Introduction:TheThirdReich
ROBERTGELLATELY
HISTORIANS todaycontinueraisingquestionsabouttheThirdReich,especially becauseoftheunprecedentednatureofitscrimes,andthemilitaryaggressionit unleashedacrossEurope.Muchoftheinspirationforthecatastrophicregime,lasting ameretwelveyears,belongstoAdolfHitler,avirtualnon-entityinpoliticalcircles before . Hehadbeenbornin andwasnotevenaGermancitizen.Moreover,during hislargely ‘normal’ youthinAustria-Hungary,herevealednosignsofhisfuture,and byagetwentyhewasadrifterwithlittleeducationandsociallywithdrawn.Hehad nopassionateambitionssavetobecomeanartistofsomekind,avocationforwhich hehadnoformaltraining.Hedabbledinpainting,vaguelyaspiredtobecomea designerofthesetsfortheoperasheadored,yetonthatscore,hemadenoprogress whatsoever,andintheautumnof ,hehitrockbottomwhenhelandedina Viennesehomelessshelter.InFebruarythenextyear,helefttotakeresidencein amen’shostel,wherehestayedforjustoverthreeyears,wheninMay ,thanksto receivingatidysumofmoneythatwasduefromhisfather’sinheritance, ‘theartist’ AdolfHitlerleftforMunich,withdreamsofbecominganarchitect.Oncemore, however,hemadefewfriends,could findnowork,andagainhadtopaintpostcards togetby.Heappeareddoomednevertoachievemuchofanything,giventheexisting orderwithitsrigidclassandpoliticalstructuresthatallowedrelativelylittlesocial mobility.ButthenthecomingofwhatwouldbetheGreatWarin turnedthe worldupsidedown.Theprospectof fightingforGermanyexcitedthisyoungman’s nationalism,asitdidformillionsofothersinnearlyallpartsoftheglobe,andhesoon volunteered.Thewarwouldhaverevolutionaryconsequences,drivingouttheold orders,andultimatelymakingitpossibleevenforsocialoutsiderssuchashimto entertainloftyambitions.
However,inNovember ,onhisreturnfromthewarlostbyGermany,wehave noevidencethatHitlerdreamedofbecomingsomekindofrevolutionaryleader,and hisambitionwasthemoremodestoneofstayinginthearmyaslongashecould.Like somanyinGermany,hewasconvincedthattheHomeFronthadbetrayedthe ‘undefeatedarmy’,hadstabbeditintheback,and,likemillionsofothers,hewould believeinthislegendfortherestofhislife.
Atagethirty,hecouldcountpracticallynoaccomplishmentsandheremaineda rootlessloner,acorporalintheshatteredarmy,withnomoneyandfewprospects. However,hesoonattractedtheattentionofofficersonthelookoutforenlistedmen theycouldtraintoaddressthedemobilizingtroopswithnationalistmessages.During thebriefschoolingthatfollowed,Hitlerdidquitewell.Inthecourseof ,hehelped foundanewpoliticalentity,theNationalSocialistGermanWorkersParty(NSDAP),or NaziParty.Hequicklybecameitsleading figure,thoughtheragtagoperationwas onlyoneamongthedozenslikeitonthepoliticallandscapeofthedispiritedcountry.
Alittlemorethantwentyyearslaterandastonishingly,inautumn ,Adolf Hitler,now fifty-twoyearsoldhadbecomeGermany’sunrivalledandworshipped leader,standingattheheadofarestoredeconomicpowerhouse.Moreover,bymid,hehadrebuilt,armed,anduseddecisivelythenewlynamedWehrmachtto defeatPolandandmoreremarkablystill,tocapturemostofWesternEurope.Thena yearlater,hehaddirectedhisdynamicarmiesagainsttheSovietUnion,sothatin December,theGermanswereatthegatesofMoscowandLeningrad.
Atthatmomentinlate ,Hitlerappeared howeverbriefly tobethemost powerfulrulerontheplanet.Hecouldsurveyavastcontinentalempirethatincluded nearlyallofEuropefromtheEnglishChannel,thennorthtoNorwayandeastto Leningrad,onwardfarsouthintotheCaucasus;andinagrandarcsouthwestwards, totheBalkans,Greece,andpartsofNorthAfrica.BynowthenewGermany,inits questformore ‘livingspace’ hadshakenthefoundationsofwesterncivilizationtoits core,andwasinthemidstofamassmurdercampaignaimedmainlyattheJewsacross EasternEurope.Beforeitscollapse,theThirdReich’sdeedswouldturnitintothe epitomeofevil,anditwouldleavescarsacrossEuropeandbeyondthatremainvisible tothisday.
Giventhisdramaticturnofevents,itislittlewonderthatsince generationsof historianskeeptryingtoexplainhowitallhappened.Inthisbook,specialistexperts willdistilthatwork,presenttheirownup-to-dateresearch,andprovideabalanced andaccessibleaccountoftheera.Eachchapterfocusesonspecificquestionsand issues,andattheendofthevolume,weprovideaselectlistofSuggestedFurther Readings.TheauthorsshowthatourunderstandingoftheThirdReichhasevolved overtheyearsasweunearthednewmaterialsanddocuments,adoptednewmethods andapproaches,orstudiedwhathappenedfromdifferentperspectivesthatgivenew meaningtotheoldevidence.
