aimed at the protection of the public. 10 Within the ‘nuclear village’, several organisations and governmental bodies were tasked with reinforcing safety standards. Notably, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) was the main regulating body, which was a semi -autonomous organisation under the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE). The former is within the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). Formed in 2003, the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organisation (JNES) carried out on -site safety inspections and assessments. NISA relied on their findings. On the other hand, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) takes responsibility for monitoring environmental radiation, as well as promoting nuclear energy and safety regulation for research react ors. To monitor the work of NISA and MEXT, the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) was established, acting as an independent agency. In addition, they undertake the development of safety regulations. Next to these bodies, the Japan Technology Institute (JANTI) and the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) served as the stakeholders, one acting as a channel to share information and best practices on safety concerns, while the other acted as a lobbyist of the nuclear industry.11
It is alleged that, although NISA was established as a “special agency” independent of METI, the reality in practice was quite different. 12 Industry interests often overpowered the
7 Ferguson, Charles D., Mark Jansson, ‘Past Problems with Japan’s Regulatory System’ [2013] Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18921.5?seq=1> accessed 10 May 2026 5.
8 ibid.
9 ibid.
10 ibid.
11 ibid 9.
12 Jihwan Lim, Young Eal Lee, Minjeong Byeon, Jeongwon Yoo, Jongmin Lee, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Safety Regulation after the Fukushima Accident: Regulatory Framework Changes and Current Restart Status of NPPs’ (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety 2017) 6.
organisation when it came to enforcing safety standards in place or promoting stricter ones. 13 METI, which was in charge of regulating commercial NPPs, simultaneously promoted the use of nuclear energy, causing conflict of interest. 14 This prompted criticism towards NISA’s performance as a nuclear watchdog and questions over the partiality of safety policies arose. 15
Additionally, the structure of Japan’s regulatory corpus overlapped in ways that later contributed to significant oversight failures. The NSC was responsible for developing and advocating for updated safety regulations, which NISA monitored. However, NSC w as established only as an advisory body and possessed limited authority to ensure that NISA incorporated recommendations into new regulations or effectively enforced them. Instead, the commission assumed a role of reviewing and investigating NISA’s work, w hile NISA similarly monitored NSC’s activities. 16 Over time, both organisations became focused on examining past incidents, rather than proactively strengthening the regulatory framework. Consequently, insufficient resources and attention were dedicated to implementing updated safety regulations based on new scientific knowledge and global best practices. 17
B. Outdated Regulation
Japan’s nuclear energy industry is governed by the following legal frameworks: the Atomic Energy Basic Act, which establishes the foundational legal principles of development, regulation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and the Act on the Regulation o f Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act), which regulates the operation and safety oversight of nuclear facilities and infrastructure. 18 ‘Nuclear villages’ promote the ‘safety myth’, which is the belief that nuclear power reactors were
13 Ferguson, Charles D., Mark Jansson, ‘Past Problems with Japan’s Regulatory System’ [2013] Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18921.5?seq=1> accessed 10 May 2026 6.
14 Jihwan Lim, Young Eal Lee, Minjeong Byeon, Jeongwon Yoo, Jongmin Lee, ‘Japan’s Nuclear Safety Regulation after the Fukushima Accident: Regulatory Framework Changes and Current Restart Status of NPPs’ (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety 2017).
15 ibid.
16 Ferguson, Charles D., Mark Jansson, ‘Past Problems with Japan’s Regulatory System’ [2013] Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18921.5?seq=1> accessed 10 May 2026 6.
17 ibid.
18 Atomic Energy Basic Act 1955 (JPN); Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors 1957 (JPN) art 1.
inherently safe, critically impeded efforts to strengthen nuclear safety prior to the Fukushima accident, and the regulatory framework was no exception. 19
1. No “back-fitting” system and ineffective “backcheck”
The Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design was first established in 1978 and then revised in 2006. However, there was no legal framework to retroactively apply new regulatory requirements to already existing power plants that had been licensed to op erate before the guidelines were in place. 20 Naturally, this hindered continuous safety improvements. 21
The legal framework also relied heavily on operator responsibility and self - assessment of risk. Under the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act, nuclear operators were responsible for maintaining seismic safety. 22 Although regulatory authorities sought confirmation whether existing power plants complied with updated guidelines, the implementation of reinforcement measures remained voluntary conduct for the operators. 23
In the case of TEPCO, the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant construction was based on seismological knowledge of more than 40 years. Over the years, research revealed a significant possibility that tsunami levels could exceed the assumptions made at th e time of construction, alongside the risk of reactor core damage from such seismic activity. 24 However, TEPCO downplayed the danger and continued operating, even though their countermeasures were insufficient to maintain a safety margin. 25
19 Ferguson, Charles D., Mark Jansson, ‘Past Problems with Japan’s Regulatory System’ [2013] Regulating Japanese Nuclear Power in the Wake of the Fukushima Daiichi Accident <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18921.5?seq=1> accessed 10 May 2026 7; Nuclear Re gulation Authority, Enforcement of the New Regulatory Requirements for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (2013) 1.
20 The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, ‘Main Report’ [2012] <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/web/20121025090656/http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/> accessed 10 May 2026 10.
21 Nuclear Regulation Authority, Enforcement of the New Regulatory Requirements for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (2013) 1.
22 The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, ‘Main Report’ [2012] <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/web/20121025090656/http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/> accessed 10 May 2026 10.
23 ibid.
24 ibid 22.
25 ibid.
2. Inadequate Regulatory Scope regarding Severe Accidents
Regulatory requirements did not cover severe accidents, and countermeasures against them, including external events, were left to the discretion of the operators. 26
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) advocated for a 5 - tier defence policy to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants. The first three tiers concern ‘prevention’ of nuclear damage, while the fourth tier focuses on ‘mitigation’, reducing the effects of severe damage to nuclear cores. Tier 5 covers protecting residents from the emission of nuclear substances, ‘evacuation’. 27 Japan’s regulatory framework focused on the tiers of ‘prevention’, while the ‘mitigation’ tier, countermeasures to severe accidents, were left to be resolved by the operator using its knowledge base. 28
Additionally, triggering events of severe accidents are classified distinctly. Internal events include failed equipment and human errors, while external events cover earthquakes, tsunamis and typhoons.29 Lastly, man- made events, like terrorism, are also caught by the scope.30 In the case of Japan, the framework only focused on countermeasures against severe accidents triggered by internal events. By the time of the Fukushima incident, sufficient solutions for external and man-made events had not been developed. 31
C. Lessons Learnt
Following the Fukushima disaster, Japan introduced reforms to its nuclear legal and regulatory frameworks. The amended laws expanded safety objectives beyond protecting the general public to include environmental protection, while broadening the scope of regulation to cover severe nuclear incidents. The reforms also introduced a retroactive system, allowing new safety requirements to be imposed on already existing facilities. 32
26 Nuclear Regulation Authority, Enforcement of the New Regulatory Requirements for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (2013).
27 The National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, ‘Main Report’ [2012] <https://warp.ndl.go.jp/web/20121025090656/http://naiic.go.jp/en/report/> accessed 10 May 2026 53.
28 ibid.
29 ibid.
30 ibid.
31 ibid.
32 Nuclear Regulation Authority, Enforcement of the New Regulatory Requirements for Commercial Nuclear Power Reactors (2013).
One of the most significant post-Fukushima reforms was the creation of a new independent nuclear regulatory body known as the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). It was tasked with conducting a comprehensive review of Japan’s safety guidelines and requirements in order to develop stricter regulations with protective mechanisms for the public and the environment. 33
The objective of the legislation was also broadened to recognise the possibility of future large scale natural disasters, terrorist or other criminal acts. The revised framework aims to simultaneously protect public life, health, property, the environment and national security. 34
III. Nuclear Liability and Compensation Regimes
Japan’s nuclear liability system is centred around the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage (Compensation Act) and the Act on Indemnity Agreements for Compensation of Nuclear Damage (Indemnity Agreements Act). 35
The Compensation Act defines a basic system for compensation when nuclear damage occurs. It is aimed at contributing to the protection of victims, as well as the development of the nuclear industry. 36 The provisions set out in the Act take precedence over general tort liability rules of the Civil Code by virtue of the principle of Lex Specialis , unless a matter is not specifically addressed by the framework, in which case the Civil Code continues to apply. 37
In the context of the Compensation Act, “nuclear damage” constitutes “any damage caused by the effects of the fission process of nuclear fuel, or of the radiation from nuclear fuel, etc”. 38 However, any damage suffered by the liable nuclear operator is excluded from the scope.39 Courts have also applied the general principle of ‘scope damage’ pursuant to section 416 of the Civil Code. 40
33 ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Toyohiro Nomura, Taro Hokugo, Chihiro Takenaka, ‘Japan’s nuclear liability system’ [NEA 2012] Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage 15.
36 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1961 (JPN) art 1.
37 Toyohiro Nomura, Taro Hokugo, Chihiro Takenaka, ‘Japan’s nuclear liability system’ [NEA 2012] Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage 15.
38 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1961 (JPN) art 2.
39 ibid.
40 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’ [2012] Washington International Law Journal 433, 434.
The Act establishes a regime of strict, channelled, and unlimited liability. When nuclear damage results from the operation of a reactor, the engaged nuclear operator is liable for the damage (strict liability). 41 The following section further channels liability to the operator, making it the primary liable party. 42 Additionally, the Act does not impose any liability caps, instituting a system of unlimited liability. 43 However, Section 3 provides that if the damage is caused by a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character or by an insurrection, liability is not incurred. 44 In such cases of exoneration, Section 17 provides that the government must take appropriate steps to relieve victims and prevent the damage from spreading further. 45
The Compensation Act obligates nuclear operators to provide financial security under Section 6. They are prohibited from operating a reactor unless financial security for compensation in case of nuclear damage is provided. 46 Nuclear operators must buy private and government insurance, or they can make a deposit. In Japan, all nuclear operators buy a policy from Japan Atomic Energy Insurance Pool, which insures up to 120 billion yen for nuclear damages. 47 However, the Pool does not cover some nuclear damages, including those caused by an earthquake or tsunami. 48
The Indemnity Agreement Act was established to cover the following damages: damages caused by an earthquake, volcanic eruption or tsunami; nuclear damage caused by normal operation; and nuclear damages for which the affected persons have not claimed compensation within a period of ten years from the occurrence of the event. 49 Operators enter into indemnity agreements with MEXT by paying indemnity fees every year. 50 Where damages exceed the operator’s financial security, the government can provide additional aid with the authorisation of the National Diet. 51
41 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1961 (JPN) art 3 para 1.
42 ibid art 4 para 1.
43 ibid arts 3-4.
44 ibid art 3.
45 ibid art 17.
46 ibid art 6.
47 ibid.
48 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’[2012] Washington International Law Journal 433, 436.
49 ibid.
50 ibid.
51 ibid 437.
A. Compensation Scheme for Fukushima Nuclear Disaster
After the disaster, the Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation published “Interim Guidelines for Determination of the Scope of Nuclear Damage Due to TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Plants”. 52 The guidelines established a broad compensation scheme for damages caused by evacuation orders, business losses, reputational harm, radiation exposure, and property damage to local governments. 53 The scope was quite flexible, as outside of the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami, it allowed for additional damages where the nuclear accident was the legally sufficient cause. Later, it was also expanded to include voluntary evacuees and radio active decontamination costs. 54
Soon after the accident, the Government enacted the Nuclear Disaster Victims Prompt Relief Law and, under the Compensation Act, established the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund. The measures were intended to ensure prompt compensation, stabilise the conditions of the power plant, and prevent adverse effects on other operators dealing with the incident. Lastly, they aimed to ensure a stable supply of electricity. 55
B. Liability concerns
1. Analysis of Liability of TEPCO
The legal issue was whether the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami were caught by the scope of “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character”, therefore exempting the liability of TEPCO for the nuclear damage caused pursuant to Section 3 of th e Act on Compensation. 56 The Advisory Committee of the Atomic Energy Commission interpreted the mentioned notion as a type of natural disaster beyond historical experience, limiting the exemption of force majeure to an extraordinarily high degree. 57 The commission further elaborated that “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character” would be an unforeseeable disaster beyond design assumptions for a reactor. 58
52 ibid 439.
