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TheOpenFuture TheOpenFuture WhyFutureContingentsareAllFalse PATRICKTODD GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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Preface Theproblemoffuturecontingentsisahorrible,intractableproblem,andI’mnot surewhatIwasthinkingwhen,afewyearsago,Idecidedtotrytowriteabook aboutit.Andyethereweare.IhopeI’vemanagedtoproduceabookthatisat leastnotwhollyonthewrongtrack.
Ibeganworkonthisbookinthesummerof2018astheEdinburghvisiting professoratDartmouthCollege.However,myinterestintheproblemoffuture contingentsbeganasanundergraduate,whereIencounteredtheproblemin connectiontotheproblemsoffatalismandfreewill.Itstruckmethen and continuestostrikemenow thattherecouldbenothingonthebasisofwhich futurecontingentswouldbetrue,andsothebestthingtosayisthattheyjust aren ’ttrue.Iacceptedinsomesemi-consciouswaythatthisputmeinconflict withtheclassicallogicthatIhadjustbeentaught butIreasonedthatother philosophersthoughtthatthiswasa finepathtotake,andanywayifitwasgood enoughforAristotle,itwasprobablygoodenoughforme.Nevertheless,itstruck measvaguelyadhocandunsatisfyingtobeforcedtoabandoncertain logical principlesinorderpreservesomequaintnotionof “freewill”.Iflogicshouldimply thatnoonehasfreewill,whoarewesimplyto “revise” ourlogic?Thatwas,if Irecall,aboutasfarasIgotonthisproblemasanundergraduate.
Asagraduatestudent,however,KennyBoyceintroducedmetoA.N.Prior’ s “Peircean” viewthatfuturecontingentsareall false,and,inviewofthedifficulties justnoted,Ihavebeenattractedtosomeversionofan “allfalse” vieweversince.
Gradually,however,Ibecamedissatis fiedwithwhatstruckmeasthestipulative characterofPeirceanism,withitssheerinsistencethat will means “determined” . Lateingraduateschool,andasapost-doc,Ireturnedtotheproblem,andbegan developingawayofgettingtoan “allfalse” view,butnotbycourtesyof Peirceanism.TheviewIdevelopeddependedcruciallyonacomparisonwith Russell’stheoryofdefinitedescriptions,andin2013,asanewmemberofstaff attheUniversityofEdinburgh, Mind acceptedmypaper, “FutureContingentsare AllFalse!OnBehalfofaRussellianOpenFuture ” ,my firstrealforayintodebates aboutthelogicoffuturecontingents.
Naturally,itallwentdownhillfromthere.Fortheacceptanceofthatpaper coincidedwithmybecomingfriendswithagroupofnewcolleagues allphilosophersoflanguageandlogic whoseinsightsforcedafundamentalreorientation ofmyapproachtotheproblemoffuturecontingents:AndersSchoubye(nowat Stockholm),BryanPickel(nowatGlasgow),andespeciallyBrianRabern(thankfullystillatEdinburgh).Thestoryofthisbookreallybeginshere,asinnumerable
conversationswithAnders,Bryan,andBrianturnedwhatwasotherwise,forme,a sortofside-interestinthelogicoffuturecontingentsintoafull-blownobsession, andforcedinmearecognitionthatthetheory,asdevelopedthusfar,wasatthe veryleastwoefullyunder-defended.Onamorepersonallevel:itisnotmerelythat, withouttheirhelp,Iwouldn’thavebeen able towriteabookofthiskind though thatmuchistrue.Itisalsothat,withouttheirhelp,Ineverwouldhaveseen fitto try towriteabookofthiskind.
Butletmebackup.ThereismuchIstillagreewithinthat Mind paper,but muchthatnowstrikesmeasnaïveorotherwisewrongheaded.(Ithastakenagood fewyearsformetobecomewillingtowritethatsentence.)Concerningthe Mind paper,oneofmycritics JacekWawer despitebeingseverelycriticalofmy “extremism”,waskindenoughtoremarkthat “theelegantsimplicityofthis theoryisimpressive”.Theappearanceofthisbookwassignificantlydelayedby myemotionalattachmenttowhatIsawasthiselegance andmyfeelingthat therejust had tobeadeepconnectionbetweendebatesaboutdefinitedescriptions anddebatesaboutfuturecontingents.Inpointoffact,however,theviewwhich Wawercharacterizedaselegantlysimplewasnotpreciselythe finalviewIhad adoptedinthatpaper.Infact,inordertopreservethetruthof “futurenecessities” , Ihadtomakemy finalproposalfundamentally disjunctive. Andthiswasnever goingtobeultimatelysatisfying.
Nevertheless,inthe firstdraftofthisbook,Iwasstilldefendinganupdated versionoftheRussellianviewIdefendedinthe Mind paper,withonefullchapter devotedtorespondingtothepublishedobjectionsfromSchoubyeandRabern (2017)andJacekWawer(2018).Intheend,andforreasonsIwon’tbother elaborating,ittookfriendlysuggestionsfromKennyBoyce,MattMcGrath, MatthewMandelkern,and(asever)BrianRabern finallytoconvincemethat thespiritofmyviewisbettercaptured,notbysayingthat will is,inpart,some kindofdisguiseddefinitedescription,butinsteadisbettercapturedbysayingthat will isauniversalquantifieroverwhat(inChapter2)Icallthe available futures thecausallypossiblefuturesconsistentwiththeprimitivefuturedirectedfacts. Thisshifthasresulted,Ibelieve,inanumberofcrucialbenefitstothebooknow beforeyou;besidesbeingintrinsicallymoreplausible,itis(a)moreinkeeping withapproachesto will foundinlinguistics,(b) fitsbetterwithmykeyproposal that will isa “neg-raiser”,and(c)makesmycorecomparisonwithLewis’ semanticsforthecounterfactualmuchmorestraightforward.Thereismuchin commonbetweentheviewsetoutinthisbook(especiallyinChapters2–4)and theviewdevelopedinthe Mind paper indeed,atcertainlevelofdescription,they arelogicallyequivalent butmuchthatiscruciallydifferent,and,Ihope,much thatiscruciallybetter,whileretainingallthesamesimpleelegance(suchasitwas) oftheformertheory.
Partofwhatmakestheproblemoffuturecontingentssodifficult,andso intractable,isthattheproblemtouchesonsomanydisparateareasofphilosophy.
Indeed,thecoredeviceIappealtoinChapter3(“neg-raising”) whatisperhaps the keytomydefenseofmywholetheory hasitshome,notinphilosophyatall, butinlinguistics.Icertainlydonotclaimthatexpertiseinalloftheneededareas hasmiraculouslyconvergedupon me. HoweverfarI’vegotteninthisbook(and thereadermustjudgehowfarthatis),itisbecauseI’vebeenguided,atcrucial points,bytheexpertiseofothers.
