1 Introduction
Onaverysimplisticviewofblameworthiness,aviewthatnobodyholds, wearealwaysblameworthywhenweactwronglyandalwayspraiseworthywhenweactrightly.Ofcoursetherelationshipbetweenrightness andwrongnessontheonehand,andpraise-andblameworthinessonthe other,ismorecomplexthanthat.Wrongnessandblameworthinessmust comeaparttosomeextent,althoughperhapsnotcompletely.Itseems undeniablethatitispossibletoactwronglywithoutbeingblameworthy. Similarly,itseemsobviousthatonecanactrightlywithoutbeingpraiseworthy,andnotjustbecausethebarforpraiseworthinessseemshigher thanthebarforblameworthiness:clearlyonecanactrightlywithout deservinganycreditatall.
Ontheotherhand,thereissurelysomeessentialrelationshipbetween ourmoralconcepts,rightnessandwrongness,andourresponsibility relatedconcepts,likepraiseworthinessandblameworthiness.Tobe praiseworthymustinvolvetheideathattheagenthasdonesomething right hasactedrightly insomesense.Andlikewise,anagentwhois blameworthymusthaveactedwronglyinsomesense.Myoverallaimin thisbookistoshedlightonournotionsofpraise-andblameworthiness. Clearly,moralpraise-andblameworthinessmusthavesomethingtodo withtheagent’srelationshiptorightorwrongaction.Butwhat,exactly? Weneedtoknowwhat ‘rightness’ and ‘ wrongness ’ meaninthiscontext. Weshouldnottakeforgrantedthatthereisanindependentaccountof rightnessandwrongnessthatwecansimplyhelpourselvesto.
InthisbookIdefendapluralisticviewofbothourdeonticconcepts andourresponsibilityconcepts.Iarguethattherearethreedifferent waystobeblameworthy:ordinaryblameworthiness,detachedblameworthiness,andextendedblameworthiness.The firstwayisclosestto thewaythatweordinarilythinkofpraise-andblameworthiness,and soIcallit ‘ordinarypraiseworthinessandblameworthiness’,andrefer
WaystobeBlameworthy:Rightness,Wrongness,andResponsibility. Elinor Mason, Oxford University Press (2019). © Elinor Mason. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833604.003.0001
correspondinglyto ‘ordinarypraiseandblame’.Iarguethatordinary praise-andblameworthinessareessentiallyconnectedtoaparticular conceptionofrightnessandwrongness,thatwhichisusedinsubjective obligation.¹Agentsareblameworthyintheordinarywaywhentheyhave actedwronglybytheirownlights.Subjectiveobligationandordinary blameworthinessapplyonlytothosewhoarewithinourmoralcommunity,thatistosay,thosewhounderstandandshareourvaluesystem.By contrast,thesecondsortofblameworthiness,detachedblameworthiness, canapplyevenwhentheagentisoutsideourmoralcommunity,andhas nosensethatheractismorallywrong.Weblameagentsforacting objectivelywrongly,evenifwedonothaveanyviewabouttheirstate ofmindinsodoing.Finally,Iargueforathirdsortofblameworthiness, extendedblameworthiness,whichappliesinsomecontextswherethe agenthasactedwrongly,andunderstandsthewrongness,buthasacted wronglyentirelyinadvertently.Insuchcasestheagentisnotpersonally atfaultintheordinarysense,but,Iargue,thesocialcontextmaybesuch thatsheshouldtakeresponsibility.
1.Methodology
ThemethodologyIuseincomingtothisaccountofhowweshoulduse ourconceptsisasortofreflectiveequilibrium.Weneedtothinkboth aboutthewayweactuallyusetheseconceptsandaboutwhatwewant fromthem.Wewantourconceptstobeclearandwelldefined,wewantas manyasweneed,wewanttobeabletomakesomefairly fine-grained distinctions,andofcoursewewantthemtoservethepurposethatwe havethemfor.Wemightendupdoingsomeconceptualengineering: adjustingourconceptstobettersuitourneeds.Ononecommonview,a viewIshare,bothourmoralconceptsandourresponsibilityconcepts aretheretoregulateandmakesenseofourinterpersonalengagement. Weshoulddecideonwhichconceptstouse,andhowtousethem,onthe basisofhowthoseconceptsfunctioninourrelationships.
¹ThroughoutthebookIassumethat ‘rightness’ , ‘obligation’,and ‘ought’ arecorollaries, andlikewisefortheconverses, ‘ wrongness ’ , ‘prohibition’,and ‘ought-not’.Iamawarethat, pragmatically, ‘ought’ seemslessstrongthan ‘obligation’,andsimilarly, ‘ought-not’ seems lessstrongthan ‘prohibition’,butIsetthatcomplicationasidehere.
