TheFieryTestof Critique
AReadingofKant’sDialectic
IANPROOPS
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Tomyfather,Jim, andtothememoriesofmymother,Pat,andmysister,Helen
ListofFigures xiii
Introduction1
0.1The fierytestofcritique8
0.2Methodandexperiment14
0.3Thescepticalmethod15 0.4Pyrrhonianpostponement22 0.5Kantiancharity24 0.6Denyingknowledge25 0.7Speculation27
0.8Thepre-eminenceoftheAntinomies29 0.9Fourmastersofmethod30 0.10Approach31 0.11Rigour32 0.12Typographicalconventions33 0.13Jargonanddatingthereflections33 0.14Acknowledgements34
PARTI:RATIONALPSYCHOLOGY
1.TranscendentalIllusion39 1.1Introduction39 1.2Illusions:logical,empirical,andtranscendental40 1.3Thesourcesoftranscendentalillusion42
1.4Thesimpli fiedaccount52 1.5Thenecessityoftranscendentalillusion53 1.6Somerecalcitranttexts55
2.EmpiricalandRationalPsychology59 2.1Introduction59 2.2Wolff60 2.3Gottsched67
2.4Baumgarten69 2.5Meier71
2.6Rationalpsychologyinthe MetaphysicsL1 72
2.7 Pure rationalpsychology78
2.8Purerationalpsychologyasthescienceofself-consciousness79
2.9Thecritiqueofpurerationalpsychology85
2.10Twowaysofproceedinginpurerationalpsychology87
3.TheFirstParalogism:Preliminaries90 3.1Introduction90
3.2Substance92
3.3Transcendentalillusioninthe firstparalogism93
3.4Kant’snotionofaparalogism97
3.5Transcendentalparalogism102
4.The B-editionFirstParalogism104 4.1Introduction104
4.2Theparalogism104
4.3Objectionsandreplies111
4.4Ameriks’sinterpretation125
5.The A-editionFirstParalogism127 5.1Introduction127
5.2Acloserlookattranscendentalillusion130
5.3Wuerth’sinterpretation134
5.4AproblemwithKant’scharacterizationofaparalogism137
5.5Twowaysofviewingaparalogism138
6.TheSecondParalogism140 6.1Introduction140 6.2TheAchilles141
6.3The A-editionsecondparalogismasaparalogismk 148
6.4Kant’scriticismevaluated149
6.5ACartesianapplicationofthemajorpremise151
6.6TheIas ‘simpleinconcept’ 154
6.7The B-editionsecondParalogism156
6.8Thepossibilityofmonism158
7.TheThirdParalogism161
7.1Introduction161
7.2Themajorpremise164
7.3Theminorpremise166
7.4Thepracticaluseoftheconceptofaperson170
7.5The B-editionthirdparalogism173
7.6Immortality175
7.7Mendelssohn’sargument177
7.8Fordyce ’sargument178
7.9Fordyce ’sargumentevaluated188
8.TheFourthParalogism190 8.1Introduction190 8.2Theparalogism191
8.3External-worldscepticismrejected193
8.4Anti-materialism196
8.5Monism197
8.6The B-editionfourthparalogism198
8.7Transcendentalillusionagain199
8.8Architectonicandmethod200
8.9Descartes203
PARTII:RATIONALCOSMOLOGY
9.TheMathematicalAntinomiesPresented209 9.1Introduction209
9.2Thephenomenonofantinomy212
9.3Theformofanantinomy217
9.4Thethesisofthe firstantinomy:time221
9.5In finity223
9.6Theantithesisofthe firstantinomy:time227
9.7Thethesisofthe firstantinomy:space231
9.8Theantithesisofthe firstantinomy:space234
9.9Thesecondantinomy:preliminaries236
9.10Thethesisofthesecondantinomy237
9.11Theantithesisofthesecondantinomy240
10.TheMathematicalAntinomiesResolved245 10.1Introduction245
10.2The firstlineofresolution246 10.3Thesecondlineofresolution249
10.4Proofsby reductio 254
10.5Regresses adinfinitum and adindefinitum 255
10.6Thecosmologicalsyllogism257
10.7Thescepticalrepresentation261
10.8TheLambertanalogy263 10.9Theindifferentists265
10.10TheindirectargumentforTranscendentalIdealism270
10.11Theroadnottaken:nonsense273 10.12Zeno275
11.TheThirdAntinomyPresented277 11.1Introduction277
11.2Thethesisandantithesis277 11.3Terminology281
11.4CausesinKant284
11.5Kant’sdeterminism287
11.6Theantinomies:lessonslearned289
11.7Thethesisargument289