I’vealsojustbeenfortunateenoughtointeractwithpeoplelikelytobeableto helpme.AtlunchafteratalkDanielRothschildgaveinEdinburgh,conversation turned or,ifyoumustknow,Iturnedtheconversation towhatIwasworking onatthemoment;inwhatseemedanoffhandremark,Rothschildnotedthatwhat Iwastalkingaboutsoundedlike “neg-raising”—acommentImadecertainto followup.AndIsoondiscovered,tomygreatexcitement,thattherewasalreadya name forthephenomenonIhadpreviouslybeenstrugglingsohardtoidentify. Thisthenledtomypaper,partsofwhichnowformthebasisofChapter3, “The ProblemofFutureContingents:ScopingoutaSolution”,publishedin Synthese NotonlywasIextremelyfortunatetohaveRothschildmentionneg-raising,Iwas alsoextremelyfortunatetohaveLaurenceHorn perhapsthechiefauthorityon neg-raising asasympathetic(albeitneverthelesscritical)referee.Hornsaysthat Anselmisthe “patronsaintofneg-raising”—andIamcertainlynotgoingto contradictHornonthismatter.ButevenifAnselmisthepatronsaintofnegraising,Horncertainlyisitschiefconfessor,andItookagreatdealofencouragementfromourinteractions.Theneg-raisingidea,evenifultimatelymistaken, Ithought,isn’t catastrophically or obviously mistaken,andthatidea,Ifelt, deservedahearing.
IamdeeplygratefultotheUniversityofEdinburgh(andtoMikeRidge)fora researchsupportgrantthatallowedmetoorganizeandhostaworkshoponmy firstdraftofthisbookinJune2019,whichledtoverysubstantialimprovements (someofwhichwerenotedabove).Inparticular,fortheirparticipationinthis workshop,IwishtothankDilipNinan,DerekBall,StephanTorre,LivCoombes, MatthewMcGrath,MonaSimion,MarkThakkar,StephanTorre,andmy EdinburghcolleaguesBrianRabernandWolfgangSchwarz.Concerning Wolfgang’scommentsinparticular:Iwillbethe firsttoadmitthatIcannot fullyresolvewhatshouldbesaidabouttheinteractionof will and probably (and theassociatedsetofissuesaboutcredencediscussedinChapter6).Conversations withWolfgang,however,haveencouragedmetothinkthatthere is asolutionfor theopenfuturistinthisdomain.Thoseconversations,however,haveequally encouragedmetothinkthat,ifsomeoneisgoingtofullysaywhatthatis,that personisnotgoingtobeme.
IpresentedanearlydraftofChapter4attheDesertPhilosophyWorkshop(St. George,Utah)inApril2019;IwishtothankJoshArmstrong,WillStarr,Eliot Michaelson,GraceHelton,ShyamNair,andJamesShawforespeciallyhelpful feedback.IalsowishtothankaudiencesatdepartmentalcolloquiaatQueens
UniversityBelfast(April2018),Dartmouth(July2018),andNottingham (November2018).SpecialthanksarealsoverymuchduetoMatthew Mandelkern,RichardWoodward,andKennyBoyce,allofwhomreadtheentire firstdraftandgavemeenormouslyhelpfulanddetailedcommentsonpractically everychapter.
Itistemptingtoelaborateonthedetailsconcerningthewayinwhichthe followingpeoplehavehelpedmeovertheyears,butIshallhavetocontentmyself withthefollowing:Forhelpfulconversationsandcriticalcomments,Iwishto thank,besidesthosealreadymentionedabove,FabrizioCariani,PaoloSantorio, GeoffPullum,JonGajewski,DavidPlunkett,GhislainGuigon,MarkBalaguer, NealTognazzini,PhilipSwenson,AndrewBailey,BradleyRettler,JonKvanvig, SamLevey,DavidHunt,MikeRea,SvenRosenkranz,AlexPruss,Robbie Williams,AldoFrigerio,AldaMari,JacekWawer,MattBenton,Godehard Brüntrup,GeorgGasser,MichaelNelson,JohnPerry,andJohnMartinFischer. IamextremelygratefultotwoanonymousrefereesforOxfordUniversityPress, andcanonlyapologizeforthefact andI’mafraiditisafact thatIhaven’t alwaysbeenablefullytodojusticetotheirtrenchantcomments,especially concerningChapter1.Inmydefense,theirsarenottheonlycommentsIhave failedtoaddress;indeed,Ihavefailedtoaddressawholerangeofcommentsit wouldprobablyhavebeensensibletoaddress,butIsimplydidn’tknowhowto address.
IamalsodeeplygratefultomycolleagueBrianRabernformakingthe flowchartsinChapters2and4,andforallowingmetoreprintourjointpaperin Noûs asChapter7.Infact,IwouldberemissifIdidn’treturntomoreexplicitly acknowledgemyenormousdebttoBrian,whosepatientadvice,expertise,and goodphilosophicalsensehaveshapedthisbookinmorewaysthanIcould mention.Itwouldbeimpossibleformetocatalogueallthewaysinwhichsome goodpointinthisbookultimatelytracesbacktosomesuggestionfromBrian,or tocataloguealltheerrorsthatwouldalmostcertainlyhaveappearedinthisbook, butforhisinfluence.Indeed,itisonlyslightlyanexaggerationtosaythatifapoint ismadeinthisbookatall,itiseitherbecauseBrianagreeswithit,orcouldn’t convincemeoutofit.Itgoeswithoutsaying,ofcourse,thatanyerrorsthat do remaininthisbookareaccordinglymostlyhisfault.
Finally,IammostgratefultomywifeRebecca,whoseunfailingsupportwas crucialtomycompletionofthisproject,andwhosepatiencefordelicatescope distinctionsIhavestrainedonnumerousoccasions.AndbeforeIforget,Imust alsothankmydogYoraandyoungsonGabriel,fordoingtheirutmosttodistract mefromthetaskathand.
5. OmniscienceandtheFuture
5.1TwoVersionsofOpenTheism:OpenFuture,andLimited
5.2TheLogicofOmniscience
5.3PerfectAnticipation:VariationsonaPrioreanTheme
6. BettingontheOpenFuture
6.1PrioronBets,Guesses,andPredictions
6.2BettingasaNormativeAct
6.4Open-FuturistAgreements
6.5Ambiguities
7. FutureContingentsandtheLogicofTemporalOmniscience (PatrickToddandBrianRabern)
7.1Open-Closurism
7.2TheLogicofTemporalOmniscience
8. TheAssertionProblem
8.1TheFirstProblem:MustOpenFuturistsChangeTheirWays?