TheprojectthatIamengagedinstraddlesethicsandmoral responsibility.Insofarasitisethics,whatIamdoingmightbedescribed asfallingintothe fieldknownas ‘normativeethics’,tobecontrastedwith ‘meta-ethics’.BythatImeanthatIamnotprimarilyconcernedwiththe ultimatetruthmakersforclaimsaboutrightnessorwrongness.Iamnot arguingaboutrelativismandrealism.Rather,Iaminterestedinwhatlimits ourdeonticconceptsandmakesthemproperdeonticconcepts:howthe conceptsofrightnessandwrongnessfunction,whattheconditionsarefor ascribingthem,andhowtheyrelatetoothernormativeconcepts.Likewise, thoughwedonottendtotalkabout ‘meta-responsibilitytheory’ and ‘normativeresponsibilitytheory’,Iamdoingnormativeresponsibilitytheory.Iamnotconcernedwithquestionsaboutfreewillanddeterminism,but with when responsibilityconceptsarecorrectlyattributed.Myaimisto investigatehowresponsibilityattributionsinteractwithotherresponsibility concepts,andwithnormativeconcepts.²
Bothnormativeethicsandmeta-ethicsarewelldevelopedassubdisciplinesand(althoughitissometimescontroversial)functionindependently.Normativeethicistsaskquestionsaboutthesubjectmatterof rightnessandwrongness(Islyingwrong?Isharmingwrong?Does animalsufferingmattermorally?Whatabouttheenvironment?)and also(thequestionsIaminterestedin)aboutthestructuralconditions thatapplytothenormativeconcepts(e.g.Cananagentactrightlyor wronglyaccidentally?Cannon-agentsactrightlyorwrongly?Isrightnessamaximizingnotion?).Innormativeethicsitiscommontotake thesequestionsseriouslyindependentlyofanycommitmenttoanyofthe variouspossiblemeta-ethicalpositions.
Bycontrast,theliteratureonfreewillandresponsibilityhasfocused muchmoreonthemetaissues,onwhetherwehavefreewillandwhether wemighthavemoralresponsibilityevenifwedon’thavefreewill.
²Muchoftheliteratureonmoralresponsibilityisfocusedonthe ‘meta’ debate the debateaboutwhetherwecanaccountformoralresponsibilityintheabsenceoffreewill. ThatincludestheworkofR.J.Wallace,whogivesusanaccountofresponsibilityaccording towhichanagentisresponsiblewhenitisappropriatetoholdherresponsible,anditis appropriatetoholdherresponsiblewhenshehasviolatedanobligationthatweaccept (1994).Wallaceisarguingthatthisiswhatmakesresponsibilityattributionstrue.Wallace’ s terminologyisdifferenttominehere:hehasanormativeaccountofresponsibilityinthe sensethathethinksweshouldusenormativeconsiderationsratherthanfactualonesto determinewhensomeoneisresponsible.
Normativeresponsibilitytheoryisinitsinfancy.³Iamengagedinthe projectofnormativetheorizingaboutresponsibility,whichItaketobe analogoustonormativetheorizinginethics.Iexamineourdeonticconcepts,andexploretheirrelationshiptoresponsibilityconcepts,praise-and blameworthiness.Iaskwhattherelationshipisbetweenthesetwosetsof notions,howtheylimiteachother,andwhatelseshapesthem.
Istartwithrightnessandwrongness.Standardsofrightactionare sensible ofinteresttous onlyifitissometimespossibleforustomeet thestandard.Noaccountofrightnesswouldclaimthatitcanberighttodo thingsthatarealwaysimpossibleforus,suchasteletransport.However, thereisafurtherconditiononasensibleaccountofrightaction:itmustbe reasonablyeasytoactrightlyonpurpose,atleastundertherightconditions.AsIputitinthisbook,thereisa ‘responsibilityconstraint’ that appliestoallconceptionsofrightness.Thatisjusttosaythatusefuldeontic conceptsmust,tosomedegree(Iwillbegivinganaccountofthevarious appropriatedegrees)berelatedtowhatwecouldberesponsiblefor.
Therearedifferentconceptsofrightnessandwrongness,andthey differintheextenttowhichtheycorrelatewithpraise-andblameworthiness.Isuspectthatwemostoftenusetheconceptsofrightnessand wrongnessinamoderatelyobjectivesense.Istartbyelucidatingauseful objectiveconceptofrightnessthatdoesnotcorrelateexactlywithpraiseworthiness,butisnotentirelyindependentofit.Inotherwords,itmeets aweakversionoftheresponsibilityconstraint.Itisnothyper-objective, butitisnonethelessanobjectiveaccountofrightness,inthatitis independentoftheagentwhoisactingonthatoccasion.
³GaryWatsonandMichaelZimmermanhave,indifferentways,donealotofworkon normativeresponsibility,thoughneitherdescribesitassuch.MichaelMcKenna(2012), ManuelVargas(2013),andDavidShoemaker(2015)allhaverecentbooksthatseemtome tobeclearexamplesofworkonnormativeresponsibilityinmysense.McKennafocuseson theoverallshapeofourresponsibilityconcepts,arguingthattheymustbeseenaspartofa communicativepractice;Vargaslikewisefocusesontheoverallshape,arguingthatthe backgroundjustificationforparticularpracticesisconsequentialist.Shoemakerfocuseson thecorrectnessconditionsforblame,givingapluralistaccountofwhatsortofqualityofwill isrelevanttoresponsibility.IcontrastmyaccountwithShoemaker’satvariouspoints,but themaindifferenceisthatwhereasShoemaker’sisasentimentalistaccount,arguingthat therearevariousreactiveattitudesthatare fittinginresponsetovariousqualitiesofwillin theblamee,mineismoreradicallypluralist.Onmyviewtherecanbemoretoblameworthinessthanqualityofwill,andmoretoblamethansentiment,andthefundamental sortingissueisthewayinwhichtheagentactedwrongly.
