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TheMetaphysicsofSensoryExperience TheMetaphysicsof SensoryExperience DAVIDPAPINEAU GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26DP, UnitedKingdom
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ToTimandKati Preface ix
Introduction1
1.ClearingtheGround9
1.1SensationversusPerception9
1.2SensationversusCognition11
1.3PropertiesandExperiences14
1.4NaïveRealism:Outline16
1.5NaïveRealismandtheTime-LagProblem18
1.6NaïveRealismandPhenomenalSimilarities20
1.7MentalContactwithReality22
1.8TheInstabilityofNaïveRealism24
1.9Sense-DatumTheories28
1.10Representationalism:ContingentandEssential30
1.11Representationalism:NaturalistsandPhenomenal Intentionalists32
1.12Representationalism:ContentandMode34
1.13Representationalism:Broadness,Supervenience, andIdentity35
2.AgainstRepresentationalism39
2.1TheMetaphysicalChallenge39
2.2InitialRepresentationalistThoughts40
2.3NaturalistTheoriesofRepresentation45
2.4TheImplausibilityofNaturalistRepresentationalism49
2.5TheDistractionsofBroadness52
2.6BroadnessinContext55
2.7TheAppealtoTransparency57
2.8Free-FloatingProperties60
2.9MysteriesofMentalContact62
2.10Here-and-Now65
2.11TheEfficacyofMentalRepresentation67
2.12TheIncommensurabilityofConsciousand RepresentationalProperties71
2.13PurePhenomenalIntentionalism74
2.14WhatAretheTruthConditions?76
3.TheStructureofExperience83
3.1TheQualitativeView83 3.2NoProblems84
3.3Block,Peacocke,andQualia85
3.4Functionalismand ‘RoleSemantics’ 87
3.5TheOrganizationofExperience91
3.6Quasi-ObjectsandTheirQuasi-Properties93
3.7IntentionalObjects97
3.8ADangerousConfusion102
3.9PaintThatDoesn ’tPoint106
3.10SpatialExperience109
4.Introspection,Adverbialism,andRichContents114
4.9RedSquaresandGreenCircles141
Preface Ihavealotofpeopletothankfortheirhelpwiththeideasinthisbook. I firststartedthinkingseriouslyaboutthephilosophyofperceptionafter finishingmypaper “PhenomenalandPerceptualConcepts” in2007. IcanremembergivingaUniversityofLondongraduateseminaron consciousnessacoupleofyearslaterwhereThomasRaleighandPhilip Goffguidedmetosomeoftherelevantliterature.Inthesummerof2012 IheldashortseminarseriesonperceptioninKing’sCollegeLondon whenClaytonLittlejohnandPatrickButlincontributedusefully.Then thatautumnIlecturedonthemetaphysicsofperceptioninKing’s;Uwe Peterswasmygraduateassistantandanindefatigableuneartherof sources;thecoursewasrepeatedthefollowingyearandJanivPaulsberg asUwe’ssuccessoragainhelpedexpandmyknowledge.
BythenIhadstartedgivingtalksonperception,initiallyinAntwerpin 2012,followedbytalksinLiegeandReadinglaterthatyear,andthenthe nextyearattheInstituteofPhilosophyinLondon,Durham,Trinity CollegeDublin,King’sCollegeLondon,and finallytheAristotelian Society.Icanrememberhelpfulcommentsonthoseoccasionsfrom BenceNanay,NaomiEilan,RobertaLocatelli,KatiFarkas,Henry Taylor,BobKentridge,MichaelTye,BarrySmith,JoseZalabardo,Matt Soteriou,andBillBrewer.
AfterthatIgavefurthertalksonthetopicinMississippi,Jerusalem, TexasChristianUniversity,Johannesburg,andAntwerpin2014; Oxford,CUNYGraduateCenter,NewYorkUniversity,andSheffield in2015;CentralEuropeanUniversity,Braga,StAndrews,Rome, Cambridge,Aracaju,Paris,andPelotasin2016;andKing’sCollege London,FloridaStateUniversity,andGenevain2017.IhaverememberedthingssaidonthoseoccasionsbyDonovanWishon,JanetLevin, GalenStrawson,MichelleMontague,EvaJablonka,RikHine,JessePrinz, BritBrogaard,KatiBalogh,KennethWilliford,SusanSchneider,Tyler Burge,AmirHorowitz,JaneAnderson,FaridMasrour,LauraGow,
ChiaraBrozzo,DavidPitt,AngelicaKaufmann,MichaelDevitt,Stephen Neale,EricMandelbaum,DaveChalmers,TomNagel,Howard Robinson,NinoKadic,CharlesTravis,TimCrane,AlexDouglas, SimonProsser,AntonellaMallozzi,TimLewens,RaeLangton,Alex Grzankowski,RaamyMaajid,SofiaStein,AdrianoBrito,Julianodo Carmo,MarcelaHerdova,StephenKearns,andThomasReed.