53 ibid 440.
54 ibid 442-443.
55 ibid.
56 ibid 444, Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1961 (JPN) art 3.
57 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’ [2012] Washington International Law Journal 433, 445.
58 ibid.
In 2008, TEPCO predicted that waves exceeding 15 meters were possible following a major offshore earthquake, while computer analysis showed that tsunami waves at the Fukushima plant could reach up to 13.1 meters. 59 Despite this knowledge, TEPCO failed to incorporate these findings into its safety countermeasures and only reported them to METI days before the disaster. 60 Consequently, the earthquake and tsunami were argued not to be considered unforeseeable or beyond the reactor’s design basis, preventing TEPCO from invoking the statutory exemption for “a grave natural disaster of an exceptional character. 61
2. Government liability
Under the State Redress Act, a public official who, during the exercise of their public authority as a state or public entity, causes damage or loss illegally to another person, negligently or intentionally, the State or the said public entity assumes the responsibility to compensate them. 62 Additionally, the provision covers not only actions but also omissions, as the Supreme Court has upheld that when human life and health are in danger, and the government fails to exercise its power over the cause of the said danger, the government is liable. 63
After the Fukushima nuclear disaster, many argued for the potential liability of the Japanese government for a multitude of reasons. First, the government should have appropriately exercised its powers over nuclear operations. Although NSC was aware of the risk of a station blackout, as reported by TEPCO, it failed to take action and disclosed findings only eighteen years later. 64
Second, the government should have properly exercised its supervisory powers over the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. Prior to the disaster, the plant had experienced several incidents, most notably the nation’s first criticality incident in 1978 and an inc ident involving a recalculating pump in 1990. 65 Not only did the authorities conceal these accidents for nearly thirty years, but they also did not impose stricter oversight on TEPCO in light of them. 66
59 ibid 446.
60 ibid 447.
61 ibid.
62 State Redress Act 1947 (JPN).
63 ibid.
64 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’[2012] Washington International Law Journal 433.
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
Critics also argued that nuclear damage was exacerbated due to the government’s own omissions, as the Investigation Committee on the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations reported that the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters failed to properly coordinate and utilise the intended facilities, such as the off -site centre designated for emergency response. 67 It was further suggested that the government failed to prevent the expansion of the disaster, as radiation monitoring systems and the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) did not function as expected. 68 Additionally, evacuation plans and drills lacked considerations of the scale of the disaster, while evacuation directives were communicated ineffectively, causing confusion at the site of the accident. 69
a) Court Assessments
Decisions on government liability in the Fukushima accident were rendered in nine cases in 2019. Court decisions were contrasting, and they attributed liability in six cases to both TEPCO and the government, while in three of the cases only the company was found liable. 70
First, the courts identified the primary cause of the Fukushima accident – a station blackout caused by the tsunami, not the earthquake. 71 Based on that, the courts determined government responsibility by examining whether tsunami countermeasures fell within the scope of the government’s regulatory authority, whether the tsunami was foreseeable, and whether the government breached its duty to prevent the consequences of the tsunami by exercising regulatory authority or other available means. 72
All nine court decisions found that the government possessed the regulatory authority and that the accident was foreseeable, thereby affirming the first two grounds. 73 Although the decisions varied slightly regarding legal basis and reasoning, this still established court
67 ibid.
68 ibid.
69 ibid.
70 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Case Law’ [2019] Nuclear Law Bulletin <https://inis.iaea.org/records/63sey-t4704> accessed 10 May 2026 47.
71 ibid.
72 ibid.
73 ibid.
practice. 74 Consequently, the determination of government liability came down to the third consideration, whether the government had breached its duty to prevent the consequences. 75
One of the decisions of the State Redress litigations relating to the Fukushima accident is the Nagoya District Court decision of 2 August 2019. 76 The plaintiffs, who claimed to have suffered damages and mental anguish due to forced evacuation, sought compensation from both the government and TEPCO.77 The court allowed the claim only against TEPCO, denying government responsibility. Both the plaintiff and TEPCO appealed. 78
The court rendered the decision by assessing the criteria discussed above. It found that the government possessed the regulatory authority over measures against the disaster, as it could have ordered TEPCO to implement protective measures. 79 In addition, the court stated that the government and TEPCO were aware of the research conducted in 2006, which identified the possibility of a station blackout in the event of a tsunami that exceeded the seawalls of the site. 80 The scientific assessments from that time also made it possible for the government to foresee that such a tsunami could occur, providing a duty to have TEPCO calculate the potential impact of an expected tsunami based on the earthquake predictions made by the government agency. 81 The foreseeability of the tsunami was decided.
On the third ground, the court concluded that even if the government had exercised its regulatory powers, the proposed measures would likely be incomplete at the time of the disaster. 82 Furthermore, tsunami precautions had lower priority than earthquake ones and considering that the government and TEPCO had limited financial and human resources, it would not have been possible to take measures against every risk. 83 Taking all these circumstances together, the court found that the station blackout caused by the tsunami could not have been prevented, even if the regulatory authority had been exercised. 84 Therefore, government liability was not established under the State Redress Act.
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 ibid.
77 ibid.
78 ibid 48.
79 ibid.
80 ibid.
81 ibid.
82 ibid 49.
83 ibid.
84 ibid.
3. Liability of General Electric Company (GE)
Five units of the power plant were built with Mark I type containment structures. 85 For units one, two, and six, the reactors were built by the General Electric Company. 86 The reactor for unit one was the first commercial reactor in Japan that was built as a “full turnkey project” by GE, meaning that the company designed and built it and turned it over to TEPCO in a readyto-use condition. 87
After the disaster, GE emphasized that the Mark I containment had a proven record of reliability for over 40 years. 88 However, doubts regarding its safety had existed long before. Safety officials of the U.S Atomic Energy Commission had recommended the discontinuation of the Mark I design because it presented safety risks. 89 Moreover, former GE nuclear engineers who resigned from the company believed that a design flaw in the Mark I could trigger a disaster. 90 One of the former employees, Dale G. Bridenbaugh, warned that the design “did not take into account the dynamic loads that could be experienced with a loss of coolant” and that the impact the containment would receive from a rapid release of energy could tear it apart, creating an uncontrolled release. 91
The Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damages contains a channelled liability provision, meaning that the liability for nuclear damage is concentrated on the nuclear operator, in the case of Fukushima TEPCO, even where defects of fault in manufacturing may exist. 92 Consequently, pursuing redress from GE in Japan is generally not possible. Although the principal office of GE is located in Connecticut, potentially offering a venue to bring a lawsuit, issues relating to forum selection and conflict of laws present sign ificant challenges to pursuing such claims. 93
In fact, a class action lawsuit was brought against GE in the United States for a negligent reactor design. 94 However, the District Court of Massachusetts dismissed the case under the
85 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’ [2012] Washington International Law Journal 433, 451-452.
86 ibid 452.
87 ibid.
88 ibid 453.
89 ibid.
90 ibid.
91 ibid.
92 Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage 1961 (JPN) art 4.
93 Eri Osaka, ‘Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’ [2012] Washington International Law Journal 433, 454.
94 Imamura v. General Electric Co. (1st Cir. 2020).
doctrine of forum non conveniens , which allows a court to dismiss a case before it when litigation would be more convenient or adequate in a foreign forum. 95 This decision was affirmed by the First Circuit, holding that Japan was the more appropriate forum for the dispute despite GE’s headquarters being located in the U.S. 96
4. Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power
The United States set up a humanitarian mission, ‘Operation Tomodachi’, to assist Japan after the disaster. Hundreds of U.S Navy servicemembers were deployed near Fukushima aboard vessels, including the USS Ronald Reagan. The plaintiffs alleged that they were exposed to massive levels of radiation because of TEPCO, which allegedly concealed and minimised the true extent of the nuclear meltdown and radiation leakage. Plaintiffs asserted that TEPCO’s misleading statements created a false sense of safety, preventing the U.S military from taking necessary precautions and repositioning the personnel at an earlier instance. 97
The service members and their families filed a class action suit against TEPCO, and later GE, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. They sought damages and redress for physical injuries, emotional distress, medical mo nitoring costs and other harms resulting from radiation exposure. 98
The litigation went through several procedural stages and became a significant transnational legal dispute concerning questions of jurisdiction, international comity, forum selection, political questions, treaty interpretation and choice of law.
In the first appellate decision of 2017, the Ninth Circuit of Appeals considered whether the case should be dismissed before trial. TEPCO argued that the litigation belonged in Japan because as the response to the disaster Japan had already established a c omprehensive compensation framework for Fukushima victims. They also had a strong interest in centralizing all Fukushima-related claims with Japanese courts. TEPCO further relied on doctrines such as international comity, forum non conveniens , and the political questions doctrine. 99
96 Imamura v. General Electric Co. (1st Cir. 2020).
97 Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Co. 860 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2017).
98 Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Co. (9th Cir. 2020).
99 Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Co. 860 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2017).
At that stage, the Ninth Circuit refused to dismiss the case. The court held that the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC) did not retroactively strip the U.S courts of jurisdiction over claims that occurred before the conventi on entered into force in 2015. Since the accident occurred in 2011, CSC could not automatically require the proceeding to be held solely in the contracting party where the accident occurred, in this case, Japan.100
The court also rejected TEPCO’s immediate request for dismissal on international comity and forum non conveniens grounds. It recognised Japan’s strong interest in managing the Fukushima compensation scheme and claims domestically but found that the United States also had significant interests in the case. The plaintiffs were all U.S servicemembers carrying out a U.S military operation when the alleged injuries were incurred. The court additionally paid attention to the factual developments regarding military decision -making and causation concerns, which were still incomplete at that point in time and deemed that dism issal would be premature at that stage. 101
The court further concluded that the political question doctrine did not require dismissal yet. 102 While TEPCO argued that adjudicating the claims would force the courts to review sensitive military decisions and foreign policy matters, the Circuit held that the plaintiffs had reformulated their assertions in a way to focus on TEPCO’s alleged negligenc e rather than on military conduct. 103 Albeit, the court emphasised that these issues could potentially be revisited as facts would develop. 104
Following remand, TEPCO and GE again moved to dismiss the case, resulting in the second opinion of the Ninth Circuit in 2020. This time, the chamber focused heavily on Japanese nuclear liability law and analysis on choice of law. 105
In the centre of the dispute was the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage. Channelling provision dictated that the operator of a nuclear facility would be liable, shielding other entities, including reactor manufacturers such as GE, from liability. The law was designed to ensure legal predictability and guarantee compensation through a cent ralised and state-
100 ibid.
101 ibid.
102 ibid.
103 ibid.
104 ibid.
