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TheScopeofConsent TheScopeofConsent TOMDOUGHERTY GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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Acknowledgements Whenwritingthisbook,Ihavebeenfortunatetobenefitfrommanypeople. IamparticularlygratefultoJohannFrick,HughLazenby,HallieLiberto, andVictorTadros,fromwhomIhavelearnedanenormousamountabout theissuescoveredbythisbook.Someofmyintellectualdebtsareso importantthatIwouldliketohighlightthemattheoutset.Johannhas mademeappreciatehowmuchphilosophicalmileagecanbegotfromthe ideaofinterpersonaljustification.Hughhashelpedmerealizetheimportanceofaconsent-receiver’sepistemicaccesstothescopeofconsent.Hallie haspersuadedmethatconsentcanbegivenbydirectiveslikerequests,and IhavebeensignificantlyinfluencedbyVictor’schallengestotheviewthat uptakeisnotnecessaryforconsent.Inaddition,HallieandVictorcameup withcasesthatsteeredmetowardstheconclusionthatsomeonecanconsent toanactionwithoutintendingtopermitthisaction.Theseareonlysomeof thewaysthattheyhaveshapedmyviews,andIamalsogratefultoeachof themfortheirsupportandfriendshipovertheyears.
Ihavealsobenefitedagreatdealfromconversationswithmanyother philosophersandfromtheirfeedbackonmywork.Theresearchforthis bookhastakenmanyyears,andIhavenotdoneagreatjobofkeeping recordsofallofthepeoplewhohavehelpedmealongtheway.Hereisano doubtincompletelistofthepeoplewhomIwouldliketothankforconversationsandcomments:LarryAlexander,ScottAnderson,DavidArchard, RalfBader,ElizabethBarnes,ChristianBarry,RenéeJorgensenBolinger, DavidBoonin,AngelaBreitenbach,DanielleBromwich,EamonnCallan, KaramChadha,ClareChambers,SteveClarke,GarrettCullity,Robin Dembroff,LuaraFerracioli,KimFerzan,JohnFilling,HelenFrowe, EduardoGarcía-Ramirez,EleanorGordon-Smith,DanGreco,Alex Grzankowski,SimoneGubler,DanHalliday,SallyHaslanger,Richard Healey,SamHesni,RichardHolton,JoeHorton,AdamHosein,Zöe JohnsonKing,KarenJones,ShellyKagan,RachelKeith,JohnKleinig, QuillKukla,RaeLangton,SethLazar,JedLewinsohn,ChristianList,Neil Manson,JeffMcMahan,KrisMcDaniel,TristramMcPherson,Colin Marshall,JosephMillum,AndreasMuller,VéroniqueMunoz-Dardé, MarkMurphy,SerenaOlsaretti,MikeOtsuka,DavidOwens,TomParr,
HannaPickard,AlejandroPerez-Carballo,KetanRamakrishnan,AnniRäty, MassimoRenzo,StellaRhode,IanRumfitt,LukeRussell,BernhardSalow, PaoloSantorio,DebraSatz,PeterSchaber,LauraSchroeter,AdamSlavny, PaulinaSliwa,LucySmith,MichaelSmith,NicSouthwood,Gopal Sreenivasan,AaronThieme,JudyThomson,SuzanneUniacke,Beth Valentine,LauraValentini,MarkVanRoojen,DanielViehoff,Uri Viehoff,KennyWalden,TomWalker,AlanWertheimer,CarolineWest, PeterWesten,andQuinnWhite.Amongthepeoplewhowillnotgetthe publicrecognitionthattheydeserveforhelpingmeareanonymous reviewersforjournalsandforOxfordUniversityPress.Additionalthanks toAaronThiemeforsuperlativeproofreadingonatightscheduleandfor apparentlyinfinitepatiencewhencorrectingcommaabuse.
IhavealsobenefitedfromfeedbackfromaudiencesattheUniversityof Sydney,theAustralianNationalUniversity,theUniversityofMelbourne, UniversityofAdelaide,theUniversityofWesternAustralia,Victoria UniversityofWellington,CharlesSturtUniversityatCanberra,the UniversityofCanterbury,theUniversityofOtago,theAustralasian AssociationofPhilosophyConference,theUniversityofCambridge,the UniversityofOxford,thePPESeminaroftheRoyalInstituteofPhilosophy, BirkbeckUniversity,UniversityCollegeLondon,theUniversityofStirling, theUniversityofWarwick,Queen’sUniversityBelfast,theLondonSchool ofEconomics,theSocietyforAppliedPhilosophyConference,the UniversityofGlasgow,theUniversityofYork,theJointSessionofthe MindAssociationandtheAristotelianSociety,theUniversityof Birmingham,theUniversityofLeeds,UniversityofMünster,Universityof Zurich,AmericanPhilosophicalAssociation–PacificDivisionConference, thePhilosophy,Politics,andEconomicsSocietyMeeting,YaleUniversity, GeorgetownUniversity,theUniversityofColoradoatBoulder,the MassachusettsInstituteofTechnology,theUniversityofConnecticutat Storrs,theUniversityofMichigan,andtheUniversityofCaliforniaat Berkeley.
Whenwritingthisbook,IhavebeensupportedbyanEarlyCareer LeadershipFellowsAwardfromtheArtsandHumanitiesResearch Council(CouncilReference:AH/N009533/1),byaFacultyFellowshipat theMurphyCenterattheUniversityofTulane,andbytheinstitutionsthat haveemployedme:StanfordUniversity,theUniversityofSydney,the UniversityofCambridge,andtheUniversityofNorthCarolinaatChapel Hill.
ThankstoAliceStevensonforthecoverartwork.
IamalsoverygratefultoPeterMomtchiloffforhisadviceandsupportin hiscapacityasSeniorCommissioningEditorforPhilosophyatOxford UniversityPress.
Mostofall,Iamindebtedtothesupportofmyfriendsandfamily.
Introduction 0.1TheScopeofConsent Likemanyphilosophers,Ihaveatalentforabstraction.Thatmightsound likeboasting,butreally ‘abstraction’ isjustapolitewordfornotpaying attentiontowhatisgoingonaroundyou.Becausethiscomeseasilytome, lifeisoftenfullofsurprises,like findingoutafteramedicalprocedurewhatit involved.Apparently,abiopsyinvolvescuttingoutbitsofone’sbody.Ihad thoughtthatatubewasbeingputdownmythroattotakephotos.Itwasa goodhospital,sothemedicalstaffhadaskedwhetherIknewwhatabiopsy was.BecauseImistakenlyhalf-thoughtthatIdid,Isignedtheconsentform withoutrealizingwhatIwasgettingmyselfinto.WhenIlaterfoundout whathadhappened,Ibegantowonder:hadIreallyconsentedtoabiopsy? Bysigningtheform,Ihadcertainlyconsentedto something.Butwasthe actualmedicalproceduresomethingthatIhadauthorized?Or,asIliketo putthatquestion,didthebiopsyfallwithinthescopeofmyconsent?