IamgratefulthatIhavebeenabletotryoutversionsofthematerialin thisbookinvariousforums.In2013FranciscoPereirainvitedmetogive threetalksonperceptionatAlbertoHurtadoUniversityinSantiago; FranciscoandalsoLeonardodiBrasiwerepenetratingcritics.Mycourse attheCUNYGraduateCenterinspring2015coveredsomeofthesame material,andNicolasPorot,JakeQuilty-Dunn,RosaCao,andGraham Priestallhelpedmeto filloutmyideas.Inautumn2018Igave five seminarsatKing’sCollegeLondononafulldraftofthebookandBill Brewer,MattSoteriouJamesStazicker,VictorTamburini,Harriet Fagerberg,GregorBos,NinoKadic,NicholasEmmerson,Jørgen Dyrstad,CecilyWhiteley,andJuliaWilamallprovidedexcellentfeedback.Ireturnedtothetopicinmyspring2019courseatCUNY;Umrao Sethisatinandwasinvaluable,andChrisBrown,WesleySauret,and JennMcDonaldalsomadehelpfulpoints.Attheendof2019Iwasable torehearsesomeofthematerialataconferenceinBilkentandreceived excellentfeedbackfromTufanKlymaz,BenceNanay,AmyKind,and ErhanDemircioglu.
Bythebeginningof2020Iwasabletocirculatea finaldraftoffthe book.IattendedAlexGrzankowski’sonlinegrouponadverbialisminthe springwithLauraGow,Justind’Ambosio,TimCrane,andKatiFarkas andtheyhelpedwiththelastchapter.SérgiodeSouzaFilhoreadthe wholedraftwithJørgenDyrstad,MatteoColombo,DimitriMollo,and FilipeCarijóandIhadausefulonlinemeetingwiththeminMay.Iwas abletodeliveraversionofchapter2toUriahKriegel’ s “summerof consciousness” onlineseminarinJulyandbenefittedgreatlyfromthe discussion;afterthesessionIcorrespondedwithMiguelAngelSebastian, GeoffLee,ScottSturgeon,HaroldLangsam,DavidPitt,FrancesEgan, KennethWilliford,andBrianMcLaughlin.InAugustWayneWuread the finalchapterandwetalkedusefullyaboutit.
Otherswhowerekindenoughtosendmethoughtsaboutthedraft wereTimCrane,NickShea,AssafWeksler,LauraGow,andMark Sainsbury.AdamPautzwasoneofthereadersforOxfordUniversity PressandPärSunströmalsosentmecomprehensivecomments:their contributionsmadeabigdifferencetothe finalresult.
Inadditiontothosementionedabove,Ihavebenefittedovertheyears fromdiscussionsaboutperceptionwithJonathanBirch,NedBlock, SamColeman,DanielDennett,KeithFrankish,KathrinGlüer-Pagin, PaulHorwich,FrankJackson,FrançoisKammerer,BillLycan,Barbara Montero,DianaRaffman,FrançoisRecanati,DavidRosenthal,Susanna Siegel,andMartineNida-Rümelin.IhaveenjoyedmoresustainedinteractionsonthesubjectwithLauraGow,UriahKriegel,AdamPautz, ThomasRaleigh,HowardRobinson,NickShea,andMichaelTye.Two ofmystudents,QianyiQininNewYorkandVictorTamburiniin London,becameparticularlycaughtupwiththetopicandmademe clarifymythinking.AndIhavebeensustainedbytheencouragementof TimCraneandKatiFarkassinceIstartedtheproject.
IhavebenefittedfromanexcellentteamatOxfordUniversityPress. PeterMomtchiloff,asalways,hasofferedwiseandencouragingadvice eversinceI firstmentionedthebooktohim.Iwouldalsoliketothank JennyKingforsohelpfullyguidingthebookthroughproduction; KabilanSelvakumarforhisextremelyefficientprojectmanagement; andSusanDunsmoreforhersensitivecopyediting.
Thebookwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthesupportofmy wifeRoseWildandmychildrenKatyandLouisPapineau.Iamfullof gratitudetothem.Katyisalsotobethankedforallowingadetailfrom herpainting ‘HardandShiny’ tobeusedforthebookcover.
Introduction Thisbookaddressesaspecificquestion.Whatisthemetaphysicalnature oftheconsciouspropertiesweenjoywhenwehavesensoryexperiences?
RightnowIamlookingatayellowballinthemiddleofmygarden lawn.Insodoing,Iamhavingaconsciousvisualexperience,constituted bymyinstantiatingcertainconsciousproperties,propertiesthatIwould ceasetopossessifIclosedmyeyes.Similarly,Icanhearvarious backgroundnoises,andIcanfeelthehardnessofthechairIamsitting on.Thesearefurthersensoryexperiencesinvolvingfurtherconscious properties.
