ModernItaly (2026),1–15 doi:10.1017/mit.2026.10145
RESEARCHARTICLE
GelasioCaetani,ItalianambassadortotheUnited States:betweenforeignpolicyandeconomicaffairs (1922-1925)
JacopoPerazzoli
DepartmentofLetters,PhilosophyandCommunication,UniversityofBergamo,Italy
Email: jacopo.perazzoli@unibg.it
(Received11December2025;revised13April2026;accepted24April2026)
Abstract
ThisarticleexaminesthediplomaticconductofGelasioCaetaniduringhistenureasItalian AmbassadortotheUnitedStatesintheearlyyearsofMussolini’sgovernment,highlightinghisinfluenceanddecision-makingprocesses.ItinvestigatesthereasonsbehindMussolini’schoiceofCaetani ashisrepresentativeinWashingtonandanalysesthemajorissuesheconfronted,rangingfromforeignpolicytoItaly’swardebtstemmingfromtheFirstWorldWar,whichMussolinisoughttoaddress. DrawingonCaetani’spersonalarchiveandcross-referencingprimarysourcesfromothercollections, thestudyoffersacomprehensiveandnuancedaccount.
Keywords: Fascism;WarDebt;UnitedStates;foreignpolicy;GelasioCaetani
Introduction
Forsometime,historianshavefocusedonFascism’ssoftpowerinitiativesatagloballevel (FranzinaandSanfilippo 2003;Cavarocchi 2010;Pretelli 2010).Inthisspecificstrandofthe vasthistoriographyonthehistoricalandpoliticalevolutionofFascism,aparticularpositionisoccupiedbystudiesexaminingtheactionsofindividualprotagonistswhoenabled BenitoMussolinitoachievehisgoalsbeyondnationalborders‘throughattractionrather thancoercion’(Nye 2004,x;Garzarelli 2004).FascismsoughttoinfluencetheEuropean imaginationasearlyasthe1920s(Albanese 2022,294–295).Inthisregard,inrelationto theabilitytopromoteitsimageinGreatBritain(Baldoli 2003;Colacicco 2020),increasing attentionisbeingpaidtothepublicactivitiesofCamilloPellizzi,aFirstWorldWarveteran, journalist,futurefatherofItaliansociology,andthefounderoftheLondonFascioin1921 (SuzziValli 1995;LongoandBreschi 2003;Salvati 2021).
Fascism’sinitiativesintheUnitedStatesfallsquarelywithinthescopeofstudieson thefortunesandmisfortunesofFascismabroad.Followingsomepioneeringworks(Cassels 1964;Migone 1971;Damiani 1980;Migone 2015),researchontheseissueshasprogressed enormouslysincethemid-1980s,thankstoanincreasinglyexplicitfocusonthedual transnationalandtransatlanticdimensions,concentratingon,amongothers,journalists, writers,intellectuals,politiciansanddiplomatswho,albeitfromdifferentperspectives, fromthe1920sworkedtodevelopeverstrongertiesbetweenFascist-ledItalyandthe
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UnitedStatesunderRepublicanadministrations(Schmitz 1988;Luconi 2000;Pinelliand Mariano 2000;Pretelli 2012;Canali 2017;Hull 2021).
Buildingonthatrichhistoriographicaltradition,whichdeservestobefurtherexpanded throughexaminationoftheprotagonists‘inthefield’ofFascistforeignpolicy(Pili 2025, 241–242),thisarticlewillanalysethesignificanceofGelasioCaetani,appointedItalian ambassadortotheUnitedStateson9November1922,andwillhighlighthisinfluenceduringtheearlydaysofMussolini’stenureasprimeminister(CorrieredellaSera 1922,1; L’Idea Nazionale 1922,1; IlPopolod’Italia 1922a,1).
Itisnotanunexploredtopic.Alongsidetheencyclopaedicentry(ScolariSellerio Jesurum, 1973,171–172)andthefirstcomprehensivebiography(Sottoriva 2014),Caetani’s workhasalreadybeenexaminedfromatleasttwoperspectives:ontheonehand,studyinghisdelicateworkamongthenumerousItalian-Americancommunities,towardswhich itwasnecessarytomaintainacautiousapproachsoasnottoprovoketheUSgovernment(Migone 1971,25–41);ontheother,analysingbothhispropagandacampaignsand hiscontributiontoMussolini’ssoftpowerstrategyintheUnitedStates(Nazzaro 2008).
Thisarticlewilldiscussasomewhatdifferentissue,withreferencetothe‘elite’dimensionusedbyMariaMalatesta(whodiscussesthespecificcaseofCaetani)toevaluate Mussolini’sfirststepsinforeignpolicyduringtheinitialphasefollowingtheMarchon Rome(Malatesta 2022,174–175).Here,Caetani’smovestopromoteFascist-ledItalyasan authoritativeandreliablepartnerwillbetracedbacktoearlyattemptstoreachanagreementonthedebttotheUnitedStatesaccruedbyItalyduringtheFirstWorldWar,creating theconditionsforloanstobegrantedtotheMussolinigovernmentbyNorthAmerican banks.OneofthemainaimsofMussolini’spolicytowardsWashingtonwasobtaininga deferralonpaymentofthemorethan1.5billiondollars(excludinginterest)owedtotheUS or,evenbetter,thecancellationofasubstantialportionofit.AshedeclaredtoUSjournalists on10November,inadditiontoconsideringit‘desirable’fortheWashingtonadministration toamendtheEmergencyQuotaActof1921,whichlimited‘thenumberofItalianemigrantsto42,000’,thegovernmentinRomewantedtosettleitsdebt,providedithad‘the opportunity’todoso(Susmel 1956,11–2; NewYorkTimes, 1922a,1).
ForthenewPrimeMinister,itwasaquestionoftryingtosoftentheapparentinflexibilityoftheWhiteHousetoachieveinarelativelyshorttimearesultthatnoprevious executivehadcomeclosetomanaging,bothbecauseofthepoliticalandsocialinstabilitythathadmarkedItalyinthepostwarperiod,whichwasofsignificantconcerntoUS observers(Schmitz 1988,36–37),andbecauseofmisunderstandingsgeneratedbyCaetani’s predecessor,AmbassadorVittorioRolandiRicci(Luconi 2000,20–24).