MyansweristhatbecauseIsignedaconsentformforabiopsy,thebiopsy didfallwithinthescopeofmyconsent.Isecretlyhopethatthismightstrike youasapieceofcommonsense,becausethiswillmakemyviewaneasier sell.Butifitiscommonsense,thenitiscommonsensethatisdeniedbya commonviewofconsent.Accordingtothisview,consentisanormative powerinthefollowingsense:bygivingconsent,wegrantsomeonea permissiontoperformanactionatleastinpartbyintendingtopermit themtoperformthisaction.¹Somesaythatwegivepeoplethesepermissionssimplybywillingthattheyhavethesepermissions.Otherssaythatwe alsoneedtocommunicatethatwearegivingthemthesepermissions.But eitherway,thethoughtisthatweconsenttosomeoneperforminganaction partlybyintendingtopermitthemtoperformthatveryaction.Whilethis
¹Hereandthroughoutthisbook,whenevergenderisirrelevant,Iuse ‘they’ asasingular gender-neutralpronounbothforcharactersinhypotheticalexamplesandforscholars.Idoso largelyforthereasonsgiveninDembroff&Wodak(2018),andalsotoavoidmakingassumptionsaboutscholars’ genders.
TheScopeofConsent.TomDougherty,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©TomDougherty. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192894793.003.0001
normativepowerviewisattractive,therehasnotbeensufficientappreciationofoneofitscentralproblems,whichisthatithasimplausible implicationsforthescopeofsomeone’sconsent.Ifconsentingtoanaction requiresintendingtopermitsomeonetoperformthataction,thenone cannotconsenttoabiopsywhilefailingtoformanintentiontopermita biopsy.SinceIachievedthatfeatwhenIbumbledthroughthehospital,the normativepowerviewisfalse.
Initsplace,Iwillproposeanalternativeview,whichiscentredaroundthe followingthreekeyideas.First,consentinvolvesdeliberatelyengagingin behaviourthatexpressesone’swill.Second,thescopeoftheconsentpartly dependsontherightwaytointerpretthisexpressivebehaviourinlightof theavailableevidence.Third,thescopealsodependsonhowthisbehaviour shouldbeinterpretedinlightofanyextraevidencethattheconsent-receiver hasadutytoacquire.Letmebrieflysketcheachideabeforeshowinghow theseideasapplytothecaseofthebiopsy.
Firstidea:consentisanexpressionofthewill.The firstideaisaviewof whatconsentis.Togiveconsent,itisnotenoughforustohavecertain thoughts.Inaddition,weneedtoengageinoutwardbehaviour.Speci fically, weneedtodeliberatelyactinwaysthatexpressourwillsconcerninghow anotherpersonacts.Therearetwowaystodothis.First,wecangrantthem permission.Second,wecandirecthowtheyact.Anexampleofadirection wouldbearequestforanotherpersontoperformanaction.
Secondidea:thescopeofconsentdependsontheconsent-receiver’ s evidence.Althoughconsentrequiresthatwedeliberatelyengageina type of behaviourthatexpressesourwills,ourintentionsdonotdeterminewhich token actionsareauthorizedbyourconsent.Instead,therangeofauthorized actionsis fixedbythecorrectwayforourconsent-givingbehaviourtobe interpreted.Partly,thisinterpretationdependsontheavailableevidence concerningwhatweintendedtopermitwhenweengageinthisbehaviour. Butnotanyevidencewilldo.Thisevidencemustmeettwoconditions.First, wemustreasonablyacceptthatthisevidencebearsonhowweshouldbe interpreted.Second,recipientsofourconsentmustreasonablyacceptthat thisevidencebearsonhowweshouldbeinterpreted.Asatermofart,Icall evidencethatmeetsbothconditions, ‘reliableevidence’.Thescopeofour consentis fixedinpartbythereliableevidencethatisactuallyavailable.
Thirdidea:thescopealsodependsonanyevidencethattheconsentreceiverhasadutytoacquire .Sometimes,othershavedutiestoacquire additionalreliableevidenceaboutwhichactionswemeantocover.Letus saythatthe ‘enhancedreliableevidence’ isthesumofthisextraevidence
andtheavailablereliableevidence.Thescopeofourconsentisalso fixedin partbytheenhancedreliableevidenceaboutwhatweintendtocoverwith ourconsent.
Together,theseideasimplythatIdidconsenttothebiopsy.Bysigninga consentform,Iwasdeliberatelyengaginginpermission-givingbehaviour. Indeed,Iwasalsodeliberatelydirectingthemedicalstaff ’sbehaviourwitha request.Therefore,twiceoverIwasdeliberatelyexpressingmywillinaway thatconstitutedgivingconsent.Tointerpretthisexpressionofmywill,the medicalstaffhadthefollowingevidence:Ihadsignedaformthatclearly statedthattheprocedurewasabiopsy,andIhadindicatedthatIknewwhat abiopsywas.Ihadtoreasonablyacceptthatmyconsentshouldbeinterpretedinlightofthisevidence.Admittedly,thatevidencewasmisleading, giventhatIdidnotknowwhatabiopsywasandhencedidnotintendto authorizeabiopsy.Butallthesame,Ihadgiventhemedicalstaffcompelling evidencethatIintendedtoauthorizeabiopsywhenIsignedtheconsent form.Moreover,themedicalstaffhadnodutytoacquireadditionalevidenceconcerningwhatIintendedtoauthorize.Bygettingmyresponsethat Iknewwhatabiopsywas,thestaffhaddoneallthatwasrequiredofthem. Therefore,theavailablereliableevidencewasthesameastheenhanced reliableevidence.Sincethisevidencesuf ficientlysupportedtheinterpretationthatIintendedtoauthorizeabiopsybysigningtheconsentform,the biopsyfellwithinthescopeofmyconsent.
0.2SexualDeceptionandtheStorybehindThisBook Iarrivedatthatviewastheresultofaprojectthatbeganwithaninterestin lyingtogetlaid.Letmeillustratethiswithatruestory.
EventhoughAprilFool’sDayisaninauspiciousdayforawedding,you stillwouldnotexpectthemarriagetoendwiththebridesuingtheCuban governmentforsexualmisconduct.²YetthatwastheconclusionofAna MargaritaMartinez’smarriagetoJuanPabloRoque,afterRoquedisappearedfromtheirFloridaresidence(Bragg1999).ThemysteryofRoque’ s absencewasresolvedafewdayslaterwhenRoqueappearedontelevision broadcastfromHavanaandunveiledthemselvesasanundercoverspysent toinfiltratethedissidentcommunityintheUnitedStates.Thiswasan
²Withminormodification,thisparagraphisquotedfromDougherty(2018a).
unwelcomesurpriseforMartinez,whohadthoughtthatRoquewasafellow dissident.Outraged,Martinez filedalawsuitaboutthedeceptionagainst Roque’semployer theRepublicofCuba.SinceCubawasnotinthehabitof defendingitselfintheFloridalegalsystem,Cubadidnotcontestthesuit, andthecourtawardedMartinezmillionsofdollarsindamages.Partof Martinez’scasewasbasedontheclaimthatRoque’sfraudmeantthat MartinezdidnotconsenttosexwithRoque.