So,torepeat,thisbookisaboutthenatureofconscioussensory properties,likethevisual,aural,andtactualpropertiesthatIamhaving rightnow.Whatkindsofpropertiesarethese?Howaretheystructured? Whatelementsdotheyinvolve?
PerhapsitisworthemphasizingfromtheoutsetthatIaminterested inthesequestionsintheirownright,andnotbecauseoftheirsignificanceforfurtherphilosophicaldebates.Manyphilosophersworkon sensoryexperiencebecausetheythinkitsanalysisiscrucialforaphilosophicalunderstandingofknowledge,orreasonsforbelief,orourability torefertothings,orothersuchtopics.InthisbookIshallmakeoccasional commentsonsuchfurthertopicswhentheyarerelevant.Butmyprimary focusthroughoutwillbeonsensoryexperienceitself.Isimplywantto understandwhatisgoingonwhenIhaveconscioussensoryexperiences.
Inmyview,conscioussensorypropertiesareintrinsicqualitative propertiesofpeople.WhenIhaveavisualexperienceofayellowball, forexample,Ihaveacertainconsciousproperty,acertainfeeling,which doesnotessentiallyinvolveanyrelationstoanythingoutsideme.Taken purelyinitself,mystatedoesnotguaranteethepresenceofanactual yellowball,nordoesitevenrepresentapossibleyellowball.Thesame
statecouldbepresentinasubject,likeabraininavat,whowasinnoway relatedtoyellownessorroundness.Inwhatfollows,Ishallaimtoshow thatthisqualitativeviewistheonlyonethat fitsthefacts.
Ishouldadmitfromthestart,however,thatthisanswerrunscontrary bothtoinitialintuitionandphilosophicalorthodoxy.Intuitionand orthodoxyaliketakesensorypropertiestobe world-involving,notpurely intrinsicpropertiesofsubjects.
Takemyvisualawarenessoftheyellowball.Thereistheball,rightin my fieldofview,withitsyellowcolour.Isn’titobviousthatmyvisual experienceinvolvesthevisiblefeaturesofthisobject,andnotjust intrinsicqualitativepropertiesofme?
Thisinitialworld-involvingthoughtcanbedevelopedintwodifferent ways.
A firstversiontakesitthatmysensoryexperiencerelatesmetothe actualballanditsactualcolour.Theballisyellow,andmysensory experiencesimplyconsistsinmyvisualopennesstothisfact.Thefact thattheballisyellowisliterallypartofmyvisualexperience.
Atthephilosophicallevel,thisisthe naïverealist theoryofsensory experience.Accordingtonaïverealism,conscioussensorypropertiesare perceptualrelationstoobservablefacts.Thepropertythatconstitutesmy consciousvisualexperienceissimplytherelationalpropertyofbeing visuallyrelatedtotheball’syellowness.
Naïverealismmightseeminlinewithinitialintuition,butitruns countertoanotherintuitivethought.CouldInothavejustthesame sensoryexperienceasIamhavingnow,eveniftheballweren’tactually yellow,butIweresufferingsomekindofcolourillusion orevenif therewerenoballthereatall,andIwerethevictimofanoutright hallucination?
Thissecondthoughtgoesnaturallywiththeideathatsensoryexperiencesare representational.Mycurrentexperiencedoesnotnecessarily relatemetoanactualyellowball.Ratheritrepresentssuchathing.It conveystomethatthereisayellowballonthelawn,eventhoughin truththeremaynotbe.
Representationalism iscurrentlythedominantphilosophicaltheory ofsensoryexperience.Onthistheory,conscioussensorypropertiesare tobeequatedwithrepresentationalproperties tohaveasensory
experienceissimplytorepresentinthesensorymodethatthingsare thus-and-so.
Thisrepresentationalisttheorycomesindifferentvarieties,tobe exploredindetailinwhatfollows.Asstandardlydeveloped,representationalismagreeswithnaïverealismthatconscioussensoryexperienceis relationallyworld-involving butnowtherelationistoworldly properties,nottoworldlyfacts.
Consideroncemoremyexperienceoftheyellowball.Perhapsthe experiencedoesnotrelatemetothe fact thattheballisyellow afterall, ifIamhallucinatingorunderanillusion,thereisnosuchfacttobe relatedto.Still,evenifIamsomisperceiving,myconsciousexperience wouldstillarguablyinvolvethe properties ofyellownessandroundness, notasinstantiatedinmyactualenvironment,butasmanifestingtheway thatmyexperiencetakesthatenvironmenttobe.Andingeneral, accordingtostandardrepresentationalism,sensoryexperiencesinvolve arangeofworldlyproperties alltheshapes,colours,andtexturesthat ourexperiencestellus,perhapsfalsely,tobepresentinourenvironment. Thesepossiblyuninstantiatedpropertiesarecertainlypresentinmy experience,sayrepresentationalists,eveniftheymightnotbepresent inmyenvironment.