TheOpenFuture:Introductiontoa ClassicalApproach AtleastsinceAristotle’sfamous ‘sea-battle’ passagesin OnInterpretation9,some substantialminorityofphilosophershasbeenattractedtothethesisthatfuture contingentpropositions roughly,propositionssayingofcausallyundetermined eventsthattheywillhappen systematicallyfailtobetrue.However,open futurists,inthissenseoftheterm,havealwaysstruggledtoarticulatehowtheir viewinteractswithstandardprinciplesofclassicallogic mostnotably,with bivalenceandtheLawofExcludedMiddle.Forconsiderthefollowingtwoclaims:
Therewillbeasea-battletomorrow
Therewillnotbeasea-battletomorrow
Accordingtothekindofopenfuturistatissue,bothoftheseclaimsmaycurrently failtobetrue.Inthissense,thefutureis “ open ”.Accordingtomany,however, denyingthedisjunctionoftheseclaims(“Therewillbeasea-battletomorrowor therewillnotbeasea-battletomorrow”)istantamounttodenyingtheLawof ExcludedMiddle(LEM).Accordingly,theopenfuturistmusteitherdenyLEM outright,orinsteadmaintainthatadisjunctioncanbetruewithouteitherofits disjunctsbeingtrue.Worse,accordingtobivalence,ifapropositionisnottrue,it isfalse andthustheopenfuturistseeminglymusteitherdenybivalence,or insteadmaintainthatadisjunctioncanbetruealthoughbothofitsdisjuncts are false.
Sucharethefamiliarproblems.Thethesisofthisbookisthattheyarebornof anillusion.Thethesisofthisbookisthatthedisjunctionoftheabovetwoclaimsis noinstanceoftheLawofExcludedMiddle indeed,thethesisofthisbookisthat thedisjunctionoftheabovetwoclaimsisnotaninstanceofanyprinciplewhose validityisultimatelyworthaccepting.Inthisbook,Idonotdefendadenialof LEM,andIdonotdefendthetruthofthegivendisjunctionbywayofdefending theclaimthatthedisjunctionistrueeventhoughitsdisjunctsfailtobetrue. IdefendtheclaimthatthedisjunctionisnoinstanceofLEM,andthat,inthe relevantcontexts,thisdisjunctionissimply false,becausebothofitsdisjunctsare false.(Withapologiestothereader,IdoqualifythisclaiminChapter2[Missing Ambiguities?] butthesequalificationscanwait.)Thecentralgoalofthisbookis
todefendthethesisthat futurecontingentsaresystematicallyfalse.Ithusdefenda versionofthedoctrineoftheopenfuturethatis consistent withtheclassical principlesofbivalenceandExcludedMiddle.
Thethesisthatfuturecontingentsaresystematicallyfalsehasbeendefended before.Indeed,suchaviewwas firstputforwardbyCharlesHartshornein1941, andlaterdefendedbyA.N.Priorinthe1950sand1960sintheformofhis ‘Peircean’ tenselogic.MyownviewandthePeirceanviewthushavemuchin common:inparticular,bothmaintainthatfuturecontingentsareallfalse. However,inmyestimation,thePeirceanviewissubjecttoseriousobjections.If Peirceanismwerethustheonlywayofmaintainingthatfuturecontingentsare systematicallyfalse,thentheopenfuture would indeedrequirearevisionof classicallogic.Mygoalinthisbookistoarticulateaversionofthethesisthat futurecontingentsareallfalsethatisnotsubjecttotheproblemsthatplaguethe Peircean.
Thecentralgoalofthisbookisthustodevelopaplausible,non-Peircean accountoftheopenfutureandthesemanticsoffuturecontingentsthatpreserves classicallogic.Abriefwordaboutthisgoalisinorder.Thestandpointthat animatesmydiscussionisnotsomuchthatclassicallogicisthetruelogic,but thattheopenfuturegivesusnoreasontothinkthatitisn’t.Iamagnostic concerningwhetherthereisanysuchthingasthe “true” logic,andIamagnostic whether,ifthereissuchathing,classicallogicisthatlogic.Nevertheless,itis clearthatbothbivalenceandExcludedMiddlestillcommandtheloyaltyofa significantproportionofphilosophers.Ihopethatthe desirability ofanaccount oftheopenfuturethatpreservesbothsuchprinciplesisnotinneedof substantialdefense.
Onedistinctivefeatureofthisbookistheextenttowhichitfeaturesdiscussion ofproblemsconcerningfuturecontingentsand omniscience.Itis,ofcourse, commonfortheoriststopointoutthelongstandinghistoricalconnections betweenthetopicsoffuturecontingentsanddivineforeknowledge.Asoftenas not,however barring,ofcourse,explicitdiscussionofthisissueinthephilosophyofreligion theseconnectionsareonlynotedinpassing,andatanyratedo nosubstantialworkinmotivatingtherelevantpositionsorarguments.Asreaders ofthisbookwillnotice,however,considerationsofdivineomniscienceare, startinginChapter6,invokedroutinelyinthisbook.Thisfactreflectsmyown interestsinthephilosophyofreligion,butitalsoreflectsmyconvictionthat thinkingabouttheproblemsofomniscienceandthefutureareinvaluablewhen assessingphilosophicaltheoriesoftheopenfuture.Indeed,Ibelievethata primaryadvantageoftheviewIaimtodevelopisthatitpromisestoprovidean elegantstoryconcerningomniscienceandthefuture andaprimaryargument Idevelopagainstrival(“supervaluationist” and “relativist”)viewsisthattheycan tellnosuchstory.However,awordofcautionisinorderaboutthesepoints.Atno pointinthisbookdoIdevelopargumentsinwhichthe truth oftheismisinvoked.
Theresult,Ihope,isanessaythatappealstophilosophersofreligion,butisnot itselfaworkdirectlyinthephilosophyofreligion.
ThisbookwillassumethebasicframeworkofA.N.Prior’stenselogic.In particular,itwillassumehenceforthwithoutcommentthatitisunproblematic toaskaboutthemeaning,andthetruthconditions,ofpropositionssuchas ‘Itwas nunitsoftimeagothat p’ and ‘Itwillbeinnunitsoftimehencethat p’—which, followingPrior,Iwillabbreviatethroughoutas ‘Pnp’ and ‘Fnp’,respectively.
Thebookisorganizedaroundtheresolutionofwhatmightbecalled “the problemoffuturecontingents”.Again,futurecontingentpropositionsarepropositionssayingofcontingent,presentlyundeterminedeventsthattheywillhappen. (Theeventsmustbeneitherdeterminedtooccur,nordetermined not tooccur.)
