VirtuesofGreatness intheArabicTradition
SOPHIAVASALOU
3
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1.GreatnessofSoul:TheReceptionofanAncientVirtue13 AncientApproaches:OneVirtue,ManyConfigurations13 ArabicApproaches:DefiningaVirtue 18
2.GreatnessofSpirit:TheTransfigurationofHeroicVirtue65 PhilosophicalHandbooks:AspiringtotheGreatestThings65 MirrorsforPrinces:AVirtueFitfortheGreat 84
Acknowledgements
Thisbookbeganlifeinlate2015,afewmonthsbeforeIjoinedtheUniversity ofBirminghamasaBirminghamFellowinphilosophicaltheology.Fromthe start,itwasconnectedtoabroadercollaborativeprojectexploringthe historyofphilosophicalandtheologicalapproachestothevirtueofmagnanimity.ThefruitsofthisprojectwillappearwithOxfordUniversityPressin thecomingyearasaneditedvolumeunderthetitle TheMeasureof Greatness:PhilosophersonMagnanimity.Iamgratefultoanumberof organizationswhose financialsupportmadeitpossibletoorganizeaconferenceonthattopic,whichprovidedpartofthecontextinwhichmy thinkinginthisbookdeveloped.TheyincludetheBritishAcademy,the MindAssociation,andtheBritishSocietyfortheHistoryofPhilosophy. Ibenefitedgreatlyfromthequestionsandcommentsofparticipantsinthat conference,especiallyJohnMarenbon’s,andalsofromthefeedback IreceivedfromaudiencesinanumberofothertalksIgaveonthetopic overthelastcoupleofyears,includingattheconferenceoftheBritish AssociationforIslamicStudiesattheUniversityofChester,theannual conferenceoftheJubileeCentreforCharacterandVirtuesinOxford,the MunichSchoolofAncientPhilosophy,theSchoolofOrientalandAfrican StudiesinLondon,andNewYorkUniversityAbuDhabi.Finally,Iowe specialthankstothetworeadersforthePressfortheircarefulreadingofthe manuscript.
Part1ofthebookincludesmaterialpreviouslypublishedinthe Journalof ReligiousEthics (Volume45,Issue4)underthetitle ‘AnAncientVirtueand ItsHeirs:TheReceptionofGreatnessofSoulintheArabicTradition’ , pp.688–731,Copyright©2017JournalofReligiousEthics,Inc.,doi: 0.1111/jore.12197.ThePostludeincludesmaterialpreviouslypublishedin Dialogue:CanadianPhilosophicalReview (Volume56,Issue2)underthe title ‘GreatnessofSpirit:ANewVirtueforOurTaxonomies?’,pp.291–316, Copyright©2017CanadianPhilosophicalAssociation,publishedbyCambridgeUniversityPress,doi:10.1017/S0012217317000324.Iamgratefulto thepublishersofbothjournalsforallowingthematerialtobereproduced hereinrevisedform.
Introduction
Whenwesurveytherichterrainofancientethicsandthedifferentvisionsof thebesthumancharacterthat flourishedwithinit,thereisoneelement onevirtuewithinthesevisions thatstandsoutasparticularlydistinctive. Thisisavirtueusuallytranslatedas ‘magnanimity’ or ‘greatnessofsoul’.For philosophicalreaders,itsmostfamiliarexpressionistheoneitreceivedatthe handsofAristotleinthe NicomacheanEthics.Inanevocativeportrait,Aristotle hadenshrinedthegreat-souledpersonor megalopsychos asanimageofthe highestethicalaccomplishment.Onemightcallitanimageofgreatness,asits verynamesuggests.Greatnessofsoulwasthevirtueofapersonwhopossessed allthevirtuestoagreatdegree,andwhoseself-knowledgewasreflectedinan awarenessofthe ‘greatthings’ hewasworthyof,aboveallhonour.Looking back,onecanalreadyseethisvirtueoccupyinganimportantplaceamong earlierwriters,includingPlato,whoidentifieditasthephilosophicalvirtuepar excellenceinthe Republic. Undershiftingnames,underdifferentconfigurations,thevirtuewouldalsofeatureprominentlyintheethicaloutlooksofa numberofotherancientthinkersandschools,notablytheStoics.Inlatertimes, itwouldcontinuelifeunderavarietyofguisesamongphilosophicaland theologicalthinkers,fromAquinastoDescartes,andfromHumetoEmerson. Refractedinthevirtue itscontentshiftingwiththem werelargerconceptionsofthegoodlifeandthenatureofhumangreatness.
Someofthestagesofthislonghistoryaremorefamiliartousthanothers. ThesharpestspotlighthasoftenfallenonAristotle’saccount,whichhas fascinatedreadersalmostasmuchasithasdividedthem,andstillattracts freshreadingsandrenegotiations.Inrecenttimes,therehasbeenincreasing attentiontootherepisodesofitsdevelopment,bothwithintheancientworld andinlaterperiods,enrichingourperspectiveontheidentityofthevirtue andfurnishinguswithnewmaterialforchroniclingthelifeitledoverthe courseofintellectualhistory.¹Yettosomeoneconsideringthisbroader
¹Seeespeciallytheforthcomingcollectionofessays, TheMeasureofGreatness:Philosophers onMagnanimity,ed.S.Vasalou(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,inpress).
scene,whatwillbestrikingisthatmostofwhatweknowaboutthevirtue tendstobefocusedontheEuropeancontext.Amongthemanylivesthis virtuehasledinphilosophicalandtheologicalhistory,oneinparticular remainsconspicuouslyunwritten.ThisisthelifeitledintheIslamicworld andtheArabictradition.