11.8Theantithesisargument293
12.TheThirdAntinomyResolved299 12.1Introduction299
12.2Empiricalandintelligiblecharacter301
12.3Whatkindoffreedom?303
12.4AnotherindirectargumentforTranscendentalIdealism304
12.5Moralresponsibility,moralgrowth,andrationalblame305
12.6Themoralargumentforfreedom309
12.7IsKantacompatibilist?313
12.8AgainstLeibniziancompatibilism314
12.9Kant’sallegedlibertarianism317
13.TheFourthAntinomy325 13.1Introduction325 13.2Thethesisargument326 13.3Theantithesisargument327 13.4Theresolution329 13.5DeMairanandthemoon331
PARTIII:RATIONALTHEOLOGY
14.TheOntologicalArgument337 14.1Introduction337
14.2Kant’spresentationoftheontologicalargument339
14.3Whatisa ‘realpredicate’?346
14.4WolffandBaumgartenonexistence348
14.5The ‘inconsistency’ objection351
14.6 Existence, being,and actuality 353
14.7 Actuality isnotarealpredicate354
14.8The ‘hundredthalers’ argument356
14.9Evaluationoftheargument359
14.10ThedisputationalformofKant’scriticism362
15.TheCosmologicalArgument364 15.1Introduction364
15.2Kant’spresentationofthecosmologicalargument367
15.3Theroleofcontingency371
15.4Theremainingphasesoftheargument373
15.5Contingencyandthe PSR 383
15.6Kant’sthirdmaincriticism:the nervusprobandi andits converse384
16.TheFirst Critique onthePhysico-TheologicalArgument390 16.1Introduction390
16.2Theordinaryphysico-theology391
16.3Kant’srevisedphysico–theology396
16.4Thepre-criticalrevisedphysico-theology:concluding remarks403
16.5Therevisedphysico-theologyinthe first Critique 404 16.6The first Critique onthephysico-theologicalargument406 16.7Kant’scriticismsofthedogmaticphysico-theologicalargument410 16.8Doweobserveend-directedness?415 16.9ThedoctrinalbeliefinanAuthorofNature418 16.10Thenon-dogmaticargument:criticismsandprospects419
17.TheRegulativeUseoftheIdeas422 17.1Introduction422 17.2TheIdeaofthesoulasaregulativeprinciple426 17.3TheIdeaofGodasaregulativeprinciple427 17.4Lawsexpressingthepurposesofnature430 17.5Lazyreasonandpervertedreason432 17.6TheIdeaofsystematicunity432 17.7The first Critique onthecoursesoftheheavenlybodies440 17.8Thetranscendentalprinciples445 17.9Theco-applicabilityofthelogicalprinciples448 17.10The focusimaginarius 448
18.ClosingReflections453 18.1Furtherconclusions454 18.2Denyingknowledge(again)457 18.3TranscendentalRealismasalogicalimpossibility459 18.4Thelossofinnocence460 18.5Exhaustiveness461
Appendix:Abbreviations463
Bibliography
Introduction
Attheopeningofthesecondeditionofthe first Critique Kantisponderingthe futureofmetaphysics.Willthisenterprise,hewonders,everbeputonthesecure pathofascience?Issuchapathevenpossible,andifnot,whyhasnature nonethelessimplantedinusarestlessstrivingto findit?¹Onthebasisofan intermittentlyconjecturalsurveyofthedevelopmentoftheestablishedscienceshe arrivesattheupbeatconclusionthat yes suchapathisindeedpossible.Buthe warnsthatgettingmetaphysicsontoitwillnotbeeasy.Itwillrequire orsohis quasi-surveyleadshimtobelieve nothingshortofanintellectual revolution:a transformationinourmodeofthinkingthatconsists,likeitsCopernicanarchetype,inaradicalreversalofperspective.WhereasforCopernicusthereversalhad involvedashiftintheinquirer’scosmicframeofreference,forKantitinvolvesa reversalinourexpectationsaboutthedirectionofepistemic fit:insteadoftaking ourcognitiontoconformtoobjects,weareto ‘experiment’ withthesupposition thatobjects,beingpartlyconstitutedbythecontributionofourcognitivefaculties, conformtoourcognition(B xvi).²ItisclearthatKantregardsthisexperiment, whichhetakestodisclosethetruthofTranscendentalIdealism,asanunqualified success(B xviii).