Theproblemoffuturecontingentsarisesfromthefollowingconflict.Ontheone hand,wehavewhatwemightcall thegroundingproblem.Ifnothingaboutpresent reality andthelawsgoverninghowrealityunfoldsovertime settlesitthatthe relevanteventswillhappen,howandwhyisit true thattheywillhappen?What,in short,accountsforthetruthoffuturecontingentpropositions?Orifnothing does accountfortheirtruth,howaretheyneverthelesstrue?Thisisthegrounding problem.Ontheotherhand,wehavewhatwemightcall thelogicalproblem anda seriesof practicalproblems. If,instead,suchpropositionsarenevertrue,what becomesoftheclassicallogicalprinciplesofbivalenceandExcludedMiddle?This isthelogicalproblem.Further,ifsuchpropositionsarenevertrue orevenfalse weseemtofaceaseriesofroughly practical problemsregarding,forinstance,our practicesofbetting,ourcredencesregardingfuturecontingents,ourassertions aboutthefuture,andespeciallyourpracticeofretrospectivelypredicatingtruthto predictionsthatinfactcometopass.Ifyoupredictthatahorsewillwinarace,and thenthathorsedoeswin,wewilltypicallysaythat “youwereright”.Iffuture contingentsarenevertrue,however,thenitisnotclearhowthispracticecanmake sense.Theseareourpracticalproblems.
Openfuturistsendorsethegroundingproblem,andthusfacethelogical problemandthepracticalproblems.InChapter1,Idevelopandadvancethe groundingproblem.InChapters2–5,Iaddressthelogicalproblemfortheopen future.InChapters6–8,Irespondtothepracticalproblems.Theresult:the groundingproblemstands,andthelogicalandpracticalproblemscanbe addressed andwehaveadefenseofthedoctrineoftheopenfuture.
Itisworthnotingthatthisbookshallsimplytakeforgrantedthetwosubstantivethesesthatareplausiblynecessaryinorderforthe “groundingproblem” toget offtheground:causalindeterminism,togetherwithwhatmightbecalled nofuturism intheontologyoftime.Indebatesabouttheontologyoftime,thereare threeprimarycompetitors: presentism ,the growing-block theory,and eternalism. Roughlyspeaking,presentismisthethesisthatonlypresentobjectsexist,the growing-blocktheoryisthethesisthatpastandpresent(butnofuture)objects exist,andeternalismisthethesisthatpast,present,andfutureobjectsallexist.In
thisbook,Iassumenon-eternalism.TheargumentofChapter1isthat,given eitherpresentismorthegrowing-blocktheory,futurecontingentslackanappropriatesortof ‘grounding’,andthereforefailtobetrue.However,sincemyown personalview whichIshallatnopointattempttodefend isthat presentism is true,IshalltryinChapter1todefenda presentist versionoftheopenfuturethat doesnotsimilarlyresultinanopenpast.Growing-blockers,however,canregard thatprojectasafailure,andneverthelessaccepttheargumentstocomeforthe claimthatfuturecontingentsareallfalse.
Thisbookalsosimplytakesforgrantedthethesisofcausalindeterminism.This isthethesisthatthepastandthepresent,togetherwiththecausallaws,failto entailauniquefuture.Thatis,indeterminismisthethesisthatthereisatleast morethanonetotalwayrealitycouldevolvefrom “here”,consistentlywith presentrealityandcausallaw.Inkeepingwithtradition,wecancallanytotal waythingsmaygofromagivenmomentthatisconsistentwithcausallawa branch.Thus,indeterminismisthethesisthattherearemultiple branches.An importantwordofcaution,however:inthisbook,Iamnotthinkingofthese “branches” asinanyway concrete .Rather,theyaresimplyabstract representations thatis,abstractrepresentationsoftotalwaysthingscould evolve.(Inpointoffact,theyaresegmentsoftraditionalabstractpossibleworlds.) Thus,tosaythatthereare branches inmysenseisnottocommitoneselftothe kindof branching atissueinsome(so-called “many-worlds”)interpretationsof quantummechanics.
Havingnowstatedwhatthisbooksimplyassumesbutdoesnotdefend,Iam nowinpositiontoofferbriefchapterbychaptersummariesofwhatitdoes defend.
InChapter1,IdevelopwhatIabovecalledthe groundingproblem,and articulatewhatItaketobethe metaphysical casefortheopenfuture.More particularly,Iarguethatpresentismandindeterminismimplytheopenfuture or,intheterminologytocome,Iarguethat,givenpresentismandindeterminism, thereisno ‘privilegedbranch’ ofthosethatremaincausallypossible.Inthis chapter,Iinvestigatewhatsortofprinciplesregarding truth and grounding togetheroughttoimplythat,givenpresentismandindeterminism,thereareno truthsregardingundeterminedaspectsofthefuture.Ifurtherrespondtothe problemthat,given presentism andindeterminism,ifwehaveanargumentforthe openfuture,wealsohaveanunwelcomeargumentforthe openpast.Itisworth notingthatChapter1istheonlyproperly metaphysical chapterinthisbook.In Chapter1,Iattempttoargueonmetaphysicalgroundsthatthereisnoprivileged futurebranch buttherestofthebook,byandlarge,simplytakesforgrantedthat thereisnoprivilegedfuturebranch.Ofcourse,ifnoargumentseveninthe vicinity ofthoseofChapter1arecogentarguments,whatcomesafterChapter1isperhaps oflittleinterest.Nevertheless,therestofthebookcanbereadinisolationfrom Chapter1.
InChapter2,Iarticulate threemodelsoftheundeterminedfuture. Inacontext inwhichtherearemultiplefuturebranchesconsistentwiththepastandthelaws, isthereanysuchthingasthe “actualfuture”?AccordingtotheOckhamist,thereis anactualfuturehistory,anditisdeterminatewhichhistoryistheactualfuture history.(Thus,thereisa privileged futurehistory.)Accordingtothesupervaluationist,thereisanactualfuturehistory,butitisindeterminatewhichhistoryisthe actualfuturehistory.OntheviewIdefend,however,therejust isno “actualfuture history” inthe firstplace.Ifurtherbringouttheresultthatproponentsofallthree modelscanacceptaplausible modal semanticsfor will oneonwhich will isa universalquanti fieroverall “available” branches. Ishowhowthissemanticsfor will combinedwiththevariousmodelsunderconsiderationgivesrisetodiffering resultsaboutthetruth-valuesforfuturecontingents.Inparticular,Ibringoutthe resultthat,ifthereareseveral available branches,thenfuturecontingents,givena plausiblesemanticsfor will,simplycomeoutfalse.
InChapter3,Iarticulatemycoreresponsetothelogicalproblemforopen futurists.ThecentralpointsIdevelopinChapters3–6pertain, interalia,to controversialdistinctionsin scope. TheviewIdevelopdependscruciallyonan importantsemanticdistinctionbetweenthefollowingtwoclaims:
Itisnotthecasethatitwillbein20minutesthatthereisrain.(~Fnp) Itwillbein20minutesthatthereisnorain.(Fn~p)
Mystrategyistodefendthethesisthat will isaso-called “neg-raisingpredicate” . I don’tthinkthatTrumpisagoodpresident stronglytendstoimplicate Ithinkthat Trumpisnotagoodpresident althoughtheformerdoesnotsemanticallyentail thelatter.Thesamegoes,Ibelieve,for Itisnotthecasethatitwillrainin20minutes and Itwillbein20minutesthatthereisnorain. Under “standard” (viz.,Ockhamist) assumptionsaboutthefuture,theformerwouldofcourseentailthelatter anditis forthisreason,Icontend,thatwehavesuchtroublehearingadistinctionin meaningbetweenthegivenclaims.Onmetaphysicalgrounds,however,one mightrejectthesestandardassumptions.Ifurtherdefendaseriesofscopedistinctionsthatarepredictedbyatheoryonwhichfuturecontingentsareallfalse.