Sointheirdifferentwaysbothnaïverealismandstandardrepresentationalismtakeexperiencetoconstitutivelyinvolveelementsfromthe worldbeyondthemind.Naïverealismtakesittoinvolveworldlyfacts, andrepresentationalismtakeittoinvolveworldlyproperties.
Inthisrespect,boththesephilosophicalpositionsareinaccordwith initialintuition.Ishallbearguing,however,thatevensobotharefatally flawed.Theymightseemtomakegoodsenseat firstsight,butoncloser acquaintancetheywilldisplaydeficienciesthatcannotberemedied.
Somereadersmight finditsurprisingtolearnthatIrejectnotonly naïverealism,butalsorepresentationalism.Surelythecurrentphilosophicalenthusiasmforthispositioniswelldeserved.Dowenothaveevery reasontoviewsensoryexperiencesasrepresentations?Bothcommon senseandcontemporaryneurosciencetellusthatsensoryexperiences informsubjectsaboutfeaturesoftheirenvironmentsandguidetheir behaviouraccordingly.Doesnotthissufficetoshowthatthosesensory experiencesrepresentthoseenvironmentalfeaturestothosesubjects?
Isympathizewithreaderswhofeelsurprisedatthispoint.Indeed, therewasatimenotsolongagowhenImyselfwassurprisedtolearnthat Irejectedrepresentationalism.Formostofmyphilosophicallife,Ihad assumedthatIagreedwithrepresentationalistsaboutperception.After all,Itooholdthatsensoryexperiencesguidebehaviourbyinforming subjectsabouttheirenvironmentsandsoqualifyasrepresentations.It wasonlyrelativelyrecentlythatIcametorealizethatthe ‘representationalism’ acceptedbymostphilosophersofperceptioninvolvesfar strongercommitmentsthantheseeverydaytruisms.
Infactmyformermisapprehensionisamatterofpublicrecord.In 2009,somewhilebeforeIbecameinterestedinthephilosophyofperception,DavidBourgetandDavidChalmersconductedanonlinesurvey ofphilosophicalviews(BourgetandChalmers2014).Oneofthequestionswason ‘perceptualexperience’ andaskedrespondentstochoose between ‘representationalism’ , ‘qualiatheory’ , ‘disjunctivism’,and ‘sense-datumtheory’.Well,Ihadnodoubtthatsensoryexperiences arerepresentations,forthereasonsjustrehearsed,soItickedthe first option.
Itwasonlyafewyearslater,whenIstartedworkingseriouslyon perceptionmyself,thatIrealizedthatIdidn’tbelievethekindofrepresentationalismembracedbyphilosophersofperceptionatall.Thereason isthattheirtheoryisfarstrongerthantheclaimItookmyselftobe endorsinginthePhilPaperssurvey.Representationalisminthephilosophyofperceptionisn’tjustthethesisthatsensoryexperiencesare representations.Representationalisminthephilosophyofperceptionis thefarstrongerfurtherthesisthatsensoryexperiencesare essentially representational.
Tobringouttheissue,hereisananalogy.Takethewords, ‘ Elvis PresleyoncevisitedParis’ ,consideredasasequenceofmarkson paper,inacertainfontstyle,andcolouredblack.ThisEnglishsentenceiscertainlyarepresentation.Itportraystheworldassatisfyinga certaincondition,namelythat ElvisPresleyoncevisitedParis,andis trueifthisconditionobtainsandf alseotherwise.However,those marksarenot essentially representational.Itisnottheirnatureas writtenmarksthatconstitutesthemasrepresentations,buttheworkingsoftheEnglishlanguage.Justthosemarkscouldhavemeant
somethingdifferent,ornothingatall,ifourlinguisticpracticehadbeen different.
Thepointisthatthosemarksonlyrepresentastheydobecauseof certaincontingentfactsaboutthem.Theygaintheirrepresentational powersbecauseofthewaytheyareusedbytheEnglishlanguage community.Butitisnotanessentialfeatureofthosemarksthatthey aresoused.Wecaneasilythinkofpossiblesituationswherejustthose markswouldhavehadadifferentsignificance.
Representationalistsinthephilosophyofperceptionthinkthatconscioussensoryexperiencesare not likewrittenmarksonpaper.Intheir view,consciousexperiencesdon’tjusthappentorepresent,courtesyof furthersurroundingfacts.Rathersensoryexperienceshavetheirrepresentationalpowersessentially.Anygivenconsciousexperienceispersea representation.Itsrepresentationalpowerisdeterminedbyitsconscious nature,anddoesnotdependonthewayitisembeddedinsomefurther environment.