Initiallyin ,AlliedlawyersandprosecutorsfromtheWestinGermanybegan investigatingthecrimesoftopNaziofficialsaspartofthepost-wartrials.The emphasisatthattimewasonarelativelysmallcircleofperpetrators,anapproach thatearlypost-warwritersfollowed,asdidHannahArendt,drivenfromGermany beforethewar.SheportrayedNationalSocialismasasystemof ‘totaldomination’ whose ‘monstrousmachine’—mannedbylowlycharacterssuchasAdolfEichmann wasresponsibleforthe ‘administrativemurder’ oftheJews.Thislineofargumentation
Introduction:TheThirdReich
postulatedthatsomethinglikeunthinkingrobotsor ‘totalitariancharacters’ operateda smoothlyrunning,efficientgovernmentkilling-machine.However,asthelateDavid Cesaranipointedout,sincethe sand s,scholarshavediscoveredthat NationalSocialistGermanywasno ‘totalitarianmonolith’.InsteadtheThirdReich wasamultifacetedsystemofcompetingandoverlappingagencies ‘overwhichHitler presidederraticallyandinwhichpolicyemergedasacompromisebetweenpowerful individualsandinterestgroups’ .
AnotherimageofthewardevelopedinEasternEurope,whereSovietleaderJoseph Stalin’sadaptionsoftheso-calledagenttheoryoffascismprevailed.Perhapsitsmost influentialformulationcamefromGeorgiDimitrov,theheadoftheCommunist International,whosaidin thatsincetheGreatDepression,certain ‘imperialist circles’ were ‘tryingtoshiftthewholeburdenofthecrisisontotheshouldersofthe workingpeople.Thatiswhytheyneedfascism.’ AsfortheNaziregime,heconcluded thatitwas ‘themostreactionaryvarietyoffascism’,hadnothingincommonwith socialism,andwasmorelike ‘fiendishchauvinism.Itisagovernmentsystemof politicalgangsterism,asystemofprovocationandtorturepracticedupontheworking classandtherevolutionaryelementsofthepeasantry,thepettybourgeoisieandthe intelligentsia.Itismedievalbarbarityandbestiality;itisunbridledaggressionin relationtoothernations.’
Thishighlyinfluentialcondemnation,unfortunatelyledscholarsawayfromtrying tounderstandthattheNationalSocialistsheadedarevolutionarymovementinits ownright,andthatithaddeeprootsinGermansociety.Although ‘capitalists’ had contributedsomemoneytothepartyonitswaytopowerin ,infactithadbeen largelyself-funded.After ,thenewregimecrushedtheworking-classmovement andthetradeunions,thoughitwouldbeamistaketobelievethatworkersremained immunefromthemanyappealsoftheThirdReich.
Inthe sandoutsidetheSovietUnion,mainlyyoungerscholarsbeganreshapingourunderstandingoftheThirdReich.Theystartedlookingathowordinary peopleexperiencedtheNazieraandsomeofthemstudiedhownon-officialsand civilianshadparticipatedintheterrorsysteminGermanyandacrossEuropeduring theoccupationyearsfromFrancetoPoland,andbeyond.Inthelastseveralyears,and belatedly,agreatdealofworkhasbeendirectedattheeffortsoftheNaziregimeto createa ‘communityofthepeople’,araciallybased,exclusive,andharmonious societythatHitlerhadpromisedtheGermansevenbeforehebecamechancellorin .Thisapproach,aswithpreviouseffortstowritepioneeringhistory,setoff stormyandcontinuingcontroversies.
Inthisbook,wefocusonfouroverridingandinterrelatedthemesthatlinktogether toformacoherentaccountoftheThirdReich.
Hitler’sRole
First,weunderlinethesignificanceofAdolfHitlerasacharismaticleader,an approach thatIanKershawartfullyemployedinamassivebiographythatstill
ranksasthestandardworkonthetopic.HistorianVolkerUllrich,in andthe firstmajorGermanbiographyofHitlersinceJoachimFest’sclassicaccountfrom ,uncoversnew,orlittleused,documentstoadjustKershaw’spicture,thoughhe alsounderlinestheimportanceofHitler’scharismaticappeal.Ifsuchanapproach doubtlessoffersimportantinsights,weshouldnonethelessbecautiouswhenusingthe term ‘charisma’.Sincethe s,whenthiswordbegantobecomepopularin everydaylanguage,itsmeaninghasbecomehopelesslyclouded,anditisoftentaken asapositiveattributeorasynonymforanyoneoranythingpossessingexceptional magnetism,greatcharm,orstunningappeal.
Historiansborrowedtheconceptofcharisma,that ‘specialgift’,fromthefamed sociologistMaxWeber,whowroteaboutitlongbeforetheThirdReich.Webersaid thatreligiousorpoliticalleadersinthedistantpasthadexercised ‘charismaticauthority’ whentheirfollowersregardedthemaspossessinga ‘divinelyconferredpoweror talent’.Duringtimesofdistressoverthecenturies,whetherpsychological,religious, economic,orpoliticalinnature,certain ‘natural’ leadersarosetorulethroughthis uniqueformofauthority.ForWeber ‘Themerefactofrecognizingthepersonal missionofacharismaticmasterestablisheshispower.’ Thus,whenwespeakabout Hitler’scharismaticappeal,weneedpayparticularattentiontothecontentofhis messages,sothattherealissueisnotmerelyabouthissupposedmagicalpersonality orallegedlycaptivatingblueeyes.Wealsoshouldexaminehowpeopleunderstoodhis mission,whattheythoughthestoodfor,andtheextenttowhichtheyacceptedand identifiedwithsomeorallofit.