InChapter4,Idefendthesescopedistinctions(andmytheoryoftheopen futuremoregenerally)bymeansofacomparisonwiththecounterfactualconditional.InChapter3,Iattempttomakeplausibleadenialoftheprinciplesome authorshavecalled “WillExcludedMiddle” (WEM): Fnp _ Fn~p. AsIhopeto show,adenialofWillExcludedMiddleisdeeplyparalleltothedenialofwhathas beencalled “ConditionalExcludedMiddle” :
(CEM)Ifithadbeenthecasethat p,itwouldhavebeenthecasethat q _ Ifithad beenthecasethat p,itwouldhavebeenthecasethat~q.
CEMhasbeenthesubjectofvigorousdisputeinbothmetaphysicsandsemantics. Myclaimissimple:ifCEMisnota semantic truth andmany(e.g.,Lewisand Williamson)havecontendedthatitisnot thenneitherisWEM.
Chapter5takesupwhatA.N.Priorhascalled “TheFormalitiesof Omniscience”.TheviewIdefendcanacceptthefollowingbiconditional: p if andonlyif Godbelievesp.Accordingly,myviewcanhappilyacceptthefollowing biconditionals:
Itwasnunitsoftimeagothat p iffGod(quasi-)remembersthannunitsoftime ago, p.(Pnp iff Remnp)
Itwillbeinnunitsoftimehencethat p iffGodanticipatesthatinnunitsoftime hence, p.(Fnp iff Antnp)
Accordingly,myviewcanhappilyaccept whereasotheropenfutureviews cannot theplausiblethesisthat thelogicofthetensesisthelogicofperfect memoryandanticipation.Ifurtherdiscussasetofprinciplesregardingdivine omnisciencethatarecruciallyrelatedtothescopedistinctionsdefendedin Chapters2–4.Inparticular,Idefendthefollowingslogan:
Foranomniscientbeing:Absenceofmemoryimpliesmemoryofabsence,but absenceofanticipationdoesnotimplyanticipationofabsence.(~Remnp implies Remn~p,but~Antnp doesnotimply Antn~p)
Forexample:fromthefactthatGoddoesnotrememberasea-battleyesterday,we can,giventherelevantidealizingassumptionsaboutGod,concludethatGod rememberstherebeingnosea-battleyesterday andthusthattherewasnoseabattleyesterday.However,fromthefactthatGoddoesnot anticipate asea-battle tomorrow,wecannotconcludethatGodanticipatesthe absence ofasea-battle tomorrow;Godmayhavenoanticipationasofyeteitherway.Thisis,onmyview, preciselytheasymmetryofopennessbetweenpastandfuture.
InChapter6,Ishiftgears.Chapters3–5areprimarilyconcernedwiththe logicalproblemfortheopenfuture.InChapter6,however,Iturntothe firstof our practical problemsforthedoctrineoftheopenfuture aproblemarticulated inthe firstinstancebyA.N.Prior.Priornotedthatitcan seem that,ontheopen futureview,ifIbetthatagivenhorsewillwinarace,andthenthathorsedoeswin, someoneworkingunderopen-futuristassumptionscouldrefusetograntthe payout.Afterall,itwouldseem,whatIwasbettingwastruewasnot,onmy view,true.Irespondtothisproblembydevelopingapictureof betting thatdoes notpresupposethetruthofanyfuturecontingents andIaddressadifficult relatedproblemhavingtodowithwhat credence weshouldassigntotheclaim
thatitwillraintomorrow,onassumptionthatnoraintomorrowisobjectively possible.(Hint:itis0.)
InChapter7,IbuildonthemesfromChapter5,andcriticizethetwomost prominentrivalpositionstomyown: supervaluationism and relativism.Inthis chapter,co-writtenwithBrianRabern(andpreviouslypublished),Ibeginconsiderationofwhatmightbecalledthe “predictionproblem ”.Thisproblemis associatedwithacriticalprincipleoftense-logic,aprincipleIcall “Retro-closure” : p ! PFp or,initsmetricformulation, p ! PnFnp. Moresimply:If p,thenitwas nunitsoftimeagothatitwillbethecasenunitsoftimelaterthat p.Forexample: ifitisraining,itfollowsthatyesterdayitwouldrainadaylater.Thecrucialresult fromthischapteristhefollowing.Youcantakeyourpickbetweentheopenfuture andRetro-closure,but contrawhatispredictedbybothsupervaluationismand relativism you can ’thaveboth.Ifurtheraddanappendixtothischapter writtensolelybymyself explainingwhy,asIseeit,wedon’t need Retro-closure. TheargumentagainsttheopenfuturefromthevalidityoftheRetro-closure principleis,inmyestimation,farandawaythemostcommonargumentgiven againstthedoctrineoftheopenfuture.Itisthuscrucialforasuccessfuldefenseof theopenfuturethatweseehowRetro-closuremayplausiblybedenied.
InChapter8,Iaddresswhathassometimesbeencalledthe assertionproblem foropenfutureviews.Roughly,theproblemstemsfromtheobservationthatwhat areplausiblyfuturecontingentsarestillsometimesproperly assertible despite being,onmyview,false.Thechallengeisthustospecifyhowtheopenfuturist’ s proposalinteractswithstandardnormsofassertion.Thereare,tobesure,further objectionstothedoctrineoftheopenfuture myversionincluded butabook hastoendsomewhere,andmineendshere.
GroundingtheOpenFuture Mygoalinthischapteristoprovideanargumentthat,givenpresentismand indeterminism,thefutureis “ open ”,althoughthepastisnot.Oneoftheprimary rejoinderstopresentistargumentsfortheopenfutureisthatsucharguments would also implytheopenpast andthatwearerightlyreluctanttoacceptthe openpast.Thismuchisright:weshouldnotaccepttheopenpast.Myaiminthis chapteristoshowthatitisplausibleonpresentistindeterministgroundstoaccept theopenfuture,butnottheopenpast.Thereisnothingapproachingadecisive argumentthatpresentismandindeterminismtogetherimplytheopenfuture let alonesuchanargumentthat also doesnotimplytheopenpast.Nevertheless, Ibelievethatthispositionremainssubstantiallytheoreticallymotivated,andhere Iwishtobringtolightthesemotivations.