Considerwhatitisconsciouslylikeformetovisuallyexperiencea yellowball.Accordingtorepresentationalism,theconsciousnatureof thisexperiencesufficesonitsownto fixitsrepresentationalcontent, namelythat ayellowballisbeforeme.Unlikeconventionalmarkson paper,theexperienceneedsnohelpfromitscontingentsurroundingsto havethisrepresentationpower.Oncetheconsciouscharacterofan experienceisgiven,saytherepresentationalists,nothingmoreisneeded forittohavearepresentationalcontent.¹
Inmyview,representationalismiswrongaboutthis.Conscioussensorypropertiesareverymuchlikewrittenmarksonpaper.Inthemselves theyaredumbarrangementsofcontentlesssigns.Whiletheydorepresentworldlyfacts,thisisonlyinvirtueoffurthercontingentfactsabout thewaytheyareembeddedinthewiderworld.Takeawaythosefurther facts,andyoutakeawaytherepresentationalpoweroftheexperience.
¹Somerepresentationalistsallowthat,inadditiontotheirbuilt-inrepresentationalcontents, somesensoryexperiencesalsohave ‘broadcontents’ thatdodependonenvironmentalcircumstancesextraneoustotheirconsciousnature.Still,onpainofabandoningtheirrepresentationalism,theyalsoholdthatsuch ‘broad’ contentsareadditionaltobuilt-in ‘ narrow ’ representationalcontentsthataredeterminedbyconscioussensorypropertiesalone.Weshall returntothisissueatanumberofpointsinwhatfollows.
Justthatsameexperiencecouldhavehadaquitedifferentrepresentationalsignificance,ornorepresentationalsignificanceatall,givendifferentcontingentsurroundings.
Imagineacosmicbraininavat,aperfectduplicateofmybrainthat coagulatesbycosmichappenstanceininterstellarspace,togetherwith sustainingvat,andproceedstooperatejustlikemybrainforsome minutes,withthesamesensorycorticalinputs,motorcorticaloutputs, andinterveningneuronalprocesses.Itakeitthatthisbeingwouldshare allmyconscioussensoryexperiences.Yetitssensorystateswouldrepresentnothing.Theywouldlackthekindofsystematicconnectionswith worldlycircumstancesrequiredforrepresentationalsignificance.They wouldnomorehavearepresentationalcontentthanwouldthemarks ‘ElvisPresleyoncevisitedParis’ tracedoutbythewindonsomemountainonMars.
Theanalogywithwordsisn’tperfect.Thefurtherfactsthatallow sensoryexperiencestorepresentaredifferentfromthosethatmake wordsrepresent.Theyarenotcontingentfactsaboutlanguagecommunities,butcontingentfactsaboutthewaytheintrinsicmentalstatesof normalsubjects butnotofthecosmicbraininavat arecorrelated withfeaturesoftheirperceptibleenvironments.Evenso,theunderlying pointstands,orsoIshallargue.Theconsciouspropertiesweenjoyin sensoryexperiencestandtotherepresentationalpowersofexperience justasthetypographicalpropertiesofwordsstandtotherepresentationalpowersofwords.Normalinstancesofthoseconsciousproperties dorepresentthings,justasdonormalinstancesoftypographicalproperties,butinbothcasesthosepropertyinstancesonlyrepresentinvirtue offurthercontingentfactsaboutthem.
Somyownviewisthatsensoryexperiencesareintrinsic²qualitative propertiesofpeoplethatareonlycontingentlyrepresentational.Ishall callthisthe ‘qualitativeview’ inwhatfollows.Thispositionhasscarcely anydefendersinthecontemporaryliterature.Themajorityofcontemporaryphilosophersofperceptionthinkexperiencesareessentially
²Forourpurposes,itwillsufficetounderstandan ‘intrinsic’ propertyofanentityasonethat ismetaphysicallyindependentofthepossessionofotherpropertiesbyotherentities.Forfurther discussionofthisdefinition,seeLewis(1983),LangtonandLewis(1998),andMarshalland Weatherson(2018).
representational,andthenextmostpopularviewisnaïverealism.Imust saythatI findthisratherodd.Intruththerepresentationalismofthe philosophersofperceptionisastrangeview,requiringunusualcommitmentsonthepartofitsadherents,whilethechallengesfacingnaïve realismarescarcelylessformidable.Giventhis,youmighthaveexpected moreofthespecialiststoexplorethepossibleattractionsofthe qualitativeview.
Itistruethatafewcontemporaryphilosophersofperceptionuphold theexistenceofsome ‘qualia’,bywhichtheymeanintrinsic,qualitative, non-relationalelementsofconscioussensoryexperience—‘mentalpaint’ inNedBlock’sgraphiccoinage(Block2003).Theseadvocatesofqualia, however,takethemselvestobepointingto extra elementsinsensory experience,overandabovethoseconstitutedbyrelationstoworldlyfacts orproperties.ThisisnotthequalitativeviewthatIfavour.Idenythat thereare any essentiallyrelationalelementsinconsciousexperience.On myview,it’ s all paint.