Thisleadstotheimportantquestion,whatisitthatfundamentally makesagentspraiseworthyorblameworthy?Ifanagentcanactwrongly withoutbeingblameworthy,whatisitthatmakesherblameworthywhen sheisblameworthy?Thishashistoricallybeenaquestionintheliterature onfreewillandresponsibility,andisassociatedwiththenotionofdesert. Thethoughthasbeenthatweneedto findsomethinginvirtueofwhich theagentdeservestobeblamed,wherethechallengeismadeharder ifwethinkthattoblameistoimposesuffering.Ifdeterminismistrue,if weareallatthemercyofcausalforces,andnotthesourceofourown actionsinanydeeplymeaningfulsense,itisnotoriouslyhardtosayhow wecoulddeserveblame.⁴
InthisbookIdonotframetheissueintermsofdesert.Iprovidean accountoftheconditionsunderwhichitis fittingtoblamepeople.The accountIgiveisconsistentwithvariousdifferentviewsaboutdesert,and aboutcompatibilismandincompatibilism.Myaimistogiveaconvincingstoryabouttheconnectionsbetweenactingwronglyinacertainway andbeingblameworthy.Mystoryisnotsupposedtotranscendorjustify thenormativerealm:Iaminterestedinthenormativeconditionsof blame,thequestionofwhenitisappropriatetoblamepeoplewithinthe termsofourpractices,notthemetaphysicalconditionsthatmightmake blameappropriate.
Ideveloptheideathatthereisonespecialsenseofwrongness, subjectivewrongness,thatcorrelateswithordinaryblameworthiness. Thisisnotthewaywealwaysusetheterm ‘ wrongness ’.Ithinkwe usuallyusetheterms ‘rightness’ and ‘ wrongness ’ inamoderatelyobjectivesense.Butwedosometimesusedeonticconceptsinawaythat suggeststhattoactwronglyisprettymuchautomaticallytobeblameworthy.Forexample,wemightsaythatadoctorwhorandomlypicksa medicineofftheshelfactedwrongly,evenifwhatshedidturnedoutvery well.Whatwemeanisthat,byherownlights,whatshedidwasbad,and blameworthy.Thisissubjectivewrongness.Therehasnotbeenahuge amountofinterestinoranalysisofsubjectiverightnessandwrongness.⁵
⁴ See,forexamplePereboom(2001)andelsewhere.Pereboomdoubtsthatwecangive anaccountofthenormativeconditionsforblamethatareanythingbutconsequentialist. Idonotaddressthatheadoninthisbook,butIgiveanon-consequentialistaccount.
⁵ HollySmithisanexception;Idiscussherworkinwhatfollows.Irefertoherviewsas presentedinherpublishedpapers,butherargumentsaredevelopedinmoredetailinher book, MakingMoralityWork,inpressasIwritethis.
Iargueforanaccountofsubjectiverightnessandwrongness,andIshow thatitdoescorrelatewith,andilluminate,ourconceptsofpraise-and blameworthiness.
Ouraccountofsubjectiverightnessshouldcaptureoursensethatwhat anagentdoes,fromtheirownpointofview,iswhatmakesthem praiseworthy.Inanutshell,Iarguethattoactsubjectivelyrightlyisto trytodowellbymorality.Ishowthattryingtodowellbymorality relatestopraise-andblameworthinessintheappropriateway.Anagent whosincerelytriestodowellbymoralityispraiseworthy(evenifshe goesastrayinvariousways),andanagentwhofailstotrytodowellby moralityisblameworthy.Theequivalencebetweenactingsubjectively wronglyandbeingblameworthyismutuallyexplanatory.Inunderstandingeachintermsoftheother,wemakebettersenseoftheseideas.
Thispictureisharmoniouswithabiggerpicture,accordingtowhich ourblamingpracticesareessentiallyinterpersonal,andinextricably linkedwiththefactthatweexistinamoralcommunitywithothers.⁶ Weblameothersinourmoralcommunityinanordinarywaywhenthey knowinglydosomethingthatviolatesourmoralstandards.Onmy accountordinaryblamemakessensebecauseitattachestosubjective wrongdoing.Inblamingintheordinaryway,weareappealingtothe agent’sownsenseofwhattheyoughttohavedone,bythelightofthe valuesweshare.Thoseoutsideourmoralcommunitycanbeblamed,but inaverydifferentway:theycanbeblamedwithdetachedblame,whichis notcommunicative.
Inthinkingabouttheconditionsthatmakeblame fitting,Ilookat bothindividualcasesandthebiggerpicture.Inethicstherearesimpler andmorecomplexaccountsoftheshapeofourconcepts,andthesameis trueinthinkingaboutmoralresponsibility.Inethics,awonderfullyneat andsimpleaccountoftheoverallshapeofournormativeconceptsis consequentialism.Notoriously,consequentialismclasheswithour
⁶ TheideathatweshouldunderstandmoralresponsibilitypracticesintermsofinterpersonalinteractionsisofcourseduetoP.F.Strawson(1962).SeeShabo(2012)fora defenceoftheStrawsonianviewthatresponsibilitypracticesandrelationshipsaredeeply intertwined.RecentcommentatorshavepointedoutanddevelopedStrawson’semphasison themoralcommunity,andthecommunicativeaspectsofourmoralresponsibility practices seeWatson(2004andelsewhere),Hiernonymi(2004),Darwall(2006), Scanlon(2008),McKenna(2012),andMacnamara(2015a).Idrawonmuchofthiswork inwhatfollows.
intuitionsaboutparticularcases.Thepricefortheoreticalneatnessis intuitiveimplausibilityinmanysituations.AttheotherextremeisRossstylepluralism,whichgivesusplausibleanswersalotofthetime,butno pleasingtheoreticalneatness.