Clearly,whatmakesit primafacie difficulttogivea presentist argumentforthe openfuturethatdoesnotimplytheopenpastissimple:presentismis,initself, symmetricwithrespecttopastandfuture;itsaysthatneitherpastnorfuture objectsexist.Iftheopennessofthefutureweremeanttofollowfromsomething likethe non-existence oftherelevantclassofobjects,thenpresentismisgoingto implyanopenpastifitimpliesanopenfuture.Inthislight,wecanobservethatan argumentthatthefutureisopenwhereasthepastisnotiscertainlyeasiestto developifweassume,notpresentism,butinsteadthegrowing-blocktheoryof time.¹Forthentherelevantasymmetryissimplybuiltintotheontologyofthe theory;aswe’llsee,wecouldthensaythattruthsaboutthepastsuperveneon reality,andwecoulddenythatthetruthoffuturecontingentswouldsimilarly superveneonreality,andsowecoulddenythattherearesuchtruths. Consequently,thebulkofthisbookcouldhappilyproceedfromtheassumptions ofindeterminismandthegrowing-blocktheoryoftime.However,Idonotwishto proceedfromtheassumptionofthegrowing-blocktheoryoftime,andthisfor tworeasons.First,whetherpresentistscangiveacogentargumentfortheopen futurethatdoesnotimplytheopenpastisofintrinsicmetaphysicalinterest. Second,Iamapresentist.AndwhereasIregardthedoctrineoftheopenfutureas areasonabledoctrine,Iammuchlessinclinedtoviewthedoctrineoftheopen pastasareasonabledoctrine.Ifanyargumentfrompresentistassumptionstothe openfuturesimilarlyimpliedthatthe past isopen,Iwouldregardthisasadeep
¹Cf.Diekemper2005foranextendeddevelopmentofthistheme.
problemforthedoctrineoftheopenfuture.Thecurrentprojectconcernswhether thepresentistopenfuturistcanovercomethisdeepproblem.Ibelievethatshecan.
Indebatesaboutindeterminismandtheopenfuture,itisroutinefortheorists toemploytheterminologyof branches.Inthecontextofcausalindeterminism, Ishallassume,wehavevariousabstract branches thatrepresentmaximalways thingsmightgofromagivenpointintime,consistentlywithwhathashappened uptothatpointandthecausallaws.Andacentralquestionindebatesaboutthe statusof futurecontingents iswhether,insuchacontext,thereisanysuchthingas the privileged branch thatis,ofallthebranches,thebranchthatuniquely(and determinately)hasthestatusofbeing goingtoobtain litupwithwhatBelnap andGreen(1994)oncecalledthe ‘thinredline’.Myclaiminthischapteristhat thereis noprivilegedbranch,andthereforefuturecontingentsfailtobetrue,and thefutureisopen.²HereIconfrontthequestion:howmightwearguethatthereis notaprivileged future,butthere is aprivileged past?
ThecentraldistinctionIwishtodevelopinthischapterpertainstowhetherwe oughttoarguefortheopenfuturefromaclaimabout truthingeneral orinstead fromaclaimabout thefutureinparticular. Imaintainthatifwearguefroma claimabout truthingeneral forinstance,fromthethesisthat “truthsupervenes onbeing” (TSB) then,ifwearepresentists,wecanaccepttheopenfuturebut not theopenpastonlyifwehave(orarepreparedtoadopt)whatmanywillregardas anexoticontology.ItisthisresultthatIwishtobringoutinthe firstsectionofthis chapter.Thespiritofmydiscussionisnottorecommendsuchontologies(norisit tosayanything against them) rather,itistoshowthat,onceweseehowsuch ontologieswoulddotheworkTSBrequiresofthem,we’llseethatsuchwork needn’tbedoneinthe firstplace.AsIaimtoargue,weshouldsimply reject TSB, andinsteadmaintainthatthepastissimply brute.However,ourreasonsfor thinkingthatthepastisbrute(andTSBisfalse)are not reasonsforthinkingthat thefutureis orcouldbe similarlybrute.Wethushavesubstantialtheoretical reasonfrompresentistindeterministassumptionstoaffirmtheopenfuture,but not theopenpast.
1.1TruthandReality Themostfamiliarargumentsfortheopennessofthefutureproceedfromsome claimabouttherelationshipbetweentruthandreality forexample,fromthe
²Itisworthnotingthatthereareotherconceptionsofwhatitisforthefuturetobe “ open ” thanthe oneatissueinthisbook.Formoreonthesethemes,seeTorre2011andGrandjean2019.Furthernote: inthisbook,Iamnotthinkingof “ openness ” asasortofsubstantivepre-theoreticaldesideratumthat varioustheoriesmightbetryingtocapture,asinBarnesandCameron2009.Forme,thesenseof “ openness ” employedhereissimplystipulative.
thesisthat truthsrequiretruthmakers.³However,inlightofwell-knownproblems with “truthmakermaximalism ”—theclaimthatalltruthsrequiretruthmakers it isworthseeingifwecanproduceanargumentfortheopenfuturethatassumes the weakest ofsuchprinciplesabouttruth:thethesisthat truthsuperveneson being.⁴
TSB:Necessarily,foranytrueproposition,ifthatpropositionwereinsteadnot true,therewouldhavetobeadifferenceinreality(inwhichobjectsexistsorin whatpropertiestheyinstantiate).
Itisofparticularinterestforourdiscussionhow presentism interactswithTSB.If presentismistrue,then being justis present being,andrealityjustis present reality; accordingly,iftruthsupervenesonbeing,itsupervenesonhowthingsare right now.Thus,accordingtopresentismandTSB,wehave:
TSB-P:Necessarily,foranytrueproposition,ifthatpropositionwereinsteadnot true,therewouldhavetobeadifferenceinpresentreality(inwhichobjects presentlyexist,orinwhatpropertiestheypresentlyinstantiate).
AccordingtoTSB,therecanbenodifferenceintruthwithoutadifferencein reality.Butifallofrealityis present reality,thenTSBimpliesthattherecanbeno differenceintruthwithoutadifferenceinpresentreality.
Wecannowgivethefollowingsimpleargumentthat,givenTSB-P,future contingentscannotbetrue.Supposeforreductiothatitwereatruefuture contingentthattherewillbeasea-battletomorrow.Sincethisisatruefuture contingent,itisnot determined thattherewillbeasea-battletomorrow(nor,of course,thattherewillnotbeasea-battletomorrow).Buttosaythatitisnot determinedthattherewillbeasea-battletomorrowistosaythatwhatexists presentlyisconsistentbothwiththerebeingasea-battletomorrowandthere not beingasea-battletomorrow.Accordingly,ifitisatruefuturecontingentthat
³Cf.Sider:
Moreimportantly,groundingthetensesinthepresentplusthelawsofnaturethreatenstoimplythat thepastis ‘ open ’,justassomehaveclaimedthatthefutureisopen.Ifthelawsofnaturearepresent-topastindeterministic,currentfactsplusthelawsdonotimplyallthefactsaboutthepast;given presentismandeitherthetruth-makerprincipleortheprinciplethattruthsupervenesonbeing,for manystatements, φ,neither d itwasthecasethat φe nor d itwasthecasethatnot-φe willbetrue.(Sider 2001:38)
Markosian1995,however,developsanargumentfortheopenfuturefromatheoryoftruthas correspondence.