WhendidHitlerdiscoverhepossessedthis ‘specialgift’?Duringhisyouthandin theFirstWorldWarheexhibitednosignsofpossessinganyextraordinaryabilities whatsoever,leastofallasapublicorpoliticalperson.Ifanything,hewasgenerally shy,reclusive,anddevoidofany ‘proper’ connectionstothegoverningclasses.Hehad leftViennaforMunichin ,perhapspartlytododgethedraftinhisnativeland. YetinMunich,hethrillinglycelebratedthecomingofwarinAugust ,cheeredits announcementandpromptlyvolunteeredto fightforGermany.Inthedragged-out struggleontheWesternFront,hewonwell-deservedhonours,andyetheremaineda lonerapparentlypossessingfewifanyleadershipqualitiesorunwillingtoassumethe roleofanofficer.Nevertheless,inhisownmind,asearlyas ,hebeganattaching specialmeaningtotheslaughterhesawat firsthand.Thatyear,hebeganthinkingof thestruggleinominousterms,togobyaFebruarylettertoaMunichacquaintance.In it,hesaidthatwhenheandhiscomradesmadeithome,hehopedtheywould ‘findit purerandcleansedofforeignness’.Surely, ‘thedailysacrificesandsufferingofhundredsofthousandsofus’ would ‘smashGermany’senemiesabroadbutalsodestroy ourinternalinternationalism thatwouldbeworthmorethananyterritorialgains’ .
Instead,onhisreturntoMunichinlateNovember ,andconvincedtheHome Fronthadletdownthetroops,hefoundacityrivenbyrevolution,andaright-wing countermovementalreadyragingagainsttheevilof ‘JewishBolshevism’.Ifitwastrue thatanumberoftherevolutionaryleaders,suchasKurtEisnerandsomeofhis comradesinMunichwereJewsinMunich’srevolutionof November,twodays
beforeBerlin’s,infacttherevolutionsacrossallofGermanyweretheproductof widespreadsocialdiscontentwiththesacrificesoffouryearsofwar.
Hitlerwantednothingmorethantoremaininanarmyrole,whichhemanaged whenofficersselectedhimfortrainingtospeakonnationalistmatterstodemobilizing troops.HissuperiorsalsoassignedhimtomonitorpoliticalgroupsinMunich,likethe tinyGermanWorkers’ Party(DAP),oneofmanymarginalrightwingandantiSemiticpartiesinthearea.Hewassufficientlyimpressedsuchthatonlyaweekafter attendingoneofitsmeetingsinSeptember ,hejoinedup,soonbecameitsstar attraction,andin hehelpedtotransformitintotheNationalSocialistGerman WorkersParty,theNSDAPorNaziParty.On March ,whenGermany hadbeenhishomeforover fiveandahalfyears,thethirty-year-old pushedoutof themilitaryornot tookanuncharacteristicallyboldleapintopolitics.Socially, psychologically,andpoliticallyhebegancreatinganewidentityandevenanew personality.Soonhecoulddraw , listenersforoneofhisspeeches,andstill morecametohearwhathehadtosayashisreputationspread.
Althoughaconfirmedanti-Semitesince togobytheonlyreliablewritten evidencewehave hesoonrevealedaradicalstreakonthatscore,asindicated privatelytoHeinrichHeim,ayoungMunichlawstudent,whobecamealife-long confidant.InoneofhislettersfromAugust ,recentlyfoundbybiographer VolkerUllrich,HeimquotesHitlerassaying, ‘AslongasJewsremainwiththeir perniciouseffects,Germanycannotconvalesce.Whenitcomestotheexistenceor non-existenceofapeople,onecannotdrawalineatthelivesofblinkered[German] ethniccomradesandevenlesssoatthelivesofahostile,dangerous,foreigntribe.’ Thus,hegaveapreviewofhis ‘redemptive’ versionofanti-Semitism,bywhichhe linkedthesalvationofhiscountryto ‘pushingout’ theJews,thoughwhatthatmeant wouldkeepchanging.
Meanwhileasthepost-warrunawayinflationreachedcatastrophicproportionsin ,hismessagesfoundanevermoreenthusiasticresponse,atleastinBavaria.Fora time,hebecametheveritable ‘kingofMunich’,somuchsothatinNovemberthatyear atthepeakoftheinflation,heattemptedwhatturnedouttobeapoorlyorganized coup.Afteritsignominiousfailure,hewouldmakecertainneveragaintobetoofar aheadofthepeople,apoliticalviewhedevelopedin MeinKampf,theautobiography hewrotemostlyinprison,whichrevealedhowhethoughtandwhatheplanned.We nowknowthatitisamyththatnoonereadhisbookwhenitappearedinthemids,andwealsoknowthatHitlerwasdefinitelyitsauthor.Itremainslesscertain whatrolethelargeworkintwovolumeshadinwinningpeopletothecause.
Weshouldrealize,however,thathedidnotneedtoconvertallthefollowers,many ofwhom,likethetopNazileaders,werealreadyinaccordwithsimilarideastohis, beforetheylaideyesonhim.Perhapsaboveall,theysharedhiscommitmenttothe mission of ‘redeeming’ adefeatedandbrokenGermany,aquestthatmarkedthe careersofsuchkey figuresinthepartyasHeinrichHimmler,GregorandOtto Strasser,ErnstRöhm,HansFrank,RudolfHess,andthetwoBalticGermanémigrés AlfredRosenbergandMaxErwinvonScheubner-Richter. Introduction:TheThirdReich
InthecaseofJosephGoebbels,Germany’sfuturePropagandaMinister,wehave hisvoluminousdiarythatprovidesalmostdailycluestohisownpoliticalawakening. Liketheothers,hewasaproductofthepsychologicalandpoliticalatmosphereof post-wardisenchantmentandaimlessness.LongbeforehehadevenheardofHitler, Goebbelshadbecomepro-GreaterGermany,and ‘anti-international’,aswellas deeplyanti-Semitic acommonplaceinthosetimes.Heturnedawayfromleftist materialism,thoughnotnecessarilyagainstsomekindofGermansocialism.