ThereisapromisingwaytomakeMartinez’scaseandanunpromising way.TheunpromisingwaywaschosenbyMartinez’slawyer,whosaid thatMartinez ‘wouldnothavegiven[their]consent,had[they]known’ . Thisputsthecaseintermsofcounterfactuals:thelawyerappealstowhat Martinez wouldnot haveconsentedto.Theproblemwiththisapproachis thatcounterfactualscanholdforallsortsofweirdreasons.Supposethat Roquehadinsteadconcealedthattheywereaworldchampionatmassage. AndsupposethatifMartinezhadknownthatRoquewasaworldchampion atmassage,thenMartinezwouldhaverefusedtohavesexononeoftheir earlydatesandinsteadinsistedonamassage.Evenifcounterfactually Martinez ‘wouldnothavegiventheirconsent,hadtheyknown’ howgood Roquewasatmassage,thiscounterfactualholdsforaweirdreasonthatdoes notbearonwhetherMartinezconsentsintheactualworld.Becausecounterfactualscanholdforweirdreasons,counterfactualsdonotdetermine whethersomeonegivesvalidconsenttoanotherperson.
ThepromisingwaytomakeMartinez’sclaimistosaythatsexwithRoque didnotfallwithinthescopeofMartinez’sconsent.³By ‘thescopeofMartinez’ s consent’,ImeanthesetofsexualencountersthatMartinezmadepermissible bygivingconsent.Considertheprinciplethatthisscopewasdeterminedbythe contentofMartinez’sintentions.OntheassumptionthatMartinezdidnot intendtopermitsexwithaspy,thisprincipleimpliesthatsexwithaspydidnot fallwithinthescopeofMartinez’sconsent.GiventhatRoquewasaspy,it wouldthenfollowthatsexwithRoquefelloutsidethescopeofMartinez’ s consent.ThatistosaythatMartinezdidnotconsenttosexwithRoque.
Ihadinmindthistypeofscope-basedargument,ratherthana counterfactual-basedargument,whenIwrotethearticlethatbeganmy interestinthetopicofthisbook.⁴ In ‘Sex,Lies,andConsent’,Idefended
³AdifferentwaytomaketheclaimistoinvoketheideathatMartinezwasinsufficiently informedtogive valid consent.Fordiscussionofhowsexualdeceptioncaninvalidateconsent, seeLazenby&Gabriel(2018).
⁴ Theargumentdoesnotfocusonwhatsomeonewouldagreetoinacounterfactualscenario butinsteadfocusesontheactualscopeoftheirconsent.Theargumentreliesonthepremisethat
theprinciplethatourintentionsdeterminethescopeofourconsent.As Iputtheidea, ‘therightsthatwewaivearetherightsthatweintendtowaive’ (Dougherty2013:734).Thatprinciplepromptsustothinkaboutthe featuresofasexualencountertowhichtheconsent-giver’swillisopposed inthefollowingsense:theconsent-giverintendsnottopermitanencounter withanyofthesefeatures.Icalledsuchafeaturea ‘deal-breaker’ . ⁵ Itfollows fromthisprincipleanddefinitionthatifadeceiverhidesfromtheirvictim thefactthatasexualencounterhasafeaturethatisadeal-breakerforthe victim,thenthevictimdoesnotconsenttothisencounter.Sincethisprinciple placesnorestrictionsonwhatcountsasadeal-breaker,itisnotjustsomeone likeRoquewhoisintrouble.Theprincipleimpliesthatasexualencounter couldfalloutsidethescopeofsomeone’sconsentinvirtueofdeceptionabout any featurewhatsoever.Forexample,thiscouldpotentiallybedeception aboutsomeone’snaturalhaircolourortheuniversitythattheyattended.If eitherofthesefeaturesisadeal-breakerfortheconsent-giver,thenthis deceptionwouldleadtoanon-consensualencounter.
WhatIcametoseeasthecentralmistakeofthatarticlewasmy assumptionthatconsentisamentalphenomenon.⁶ Thisassumptionled metothinkthatourintentionsdeterminethescopeofourconsent. However,Inowthinkthatthisassumptioniswrong.Ourmentalstates areprivate,andyetconsentpubliclytransformsourmoralrelationships
thescopeoftheirconsentisgroundedintheactualintentionsthattheyhaveintheactual scenarioinwhichtheygiveconsent.Forcriticismofthearticlebasedoninterpretingitas makingthecounterfactualargument,seeTadros(2016);Manson(2017);Jubb(2017); Bromwich&Millum(2018).JonathanHerring(2005)makesacounterfactual-basedargument indefenceofasimilarconclusiontomyconclusionaboutsexualdeception.Foranextensionof theargumentbeyonddeal-breakers,seeMatey(2019).
⁵ Apossibledefectofthistermisthatitmaysuggestthatweshouldconsiderthedealsthat someonewouldorwouldnotcounterfactuallymake.However,mydefinitionconcernsonlythe actualcontentsoftheconsent-giver’sactualattitudes.
⁶ Anotherimportantmistakeconcernedmyargumentaboutthegravityofcertainformsof sexualmisconduct.ThearticleattractedcriticismthatpersuadedmethatIhadofferedaweak argumentformyclaimthatitisseriouslywrongtohavesexwithsomeonewithouttheirconsent (Manson2017;Brown2020;Booninn.d.).OneofthemainreasonsthatIofferedforthisclaim wasthattheclaimprovidesthebestexplanationofwhyitiswrongtohavesexwithacomatose person.However,Ifailedtoconsiderkeyalternativehypotheses.Consider,forexample,the alternativehypothesisthatitisseriouslywrongtohavesexwithsomeonewithouttheirconsent whentheystronglydesirethatthissexualencounternottakeplace.Thishypothesisalso explainswhyitisseriouslywrongtohavesexwithacomatoseperson.Butthehypothesis avoidsimplyingthatitisseriouslywrongforaYalegraduatetohavesexwithavictimwhodoes notintendtohavesexwithaYalegraduate,yetdoesnotstronglydesiretoavoidsexwithaYale graduate.Insofarasthatimplicationstrikespeopleascounterintuitive,therivalhypothesis providesanexplanationthatismoreattractivethanmineofwhyitiswrongtohavesexwitha comatoseperson.Giventheavailabilityofcompetinghypotheseslikethis,myargumenttothe bestexplanationwasweak.
witheachother.Sinceconsentisapublicphenomenon,wemustengagein outwardbehaviourtogiveconsent.Oncewetakeonboardthatpoint,we losethemotivationtoholdthatourintentionsallbythemselves fi xthe scopeofourconsent.
Sowhatdoes fixthescopeofconsent?Forawhile,myhypothesiswasthat thescopeisdeterminedbythepermissionsthattheconsent-giversuccessfullycommunicatestotheconsent-receiver.Thathypothesisimpliesthat consentinvolvesameetingofmindsbetweentheconsent-giverandthe consent-receiver.Throughthismeetingofminds,theconsent-givercan controltheconsent-receiver’sbehaviour.Sincetherewasnomeetingof themindsbetweenMartinezandRoquethatMartinezwaspermitting sexwithanundercoverspy,thathypothesisbodesillforRoque.The hypothesisimpliesthatifMartinezdidnotcommunicatethatMartinez waspermittingsexwithaspy,thensexwithaspylayoutsidethescopeof Martinez’sconsent.