105 Cooper v. Tokyo Electric Power Co. (9th Cir. 2020).
backed financial support. GE was in favour of Japanese law applying to the case, as the legal framework would impose liability exclusively on TEPCO. The plaintiffs countered with support for California law, as California's Products Liability law allows cla ims against manufacturers for defective reactor design. 106
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Japanese law governed the dispute by applying California’s governmental interest choice of law test. The court found a true conflict between California’s interest in compensating harmed plaintiffs and Japan’s interest in channelling liability with its nuclear regulatory system. Essentially, Japan’s interests would be seriously impaired by the court’s determination, since the accident occurred in Japan, involved a Japanese nuclear facility, affected Japanese energy policy, and was alr eady subject to an intricate Japanese compensation system. Accordingly, the court held that Japan’s Compensation Act overrode all claims against GE. 107
The Circuit also affirmed dismissal of the claims against TEPCO on international comity grounds. The court considered Japan’s sovereign interest in adjudicating all Fukushimarelated disputes, since it had already created an extensive legal process and com pensation mechanism for both Japanese and foreign victims. The U.S court decided it should allow Japanese courts and institutions to handle the case instead, to not risk undermining the country’s carefully structured regime and its broader nuclear regulato ry policy. 108
IV. International Dimension
A. International Nuclear Liability Regimes
Since the 1950s, the beginning of the development of nuclear power reactors, governments realised that ordinary common law would not be able to address the risks involved with this new source of energy. 109 No major civil nuclear accidents with off-site consequences had occurred until 1986 at Chernobyl. Even before, sovereigns were aware that large-scale emission of radiation would have widespread effects on human life and health, public and private property, as well as the environment and economy. 110 Hence, special liability regimes
106 ibid.
107 ibid.
108 ibid.
109 Ximena Vasquez-Maignan, ‘The Japanese nuclear liability regime in the context of the international nuclear liability principles’ [NEA 2012] Japan’s Compensation System for Nuclear Damage 9. 110 ibid.
were deemed necessary. States slowly started adopting nuclear liability and compensation regimes at national and international levels. 111
Nuclear accidents may cause damage beyond the geographical borders of the country where it occurs.112 Therefore, it was detrimental to establish third -party liability regimes and treaty relations between nuclear states and their neighbours to ensure compensation for all victims, including in neighbouring states. 113
The international nuclear liability mechanisms are based on following conventions: the 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention), the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage ( Vienna Convention) and the 1997 Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC). 114
These conventions lay down internationally accepted fundamental principles on nuclear liability, which are usually transposed into national legislation. 115
1. Strict Liability – the nuclear operator is held liable regardless of intention, whether of fault or negligent.
2. Exclusive liability (legal channelling) – all liability for damage suffered by third parties is exclusively attributed (channelled) to the nuclear operator.
3. Limitation of liability in amount – conventions originally provided for a maximum amount of compensation for the operator to be liable for. However, like Japan, several other states opted for unlimited liability. This was made possible by the conventions prescribing a minimum liability amount.
4. Compulsory Financial Security – the nuclear operator must financially secure its liability, so, in the case of an incident, funds are available for compensation.
5. Limitation of liability in time – overtime the conventions have extended the period in which redress can be pursued for the benefit of the victims of the accident, as health -
111 ibid.
112 ibid.
113 ibid.
114 ibid.
115 ibid.
related damages caused by radiation may not be perceptible for a certain time after the incident, making the legal period very important to the affected parties. 116
Additionally, the conventions include two more important principles for handling the complexities that arise from the transboundary nature of nuclear damage. First, only the courts of the country where the nuclear accident happened have jurisdiction over t he claims. Second, those courts apply both the convention rules and their own national laws to all claims equally, without discrimination based on nationality, residence, or domicile. 117
B. Lessons Learnt for the International Community
The Fukushima Daiichi accident fundamentally altered global approaches to nuclear safety and regulation, reinforcing the significance of having stronger national and international standards to ensure the reliability of nuclear energy. The accident inspired the revision of IAEA’s safety standard, which promoted stricter safety requirements for nuclear installations worldwide. 118
One of the key shifts in nuclear safety thinking was from the prevention of ordinary “designbasis” accidents to preparing for severe accidents and attempting to minimize their consequences. Regulators and operators now recognise that plants must be able to withstan d extreme natural activities, like earthquakes or flooding, that exceed previously expected limits. Design standards are strengthened to account for rare and extreme events. 119
Fukushima also accelerated reforms in emergency preparedness and accident management. Nuclear operators are now expected to include severe accident management measures in plant operation. Importance is placed on the ability to maintain transportation and communication systems during disasters, and to ensure that trained personnel can reach accident sites even in extreme conditions. 120
The Fukushima accident demonstrated that nuclear incidents could affect the entire international community and therefore require coordinated global responses. This led to a
116 ibid.
117 ibid.
118 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Ensuring the Safety of Nuclear Installations: Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Daiichi Accident’ (IAEA Bulletin, March 2021) <https://www.iaea.org/bulletin/ensuring -the-safetyof-nuclear-installations-lessons-learned-from-the-fukushima-daiichi-accident> accessed 11 May 2026.
119 ibid.
120 ibid.
broader legal and regulatory impact on strengthening international cooperation by adopting the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. 121
V. Safety Vulnerabilities During the Event
To understand the Fukushima nuclear accident, it is crucial to consider not only the legal dimensions, but also safety aspects. Therefore, the following sections focus on two overarching safety issues related to the incident. In addition to these safety co ncerns, gaps in crisis communication processes between key actors will be examined.
A. Hazard Underestimation and Design Failures
One of the primary factors contributing to the Fukushima nuclear accident was the failure to adapt safety designs, which was rooted in the underestimation of tsunami hazards. 122.According to the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Analysis Report the tsunami that damaged the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station had a 9.1 magnitude rate. 123 The postevent tsunami reproduction calculations showed that the waves, caused by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake, reached approximately 13 meters in height. 124 In comparison, the Great Lisbon Earthquake of 1755 had an estimated magnitude of 8.7 and generated tsunami waves up to 10 meters high. 125 Multiple stakeholders including Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) and The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion (HERP) stated that an earthquake caused by the joint movement of multiple source regions was unforeseeable. 126 Furthermore, the expert committee of the Central Disaster Prevention Council expressed the unexpectedness of such a powerful tsunami, taking into consideration the earthquake history of Japan.
121 ibid.
122 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
123 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
124 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
125 Barkan, R., ten Brink, U. S., & Lin, J. (2009). Far field tsunami simulations of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake: Implications for tsunami hazard to the U.S. East Coast and the Caribbean. Marine Geology, 264(1–2), 109–122. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0025322708002818
126 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
However, researchers independent from the Japanese government identified a 1,000year pattern of massive tsunamis occurrence in the region, with the last recorded one in 869. 127 In addition, the design-basis tsunami for the Nuclear Power Plant of Fukushima was the 1960 Chile tsunami with a height of 3.1 meters. 128 Despite the revision in 2009 to 6.1 meters and the relocation of the residual heat removal motors to a higher elevation; TEPCO failed to properly improve its safety measures to avoid flooding of the nuclear plant. James M. Acton and Mark Hibbs highlighted that TEPCO, as well as the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), did not follow international standards and internationally recognized practices. 129 Such regulations as, the guidance of International Atomic Energy Agency and, the site -specific computer modelling. Moreover, TEPCO decided to ignore the conducted computer modelling that forecasted the occurrence of a massive 15.7 meters high tsunami. 130 One of the underlying reasons for these failures was the strong government influence on promoting nuclear energy, which resulted in the disregard of independent nuclear expert opinion in this matter.
131
B. Technical Deficiencies and Systemic Inadequacies
After the beginning of the nuclear accident multiple technical issues occurred that fell outside the scope of the company’s risk assessment and lacked any defined control measures.
132 The malfunction of the cooling systems located in the power plant units miscarried the removal of decay heat. 133 Without low-pressure water, which was the barrier between the increasing heat and the nuclear plant’s metal building structure, the crisis of Fukushima exponentially worsened.134 The issue in Unit 1 appeared after the shut off the direct current power, meanwhile
127 Somerville, P. (2020, February 4). Officials acquitted of professional negligence in the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Risk Frontiers. https://riskfrontiers.com/insights/officials -acquitted-of-professional-negligence-in-thefukushima-nuclear-disaster/
128 Acton, J. M., & Hibbs, M. (2012, March 6). Why Fukushima was preventable. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2012/03/why-fukushima-was-preventable
129 Acton, J. M., & Hibbs, M. (2012, March 6). Why Fukushima was preventable. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2012/03/why-fukushima-was-preventable
130 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
131 The National Diet of Japan. (2012). The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive summ ary. https://www.nirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
132 Weightman, M. (2011). Japanese earthquake and tsunami: Implications for the UK nuclear industry (Report No. ONR-FR-REP-11-002 Revision 2). Office for Nuclear Regulation. https://www.onr.org.uk/media/bksbmyi4/final-report.pdf
133 Ibid.
134 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
other units were affected by the overheating of suppression pool or the discharged batteries. 135 To prevent deepened repercussions such as substantial reactor pressure vessel malfunction, Safety Relief Valves must have been implemented. 136 However, these safety devices, which help pressure release when crucial, were unable to function in the absence of direct current power and nitrogen gas.137 Unfortunately, improvisational countermeasures such as replacing essential power with batteries from employee’s cars, did not succeed. 138
The crisis worsened due to the unmanaged gas production, which was one of the consequences of the core meltdown. 139 This escalation was driven by the zirconium-water reaction, where overheating fuel cladding reacted with steam to create large amounts of explosive hydrogen and release extra heat into the melting core. 140 Hydrogen backflow, which refers to the migration of gas in shared ventilation systems between Unit 3 into the offline Unit 4 building, triggered eventual detonation. 141 Ventilation of this containment was unmanageable, due to the electrical breakdown of both motor-operated and air-operated valves.142 Furthermore, the lack of air and nitrogen resulted in the system being incapacitated, which decreased the available air rapidly. 143 This was hardened by the circumstances such as workers needing to operate manually in dark and high -radiation environments. 144 After multiple
135 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
136 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
137 Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan. (2014). Analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident: Interim report [Provisional translation]. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/anaylysis_nra1014.pdf ; Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corpcom/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
138 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (2012). General Electric advanced technology manual: Chapter 7.1. Fukushima Dai-ichi earthquake and tsunami event. Human Resources Training Division. https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ml1414/ml14140a185.pdf
139 National Research Council. (2014). Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants. The National Academies Press https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/18294/chapter/7
140 ibid.
141 Nuclear Regulation Authority, Japan. (2014). Analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident: Interim report [Provisional translation]. https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/anaylysis_nra1014.pdf
142 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
143 Ninokata, H., & Okamoto, K. (2021). Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. Insights Concerning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 1, 68–80. https://www.aesj.net/document/fukushima_vol1/1 -68_80.pdf
144 National Research Council. (2014). Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants. The National Academies Pre ss.https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/18294/chapter/7
attempts of successful valves opening the “fail- close” safety design was activated when power or air pressure fluctuated. 145
C. Systemic Failures in Crisis Communication
The failures in crisis communication contributed to both the unorganized and insufficient management during the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. 146 The multiple choke points in insufficiency indicates an overall flawed communication and information sharing system. A significant issue was seen at the receiver end of the communication. 147 An improvised group of politicians and advisors at the Prime Minister’s Office (Kantei) took over the control due to the failure of government accident response systems. The off -site Emergency Response Centre was unable to function due to infrastructure damage. 148. The lack of expertise of the group resulted in late reactions such as the Declaration of a Nuclear Emergency Situation with a 2hour delay. 149
The change in the official route of communication complicated the situation further. 150 After NISA failed to complete its role as leading entity in the management of the nuclear emergency, the intermediary responsibility rested with the Kantei. The direct information sharing between Kantei and the TEPCO headquarters and the Fukushima site re sulted in unpredictability, improvised procedures, panicked on -site staff members and double workload to TEPCO due to the simultaneous communication channels and accident management. 151 The misunderstanding between the intention of full or temporary evacuation is a great example of the unclear communication during the crisis. 152
145 Ninokata, H., & Okamoto, K. (2021). Lessons learned from Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident. Insights Concerning the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, 1, 68–80. https://www.aesj.net/document/fukushima_vol1/1 -68_80.pdf
146 The National Diet of Japan. (2012). The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive summar y. https://www.nirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
147 ibid.
148 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
149 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
150 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
151 ibid.