AlthoughGoebbelswasnoactivistatwar’send,likesomanyinthecountryhe longedforthereturnofa ‘greatman’,perhapsonthemodeloftheIronChancellorOtto vonBismarckorFieldMarshalPaulvonHindenburg,thewarheroandfuturepresident.Goebbelsconfidedtohisdiaryinmid- thatGermany ‘yearnsfortheOne,the Man,astheearthlongsforraininsummer’.Forashorttime,hethoughthehimself mightbethatman(othersdidaswell),atleastuntilheheardHitlerspeakingforthe first timeon July .Goebbels’sresponsewastostandoutside ‘andcrylikeababy. Awayfromotherpeople.’ Laterhenotedoftheexperience,thatitwaslikea ‘resurrection.Whatavoice.Whatgestures,whatpassion. JustasIwishedhimtobe. ’ The emphasisisaddedhere,becauseitalmostseemsasifHitlerwasGoebbels’spsychologicalprojection,hisowndreamfulfilled.On finishingthe firstvolumeof MeinKampf, Goebbelsstillhadquestions,thoughsemi-worshipfulonesaboutitsauthor: ‘Whois thisman?Half-plebian,half-god!IsthisreallyChristorjustJohntheBaptist?’ AfterHitler’sreleasefromprisoninlate ,hebeganhispoliticalworkalmost fromscratch,andtogetherwithahandfulofloyalists,soonrefinedtheNaziParty machine.Nevertheless,itwasanuphillbattleuntilanothermajorsocialcalamity visitedthecountryintheguiseoftheGreatDepressionin .Morethananythingit wasthiseconomicchaosandmassjoblessnessthatmadepeoplepsychologicallyready toreceivetheNazimessage,andtoseehopeinHitler’svaguepromises.Thegreat breakthroughcameinthenationalelectionsin ,the firstvotesincethestock marketcrash.Overnight,the ‘marginal’ NaziParty,withanarmyofmilitanttrue believers,becameapowerwithwhichallothershadtocontend.Earlythenextyear,in aprivatemissive,Hitlerwasagaindeclaringhimselfaprophet oneofhisfavorite poses now claimingtopredict ‘withnearoracularcertainty’,thathewouldhave powerwithintwoandahalftothreeyears.Thistimehewasright.
AfterhewasappointedchancellorinJanuary ,aconcertedofficialeffortwas madetoconveythenewnationalleaderasifGod-senttofulfilasacredcalling.Soon thegreatmajoritywouldembracethemissionhearticulatedandthusimplicitlyaccept hisrighttoactbasedoncharismaticauthority.MaxWebersagelynoted,however, thatthisauthority’srevolutionarycorebeginstodiminishifitbecomesroutine.Hitler instinctivelygraspedwhatthisquandaryentailedinruling,sothatfromhis firstdays inpower,andtoanextentevenbefore,heworkedagainstthegrainandavoided bureaucratictasks.Perhapshewassimplyindolent,thoughnodoubt,herecognized howevenholdingcabinetmeetings(whichsoonstopped)woulderodehispersonal appeal,andhewouldceasetoappearasdivinelyordainedandabovepoliticsasusual.
Althoughself-taughtandavoraciousreader,heclaimedtointimatesthatheliked tolearnalsobyspeakingwiththemprivatelyabouttheirviews,suchasonhowto organizetheeconomyandsociety.Already,however,hepreferredthosearoundhim tohailhimastheFührer(notChancellor)tosymbolizehisidentificationwitha people’smovementandtoreinforcehisstandingasnotjustanotherpolitician.
Yetevenontheroadtopower,theNationalSocialistsdidnotneedtoinventmany ofthesentimentsonwhichtheybuilt.Therealreadyexistedstronganti-Weimar feelings,alongwiththedeepconvictionoftheinjusticeoftheVersaillesPeace,antiSemitism,andanti-Bolshevism.AttheendofMarch ,ElisabethGebensleben,a mother(born )andapassionatefemalePartymemberinBrunswick,while enthralledbyHitlerandoverjoyedwithhisrecentvictoryatthepolls,notedthat onlythendidthecommunistsburntheirred flagsandseektojoinhermovement. ‘Of coursethatisimpossible’,shewrotetohermarrieddaughterinHolland; ‘first,they willhavetomakeitthroughathree-yeartest-periodinaconcentrationcamp.The samefortheSocialDemocrats.’
HitlerwentontoexerciseenormousinfluencethroughouttheyearsoftheThird Reich,andrighttothebitterend.FelixRömer,ayoungGermanhistorian,has summeduptheman’sappealfortheGermanPOWsinAlliedcaptivitywhohestudied inaninsightfulbook,stillnotavailableintranslation.Römerconcludesthat ‘inthe eyesofthesementheFührerembodiedallthatwaspositiveandattractiveabout NationalSocialism’,whiletheyattributedallnegativitiestothoseinhisimmediate entourage,blamedotherauthorities, ‘orconvenientlyexplainedthemaway’.The avowalsofloyaltyofthemenincaptivitycutacrossoldreligious,class,andpolitical lines,andtotheextentthatanyprisonersnowclaimedtorejectHitlerandNazism, theytendedtobelongtoolderoppositionalclusters.The ‘communityofthepeople’,at leastinapsychologicalsense,persistedinsidetheWehrmachtincaptivity,evenafter June ,whenitshouldhavebeenobviousthatdefeatwasinevitable.