Thissamestructureappearsinthinkingaboutresponsibility,though aswritersonresponsibilitydonotusuallythinkofthingsinthisframeworkitisnotaseasytocharacterizetheirviewsintheseterms.Take debatesaboutqualityofwill.Oneveryneatsortofviewsaysthatall responsibilitydependsonqualityofwill.Thejustificationforthinking aboutqualityofwillmightbeunderstoodasawayofansweringworries aboutmetaphysicalfreewill.⁷ Butwemightalsounderstanditasa contributiontonormativetheorizing:thinkingaboutthejustifyingand unifyingaccountofthesubstanceofourresponsibilitypractices why doweholdPresponsiblebutnotQ?Howdoexcuseswork?Andsoon. Neatertheories,thatattempttoreduceallresponsibilitypracticetoone sortofqualityofwillarelessabletomatchupwithourpre-theoretical intuitionsaboutcases.Messier,pluralistictheoriesdobetterataccommodatingourmessyintuitions,butofcoursemustbemarkeddownfor lackoftheoreticalneatness.
Iendupwithapluralisticviewofbothnormativeethicalconceptsand responsibilityconcepts.Iarguethatreflectingonwhatweneedfromour responsibilitypracticesallowssomecasesofblamingthatarenotbasedon qualityofwill.Sometimesweneedtoblamepeopleforthingsthatthey havedonewithnobadqualityofwillatall.HereIamfollowingBernard Williamsintothedeependofapluralisticview.AsWilliamsputsit: Everywhere,humanbeingsact,andtheiractionscausethingstohappen,and sometimestheyintendthosethings,andsometimestheydonot;everywhere, whatisbroughtaboutissometimestoberegrettedordeplored,bytheagentorby otherswhosufferfromitorbyboth;andwhenthatisso,theremaybeademand madebyhimself,byothers,orbyboth.Whereverallthisispossible,theremust besomeinterestintheagent’sintentions,ifonlytounderstandwhathas
⁷ Strawsonisofteninterpretedasarguingthatourreactionstoqualityofwillinothers arewhatmakesenseofourmoralresponsibilitypractices.Bennett(1980)certainlytakes Strawsontobeaprojectivist,asdolatercommentatorswhotakethemselvestobeimprovingonStrawson’sprojectivismbygivinganaccountofwhenitisappropriatetohavethe reactiveattitudes Wallace(1994),FischerandRavizza(1998).Myownviewisthat Strawson’smostinterestingcontributionshereshouldnotbereadasacontributionto thecompatibilism/incompatibilismdebateatall;rather,theyareacontributiontonormativeresponsibilitytheorizing.
happened itmustbeapossiblequestionhowtheintentionsandactionsofan agentatagiventime fitinwith,orfailto fitinwith,hisintentionsandactionsat othertimes
Thesereallyareuniversalmaterials.Whatwemustnotsupposeisthattheyare alwaysrelatedtooneanotherinthesamewayor,indeed,thatthereisoneideal wayinwhichtheyshouldberelatedtooneanother.(1993,55–6)
IthinkWilliamsisrightaboutthis.Intheend,wecannotexpectthefour elementshespeaksof,cause,intention,stateofmind,andappropriate response,torelateinexactlythesamewayineverycircumstance.Iargue, inaWilliams-esquevein,thatwecanbeblameworthyformorethanjust whatweintend,andformorethanjustwhatcomesfromourdeep motivations.Iarguethatsometimespeopleshouldtakeresponsibility forwhattheydothroughglitchesorautomatedpsychologicalprocesses.
2.TheArguments
InChapter2Iintroducetheresponsibilityconstraint,whichisawayto puttheclaimthatournormativeconcepts,rightnessandwrongness,are essentiallyrelatedtoresponsibilityconcepts.Theresponsibilityconstraintisvagueasitstands,andinthischapterIexplorevariousways tocashoutthefundamentalthought.
Iarguethatthereisasensibleobjectiveaccountofrightnessand wrongnessthatmeetsafairlyweakversionoftheresponsibilityconstraint.Thepointofanobjectiveaccountofrightnessistoprovidea generalbenchmarkforbehaviour,astandardthatweshouldstriveto meet.TheaccountofobjectiverightnessIfavour,prospectiverightness, doesnotabstractawayfromalluncertainty,buttakesintoaccount reasonablefactualignorance.Thus,whenwelookatwhatisprospectivelyright,wearethinkingaboutwhatitwouldbereasonabletodointhe circumstances.Wearenotjustthinkingaboutwhatwouldbebest,but aboutwhatagentslikeusmightbeexpectedtodo.
IthenturntotheconceptofrightnessthatIamreallyinterestedin, subjectiverightness.Iarguethatthepointofanaccountofsubjective obligationistogiveusastoryaboutwhatmakestheagentpraise-or blameworthy.Objectiveobligationspecifiesatarget,whichtheagent mayormaynothit.Hittingthetargetwouldbegood,butsometimes agentsmissthroughnofaultoftheirown.Soevenifweknowthatan agentfulfilled(orfailedtofulfil)herobjectiveobligation,wedonot
necessarilyknowhowtoappraiseher.Bycontrast,thenotionofsubjectiveobligationidentifieswhatitisintheagent’sownpsychologythat rendersherpraise-orblameworthy.