152 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
In addition, the failure of technical communication tools hardened the cooperation between stakeholders.153 The plant’s wired paging system including wireless phones data reporting and recording devices become inoperable. The information sharing between the onsite Emergency Response Centre and Main Control Rooms depended on a single wired telephone line and whiteboards for data recording. 154 Furthermore, the Safety Parameter Display System, the government’s immediate plant status provider system lost power, which provided a significant disadvantage in the access of data about the situation. 155
The withholding of information by TEPCO hindered the ability of the government to coordinate an effective emergency response. 156 Information suppression was actively maintained by forcing TEPCO employees to censor their comments about the disaster to mitigate negative public opinion. Immediately following the nuclear accident, the public received no information regarding the increasing pressure data from Unit 3. 157 This was done to protect TEPCO's relationship with NISA, which had issued an information ban. Moreover, the company did not realise relevant radiation monitoring data after the incident, at the same time there was active communication with the press.
VI. Environmental and Health Consequences of the Event
It is crucial to acknowledge how the environmental and health repercussions caused by the Fukushima nuclear accident shaped the region's biodiversity and the long -term health of the citizens.158
153 Ibid.
154 National Research Council. (2014). Lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident for improving safety of U.S. nuclear plants. The National Academies Press https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/18294/chapter/7
155 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
156 The National Diet of Japan. (2012). The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive summary. https://www.nirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
157 The National Diet of Japan. (2012). The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive summary. https://www.nirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
158 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
A. Environmental Effect
This nuclear accident resulted in significant environmental damages, which affected multiple ecosystems.159 Within an 1,800 square kilometre area of the nuclear accident the radiation level was double the worldwide average for natural background radiation. 160 Numerically, a cumulative radiation dose of 5 mSv/year was released to the atmosphere. The conflicting wind patterns were working at cross -purposes, which rapidly enlarged the area affected by radiation through airflow.161
The marine biodiversity was greatly affected by the nuclear accident. 162 The pollution originated from direct and indirect sources, which is the explanation for why this event was considered as the largest accidental release of radioactive material into the ocean in history 163 After the leaking of the highly radioactive coolant water, the atmospheric deposition still remained as a non-point source. This did not stay as a local environmental issue due to the Kuroshio Current playing a hydrological transporter role across the North Pacific basin. 164 The radioactive material persisted in the seabed sediments for decades. By becoming integrated into the diet of the benthic organisms, the nuclear pollution continued throughout the whole foodchain. 165
B. Health Effects
When analysing the health risks related to the Fukushima nuclear accident there are multiple aspects that need to be taken into consideration such as the direct radiation impact,
159 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. (2021, March 9). A decade after the Fukushima accident: Radiation-linked increases in cancer rates not expected to be seen. https://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/news/content/a -decade-after-the-fukushima-accident_-radiation-linkedincreases-in-cancer-rates-not-expected-to-be-seen.html
160 The National Diet of Japan. (2012). The official report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission: Executive summary https://www.nirs.org/wpcontent/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf
161 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
162 Bhutto, S., Khoso, A. R., & Wang, S. (2025). Sociological and ecological vulnerabilities from nuclear waste discharge: A case study of Fukushima's marine ecosystem. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation, 6(2), 877–886. https://www.allmultidisciplinaryjournal.com/uploads/archives/20250403191614_MGE-2025-2-213.1.pdf
163 Tokyo Electric Power Company. (2012). Fukushima nuclear accident analysis report. https://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu12_e/images/120620e0104.pdf
164 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
165 Bhutto, S., Khoso, A. R., & Wang, S. (2025). Sociological and ecological vulnerabilities from nuclear waste discharge: A case study of Fukushima's marine ecosystem. International Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Growth Evaluation, 6(2), 877–886. https://www.allmultidisciplinaryjournal.com/uploads/archives/20250403191614_MGE-2025-2-213.1.pdf
associated mortality and the mental and social wellbeing of the population. 166 2,313 recorded deaths can be connected to insufficient evacuation processes. 167 The most affected group was the elderly and/or chronic patients, who were vulnerable to the relocation caused stress, lack of medical services and substandard temporary shelters. 168
However, in comparison to other nuclear accidents including the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe no radiation caused death or diseases were recorded. 169 Furthermore, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) stated no increase in radiation-related illness is expected. 170
Despite the absence of direct radiological impact on human health, various social and psychological effects were documented after the incident. 171 A survey conducted by the Fukushima Global Communication Programme of the United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability discovered that the majority of the affected population suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), anxiety and depression. 172 From this survey in February of 2013, results showed that out of 2425 survey respondents 65% were considered to be at high risk for PTSD. 173 In addition to losing their social connection, displaced residents needed to face discrimination due to fear from radiation as well as collapse of their local economies.174
166 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
167 World Nuclear Association. (2026, February 27). Fukushima Daiichi accident. https://worldnuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-plants/fukushima-daiichi-accident 168 ibid.
169 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
170 United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. (2021, March 9). A decade after the Fukushima accident: Radiation-linked increases in cancer rates not expected to be seen. https://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/news/content/a -decade-after-the-fukushima-accident_-radiation-linkedincreases-in-cancer-rates-not-expected-to-be-seen.html
171 International Atomic Energy Agency. (2015). The Fukushima Daiichi accident: Report by the Director General (Report No. GC(59)/14). https://www-pub.iaea.org/mtcd/publications/pdf/pub1710-reportbythedg-web.pd
172 Tsujiuchi, T. (2015). Mental health impact of the Fukushima nuclear disaster: Post -traumatic stress and psycho-socio-economic factors (Working Paper No. 8). United Nations University Institute for the Advanced Study of Sustainability. https://i.unu.edu/media/fgc.unu.edu-en/page/922/FGC-WP-8-FINAL.pdf
173 ibid.
174 Asia Pacific Initiative. (2022). 10-year Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident. https://apinitiative.org/GaIeyudaTuFo/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/10-year-Investigation-Commission-on-theFukushima-Nuclear-Accident_en_20220401-1.pdf
VII. Conclusion
To gain a thorough understanding of the situation, i t is essential to acknowledge the aspects that contributed to the disaster. Although the activating events, the combination of the Great East Japan Earthquake and the resulting tsunami, occurred due to natural phenomena, the outcome was mainly shaped by existing legal, regulatory, technical, and institutional failures. Bureaucratic dichotomy, regulatory capture, outdated safety standards, and an overreliance on operator discretion were characteristics of the pre -Fukushima framework of Japan. Therefore, preventable risks such as station blackout, which occurred due to pre -existing flaws in the system, had no countermeasures in place.
The Fukushima nuclear incident revealed the strengths and weaknesses in the nuclear liability regime of Japan. Holding the operating organization of the nuclear facility, TEPCO exclusively liable as well as providing a structured system for victim compensation were strong mechanisms designed to insulate the state from primary liab ility while ensuring structured financial restitution for affected populations. However, the limited government responsibility, the insufficiency of regulatory enforcement and the adjudicatory comity highlight the challenges of this legal system. This represents how legal responsibility is expected to operate in advance of a crisis, not only taking reactive measures. Consequently, a legal framework rooted in robust regulatory control is preferred overcompensation law.
Furthermore, the lack of safety adaptation in technical designs, alignment with international standards, and insufficient crisis communication contributed to the worsening of the nuclear situation. Fukushima highlighted the negative effect on the natural e nvironment, public trust and health of citizens caused by unresolved risks triggered by the chain of catastrophic events. A stronger emergency response system and adequate accident preparedness with transparency and effective oversight of the system could have significantly mitigated these adversarial outcomes.
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State Sovereignty, Use of Force, and Non-Intervention in Venezuela: A legal and security analysis of the Maduro Case
By Leon Paladinić* and Sophia Angelina Baerend*
Abstract
This paper examines the Venezuelan crisis primarily through the focus of international law and security, with specific attention on the legal principles of state sovereignty, nonintervention, the prohibition on the use of force, and humanitarian intervent ion. The article argues that the crisis in Venezuela became not only a political and humanitarian emergency, but also a major legal controversy that tested the limits of the modern international legal order. As economic collapse, political repression, and mass migration increased greatly under Nicolás Maduro, international governments increasingly debated over whether foreign involvement could be legally justified under doctrines such as humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), or whether such actions would violate Venezuela’s sovereignty under the United Nations Charter.
This analysis examines whether the United States’ reported capture of Nicolás Maduro inside Venezuela was lawful under international law. Although the United States may argue that the operation was connected to criminal prosecution and national security, t he stronger legal position is that the operation likely violated Venezuela’s sovereignty unless justified by valid consent, self-defense, or UN Security Council authorization. The operation also raises concerns under the UN Charter’s prohibition on the use of force, the limits of extraterritorial enforcement, and the immunity normally given to sitting heads of state. Overall, serious criminal allegations may justify prosecution, but they do not automatically justify a unilateral military operation inside another state’s territory.
* L.L.B. Candidate, International and European Law Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
* Bachelor’s Candidate, Safety and Security Management Studies Programme, The Hague University of Applied Sciences.
I. Introduction
The system of modern international relations is built largely on the concept of Westphalian sovereignty, which emphasizes territorial acknowledgement, political independence, and the right to govern a state without external influence. These principles are reinforced by the United Nations Charter yet are continuously challenged by debates over international security and foreign intervention.
The relationship between autonomy and security is immense. Wars have been fought, organizations have been founded, and policies have been published due to this association. These elements of international security aim to reduce conflict and violence by dis couraging violations of borders and limiting foreign intervention. Such violations are acts against sovereignty. This remains a pillar of the international system, as it provides legal equality among countries, helping to foster and maintain order in inter national relations. The UN Charter reinforces those same principles through agreements that prohibit the use of force against an acknowledged territory, as well as limit foreign intervention.
However, issues often arise when sovereignty conflicts with the humanitarian or ethical priorities of countries that believe providing aid can help to prevent human rights violations and other atrocities. In such cases, debates over whether foreign involve ment is justified begin to emerge.
II. Venezuela before Nicolas Maduro: Hugo Chaves, the Bolivarian Revolution, and American tensions
Tensions between sovereignty, human rights, and foreign intervention are not new to Latin America. The election of Hugo Chavez as president, Nicolas Maduro's predecessor, marked the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution, a socialist political movement. Th e revolution aimed to improve living conditions for the population and prioritized adult literacy, education, and healthcare (Ebsco, 2021).
While the revolution aimed to improve Venezuela, relations were not improved with the United States, for a multitude of reasons. The anti -imperialist and anti-capitalist stance of the Bolivarian Revolution clashed with the United States on matters such as economic independence, ideology, oil, and other natural resources, as well as national security (Peterson, 2025).
As part of Chavez’s goal to improve the Venezuelan economy, United States -supported economic and trade agreements were dismantled to help promote regional trade and economic cooperation. This conflicted with the economic interests of the United States and reduced bilateral trade cooperation.
Economic tensions between the two countries became even more significant due the Venezuela’s major role in the international oil industry. Venezuela houses the largest proven oil reserves in the world. By cutting economic ties to the United States and nati onalizing vital industries (such as oil), it removed a geographically convenient and large supplier from the States. American companies (such as Chevron or ExxonMobil) had also invested billions into the oil industry, and the United States government aimed to protect those investments, as well as their sector of the American economy (Hajdari, 2025).
Disputes over business, however, did not end there. Radical anti -capitalist and antiimperialist ideologies, which were crucial to the Bolivarian Revolution, strongly went against the capitalistic and perceived imperial influence, which conflicted with the United States capitalist economic system. The clash in ideals allowed for further tension between the former allies. The American distrust for the revolution and Hugo Chavez can also be linked to the fact that only eight years prior, America had been in D EFCON2, meaning that they believed nuclear war was imminent and inevitable. Although the Cold War was over, the United States feared a “Pink Tide" and that Hugo Chávez's anti-imperialist, socialist agenda would evolve into communism (Schrama, 2018). This s hift to socialism was not an isolated incident, and represented a broader regional shift towards a more left -wing government, making Venezuela a part of a larger ideological movement.