However,Iendedupthinkingthatthishypothesisfacestwodecisive objections.The firstobjectionisthatconsentcanbegivenbysomeonewho publiclydeclaresthattheyaregivingsomeoneapermission,eventhough thisdeclarationhasnotyetcometotheattentionoftheconsent-receiver. Forexample,ahomeownercanconsenttoaneighbourwalkingontheir lawnbyputtingupasignthatindicatesthattheneighbourispermittedto walkonthelawn.Eveniftheneighbourhasnotyetreadthesign,thesign wouldstillcreateapermissionfortheneighbourtowalkonthelawn.The secondobjectionisthatsomeonecanconsenttoaparticularaction,even thoughtheydonotintendtopermitthisaction.Thisscenarioisexemplified byourintroductorycaseofthebiopsy.Thescenarioisalsoexemplifiedbya caseinwhichasobercustomerfalselybelievesthattheyareintoxicated,and sodoesnotbelievethattheycanvalidlyconsenttoatattoo.Wecansuppose thatthecustomerthinksthatitiscommonknowledgewiththetattooartist thatthecustomeristoodrunktopermitthetattoo,andconsequentlythe customerdoesnotattempttocommunicatethattheyaregivingthetattoo artistanewpermission.Yetbyrequestingthetattoo,thecustomerwould giveconsenttothetattoo.
Becauseofcaseslikethetattoocase,Isettledontheviewthatconsentis givennotonlybybehaviourthatexpressespermission,butalsobydirections likerequests.Whilethatviewanswersthequestionofwhatconsentis,the viewdoesnotyetanswerthequestionofwhat fixesthescopeofconsent. WhileIwaspuzzledaboutthisquestion,Iwasalsowritingabouthow coercioninvalidatesconsentandaboutwhatisrequiredforinformed
consent.⁷ Forthosetopics,Iincreasinglyfoundithelpfultoplaceconsent withinThomasScanlon’s(1986,1998)viewofthemoralsignificanceof choice.WhatIfoundsousefulaboutScanlon ’sviewwasthetheoreticalrole thattheviewgivestointerpersonaljustification.OnScanlon’sview,the permissibilityofanagent’sactiondependsonwhethertheagentcanjustify theactiontoeachindividualwhoisaffectedbytheaction.WhileIdidnot agreewithScanlon ’sclaimthatallofinterpersonalmoralitycanbeexplained intermsofinterpersonaljustification,Iwaspersuadedthatinterpersonal justificationstructuresanimportantpartofinterpersonalmorality,includingthepartthatconcernsconsent.⁸ Onthesegrounds,Icametothinkof consentasaconsiderationthataconsent-receivercaninvokeinorderto justifytheirbehaviourtotheconsent-giver.
Ifwethinkofconsentintermsofinterpersonaljustification,thenwecan makeprogressonthescopeofconsentbyaskingthefollowingquestion: howcanaconsent-receiverjustifyanactionbyappealingtotheconsent?My answertothisquestionhastwoparts.First,aconsent-receivercanjustify theirbehaviourbyappealingtohowtheconsent-giverhasexpressedtheir willforhowtheconsent-receiverbehaves.Second,thisjustificationis evidentiallyconstrained.Ontheonehand,itisconstrainedbytheavailable evidenceconcerninghowtheconsentshouldbeinterpreted.Ontheother hand,itisalsoconstrainedbyanyevidencethattheconsent-receiverhasa dutytoacquire.Inbothrespects,thisjustificationisconstrainedbythe evidencethattheconsent-giverandtheconsent-receivermustreasonably acceptasbearingonhowtheconsentshouldbeinterpreted.Whenthe relevantevidencesuf ficientlysupportstheinterpretationthattheconsentgiverengagedintheirconsent-givingbehaviourwithacertainactionin mind,theconsent-receivercanappealtotheconsentinordertojustify performingtheaction.
Whatdoesthisprincipleforthescopeofconsentimplyforsexual deception?Wewillreturntothisquestionattheendofthebook,butlet me flagupfronttwokeyimplications.First,thisprincipleallowsforleniency towardsanagentwhenthereisnoavailableevidencethatasexualencounter
⁷ SomeofthisworkhasbeenpublishedinDougherty(2020,2021,forthcoming).Otherwork ofmineoncoercedconsentiscurrentlyunpublished.AlthoughIdonotdiscussatlengthinthis booktheconditionsforwhenconsentisvalid,aninterpersonaljustificationapproachtoconsent getsfurthersupportfromprovidinganattractiveaccountofthesevalidityconditions.
⁸ Forworkthatalsoaimstocircumscribetherolethatinterpersonaljustificationplaysin interpersonalmorality,seeFrick(2015:219–223).Forrelatedcriticismofnon-circumscribed contractualism,seeKamm(2007:455–490).
involvesadeal-breakerfortheirpartnerandtheagenthasnodutytoacquire furtherevidenceaboutthis.Second,theprinciplestillhassevereimplicationsforsomedeceivers.Forexample,ifRoque’sevidenceindicatesthatsex withaspyisadeal-breakerforMartinez,thenMartinezdidnotconsentto sexwithRoque.
0.3ThisBook’sStructureandaRoadMap Thebook’sstructurefollowsthetrajectoryofmythinkingaboutthescopeof consent.Thebookhasthreemainparts,eachofwhichdiscussesaseparate account.Eachaccountisapackageofaviewofconsent,aprinciplefor consent’sscope,andanargumentthatmotivatesthisviewandprinciple. PartIofthebooksetsoutthe ‘MentalAccount’.Accordingtothisaccount, consentisamentalphenomenon,andthescopeofconsentis fixedbythe consent-giver’sintentions.PartIIsetsoutthe ‘SuccessfulCommunication Account’.Accordingtothisaccount,consentinvolvescommunicative behaviour,andthescopeofconsentis fixedbywhattheconsent-giver successfullycommunicatestotheconsent-receiver.PartIIIsetsoutthe ‘EvidentialAccount’,whichIendorse.Accordingtothisaccount,consent involvesdeliberatelyexpressingone’swill,andthescopeofconsentis fixed bycertainevidenceconcerninghowtheconsentshouldbeinterpreted.
Hereishowthatstructurebreaksdown,chapterbychapter.InChapter1, Ibeginbyclarifyingthequestionofwhat fixesthescopeofconsent,and IdiscussthemethodsthatIwillusetoanswerthequestion.
InPartIofthebook,IdiscusstheMentalAccount.InChapter2,Idiscuss theaccount’sprincipalmotivation.Thisisthe ‘AutonomyArgument’.The roughideaisthatsinceconsentisanexpressionofourautonomy,andsince ourintentionsarealwaysunderourcontrol,consentconsistsinour intentions.