Therearetwoideasthatareassociatedwiththenotionofsubjective obligation:thatitshouldbeactionguiding,andthatitshouldbeaccessibletotheagent.Ishowthattherearevariouscomplexitieshere. Subjectiveobligationcanbeneitherfullyactionguiding,norfullyaccessible.However,itisimportantthatanaccountofsubjectiveobligationis abletoexplaintheplausibilityandelementoftruthinthesetwoideas. TheaccountIdevelopexplainsthelimitedsenseinwhichsubjective obligationisactionguiding(Iarguethatthesubjectivelyrightthingtodo genuinelyoughttobedone,thereisagenuineimperativethere,evenif thisisnotalwaysimmediatelyhelpful),andIarguethattheaccessibility requirementislimitedinsomeways,butthatthereisageneralreflexivity requirementthatismet,theagentmustknowwhatsheisdoinginthat shemusthavebackgroundknowledgeofheraim.Thisaccountmakes senseofpraise-andblameworthiness.
Thestandardwaytoformulatesubjectiverightnessisintermsofthe agent’sbeliefs:somethinglike, ‘anagentactssubjectivelyrightlywhenshe doeswhatshebelievesisthemostmorallysuitablethingtodo’.Iargue thatthebeliefformulationcannotmakesenseofacrucialelementofour subjectiveobligation:ourongoingandcontinuousobligationtoimprove ourbeliefs,andtobealerttonewevidence.Ifwebasesubjectiveobligation onbelief,wecannotcriticizeanagentwhoactsonhercurrentbeliefs,even ifthosebeliefsarefaulty.Iarguethatinordertomakesenseofourdutyto improveourbeliefsweneedapracticalaim,andthatisexactlywhatis involvedintheconceptof ‘trying’.Thusoursubjectiveobligationisnotto dowhatwebelieveismorallysuitable,buttotrytodowellbymorality.
Forboththebeliefformulationandthetryingformulationofsubjectiveobligation,therearisesaquestionaboutwhetherwearetalkingabout thevaluesystemthattheagenthappenstohave,orthecorrectvalue system.Iarguethatforsubjectiverightnesstoalignwithpraiseworthinessintherightsense,weneedsomesortofanchorinthecorrectmoral view.(IinitiallydefendthisideainChapter2anddeveloptheargument inChapter4).Iarguethatanagentactssubjectivelyrightlywhenshe triestodowellbythestandardsofwhat reallyis morallyappropriate. Inotherwords,shehastogetmoralityright.Myaccountofsubjective obligationthusdependsonanagenthavingagraspofthecorrectmorality.
InthebookIuseacapitallettertodenotethatIamtalkingabouttheone trueMorality, ‘TheTrueandtheGood’,asSusanWolfcallsit(1990).
Italkofthisasifitisanobjectivemeta-ethicalfact,butthatisjusta wayoftalking.Theviewisnotthatthismustbemetaphysicallyreal, rathertheviewisthatweneedtorefertooursharedunderstandingof themoralfacts.Ileaveitopento fillinthemeta-ethicalaccountofthe statusofthesefacts.AllIneedhereisthatitmakessensetoustotalk aboutgettingmoralityrightandgettingitwrong anditclearlydoes,in sharpcontrasttoourviewsaboutthetastinessofMarmite,forexample, whichweobviouslytaketobeanon-factiveissue.
ItisimportanttopointoutthatmyaccountofMoralityisbroad,and allowsforreasonableerror.Onecan ‘haveagraspofMorality’ inmysense withoutgettingeverythingright.Thereisroomforreasonabledisagreement(IdefendthatinChapter2).Also,althoughIthinkthatmostpeople dohaveagraspofMorality,Idonotwanttoimplythatpeoplehaveallthe answersattheir fingertips.Theclaimisratherthatpeoplewouldassentto themaintenetsofMoralityiftheythoughtthroughtheirmostseriously heldconvictionsandcommitments,andthattheycanusetheirknowledge ofMoralityto figureoutwhattodoonparticularoccasions.
InChapter3IgiveanintuitiveaccountofthesenseoftryingthatIam interestedinhere.Actingsubjectivelyrightlyandtryingarebothsubject tosomesortofaccessibilityrequirement.Iarguethatinthecaseof trying,thisisbestunderstoodasareflexivityrequirement:theagent mustknowwhatsheisdoing.Tryingtodosomethinginvolveshaving thegoalasaconsciousaim.A flowerisnottryingtoturntowardsthe sunandsimilarly,Iargue,humanbehaviourmaybecausallyaffectedby anaimwithoutitsbeingthecasethattheagentistryingtoachievethat aim.Atthesametime,wecanbetryingtodothingsthatwearenot aware, atthetime,oftryingtodo.Thus,surprisingly,itmaysometimes bethecasethatweareactingsubjectivelyrightlyanddonotknowit,or believethatweareactingsubjectivelyrightbutarenot.Idefendthis consequenceofmyviewbyarguingthatthereisnotheorythatcanfully meetanaccessibilityrequirement,andsotheaccessibilityrequirement mustberelaxed.