Giventheaimsofthisarticle,wemustfirstattempttounderstandwhyMussolinichose toappointCaetani,whowasfromtheworldofpolitics,whilecareerdiplomatsPietro TomasidellaTorrettaandCamilloRomanoAvezzanaweresenttootherimportantdiplomaticposts,suchasLondonandParis.Secondly,wewillanalyseCaetani’sattemptsto presentItalyasacountrythatwasnolongershakenbypoliticalandsocialstrugglesand wasworkingtowardsEuropeanstabilisation(Cassels 1970;Burgwyn 1997,17–35;Tollardo 2016,22–44).Finally,linkingtheevolutionofMussolini’sforeignpolicytotheconsolidationofItaly’sfinancialexposure(Schmitz 1988,85–110),wewillfocusonthemethodsused bytheItalianambassadortobringthetwocountriesclosertogetheronthemacro-issueof wardebt.ItwasCaetani’ssuccessor,GiacomoDeMartino,wholedthefinalphaseofthe negotiationsthatresultedintheagreementof14November1925;however,itwasCaetani wholaidthefoundationsforthefuturereconciliationbetweenRomeandWashington.
Twofurtherpreliminaryremarks:thedecisiontofocusonthethreeyearsfrom1922 to1925isnotsolelyattributabletotheincumbencyofCaetani,whowasappointedin November1922andleftofficeatthebeginningof1925(CorrieredellaSera 1925a,1).Infact,
thatperiodwas,toallintentsandpurposes,consideredaturningpointintheevolution ofFascisminpower(Baldoli 2023).Withoutenteringintoavasthistoriographicaldebate, inshort,althoughFascismwasconsideredadictatorialregimefromthemomentofthe MarchonRome(Gentile 2012),itisalsoundeniablethattheconstructionofthetotalitarian Fasciststatebeganinearnestin1925,oncethephaseof‘uncertainty’hadbeenovercome (Aquarone 1974,3–46).
Thesecondclarificationconcernsprimarysources.Inadditiontomakingextensiveuse ofCaetani’spersonalpapers,thisresearchdrawsondocumentsfromItalianarchives,both personalandinstitutional.Althoughthereisariskoffocusingalmostexclusivelyonthe ambassador’swork,without,forexample,consideringtheperceptionofCaetani’sactivitiesinUSpublicopinion,thepredominantrelianceonItaliansourcesisnotamatterof convenience.Rather,thisapproachalignswiththeobjectiveofexaminingaspecific,and thereforenecessarilypartial,aspectofthebroaderframeworkofrelationsbetweenItaly andtheUnitedStatesduringthe1920s.Accordingly,focusingontheambassadorexpressly chosenbyMussolinienablesananalysisofthespecificobjectivesofFascismvis-à-visthe USgovernmentduringtheearlystagesofthe20-yearFascistperiod.
WhyCaetani?AfewreasonsbehindMussolini’schoice
AfewdaysafterbeingappointedPrimeMinister,Mussolini,whohadalsoretainedthepositionsofMinisterfortheColoniesandMinisterforForeignAffairs,madeanunusualgesture. InsteadofcontinuingwiththecustomarytalksatthePalazzodelViminale,onthemorningof3NovemberhevisitedtheambassadorsofItaly’smostimportantpartners–Great Britain,France,JapanandtheUnitedStates(IlPopolod’Italia 1922b,1).Mussoliniwanted toguaranteetoWashington’srepresentative,RichardWashburnChild,‘severalmeasures, someofastructuralnature,othersofamoreadministrativenature,whichwouldcontribute …torevivingtheprospectsforcooperation’betweenthetwocountries(Asso 1993,84).
Amongtheformerwastheintentiontoprivatisenumerouspublicservices,including therailways,andageneralreductioninthebudgetdeficit.Asforadministrativemeasures,MussoliniinformedChildofhisintentiontoreplaceRicciasambassadorforthree primaryreasons.First,heaimedtodistinguishhisadministrationfrompreviousliberal governmentsbydismissingadiplomaticrepresentativeassociatedwithsignificantcontroversy.TheliberalgovernmentshadthemselvesconsideredreplacingRicci(NewYork Times 1922d,1).Second,Mussolinisoughttoremoveanambassadorwhosepublicstatements,aimedatprotectingtheinterestsoftheItaliandiasporaintheUnitedStates,had ledtonumerousmisunderstandings(Schmitz 1988,56–7).Third,heintendedtohaltRicci’s ineffectiveeffortstomobiliseAmericancitizensofItalianoriginagainsttheFordneyMcCumberTariffBill,whichMussolinibelievedwouldundulypenaliseItalianexports (NewYorkTimes 1922c,18).
IntentonimprovingaffairswithWashingtonfromtheoutset,Mussolinilookedto appointanewdiplomaticrepresentative,someonewhoenjoyedgoodrelationsinthe USeconomicandpoliticalspheres.OnepossiblecandidatewasLuigiAlbertini,the deus exmachina ofthenewspaper CorrieredellaSera,whohadspentsometimeinWashington between1921and1922asaninfluentialmemberoftheItaliandelegationtothe DisarmamentConference,wherehehadwonsympathyandapproval(Barié 1972,448–466). However,inthesummerof1922,Albertinibegantoexpressincreasinglyseriousconcerns aboutFascistmethods,despitehisinitialsympathyforthemasa‘healthyreactiontothe risingtideofsocialism’(DeCaro 1960,732).Havingascertainedhisunavailability(Pirelli 1984,50),on7NovemberMussoliniformallyaskedCaetaniifhewasavailable.1 Caetani acceptedthepositionandresignedasamemberofparliament.2
ThenewdiplomaticrepresentativetotheUnitedStateshadanunconventionalprofile comparedwithotherambassadors.Commentingonhisappointment,the NewYorkTimes emphasisedhisroleduringthewarintheoperationagainstAustro-Hungariantroopsthat ledtothemineexplosionundertheColdiLanaon17April1916(NewYorkTimes 1922b,18). However,Mussolinididnotappointhimforhisundeniablemeritsatthefront.Ifanything, takingintoaccounttheconcurrentattempttorecruitAlbertini,thereasonsforhischoice aretobefoundelsewhere:perhapsevenmoresothantheeditorofthe CorrieredellaSera, Caetanihadadensenetworkofcontactsoverseas,whichhehadbuiltupsincethebeginning ofthetwentiethcentury.