Itisnotasifthisqualitativeviewisparticularlyobscureoroutlandish. Ithasrespectableantecedentsinthehistoryofphilosophy.Moreover, Isuspectthatitistheviewadoptedbymostnon-specialistswithaserious opinionaboutsensoryexperience,betheyreflectivehighschoolstudents,practisingneuroscientists,orphilosophersworkinginotherareas.
Iamnotsurewhythequalitativeoptionissounpopularamongthe specialistphilosophersofperception.Perhapsitisbecausethepositionis undoubtedlyugly.Itisnaturaltothinkofsensoryexperienceasinsome senseprovidingabridgebetweenthemindandtheworldbeyond.Both naïverealismandrepresentationalismsupportthisnaturalthoughtin theirdifferentways,bybuildingworldlyfactsorpropertiesintothe fabricofexperienceitself.Thequalitativeviewrejectsanysuchworldly involvementinexperience.Itsaysthatconscioussensorypropertiesare sufficientuntothemselves,enclosedwithinaninternalsubjectiverealm, andhavenoessentialconnectiontoanythingbeyond.Thiscertainlyisn’t aviewthatwearsitsattractionsonitssleeve.
Still,philosophyisn’tabeautycontest.Ifthesuperficialattractionsofa theorywereallthatmattered,wecoulddispensewithcarefulargument andanalysis,andsimplyoptforthosepositionswhosesurfacefeatures bestconformtoourinitialintellectualinclinations.Intruth,however,the
surfacecharmsofatheoryoftenhidedebilitatinginternalfailings.Soit is,Ishallbearguing,withthealternativestothequalitativeview.Once weprobebeneaththesurface,thesetheoriesturnouttobe flawedinside. Iseenoalternativetolearningtolivewiththequalitativeview.On first impressions,itmightstrikeusaslessattractivethanitsinitiallymore appealingcompetitors.Butintruthitistheonlyoptionthatmakesgood metaphysicalsense.
Therestofthisbookwillproceedasfollows.Chapter1setsthestage andoffersargumentsagainstbothnaïverealismandsense-datumtheories.Chapter2examinesthecurrentlydominantrepresentationalist approachandexposesitssevereinternalproblems.InChapter3,the qualitativeviewisdevelopedandshowntoaccommodatetheinternal structureofsensoryexperience.The finalChapter4explorestheimplicationsofthequalitativeviewforintrospection,descriptionsofexperience,andrichperceptualcontents.
1 ClearingtheGround 1.1SensationversusPerception Thischapterwilldealwithvariousissuesthatcanusefullybeaddressed atapreliminarystage.Ishallbeginwithsomeinitialclarificationsand distinctions.Iwillthendiscussnaïverealismandsense-datumtheories. Finally,Ishallmakesomeinitialpointsaboutrepresentationalism,asa precursortotheextendedcritiqueofthispositionwhichfollowsinthe nextchapter.
Adifferentkindofbook,oneaimingatacomprehensivesurveyofthe philosophyofperception,wouldnodoubtofferamoreextendedtreatmentofnaïverealismandsense-datumtheories.However,Ihaveno greatdesiretoaddtothealreadyextensiveliteratureonthesetwo approaches,andsoshallrestrictmyselftosomegeneralcommentsthat willservetoidentifythesepositionsasreferencepointsandindicatemy reasonsforputtingthemtooneside.
Letmestartwithaterminologicalpoint.Ihavecalledthisbook ‘The Metaphysicsof SensoryExperience’.Themorefamiliarterminologyin thissubjectarea,however,isnot ‘sensoryexperience’ but ‘perception’ andassociatedphrases asin ‘thephilosophyofperception’ , ‘perceptual experience’ , ‘thecontentsofperception’,andsoon.
ThereasonIhavepreferred ‘sensoryexperience’ to ‘perception’ is simplythat ‘perception’ isasuccessterm,andsostrictlyexcludesillusory andhallucinatorysensoryexperiences.Youcanonlyperceivewhat’ s there.Soyoucan’tperceiveaballtobeyellow,say,inacasewherethe ballyouarelookingatisgreen,orwhereyouaren’tlookingatanything atall.YetIwantmyanalysistocovercaseslikethis.Iwanttounderstand whatisgoingonwhenIhaveavisualexperienceasofayellowball,
evenwhenthereisnoyellowballpresentformetoperceive. ‘ Sensory experience’ includesthesecasesinawaythat ‘ perception’ doesnot.¹
Idonotintendthisterminologyof ‘sensoryexperience’ toprejudge theissueagainstnaïverealistviewsthatinsistonafundamentaldivision betweenthekindofconsciousexperienceswehaveinthe ‘goodcases’ of successfulperceptionandthosewehaveinthe ‘badcases’ ofillusionsand hallucinations.Asithappens,Irejectnaïverealism,andwillbearguing laterinthischapterthatthesamekindofexperiencecanoccurinboth kindsofcases a ‘commonfactor’,asitisnormallycalled.Butforthe momentIonlyintendmyterminologyof ‘sensoryexperience’ tosignal thatoursubjectmattercoversbadcasesaswellasgood.Naïverealists willhavenocausetoobjecttothisterminologicalstipulation.Afterall, evenphilosopherswhodenyanyexperientialcommonalitybetweenbad casesandgoodonesmustacknowledgethatbadcasesdooccur,andso thattherearequestionstobeansweredabouttheirnature.