Thankstothepatienteffortsofgenerationsofscholars,thetheoryKant developsinaimingtoenactphilosophy’sCopernicanrevolution hisso-called ‘metaphysicsofexperience’—hasbynowbeenexaminedinminutedetail.Less closelystudied,however,havebeentheintellectualpressuresthatprecipitatethe crisistowhichthatrevolutionisaresponse.Inparticular,muchremainstobesaid aboutKant’sexaminationintheTranscendentalDialecticofthepathologies or, moreprecisely,illusions,delusions,and(antinomial)paradoxes thathesupposestoliewithinandbehind,dogmaticspeculativemetaphysics.³Anumberof
¹SeeB vii,B ix–xi and,especially,B xv.QuotationsfromKant’swritingsaredrawnfromthe PrussianAcademyedition,the first Critique beingcitedbytheA/Bpagination.ImmanuelKant, GesammelteSchriften (Berlin:Königlich-PreussischenAkademiederWissenschaftenzuBerlin[now deGruyter],1900–).Englishtranslationsaremyown,thoughoftenindebtedtosomeselectionofthe translationslistedintheBibliography.
²Kant’sdecisiontopresenthisTranscendentalIdealismasahypothesistobeexperimentallytested reinforceshisanalogy;forheseesCopernicusashavingformulatedoneofthemostcelebrated hypothesesofall(24:223).
³Itakeitthatanantinomyisa ‘paradox’ inthe ‘modern’ senseidentifiedbyRoySorensen,namely: ‘asmallsetofpropositionsthatareindividuallyplausiblebutjointlyinconsistent’.SeeRoySorensen, A BriefHistoryoftheParadox:PhilosophyandtheLabyrinthsoftheMind (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2003)at120.Inanantinomy,thesmallsetinquestionisa pair ofpropositions.If ‘A’ isanameof
TheFieryTestofCritique:AReadingofKant’sDialectic.IanProops,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©IanProops. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199656042.003.0001
specificquestionsarise:First,what,ifanything,uni fiesthevariousinstancesof the ‘worm-eatendogmatism ’ towhichKantis,muchofthetime,reacting?Do theystemfromasinglesource,and,ifso,whatisitsnature?Second,assuming thereisasinglesource,isitpeculiartodogmaticspeculativemetaphysicsor doesitunderlieabroaderrangeofproblematicapproaches?Third,andrelatedly,exactlywhichoutlooks,besidesdogmatism,isKantmeaningtoopposein theTranscendentalDialectic?Fourth,isanyparticularpartofspeculative dogmaticmetaphysicsespeciallyrevelatoryofthesourceofitspredicament? Fifth,doesKantregardanypartofspeculativemetaphysicsasworthsaving? And,ifso,howdoesthissalutarypartoftheenterprisedifferfromthepartsto bediscarded?
Toanswertheseandrelatedquestions,Ihavefounditnecessarytoattempta studyoftheTranscendentalDialecticasawhole.The ‘Dialectic’,asthispartofthe workiscolloquiallyknown,accountsforsometwo fifthsofKant’smasterwork.Init weareoffered among many otherthings asearchingexaminationofthedogmatic speculativemetaphysicsofcertainofthecriticalKant’smodernpredecessors amongthem,mostnotably:Descartes,Leibniz,Wolff,Mendelssohn,and(less explicitly)Kant’searlier ‘pre-critical’ self.⁴ Themetaphysicsofthesephilosophers qualifiesas dogmatic,inKant’sview,becauseithastenstoitsattemptedproofs withoutundertakingapreparatoryexaminationofthemind’scapacitiesand powers.⁵ Itis speculative becauseitrestson ‘theoretical’ grounds,suchasthe PrincipleofSufficientReason,ratherthan ‘practical’ grounds,suchasthefactthat westandundermoralobligations.⁶
InKant’sview,theultimategoalofdogmaticspeculativemetaphysicsisto provecertain ‘cardinalpropositions’ ofpurereason including,pre-eminently, theexistenceofGod,ontheonehand,andthenaturalimmortalityofthehuman therelevantantinomy,thenthepairwouldbe: ‘Thethesisandantithesisof A arecontradictories’ and ‘Thethesisandantithesisof A areeachsupportedbysoundarguments.’ Theantinomialparadoxwould beresolvedifonecouldshoweitherorbothofthesepropositionstobefalse.Aswewillsee,Kantinfact supposesthathecanshowbothtobefalse.