InChapter3,IarguethattheAutonomyArgumentalsohasimplications forthescopeofconsent.Thereislittlevaluetotheconsent-givercontrolling whethertheyconsent,unlesstheyalsocontrolwhattheyconsentto.This extensionoftheAutonomyArgumentmotivatesthe ‘PermissiveIntention Principle’ forthescopeofconsent.Thisprinciplegroundsthescopeof consentinthementalcontentoftheconsent-giver’sintentionsconcerning whichactionstopermit.
InPartIIofthebook,IsetoutthecaseforandagainsttheSuccessful CommunicationAccount.ThisaccountendorsestheBehaviouralViewof
consent,accordingtowhichconsentrequiresexternalbehaviour.In Chapter4,IarguethatweshouldrejecttheMentalViewinfavourofthe BehaviouralViewonthegroundsthatconsentisapublicphenomenon.
InChapter5,IturntoaspecificversionoftheBehaviouralView.Thisis theSuccessfulCommunicationView.Thisviewcanbemotivatedbytheidea thatanagentwrongsavictimbyactinginthevictim’spersonaldomainina waythatthevictimdoesnotcontrol.Thisidealiesattheheartofthe ‘Control Argument’.Theargumentalsosupportsthe ‘SuccessfulCommunication Principle’ forthescopeofconsent.Accordingtothisprinciple,anaction fallswithinthescopeofsomeone’sconsentwhentheconsent-giversuccessfullycommunicatesanintentiontopermitthisaction.
InChapter6,Iofferthe firstpartofmyargumentforwhyweshouldreject theSuccessfulCommunicationPrinciple.Theprincipleimpliesthatconsent isgivenonlywhenaconsent-receiverrecognizesthattheconsentwasgiven. However,thisimplicationisfalse.Acounterexampleistheaforementioned caseinwhichahomeownerputsupasignthatstatesthataneighbourcan walkonthehomeowner’slawn.Byputtingupthesign,thehomeowner consentstotheneighbourwalkingonthelawneveniftheneighbourremains unawareofthesign.Wecanseethisbyconsideringthepossibilitythatathird partyreadsthesign.Sincethethirdpartywouldknowthatthehomeowner hasgivenconsent,itfollowsthatthehomeownerhasgivenconsent.
InChapter7,Iofferthesecondpartofmyargumentforrejectingthe SuccessfulCommunicationPrinciple.LikethePermissiveIntention Principle,theSuccessfulCommunicationPrincipleimpliesthatanaction fallswithinthescopeofsomeone’sconsentonlywhentheyintendtopermit thisaction.Thatimplicationisalsofalse.Therearevariouscasesinwhich theappropriateinterpretationofaconsent-giver’spublicbehaviourdiverges fromtheirprivateintentions.Examplesincludetheaforementionedbiopsy caseandtheaforementionedtattoocase.Whentheconsent-giver’sbehaviourdivergesfromtheirintentions,thescopeoftheirconsentis fixedbythe appropriateinterpretationoftheirbehaviour.
InPartIII,IdeveloptheaccountofconsentthatIendorse.Thisisthe EvidentialAccount.InChapter8,Istarttodevelopthe ‘ExpressionofWill View’ ofconsent.Imotivatethisviewwiththe ‘InterpersonalJustification Argument’.Thisargumentfocusesontheideathatanagentcanjustify treatinganindividualinacertainwaybyappealingtohowtheindividual hasexpressedtheirwill.
InChapter9,IelaboratethattheExpressionofWillViewisadisjunctive view,insofarasitallowsthatconsentcanbegiveneitherbydeliberate
behaviourthatexpressespermissionorbydeliberatebehaviourthatdirects howanotherpersonacts.
InChapter10,Ireturntothequestionofwhichprinciplegovernsthe scopeofconsent.Iarguethatthescopeisnot fixedbyconventionsbut insteadbycertainevidenceaboutwhattheconsent-giverintendstocover withtheirconsent.Toformulateapreciseprincipleforthescopeofconsent, Iintroducethenotionof ‘reliableevidence’.Thisistheevidencesuchthat boththeconsent-giverandtheconsent-receivermustreasonablyacceptthat thisevidencebearsontheappropriateinterpretationoftheconsent.Using thisnotion,Iformulatethe ‘AvailableReliableEvidencePrinciple’ forthe scopeofconsent.Accordingtothisprinciple,anactionfallswithinthescope ofsomeone’sconsentwhenthereliableevidencethatisactuallyavailable sufficientlysupportsinterpretingtheconsent-giverasintendingtheirconsent-givingbehaviourtoapplytothisaction.Thisprincipleisalmost correct,butrequiresanimportantmodi fication.
ThatmodificationcomesinChapter11,whereIarguethatthescopeof someone ’sconsentisalsodeterminedbyanyadditionalreliableevidence thattheconsent-receiverhasadutytoacquire.Idefinethe ‘enhanced reliableevidence ’ astheunionoftheavailablereliableevidenceandany reliableevidencethattheconsent-receiverhasadutytoacquire.Iconclude thatweshouldacceptthe ‘DueDiligencePrinciple’ forthescopeofconsent. Accordingtothisprinciple,anactionfallswithinthescopeofsomeone’ s consentwhenboththeavailablereliableevidenceandtheenhancedreliable evidencesufficientlysupportinterpretingtheconsent-giverasintending theirconsent-givingbehaviourtoapplytothisaction.
IntheconcludingChapter12,IsummarizetheEvidentialAccountand surveytheremainingdoubtsthatwemayhaveaboutthisaccount.Iendthis bookbyrevisitingthetopicofsexualdeception.
1 TheQuestionofConsent’sScope Consentallowspeopletoperformarangeofactions,butthisrangehasits limits.Ashleysaystotheirhouseguest, ‘MakeyourselfathomewhileIamat work,’ andnowTaylorcanputtheirfeetupandwatchtelevision.But Ashley’sconsentdoesnotgiveTaylorpermissiontosticktheir fingerin Ashley’speanutbutterandsuckitclean,evenifTaylorlikesdoingthatin theirownhome.AmongallofthepermissionsthatAshleycangiveTaylor, somewillbegrantedbyAshley’sconsent,whileotherswillnot.Icallthis rangeofpermissionsthe ‘ scope ’ ofAshley’sconsent.¹
Thisbook’scentralquestioniswhichprinciplegovernsthescopeof someone ’sconsent.Thecorrectprinciplewillspecifytheconsiderations thatdeterminewhatthisscopeis.Therearevarioushypothesesforwhat theseconsiderationsmightbe.IsTaylorprohibitedapeanut-butterydigit becauseofAshley’sintentionswhengivingconsent?IsTaylorprohibited thisbecauseofthemeaningofwhatAshleysays?BecauseofhowTaylor interpretsAshley?Becauseofbackgroundconventionsconcerningwhat houseguestsareallowedtodoinpeople’shomes?
Tosetupourinvestigationintowhichprincipleiscorrect,afewpreliminarieswillhelp.InSection1.1,wewillpindownthequestionofwhat determinesthescopeofconsent.InSection1.2,wewilllookatthemethods thatwewillusetoanswerthisquestion.