Onefurtherterminologicalpoint.Certainphilosophicaltraditions, especiallythoseassociatedwithKantandReid,distinguish sensation from perception andmeanbythisthattheformerissomespeciesof raw,non-representationalmaterial firstpresentedtoconsciousness,and thelatterissomethingthatresultsonlywhenthisrawmaterialisworked upintorepresentationalformwiththehelpofhighermentalfaculties involvingconcepts.ThisisnopartofwhatIintendtoconveybymytalk of ‘sensoryexperience’.Aswillbecomeclearinwhatfollows,Idonot takeconscioussensoryexperiencetoneedanyhelpfromhighermental facultiestobecomerepresentational.Itisrepresentationalinitsown right,independentlyofwhathighermentalfacultiesmakeofit.(Sothe sensoryexperiencesofanimalscanrepresenttheirenvironmentsto them,evenwhenthoseanimalslackanyhighermentalfaculties.)
ItistruethatIdenythatconscioussensoryexperienceis essentially representational.Butthatisadifferentissue.Onmyview,sensory
¹ItisunhelpfulthatEnglishandotherlanguageshavenosimplewordthatstandsto ‘perception’ as ‘belief ’ standsto ‘knowledge’.RuthMillikanhassuggestedthatweintroduce ‘visaging’ toservethisroleinthevisualrealm(2000:111).Thiswouldallowustosaythat someoneis ‘visagingayellowball’ eveninillusoryorhallucinatorycaseswherethereisno yellowballtobeseen.However,Ifearthatanysuchneologismwouldbemoredistractingthan helpful.SowhennecessaryIshalltalkof ‘visuallyexperiencingayellowball’;thisshouldbe understoodnon-factively(bycontrastwith ‘seeing’ or ‘perceiving’ ayellowball).
experienceneedsanappropriateenvironmentalsettingtobecome representational.Withouttherightenvironmentalembedding,itisrepresentationallysilent.Butthisisnotbecauseitisinsufficientlystructured initself,somehowlackingtherightformpriortoitsreshapingbyhigher mentalpowers.Sensoryexperienceisalreadyperfectlyadequatetoplay arepresentationalrolegiventherightenvironment.Itdoesn ’tneedany helpfromhighermentalfaculties,evenifitdoesneedhelpfroman environmentalsetting.
1.2SensationversusCognition Idon’twanttoberestrictiveaboutsensoryexperiences.Aswellastaking thesetoincludeproductsofthefamiliar fivesenses sight,hearing,touch, smell,andtaste Ialsowanttoencompassarangeofothersensory modalities,suchasproprioception,kinaesthesia,balance,andpain.
Ihavenoclearviewsonthenumberofdifferentsenses,orwhat distinguishesthemfromeachother,orindeedwhether,giventheirrich interconnections,theyshouldberegardedasseparatesystemsatall.(See Nudds2004;Macpherson2010;O’Callaghan2012.)Sincemysubjectis thenatureofsensoryexperienceassuch,Icanhappilyby-passthese issues.Asisnormalinthisarea,Ishalldrawmainlyonvisionformy examples,butIintendmyconclusionstoapplytosensoryexperiencein general.
AsIshallusethephraseinthisbook, ‘experience’ willalwaysbe understoodasimplying conscious sensoryexperience.Somephilosophersareinterestedinthepossibilityof ‘unconsciousperception’ ,as putativelyillustratedbyresponsestosubliminalvisualstimuliandthe like(Block2016;Phillips2018).Ihavenoprincipledobjectiontotheidea ofunconsciousperception.Theremaywellbesomeinterestinglyunified categoryofresponsestosensorystimulithatcoversbothconsciousand unconsciouscases.Mystipulationabout ‘experience’ alwaysbeingconsciousisintendedasnomorethananexpositoryconvenience.Given thatthisbookisspecificallyabouttheconsciouspropertiesthatare associatedwithsensoryexperience,itwillbehelpfultounderstandthe termaccordingly.
Ishalloffernogeneraltheoryinthisbookofwhatqualifiesamental stateasasensoryexperience,norindeedofwhatqualifiesamentalstate asconscious.Theseareinterestingquestions,buttheyarenotmy concernhere.Iamhappytotaketheseissuesasread,inlinewith muchotherworkinthephilosophyofperception,andmoveontothe metaphysicalanalysisofthosepropertiesthatdoconstituteconscious sensoryexperience.