Bornin1877intooneoftheoldestnoblefamiliesinLazio,whichhadaparticular prominenceevenintheearlydecadesoftheKingdomofItaly,3 Caetanigraduatedincivil engineeringfromLaSapienzaUniversityin1901,thenspecialisedinmetallurgy–firstin Liège,Belgium,andthenatColumbiaUniversity.IntheUnitedStates,heembarkedona successfulcareerinmining,firstbeinghiredbyanIdahocompany,BunkerHill,andthen foundinghisownconsultingagencyinSanFrancisco,whichalsoopenedanofficeinNew Yorkin1914,allowinghimtogetclosertothecity’sfinancialcircles.WhentheFirstWorld Warbrokeout,hereturnedtoItalytoenlistand,thankstohisengineeringandmining skills,wasassignedtothefirstregimentofsappersandminers,forwhichhecoordinated theoperationonColdiLana(Fiorani 2021,286–287).
Dischargedattheendofthewarholdingtherankofcolonel,Caetanisoonbecame involvedinItaliannationalism,ofwhichRomewasanepicentreforpoliticalandcultural development.Electedcitycouncillorofthecapitalwithover40,000votesinthelocalelectionsof31October-1November1920(Roccucci 2001,438; L’IdeaNazionale 1920,2)beforethe generalelectionof15May1921,Caetaniwasoneofthreenationalistcandidatesonthelist fortheRomeconstituencypresentedbytheNationalBloc,alongsideLuigiFederzoniand AlfredoRocco(Roccucci 2001,480).Hewasre-elected,confirmingthenationalists’popularityinthecapital.HeandFederzoniwerethetwocandidateswhowonthemostvotes,with 22,671and20,663votesrespectively,whileRoccocamefourthwith17,317votes,(Roccucci 2001,486).Whentheliberalstate’sdaysseemednumberedintheearlyautumnof1922, Caetani,awarheroandinfluentialnationalist,seemedwilling,likeFederzoni,tomobilise againstFascismiftheBlackshirts’calltoarmstookonanti-monarchisttones(NelsonPage 1950,124–125).OncehesawthatVictorEmmanuelIIIwaswillingtoappointMussolinias headofgovernment,heabandonedhispreviousreservationsandtookpartintheMarch onRome(Fiorani 2021,287).
AninfluentialnationalistwhohadconvertedtotheFascistcause,Caetaniwasconsideredtherightpersontopromoteoverseas‘theimageofanItalywherelawandorderhad beenrestored’(Nazzaro 2008,pos.2898).Thechallengesthatawaitedhimweretrulydaunting.InadditiontotryingtoconvincetheWhiteHouseoftheneedtoreviewimmigration quotas,whichtheEmergencyQuotaActof1921hadsetatthreepercentperyearforeach nationalityalreadypresentintheUSaccordingtothe1910census,hehadtoinitiatethe firstdiscussionstoresolvethemacro-issueofwardebt.
Despitesomeconcernsregardinghisrelativeyouth(Caetaniwasonly45atthetimeof hisappointment)(Canali 1997,205),twofactorsweredecisiveinMussolini’sdecision:onthe onehand,thefactthatCaetanihadnumerouscontactsintheUSwhich,aftertheseizure ofpower,werebeneficialtoFascism,especiallysincetheywerepersonalrelationshipswith someoftheleadersofWarrenHarding’sadministration,suchasSecretaryofCommerce HerbertHoover;4 ontheotherhand,hehadalreadyworkedhard,duringhisbriefstint asaRomecitycouncillor,totrytoobtainaloanforthecapital’smunicipaladministrationfromCrockerNationalBankinSanFrancisco,inordertoremedyRome’s‘financial difficulties’.5
Therelational-businessnaturebehindMussolini’schoicecanbeconfirmedbyanother fact,whichscholarshaverightlypointedout.GuidoJungwassenttoWashingtonalongside thenewambassador,‘officiallywiththepositionoffinancialadvisor…butinrealitywith thespecifictaskofaddressing…thedelicateissueofItaly’swardebttotheUnitedStates’ (DeIanni 2009,151–152).InadditiontothelongstandingrelationshipbetweenCaetaniand Jung,ofwhichMussoliniwasundoubtedlyaware,datingbacktothetimeoftheretreatfrom Caporetto,thePrimeMinister’sdecisionwasalsoinfluencedbytherangeofrelationships thatJunghadmanagedtobuildoverseas:asamemberoftheItaliandelegationduringthe postwarperiodhehadparticipatedintheconferencesinParis(1919),Cannes(1922)and Genoa(1922),establishingcontactswithvariousfiguresintheNorthAmericanbanking andfinancialworld,comingtobeknownandrespectedbythem,atestamenttotheweight ofhisinfluence(Canali 1997,209).
InsearchofItalianstabilityaftertheFirstWorldWar Asearlyasthe1970s,CharlesMaierurgedattentiontotheroleoftheUnitedStatesinthe processofpolitical,social,andeconomicstabilisationinpostwarEurope,includingItaly (Maier 1975).Withinthetransatlanticspace(Cohrs 2022;Bitumi 2023),theHardingadministration,thankstothecontributionsofHooverandSecretaryofStateCharlesE.Hughes, aimedtolinkthe‘goalsofeconomicstability,nationalprosperity,andinternationalpeace tomoreamorphousconceptionsofcivilisation,self-restraint,racialsupremacy,religiosity, andprofessionalism’(Goodall 2014,57).
FromtheAmericanperspective,FascismrepresentedtheidealsolutionforItaly’stroubles,makingthecountryasafedestinationforNorthAmericanexports,anotheressential Republicangoalduringthe1920s.Inadditiontotheeconomicdimension,tounderstand Caetani’sactionsoverseas,wemustalsoconsiderapoliticalelement:startinginthe1920s, thesearchfornormalcybecameadeclaredgoalofRepublicans(Parrish 1992,7–11).This wenthandinhandwiththerepressionofpoliticalandsocialdissent,ahallmarkofthetwo years1919–1920,whentheRedScareandnationalhysteriaexplodedintheUnitedStates (Murray 1955;Weinrib 2019,7–31).