Venezuela under Hugo Chávez further increased tensions with the United States by reducing financial ties, and strengthening alliances with countries such as Russia and China. Although this is not officially cited as the reason that Venezuela was declared a threat to national security in 2007, Venezuela’s allies are believed to have elevated its level of perceived threat to Washington (FDD Action, 2025).
Although Hugo Chávez's policies changed Venezuela’s relationship with the United States and strengthened the Bolivarian Revolution internally, they also made Venezuela heavily dependent on its own oil supply and vulnerable to economic instability caused by oil price fluctuations. Lack of economic diversification, due to oil being roughly 95% of export revenue,
weakened the nation's resilience. The economy’s leaning (almost) solely on one industry created a “petrostate”, meaning that government income was deeply reliant on oil and gas and economic and political power were concentrated to the elites instead of the government (Roy and Cheatham, 2024).
These same vulnerabilities which allowed Venezuela to enter such a state flourished under Maduro, whose presidency saw economic collapse and political upheaval. This event caused the largest humanitarian crisis and exodus (7.9 million individuals having le ft Venezuela since 2014 (UNHCR, n.d.) and 73.2% of the population living in poverty as of 2024) (Statista, 2025) in Latin American history.
III. Principle of non-intervention in international relations
The immense severity of the crisis raised questions within the international actors regarding matters of state authority and foreign involvement: Should other countries intervene if the matter turned to a crisis of human rights, or would doing so be a dire ct violation of the very definition of sovereignty?
The principle of non-intervention is defined by the Princeton Encyclopedia as “the prohibition of the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.” (Wood, n.d.) and “that a state should not otherwise intervene in a dictatorial way in the internal affairs of other states.”
Historically, Latin America had repeatedly been the victim of the absence of such a non-intervention principle, as they were frequently colonized by European and (later) United States colonial powers (Helal, 2025). In the 20th century alone, the United Sta tes intervened within the Dominican Republic three times, Cuba four times, Honduras four times, Nicaragua four times, and Panama three times, amongst many others (Hill, 2026).
Due to this history and past trauma to the region, many other Latin American countries were hesitant to assist with the United States -led external action due to a fear of falling back on the same historical habits of forced intervention. Further, neighbori ng countries such as Brazil or Colombia feared actions that could lead to even more instability or military attention from the United States (Relief Web, 2019).
This hesitation was exacerbated by the preexisting legal mechanisms put in place after the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the Organization of American States (OAS) two years later (Farer, n.d.). Both organizations emphasized equal sovereignty o f states and the significance of avoiding unilateral military action. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter explicitly prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, except in the case of self -defense or authorization by the UN Security Council (Delanis, 1979).
For many Latin American countries and governments, supporting intervention without the agreement of foreign governments risked undermining those necessary postwar constructs that smaller and less powerful countries relied on for protection. As a result, go vernments who condemned and publicly persecuted human rights violations or political repression within other countries remained hesitant about supporting direct military involvement.
Simultaneously, the debate around nonintervention revealed growing tensions surrounding international relations between respect for territorial autonomy and respect for human rights. By the late 20th century, humanitarian crises increasingly challenged the interpretation of state sovereignty as absolute rule (van der Horst, 2023). Some policymakers argued that when governments failed to protect their own citizens or actively committed acts against them, the international community had a moral right to respo nd (Garriges, n.d.). Others warned that humanitarian justifications could just as easily be used as a loophole by powerful countries seeking to expand their own territory, under the guise of protecting human rights.
Consequently, the crisis in Venezuela evolved from a regional political dispute to a larger global argument over the balance of international law, human rights national sovereignty, and the legitimacy of a nations rate to intervene.
IV. Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
With the sheer degree that the Venezuelan crisis had risen to, becoming one of the most severe political and humanitarian emergencies in the Western world, years of economic ruin, political oppression, food and medicine shortages, and mass emigration have led to many individuals in the international community debating over whether humanitarian intervention or the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) could justify international intervention. The
potential intervention of the United States, in particular, has made the Venezuelan crisis vital to understanding the controversies and nuances surrounding topics such as intervention on the basis of human rights.
Humanitarian intervention refers to the use of diplomatic or military measures by countries or international organizations to prevent human rights violations in another country. Although intervention has traditionally clashed with the concept of state auth ority, after such tragedies as the Rwandan genocide in 1994 (Adams, 2012), foreign governments developed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, formally supported by the United Nations in 2005 (United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Re sponsibility to Protect, n.d.)
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) posits that countries have a responsibility and a right to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. If a country fails to follow through with this, the United Na tions may take collective action.
Supporters of applying the R2P to the crisis in Venezuela argue that the government under Nicolás Maduro has violated human rights multiple times, on an immense scale. Crimes such as repression of political dissent, arbitrary detention, torture, enforced d isappearances, impunity, and attacks on the rights of expression have contributed to widespread suffering (Amnesty International, n.d.). More than seven million Venezuelans have fled the country, creating a massive displacement and refugee crisis. Some cla im that, because the Venezuelan government has failed to protect its own citizens and has instead contributed to the crisis, the international community has a moral responsibility to intervene.
The United States became heavily involved in the crisis during the first Trump administration but had placed sanctions on Venezuela prior to the current president, including visa restrictions, asset blocking sanctions related to drug trafficking, forbiddin g the sale of any and all United States commercial arms to Venezuela, and a law requiring the president to impose sanctions on individuals deemed criminally responsible for “significant acts of violence, serious human rights abuses, or antidemocratic actio ns" (Seelke, 2026). The United States also recognized Maduro’s opposition, Juan Guaidó, as Venezuela’s legitimate president in 2019 and repeatedly stated that all options were under consideration, including military. American officials justified these stat ements and actions by emphasizing democracy and humanitarian concerns.
However, critics have opposed the possibility that the United States imposing sanctions would worsen the quality of life and deepen the poverty levels of the Venezuelan people (United Nations Human Rights, 2025). It is also noted that R2P is meant to be a multilateral process authorized by the United Nations Security Council, not absolute action decided by one country.
The Venezuelan crisis demonstrates both the appeal and difficulty of humanitarian and international intervention and R2P in execution. While the suffering of human rights creates strong ethical pressure for foreign action, disagreements in national self -governance and the consequences of intervention prevent unified agreement.
V. Reactions from Major Global Powers
Although the crisis of human rights violations created pressure on foreign governments to intervene, disagreements on self-governance and the potential consequences of intervention halted a unified agreement. Divisions became especially clear in the reacti ons of global powers to the United States' intervention, as the opinions of global powers were shaped by strategic self-interests and concerns about international security.
In 2025, as the United States took a significant stance against Maduro, Russia strongly opposed their involvement and became one of Venezuela’s most significant allies. Vladimir Putin condemned the newly implemented American sanctions. Russia’s United Nati ons envoy, Vassily Nebenzia, called the sanctions “illegal” and “a real act of aggression," even going on to say that the United States’s intervention could "become a template for future acts of force against Latin American states" (Aydogan, 2025).
Russia provided financial and military assistance as well as diplomatic support to Caracas. Moscow also had important economic interests in Venezuela’s oil sector through Russian energy companies located in Venezuela (Bayoumi and Magid, 2025). Through supp ort of Maduro, Russia challenged United States influence in Latin America and demonstrated its power as a major state capable of resisting United States pressure or foreign policy.
Russia’s stance against United States intervention increasingly complicated the likelihood of a unified agreement and the stance within foreign governments, as well as the United Nations. As a result, the issue expanded beyond domestic politics into a broa der international debate, involving more actors into the matter.
China also supported the Venezuelan government, although in a more reserved and finance-focused manner. China had invested billions into Venezuelan oil and infrastructure projects over several years. Chinese President Xi Jinping criticized unilateral Unite d States sanctions and emphasized the principles of sovereignty and non -intervention (Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, 2026). Although China reduced some financial support as Venezuela’s economy dwindled, diplomatic cooperation with Maduro’s government was continued. Such a response reflected broader foreign policy approaches by means of avoiding direct political conflict but protecting international strategic investments.
European countries displayed mixed reactions to the US led intervention. Nations such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany criticized Maduro’s government and recognized Juan Guaido as interim president in 2019 (Wintour, 2019). The EU called for free and fair elections while condemning human rights violations. However, European leaders generally avoided supporting military intervention, instead preferring negotiations and diplomatic pressure. Some European countries showed concern that aggressive Unite d States policies could worsen the instability and increase emigration from Venezuela.
Overall, the lack of a unified opinion and response to the Venezuelan crisis evolved from a domestic political conflict into an international struggle. This highlighted vulnerabilities in disagreements between countries on the definitions of national self - correction, democracy, and global influence.
VI. Security Implications for Latin America
The Venezuelan crisis has had major security implications for Latin America and continues to shape the region's future stability. Venezuela’s political collapse, economic crisis, and humanitarian emergency created issues that transcended borders. Issues of mass emigration, organized crime, political instability, and foreign intervention have affected bordering countries and raised concerns of the long -term security of the entire region.
One of the most immediate consequences has been the mass emigration of people out of Venezuela to neighboring countries such as Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and Ecuador. Although many governments have attempted to provide support and adapt, the abrupt populatio n increase has placed immense pressure on the healthcare and housing systems, as well as education and labor markets (Gonzalez et al, 2021). In some areas, rising unemployment and social tension have increased public frustration and political instability.
The crisis has also contributed to the growth of organized crime and illegal armed groups (Rendon and Cohan, 2019). Weak border control and instability inside of Venezuela have allowed for criminal organizations to expand their activities into drug and hum an trafficking, illegal mining, and smuggling. Such groups include Colombian criminal gangs who have reportedly operated in Venezuelan territory, and especially near border regions (Relief Web, 2021). This has created security concerns for nearby countries , as well as complicated efforts to control violence and cross -border crime. Latin American governments increasingly fear that prolonged instability in Venezuela could turn parts of the country into criminal safe havens.
Another implication has been the rise of political polarization across Latin America (Kahn, 2024). The Venezuelan crisis drove a deeper fissure between ideological divisions between left-wing and right-wing governments. Some countries support the governmen t of Nicolas Maduro, while others continue to back opposition movements and international pressure campaigns (such as that of the United States). Such disagreements weaken crosscountry collaboration, making it more difficult for organizations such as the Organization of American States to coordinate a unified response. This crisis, therefore, not only affects Venezuela itself but also challenges regional diplomacy and unity.
There are also fears that outside interference in Venezuela could increase geopolitical tensions in the region. Future competition between major powers, especially since Russia, China, and the United States are involved, could increase the already tense po litical climate and reduce independent decision-making.
However, the crisis may encourage stronger cooperation in the future. Latin American countries have learned the importance of humanitarian coordination and diplomatic communication during large-scale emergencies such as this. If governments cooperate effectively, they could develop stronger institutions that are capable of responding to future crises more successfully.
This crisis has created serious security challenges for Latin America, including migration pressures, organized crime, and political division. Future implications will depend predominantly on whether Venezuela achieves political stability and economic stab ility, as well as how regional and global powers continue to respond.
The Venezuelan crisis cannot be understood only as a regional security issue. Its effects on migration, organized crime, political instability, and foreign involvement show why outside states, especially the United States, viewed Venezuela as a matter of b roader international concern. However, once security concerns lead to direct foreign action, the debate shifts from political strategy to legality. The same crisis that created pressure for intervention also raises major legal questions about sovereignty, non- intervention, the use of force, and whether one state may lawfully act inside another state’s territory. The United States’ reported capture of Nicolás Maduro must be examined not only as a response to instability, but also as a possible violation of international law.