Thismaynotbeentirelysurprising,givenhowmanyswathesofthe vibrantintellectualhistoryoftheIslamicworldstillremainplungedin darkness.Yetthereismuchtosuggestthatsuchaninvestigationwouldbe worthwhile.Thiswasaworld,asweknow,thatopeneditsdoorswidetothe ancientphilosophicallegacyearlyinitshistory,throughalarge-scaletranslationmovementthatsawanextraordinaryarrayofGreekphilosophical andscienti fictextstranslatedintoArabicbetweentheeighthandtenth centuries.TheresponsethislegacyprovokedamongMuslimintellectuals wascomposite.Oftenamicableandappreciative asIbnQutayba(d.889), oneofthefoundersofArabicletters,putit, ‘knowledgeistheobjectofthe believer,anditprofitshimwhateverthesourcefromwhichitmaybe drawn ’—theirengagementwiththislegacywasalsomarkedbymoments oftensionandhighconflict.²Itistheconflictthathasfrequentlyshaped prevailingviewsoftheplaceofphilosophyintheIslamicworld.Inthepast, suchviewshaveralliedaroundthespectacularcareeroftheeleventh-century theologianAbū _ Hāmidal-Ghazālī (d.1111),andthetruculentcampaignhe appearstohavewagedagainstthephilosophers,notablyinhiscelebrated work ThePrecipitanceofthePhilosophers.³Thispicturehasbeguntoloosen itsscholarlygrip,andachangingviewofal-Ghazālī’sownrelationshipto philosophyhasbeenamongthemanytributariestoitsreversal.Inrecent times,severalreadershaveredirectedattentiontoal-Ghaz ālī’sindebtedness toandcontinuedappreciationofthephilosophicaltradition. ⁴
²SeeIbnQutayba, SpringsofInformation/ ʿUyūnal-akhbār (Cairo:Ma_ tbaʿatDāral-Kutub al-Misriyya,1996),introduction,p. sīn. IbnQutaybahimselfhadanambivalentrelationshipto thephilosophicaltraditionanditsrationalisticmethods.
³Or IncoherenceofthePhilosophers,asitisoftenknown.SeeAlexanderTreiger, Inspired KnowledgeinIslamicThought:Al-Ghazālī’sTheoryofMysticalCognitionanditsAvicennian Foundation (LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2012),foradefenceofthisalternativetranslation(App.B)andalso,morebroadly,foranaccountthatcontributestotherereadingof al-Ghazālī’srelationshiptophilosophy.
⁴ AkeystimulusforsuchrereadingswasRichardFrank’sseminalaccountofal-Ghazālī’ s cosmologyin CreationandtheCosmicSystem:al-GhazâlîandAvicenna (Heidelberg:Carl Winter,1992),butsincethattimetheyhavegatheredapace.Forusefulpointerstothis scholarship,seeKennethGarden, TheFirstIslamicReviver:Abū _ H āmidal-Ghazālī andHis RevivaloftheReligiousSciences(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2014),5–7.
Manyofthewritingsandrewritingsofthestatusofphilosophyinthe Islamicworldhavefocused,unsurprisingly,onissuesofmetaphysics.These weretheissuesthatapparentlychannelledal-Ghazālī’sowndiscomfortin ThePrecipitance. Whataboutethics?Ifwewereinterestedinbuildinga moreinclusivepictureaboutthestatusofphilosophyandcalibratingmore finelythebalanceofamityandconflictthatcharacterizedMuslimthinkers ’ transactionswithit,itisclearthatthiscouldnotbeachievedwithouttaking intoaccountthesethinkers’ engagementwiththeethicalelementsofthe ancienttradition.Ethicshassometimesseemedanunpromisingsubjectto commentatorsaddressingthehistoryofphilosophyintheIslamicworld. ‘Falsafa’,asPeterAdamsonmatter-of-factlynotesinaconspectusofthe Arabictradition, ‘isnotparticularlyknownforitscontributionstoethics.’⁵ TheintellectualgiantsofArabicphilosophy,suchasAvicenna(d.1037)and Averroes(d.1198),devotedtheirimmenseenergiestootherareasofphilosophicalinquiryandmostlyturnedacoldshouldertoethicaltopics.Those worksofphilosophicalethicsthat were writtensometimesseemtolackthe intellectualélanthatgivessparkletoworksinotherareas.Evenamong writerswithovertreligiouscommitments,conflictdoesnotseemtobeinthe airtomakeitcrackle.Inhisfamousautobiographywherehediscusseshis relationshiptophilosophy,notably,al-Ghazālī treatsethicswithcomparativelyvelvetgloves.Yetisitpossiblethatbylookingcloser andbyposing morespecifickindsofquestions wemightgetadifferentview?
TheselargerperspectivesandquestionsabouttheplaceofancientphilosophyintheIslamicworldlieinthebackdropofthepresentbook,which beganlifeasanattempttoanswerasimplequestion.Amongthemany ethicalideasthatthinkersintheIslamicworldconfrontedintheGreektexts thatreachedthemintranslation,howdidtheyrespondtothisone tothe virtueofmagnanimityorgreatnessofsoul?Thisisavirtuethatoccupieda specialplaceintheancienttradition,embodyingaconceptionnotonlyof goodness,butindeedgreatness.Nolessimportant,thiswasaconception thathasoftenbeenviewedasunusuallyexpressiveofthedistinctivesocioculturalmilieuinwhichitwasarticulated.HowdidMuslimthinkersmake senseofthisdistinctivevirtue?Whatstorycouldonetellaboutthereception ofthispartoftheancientethicaltraditionintheIslamicworld?
Totheextentthatthebackdropsketchedoutabove regardingtheplace ofphilosophyintheIslamicworld wasshapedbyquestionsaboutconflict,
⁵ PeterAdamson, ‘TheArabictradition’ , TheRoutledgeCompaniontoEthics,ed.John Skorupski(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2010),63.
suchastorywouldseemcalculatedtoengageitespeciallystrongly.For conflicthasinfactbeenasalientthemeinthetrajectorythisvirtuehas tracedacrossphilosophicalandtheologicalhistory.Thisconflicthasbeen palpableamongrecentphilosophers,evenamongvotariesofAristotle’ s ethics,whohavetakenturnsdecryinghisdepictionofgreatnessofsoulfor alitanyofmoralevils.Thefocusofsuchcriticismshasoftenbeenthe flawed modeofself-evaluationanddeficienthumilityexhibitedbyAristotle’ s exemplar.Yetthisconflicthasalsobeenpalpableinthereactionsofearlier eras,notleastwithintheologicalcircles,assuggestedbythehistoryofthe Christianengagementwiththeancienttradition.Thetensionbetween greatnessofsoulormagnanimityandhumility,asJenniferHerdtremarks, ‘isoftenseenascapturingthebasictensionbetweenpaganandChristian conceptionsofvirtue’ . ⁶ Thishistoryofstrainedresponsespresentsitselfas animportantfoilforconsideringtheArabicreception.
Yetifthepresentbookbeganasanattempttoanswerthissimple question,itsplot andthequestionsthatorientedit wasgraduallyforced towidenduringitsprogress.Ontheonehand,itwassoonclearthatthe storyaboutthereceptionofthisancientvirtueintheIslamicworldwasnot quitewhatonewouldexpectcomingfromthecontextsjustoutlined.This, infact,turnedouttobeastoryinwhichthethemeofconflicthadamore complexplace.Itwasastorythatwasasmuchaboutactsasitwasabout omissions,andasmuchaboutwhatwassaidasaboutwhatwasn’t(andwhy). Yetevenmoreimportantlyfortheoverallplot,thiswasastoryinwhichthe identityofthesubject,asinmanygoodstories,underwenttransformation inthetelling.Becauseoneofitssurpriseswasthattherearenolessthan two distinctArabicconceptsthatcanbeidentifiedascounterpartsor interlocutors toputitasbroadlyaspossible oftheancientvirtueof greatnessthatwas megalopsychia.Thesewereconceptswhosegenealogies andtrajectoriesconvergedbutalsodivergedincrucialrespects,andwhose contentinvolvedanequallydelicatepatternofconvergencesanddivergences thatmarkedthemoffasseparateyetconsanguineous.