Giventhesedualpurposes,namelytocontributetoEuropeanstabilisationfroma decidedlyeconomicperspectiveandtoconsolidatethedomesticscenario,itiseasyto understandwhyCaetani,whenpresentinghiscredentialstoPresidentHardingattheend of1922,declaredthatMussolini’srisetopowerwould‘normalise’Italy,bothbypromoting ‘arapidandeffectivereorganisationofinternalaffairs’andbygivingimpetusto‘active andcordialcooperationwiththegovernmentsoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,England andFrancetosettlethepoliticalandeconomicconditionsofEurope,whichtherecentwar haddisrupted’.6
Attheoutsetofhisterm,CaetaniattendedtheItaly-AmericaSocietybanquetinNew York.7 Thisdecisionwasprobablyconsidered,giventhattheorganisationwasestablished in1917tofoster‘tieswithItaly’(Forsyth 1993,218219).On23January1923,theambassador addressedtheaudiencewithnotableclarity:referringtoinstructionsreceivedfromRome, whichhadinsistedonreiteratingthewillingnessinprincipletosettlethedebtsprovided thattherewas‘thepossibilityofdoingso’,8 Caetanistatedthatthenewgovernmentwasnot ‘adictatorialgovernment’,asitwascomposedof‘themostcapablemenregardlessoftheir politicalopinions’.Whiletheprimaryobjectivewasidentifiedasthe‘financialandeconomicreconstructionofthecountry’,Caetaniaffirmedthat,underMussolini’sleadership, Italywouldbecome‘anexamplebecauseofitsindustrialpeaceandfirmdeterminationto fostertheworldreconstructionforthebenefitofhumanity’.9
Despitesuchassurances,Europeanstabilitywasseverelytestedin1923bytwocrises thatthreatenedtounderminethenascentrelationshipbetweentheWhiteHouseandthe governmentinRome(Schmitz 1988,37).
First,on11January,contingentsofFrenchandBelgiantroopsoccupiedtheRuhrin responsetoGermany’sfailuretopaythereparationsstipulatedintheTreatyofVersailles. AfterhavingessentiallysupportedtheFranco-Belgianinitiative,thoughlimitinghimself tosendingacontingentoftechnicianstosupervisethemanagementofmineralresources, Mussoliniwasforcedtochangecourse.Notwishingtounderminethe‘favourablepredispositiontowardsItaly’bothin‘governmentcircles’andamongthe‘rulingclasses’overseas,10 Mussolini,afteraskingCaetanitourgeUSSecretaryofStateHughestocoordinatea‘moderatingaction’toavert‘thegravedangersofthepresentsituation’,11 optedfordetachment fromFranceandBelgium,realigninghimselfwithUSwishesfor‘Europeanpeace’(Migone 2015,71).
ThesecondcrisisinthelastdaysofAugustwastheItalianattackonCorfufollowing thekillingofGeneralEnricoTelliniandothermembersoftheinternationalcommission taskedwithdefiningtheGreek-Albanianborders(Collotti 2000,26),firstbombingitand thenoccupyingit(DiIorio 2025,36–53).AlthoughUSnewspapersattributedthistothe ‘continuationofhostilitiesbetweenthosewhosupportedtheLeagueofNationsandthose whohadopposedAmericanadhesionsince1919’(Damiani 1980,31),manycommentators interpretedtheattackontheGreekislandasademonstrationofItaly’snewimperialism (NewYorkTimes 1923a,16).
TorefutesuchinterpretationsandreassuretheWhiteHouse,Caetanideliveredaconciliatorymessage:therewasnomilitaryoperationunderwayinCorfu;itwasa‘temporary’ missionthroughwhichItalyintendedsimply‘toprotectitsprestigeanddemonstrateits unyieldingdeterminationtoobtainthereparationsduetoitinaccordancewithcustom andinternationallaw’.12 Thesuccessoftheseargumentswasdemonstratedbytheadverse reactionstoaspeechbyformerPresidentWilsonatthearmisticecelebrations,blaming Italyforthrowing‘thewholefieldofinternationalrelations…intoperilousconfusion’(New YorkTimes 1923b,1).IntheviewoftheUSpress,theformerheadofstate’swords,rather thanawell-foundedcriticism,resembledatbestthe‘expressionofasenileandexhausted mind’.13
Havingovercomethetwocriticalmomentsof1923withoutsubstantialrepercussions, CaetanihadtodealwiththefalloutintheUSfromthemurderofGiacomoMatteotti. Thefactsarewellknown;sufficetosayherethat,followingthedisappearanceofthe socialistdeputyon10June1924,alargepartoftheantifascistopposition(exceptforthe Communistsandsomeliberalfactions)withdrewfromtheChamberofDeputiesinthe AventineSecession(BaldoliandPetrella 2024;MazzeiandPerazzoli 2026).
AsduringtheweeksoftheCorfuaffair,theUSpresswasinitiallyhostiletowardsthe government’sactionsinRome(Perazzoli 2025,57–78).MussolinithereforeaskedCaetanito intervenequickly,makingclearthatanystancecontrarytoFascismwouldbeinterpretedas a‘hostilecampaignagainstItaly’.14 FullyalignedwiththewishesofthePrimeMinisterand takingadvantageofthepro-FascistpublicstatementsmadebytheformerUSambassadorto Rome,RichardWashburnChild(Hull 2021,44–45),duringaninterviewwiththeAssociated Press,Caetanistatedthatitwas‘inevitablethatinalargeparty’suchastheFascistParty, ‘unworthyelementsandevensomecriminals’couldinfiltrate.15
Caetani’sintentionswereclear.Ontheonehand,denyinganyinvolvementbythehead ofgovernmentintheoperationthathadledtothekillingofamemberofparliament, CaetaniconsideredMatteotti’smurdertobe‘contrarytotherealintentions’ofMussolini, whichwerenamelytoproceedwiththepoliticalstabilisationofthecountry.16 Ontheother hand,asheexplainedon10November1924atanItaly-AmericaSocietybanquetinNew
York,thecriticismoftheantifascistoppositionwasmeaningless,becauseinMussolini’s Italy‘everywherelifeispeaceful…peopleareprosperousandhappy’(DemocratandChronicle 1924,3).TherewerenoshortageofdoubtsintheUSStateDepartmentregardingFascism’s abilitytoholdontopower(Schmitz 1988,75).However,Caetaniachievedthedesiredresult: atthebanquet,SecretaryofStateHughesexpressedhissatisfactionwithMussoliniandhis government,which‘wereshowingtoreachanewlevelofprosperityinthepostwarera’ (Migone 2015,46).
Theeconomic‘game’betweenloanproposalsandwardebt
TheUSRepublicanadministrationledbyCalvinCoolidge,whoreplacedHardingafterthe latter’sdeathin1923,haddevelopeditsfavourablestancetowardsItalianFascismbased onthreecriteria:despiteitssystematicuseofviolenceanditsclearintentiontodestroy democraticinstitutions,ithadprovedtobeanexcellenttoolforpreventingthespreadof Bolshevism;astrongFascistexecutiveguaranteedstabilityinItaly,allowingforeconomic reconstruction,whichbroughtopportunitiesfortheUnitedStates;and,unlikehispredecessors,Mussoliniappearedtobeincompletecontroloftheinternalsituation(Schmitz 1988,71).