TheDictatorship’sUseofPlebiscitesandElections
The secondtheme weexploreinthebookistherelatednotionofHitler’sregimeasa curiousmixtureofdictatorshipandappealstothepublicviaplebiscitesandelections, asystemwecanlabeloneofplebiscitarydictatorship.In MeinKampf,hesaidhe wantedanauthoritarianregime,backedbythepeople,andonceinpower,todemonstratethatsupporthecoulduseelectionsortheplebiscitespermittedbytheWeimar constitution.Norwashealoneamongdictatorsinwantingtoputallkindofissuesto thevote.However,partlybecausetheNazisoverwhelminglywontheseexercises duringthe firstsixyears,manypeopleatthetimeandscholarseversince,doubted thevalidityoftheresults.Butweretheseeventsandtheplebiscitesall fixedandterrorfilled?Althoughhistorianscommonlyinsistthattheywere,recentinvestigations showotherwise,aswedointhisbook.Infact,thegovernmentortheNaziParty steppedinwhenlocalNazistookobviouslyillegalmeasurestohinderorchangethe Introduction:TheThirdReich
vote,becauseBerlindidnotwantoutsideobserverstocastdoubtontheoverwhelminglypositiveresults.
MembersoftheSocialDemocraticPartyunderground,andNazism’ssworn enemieswroteintheirsecretreportsthat ‘thefascists’ hadalreadymadeenormous gains.InNovember,whentheNazistook percentofthevoteinaplebisciteand . percentinsimultaneousnationalelections,thesocialistswrotethat ‘critical foreigners’ weretemptedtoassumetheseoutcomeswereobtainedby ‘forceorterror’ . Alas,theSocialistsdespairinglyhadtoadmitthatsuchviewsmisperceived ‘thereal andprofoundinfluencefascistideologyhasuponallclassesofGermansociety’.The undergroundreportconcludedwithgrudgingacknowledgementthatgenerallythe resultswere ‘atruereflectionofthemoodofthepopulation’,andtheturnoutin favourofNazismindicated ‘anextraordinarilyrapidandeffectiveprocessbywhich societywasbecomingfascist’ .
In ,totakeanotherexample,Hitlerwasalreadybathedinapopularapplause tooobvioustoignore,thankstothe firststepstorestoretheeconomyand ‘good order’.ThatsuccesswasundoubtedlyreflectedinthepositiveresultsoftheSaar plebiscite(January ),allowedbytheVersaillesTreatyof .Anotherelection totheReichstagon March tookplaceasaplebiscitesupposedlyauthorizing HitlertoremilitarizetheRhineland aboldstephehadalreadytaken.Thatmove flauntedcertainstipulationsinthesame,much-hatedVersaillesTreaty,andherethe regimemanagedanastounding . percentofthevotes.Althoughtheunderground socialistsusuallyemphasizeddisagreementanddiscordintheiraccountsofpeople’s attitudestotheNaziregime,on March theirobserverinMunichhadto admit,afterwitnessingaparadethereofthenewlynamedWehrmacht,that ‘the enthusiasmwasenormous.ThewholeofMunichwasonitsfeet.’ Headded,asifin replytocomrades andfuturehistorians whopointtoNaziterrorforexplaining theevidentconsensusbehindHitler’s regime: ‘Peoplecanbeforcedtosing,butthey cannotbeforcedtosingwithsuchenthusiasm.’ Thereporterhadexperienced theheadynationalistenthusiasmattheoutbreakofwarin ,andnowhecould onlysay, ‘Thatthedeclarationofwar[backthen]didnothavethesameimpactonme asthereceptionofHitleron March.’ Theleaderhad ‘wonpopularity’ and ‘isloved bymany’ .
WhydidHitlerneedelections?Infact,hehadnouseforthemassuch,thoughhe andJosephGoebbelstookthemveryseriouslybecause,asthePropagandaMinister putitinaninterviewin ,theregimewantedtoshowtheworldthattheentire nationstoodbehindtheregime’slegislation.Thereby,thegovernmentwoulddemonstratetheunityofthepeopleandtheirleader.Iftherewasdoubtlesslysomecoercion ormoralsuasionfromtheneighbourhoodorthePartytogetoutandvote,observers liketheSocialistPartyundergroundatthetimedidnotthinkthatterrorwasalways involved.
Howcouldthenationgetonsidesoquickly?Germanscholarsafter ,partly forpsychologicalreasons,shiedawayfromtheobviousfactthatforatimemostofthe nationhadsupportedNazism.Indeed,somanypeoplejoinedthePartyoroneofits
affiliatedorganizationsthatthemembershipeventuallyincludedpracticallyeveryone inthecountry.Afterthewar,manyscholarsemphasizedtherepressivecharacterof theregimeanditsunprecedentedcrimes,whileatthesametimetheseacademicsput asidequestionsastothesocialsupporttheregimehadenjoyed.However,afterseveral generationsofresearchandwriting,wehavenowreachedquitedifferentconclusions. AsUlrichHerbert,oneofGermany’sleadinghistorians,suggestedrecently,during theeraoftheThirdReich withtheobviousexceptionofitslastmonths perhaps percentoftheGermanpopulation ‘livedrelativelysecurelyandfairlyundisturbed undertheNaziregime’,andthisgreatmajoritywas ‘neverevenremotelyendangered bystaterepression’ .