Thefocusofoneoftheseconcepts kibaral-nafs,or ‘greatnessofsoul’— wasontherightattitudetotheselfanditsmerits,andboreastrongaffinity toAristotle’ sconfigurationofthevirtue.Thefocusofthesecond ʿi _ zam
⁶ JenniferHerdt, PuttingonVirtue:TheLegacyoftheSplendidVices (Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,2008),40.Foranexemplaryexpressionofthisview,seeBertrandRussell, History ofWesternPhilosophy (LondonandNewYork:Routledge,2005),170.YetevenwithinChristian theologicalhistory,theexpressionofthisconflicthasnotalwaysbeenstraightforward.Seemy briefcommentsinchapter1below,andalsomyintroductionto TheMeasureofGreatness.
al-himma,whichItranslateas ‘greatnessofspirit’—wasonrightdesireor aspiration.Unlikethe firstconcept,whichultimatelyappearstohavefailed tostrikedeeprootsinArabic-Islamicethicalculture,thesecondspreadlike wildfirethroughanumberofgenresofethicalwritingandformedanimportantelementofthevisionsofcharacterexcellencearticulatedindifferentkinds ofethicalworks.Recountingthefullerstoryaboutbothconceptsmeant movingawayfromasimpleaccountofthereceptionofGreekthought,and towardamorecomplexnarrativeaboutabroaderfamilyofmoralconcepts andlargerregionofmoralthought.Onemightcallthisfamily ‘virtuesof greatness’ ⁷ Whilethebiographyofthisfamilyprovidesnewinsightintothe Arabicreceptionofancientethics,italsohasmuchtotellusaboutthesources andpatternofIslamicethicalthoughtmoreglobally.
Thecomplexityofthisbiographicalaccountisreflectedinthestructureof thepresentbook,whichunfoldsintwoparts.Letmebrieflysketchthemout. Part1focusesonthe firstvirtueofgreatness,whichisalsothevirtuethatcan bemoststraightforwardlyidentifiedasthe ‘heir’ oftheancientone.SurveyingtheethicalworksofsomeofthemostprominentMuslimthinkers influencedbyancientthought,notablyal-Fārābī (d.950/1),Miskawayh (d.1030),andal-Ghazālī,we findthatgreatnessofsoulindeedmakesan appearanceintheseworks.ItdoessoundertheArabicterm kibaral-nafs,a calqueoftheGreek megalopsychia.InMiskawayh’sandal-Ghazālī’sclassificationsofthevirtuesandvices,thisvirtueispredominantlydefinedin termsthatapproximatetoAristotle’saccount.Theoveralltreatmentthe virtuereceivesamongthesewritersappearsalltoocursory.Thismayseem surprisinginviewofitsrelativesignificancewithintheancienttradition.It mayalsoseemsurprisinginviewofwhatweknowaboutthechequered careerofthevirtueinotherphilosophicalandtheological(Christian)circles, particularlyinitsAristotelianversion,whoseconflictwithanidealof humilityhasoftencomeupforremark.DidthinkersintheArabictradition takeadifferentviewofthisideal adifferentviewofthe ‘ethicsofselfesteem ’ andtherightattitudetotheselfanditsmerits?
IinvestigatethisquestionbyofferingasubstantivereadingofMiskawayh’s,and,rathermoreconcertedly,al-Ghazālī’ s accountoftheethicsof esteem(honour)andself-esteem,drawingonamoreextensiverangeof
⁷ ThistermhasalsobeenusedrecentlybyDanielC.Russell,butinaratherdifferent connection,referringtoAristotle’svirtuesofmagnificenceandmagnanimity: ‘Aristotle’svirtues ofgreatness’,in VirtueandHappiness:EssaysinHonourofJuliaAnnas,ed.RachanaKamtekar (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012).
works.Therearedelicateinterpretiveissuestobenavigatedinpiecing togetheraconfidentaccountofal-Ghazālī’sethicalcommitmentsinthis context.Yetmyconclusionisthat,justlikephilosophicalandtheological criticsofAristotelianmagnanimity,al-Ghazālī privilegesthevirtueof humilityanddenigratesthestatusofhonourasagood.Thevirtueof magnanimitythatal-Ghazālī incorporatesinhistablesofthevirtuesthus appearstobeinprofoundconflictwithhisconsideredethicalviewpoint indeed,withwhathasaseriousclaimtobeingviewedasanidealcentralto Islamicreligiousmorality.Why,then,doesal-Ghazālī (likeMiskawayh)pass thisconflictoverinsilence,leavingittohisreaderstoreadbetweenitslines? Iendwithsomesuggestionsaboutwheretheanswertothispuzzlemightlie, andwhatitmayhavetotellusaboutthesethinkers’ engagementwith ancientphilosophymorebroadly.
The firstpartofthebookmayseemtoleadtoadisappointingdenouement.Thatlarger-than-lifevirtuewhichhadformedoneofthebrightest jewelsinthecrownforAristotleandotherancientthinkersentersthe Islamicworldonlytofadeaway;theforeigngraftnevertakes.Yetthis,as Part2ofthebookaimstoshow,isnottheendofthestoryofthe ‘virtuesof greatness’ intheArabictradition.Therewasanotherconceptbelonging tothesameregionofmoralthoughtthatledamore fl ourishingand full-bloodedlifewithinthistradition,namelygreatnessofspirit( ʿ i _ zam al-himma).Crucially,thisvirtueappearsnotonlyinphilosophicaltreatises, butalsoinanumberofothergenresofethicalwriting,includingmirrorsfor princesandworksofetiquetteorliterature(adab).Unlikethe firstconcept, whichthematizedtherightattitudetotheselfanditsmerits,thissecond conceptthematizesrightdesireoraspiration,andsomeofitschiefarchitects parseitmorespecificallyasafoundationalvirtueofaspirationtomoral virtue,orindeedmoralgreatness.