⁴ Moreaccurately,intheDialecticweareofferedatreatmentofsomebutnotallofthedogmatic viewsofthesephilosophers.Leibniz’scommitmenttotheidentityofindiscernibles,forexample, receivesitscritiqueintheappendixon ‘Theamphibolyofconceptsofreflection’,whichimmediately precedestheTranscendentalDialectic.InthisearliersectionKant’scritiqueisdirectednottowardsthe facultyofreasonanditspurportedproducts asittendstobeintheDialectic butrathertowards certainconclusionsdrawnfrom ‘mereactsofreflection’ (A278/B335).Kanthasinmindcertainerrors thatoccurintheperformanceof ‘transcendentalreflection’:thepracticeofassigningrepresentationsto theirappropriatecognitivefaculties(compare9:73).
⁵ B xxxv;8:226;9:83–4.Kantinsiststhatthereisnothing initself problematicaboutseekingstrict proofsfromprinciplesknownapriori theso-called ‘dogmaticprocedure’ ofreason(B xxxv).Buthe believesthatwemustusethisprocedureonlywithinitsproperdomains.
⁶ Aswewillsee,however,theword ‘speculative’ isnotalwayspejorativeforKant(compareA xxi). Inparticular,whenitmodifies ‘ reason ’,itcanmeanmerely ‘theoretical’ asopposedto ‘practical’ (compareB xliii).
soul,ontheother.⁷ Theobjects whetheractualormerelyputative withwhich thismetaphysicsdealsfallintotwooverlappinggroups.Ontheonehand,there arethethree ‘supersensibleobjects’ connectedwithKant’sdoctrineofpractical faith,namely,God,immortality,andfreedom.⁸ Ontheother,therearetheobjects studiedbythethreebranchesofWolffian ‘special’ metaphysics.Thesearethe intentional or,asKantputsit, ‘imagined’—objectsofthe ‘TranscendentalIdeas’ of:theworld(conceivedofasanabsolutetotalityofobjectsofsense);thesoul (conceivedofasasimplesubstance);andGod(conceivedofasthesupreme intelligence).⁹ Aswewillsee,Kanttakesadifferentepistemicattitudetowards theexistenceofeachoftheseobjects:herejectsthe firstasnon-existent,isagnostic abouttheexistenceofthesecond,andbelievesinthethird thoughonthislast pointheisnot,Ifear,entirelyconsistent.¹⁰ Inallthreecases,however,heinsists thatwecanhavenotheoretically-grounded knowledge [Wissen]oftheseobjects, andhedisdains,asahallmarkofdogmatism,theambitiontoacquireit.¹¹
Thisambition alongwithitscharacteristicattitudesandallegedproducts constitutesthemaintargetofKant’scritiqueofspeculativemetaphysicsinthe Dialectic,and,perhapsunsurprisingly,my firstandmostbasicgoalwillbeto scrutinizethedetailsofthatcritique.¹²ButIhave,inaddition,anumberofless predictablegoals,whichIwouldliketospendamomentoutlining.
⁷ SeeR5637(18:273)andA741–2/B669–70.Thischoiceof ‘cardinalpropositions’ isentirely appropriatebecauseDescartesinhis DedicatoryLettertotheSorbonne describesGodandthesoulas twotopicsconcerningwhichdemonstrativeproofscanandshouldbeprovidedwiththeaidof philosophyratherthantheology(AT VII,1; CSM II,3).Kantoccasionallycharacterizesthefreedom ofthewillandtheidealityofspaceandtimeascardinalpropositionsofmetaphysics,thoughwhenhe doessoheisexpressinghisownviewoftheappropriatetargetpropositionsofmetaphysicsratherthan thatofhisopponents(seeA799–800/B828,R6349,andR6353).