1.1FramingAssumptions TheEnglishword ‘consent’ isusedbroadlytorefertodifferentmoral phenomena.Onlyoneoftheseisthisbook’stopic.Thisistheconsentthat releasesotherpeoplefromduties.Itissometimescalled ‘permissiveconsent ’
¹Forworkthatusesthisdefinitionofthe ‘ scope ’ ofconsent,seeArchard(1998:6–7); Manson(2018).ThisdiffersfromwhatNeilMansonandOnoraO’Neill(2007:77–84)have inmindwhentheytalkofthe ‘scopeofinformedconsentrequirements’.Bythis,theymeanthe biomedicalinteractionsforwhichpeoplemustseektheinformedconsentofpatientsorresearch participants.
TheScopeofConsent.TomDougherty,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©TomDougherty. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192894793.003.0002
(Manson2016).Permissiveconsentcontrastswithotheragreements,like promisesortransfersofproperty.Theseagreementscancreatedutiesand bringaboutotherchangesinourmoralrelationshipswitheachother.Since thisbook’stopicispermissiveconsent,Iwillhavethisinmindwhenever Iusetheterm ‘consent’ fromnowon.
Sinceconsentcanmakeactionspermissible,itistheoreticallyimportant fornormativeethicistswhoareafteratheoryofrightandwrongaction.In addition,consentispracticallyimportantformanyofourinteractions.In particular,consentisnecessaryformakingpermissiblecertainmedical interactionsandsexualinteractions.²Inturn,ourtheoryofconsent shouldinformhowwedesigntheinstitutionalandlegalrulesthatgovern theseinteractions.
Whileinstitutionalandlegalissueswillsometimesfeatureinourdiscussion,ourprincipalconcerniswiththemoralityofconsent.Whenconsentis morallyefficacious,Icallit ‘validconsent’.³Whenitismorallyinefficacious, Icallit ‘invalidconsent ’.Whilethevalid/invalidconsentterminologyis widelyusedinmoralphilosophyandbioethics,itislesscommoninthe philosophyofthecriminallaw.⁴ Thisisbecausethecriminallawitselfoften usestheword ‘consent’ asasuccessterm,sothatthetermonlyappliesto somethingthatislegallyefficacious.⁵ Onthesuccesstermusage,onewould notdescribesomeoneas ‘consenting’ whentheyagreetosexatknifepoint.
Inturn,somephilosophersofthecriminallawalsouse ‘consent’ asasuccess termwhentheyaretalkingaboutbothlegalconsentandmoralconsent. ThesephilosopherswouldusedifferenttermstodescribewhatIcall ‘invalid consent’.Forexample,ifsomeoneagreestosexatknifepoint,thenHeidi Hurd(1996)woulddescribethisasmerely ‘primafacie consent ’,while KimberlyFerzanandPeterWesten(2017)woulddescribethisas ‘assent’ .
²Otherkeyapplicationsincludeconsenttotheuseofproperty,consenttodata-sharing,and consenttotheuseofcomputers.However,Ilacktheexpertisetoaddressthecomplexityofthese issues.Forahelpfulessayonthelegalaspectsofconsenttotheuseofcomputers,whichbrings outtheimportanceoftheissueofconsent’sscope,seeGrimmelmann(2016).
³Theorthodoxyisthattherearethreenecessaryconditionsforvalidconsent.First,valid consentmustbegivenbyasuitablycompetentagent.Forexample,ifsomeoneishighly intoxicatedorasmallchild,thenitislikelythattheirconsentismorallyinefficacious. Second,validconsentmustbegivenbysomeonewhoissuitablyfree.Forexample,consent givenunderadeaththreatisalsomorallyinefficacious.Third,validconsentmustbegivenby someonewhoissuitablyinformed. Forexample,medicalconsentisoftennotvalidwhengiven byapatientwhoisunawareofalternativetreatments.
⁴ Forsimilardefinitionsof ‘validconsent’,seeWertheimer(2003:121);Pallikkathayil(2011): 7;Tadros(2016:204);Bolinger(2019:80).
⁵ Forconsentinthelaw,seeWesten(2004)andBeyleveld&Brownsword(2007).For discussionofconsentandsexualmisconductinthelaw,seeSchulhofer(1998).
Whetherweuse ‘consent’ asasuccesstermisamerelyterminologicalissue onwhichnothingsubstantivehangs.Thisterminologicalissuewillnotaffect ourdiscussion,asIwillbesettingtoonesideinvalidconsent.⁶ Itisonly whenconsentisvalidthatthequestionarises:whichactionsaremorally affectedbytheconsent?
Topindownthatquestion,itwillhelptospecifythewaythatvalid consentchangesourmoralrelationshipswitheachother.Theserelationshipshaveadyadicstructureintherespectthatwehave ‘directedduties’ that weowe to eachother.Forexample,youowemeadutynottosteponmy toes.Thisisequivalenttomyhavingaclaim-rightagainstyouthatyounot steponmytoes.Bystatingthatyourdutyisequivalenttomyright,Imean thatthereisasinglenormativerelationshipthatwecandescribeeitheras youowingmethatdutyorasmehavingthatrightagainstyou.Withrespect todutiestoomitactions,wecanstatethegeneralequivalencebetween directeddutiesandclaim-rightsasfollows:⁷
XowesYadutynottoperformAifandonlyifYhasaclaim-rightagainst XnottoperformA.
Forbrevity,Iwillsimplycallthese ‘duties’ and ‘rights’ fromnowon.These aretheaspectsofourmoralrelationshipsthatareaffectedbyconsent.If YgivesconsenttoXperformingactionA,thenYcanreleaseXfromaduty nottoperformAandwaivearightagainstXperformingA.Inthatrespect, consentisathree-placerelationbetweentheindividualgivingconsent,the individualreceivingconsent,andanaction(orsetofactions).Itwillhelpto havetermstorefertotheindividualwhogivesconsentandtheindividualto whomconsentisgiven.Respectively,Icalltheseindividualsthe ‘consentgiver’ andthe ‘consent-receiver ’.Idonotmeanforthisterminologytoimply thataconsent-receivermustbeawareoftheconsent.Indeed,induecourse, Iwillarguethatsomeonecanbeunawarethattheyhavereceivedconsent. Instead,allthatImeanbycallingsomeonea ‘consent-receiver ’ isthatthey arethetargetoftheconsent.
⁶ Consequently,IwillnotdiscussaninterestingpossibilitythatSerenaOlsarettisuggestedto me.Couldaninstanceoflow-levelcoercionundermineconsenttooneactionwhilenotinvalidatingconsenttoadifferentaction?Ifthisispossible,thencoercioncanhavetheeffectofputting some,butnotallactionsoutsidethescopeofsomeone’sconsent.
⁷ Fordiscussionofhowclaim-rightsanddutiescorrelate,seeThomson(1990).Some scholarsrefertodirecteddutiesas ‘bipolarobligations’.Fordiscussionofdirecteddutiesand bipolarobligations,seeSidgwick(1874);Sreenivasan(2010);Thompson(2004);Darwall(2006); Cruft(2019);Wallace(2019).