Ibeginbydocumentingitsdevelopmentinworksofaphilosophical character,focusingontheworksofthetenth-centuryChristianphilosopher andtheologianYahyā ibn ʿAdī (d.974)andtheeleventh-centuryreligious andliteraryscholaral-Rāghibal-I _ sfahānī.Ithenturntoplotitsdevelopment inmirrorsforprinces,drawingonanumberofprominentrepresentativesof thisgenre.Thereareimportantcontinuitiesbetweenthewaysthevirtueis articulatedacrossthesegenres,thoughalsosomenoteworthydiscontinuities. Therearelikewisesuggestivecomparisonstobedrawnwithapproachesto thevirtueofgreatnessofsoulfamiliartousfrombroaderphilosophical history.Takentogether,theseobservationsinviteaquestionaboutthe intellectualoriginsofthevirtue.Thisgenealogicalstoryturnsouttobea
marvellouslycomplexone.WhiletheinfluenceoftheGreektraditioncannot bewhollyexcluded,astrongerargumentcanbemadefortheinfluenceofthe Persianculturaltraditionand,moreintriguinglyandmoreconvincingly, theinfluenceofpre-IslamicArabculture. ‘Greatnessofspirit’ wasinfactone oftheepithetsappliedtotheArabheroofpre-Islamictimes.Thisheroicideal isreconfiguredintellingwaysafteritistransplantedintothesoiloftheIslamic faithandexposedtotheeffectsofotherintellectualtraditions.Againstthis landscape,onecanplaceonnewfootingthequestionabouttherelationshipof thevirtuesofgreatnesstoIslamicreligiousmorality.
QuestionsabouthowtheapproachestakenintheArabictraditionrelate todevelopmentsinbroaderphilosophicalhistoryformarunningthemein Parts1and2ofthebook.Inthebook’sconcludingPostlude,thisphilosophicalconcerntakesadifferent,andlesshistorical,form.Thevirtueofgreatness Iidentifiedasamoreprominentanddistinctiveelementoftheidealsof characterarticulatedintheArabictradition,greatnessofspirit,mayhave muchtotellusaboutthecontentoftheseideals,andabouttheintellectual processesthatshapedthem.Yetdoesthishistoricallessonexhausttheinterest thatcontemporaryreadersmighttakeinthisparticularideal?Isthereanythinginthisidealtoengagetheattentionofcontemporaryphilosophersof thevirtues?Inseekingtoanswerthesequestions,Iconsidertwodifferentways ofconstruingtheidentityofthisvirtue:oneasameta-virtue,anotherasa substantivevirtuethathasanaffinitywiththevirtueof ‘emulousness’ as theorizedinrecentphilosophicalworkonthevirtues.Itisthelatterconstrual thatenablesustopickoutthedistinctivecommitmentsthatconstitutethe virtue,aboveallitsemphasisonopen-endedmoralaspiration.Manyphilosophersofthevirtueswill findthesecommitmentscontentious.Ioutlinea numberofwaysinwhichthisvirtuecanbedefended.Yetthegreatestvalueof engagingwiththisidealofcharactermaylieintheveryspacefordebateit opensandinpersuadingusthatthisdebateisworthwhile.
Inframingtheprojectofthisbook,Ihavespokenofa ‘ family ’ of concepts,andofdifferentvirtuesthatcanbeviewedas ‘ counterparts ’ or ‘ interlocutors ’ oftheancientvirtueofgreatnessofsoul.Thequestionmay beraised:howexactlyissuchtalktobeunderstood,andhowmuchweight isitintendedtocarry?Putdifferently:whatkindofclaimofkinshipis beingmadehere,andisitsuf fi cientlyrobusttoensurethatthisisabook withacoherentsubject abookabouta single subject?Unlessthetwo ‘ separateyetconsanguineous ’ virtuesthatformthefocusofthisbookcan beseentobeunitedbyarobustrelation,whatsensedoesitmaketotreat themaspartofasinglestory?
Theseareinterestingquestions,andtheypointontolargerquestions aboutwhatitmeanstosaythatoneconceptis ‘like’ another,oran ‘instance ’ ofanother,orofalarger ‘family’ or ‘kind’.Whatisparticularlyworth bearinginmindisthatnotionslike ‘beingthesameconcept’ or ‘beingthe same kind ofconcept’ arenotfencedoffbycrystal-clearboundarieswhich wouldlendthemselvestocrystal-clearrepliestosuchquestions.Yetasinthe literalfoundationofthemetaphorof ‘families’ and ‘familyrelations’,this doesnotpreventusfrombeingabletointuitivelyrecognizeresemblances andpickoutpatternswhenfacedwithactualcases.
Thinkingaboutmanyofthestandardvirtues,wenaturallyassumethat wehaveasufficientgraspoftheirconceptualcontoursthattherewouldbe noinsuperabledifficultyinrecognizingthemeveninnewcontexts atthe limit,inothercultureswhosemorallanguageisunfamiliartousandwhose fabricofethicalthoughtwearenewlyconfrontedwith.Tobesure,thiskind ofcross-culturalidentificationisnotentirelyunproblematic,evenwhenwe thinkofstandardvirtuessuchascourageorcompassion. ‘Itisadifficult question,’ asDanielRussellpointsout,whether ‘thecourageofaQuakeris thesameasthecourageofaSamurai’ . ⁸ Yetfromamethodologicalviewpoint,theconfidencethatsuchcross-culturalidentificationofthevirtuesis possiblewouldseemtobeunderpinnedbyauniversalismthathasbeen tightlyboundupwithanethicsofcharacter,andthatinturnisweddedto thenaturalistictermsinwhichthisethicshasbeencommonlydeveloped. Thiskindofuniversalism,asMarthaNussbaumsuggestedinaninfluential essay,shapesAristotle’sapproachtothevirtues.Takenmostsimply,the virtuesandvicesrepresentbetterandworsewaysofhandlinguniversal spheresofexperiencewhichallhumanbeingsshareandwhichnecessarily confrontthemwiththechoiceofactinginonewayoranother. ⁹
Yetthispointwouldnowappeartoaddfreshimpetustothequestion raisedaboveabout ‘families’ and ‘kinds’.Becausethevirtueofmagnanimity orgreatnessofsoulhasoftenbeenfelttoconstituteaveryspecialcaseset againsttheothervirtuesthatfeatureinAristotle’sworkandthatofhis philosop hicalsuccessors virtueslikecourage,temperance,generosity,or justice.Ithasfrequentlybeendescribed,anddecried,asavirtuesteepedin thespeci ficitiesofitstime,encoding(inonephrasing) ‘anattitudetoone’ s
⁸ DanielRussell, PracticalIntelligenceandtheVirtues (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 2009),173.