⁴ Theliteratureontruthandtruthmaking(andtherelatedthesisthattruthsupervenesonbeing)is, ofcourse,enormous.Forastartontruthmaking(andadefenseoftruthmakermaximalism),see Armstrong2004;foracriticaldiscussionoftheseprinciples,seeMerricks2007.Bigelowstatesthe ‘truth supervenesonbeing’ principleasfollows: “Ifsomethingistruethenitwouldnotbepossibleforittobe falseunlesseithercertainthingsweretoexistwhichdon’t,orelsecertainthingshadnotexistedwhich do” (1988:133).
therewillbeasea-battletomorrow,ifthispropositionwereinsteadfalse,this would not require anydifferenceatall inwhatpresentlyexistsandhowthingsare. Thepresentcouldbe justasitis,andyetitbe false thattherewillbeasea-battle tomorrow.Accordingly,iftherearetruefuturecontingents,wehaveaviolationof TSB-P.GivenTSB-P,therefore,therecanbenotruefuturecontingents.
ConsiderthefamiliarpictureoftheLaplaciandemon.Supposethat,allofa sudden,aLaplaciandemoncomesintoexistence.AndthisLaplaciandemonhas comprehensiveknowledgeof(i)thestateoftheuniverseatthecurrentmoment and(ii)thelawsofnature.Andnowitsprojectistoconstructacompletestoryof thefuture oratleast,toconstructasmuchofsuchastoryitispossibleto constructfromwhatispossibletogatheraboutitfromthepresentandthelaws. IndeterminismisthethesisthatanysuchLaplaciandemonwillnotbeableto recoveracomplete “storyofthefuture” fromcurrentconditionsandlawsalone. Instead,thatdemonwillbeleftwithmultiplesuch “stories” concerningwhich again,lookingsolelyatcurrentrealityandlaw ithasnoreasontopreferoneto theother.Theconsequenceisthis.Ifonesuchstoryisprivilegedovertheothers ifitistruethat that storyistheonethatisgoingtoobtain thenthefactthatthis storyistheprivilegedonedoesnotsuperveneonanythingtowhichourdemon hasaccess.Onpresentistassumptions,however,thisistosaythatthistruthdoes notsuperveneon anythingatall.
Perhaps,however,takingacuefromBigelow,therearewaysofbuilding somethingintothepresentfromwhichauniquestoryofthefuturecouldin principlebeconstructed crucially,somethingthatdoesnotviolatethespiritof causalindeterminism.Perhaps,somepresentistsmaysay,thingshave(orsome thinghas)primitive futuredirectedproperties,propertieslike beinggoingtobeina sea-battletomorrow. ⁵ Andiftherelevantdemonhadaccessto everything,our demonwouldhaveaccesstosuchproperties,propertiesfromwhichitcould predictauniquefuture.(Thequestionwhethercausaldeterminismistrue,these philosopherswillinsist,isthusamatterofwhetherthedemoncanpredicta uniquefuturefromamore limited setoffactsinthepresent,togetherwithcausal law e.g.,fromthefactsinthepresent,minusanyfactsaboutwhichthingshave whichprimitivefuturedirectedproperties.)Butnowtherelevantopenfuturists willbeapttocomplain.Forpresumably,noamountofinspectionofagivennaval commanderisgoingtorevealhishavingaprimitivepropertysuchas beinggoing tobeinvolvedinasea-battletomorrow.Tobesure,thedemonmayknowthatthe commanderhasthisproperty andthecommandermayhavethisproperty. However,ifhedoesso,theywillinsist,hewilldoso because hishavingitis entailedby other morebasicfactsabouthim,hiscausalenvironment,andthe
⁵ Foradefenseofthis “Lucretian” wayofgroundingtruthsaboutthefutureandpast,seeBigelow 1996,andTallantandIngram2020.Foradifferentpresentistapproachtogroundingtruthsaboutthe past,seeCrisp2007,andIngram2019.
causallaws.Accordingly,theopenfuturistcan,withconsiderablejustification, regardthepostulationofsuchprimitivefuturedirectedpropertiestobean ontologicalextravagancemotivatedsolelybythepreservationofatheory.
Itisthusveryplausibletosupposethat,ifindeedtherearetruefuture contingents,thenthetruthofthesefuturecontingentsdoesnotsuperveneon presentreality,atanyrategivennaturalassumptionsabout “presentreality” : presentrealitycouldbe justasitis,andyetthesepropositionsfailtobetrue. Accordingly,wemaygiveour firstargumentfortheopenfuture:
1.Iftherearetruefuturecontingents,thetruthofthesefuturecontingents wouldnotsuperveneonpresentreality.
2.Butalltruthsupervenesonpresentreality.So, 3.Therearenotruefuturecontingents.
1.2TheProblemofthePast Butnowourproblemsbegin.AsIseeit,premise(1)oftheaboveargumentis plausible,andIdonotherefurtherconsiderwaysonemightdisputeit.⁶ The trouble,however,comesfromthe bluntness oftheweaponemployedinpremise (2):TSB-P.ForTSB-Prequiresthatalltruthssuperveneonpresentreality.What, then,becomesoftruthsaboutthe past inparticular,truthsaboutthepastthat presumably cannot beretrodictedfromthepresenttogetherwithcausallaw?In otherwords:whataboutthetruthof past contingents?Thisobjectionwaswellput byMichaelClarkinthe1960sagainstCharlesHartshorne’sdefenseoftheopen future.Clarkwrites:
Iftheanalysisisplausibleforthefuturetense,whynotasimilaranalysisforthe pasttense?Ifweconsiderpresentconditionsascausalconditions,itistruethatit isreasonabletoregardthefutureasindeterminateinthesensethatnotevery detailhasbeencausallysettledyet.So,givenpresentstatesofaffairsandthelaws ofnature,therearemanydifferentdetailedcourseswhichthefuturemighttake. Butequally,giventhelawsofnature,ifweconsiderpresentconditionsaseffects, therearemanydifferentdetailedpastsfromwhichtheymighthavearisen.There arepasteventswhicharecontingentwithrespecttothepresent,whicharenot
⁶ LetmeemphasizethatIhaveonlyconsidered one candidatepresentistwayofattemptingtoshow thatfuturecontingentsmightstill “superveneonreality”—theLucretrianstrategysuggestedby Bigelow.Perhapsthe “ersatzist” strategyofCrisp(2007)mightdobetterthanLucretianisminthis regard.Briefly,however,mymaincontention,oncemore,isthatthe “ersatzist” strategywillnotgivethe presentistopen-futuristnon-openpaster(!)whatheorshewants.Ifsuchatheoristsaidthatthereare notruefuturecontingentsbecausetherearenorelevant “ersatzfuturetimes”,itseemsclearthat,on presentistgrounds,neitherwilltherebetherelevantersatz past times andso,onceagain,ifwe’ re gettingtheopenfuture,weare also gettingtheopenpast.