Themoraldefaultisthatweoweeachotherdutiesnottointeractwith eachother’ spersonaldomains.Forexample,wehavedutiesnottolay handsoneachother ’sbodiesorproperty.Thesedutiesformprotective perimetersthatdemarcateeachindividual’spersonaldomain.Consider whathappensifsomeonebreachesoneoftheseduties.Supposethatyou dropyourantiquecrystalvaseonmyfootandthevaseshatters.Ican complainthatyouractionwaswrongbecauseitdestroyedavaluable crystalvasefornogoodreason.Thiscomplaintwouldnotbegrounded inmyrighttodeterminehowyouactinmypersonaldomain.Bycontrast, ifIcomplainthatyouareviolatingmyrightthatyounotharmmyfoot, thenIamvoicingadomain-basedcomplaintagainstyouraction.Ihave thiscomplaintbecauseyouhavewrongedmebybreachingadutythatyou owedtome.Thisbreachwouldtypicallyleavea ‘ moralresidue ’ inthesense thatyoumustapologizeandcompensatemefortheharmthatIsuffered (Thomson1990:82 – 98).
Validconsenthasthenormativeeffectofreleasingpeoplefromthese domain-basedduties.Consequently,anindividual’sconsentcanmakeitthe casethattheindividualisnotwrongedbyhowanagentactsinthe individual’spersonaldomain.Butwhileconsentcaneliminatethistypeof wronging,itmaybethattheconsentdoesnotpreventtheconsent-receiver fromwrongingtheconsent-giverinadifferentway.SupposethatAshley consentstoTaylorhangingoutintheirhomewhileAshleyisatwork. Inaddition,AshleymakesTaylorpromisetogooutandbuymilkatsome pointduringtheday.Taylordoesnotbuymilkandinsteadstaysinsideall day.Bystayinginsideallday,TaylordoesnotwrongAshleyinvirtueof trespassinginAshley’spersonaldomain.Thatwrongingisprecludedby Ashley’sconsent.However,TaylordoeswrongAshleyinvirtueofbreaking theirpromisetoAshley.Ashley’sconsentdoesnoteliminatethiswronging. Thisillustratesthegeneralphenomenonthatevenifanindividualconsents toanagent’saction,itmaystillbethattheagentwrongstheindividualwith thisaction,anditmaystillbethattheactionisimpermissible.Thispointis particularlyimportantforsexualethics.Whileanagentneedstheirpartner’ s sexualconsenttoavoidwrongingthem,consentisnotamoralpanacea. Asexualencountercanbeconsensualandyetbemorallyproblematicon othergrounds.
Sinceconsentreleasespeoplefromdutiesandwaivesrights,thenormativeeffectsofconsentareconstrainedbyfactsaboutwhichdutiesandrights wehavesimplyasmoralpersons.Theseareour ‘natural’ rightsandduties, whichcontrastwiththerightsanddutiesthatwe ‘acquire’ asaresultofour
interactionsandrelationshipswithotherindividuals. ⁸ Withintheoriesof rights,itisuncontroversialthatwehavenaturalrightsthatothersdonot interferewithourpersonaldomains.Theserightscorrelatewithdutiesto omit certainactions.Itismorecontroversialwhetherwehaveanynatural rightsthatcorrelatewithdutiesthatothershaveto perform actions.Toavoid unnecessarycontroversy,Iwillremainneutralonwhetherwehavenatural rightsthatcorrelatewithdutiestoperformactions.Instead,Iwillfocuson naturalrightsthatcorrelatewithdutiestoomitactions.Thesedutiesof omissionarethelocusofmost,ifnotall,ofthepracticalinterestinconsent. Forexample,medicalconsentreleasespeoplefromdutiestorefrainfrom medicalprocedures,whilesexualconsentreleasespeoplefromdutiesto refrainfromsexualactivity.
Somepeopleobjecttothinkingofsexualethicsinthisway.Theyworry thatthisportrayssexualactivityasasymmetric,withonepartydoing somethingtoanother.Moreover,somepeopleworrythatthisproblemis aggravatedbythegenderedassumptionthatmenplaytheroleofinitiators andwomen,thepassiveconsenters.⁹ Iamsympathetictotheconcernthat consentisoftentalkedaboutinthisway,butIdonotseethisasaproblem thatisinherentintheconceptofconsentitself.Wecanemploytheconcept inegalitariandiscoursethatrecognizeseveryone’ssexualagency.For example,itisconceptuallycoherenttosaythattwopeopleneedeachother’ s consenttoanencounterinwhichtheyareequallysexualagents.¹⁰ Similarly, itiscoherenttosaythatthemoraldefaultisthattwopeoplesymmetrically havedutiesnottoengageinsexualactivitywitheachother,andtheyeach needtoreleasetheotherfromtheseduties.
Anotherconstraintonthenormativeeffectsofourconsentcomesfrom thegrainoftherightsthatwepossess.Somepeopletaketheviewthatwe havecoarse-grainedrightsthatothersdonothavesexwithus,butwelack fine-grainedrightsagainstspecifictypesofsexualinteraction.Toillustrate thistypeofview,considerthefollowingcaseofHallieLiberto’s(2017:S134):
⁸ Thereisaterminologicalissueastowhen,ifever,weshouldusetheterm ‘consent’ torefer toreleasingpeoplefromacquireddutiesandwaivingacquiredrights.Iwillremainneutralon thisterminologicalissuebecausenothingsubstantivehangsonitandbecauseacquiredrights anddutieswillnotbetheprimaryfocusofourdiscussion.
⁹ Inparticular,seeMacKinnon(2016:440)andalsoPalmer(2017:476);Kukla(2018: 75–76);Gardner(2018:60).
¹
⁰ AsKaramvirChadha(2020)pointsout,jointsexualactivityiscomposedofparticular sexualactsperformedbyindividuals,andtheseindividualsneedeachother’sconsentfor performingtheseacts.
PaternalisticDeal-Breaker.JoandCaseyarehavingsex.Jocatchesa slightlypainedexpressiononCasey’sfaceandasksCaseyiftheintercourse ishurtingCasey.CaseyknowsthatifJolearnsthattheintercourseis hurtingCasey,thatJowillwanttostophavingsexwithCaseyimmediately, forCasey’ssake.CaseyisinsomepainbutwantsJotohaveasexually satisfyingexperience.Caseysays, ‘No,honey.’