⁹ SeeMarthaC.Nussbaum, ‘Non-relativevirtues:anAristotelianapproach’ , MidwestStudies inPhilosophy 13(1988),32–53.
ownworththatismoreGreekthanuniversal’.¹⁰ Itisthe flagrantexception totheapparentuniversalismofAristotle’sethics theTrojanHorse,for some,thatbetraysitscontingentculturalroots,servinguptheimageofthe Atheniangentlemaninoneview(AlasdairMacIntyre)andtherepugnant relicsoftheHomericheroinanother.¹¹Facedwithavirtueofsuchthick culturalidentity,whatchancedoesthenotionofabroader ‘kind’ or ‘family’— afamilyofwhichthisvirtuewouldbeonlyonememberamongothers,and towhichvirtuesarticulatedinotherethicalculturesmightbediscoveredto belong haveofgettingofftheground?
Fromthisperspective,itwouldseemthatonecouldonlyintelligiblyspeak of this virtueasitlivedandbreathedin this particularculturalandtextual tradition.Thiswouldhavecrucialimplicationsforthewayweunderstand ourabilitytoidentifytheconcept,yieldinganemphasisongeneticdescent inwhichthemetaphorof ‘familyrelations’ wouldcometoitsnarrowest fruition.Ourabilitytorecognizethatagivenconceptfoundamongparticularthinkersrepresentsthesameconceptastheoneatworkintheancient traditionwoulddependonourabilitytorecognizethesethinkersasheirs andparticipantsofthistradition.Isn’tthisgeneticcontinuity,itmightbe said,foundationaltoourabilitytoidentifyAquinas’ notionof magnanimitas,Descartes’ s générosité,orHume’ s ‘greatnessofmind’ asinstancesofthe verysameconcept?Ontheseterms,astoryaboutthelifethatthevirtueof greatnessofsoulledintheIslamicworldcouldonlymakesenseasastory aboutthereceptionoftheGreektextualtradition.
Yet,ontheonehand,itisimportanttoobservethat,evenwithinthat philosophicaltraditionwhichisconnectedbyavisiblebackboneofgenetic descent,thisvirtuehadafarfromunifiedidentity.Itwasavirtue,forone, whoseconceptualtraitschangedovertime.Aquinas’ magnanimity,totake themostobviousexample,isinsomewaysadramaticrevisionofAristotle ’ s, makingway,amongotherthings,fortheelementofhumilitythatthelatter hasbeenaccusedofdisregarding.Evenwithintheancientcontext,different thinkersapproacheditinavarietyofways.IfAristotle,forexample, articulateditasavirtueofself-evaluationconcernedwithhonour,prominentStoicthinkersarticulateditasavirtuecodifyingtheattitudeofindifferencetoexternalgoodsthatepitomizedtheirmoralapproach.Weshouldnot
¹⁰ Ibid.,38;cf.34,referencingtheremarksofBernardWilliamsandStuartHampshire.
¹¹ForMacIntyre’sview,see AfterVirtue,3rdedn(London:Duckworth,2007),182,and A ShortHistoryofEthics (LondonandNewYork:Routledge,1998),75–7;forthesecondpoint, whichisinfactcloselylinkedtoMacIntyre’s,seeNancySherman, ‘Commonsenseand uncommonvirtue’ , MidwestStudiesinPhilosophy 13(1988),102–3.
thusoverlookthepluralityofwaysinwhichthisconceptwasarticulated intheancientcontext,orindeedthepluralityoftermsthroughwhichit wasexpressed(Plato ’ s megaloprepeia ,Aristotle ’ s megalopsychia ,Longinus ’ megalophrosyne,Cicero’ s magnitudoanimi).Ifinfactwelookfarback enoughtotakeintheHomericrootsoftheconcept asAristotlehimself invitesustodointhe PosteriorAnalytics oursenseoftheconceptualand linguisticboundariesoftheconceptwillbeloosenedstillfurther.¹²
Thisisnottodenythatmanyofthesearticulationshadimportant conceptualingredientsincommon.AsArthurLovejoynotedinadifferent context,intellectualinnovationisoftenlessamatteroftheemergenceof entirelynovelelementsthanofanewpatterningorrearrangementof existingones.¹³Manyoftheancientconfigurationsofgreatnessofsoul canbeseenasdifferentwaysofpatterningorbalancingalimitednumber ofexistingelements.Thesenotablyincludeanattitudetoself-worth,andan attitudetoexternalgoods,includinghonour.Thewaysuchelementswere patternedbyparticularphilosophers ahighsenseofself-worthasan individual ora humanbeing? attachment tohonouror indifference? reflectslargervariancesinethicaloutlook.Yetthedifferencesaresuf ficiently realtosuggestthatthenotionofa ‘family’ ofconcepts afamilyconstituted byanintersectingpatternoflikenessesandunlikenessesexhibitedover time mayberequiredeveninapproachinganintellectualtradition sharingthesamebroadpathwayofgenealogicaldescent.¹⁴ Oncethisis granted,thepossibilityofopeningupthisfamilytovirtuesarticulated outsidethisculturaltraditionbeginstolooklessunimaginable.
Foranexampleofwhatsuchcross-culturalidentificationmightlooklike, onemightconsiderthecaseoftheIcelandicsagas.Inanessaywrittensome timeago,KristjánKristjánssonproposedthatitispossibletorecognize asubstantialaffinitybetweentheconceptofgreatnessofsoularticulated byAristotleandaconceptthatiscentraltothemoralcodepresentedinthe sagas,the mikilmenni variouslytranslatedas ‘greatmen’,the ‘great-hearted’ , or ‘great-minded’.LikeAristotle’sgreat-souledmen,the mikilmenni combine greatvirtuewithastrongsenseofself-esteemandawarenessoftheirmerits.
¹²InHomer,acommonheroicepithetis megaletor.ForAristotle’sremarks,see Posterior Analytics II.13.97b15–25.
¹³ArthurO.Lovejoy, TheGreatChainofBeing (Cambridge,MA;London:HarvardUniversityPress,1964),3–4.
¹⁴ ChristopherGill’ssuggestionthattheStoicconceptionofmagnanimitymayhavedeveloped independently fromAristotle’saddsaninterestingtwisttothispoint.Seehis ‘Stoic magnanimity’,in TheMeasureofGreatness,ed.Vasalou.