⁸ At5:469Kantcallsthesesupersensibleobjects ‘ res fidei’ (‘mattersoffaith’)(seealso20:350, R6317,and20:295).Immortality,beinga ‘futurelife<vitafutura>’ thatfollowsnecessarilyfromthe natureofthesoul(28:763),isaphaseoftemporalexistence(compare20:298).Accordingly,Kant’ s reasonfordeemingit ‘supersensible’ cannotbethatitisatemporal.Thereasonisratherthatitisnota possibleobjectofexperience(4:477;29:945).Thisissofortworeasons.First,thedaywillnevercome whenIamableempiricallytoverifymyunendingexistence;second,forKant,immortalityrequiresthe post-mortem necessary enduranceofthesoul afeaturethatcannot,heinsists,bereadoffofthe deliverancesofthesenses.Incidentally,thefactthatimmortalityisaphaseoftemporalexistence suggeststhatKantdoesnotconceiveofthesupersensibleobjectsthataremattersoffaithas ingeneral thingsinthemselves;forthingsinthemselvesareineverycaseatemporal thoughhecertainly conceivesofsomeoftheminthisway.
⁹ KantreferstofreedomasatranscendentalIdeaatA533/B561andA558/B586,buthedoesnot treatitastheprimaryobjectofanybranchofWolffianmetaphysics.
¹
⁰ Tobeclear,Kantisagnosticabouttheexistenceofthesoul whenitisconceivedofasasubstance; heis not agnosticaboutitsexistencewhenitisconceivedof,moreneutrally,aswhateveritisina humanbeingthatthinks theso-called ‘thinkingI’.Second,theinconsistencywithrespecttoKant’ s beliefinGodarisesbecauseheisapttocharacterizetheobjectsofthetranscendentalIdeas whichhe alsoterms ‘conceptsofreason’—asmere ‘heuristic fictions’ (A771/B799).
¹¹InthecaseofGod,Kantevenseemstothinkthatsuchknowledgeisnoteventobe desired.Were wetopossessit,hethinks,wewouldbeincapableofgenuinelymorallymotivatedaction;forwewould envisagerewardandpunishmentsodistinctlythatmoralitywouldbetransformedintoself-interest. See,forexample,28:1292andcompareR4996;18:55.
¹²ThisisnottodenythatthereissomeoverlapbetweenthegoalsoftheDialecticandotherpartsof the first Critique.Indeed,KantsupposesthattheDialecticconfirmsaresultalreadyprovedinthe
Mysecondmaingoal the firstofthelessobviousones istoemphasizea pointoriginallynotedsomesixdecadesagobyLewisWhiteBeck,namely,that althoughheunequivocallyrejectsthedogmaticprojectofattemptingtogain theoreticallygroundedknowledgeofthesupersensible,Kantnonethelessendorses certaintheoreticallygrounded arguments concerningthesematters,arguments thatheseesasproducingsomethinglessthanknowledge.¹³Thesearguments, whichoccurinthe first Critique,drawonthreeelements:(a)empiricalpremises, (b)theprincipleofanalogy,and(c)oneorotherprincipleofreasongoverning inquiry(aprincipleoftheform ‘proceedinyourempiricalinquiriesonthe assumptionthat p’).Theyseektoproduce,notknowledgebutrathercertain firmlyheld(hencestable),inpart theoreticallygrounded beliefsthatare,inspite oftheirstability,notwhollyunshakable(A827–8/B855–6).Thesebeliefsare instancesofaphenomenonKantterms ‘doctrinalbelief ’ [doctrinalenGlauben],a phenomenonthatincludes,atminimum,beliefsinahumanafterlife(B425–6) andin ‘agod’ (A826–7/B854–5) understoodnotasaperfectbeing,butmerely asa ‘wiseandgreatoriginatoroftheworld’ (B xxxiii).