InlinewiththeRepublicans’diplomaticapproach,Mussolinisoughttobuildfruitful relationsbetweenRomeandWashington,focusingprimarilyoneconomicmatters.After all,ashehadalreadystatedon16November1922whenhepresentedhisgovernmentto theChamberofDeputies,hewouldworktoimprove‘ourrelationswiththeUnitedStates… especiallyasregardscloseeconomiccooperation’(Susmel 1956,21),whichfoundsupport inthenewliberalistturn(Mattei 2022,205).
TheseideasaimedatmakingapositiveimpressiononUSfinancialcircles,whichhad thecapitalnecessarytostabiliseItaly’sfragileeconomy.Fromthefirstweeksofhisterm, Caetaniaddressedthesecircles,actingpersonallyattimesandentrustingmoredelicate talkstoJung(Asso 1993,86),whoinearlyJanuary1922inNewYorkhadsoundedoutrepresentativesofsomemajorUSbankinginstitutions,includingJ.P.MorganandDillon,Read &Co.,aboutthepossibilityof‘loanstoItaly’.17
However,toobtainUScredits,anagreementonfinancialexposurehadtobereached (AstoreandFratianni 2019,197–222).Asiswellknown,inearly1922,theWorldWarForeign DebtCommissionwasestablishedinWashington,taskedwithnegotiatingtherepayment ofloansgrantedtotheAlliesduringtheconflict,andthecommissionmadeitclearfrom theoutsetthatitwouldworktowardsfullrepaymentofdebts(Eichengreen 1995).Caetani’s missiontoobtainmoresustainableconditionsfortheItalianeconomydidnotappeartobe aneasyone(Migone 2015,86–90).
DespitetherigidityoftheWorldWarForeignDebtCommission,whichconcernedall oftheUnitedStates’Europeanpartners,theNorthAmericancontextdidnotappearparticularlyhostiletowardFascismanditseconomicandfinancialrequests.18 Consequently, withthedeclaredobjectiveofreachinganagreementonthedebt,Italywouldhavehadto demonstrategoodwillbyapprovingspecificmeasuresthattheWhiteHouseviewedwith interest.ThereschedulingoftheparliamentarydebateontheWashingtonTreaty,asindirectlyrequestedbyHardinginhislettertotheSenateattheendof1922,19 shouldbe understoodinthislight.SignedbyrepresentativesoftheUnitedStates,Britain,France, Japan,andItaly,theagreement,whichprovidedforareductioninthetonnageofwarships, limitingnewconstructionandprovidingfortheeliminationofoldunits,wasputbackon theparliamentaryagendabyMussolinihimself.20 ApprovalbytheChamberofDeputiesand theSenateinMarch,followedbyformalratificationinWashingtonon17August,showed Italy’sintentiontoaccommodatetheRepublicanadministration’saimofstabilisingthe internationalsituationthroughdisarmament(Rhodes 2001,39–55).
AnotherprerequisiteforconductingthedialogueondebtonafavourablebasisforItaly wasCaetani’srepeatedrequeststoMussolininottoexcessivelyencouragetheorganisationofItalianFasciintheUnitedStates.Accordingtotheambassador,whoalsoexplained toFederzoni,hisoldcomrade-in-armsandfellownationalist,21 toomuchsupportfrom thegovernmentinRomewouldhaveaggravatedfeelingstowardsMussoliniandItaly:on theotherhand,hewrotetothePrimeMinister,Americansfounditintolerablethatthis wouldsubject‘Italian-AmericancitizenswhoswearallegiancetoAmericatotheordersof theItalianFascistParty’.22 Wecanaddthesereflectionstotheconstantcomplaintsfrom GiuseppeBastianini,thesecretarygeneraloftheFasciabroad,aboutthecreepingboycottcarriedoutbytheItaliandiplomaticcorpsintheUnitedStates(Pretelli 2003,115–127; Luconi 2000,37–41;Cannistraro 1999),andgraspanaspectthatisparticularlyrelevantto thisstudy.Duringthe1920s,Fascism’sdifficultiesingainingsupportwithinthevastimmigrantcommunitymustbeattributedtotheRomangovernment’sunwillingnesstoorganise theItalianFasciintheUnitedStates(Nazzaro 2008,pos.1653).Infact,Mussoliniconsideredtheriskofunderminingthegoodrelationsbetweenthetwocountries,whichwere alsointendedtodefinitivelyresolvethemacro-issueofwardebt,tobetoogreat.
WiththePrimeMinister’sdeclaredsupport,Caetaniopenedapreferentialchannelwith J.P.Morgan,alsorecommendedbyJung,whosetieswithoneofthemostinfluentialfiguresattheNewYorkbank,ThomasW.Lamont,datedbacktotheParisPeaceConference (Asso 1993,88).Inthiscomplexgame,theambassadorfoughtontwofronts.Firstly,he keptthegovernmentinRomeconstantlyupdatedonthestabilityoftheUSfinancialsituation,which,asTreasuryMinisterAlbertoDeStefaniinformedhim,wasundoubtedly adecisivefactorin‘obtainingtrulyfavourableconditions’.23 Secondly,hetookstepsto facilitateLamont’sarrivalinItaly,sothathecould‘explorethegroundforpossibleloan issues’.24 TakingplaceinMay1923,theUSbanker’sItalianmissioncoincidedwiththestart ofthe‘privilegedrelationshipbetweentheFascistgovernmentandtheHouseofMorgan’ (Migone 2015,92),notleastbecauseitwasenhancedbyadirectmeetingbetweenLamont andMussolini.Althoughitdidnotresultin‘arealfinancialnegotiation’,thatmeeting demonstratedthesubstantialopennessofAmericanprivatefinancetowardstheFascist-led governmentinRome(Asso 1993,89–91).
Inthespringof1923,thetimewasnotyetripefordebtconsolidation.Althoughitwas consideredunrealistic‘toexpecttheItaliangovernmenttobereadytoopennegotiations untilafterthosewithGreatBritainwerecompletedandthosewithFrancehadatleast begun’,HughesconsidereditessentialthattheRomeexecutivepubliclyexplainthereasons whynegotiationswithWashingtonhadnotyetstarted,whilealsoreiteratingitscomplete willingnesstoreachanagreementwiththeUnitedStates(Migone 2015,97).