Iusetheconceptoftryinginabroadsense,sothatitappliestodoings aswellas ‘settingoneself ’.Whenanagentistryingtodowellby Morality,shemustseekmoreinformationwhennecessary,including aboutthenatureofMorality.Itisessentialthatshehasagoodgraspof
Moralityinthebroadsense:herbasicunderstandingofMoralitygives heraframeworkforresolvinguncertaintieswithinMorality.
Iconcludewithanaccountoffailingtotry,whichcorrelateswith ordinaryblameworthiness.Itisimportanttobeabletodistinguish betweenfailingtotryandmerelynottrying.Alazyagentmightnottry tosaveatrappedkitteninasituationwheresheknowsthatthereisa trappedkitten,andthatcountsasfailingtotry.Butiftheagenthadno ideathatthekittenwasthere,her not tryingisnot failing totry.Again, thecrucialfactorisknowledge.SomeonewhograspsMorality,andhasit asanaim,canfailtotry.SomeonewhodoesnotgraspMoralitymay ‘not try’,buttheydonotcountasfailingtotry.Thereflexivityrequirement, theideathattheagentmustbeabletorecognizewhatsheisdoing,is essentialtomyaccountoftheconnectionbetweensubjectiveobligation andpraise-andblameworthiness.
InChapter4,Igiveanaccountofordinarypraise-andblameworthiness, andshowhowtheselinkupwithsubjectiveobligation.Onmyaccount,an agentispraiseworthyifshetriestodowellbyMorality.Praiseworthiness requiresthattheagenthasMorality(atleastbroadly)correct.Anagentis praiseworthywhensheactsaccordingtothetruevaluesystem,notmerely whensheactsonherconscience.Correspondingly,anagentactssubjectivelywronglywhenshefailstotrytodowellbyMorality.
Icontrastmyaccountwithrivalviewsofwhatisnecessaryand sufficientforpraiseworthiness.Ontheonehand,thereisacommon viewthatbeingmotivatedintherightdirectionissufficientforpraiseworthiness.Thisisaviewoftenheldbyattributionists,thosewhoarguethat choiceandcontrolarelessimportanttomoralresponsibilitythanthedeep motivationsthatdriveanagent,ortheagent’ s ‘deepself ’ asitisoftenput.⁸ Onthissortofaccount,moralconcern,orbeingmotivationesteemworthy (inmyterminology),isallthatisneededforpraiseworthiness:theagent mightnotknowthathermotivationsaregood,andmighteventhinkher motivationsareleadingherastray.
⁸ Theterminologyiscontested,butIwillusetheterm ‘attributionist’ torefertoviewsthat basemoralresponsibilityforactsontheagent’sdeepcharacterandmotivationsratherthanon whatshedoesknowingly.IamreferringheretoArpalyandSchroeder’sworkonpraise-and blameworthiness seeArpalyandSchroeder(1999)andArpaly(2003)inparticular.Aswellas ArpalyandSchroeder’swork,attributionismisdeveloped(invariousdifferentways)by Watson(1996,reprintedin2004),AngelaSmith(2005andelsewhere),Scanlon(1998and elsewhere),Sher(2009andelsewhere),andTalbert(2008andelsewhere).
Iarguethatthisaccountfailstodojusticetoourordinaryaccountof praise-andblameworthiness.Wedothinkthatthereissomethingto admireinpeoplewhohavegoodmotivations,butwedonotthinkthem fullypraiseworthy.Andsowhynotmakeadistinctionhere?Weshould agreethatmotivationesteemworthinessisanecessarycomponentof praiseworthiness,butitisnotthewholestory:moralknowledgeisalso necessary.Iarguethatthatisabetteraccountofpraiseworthinessand, inparticular,itmakessenseofthereflexivityrequirement:therequirementthatanagentbeabletorecognizethemoralstatusofherown behaviourandjudgeheractionassomethingsheshouldorshouldnot havedone.
Ialsoaddressarivalfromtheotherendofthespectrum,the ‘Searchlight’ theorist,touseGeorgeSher’sterm(2009),whoarguesthattheonly waytobeblameworthyistohavefullawarenessofthewrongnessof one ’saction,eitheratthetimeofactionoratsomeearliertimefrom whichthecurrentactionwaspredictable. ⁹ Iarguethatthistakesthe reflexivityrequirement too seriously.Onthebestunderstandingof thereflexivityrequirement,agentscanbeblameworthyjustsolongas itmakessensetosaythatthey shouldhaveknown whattheyweredoing atthetime.AllthisrequiresisagoodgraspofMoralityingeneral.
InChapter5Idiscussthenatureofpraiseandblame.Iarguethat myaccountofordinarypraise-andblameworthinessmesheswithan accountofpraiseandblameasessentiallycommunicative.Iargue,using MichaelMcKenna’sphrase(2012),thatweshouldseepraiseandblame (thoughnotnecessarilythewholeresponsibilitysystem)asbeingpartof aconversation.Agentswhoarepraise-orblameworthyintheordinary wayhavetherightbackgroundknowledgeandbackgroundaimto engageinameaningfulconversationabouttheirbehaviour.Blame isaresponsetoacertainsortoffault,andcaninvolveademandfor acceptanceoftheblame,apology,remorse,reparation,andsoon.The blameewhoengagesintheconversationshouldaccepttheblame,andbe willingtomovethroughthevariousstepsoftheconversation,toapologize,tomakereparations,andeventually,insomebutnotallcases,toask forandacceptforgiveness.Praiseis,perhapssurprisingly,roughlysymmetrical.Topraisesomeoneistoopenasortofconversationwiththem,
⁹ ThissortofviewisdefendedbyLevy(2013andelsewhere),Rosen(2002andelsewhere),andZimmerman(1997andelsewhere).
andtomakecertaindemands:chie flythedemandthatthepraisebe accepted.Whatmakestheseexchangespossibleisthesharedmoral community,thesharedvaluesystem.