Theyarelikewise flankedbytwoviciousextremes,the ‘small-minded’ andthe ‘overlyambitious’.Giventheheroicrootsandovertonesoftheancientvirtue, therearealsosuggestivecomparisonstobemadewithsagamorality,withits heroicaspect.¹⁵
Ifthisaccountiscorrect,herewehavetwovirtuetermswhichare connectedbysufficientsimilaritiesinconceptualcontentforustobeable toidentifythemascross-cultural ‘counterparts’.Thisisonepossiblemodel forhowsuchidentificationcouldhappen,thoughjusthowheavilywecan leanonthisparticularinstancewillultimatelydependonourapproachto complexquestionsabouttherelativeimportanceofindigenousandforeign elements(notablytheinfluenceofLatinliterature)inthesagas.¹⁶ Itisan interestingquestionhowmuchculturalluck(tocoinaterm)isrequiredfor felicitousisomorphismsofthissorttoemerge.Mightthiskindofvirtue concepthaveastrongprobabilityofemergingnaturallywithincertaintypes ofsocialstructuresorstagesofsocialdevelopment?Ifitdid,thiswouldhave significantimplicationsforthewaywethinkabouttherelationshipbetween whatisculturallycontingentanduniversalintheconcept.
Intheabsenceofobviousisomorphicterms,therewouldstillbeanother possibilityifourinterestlayincarryingoutacross-culturalethicalconversation.Wemightinsteadundertakeacomparisonnotatthelevelofthe virtueterm,butofwhatIearlierdescribedasitscoreelementsorstakes.In thecaseofourspecificvirtue,thismightmeaninvestigating,forexample, whetherinaparticularethicalculturesimilarstanceswereadoptedonstakes suchastheappropriateattitudetoself-worthortoexternalgoods,and whetherconcordancesinethicalstancescanbediscernedregardlessof whethertheseconcordanceswerecodifiedinasinglecorrespondingterm.
¹⁵ KristjánKristjánsson, ‘Liberatingmoraltraditions:sagamoralityandAristotle’ s megalopsychia’ , EthicalTheoryandMoralPractice 1(1998),397–422.
¹⁶ Thishasbeenthesubjectofsomedebate.AsMargaretCluniesRossnotes,thesimple earlierviewthat ‘nativetraditionstaughttheIcelanderswhattowrite,butforeignliterature taughtthemhowtowriteit’ hasgivenwayamongsagascholarstoamorenuancedunderstanding oftheinterplaybetweenindigenousandforeigntraditions: TheCambridgeIntroductiontotheOld Norse-IcelandicSaga (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010),48.SeeAnnetteLassen, ‘IndigenousandLatinliterature’ , TheRoutledgeResearchCompaniontotheMedievalIcelandic Sagas,ed.ÁrmannJakobssonandSverrirJakobsson(AbingdonandNewYork:Routledge,2017), forahelpfuloverviewthathighlightstheimportanceofLatinliteratureasabackgroundforthe sagaswhilealsounderscoringthechallengesofmappingthisrelationshipindetail.Theviewthat therearesignificantresemblancesbetweenAristotle’sethicsandsagamoralityandthattheseare nottobeexplainedgenetically reflecting,rather, ‘thespontaneouscombustionofthehuman spirit...givingoffidenticalheat,light,andpowerinplacesremotelyseparatedinspaceand time’—wasclearlyvoicedbyoneoftheearlierscholarstocommentontheaffinity.SeeSveinbjorn Johnson, ‘OldNorseandancientGreekideals’ , Ethics 49(1938),18–36,36quoted.
ThisisnotthetypeofprojectIhavepursuedhere.Myinvestigationin thisbookhasbeenstructuredaroundvirtueterms,ratherthanstakes, thoughafocusonstakesalsoformsabuildingblockofmydiscussion, notablyinPart1,whichconsidersal-Ghazālī’ssubstantiveattitudetothe stakesofesteemandself-esteemasacontextforhisengagementwiththe specificvirtueofgreatnessofsoul.Therearecertainlymanyinteresting comparativestorieswaitingtobetoldabouttheapproachestakenby Muslimthinkerstosomeoftheotherelementsthematizedbythisvirtue, andtothebroaderethicalthreadsthatenteredintoitsskein toquestions abouttheimportanceofexternalgoods,abouttheroleofluckinthegood life,orabouttherelationbetweendependenceandtheaspirationtoselfsufficiency.Theresultsofcertaincomparisonsseemmorepredictablethan others.Thenotionoffortuneorluck,forexample suchapotentelementin ancientphilosophers’ confrontationswiththefragilityofthehumangood couldhardlybeapproachedinthesamewaybythinkerssteepedinatheistic world-viewinwhichGod’sdetermininginfluenceonalleventsoccupieda pivotalplace.Theattitudetosuchevents,bythesametoken,couldnotbea proudavowalofindependencebutasenseofdependenceembracedasakey moralvalue.
Formypurposes,itwillbeenoughiftheabovehasopeneduptheconcept ofourfocalvirtuesuf ficientlytoenableustoentertainthepossibilityofa largerfamilyofconcepts afamilyofwhichgreatnessofsoul,asdeveloped intheancienttradition,mightnotformtheonlymember.ThattheArabic virtueofgreatnessofspirithasagoodclaimtobeincludedwithinthatlarger familyisamorespecificsuggestionwhichcanonlybeborneoutthroughthe detailedstorythatfollows,whichwillallowthepatternofaf finitiesand resemblancestostandout.TothistaskInowturn.
1 GreatnessofSoul
TheReceptionofanAncientVirtue
AmongthemanyethicalideasthatthinkersintheIslamicworldencounteredintheGreektextsthatreachedthemintranslation,howdidthey respondto andmakesenseof theidealofmagnanimityorgreatnessof soul?Avirtuecodifyingaconceptionnotonlyofgoodnessbutindeedof greatness,ithasoftenbeenregardedasoneofthemostdistinctiveelements ofancientethics.Initsbest-knownversion,Aristotle’s,ithasalsobeen regardedastheelementmostredolentofthesocialandculturalcontingenciesoftheworldinwhichittookshape.Whatstorycanonetellaboutthe receptionofthisaspectoftheancientethicaltraditionintheIslamicworld? Theaimoftheinvestigationthatfollows(Part1ofthebook)istoanswer thisquestion.
Beforewelaunchintothemainstory,weneedto firstsaysomething abouttheidentityoftheancientvirtueofgreatnessofsoul,andaboutthe textualsourcesthatgavethinkersintheIslamicworldaccesstoit.