TorespondtotheUSSecretaryofState’stwofoldrequest,twopubliceventswereorganised,oneinMilanandtheotherinNewYork.On13May1923,infrontofanaudienceat LaScalaTheatre,DeStefanitookstockofthestateoftheItalianeconomyeightmonths aftertheMarchonRome,andofficiallyannouncedthegovernment’swillingnessto‘meet itscommitments’concerningthedebtowedtotheUnitedStates.However,hesaiditwould benecessaryforthe‘powerfulAmericanRepublic’toapprove‘generousconcessions,proportionaltothosegrantedtoEngland,giventhegreatdiversityofoureconomyandthevast contributionitmadetothecommonvictory’(IlPopolod’Italia 1923,1).DeStefaniangledfor favourableterms(CorrieredellaSera 1923,1)bylinkingtheresolutionofItaly’sdebttothe negotiationsbetweenLondonandWashington,whichwouldcometoasuccessfulconclusionthefollowingJuneandleadtoBritainrepayingtheUnitedStatesapproximately$4.6 billionin62annualinstalmentswithreducedinterest(Self 2006,52–54).
ThesecondpublicoccasionsawCaetanitakecentrestage.Duringthebanquethostedby theAmericanIronandSteelInstituteon25May1923theambassador,ratherthandwelling
onfinancialmatters,chosetoremindthosepresentthat,thanksinparttoUSsupport,Italy hadmadeadecisivecontributiontotheEntente’svictory.WithoutItalianintervention, Caetanisaid,‘theUnitedStatesprobablywouldneverhavehadthepossibilityofentering intothewar,becausethewarwouldhavebeenoverbeforeAmericawasreadytocrossthe ocean’(Caetani 1924,7).
Despiteaquiteevidentconnection,reiteratedbyHughestoCaetaniduringaprivate meetinginearlyJune,25 talksontheloanslowedsignificantly,fortworeasonsthatwere entirelyItalian.First,Mussolini’smuscularapproachtotheCorfucrisisraisedconcernin financialcircles.AsLamontwrotewithregrettoGiovanniFumi,J.P.Morgan’strusteein Italy,thedecisiontobombandoccupytheGreekisland‘hasgivenusallatremendousjolt here’(Asso 1993,91).Second,underDeStefani’splantobalancethebudget,Italycould nottakeadvantageofhypotheticalUSloansbecausetheywouldhavebeen‘muchmore expensive’thandomesticfinancing,giventhatNorthAmericancreditinstitutionswould havebeenunlikelytosettleforaninterestratebelow7.5to8percent(DeCecco 1993,718).
Neitherwastheretheprogressexpectedregardingthedebt.Inthiscase,thelackof accelerationwasattributabletobothItalyandtheUS.AlthoughMussolinihadurged CaetaniinOctober1923toseizetheopportunitiesofferedbytheWhiteHouse,authorisinghimtoproceedwithanynegotiations,26 correspondencebetweentheMinisterofthe Treasuryandtheambassadorshedslightonthedualnatureofthedelays.Accordingto DeStefani,therewereundoubtedbenefitsofdebtconsolidation,27 butbeforereachingan agreementwithWashingtonitwasnecessarytoprioritisefinancialstabilisation(IlPopolo d’Italia, 1924,1).ForCaetani,theUSadministrationwasalsoanobstacle,continuingto ‘slumber’ontheissueofdebt.28
Theclimatewasnotconducivetoarealimprovementinbilateraldialogue,asdemonstratedbytheanti-immigrationshiftlaunchedbyCongressin1924,ameasurewhichreinforcedtheprovisionsalreadyestablishedintheEmergencyQuotaActof1921(Filkenstein 1988,38–39).DespitenumerousattemptsbyCaetanitoadvocateforanincreaseinimmigrationquotastoachieveoneofthetwopointsofMussolini’sprogrammeregardingtheUnited States,29 theImmigrationActloweredthemfrom3percentto2percent,basedonthe1890 census.ThismeantthatItalianimmigrationwouldbelimitedtoafewhundredindividuals peryearatmost,creatingafurtherproblemforthegovernmentinRome(Gabaccia 2000, 131–132).Therefore,inthefaceofthis‘hysteria’and‘demagoguery’,Caetanisuggested waitingformorefavourabletimestoaddressthecomplicatedeconomicissues.30
Conclusion
CaetaniwasofficiallyreplacedbyGiacomoDeMartino(CorrieredellaSera 1925b,1)atthe beginningof1925,followingcommunicationwithMussolinithathewouldliketoreturnto Italyanddevotehimselfonceagaintofamilybusiness.31
Thenewdiplomaticrepresentativeledthephasethatculminatedintheagreement betweentheWorldWarForeignDebtCommission,chairedbyUSTreasurySecretary AndrewMellon,andtheItaliandelegationledbythenewMinisterofFinance,Giuseppe Volpi(Romano 1982,130-40;Segreto 2019,13–39;Segreto 2020,905–934).Signedon14 November,thesettlementwasfavourabletothegovernmentinRome:thenewtreaty‘called forthefullrepaymentoftheprincipalof$1,647,869,197.96plusinterestover62years.The finaltotaltobepaidwas$2,042million’.Accordingly,the‘averageinterestrateof0.4per cent’stoodfor‘acancellationof80.2percentofthetotalowedtotheUnitedStatesatthe5 percentinterestrateagreeduponwhentheloanswereinitiallymade’(Schmitz 1988,95), whileforGreatBritain,France,andBelgium,theamountswrittenoffwere30percent,60.3 percentand50percentrespectively.
Fourdaysafterthedebtsettlement,LamontinformedtheStateDepartmentthatJ.P. MorganhaddecidedtograntItaly‘aloanof$100,000,000’,withthecommitmentthat itbeusedforeconomicandfinancial‘stabilisationpurposes’.32 Threeyearsaftertaking office,despiteongoinginternalpoliticalinstabilityresultingfromtheaftermathofthe MatteottimurderandthecrisistriggeredbytheAventinesecession(BaldoliandPetrella 2024;MazzeiandPerazzoli 2026),Mussolinicouldbesatisfiedwiththeturnthatbilateral relationsbetweenRomeandWashingtonhadtaken.Withtheexceptionofcertaincritiques originatingfromdemocraticcirclesofCongress,greatermutualtrust,wellsymbolisedby thedebtandloanagreements,wouldpavethewayforNorthAmericaninvestmentinItaly, whichreacheditspeakinthesecondhalfofthe1920s(Migone 2015,141–164).