Toanalysethiscase,Liberto(2017:S137)makesthefollowingtwoclaims. First,Johasacoarse-grainedrightthatCaseynothavesexwithJo.Second, Jodoesnothavea fine-grainedrightthatCaseynothavesexwithJowhen Caseyisinpain.Sinceconsentcanonlymakeadifferencetorightsand dutiesthatactuallyexist,thescopeofJo’sconsentcouldnotbeaffectedbya non-existent fine-grainedright.Therefore,onLiberto’sview,itisimpossible forJotorestrictthescopeoftheirconsenttosexualencountersinwhich Caseyisnotinpain.¹¹
Thenormativeeffectsofconsentarealsoconstrainedbyfactsabout whichrightsanddutiestheconsent-giverhastheauthoritytochange.For example,whenAshleytellsTaylortomakethemselvesathome,Taylor’ s rangeofnewpermissionsispartlydeterminedbythepermissionsthat Ashleycangrant.AshleycannotletTaylorclamberthroughtheirneighbour’swindowtomaketoast,sinceitisnotuptoAshleywhogetstodothat. SinceTaylorowesthatdutytotheneighbour,AshleycannotreleaseTaylor fromtheduty.Likewise,thenormativeeffectsofourconsentwouldalsobe constrainedifwecannotwaivesomeofourownrights(Tadros2011,2016). Supposethatsomeoneexplicitlysaystoanotherperson, ‘Youmaykilland theneatme.’ Theconsent-giverclearlymeanstopermitbeingcannibalized. Butconsiderthehypothesisthattheconsent-givercannotwaivetheirright againstbeingcannibalized.Ifthishypothesisiscorrect,thentheconsent wouldnotcreateapermissionfortheconsent-receivertocannibalizethe consent-giver.Similarly,iftheconsent-givercannotwaivetheirrightagainst beingcannibalized,thenthiswouldrestrictthenormativeeffectsbrought aboutbytheconsent-giversaying, ‘Youcando whatever youwanttome.’
Becauseofthesepoints,ourbackgroundtheoryofrightsandduties constrainsouraccountofhowconsentchangesourmoralrelationships
¹¹Thereisaseparateissueofwhethersomeonecanplaceconditionsonwhentheirconsent hasmoralforce.Forexample,Jocouldsay, ‘Onconditionthatyoudonothaveaheadache, Iherebywaivemyrightagainstsexwithyou.’ Fordiscussionofconditionalconsent,seeChadha (forthcoming).
witheachother.Inthisbook,Iwillbesettingtoonesidethequestionof whichbackgroundrightsanddutieswehave.Downstreamfromacceptinga theoryofthesebackgroundrightsandduties,weneedaprinciplethattells uswhichofthesearealteredbysomeone’sconsent.Thatprincipleisthe focusofthisbook.Accordingly,theforegoingpointsareframingassumptionsforourdiscussion.Thesepointscircumscribethisbook’scentral questionofwhatdeterminesthescopeofsomeone’sconsent.Wecanstate thisquestionasfollows:ofthedomain-baseddutiesfromwhichaconsentgivercanreleaseaconsent-receiver,whatdetermineswhichdutiesare eliminatedbytheconsent-giver’svalidconsent?Sincerightsareequivalent toduties,thatquestioncouldalsobestatedintermsofrights.Toavoid clutteringourdiscussionbyrepeatingtheseframingassumptions,Iwill leavetheseimplicitfromnowon.
1.2Methodology Whatmethodsshouldweusetoanswerthequestionofwhatdeterminesthe scopeofconsent?TherearefourmethodsthatIwillsketchupfront.
Thecomparativemethod .Often,itisagoodideatoansweraphilosophicalquestionholistically,by fleshingoutalternativeanswersandchoosing betweentheseanswersinlightofalltheirrespectiveadvantagesanddisadvantages.Aswellasmakingitmorelikelythatwearriveatthetruth,this methodhelpsusunderstandwhythequestionisphilosophicallyinteresting anddifficult.ThisishowIinterpretthe ‘comparativemethod’ ofmoral philosophy.¹²
HereishowIwilladoptthecomparativemethodinourinquiry. Ultimately,weareseekingthecorrect principle thatspeci fieswhatdeterminesthescopeofsomeone’sconsent.Tochoosebetweencandidateprinciples,weneedtoseehowtheseprinciplescancombinewith views ofwhat constitutesconsent,aswellas arguments thatmotivatetheseviewsand principles.Iwillusetheterm ‘accounts’ torefertopackagesofarguments, viewsofconsent,andprinciplesforconsent’sscope.Thisbookwillcompare theprosandconsofthreemainaccounts.ThesearetheMentalAccount,the SuccessfulCommunicationAccount,andtheEvidentialAccount.Whenwe
¹²AparadigmaticuseofthismethodisHenrySidgwick’s(1874)investigationintothe ‘MethodsofEthics’.IinterpretJohnRawls(1971)asusingthismethodwhenarguingfor theirprinciplesofjusticeoverutilitarianism.
investigatetheseaccounts,itwillturnoutthatthereisaspecialreasonto adoptthecomparativemethodforourinquiry:certainargumentsforviews ofconsentalsoprovidesupportforprinciplesgoverningconsent’ sscope. Themethodofcases. Onewaytomakeprogressinmoralphilosophyis toconsidertheimplicationsthatviewsandprincipleshaveforvariouscases. Thisistheso-calledmethodofcases.Ithastwoparts.First,themethod involvestakinganindependentstanceonwhichclaimsweshouldacceptor rejectaboutcertaincases.Sometimes,theseclaimscanbeacceptedas intrinsicallyplausible.Often,whenphilosopherswishtoindicatethatwe shouldacceptaclaimonitsownterms,thentheywilldescribethisclaimas ‘intuitively’ correctorsaythattheclaimissupportedby ‘intuition’ . AsIunderstandtalkof ‘intuition’ inthiscontext,thisdoesnotpresuppose anyparticularmoralepistemologyandinsteadissimplyawayof flagging thataclaimisbeingofferedasanundefendedpremiseinanargument.On thiswayofthinking,ifonephilosopherpresentsaclaimas ‘intuitive’,and anotherphilosopherdoesnot findtheclaimplausible,thenthelatter philosopherdoesnotacceptapremiseintheformerphilosopher’ sargument.Atothertimes,itcanbeappropriateeithertoprovideasub-argument thatdefendsaclaimaboutacaseoradiscussionoftheclaimthatmakes clearwhyweshouldacceptit.Second,themethodusestheseclaimsto evaluateviewsandprinciples.Ontheonehand,ifavieworprincipleentails aclaimthatweindependentlyhavereasontoreject,thenwehavereasonto rejectthevieworprinciple.Ontheotherhand,ifavieworprincipleentailsa claimthatweoughttoaccept,thenthatcountsinfavouroftheviewor principle.Inthisbook,Iwillusethismethodextensivelytodecidewhich viewsandprinciplestorejectandwhichtoaccept.
Thereareatleastthreereasonswhythemethodofcasescanbehelpful. First,ifwejustdiscussabstractideas,thenourdiscussionrisksbecoming hardtofollowandengagewith.Itiseasiertoseewhatitisatissuewhenwe lookatconcreteexamples.Inthisrespect,Ithinkofusingcasesasimplementingthecommonadvicethatauthorsshoulduseexamplestomaketheir writingclearandeasytofollow.Second,usingcasescanalsomakecommunicationmoreefficient.Onceacommunityofphilosophershastheknack forthinkingaboutwhatprinciplesimplyaboutcases,thesephilosopherscan quicklycommunicatealotwithalittle.Third,themethodofcasespushesus todivedeepintothedetailsofourtopic.Itiseasytoskateoverdistinctions whendoingphilosophyatahighlevelofabstraction,anditisalsoeasyto missimplicationsofviewsorprinciples.Agoodwaytoprobethesedetailsis toconsiderwhattheseviewsandprinciplesimplyforcases.Idonotmeanto implythatthemethodofcasesisessentialinthisregard.Certainly,thereare