Nazism’sSocialVision
The thirdtheme thatrunsthroughthisbookpertainstothe ‘communityofthe people’,aconceptthatwasintheairinthe sandevenearlier,andwhichthe Nazismadetheirown.GiventhatHitler’sversionwouldexcludeJewsandmany othersdeemed ‘raciallyinferior’,medicallyunfit,orpoliticallysuspect,howseriously didanyonetakethishighlytoutedsocialvision?
In ,severalhundredmembersoftheNaziPartysubmittedessaysinafamous contestsponsoredbyTheodoreAbel,aColumbiaUniversityprofessor.Hepromised prizesbasedonthebestautobiography,andparticularlyforanaccountofwhathad ledthemtoHitlerandtheparty.Mostunderlinedthattheywanteda ‘communityof thepeople’ inwhichclassconflictwouldendandtherewouldbea ‘return’ tosocial harmony.AsignificantminoritysaidtheyalsowantedtheJewsandotherforeigners pushedout.OtherswentovertothepartyprimarilybytheirattractiontoHitlerand his(surprisinglyvague)promisesofchange.Havingreadmanyoftheessaysmyself, nowheldattheHooverInstitutiononthecampusofStanfordUniversity,Icertainly agreewithAbel’sconclusions.Perhapsthewriters,consciouslyornot,toneddown theiranti-Semitism,giventhattheywerewritingforanAmericanprofessor,butthat prejudicecomesthroughindirectly,innumerousways.
Todayhistoriansdebatetheextenttowhichtheregimecreatedthemuch-heralded ‘communityofthepeople’.Althoughsomeareconvincedthatsuchamythical communityneverexisted,andamountedtolittlemorethanacheappropaganda device,simplydismissingtheideaof ‘community’ istooeasy.Itwaspreciselythis elementofNaziideologythatdictatedthestructureofthepromisedutopia.True enough,therewasneveraseriousattempttobringsocialequalitytoall,becauseonly theraciallypurewerevalued,anyonewhodidnot fitwouldbeexcluded,andrealclass differencespersisted.Nevertheless,theselectmajorityenjoyedasocial-psychological senseofbelongingtoaspecialracialcommunity.
Theregimesoughttopavethewayforthemanytoenjoytheluxuriesandpleasures thatuntilthenhadbeenopenonlytothesocialelite.Hence,Hitlerpromiseda people’scar,theVolkswagen,andmillionsdeposited fiveReichmarkperweek ‘to become carownersinfouryears’ .
AutomakerFerdinandPorsche,incivilianclothesstandingnexttoabeamingHitler,giveshimabirthdaypresent()ofaprototypeofthe Volkswagenconvertible.
Althoughcustomershadtopaywellinadvanceandcollectednointerest,tensof thousandssoonsignedup,thoughnoneofthemevergotthe finishedproduct. Nevertheless,historianHartmutBerghoffunderlinesthesignificanceoftheir ‘virtual consumption’,thatis,while ‘racialcomrades’ didnotgettheirowncarorhouseas promised,thepublicitycampaignssurroundingtheseandotherdreamsallowedthem ameasureofconsumersatisfaction.Theycouldenvisiondrivingdownthenew autobahnintheirowncar.Inaddition,forthe firsttimeinhistory,theGerman governmentshowedrealconcernforordinarypeople,sponsoredcrusadestoclean upandbeautifytheworkplace,aswellassmalltownsandvillages,andtheseefforts impressedmanyerstwhiledoubters.Opportunitiesexistedforthemtoenjoyopera,or tocontemplatevacationstoforeignlandsoncruiseships,pastimesuntilthenreserved foronlythewell-to-do.Visitstothecinemamultipliedmanytimesover,asdid excursionstoartgalleries,thesymphony,operas,andexhibitions.Thentherewere festivalslike ‘thedayofGermanart’,duringwhichtherewereparadesof floats bedeckedwithhistoricalcharactersfromtheGermanpast,whichmadeNational Socialistideologyvisibleinwaysmeanttoappeal.Besidestryingtowinoverthe workers,thenewregimereachedouttoengageallofsociety,includingtheoftenignoredpeasantry.AspecialHarvestFestival,introducedinSeptember ,builton oldtraditions.ItbroughthundredsofthousandstogetheratBückeberginLower Saxony,andinadditionlocalitiesacrossthecountrycelebratedtheeventaswell.
Ofcourse,theunderlyingreasonthatsomanyturnedinfavourofHitlerand NationalSocialismwasthattheregimeendedunemployment,thougheventhatdid nothappenovernight.Nordidworkcreationprojectshelpallthatmuch,because rearmamentdidfarmoretoovercomejoblessness.Economichistoriansprovide variousestimatesformilitaryexpenditures,thoughallagreeontheenormousincrease fromthe firstyearofHitler’sruledowntotheoutbreakofthewar.Hans-Ulrich Wehlersuggeststhatmilitaryspendingwentfrom percentofthenationalbudgetin upto percentin .Thismassiveinfusionofcapitaladditionallycreated goodjobsandsomecommunitiesprosperedasneverbefore.Moreover,withthe reintroductionofthemilitarydraftinMarch ,ever-largernumbersofyoung menwentintothearmedforces.Whereasuntilthatyearthenumberservinginthe militarywaslimitedto ,,byAugust anewarmamentsplancalledforthe wartimestrengthofthearmytoreach ,, by October .Bycomparison, thenumbersemployedinconstructingthehighlytoutedautobahnweremodest,going from , inDecember ,increasingslowlyandonlytopping , forthe firsttimeinMay . IfbeatingtheGreatDepressionwasalongstruggle,Germanyeventuallysucceeded. NodoubtHitlerbolsteredtheeffortbyexudingconfidenceandsettinganewpsychologicaltone.Beingpartofthis ‘community ofthepeople’ camewithitsrewards.Even membersoftheworking-classpartieswhohadbeenthestrongestopponentsof Nazismpriorto came,ifreluctantly,toacceptthattheeconomywasimproving. Infact,VolkerUllrichhasshownthatamajorityofworkers,likeothersocialgroups, changedtheirnegativeopinionofNazismandHitlerwithremarkableeaseand
TheBückebergFestival.Thesanctifiedspacedownthemiddlewas,onHitler’sorders,tobecalledthe ‘Führer’sWay’,andreservedforhisascentand descentofthemountain.