Anoverallimprovementintransatlanticrelationsundoubtedlyfacilitatedthisshift. Indeed,thelaunchoftheDawesPlaninearly1924notonlydemonstratedthecentralroleof USfinanceinGermany’seconomicstabilisation,butalsohighlightedAmerica’sinterestin consolidatingthepoliticalbalanceinEurope(Schuker 1976;Gomes 2010).Caetani’sactivitieswerepartofthisscenarioofrenewedoptimism,whichcouldnotignoredevelopments intheUSpoliticallandscape–aboveall,ofcourse,thesuccessionaspresidentofCalvin CoolidgeinAugust1923afterHarding’sdeath.
Whilenotableto‘admitthepossibilityofcancelling’thewardebt,thenewpresident’s programmeleftroomformanoeuvrefor‘regulationssimilartothose…concludedwith England’,33 namelyareductionininterestandadeferralofpaymentsofthepredicted$4billion.InhisfirstmessagetoCongressafterhiselection,Coolidgehadstatedthat,concerning thewardebtrepayment,the‘termsandconditions’couldbeadapted‘tothedifferencesin thefinancialcapacityofindividualcountries’.34 Consequently,toavoidmisunderstandings, theambassadorwarnedMussoliniagainstsupporting,evenindirectly,anypresscampaign aimedat‘totalcancellation’,theonlyeffectofwhichwouldbetohardenUSpublicopinion onceagain.35
AttheendofDecember1924CaetaniinformedMussoliniaboutaconversationwith Lamont,givingadetailedpictureofUSpublicopinion.Inhisopinion,despitepublicstatementsofsubstantialopposition,‘Congressandthepublicaremuchmorepreparedto sacrificetheircreditsthanisgenerallybelieved’.Thismeantthatanagreementcouldbe envisagedinthenot-too-distantfuturethatItalywouldbeableto‘materiallymaintain’.36 However,towinUSconsent,thegovernmentinRomeneededtoraisethe‘issue…openly andcourageously’,toconfront‘theAmericans’with‘thenecessity’.37
StefanoLuconiiscorrectthatDeMartinowas‘appointedwiththeprimarytaskof resolvingtheissueofItaly’swardebts’(Luconi 2000,28).Althoughtheanalysiscouldbe furtherexpandedinfutureresearchthroughadditionaluseofUSarchivalsources,this articlepresentsaninitialinterpretativehypothesis.Similartootherintermediarieswho facilitatedinteractionsbetweenFascistItalyandRepublicanAmerica,includingChild,the AmericanambassadortoItalyduringtheMarchonRomeandlaterapropagandistathome forFascism(Hull 2021,35–58),andSalvatoreCortesi,theheadoftheAssociatedPressin Rome(Canali 2017),Caetaniplayedacrucialroleininreactivatingabilateraldialogue thathadbeeninsubstantialdifficultybeforehisarrival.WorkingintandemwithJung,the formernationalistdeputyactedasapoliticallink,establishingfruitfulcontactsandconnectionsbothwithinthehighestranksoftheRepublicanadministrationandwiththose figuresintheworldofprivatefinancewhocouldbeinterestedindevelopingmoresolid relationswithItaly,inpartwithaviewtofutureinvestments.
Thehistoriographyhasrightlyidentifiedtheachievementofthoseeconomicgoalsasthe aimoftheinitialphaseofrelationsMussolinisoughttodevelopwiththeUS(Schmitz 1988, 85).AtatimewhentheFascistsshouldhavebeenconcentratingtheireffortsonthedomesticfrontinordertoconsolidatetheirgovernment,Caetanitookactiontopromote,albeitin
asomewhatforcedmanner,theimageofacountryfinallygovernedbyanauthoritativegovernmentthatwasovercomingtheturmoilofthepostwarperiodandsettingoutonthepath to‘normalcy’.Keepingquiet,obviously,abouttheongoingFascistviolence,theambassador focusedonpresentingMussolini’sexecutiveasessentiallymoderate,repeatedlyemphasisingtheliberalnatureofitseconomicandfinancialprogramme,whichwassopopularwith ‘foreignbankers,inparticulartheAmericans’(Migone 2015,90).
ConcerningthecrisesintheRuhrandCorfu,scholarshiphaswidelyexaminedthequestionofcontinuityanddiscontinuitybetweenliberalItalyandtheearlydaysofFascismin internationalaffairs(DiNolfo 1960;Rumi 1968;Azzi 1993;Knox 1995;Duranti 2014;Lefebvre D’Ovidio 2016).Aswehaveseeninthisarticle,bilateralrelationswithWashingtonplayeda pivotalroleinchangingMussolini’spositionduringtheweeksoftheFranco-BelgianoccupationoftheRuhr.Atthesametime,therewasconcernoverseaswhenItalyattackedCorfu, totheextentthatpeoplewonderedwhetheritwasthestartofanewItalianimperialism.
ItwasCaetaniwhointervenedinthiscomplicatedpoliticalanddiplomaticgamethat threatenedtounderminetheconsensusFascismhadgainedoverseasaftertheMarchon Rome.Withoutforgettingthatthemedium-termgoalwastoestablishasolidbilateralrelationshiptolightenthewardebtandsecureloanstheItalianeconomydesperatelyneeded, theambassadortookactiononseveralfronts.DuringtheRuhrcrisis,heurgedMussolini toabandonhisfavourableattitudetowardsFranceandBelgium,remindinghimoftheconcernsthishadraisedoverseas;onthesidelinesoftheCorfuaffair,hestressedthatItaly’s actionswereintendedtoensurethecountry’srespectabilityandshouldnotbeconsidered thestartofamilitarycampaignagainstGreece.
Caetani’sbehaviourwassimilarinhandlingtherepercussionsoftheMatteotticrisis which,inmyopinion,representedaclearturningpointinthepresentationofFascism’s imageabroad.ForCaetani,Mussoliniwasalsoavictimofthatmurder,whichhadgivenrise toadisproportionatereactiononthepartoftheanti-fascists.Consideringthesubstantial groundlessnessoftheopposition’scriticisms,‘theFascistgovernment’,asCaetanisaidin oneofhiscountlesspublicspeeches,‘wasobligedtoactharshlyagainstcertainpapersthat byspreadingfalseandseditiousnewswereputtingindangerthepeaceandtheprosperity ofthecountry’.38
DuringhistenureinWashington,CaetaniactivelypromotedtheimageofItalyasanewly stablenation,aimingtosupporttheconsolidationofpoliticalbalanceinEurope.Atthe sametime,oncethefinancialsituationhadimproved,theopennessoftheUnitedStateshad beenestablished,andthe1924electionshadbeenwon,thenegotiationstosettleItaly’swar debtcouldfinallygetunderway.Caetanididnotbringthatchallengetofruition;however, hisworkprovedsignificantinachievingthepositiveresultforMussolini.