AncientApproaches:OneVirtue,ManyConfigurations
Sowhatwasgreatnessofsoul,andhowdidancientphilosophersunderstand it?Formanyreaders,theprimaryreferencepointforansweringthis questionhasbeentheaccountofthevirtueofferedbyAristotleinthe NicomacheanEthics.Therearecertainlygoodreasonsforgivingthis accountacentralplaceinourengagementwiththevirtueandoureffort tomapitsmeaningandconceptualfrontiers.Yetinopeningthisdiscussion, itwillalsobeimportanttotakeawiderview,onethatsensitizesusasmuch totheopennessofthosefrontiersastotheirelementof fixity.Becausesince itsearliestphilosophicalbeginnings,greatnessofsoulisavirtuethathasnot enjoyedperfectunityorstabilitybuthasharbouredcompetingtendencies andprovokeddifferentarticulations,nolesswithintheancientcontextthan inlaterphilosophicalhistory.EvenAristotle’saccountinthe Nicomachean
Ethics hasfrequentlybeenreadasanattempttoadjudicatethedifferent meaningsthevirtuecarriedinhisowntime,ashehadoutlinedtheminan oft-citedpassageofhis PosteriorAnalytics .¹
Thedifferentpossibilitiesharbouredbythevirtuearealreadyvisiblefrom itsearliestphilosophicalappearances.Inthe Republic,Platonamesgreatness ofsoul(usingtheterm megaloprepeia)asoneofthechiefqualitiesstipulated inthephilosopher,andinthatcontextheforgesastronglinkbetweenthe virtueandthepursuitofintellectualactivity. ‘Willathinkerhigh-minded enoughtostudyalltimeandallbeingconsiderhumanlifetobesomething important?’ (486a;cf.487a).²Offeringhisownaccountonegenerationlater, Aristotleconspicuouslyavoidsthislink,implicitlytyinggreatnessofsoulto theperfectionofpracticalratherthanintellectualvirtue.Greatnessofsoul, asitemergesinthe NicomacheanEthics,maybecharacterizedasavirtueof self-knowledgeorself-evaluation.InAristotle’swell-thumbedformulation, itisaqualitythatbelongsto ‘thesortofpersonthatthinkshimself,andis, worthyofgreatthings’ (1123b1–2).³
Packedintothisremarkisanunderstandingofgreatnessofsoulasavirtue incorporatingarelationshipbetweenthreeterms:aperson’sactualworth,his judgementabouthisworth,and(hisjudgementabout)whathisworthentitles himto.Thebasisofthisperson’sworthishisvirtueorexcellence. ‘Thetruly great-souledmanmustbegood,’ Aristotlewrites,indeedsuperlativelyso: ‘greatnessinrespectofeachoftheexcellenceswouldseemtobelongtothe great-souledperson’ (1123b30).Thattowhichitentitleshimishonour,which isthegreatestofallexternalgoods,theoneweevenbestowuponthegods. Thegreat-souledmanisthepersonofgreatmoralcharacterwho,knowing hisgreatness,knowstherecognitionitentitleshimtoreceivefromothers. Greatnessofsoulisthusavirtueprincipallyconcernedwithhonour.
ThisthumbnailsketchofAristotle ’sviewisworthholdingonto.Yetfor theaccountthatfollows,itisalsoimportanttoattendtosomeofthenuances whichshapeitsspecificidentity,andwhichopenouttodifferentwaysof configuringthelatter.Thepassageofthe PosteriorAnalytics justreferredto
¹Fordiscussionofthispoint(andofAristotle’sviewofgreatnessofsoulmoregenerally)see NeilCooper, ‘Aristotle’scrowningvirtue’ , Apeiron 22(1989);MichaelPakaluk, ‘Themeaningof Aristotelianmagnanimity’ , OxfordStudiesinAncientPhilosophy,26(2004),269–70;andRoger Crisp, ‘Greatnessofsoul’,in TheBlackwellGuidetoAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics,ed.Richard Kraut(Oxford:Blackwell,2006),169–70.
²Irelyonthetranslationofthe Republic byG.M.A.Grube,rev.C.D.C.Reeve(Indianapolis:Hackett,1992).
³Idrawonthetranslationofthe NicomacheanEthics byChristopherRowewithcommentarybySarahBroadie(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),withoccasionalmodifications.
offersagoodhandleforthepurpose.There(II.13.97b15 –25)Aristotlehad identifiedtwokeysemanticstrandsofthevirtue—‘intoleranceofinsults’ , notablyexemplifiedbyAchilles,and ‘indifferencetofortune’,notablyexemplifiedbySocrates.Incraftinghisownpositiveaccountinthe Nicomachean Ethics,hehadpreservedthe firstmeaningbyconnectinggreatnessofsoulto honour,buthehadeffectedacriticalrevisionwhenitcametoframingthe strengthofattachmentthathonourshouldarouse.Thegreat-souledman shouldonlybe ‘moderatelypleased’ whenhereceivesthegreathonourhe merits;foritisafterallonlyhisdue,and ‘therecouldbenohonourworthy ofcompleteexcellence’ (1124a6 –8).Andwhilehisaccountfocusedon honour,hehadalsopreservedthesecondmeaningbytyinggreatnessof soultoasimilarstanceextendingbeyondhonourtoencompassallexternal goods,onethatcruciallymitigatedtheattitudeofSocraticindifferenceby thesameemphasisonmoderation.Thegreat-souledmanwillbe ‘moderatelydisposedinrelationtowealth,politicalpower,andanykindofgoodor badfortune’,andhewill ‘neitherbeover-pleasedatgoodfortunenoroverdistressedatbad’ (1124a13–16).Heissomeoneultimatelylittlegivento strongresponses,whetherofdismayoradmiration:hissenseofhisown greatnessispartlyexpressedinthesensethat ‘nothingisgreat’ (1125a3).
Thesemoveswouldbenegotiateddifferentlyatthehandsofotherthinkers andotherphilosophicalschools,resultingincompetingconfigurationsofthe virtue.ThedominantStoicapproachnotablyreflectedthemoretrenchant stancethesethinkersadoptedontheoverarchingquestionofthevalueof externalgoodsfortheethicallifeandtheroleofluckinthehumangood. Greatnessofsoulwouldthusbeinscribedamongthemasavirtueembodying thedistinctiveStoicidealofconfrontingvicissitudesoffortunewithequanimity, affirmingthehumanabilitytoleadalifeofvirtueinthefaceofsuchvicissitudes andtreatingexternalgoodswithacontemptthatrevivedSocrates’ more categoricalindifference.Ciceroprovidedakeyexpressionofthisviewinhis OnDuties whenhedescribedgreatnessofspiritaslyingin ‘disdainforthings external,intheconvictionthatamanshouldadmire,shouldchoose,should pursue,nothingexceptwhatishonourableandseemly,andshouldyieldtono man,nortoagitationofthespirit,nortofortune’ (Book1,66).⁴
⁴ IdrawonthetranslationbyM.T.GriffinandE.M.Atkins(Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,1991).ForfurtherdiscussionoftheStoicapproachtothevirtue,seealsoRené AntoineGauthier, Magnanimité:l’idéaldelagrandeurdanslaphilosophiepaїenneetdansla théologiechrétienne (Paris:J.Vrin,1951),pt1,ch.4;Gill, ‘Stoicmagnanimity’ .