Thisleadstoadiscussionofanothersortofpraiseandblame,which Icall ‘detachedpraiseandblame’.Thesearereactiveattitudesthatwe taketothosewhoactwrongly,butwithoutactingsubjectivelywrongly. Detachedblameisnotcommunicative.ItisclosertowhatStrawsoncalls the ‘objectiveattitude’.Itdoesnotdemandananswer,itisanassessment oftheagent’sbehaviourmorethanademandthatshebehavebetter.Yet itisgenuineblame,itisanemotionalreactiontotheagentthatgoes beyondamerejudgmentofblameworthiness.Disdainandcontemptare goodexamplesofreactionsthatareofteninvolvedindetachedblame. Furthermore,drawingonScanlon ’saccountofblame(2008),Iarguethat detachedblamemayinvolveamodificationoftherelationship:the blamersees,notsomuchthatsomethinghasbeendamagedinher relationship,butrather,thatsomethingthatshemighthavehopedwas possibleisnotinfactpossible.Theblameedoesnothavetheattitudes thatqualifyherforproperinterpersonalengagement.
Aswithordinaryblameandordinarypraise,detachedblameand detachedpraisearesymmetrical.Wemightseethatsomeonehasvery goodattitudes,orisdeeplymotivatedtowardsgoodthings,butifthat personlacksagraspofMorality;iftheylackanawarenessoftherightmakingfeaturesoftheiractions qua right-makingfeatures,thenwe cannotpraisethemintheordinaryway.However,wecanthinkwellof them,wecanapproveofthem,wecanadmirethem:we findthemtobe praiseworthyinthedetachedway.
InChapter6Iarguethatthesortsoffactorthatcountasexcusing differbetweenthetwosortsofblameworthiness.Inthecaseofordinary blameworthiness,theusualsortofexcuseisasimpleexcuse:something thatshowsthattheagentwasnotactingsubjectivelywronglyafterall. Theremayalsobepartialexcusesandmitigatingcircumstances,but, Iargue,intheendtheyarealsowaysofshowingthattheagentwasnot actingassubjectivelywronglyasit firstappeared.Inthecaseofdetached blameworthiness,variousfactorsthatexplain why theagenthasabad willcanalsofunctionasanexcuse.Thus,badupbringing,badsocialor epistemicenvironment,andsoon,canbeexcuses,inthesensethatthey shouldundermineourdetachedblameresponses.Wecometoseethe agentaslessofanagentwhenwereflectonthefactsthatexplaintheir
badwill,andretreattoanevenmoreobjectivestancethanthatimplied indetachedblaming.
Ihavestillnotcoveredalloftheterrainofwrongdoingandblameworthiness.Therearemixedcases,caseswhereanagenthastriedvery hard,butstilldoesbadly.Someties,ofcourse,theexplanationfordoing badlyconstitutesanexcuse.Ifanagentispushed,orisnon-culpably ignorant,hereffortsmaynotresultinsuccess,butitisclearthatsheis notblameworthy.Othercasesarenotsoclear.Anagentmayhavemixed motives:imagineanagenttriesveryhardtodowell,andtheexplanation forherfailureisthatherowndeepmotivationsareverypoor.For example,anagentmaytryveryhardtobecalmandpolite,buther deeplymisanthropiccharacterandviletempergetthebetterofher:she saysmeanthingsinanexplosionofrage.
Inmixedcaseslikethat,wecansaythattheappropriatestancetotake iscomplex.Anagentcanbeinourmoralcommunity,andyethavea charactertrait,ortendency,thatisnotproperlyunderheragential control.Iarguethatthatdoesn’tmeanthatshehasanexcuse,thetrait isstillpartofheragency,andthusweareboundtohavesomesortof blamingreaction.Itisappropriatetothinktheagentpraiseworthyinthe ordinarywayfortryinghard,andeventopraiseher,butalsotothink thatalocaldetachedblameworthinessapplies.Thismakessenseofthe realcomplexityinourreactions:wewouldnaturallydisdainsuchagents fortheirbadtraits,andmodifyourrelationshipsaccordingly,whilestill acknowledgingthattheyarepraiseworthyintheordinarywayfortrying hardtodowellbytherightvalues.
Thispictureofthetwosortsofblametakesveryseriouslytheideathat moralcommunityisanessentialnotioninunderstandingblame.Like Strawson,Ithinkthatrelationships,bothourfairlyimpersonalrelationshipwithothersinourmoralcommunityandourpersonalrelationships, areessentialtounderstandinghowresponsibilityattributionsand blameworthinesswork.Ifsomeoneisnotinourmoralcommunity,the wayinwhichweblamethemchanges,andrightlyso.Wecannotexpecta responsefromsomeonewhoisoutsideourmoralcommunity.