sometimesovernight.Onecontemporarylookingbackrecalledfondly, ‘Suddenly everythingseemedpossible.’
Thisisnottosaythatterrorhadceasedcompletelyaftertheexcessesinearly . However,thisterrorwasnotrandom,foritaimedoverwhelminglyatthosealready feared,likerecidivistcriminals;ordespised,aswerethevagabonds,Gypsies,and ‘others’.Therewerespecialcampaignstocleanupthestreetsfromprostitutes,pimps, andpornography.Thegreatlyempoweredpolicealsoenforcedmorerigorouslythe lawsalreadyonthebooksagainsthomosexualacts,whilenewlawsmadeitpossible tosterilizeanyonedeemedtoberaciallyorphysically ‘defective’.Inaddition,the notorious ‘Gestapomethods’ werenopost-warinvention,thoughtheywereused selectively,abovealltocracktheundergroundcommunistmovementandlaterin –,totrackdownpocketsofresistanceandcrime.Althoughitisdifficultto generalizeabouthow ‘goodcitizens’ reactedtothesedevelopments,thereisevidence tosuggestthatmanywelcomedthecrackdowninthenameof ‘lawandorder’.When askedrecentlyaboutthesekindsofcrimes,onegrandmothersaidsimply ‘Wedidnot worryaboutthem.’ IflateronherJewishfriendsoracquaintancessimplydisappeared, shesaid, ‘Butthatwasjusthowthingswere,wedidnotaskanyquestions,perhapswe werescared.’
WarandEmpire
The fourthand finaltheme inthebookpertainstowarandtheNaziempire.In Hitler’sview,fosteringtheeconomyandbuildinga ‘communityofthepeople’ were notendsinthemselves,asmuchastheywereprerequisitestofulfillinghisexpansive plansontheforeignpolicyfront.Duringhis firstyearsinpower,evensmall,bloodless diplomaticvictoriesorhisspeechespleadingforpeace,madehimmorepopular,while atthesametimehegrewmoreconfidentandassertive.Thosewhohadknownhim duringthe shardlyrecognizedhimbythelate swhentheysawhimagain.
ThebroadlyshareddreamamongtheGermanelitewasthatoncetheycreateda ‘harmonious’ andconflict-freesocietyathome,thecountrywouldbeinapositionto breakoutofwhatnearlyallGermansdeemedtobeanunjustpost-warpeace settlementthatthevictorsimposedonthemin .Hitlerandthosearoundhim wantedmuchmore,includingthedefeatoftheexternalenemiesandthentheseizure ofLebensraumintheEast.Inthesevastlands,reachingintoUkraine,perhapsto MoscowandeventotheUralMountains,theconquerorswouldestablishanew order,aGermanicutopiaforthe ‘masterrace’.Newsettlerswouldthenpushoutthe nationsalreadythere,enslaveorevenmurderthem.
Theeasy first attainments,whichHitlerchalkedupinforeignpolicy,encouraged thisbrutalvisionofLebensraumintheEast.Ontopofthat,ceaselesspropaganda infectedmanyintheNaziPartywelldowntheline.Apartfromtheleader,othersin thehierarchydreamedofagrandempire,andtheirplans,alongwiththoseofthe academicexpertsandtheSS,calledfornothinglessthanthedeliberatestarvationof millions.Today,thesevisionsandothers,suchasthosethatwerepartoftheGeneral
PlanEast,readliketalesofhorror,repletewithwarsofconquest,plunder,and enslavementonintothefutureuntilperhapsashowdownwiththeUnitedStates. Outlandishly,theambitionsgrewinscaleevenafterGermanybeganlosingthewar.
Moreover,itwasinthecontextofcreatingaGermanicempirethattheregimeset aboutthetrulymonstrousundertakingofmurderingallofEurope’sJews.Although manyintheNazihierarchyhadentertainedmurderousthoughtsabouttheJewsfor years,mosthistoriansinsistthatthedecisionordecisionsforthe ‘finalsolution’ came onlyafterwarbeganwiththeSovietUnioninJune .
Backin ,JewsinGermanyhadbeenwellintegratedandthusslowtoaccept howfundamentallytheirliveswouldchangewhentheNaziscametopower.TheJews wereasmallminorityinthecountry,andthoughtheymadeuplessthanonepercent ofthepopulation,theystoodoutinthelargercities,andastrandofGermanpublic opinionresentedthemevenbeforetheNazismadeanti-Semitismmorepopular.Itdid notmatterthattheJewshadlivedintheselandsforoverathousandyears,orthatin thenewGermanyfoundedin theyhadobtainedequalrightsunderthelaw,and enjoyedmoreopportunitiesforsocialadvancementthanalmostanywhereonearth.