VII. Introduction to Legal Analysis
The reported capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3, 2026, by United States forces raises serious questions under international law. 1 According to public reporting, the operation took place inside Venezuelan territory and resulted in Maduro’s transfer to the United States for criminal prosecution. 2 The legal difficulty is not simply that a foreign leader was accused of serious offences. 3 Rather, the controversy arises because the United States allegedly used military force inside another state’s jurisdiction, in order to obtain custody of a sitting head of state. 4
The case, therefore, sits at the intersection of several core principles of the international legal order. 5 These include state sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction, and the personal immunity of incumbent high-ranking state officials. State sovereignty means that each state has legal authority over its own territory and political affairs, free from unauthorized interference by other states. The prohibition on the use of force prevents states from using military power against another state’s territorial integrity or political independence, except in limited circumstances recognized by international law. The distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction means that
1 House of Commons Library, ‘The US Capture of Nicolás Maduro’ (House of Commons Library, 6 January 2026) <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research -briefings/cbp-10452/> accessed 31 May 2026; Marc Weller, ‘The US Capture of President Nicolás Maduro – and Attacks on Venezuela – Have No Justification in International Law’ (Chatham House, 4 January 2026, updated 6 January 2026) <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2026/01/uscapture-president-nicolas-maduro-and-attacks-venezuela-have-no-justification> accessed 31 May 2026.
2 House of Commons Library (n 1).
3 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
4 House of Commons Library (n 1); Reuters, ‘UN Chief Guterres Raises Concerns about Instability in Venezuela, Legality of US Operation’ (Reuters, 5 January 2026) <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un -chief-guterresraises-concerns-about-instability-venezuela-legality-us-2026-01-05/> accessed 31 May 2026.
5 Weller (n 1); House of Commons Library (n 1).
a state may sometimes have authority to make laws applying to foreign conduct, but it does not automatically have authority to enforce those laws physically inside another state’s territory. Personal immunity of incumbent high-ranking state officials protects certain sitting officials, such as heads of state, from arrest or criminal prosecution before foreign national courts while they remain in office. Moreover, Article 2(1) of the UN Charter affirms the sovereign equality of states, while Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. 6 A military operation conducted by one state inside the territory of another, without clear consent or another recognized legal basis, therefore creates a strong presumption of illegality.7
At the same time, the legal analysis is complex because the United States framed the operation as connected to criminal prosecution, transnational crime, and national security. 8 The following section of the article examines whether the operation can be understood as a lawful enforcement measure or whether it is better characterized as an unlawful violation of Venezuela’s sovereignty. It also considers whether international law pe rmits the arrest and prosecution of a sitting foreign head of state before domestic courts. Overall, the stronger legal position is that the operation breached international law unless the United States can establish a valid justification, such as consent, self-defense, or Security Council authorization.
A. Background of the Operation
On January 3, 2026, the United States reportedly carried out a military operation in Caracas, Venezuela, resulting in the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. The operation allegedly involved U.S. special forces acting inside Venezuelan territory and was described in some sources as “Operation Resolve” or “Operation Absolute Resolve.” 9 According to the UK House of Commons Library, the operation included a raid in Caracas and the transfer of Maduro and Flores first to a U.S. warship Iwo Jima and later to New York.10
6 Charter of the United Nations art 2(1), 2(4).
7 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14; Weller (n 1).
8 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
9 House of Commons Library (n 1); US Department of Justice, ‘U.S. Soldier Charged With Using Classified Information To Profit From Prediction Market Bets’ (Department of Justice, 23 April 2026) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us -soldier-charged-using-classified-information -profit-prediction-market-bets> accessed 31 May 2026.
10 House of Commons Library (n 1).
The United States presented the operation as connected to criminal prosecution rather than as a conventional act of war. 11 U.S. officials stated that Maduro had been indicted in the Southern District of New York on charges including narco -terrorism conspiracy, cocaine importation conspiracy, possession of machine guns and destructive devices, and conspiracy to possess such w eapons.12 The House of Commons Library records that the U.S. Attorney General referred to these charges after the operation, and that Maduro and Flores later pleaded not guilty at their first court hearing in New York on January 5, 2026. 13
Further confirmation that the operation was a U.S. military action appears in a later U.S. Department of Justice press release dated April 23, 2026. 14 Although that press release concerned the indictment of a U.S. Army soldier, Gannon Ken Van Dyke, for allegedly profiting from classified information, it stated that the soldier had participated in the planning and execution of a U.S. military operation to capture Maduro, referred to there as ‘Operation Absolute Resolve’. 15 The same press release stated that, in the early hours of January 3, the United States apprehended Maduro and Flores at a residence in Caracas. 16
The operation was immediately controversial because it combined a law -enforcement objective with military activity inside another state’s territory. 17 Chatham House described the operation, from the U.S. perspective, as a “judicial extraction mission” supported by the military. 18 It also argued that the scale of the action, including strikes on targets in and around Caracas, created a significant challenge to Venezuela’s sovereignty and to the rules of the UN Charter. 19 The controversy was reinforced, as it was later reported that Maduro appeared in a U.S. federal court in March 2026 in connection with the narco -terrorism case, after having been captured by U.S. military forces in January. 20
11 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
12 House of Commons Library (n 1).
13 House of Commons Library (n 1).
14 US Department of Justice, ‘U.S. Soldier Charged With Using Classified Information To Profit From Prediction Market Bets’ (Department of Justice, 23 April 2026) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us -soldier-charged-usingclassified-information-profit-prediction-market -bets> accessed 31 May 2026.
15 US Department of Justice (n 14).
16 US Department of Justice (n 14).
17 Weller (n 1).
18 Weller (n 1).
19 Weller (n 1).
20 The Guardian, ‘Nicolás Maduro Appears Again in New York Court on “Narco -Terrorism” Charges’ (The Guardian, 26 March 2026) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/mar/26/nicolas -maduro-federal-courtnarco-terrorism-case> accessed 31 May 2026.
For the purpose of this Article, the key factual point is that the United States did not merely seek Maduro’s extradition through ordinary diplomatic or judicial channels. 21 Instead, it physically apprehended a sitting foreign leader through an operation conducted inside Venezuelan territory and transferred him to the United States for prosecution. 22 This factual background is central to the legal assessment as it raises three main questions. Firstly, whether the operation violated Venezuela’s sovereignty, secondly whether it constituted a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and third, whether any recognized legal justification could excuse the action. 23
B. Legal Issues Raised by Maduro’s Capture
Maduro’s capture raises several connected legal issues because the operation allegedly involved U.S. forces physically apprehending a sitting foreign president inside Venezuelan territory. 24 The first issue is sovereignty. 25 International law generally protects each state’s authority over its own territory and internal political affairs, and Article 2(1) of the UN Charter is based on the sovereign equality of all UN member states. 26 If U.S. forces acted in Venezuela without valid consent, the operation directly interfered with Venezuela’s territorial authority. 27
A second issue is the prohibition on the use of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 28 Article 2(4) requires states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. 29 Because the operation was allegedly conducted by U.S. military forces within Venezuela, the central question is whether it amounted to a prohibited use of force or an unlawful intervention in Venezuela’s internal affairs.
30
A third issue is whether any exception could justify the operation. The most relevant possibilities are consent, self-defense, and international law enforcement against transnational crime. 31 These arguments are difficult because international law does not generally permit one
21 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
22 House of Commons Library (n 1); US Department of Justice (n 14).
23 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4); Weller (n 1).
24 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
25 Weller (n 1).
26 Charter of the United Nations art 2(1).
27Weller (n 1).
28 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4).
29 Charter of the United Nations art 2(4).
30 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
31 Weller (n 1); Charter of the United Nations art 51.
state to carry out military law -enforcement operations inside another state’s territory without a clear legal basis. 32
A fourth issue concerns head-of-state immunity. As a sitting president, Maduro may have been entitled to personal immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign states while in office. 33 The International Court of Justice has recognized that certain high -ranking state officials enjoy immunity from criminal process before foreign domestic courts during their term. The question is therefore whether the United States could lawfully arrest an d prosecute Maduro while he remained Venezuela’s sitting head of state.
Finally, the case raises the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The United States may argue that it had jurisdiction because Maduro was accused of crimes with effects beyond Venezuela, including drug trafficking and narco - terrorism-related offences. H owever, even where a state claims criminal jurisdiction over foreign conduct, a separate question remains whether it may enforce that jurisdiction by apprehending the accused person in another state’s territory. The legality of the prosecution and the lega lity of the method used to obtain custody must therefore be analysed separately.
VIII. Sovereignty and the Use of Force
A. State Sovereignty under Article 2(1) of the UN Charter
State sovereignty is one of the foundational principles of international law. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter provides that the United Nations is based on the sovereign equality of all its members. In practical terms, this means that each state has equal le gal status and normally has exclusive authority over its own territory and internal political affairs. 34 In the Maduro case, the sovereignty issue arises because the United States allegedly carried out a military operation inside Venezuelan territory instead of relying on extradition, diplomatic cooperation, or other ordinary legal procedures. 35 The capture of a sitting president within his own state directly affects Venezuela’s territorial authority and political
32 Weller (n 1); The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, 18–19; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
33 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium ) (Judgment) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, paras 51–55.
34 Charter of the United Nations art 2(1); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 202–05.
35 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
independence. Even if the United States had criminal charges against Maduro, those charges did not automatically give it the right to enforce its laws physically inside Venezuela.
This point reflects a basic distinction in international law between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to enforce. 36 A state may sometimes apply its criminal law to conduct with cross-border effects, such as drug trafficking or terrorism -related conduct. 37 However, enforcement action inside another state’s territory normally requires that state’s consent or another recognized basis under international law. 38 Therefore, the central sovereignty question is not only whether the United States had reasons to prosecute Maduro, but whether it had authority to enter Venezuela and seize him.
B. Prohibition on the Use of Force under Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits states from using or threatening force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. This rule is a central part of the modern international legal order because it limits unilateral m ilitary action by states. The International Court of Justice has also treated the prohibition on the use of force as a rule of customary international law.
The U.S. operation raises an Article 2(4) issue because it reportedly involved military forces operating in Venezuela to apprehend Maduro. If U.S. forces entered Venezuelan territory without valid consent, Security Council authorization, or a lawful claim of self-defense, the operation would likely fall within the kind of unilateral force that Article 2(4) is designed to prevent. This is especially significant because the operation was not passive cooperation with local authorities, but the use of state military power within another state’s territory.
The United States could argue that the operation was directed at criminal accountability rather than at Venezuela as a state. However, international law looks not only at an operation’s stated purpose, but also at its nature and effects. A military raid in side another state can still implicate Article 2(4), even if the immediate objective is to arrest an individual rather than to occupy territory or formally overthrow a government.
C. Violation of Venezuela’s Territorial Integrity
36 The Case of the SS Lotus (France v Turkey) PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, 18–19.
37 Lotus (n 32) 19.
38 Lotus (n 32) 18–19.
Territorial integrity refers to a state’s right to control its own territory free from unauthorized foreign military action. Given Maduro was captured in Caracas, the operation directly raises the question of whether Venezuela’s territorial integrity was v iolated. The fact that the target was an individual does not remove the territorial issue, because the enforcement action still occurred on Venezuelan soil.
The International Court of Justice’s reasoning in Nicaragua v United States is relevant by analogy. In that case, the Court found that unauthorized military actions against another state could violate both the prohibition on the use of force and the principle of nonintervention.
39 Although the facts of the Maduro operation are different, because Nicaragua involved a broader pattern of military and paramilitary activity, including support for armed groups and actions against Nicaraguan territory, while the Maduro operation was a nar rower capture mission directed at one individual. The underlying principle is similar: one state may not normally use military power within another state’s territory without a recognized legal justification.
40
On this basis, the operation is difficult to reconcile with Venezuela’s territorial integrity unless the United States can establish valid consent, self -defense, or Security Council authorization. Without one of these justifications, the capture would like ly be characterized not merely as a criminal law -enforcement measure, but as an infringement of Venezuela’s sovereign authority.