Kantillustratesthenotionofdoctrinalbeliefwithhisownbeliefthatother planetsareinhabited abelief,hetellsus,onwhich,iftherewerearealistic chanceofsettlingthequestionempirically(sothattherewouldbeapointto makingabet),he’dstake ‘manyoflife’sadvantages ’,includingallheowns(A 825/B853).Sincehetakesbettingbehaviourtobethetouchstoneofthestrength ofabelief(A825–6/B852 –3;24:853),theexamplesuggeststhatKantconceives ofdoctrinalbeliefsassomewhatakintohigh-credencepartialbeliefstates.¹⁴ The upshotisthathemustbeadjudgedabelieverin ‘agod’—averygreatandwise originatoror ‘AuthorofNature’—andinanafterlife.Andwemustsupposehimto holdtheseviewson theoretical ratherthanmerelypractical(thatis,moral)grounds. BeckmadehisobservationthatKantendorsesatheoreticallybasedargument foradoctrinalbeliefintheafterlifeinaneasy-to-missfootnoteinabookon Kant’ssecond Critique.So,itisperhapsnotallthatsurprisingthatthetopicof doctrinalbeliefhas,untilrecently,beenlargelyneglectedbyscholarsofthe first.¹⁵
TranscendentalAnalytic:namely,that ‘allofourinferencesthatseektotakeusbeyondtherealmof possibleexperiencearedeceptiveandbaseless’ (A642/B671).HesupposesthatonethingtheDialectic addstothisalreadyestablishedresult(beyonditsconfirmation)isanillustrationofthefactthatwe havea ‘naturalpropensity tooverstepthisrealm’sboundary’ (ibid.,emphasisadded).
¹³SeeLewisWhiteBeck, ACommentaryonKant’sCritiqueofPracticalReason (Chicago:University ofChicagoPress,1960)at266,n18.
¹
⁴ Moreprecisely,hetakesbetting andoathtaking tobethetouchstonesofthesufficiencyof holding-to-betruewhenthatholding-to-betrueconstitutesbelief(9:73).Wewilllaterseeareasonto thinkthattheaffinitybetweendoctrinalbeliefsandwhatwecallbeliefstodayisactuallynotascloseas onemightat firstsuppose.
¹⁵ OwingtotheinsightfulworkofAndrewChignell,Kant’sattachmenttothenotionofdoctrinal beliefisnowbecomingmorewidelyknown.ButevenChignell’sotherwiseexcellentdiscussionofthe phenomenonofdoctrinalbelief(orashepreferstocallit ‘TheoreticalBelief ’)failstoregisterBeck’ s
Nonetheless,hisobservationisofthe firstimportanceforourunderstandingof Kant’scriticalproject.ItsuggeststhatKantseestwobranchesoftraditional speculativemetaphysicsinparticular,namelyrationaltheologyandrational psychology thelatterbeingthebranchofrationalmetaphysicstowhichhe assignstheargumentforadoctrinalbeliefinanafterlife(28:441–2,28: 591–2) as inpart legitimateenterprises.¹⁶
Ifthisisright,thenKant’sbugbearintheDialecticisnotspeculativeor theoreticalmetaphysicspersebutrathersomethingmorespecific.Whatexactly? Aprimecandidate,Iwouldsuggest,is dogmatism understoodasanunrealisticallyinflatedestimationofhowmuchonecan know ontheoreticalgroundsalone (alongwiththeprojectoftryingtofulfilthisexpectation).¹⁷ InKant’sview, dogmatismcantaketheformeitherofdogmaticspeculativemetaphysicsorofa somewhatparadoxicallylabelled ‘dogmatic scepticism’—thepragmaticallyselfdefeatingattempttoestablishwithcertaintythatnothingiscertain,anaspiration thatKantassociates,somewhatfrowningly,withAcademicscepticism.¹⁸
ThescepticismofPyrrho,bycontrast,hetreatsasworthyofrespect.The Pyrrhonian ‘critical’ or ‘problematic’ sceptic,hesupposes,doubtsonlyinorder toeventuallygaincertainty(24:214).KantplainlyhasgreatsympathyforPyrrho, though,equallyplainly, his Pyrrhoisnottobeconfusedwiththefounderof traditionalPyrrhonism.Indeed,Kantregardsasacompletenon-starterthe positionusuallytermed ‘Pyrrhonism’—namely,thephilosophythatadvocates thebalancingofclaims,followedbythesuspensionofjudgment,withtheaim ofattaining tranquillity.Herejectsthisapproachmainlybecausehesupposesthat oncertainquestionstheresimplyisnopermittedignorance hencenoprospect
pointthatKantarguesforadoctrinalbeliefintheafterlife.SeeAndrewChignell, ‘BeliefinKant’ , PhilosophicalReview,116(3)(2007),323–60.