ForHitlerandtheNaziParty,reversingthoserightsandforcingtheJewsoutwasa toppriority.However,mostcitizensdidnottakeanti-Semitismnearlyasseriously. Thus,inApril ,anofficiallysponsoredboycottofJewishbusinessesandprofessionalswasapropaganda flop.Nevertheless,HitlerwhisperedtotheItalianambassadorVittorioCeruttithathewantedfarmorethansuchaboycott,andheappallingly predicted, ‘Thatin or yearsthenameHitlerwillbeuniversallyglorifiedasthe nameofthemanwho,onceandforall,eradicatedtheglobalpestilencethatisJewry.’ Indeed,hisanti-Semitismwouldgrowmorevirulentbytheyear.
OfficialandinformaldiscriminationslowlyescalatedasHitlergainedpopularsupportandmorefreedomofactionfrominternationalpressure,especiallyinSeptember whenGermanyobtainedtheSudetenlandatCzechoslovakia’sexpense.Just overamonthlaterinNovember,theNazisunleashedoneoftheworstpogromsinthe nation’slonghistoryintheoutrageous ‘nightofbrokenglass’,or Reichskristallnacht. Thereafter,theJewshadtosellofftheirpropertiesatbargainbasementpricesinthe so-calledAryanizationcampaign,thestate-sponsoredrobberythatspreadeverywhere theGermanswentinthewaryears.
WiththeconquestofPolandinSeptember ,theThirdReichfounditself facedwithmillionsofJews,anduncertainaboutwhatshouldhappentothem.As soonasthewaragainsttheSovietUnionbeganinJune ,specialtaskforces beganshootingthousandsofJewsintheEastandforcingmillionsintoghettos.On July,duringaneveningintheFührer’sbunker,oneofhisadjutants,WalterHewel recordedaparticularlyhorrificstatement,whenhequotedHitlerassaying: ‘Ifeellike theRobertKoch[–]inpolitics.Hediscoveredthebacillusandpointed medicalscienceinnewdirections.IdiscoveredtheJewsasthebacillusandtheferment ofallsocialdecomposition.’ Suchthinkingrationalizedthemurderousactsalready underway,forbythenthespecialtaskforceswereshootingnotjustmaleJews,but alsofemalesandchildren.
HitlercrossedanimportantlineinSeptember ,whenhedecidedonthe deportationofalltheJewsremaininginGermany(theAltreich).Indeed,bythelast weekinOctober,tofollowChristopherBrowning’sconclusion, ‘theclosecircle aroundHitler,andgraduallyothersaswell,knewwhatHitlerexpectedofthemand inwhatgeneraldirectiontheyplannedtoproceed’.ByearlyNovember,construction beganonthe firstdeathcamps,whosesolepurposewastoproducedeath,andthat development,amongothers,suggeststhatshortlybeforehehadgivenanorder,or utteredawish,tokillalltheJewsinEuropeasfarashisarmiescouldreach.Onthe otherhand,inrecentyears,historianspointtoanimportantmeetingofNazileaders on December ,thedayafterHitler—inastepnotcalledforbythetreatywith Japan haddeclaredwarontheUnitedStates.FinallyonthatdateaWorldWarhad arrived,amomentwhenHitler fi rst ‘ prophesized’ (on January )what wouldhappentotheJews.Theresult,hehadsaid,wouldnotbe ‘theBolshevization oftheearth,andthusthevictoryofJewry,buttheannihilationoftheJewishrace inEurope! ’
Apartfromcontinuingargumentsamonghistoriansastothedateordatesofa possibleHitlerorderordecisionfortheHolocaust,recentstudiesunderlinetherole of ‘ordinary’ Germans,thatis,men(andsomewomen)whowerenotintheParty ortheSS,whovolunteeredtoserveinpolicebattalions,andsoonfoundthemselves inthekilling fi elds.MillionsintheWehrmachtnotonlysawtheeventsthemselves, theyoftencooperatedwiththeSSandsometimesbecameinvolvedinthekilling. Certainly,theGermanoccupationforcesdidnothavetosearchforcollaboratorsin thekillinginEasternEurope,forinmanyc aseslocalsrushedtotakeadvantageof thesituation.
Duringthewar,thefearthathauntedHitler,andtoasurprisingextentthosein theof fi cercorpsofthearmedforceswelldownthechainofcommand,andnotjust amongSSandPartyfanatics,wasarecurrenceofthe ‘ stab-in-theback’ of . Accordingtothatmyth,theHomeFrontletdownthebattlefrontandbroughtabout thedefeatofthearmyintheFirstWorldWar.Inasense,manyofthestepsthe regimehadtakenduringtheyearsofpeaceafter andespeciallyduringthewar wereinparteffortstoensurethathistorydidnotrepeatitself.Thus,Hitlerdidnot wanttoaskGermanstosacrifi cetoomuch,sothatGoebbelshadanuphillstruggle towinhissupportfor ‘totalwar’,andbythetimehegotthego-ahead,itwasalready fartoolate.
Toavoidthedemoralizationthatenemypropagandamightbring,theregime outlawedcitizenslisteningtoforeignradio,suchastheBBCorRadioMoscow;the policetookimmediatestepstoarrestoffendersandallpotential ‘enemieswithin’;and theconcentrationcamppopulationexpanded.Thewaralsocreatednewsocial problems,aboveallintheformofmillionsofforcedlabourersbroughtintomake upforthemillionsofGermansinthearmedforces.MostwerefromPolandandthe westernSovietUnion.Theyweremarkedwithbadges,treatedlikeslaves,andtold thatiftheydaredhaveanysexualrelationswithGermans,thepunishmentwouldbe death,athreatoftencarriedout. Introduction:TheThirdReich