IX. Possible Legal Justifications
A. Self-Defense
The first possible justification is self -defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual or collective self -defense if an armed attack occurs against a UN member state. For the United States to rely on this justification, it would need to show that Venezuela, or actors legally attributable to Venezuela, had committed or were imminently threatening an armed attack against the United States.
39 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14.
40 ibid.
In the Maduro case, this argument is difficult to sustain. Although the United States may claim that Maduro’s alleged involvement in drug trafficking and narco -terrorism created a national security threat, international law generally distinguishes criminal activity from an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51. 41 Drug trafficking and transnational organized crime may justify prosecution, sanctions, or international cooperation, but they do not automatically justify military force inside another state’s territory.
The International Court of Justice has interpreted self -defense restrictively, particularly when a state seeks to justify force against another state. 42 In Nicaragua v United States , the Court emphasized that the right of self -defense depends on the existence of an armed attack and that not every hostile or unlawful act reaches that threshold. 43 Applying that reasoning here, the United States would need more than evidence of criminal conduct or political hostility. It would need to establish a sufficient armed attack or imminent armed attack connected to Venezuela.
A self-defense argument would also need to satisfy necessity and proportionality. Necessity would require showing that military action inside Venezuela was required because no peaceful or less intrusive alternative was available. 44 Proportionality would require showing that the scale and effects of the operation were limited to responding to the alleged armed attack. 45 If the operation’s primary purpose was to arrest Maduro for prosecution rather than to repel an armed attack, the self-defense justification becomes significantly weaker.
B. Consent by the Territorial State
A second possible justification is consent by the territorial state. Under international law, a state may allow another state to conduct certain operations on its territory, including military or law-enforcement cooperation, if the consent is validly given by an authority capable of representing the state. 46 If Venezuela had clearly consented to the U.S. operation, the
41 Charter of the United Nations art 51; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 191, 195.
42 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 191, 194–95.
43 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 191, 194–95.
44 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 194.
45 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 194.
46 Weller (n 1); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 246, 252.
objections based on sovereignty and territorial integrity would be reduced because the United States would not have acted unilaterally.
Consent is problematic here because the operation involved the capture of Venezuela’s sitting president. It would be difficult to argue that Maduro’s own government consented to a foreign military operation designed to arrest him and transfer him to the Un ited States. Consent also cannot simply be inferred from support by an opposition figure, a rival political group, or an external actor.
For consent to justify intervention, it must be clear, valid, and given by an authority legally capable of speaking for the state. 47 If the United States relied on consent from an opposition movement or a rival claimant to governmental authority, the legality of that consent would itself be disputed. 48 This is especially sensitive because recognizing one political actor over another may interfere with the political independence of the state.
Accordingly, unless the United States can establish valid consent from the Venezuelan state itself, consent is unlikely to provide a strong legal justification for the operation. In the absence of such consent, the entry of U.S. forces into Caracas remains difficult to reconcile with Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty.
C. International Law Enforcement against Transnational Crime
A third possible justification is that the operation was an act of international law enforcement against transnational crime. The United States could argue that Maduro was targeted not because of his political position, but because he faced serious crimina l charges, including narco-terrorism and drug-trafficking-related offences. On this view, the operation would be framed as an enforcement action against international criminal activity rather than as an attack on Venezuela as a state.
However, international law does not generally recognize a broad right of unilateral military enforcement against transnational crime inside another state’s territory. 49 Even where a state has jurisdiction to prosecute serious crimes, it usually must obtain custody through lawful means, such as extradition, mutual legal assistance, arrest with territorial consent, or
47 Weller (n 1); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 246, 252.
48 Weller (n 1).
49 Lotus (n 32) 18–19; Weller (n 1).
other forms of international cooperation. 50 Criminal charges alone do not authorize a state to send military forces into another country to seize the accused person.
This distinction is central to the Maduro case. The United States may have claimed criminal jurisdiction because the alleged offences had effects connected to the United States. Yet a claim of jurisdiction to prosecute is different from a right to enforce that jurisdiction abroad. 51 A state may be able to apply its criminal law to certain cross -border conduct, but it normally cannot carry out arrests or military operations inside another state without consent or another recognized legal basis.
The operation therefore exposes a tension between criminal accountability and the international legal rules protecting sovereignty. On one hand, transnational crimes such as drug trafficking can create serious international security concerns. 52 On the other hand, allowing states to use military force abroad whenever they accuse a foreign leader of criminal conduct risks weakening both the prohibition on force and the principle of sovereign equality.
For that reason, the law-enforcement justification is limited. It may explain why the United States wanted Maduro in custody, but it does not by itself justify the method used to obtain custody.53 Unless combined with valid consent, self -defense, or Security Council authorization, international law enforcement against transnational crime is unlikely to provide an independent legal basis for a military capture operation inside Venezuela.
X. Immunity and Jurisdiction
A. Head-of-State Immunity
A major issue raised by Maduro’s capture is whether a sitting head of state may be arrested and prosecuted before another state’s domestic courts. Under customary international law, certain high-ranking officials enjoy personal immunity, also known as immu nity ratione personae, while they remain in office. 54 This form of immunity protects heads of state, heads
50 Lotus (n 32) 18–19; United States v Alvarez-Machain 504 US 655, 669–70 (1992).
51 Lotus (n 32) 18–19.
52 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Transnational Organized Crime’ (UNODC) <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/toc.html> accessed 31 May 2026
53 Lotus (n 32) 18–19.
54 Arrest Warrant (n 33) paras 51–55.
of government, and foreign ministers from arrest or criminal proceedings before foreign domestic courts during their term of office.
The International Court of Justice addressed this principle in the Arrest Warrant case. Although that case concerned the foreign minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo rather than a president, the Court’s reasoning is relevant because it emphasized that highranking officials may need immunity in order to perform their intern ational functions effectively. 55 The Court held that an incumbent foreign minister enjoyed immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability before foreign national authorities, even where serious international crimes were alleged.
Applying that reasoning to Maduro, the argument for immunity is strong given he was still Venezuela’s sitting president at the time of capture. 56 His position as head of state would normally place him within the category of officials protected by personal immunity before foreign domestic courts. Therefore, despite the United States having serious criminal charges against Maduro, the question remains whether U.S. courts could lawfully exercise criminal jurisdiction over him while he remained in office.
However, immunity does not mean permanent impunity. The ICJ made clear that immunity before foreign domestic courts is procedural rather than substantive, meaning that it does not erase criminal responsibility itself. 57 A former official may, in some circumstances, be prosecuted after leaving office, and international criminal tribunals may apply different rules concerning official capacity. 58 The legal problem is therefore not whether Maduro could ever face prosecution, but whether he could be captured and prosecuted by the domestic courts of another state while still serving as head of state.
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The second major issue is whether the United States could exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over Maduro. Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to a state’s attempt to apply its criminal law to conduct that occurs partly or entirely outside its territor y. 59 States may
55 Arrest Warrant (n 33) paras 53–55.
56 Arrest Warrant (n 33) paras 51–55; House of Commons Library (n 1).
57 Arrest Warrant (n 33) para 60.
58 Arrest Warrant (n 33) para 61.
59 Lotus (n 32) 19.
sometimes claim jurisdiction over foreign conduct where there is a sufficient connection to their territory, nationals, security, or other recognized interests.
In this case, the United States could argue that jurisdiction existed because Maduro was accused of offences connected to drug trafficking and narco - terrorism affecting the United States. 60 These allegations may support a claim of prescriptive jurisdiction, meaning that the United States may argue its criminal law applied to the conduct. 61 Nevertheless, the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction does not automatically authorize enforcement action abroad.
International law generally treats enforcement jurisdiction as territorial. 62 This means that one state may not carry out arrests, searches, or military operations inside another state unless the territorial state consents or another legal basis exists. 63 As a result, even a plausible claim to prosecute Maduro would not by itself justify sending U.S. forces into Venezuela to arrest him.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v Alvarez-Machain is relevant but must be treated carefully. In that case, the Court held as a matter of U.S. domestic law that the forcible abduction of a defendant from Mexico did not prevent his trial in a U.S. court, where the extradition treaty did not expressly prohibit such abductions. However, that decision does not necessarily mean that the abduction was lawful under international law. 64 It mainly concerns whether a U.S. court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant once he is physically before the court.
Therefore, even if U.S. courts could proceed with a criminal trial once Maduro was in U.S. custody, a separate international law question remains: whether the United States violated Venezuela’s sovereignty by obtaining custody through a military operation in Caracas. Domestic jurisdiction over the person and international legality of the capture are two different issues. The first issue concerns whether a U.S. court may try Maduro once he is physically before it. The second concerns whether the United State s acted lawfully when it used military force to bring him before that court. In other words, a domestic court may decide that an irregular capture does not prevent a trial from going forward, but that does not necessarily mean
60 House of Commons Library (n 1).
61 Lotus (n 32) 19; House of Commons Library (n 1).
62 Lotus (n 32) 18–19.
63 Lotus (n 32) 18–19; Weller (n 1).
64 United States v Alvarez -Machain 504 US 655, 669–70 (1992); Lotus (n 1) 18–19.
the capture itself complied with international law. The method of obtaining custody can still violate the territorial sovereignty of the state where the arrest occurred.
C. Prosecution of Sitting Foreign Leaders
The Pinochet litigation is often cited in discussions of immunity for former leaders. In that case, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords considered whether former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet could claim immunity in extradition proceedings relating to allegations of torture. The case is important because it limited immunity for certain international crimes, but it concerned a former head of state rather than a sitting one. 65 For that reason, Pinochet does not directly remove the personal immunity normally available to an incumbent head of state.
Maduro’s case is therefore different if he was still president when captured and brought before a U.S. court. The stronger immunity argument is that a sitting head of state remains protected from foreign domestic criminal jurisdiction during the term of office. This protection may be controversial where serious crimes are alleged, but the ICJ’s reasoning suggests that personal immunity can still apply even in cases involving grave accusations.
The United States may respond that Maduro’s alleged conduct was not protected official conduct and that criminal charges involving narcotics or terrorism should not be treated as legitimate sovereign acts. That argument may be more persuasive in relation t o functional immunity, or immunity ratione materiae, which protects official acts after a person leaves office. It is less persuasive against personal immunity, which protects certain sitting officials more broadly while they remain in office.
Accordingly, the prosecution of Maduro raises two connected but distinct questions. First, could U.S. courts claim criminal jurisdiction over the alleged offences? Second, did Maduro’s status as a sitting head of state prevent his arrest and prosecution be fore those courts while he remained in office? The answer to the first question does not automatically resolve the second, because jurisdiction over the crime and immunity of the person operate as separate legal doctrines.
XI. Precedents and Comparative Cases
65 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147.
A. Abduction and Rendition Cases
Abduction and rendition cases are relevant because they show the legal tension between obtaining physical custody of an accused person and respecting the sovereignty of the state where that person is found. In United States v Alvarez-Machain, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the forcible abduction of a defendant from Mexico did not prevent his trial in a U.S. court. 66 The Court reasoned that, as a matter of U.S. domestic law, the abduction did not bar prosecution where the applicable extradition treaty did not expressly prohibit such conduct. 67
However, Alvarez-Machain must be used carefully in an international law analysis. The case mainly answers whether a U.S. court may try a defendant once he is physically before the court. It does not fully resolve whether the abduction itself violated inter national law. This distinction matters in this case because, even if a U.S. court accepts jurisdiction over him after capture, the separate question remains whether the United States lawfully obtained custody inside Venezuela.
The Maduro situation is also more serious than many ordinary abduction cases because the alleged capture was directed not at a private individual alone, but at a sitting foreign president. The operation therefore raises questions not only about irregular c ustody or criminal procedure, but also about sovereignty, political independence, and head -of-state immunity. Alvarez-Machain may support the idea that a U.S. court could proceed domestically, but it does not provide a complete international-law justification for the operation. 68
The broader lesson from abduction and rendition cases is that domestic courts may sometimes separate the legality of the arrest from the power to conduct the trial. 69 International law remains concerned, however, with whether one state violated another state’s territorial sovereignty while obtaining custody. 70 For that reason, these precedents do not eliminate the possibility that Venezuela’s rights under international law were infringed, even if Maduro’s later prosecution continued in U.S. courts.