retrodictableeveninprinciplefrompresentconditionsusinglawsofnature.As timemovesontheeventsatagivenmomentinthefuturearemademoredefinite butthoseatagivenmomentinthepastbecomelessdefinite.Considerallthe casesofsuicideinBritainthisyear.Afterthesuicideshaveoccurredthere remainsevidenceofthem;theyearafter,theevidenceisenoughtodetermine preciselywhokilledhimself,buthundredsofyearslater,perhaps,theremaining evidenceisenoughtoestablishroughlyhowmanysuicidestherewerebutnot preciselywhotheywere.Theopennessofthefutureismatchedbyacorrespondingopennessinthepast.(1969:178)
Iwanttobeginbyconsideringhow certain openfuturistswithcertainontologies could respondtotheproblematissue.Inthecitedpaper,Clarkgivesusagreat manycogentobjectionstoHartshorne’saccountoffuturecontingents.Asit happens,however,thisisanobjectionforwhichHartshorneinparticularwas wellprepared.FollowingA.N.Whitehead,Hartshornewaspreparedtosaythata complete,comprehensivestoryofthepast can beretrodictedfromthepresent. DidHartshornedefendsometemporalasymmetrythesisaboutthelawsofnature? No.Hemaintained,withWhitehead,thatthepastcanberetrodictedfromthe presentindependentlyofanysuchlaws,namelyfrom God’smemories. ⁷ Thus, accordingtoHartshorne,thoughtherearemany futures consistentwithpresent conditionsandcausallaw,thereisonlyone past consistentwithpresentconditionsandcausallaw(becausethereisonlyonesuchpastconsistentwithpresent conditions).Inthissense,Hartshornesimplydeniedthattherewereanytruepast contingents,andthusheescapesthechargethatthoughheallowstruepast contingents,hedoesnotallowtrue future contingents:heallows neither .Ifwe (verymuch)strainouranalogy,solongaswesupposethattheLaplaciandemon hasaccesstothecurrentstateofGod’smemorialseemings,thenthatdemon could retrodictacompletestoryofthepastfromthoseseemings.Forgiventherelevant idealizingassumptionsaboutGod(assumptions,incidentally,Hartshornealready wouldhaveindependentlyaccepted),ifweconsiderGod’smemoriesaseffects, thereisinfactonly one detailedpastfromwhichthoseeffectsmayhavearisen. AndsinceGodisbotheternalandincorruptible,soisthepast justasdesired.
Ofcourse,wemightnowaskthefollowing.Ifthereisonlyonecompletepast thatisconsistentwithGod’scurrentmemories,thenwhyshouldn’twesimilarly saythatthereisonlyonecomplete future consistentwithGod’scurrent anticipations?WhyisitthatGodnowhasacompletesetofmemoriesthatdiscriminate betweenallthepossiblepasts,butGodhasnotyetformedacompletesetof
⁷ Whitehead1929(esp.pp.12and347);Hartshorne1970.BothWhitehead’sandHartshorne’ s viewsonthismatterarecomplicated.Forahelpfularticulationoftheseaspectsof “processtheism” ,see Viney2018,whomaintainsthatWhiteheadhadadoctrineofthe “objectiveimmortalityoftheworldin God”;seealsoViney1989:84.
anticipationsthatdiscriminatebetweenallthepossiblefutures?Buthere Hartshornemightplausiblymaintainthattheasymmetryisgroundedinthe natureandthedirectionof causation.Godhastherelevantsetofmemories becausetherelevantevents caused Godtoformthosememories.But,hemight insist,futureevents,ingeneral,cannot cause onetoformanticipationsofthose events andthis,inpart,explainswhyGod’santicipationsarenotcomprehensive.ForifGod’santicipationsarenoteffectsoffutureeventsthemselves,Godis presumablyformingsuchanticipationsbymeansof deductions fromcurrent conditions.Inotherwords,GodisactingassomethingliketheLaplacian demonimaginedabove,whopredictsthefuturepreciselyviadeductionfrom thepresent.Thus,ifcurrentconditionsandlawsdonot fixauniquefuture(and ex hypothesi,theydonot)thenneitherwillGod’santicipationspickoutaunique future.TheeventsGod’smemoriesarememoriesof caused Godtoformthose memories,whereastheeventsGod’santicipationsareanticipationsofdonot cause Godtoformthoseanticipations.Hencetheasymmetry.This,Hartshorne maysay,issimplyafundamentalfeatureofthedirectionoftime.
Isthisasatisfactoryanswertotheproblemoftheopenpastthatarisesifone defendstheTSB-P-inspiredargumentfortheopenfuturegivenabove?Well,on itsownterms,perhapsitis.WestartfromanintuitionthatTruthSuperveneson Being.Andsincewearepresentists,wemaintainthatthismustbe present Being. Wethennoticethat,ifthereweretruthsaboutcontingentaspectsofthefuture, thesetruthswouldnotsuperveneonbeing;andsowereasonthatthereareno suchtruths.Itisthenobjected:butpresumablytherearetruthsaboutcontingent aspectsofthe past,andthesetruthswould also notsuperveneonbeing.We respond:inthesenseatstake,therearenotruthsaboutcontingentaspectsof thepast,forthepastisnot contingent inthesenseatstake:allofitsdetailsarefully retrodictablefromcurrentconditions,viz.,fromGod’smemories,andthereare therefore not multiplepastsconsistentwithcurrentconditionsandlaws. However,althoughGodcurrentlyhasacomprehensivesetofmemoriesspecifying auniquepast,Godhasnocorrespondingsetofanticipationsfromwhichone couldreadoffauniquefuture andthisasymmetryisprincipled,groundedin factsaboutthenatureanddirectionoftime,causation,orboth.
Aproblemarises,however,whenwenoticethatthistheoryseemstoinheritthe problemsthat all theoriesthatappealtotheintentionalstatesofanidealbeingor beingstoexplainwhytherearetruthsofacertainkindseemtoinherit.For supposeweaskedtheproponentofthetheisticaccountabovethefollowing:what ifGoderasedamemory and,indeed,erasedthememoryofwhichmemoryhe erased?⁸ Suchaprocedureshouldbepossible,wemighthavethought,forabeing aspowerfulas God.Oneanswerthathasbeengiventothisquestionrecently
⁸ Parallelquestionforthedivinecommandtheorist:whatifGodcommandedsomethingterrible?