Acknowledgements. Iwouldliketothanktheanonymouspeerreviewers,whosefeedbackallowedmetosignificantlyimprovethearticlebybetterdefiningitsaimsandstructure,aswellasbymeaningfullyexpandingthe referencebibliography.Iamalsogratefultoseveralcolleagueswhoreadanddiscussedearlierversionsofthetext, namelyPaoloBarcella,FerdinandoFasce,andFedericoMazzei.Anyerrorsorinaccuraciesthatremainaresolely myownresponsibility.
Competinginterests. Theauthordeclaresnone.
Notes
1. FondazioneCamilloCaetani,ArchivioCaetani,Rome(hereafterFCC),GelasioCaetani,ingegnere1903–1934 (hereafterGCI),box3,folder20,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Rome,8November1922.
2. AttiParlamentari,CameradeiDeputati,sedutadel18novembre1922,pp.8478–8481: https://storia.camera.it/ regno/lavori/leg26/sed190.pdf (lastaccessed3November2025).
3. Hisfather,OnoratoCaetani,beforebrieflyservingasMinisterofForeignAffairs(10March–11July1896),was mayorofRomebetween29December1890and14November1892.Oneofhisbrothers,LeoneCaetani,wasamemberofparliamentfortheKingdomofItalyfrom1909to1913,electedtorepresenttheConstitutionalDemocratic Party,whichwasliberal-democraticinorientation.
4. FCC,FondoCaetaniContemporanei,GelasioCaetani(hereafterGC),box10,folder2,HerbertHoovertoGelasio Caetani,London,4October1916.
5. FCC,GCI,box21,folder191,GelasioCaetanitoWilliamHenryCrocker,Rome,19October1921.
6. FCC,GCI,box3,folder25,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,29December1922.
7. GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,11January1923,inDocumentiDiplomaticiItaliani(hereafter DDI),s.VII,vol.I,LaLibreriadelloStato,Roma,1953,p.225.
8. FCC,GCI,box1,folder4,BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,13January1923.
9. FCC,GCI,box3,folder25, SpeechDeliveredattheItaly-AmericaSociety,NewYork,23January1923.
10. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,10January1923.
11. BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Roma,18January1923,DDI,pp.251–252.
12. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,BenitoMussolinitoItalianEmbassyinWashington,Rome,1September1923.
13. FCC,GCI,box1,folder3,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,13November1923.
14. ArchivioStoricodelMinisterodegliAffariEsteri,Roma(hereafterASMAE),AmbasciataItalianaaWashington (hereafterAIW),box198,folder‘IncidenteMatteotti’,BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,23June1924.
15. ASMAE,AIW,box198,folder‘IncidenteMatteotti’,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,21June1924.
16. ASMAE,AIW,box198,folder‘IncidenteMatteotti’,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,27June1924.
17. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,10January1923.
18. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,4January1923.
19. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,28December1922.
20. FCC,GCI,box1,folder4,BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Roma,3January1923.
21. FCC,GCI,box1,folder8,GelasioCaetanitoLuigiFederzoni,Washington,13April1923.
22. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,20March1923.
23. AlbertoDeStefanitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,5April1923,inArchivioStoricodellaBancad’Italia,Rome,Carte DeStefani,s.1CorrispondenzaMinistero,folderStatiUniti–GelasioCaetani.
24. FCC,GCI,box1,folder1,GelasioCaetanitoAlbertoDeStefani,Washington,30March1923.
25. FCC,GCI,box1,folder9,Suntodellaconversazionefral’ambasciatoreCaetaniedilsegretariodiStatoHughes riguardoaidebitidiguerra,Washington,3June1923.
26. FCC,GC,box1,folder9,BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,31October1923.Whatisthis?
27. FCC,GC,box3,folder.20,AlbertoDeStefanitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,7April1924.
28. FCC,GC,box3,folder20,GelasioCaetanitoGuidoJung,Washington,19February1924.
29. FCC,GC,box1,folder7,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,5October1923.
30. FCC,GC,box3,folder20,GelasioCaetanitoAlbertoDeStefani,Washington,25April1924.
31. FCC,GC,box10,folder5,BenitoMussolinitoGelasioCaetani,Rome,30September1924.
32. PapersRelatingtotheForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,1925,vol.II,J.P.MorgantotheSecretaryofState, NewYork,18November1925: https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1925v02/d317,lastaccessedon 18November2025.
33. FCC,GC,box1,folder7,AugustoRossotoBenitoMussolini,Washington,14June1924.
34. FCC,GC,box1,folder7,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,4December1924.
35. FCC,GC,box1,folder9,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,29December1924.
36. FCC,GC,box1,folder9,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,26December1924.
37. FCC,GC,box3,folder25,GelasioCaetanitoBenitoMussolini,Washington,5February1925.
38. ASMAE,s.AIW,box198,folder‘IncidenteMatteotti’,ThePoliticalSituationofItaly.AnAddressbyH.E.Gelasio CaetanideiPrincipidiSermoneta,17January1925.
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JacopoPerazzoli isalecturerinContemporaryHistoryintheDepartmentofLetters,Philosophy,and CommunicationoftheUniversityofBergamo.Hisresearchinterestsincludesocialistinternationalism,liberaldemocraticinternationalism,andtheglobalpost-FirstWorldWarperiod.
Italiansummary
QuestoarticoloesaminalacondottadiplomaticadiGelasioCaetaniduranteilsuoincaricodiambasciatoreitalianonegliStatiUnitineiprimiannidelgovernoMussolini,mettendoneinlucel’influenza eiprocessidecisionali.EssoindagaleragioniallabasedellasceltadiMussolinididesignareCaetani qualepropriorappresentanteaWashingtoneanalizzaleprincipaliquestionicheeglisitrovòadaffrontare,dallapoliticaesteraaldebitodiguerraitalianoderivantedallaPrimaguerramondiale,che Mussolinimiravaarisolvere.Basandosisull’archiviopersonalediCaetanieincrociandofontiprimarie provenientidaaltrifondi,lostudiooffreunaricostruzioneampiaearticolata.
Citethisarticle: Perazzoli,J.2026.‘GelasioCaetani,ItalianambassadortotheUnitedStates:betweenforeign policyandeconomicaffairs(1922-1925).’ ModernItaly,1–15. https://doi.org/10.1017/mit.2026.10145