B. Arrests of Foreign Officials
66 United States v Alvarez -Machain 504 US 655, 657, 669–70 (1992).
The arrest of foreign officials raises additional concerns because international law gives certain officeholders special protection while they are in office. In the Arrest Warrant case, the International Court of Justice held that an incumbent foreign minister enjoyed immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability before foreign domestic courts. 71 The Court emphasized that this immunity may apply even where serious crimes are alleged, because the purpose of the rule is to allow high-ranking officials to perform their international functions without interference from other states. 72
Although the Arrest Warrant case concerned a foreign minister, its reasoning is highly relevant to sitting heads of state. Heads of state are generally treated as among the officials most clearly protected by personal immunity while in office. 73 Therefore, if Maduro was still Venezuela’s sitting president at the time of capture, the case supports the argument that he enjoyed immunity from arrest and prosecution before U.S. domestic courts during his term.
The Pinochet litigation provides a useful comparison, but it is not identical. In that case, the United Kingdom’s House of Lords considered the immunity of former Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet in relation to extradition proceedings for alleged torture. The case is important because it showed that former heads of state may not always be able to rely on immunity for certain international crimes.
However, the case does not directly answer the Maduro issue because Pinochet was no longer a sitting head of state when the proceedings occurred. 74 The distinction between a former and current leader is legally significant. 75 Functional immunity for former officials may be limited in some cases, while personal immunity for sitting leaders remains much stronger under the ICJ’s approach.
These precedents suggest that the prosecution of a foreign official depends heavily on the official’s status at the time of arrest and trial. 76 If the person is a former leader, courts may be more willing to consider exceptions to immunity, such as in the case of Pinochet. 77 If the
person is still a sitting head of state, international law provides stronger protection, making the legality of arrest and prosecution before a foreign domestic court more doubtful.
C. Limits of Unilateral Enforcement
The comparative cases also illustrate the broader limit on unilateral enforcement in international law. A state may have authority to apply its laws to certain conduct, but that does not automatically give it authority to enforce those laws inside another state’s territory. This is the difference between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.
The Lotus case is often cited for the idea that states may exercise broad jurisdiction unless international law prohibits it. At the same time, the case recognizes an important territorial limit: a state cannot exercise its power in the territory of another state w ithout a permissive rule of international law. This principle supports the view that extraterritorial enforcement actions, such as arrests or military operations abroad, require a separate legal basis.
78
In Maduro’s case, this means that U.S. criminal charges were not enough by themselves.79 Even if the United States could claim jurisdiction over alleged drug - trafficking or narco- terrorism offences, it still needed a lawful basis to enforce that jurisdiction in Venezuela. Without consent, self -defense, or Security Council authorization, unil ateral enforcement inside another state’s territory remains difficult to reconcile with international law.
Nicaragua v United States is also relevant because it confirms that unauthorized force and intervention against another state can violate international law. Although Nicaragua involved support for armed activities rather than the capture of a president, the underlying principle is comparable. One state may not normally use force in or against another state in order to pursue its own political, security, or enforcement objectives.
Taken together, these precedents show that the Maduro operation cannot be assessed only through the lens of criminal prosecution. It must also be assessed through the international rules limiting unilateral enforcement, protecting territorial sovereignty, and safeguarding the immunity of sitting high-ranking officials. The strongest comparative lesson is that a state’s
78 Lotus (n 32) 18–19; Weller (n 1).
79 House of Commons Library (n 1); Lotus (n 32) 18–19; Weller (n 1).
interest in prosecution may explain why it seeks custody, but it does not automatically justify the method used to obtain that custody.
XII. Legal Assessment
A. Arguments Supporting Legality
The strongest argument supporting the legality of the operation is that the United States was acting to enforce serious criminal charges rather than to annex territory or wage a conventional war against Venezuela. 80 Maduro was reportedly wanted in connection with charges involving narco- terrorism, cocaine importation, and weapons -related offences. From this perspective, the operation could be framed as an extraordinary law -enforcement action directed at an individua l accused of transnational criminal conduct, rather than as an attack on the Venezuelan state itself. 81
A further argument is that the United States may have claimed extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction because the alleged offences had effects beyond Venezuela, including effects connected to the United States. 82 International law does not completely prohibit states from applying their criminal law to conduct outside their territory where a sufficient jurisdictional connection exists. 83 Therefore, the United States could argue that it had a legitimate interest in prosecuting Maduro for conduct allegedly affecting U.S. security and public order.
The United States might also rely on the seriousness of the alleged offences to argue that Maduro should not be able to use his official position as a shield against accountability. 84
In modern international law, there is increasing recognition that high -ranking officials should not enjoy permanent impunity for serious crimes. This argument would be especially relevant if the United States claimed that Maduro’s alleged conduct was priv ate or criminal rather than a legitimate act of state.
Finally, the United States could point to domestic precedents such as United States v Alvarez- Machain, where a U.S. court allowed prosecution to continue despite the defendant’s forcible abduction from another country. This precedent may support the argument that once
80 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
81 House of Commons Library (n 1); Weller (n 1).
82 House of Commons Library (n 1); Lotus (n 32) 19.
83 Lotus (n 32) 19.
84 House of Commons Library (n 1); Arrest Warrant (n 33) paras 60–61.
Maduro was physically present before a U.S. court, the court could proceed with the criminal case. However, the argument is mainly persuasive as a matter of U.S. domestic criminal procedure and does not fully answer the separate question of whether the cap ture itself was lawful under international law.
B. Arguments Indicating Illegality
The stronger international- law objections concern sovereignty, the prohibition on force, and immunity. First, the operation involved U.S. forces entering Venezuelan territory to capture a sitting foreign president. 85 Unless Venezuela validly consented, this directly interfered with Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty and its authority over persons and events within its own territory.
Second, the operation raises serious concerns under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. A military operation in Caracas to seize Ven ezuela’s president is difficult to characterize as a purely domestic criminal -law matter because it involved the use of U.S. state power inside another sovereign state.
Third, the usual exceptions to the prohibition on force appear difficult to establish. There is no evidence that the United Nations Security Council authorized the operation. This point is reinforced by the emergency Security Council meeting held on 6 Jan uary 2026, after the operation had already taken place. 86 The fact that the Council met after the capture to debate its legality suggests that the operation was not carried out pursuant to prior Security Council authorization. 87 At that meeting, several states criticized the U.S. action as inconsistent with the UN Charter, while the United States defended the operation as a law -enforcement and selfdefense measure rather than as an action authorized by the Council. 88 The Security Council context is also important because the United States is a permanent member with veto power, meaning that even if other members viewed the operation as unlawful, the Council would be unlikely to adopt a binding resolution condemning or sanctioning the United States.89 Selfdefense would require the United States to show an armed attack or imminent armed attack,
85 House of Commons Library (n 1); US Department of Justice (n 9).
86 Reuters (n 4).
87 Reuters (n 4).
88 Reuters (n 4).
89 Reuters (n 4).
and allegations of drug trafficking or narco -terrorism do not automatically satisfy that threshold. Consent is also doubtful because the operation targeted Venezuela’s sitting president, making it unlikely that the Venezuelan state clearly and validly cons ented to the action.
Fourth, Maduro’s status as a sitting head of state creates a major immunity problem. Under the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in the Arrest Warrant case, incumbent high- ranking state officials may enjoy personal immunity and inviolability before foreign domestic courts while in office. If Maduro was still Venezuela’s president when captured, the United States would need to overcome the argument that he was immune from arrest and prosecution before U.S. domestic courts during his term.
Fifth, international law generally distinguishes between jurisdiction to prosecute and jurisdiction to enforce. 90 Even if the United States had a basis to charge Maduro under U.S. law, that would not automatically give it authority to enforce that law by conducting a military arrest operation inside Venezuela. 91 The legality argument is therefore weakened because the main issue is not only whether Maduro could be prosecuted, but whether the United States lawfully obtained custody over him.
C. Overall International Law Evaluation
On balance, the arguments indicating illegality are stronger than the arguments supporting legality. The United States may have had a serious interest in prosecuting Maduro for alleged offences, and it may have been able to claim some form of extraterritor ial criminal jurisdiction. However, international law does not generally permit a state to transform criminal charges into a right to conduct unilateral military enforcement inside another state’s territory.
The central difficulty is that the operation affected several core principles of international law at the same time. It implicated Venezuela’s sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, the rules on enforcement jurisdiction, and the personal immunit y of a sitting head of state. Each of these doctrines limits the ability of one state to impose its authority directly on another state, especially through military means.
Therefore, unless the United States could establish a recognized legal basis such as valid consent, self-defense, or Security Council authorization, the operation is difficult to
90 Lotus (n 32) 18–19.
91 Lotus (n 32) 18–19; House of Commons Library (n 1).
reconcile with international law. The fact that Maduro faced serious criminal allegations may explain why the United States sought to prosecute him, but it does not by itself justify the method used to capture him. Overall, the operation appears more consi stent with an unlawful unilateral enforcement action than with a lawful exercise of international criminal cooperation.
D. Final Determination
This article has examined the legality of the United States’ January 2026 operation through the principles of sovereignty, the prohibition on the use of force, head -of-state immunity, and extraterritorial jurisdiction. The stronger legal position is that t he operation was incompatible with international law unless the United States could prove a valid exception, such as consent, self-defense, or Security Council authorization. The operation’s lawenforcement purpose does not remove the international-law problem. Even if the United States had criminal jurisdiction over the alleged offences, it still needed a lawful basis to enforce that jurisdiction within Venezuela. The capture of a sitting president by foreign military forces inside his own state therefore appears to exceed the ordinary limits of unilateral criminal enforcement.
Accordingly, Maduro’s capture likely violated Venezuela’s sovereignty and raised serious concerns under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This conclusion does not deny the seriousness of the criminal allegations against Maduro. Rather, it reflects the princ iple that even serious allegations must be pursued through methods compatible with international law.
E. Broader Implications for International Law
The case demonstrates the continuing importance of immunity rules, even when those rules are politically controversial. Head -of-state immunity can appear frustrating where serious crimes are alleged, but it serves the broader function of preventing domesti c courts from unilaterally exercising power over sitting foreign leaders. The issue is therefore not whether leaders should be permanently immune from accountability, but whether accountability should be pursued through lawful procedures and appropriate fo rums.
Finally, the operation highlights the distinction between legality and legitimacy. A state may believe that capturing an accused leader is morally or politically justified, but international law asks a narrower question: whether the action fits within acce pted legal rules. In this case,
the stronger legal assessment is that the United States’ method of obtaining custody created serious violations of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the limits of enforcement jurisdiction.
XIII. Conclusion
The broader significance of the Maduro operation to international law is that it tests the boundary between criminal accountability and the international legal order protecting sovereign equality. If states were permitted to use military force in another s tate’s territory whenever they accused a foreign leader of transnational crime, the prohibition on the use of force would be weakened. Such a rule could create a dangerous precedent, especially where powerful states act against weaker states without intern ational authorization. This crisis cannot be understood only as a regional security issue. Its effects on migration, organized crime, political instability, and foreign involvement show why outside states, especially the United States, viewed Venezuela as a matter of broader international concern. However, once security concerns lead to direct foreign action, the debate shifts from political strategy to legality. The same crisis that created pressure for intervention also raises major legal questions about sovereignty, non-intervention, the use of force, and whether one state may lawfully act inside another state’s territory. The United States’ reported capture of Nicolás Maduro must be examined not only as a response to instability, but also as a possible violation of international law.
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