Healsocontributedanotherimportantelementwhen fleshingouthis referencetothepursuitof ‘whatishonourable’ asanimperativeto ‘dodeeds whicharegreat,certainly,andaboveallbeneficial’.Indoingso,heforegroundedanaspectofthevirtuethathasseemedmoremutedinsomeofits configurations:itsconcernnotmerelywithpassivereceipt(ofhonour)or staticendurance(ofblowsoffate)butwithactiveaspiration(togreatand virtuousachievements,throughwhichhonourmaythenbedeserved).⁵ ‘Naturebroughtusforthmagnanimous,’ asSenecaputsitinoneofhis Epistles ,andjustasshe ‘implantedincertainanimalsaspiritofferocity,in otherscraft,inotherstimidity,soshehasgifteduswithanaspiringand loftyspirit,whichpromptsustoseekalifeofthegreatesthonour’ (Epistle 104,23).⁶ TheadmirationofvirtueexpressedinCicero’sremarkwas implicitlylinkedtoanoft-voicedadmirationdirectedtothehumansubject initsabilitytorealizesuchloftyvalues,onethatpreservedAristotle’ s emphasisonself-evaluationwhiledelicatelydeflectingitfromtheindividual person(thebearerofthisorthatactualizedcharacter)tothehumansubject initshighercapacitytoactualizecertainethicalandintellectualpossibilities.
‘Iamtoogreat,wasborntotoogreatadestiny’,Senecadeclareswith characteristichauteurinoneofhis Epistles, ‘tobemybody’sslave’ (Epistle 65,21);andagain: ‘Reflectthatnothingexceptthesoulisworthyofwonder; fortothesoul,ifitbegreat,naughtisgreat’ (Epistle8,5).⁷
Thisselectivesurveyalreadysuggeststhatgreatnessofsoulwasavirtue containinganumberofconceptualstrands,strandsthatcouldbenegotiated inwaysthatyieldeddivergentarticulations.Whileallowingforthedeep internalrelationsbetweenthesestrands,wemightheuristicallypickoutthe followingthree:oneincorporatinganattitudetotheself(ajudgementof self-worth),anotherincorporatinganattitudetoexternalgoods(honourbut alsogoodandbadluckmorebroadly),andarguablyathirdincorporatingan attitudeto(virtuous)activity.Itisthereachandsignificanceofthese strands,takentogether,thatisreflectedintheremarkmadebythegreat
⁵ Theelementofactivityseemsmuted,forexample,inAristotle,whopaintsaponderous pictureofthegreat-souledperson,describinghimas ‘slowtoact’ and ‘adoeroffewthings,but greatones’ (NE 1124b24–6).Yetthisinterpretationhasbeencontestedbyotherreaders,who highlightthegreat-souledman’squalityasabenefactortohiscommunity,therebyfoldingthe distancebetweenAristotle’saccountandCicero’s.See,forexample,RyanP.Hanley, ‘Aristotle onthegreatnessofgreatnessofsoul’ , HistoryofPoliticalThought,23(2002),1–20.
⁶ IdrawonthetranslationbyRichardM.Gummere AdLuciliumEpistolaeMorales,3vols (London:WilliamHeinemann;NewYork:G.P.Putnam’sSons,1918–25) withmodifications.
⁷ IdrawondifferenttranslationsofSeneca’ s Epistles here,respectivelybyRobinCampbell (London:Penguin,2004)andbyGummere.
FrenchscholarRenéAntoineGauthierthatgreatnessofsoulwasthe battlegroundonwhichnothinglessthan ‘therelationshipbetweenhuman beingsandtheworld’ wasdecided.⁸
InmovingtotheArabiccontext,thisschematicoverviewoftheplural elementsandidentitiesofthevirtueisworthkeepinginmind.Itisa schematization,torepeat,andfarfromanuancedaccountofthefull rangeofwaysinwhichthevirtuewasapproachedintheancientworld.It leavesoutofview,certainly,themoreeclecticmovesthatwouldbemadeby philosophersworkinginlaterHellenistictimes,inwhosethoughtdiverse intellectualinfluences Platonic,Peripatetic,andStoic wouldinterweave toformahostofintricatenewpatterns.Thispointisespeciallyrelevantin lightofthetextualsourcesthatcanbeidenti fiedashavingprovidedthechief meansofaccesstothevirtuewithintheIslamicworld.Fortheseinclude,on theonehand,someofthemajorworksofGreekethicsinwhichgreatnessof soulformedasignificantelement.Onthislistonewouldaboveallplacethe NicomacheanEthics,availableinArabictranslationfromaroundthesecond halfoftheninthcentury.Thesameapplies(thoughtoalesserextentgiven itsmorelimitedengagementwiththevirtue)toPlato’ s Republic,available notasanintegraltextbutintheformofshortquotations,excerpts,and abridgementsfromasimilartime.
Yetthesesourcesalsoincludeasmall flotillaoftextsofvaryinglength, manycharacterizedbyacomplicatedtextualhistoryandelusiveauthorship, whosephilosophicalidentitywastheproductofvariouskindsofintellectual syncretism.Oneoftheseisthe SummaAlexandrinorum ,anepitomeofthe NicomacheanEthics whoseprovenancehasbeenthesubjectofextensive speculation,withscholarsdebatingwhetheritshouldbeseenasatranslation fromtheGreekorasatextoriginallycomposedinArabic.Severalpartsof thiswork,includingsignificantlythediscussionofgreatnessofsoul,areonly preservedinLatin.OthernotabletextsinthiscategoryincludethepseudoAristotelian DeVirtutibusetvitiis,interestinglyextantintwoArabictranslations,andanadditional ‘seventhbook’ incorporatedintotheArabic versionofthe NicomacheanEthics,whichaccordingtooneconjecture mayderivefromalostcommentarybyPorphyry.Theyalsoincludea shorttreatiseonethicsbyacertain ‘Nicolaus’ whichwasfoundwiththe manuscriptoftheArabictranslationofthe NicomacheanEthics. ⁹ These
⁸ Gauthier, Magnanimité,303.
⁹ Forthistextualbackground,goodstartingpointsareDouglasM.Dunlop’sintroductionto TheArabicVersionofthe NicomacheanEthics,ed.AnnaA.AkasoyandAlexanderFidora