Thereisonepreliminaryclassificatoryissue,however,thatIwouldlike tocommentonatthisstage.Thisisthedistinctionbetweensensory experienceand thought.²Notallmentalresponsestotheworldare sensory.Itisonethingtoseeorotherwisesenseayellowball.Itis anothertobelieve(withyoureyesclosed,say)thatayellowballisbefore you.Giventhatthisdistinctionwill figuresignificantlyinwhatfollows,it willbeusefultosaysomethingaboutthewayIunderstandit.
At firstpass,asthisexamplewouldsuggest,itisnaturaltoappealto introspectiblephenomenologytodistinguishsensoryexperiencefrom thought(or ‘perception’ from ‘cognition’,asthedivisionisnormally calledincognitivesciencecircles).Whatismoreobviousthanthe consciousdifferencebetweenseeingayellowball withshapeand colourmademanifest andmerelybelievingayellowballtobepresent?
Itisnotclear,however,thataphenomenologicalcriterionwilldo allthework.Forastart,notallsensorymodalitieshaveasvibranta phenomenologyasvision;thinkofproprioception,orthesenseof balance,wheredistinctivephenomenologicalpropertiesarenoteasyto pindown.Moreover,manyholdthatthoughtitselfhasadefinitephenomenology.Giventhesepoints,itisnotimmediatelyobvious,tosay theleast, what phenomenologicaldifferenceissupposedtomarkthe sensory-cognitivedivide.
Theideaofaphenomenologicaldistinctionbetweensensationand cognitioncomesunderfurtherpressurefromthepossibilityof ‘richperceptualcontents’.AsweshallseeinChapter4,thereismuchcontemporary
²Itakethoughttocoverarangeofattitudes,includingstateslikehoping,expecting, doubting,andsupposing,aswellasbelieving.Thoughtscaneitherbe occurrent,whenthey areactivatedincognition,or standing,inthesenseofdispositionstoformoccurrentthoughts. Inwhatfollows,talkofbeliefandotherthoughtsshouldbeunderstoodoccurrentlyunlessitis otherwisespecified.
disagreementastowhethervisionandothersensescanregistersuchhighlevelfeaturesasbeinga kestrel,ora pinetree,or mywife.Allsidesinthis debateacceptthattherearecharacteristicconscioussensorydifferences betweenexpertobserverswhocanrecognizesuchthingsandnaïveobserverswhocan’t.Thedisputantsdisagree,however,onthesourceofthis phenomenologicaldifference.Sometakeitatfacevalue,asduetothe expertssensingthehigh-levelfeaturesassuch;othersarguethattheexperts aresimplyattendingsensorilytomoredetailedlow-levelfeatures;andyet otherssaythattheextraphenomenologyenjoyedbytheexpertsliesatthe cognitivelevel,notthesensoryone.Thesecontroversiesabout ‘richcontents’ presentfurtherchallengestotheprojectofdistinguishingsensation fromcognitionbypurelyphenomenologicalmeans.
Inthefaceofthesedifficulties,somephilosophershavesoughtto understandthesensory-cognitivedivisionintermsofcognitivearchitectureratherthanphenomenology.Thereareanumberofpossiblewaysof doingthis.
Oneoptionistoappealtosupposeddifferencesinthestructureofthe vehiclesofrepresentation:wherecognitiverepresentationis ‘symbolic’ , or ‘conceptual’ ,or ‘digital’,sensoryrepresentationis ‘iconic’ ,or ‘ nonconceptual’ ,or ‘analogue’.Thedifficultyhereistopindownasharp difference.Whiletherearenodoubtvariationsinformatcorresponding tothedifferentsortsofinformationconveyedbycognitiveandsensory states,itisunclearwhetherthisamountstoanyabsolutedistinction.In particular,itseemslikelythatsensoryaswellascognitiverepresentation involveselementsthatcanberecombinedintodifferentcomplex vehicles.Perhapssensationdisplayslesssuch ‘systematicity’ or ‘generality’ thancognition,butevensothisseemsmoreadistinctionofdegree thankind.(See,inparticular,Quilty-Dunn2019;2020.)
Adifferentoptionappealstothesupposedwaythatsensoryexperienceis ‘cognitivelyimpenetrable’.Certainlysomesensoryexperiences areresistanttocorrectionbysomecognitivestates,asillustratedmost strikinglyby ‘knowinglyexperiencedillusions’—forexample,thevisual impressionthatMüller-Lyerlinesaredifferentlengthswilltypically persisteveninobserverswhoknowtheyaresubjecttoanillusion.The problem,however,isthatsensoryprocessingisbynomeansimmuneto allkindsof ‘top-down’ cognitiveinfluences(seethecontributionsto