InChapter7Idiscussexemptionsfromordinaryblameworthiness, andconsiderwhatexactlydeterminestheboundariesoftherealmof detachedblame.InChapter4Iarguedthatmoralknowledgeisessential toordinaryblameworthiness.HereIfocusonarguingthatdeepmoral ignoranceissuf ficientforbeingoutsideourmoralcommunity,andin
therealmofdetachedblame.SomeonelikeSusanWolf ’sJoJo(1987) maynotlackanygeneralcapacities,orevenanygeneralmoralcapacities, butifheisdeeplymorallyignorant,heisnotinourmoralcommunity, andcommunicativeblamewouldbeinfelicitous.
Ialsoaddresscaseswheretheagentseemstohavemoralknowledge, butlacksacapacitytoactwell.IuseWolf ’sasymmetrythesisasa counterpoint,toarguethatincapacitydoesnotundermineeitherpraiseorblameworthiness.Solongastheagentisnotactinginacompulsiveor pathologicalway(inwhichcasetheywouldnotberesponsibleatallfor theact),anincapacitytoactwell,justlikeanincapacitytoactbadly,is consistentwithbeingresponsibleandpraise-orblameworthy.George Washingtonissaidtohavebeenunabletotellalie.Iarguethatsolongas hefullyunderstoodthatlyingwaswrong,thatfactthathehadnooption buttotellthetruthdoesnotunderminehispraiseworthiness.Similarly, solongassomeoneunderstandsMorality,andtheyareactingontheir ownvolitions,theycanbeblameworthy,evenifinasenseparallelto Washington’sincapacity,theyareincapableofactingwell.
Finally,Iconsiderwhatwemightmeanwetalkaboutpsychopaths, andIarguethatonewaytounderstandpsychopathologyisintermsofa lackofmoralunderstanding,whichwouldrenderpsychopathsoutside ourmoralcommunity,andthusexemptfromordinaryblame.Itis conceivablethattherearepeoplewhounderstandwhichthingsare rightandwrongwithoutunderstandingthewayinwhichMoralityis reasongiving.Iftherearepeoplelikethat,theyaremorallyignorant.
InChapter8Iargueforathirdsortofblameworthiness, ‘extended blameworthiness’.Sometimesanagentseemsblameworthyeventhough shehasnotmanifestedbadwillatall.ToborrowanexamplefromRandolph Clarke(2014,165),imaginethatIhavepromisedmyspousethatIwillget milkonthewayhome.ImaginethatthereisnothingthatIhavefailedtodo thatIshouldhavedoneinordertoremember.Thus,itseemsthatIamnot blameworthyfortheignorance.However,italsoseemsplausibletoClarke, andtome,thatIamblameworthyfortherebeingnomilk.
Onemightsimplydenythis.Butitseemstomany,includingmyself, thattheremustbeawayofmakingsenseofsomesortofblameworthinesshere.However,neitherordinaryblamenordetachedblameseems appropriate.Iarguethatinthissortofcase,agentsshould take responsibility.Thisisnotsimplyliability(whichobviouslyistakenonor imposedinnegligencetypecases).Itismorethanthat,itisareal
blameworthiness,alicencefortheoffendedpartytofeelsomething approachingresentment,andfortheoffenderherselftofeelremorse.
Igiveanaccountoftheappropriatereactionsoftheoffenderhere,and suggestthatweshouldrecognizethatthereareshadesofagentregret, andthatatoneend,whenanagentiswillingtotakeownershipofthe action,agentregretshadesintoremorse.Theamountofblamethatis appropriatedoesnotalwayscorrespondwiththeamountofremorse thatisappropriate,andoneimportantfeatureofextendedblameworthinessisthatthesortofblameconversationthatisappropriatehasdifferent normstothesortthatisappropriatewhentheagenthasaclearlybadwill.
Iarguethatwhatlicensesablameconversationatallaretherequirementsofourpersonalrelationships.Sometimes,whenanagentfailsto meetstandardsthatapplytoher,andherownagentialinvolvementis ambiguous,herrelationshipsrequirethatshetakeresponsibility,that sheacceptextendedblameworthiness.Relationshipsrequireadegreeof emotionalinvestment,notjustindoingtherelevantduties,butinthe attitudessurroundingthem.Iarguethathavingadispositiontofeel remorseforinadvertentfaultcanbeanimportantsignofinvestment.It isnotalwaysnecessary,anditisusuallynotnecessaryatallinimpersonalrelationships.
Whenitisnecessary,itdoesnotlicensethefullblamepartofthe conversation.Rather,extendedblameworthinesscorrelateswithatruncatedblameconversation,wheretheblamershouldusuallybesatisfied withapologyandremorsefromtheblameeastheendoftheconversation. Atthatpoint,theblamercanletgo thepersonatfaulthasshownthat sheisinvestedintherelationship,thatshecaresmoreaboutthewrongdoingthanaboutbeingastickleraboutthelimitsofherownagency.
Theunderlyingrationaleforextendedblameworthinessisnodifferent totherationaleforanyotherkindofblameworthiness.Ourresponsibilitypracticehasafunction,theverysamefunctionasourmorality practice,ofcourse,ofregulatingandrationalizingourrelationships. Thisiswhytherearesuchdifferentwaysofblamingthosewhoarein ourmoralcommunityandthosewhoareoutsideit.Thisishowwecan makesenseofresponsibilityevenwithoutbadwill.Andthisiswhywe caresomuchabouttheconditionsofrightnessandwrongness,andof praiseandblame.