¹⁶ Kanttakes ‘metaphysics’—whenthetermisusedforsomethingdistinctfromanaturalpredisposition(B22) tohaveatleastthreemeanings(A843/B869).Initswidestsense,thetermconnotes thephilosophyofpurereason.Thisdividesintocritique(orpropaedeutic),ontheonehand,andthe systemofpurereasonontheother,thelatterqualifyingas ‘metaphysics’ inasecond,narrowersense. Thesystemofpurereasoninturndividesintothespeculativeuseofpurereason(or ‘metaphysicsof nature’),ontheonehand,andthepracticaluseofreason(or ‘metaphysicsofmorals’),ontheother. Kantsupposesthattheterm ‘metaphysics’ isusuallyusedforthemetaphysicsofnature.Sincedoctrinal beliefsareproductsofthespeculativeortheoreticaluseofpurereason,itisplausibletosupposethat they ortheargumentsjustifyingthematleast countasbelonging somewhatparadoxicallygiven theircontent tothemetaphysicsofnature.
¹⁷ Kantalsotreatsdogmatismasinvolvingcertainattitudesandstances.AtA485–6/B514,for example,heassociatesitwithanattitudeof ‘erudition’,andatA757/B785withoneof ‘boastfulness’— anattitudeheregardsascapableofbeingpunctured,ifatall,thenonlybyanantinomy.Inthe Jäsche Logic heequatestheattitudeofdogmatismwitha ‘blindtrustinthefacultyofreasontoexpanditself a priori throughmereconcepts,withoutcritique,merelyonaccountofitsseemingsuccess’ (9:84).
¹⁸ See24:214and24:745–6;compare24:216andR4164(17:440).Thedogmaticscepticengagesin dogmaticdoubt,whichKantalsocalls ‘thedoubtofdecision’,anotionthatcontrastswiththecritical sceptic’ s ‘doubtofpostponement’ (24:205).Whenoneengagesinthedoubtofdecisiononedecides thatonemustremainuncertain.Whenoneengagesinthedoubtofpostponement,bycontrast,one resolvestokeeponsearching.
oftranquillity[Ruhestand ]arisingtherefrom(see Prolegomena 4:274).¹⁹ Heisno lessstaunchlyopposedtoacertain,harder-to-labelbrandofscepticismthathe findsinHume abrandhesometimes,butnotalways,treatsasaspeciesof dogmaticscepticism aswellastoacertainratherelusive ‘indifferentism’ about whichI’lllaterhavemoretosay.SincethephilosophicallandscapeofKant’stime isdenselypopulatedand,todate,onlysketchilysurveyed,athirdmajoraimofthe bookistogainaclearerviewofthefullrangeofpositionsagainstwhichKantis opposinghiscriticalphilosophy.²⁰
Oneofthemorecatchyslogansofthe first Critique isKant’sconfessionthathe founditnecessaryto ‘deny’—orperhaps ‘annul’ [aufheben]—‘knowledge[Wissen] inordertomakeroomforfaith[Glaube]’ (B xxx).²¹Tantalizingly,heleavesthis signatureclaimsomewhatunder-elaborated.Whyexactly onewantstoknow shouldhavingknowledgeofcertainmatters oratleasttheambitiontoacquire it threaten,intheabsenceofthecriticalphilosophy,toleavenoroomforfaith? Afourthgoalofthebookistoshedsomelightonthismatter.
The CritiqueofPureReason,weare(rightly)told,isPureReason’scritique ofitself.²²ButwhatexactlyisKantian ‘critique’?A fifthgoalistoaddressthis question.IwillarguethatforKantcritiquehasbothasubjectiveandanobjective side.Subjectively asiswellknown itisaninvestigationofthelimitsofthe
¹
⁹ Inanothersense,heallowsthata true tranquillitymayindeedbeobtainedsolongasitarisesnot fromoursettlingforignoranceontheantinomialquestionsbutratherfromthelitigationmade possiblebycritique(A751–2/B779–80).Thismeansthatwearetopursuea verdict ontheantinomial questionsnota victory andtheverdictistoconsistnotinarulinginfavourofonesideofthe antinomialdisputeandagainsttheotherbutratherinajudgmentaboutthesourceofthecontroversy,a judgmentmadepossiblebycritique(ibid.).Thesceptic’stranquillity,Kantsupposes,providesan inappropriatelyshortpathtophilosophicaltranquillity(A757/B785):theimplicationwouldseemto bethatKant’sownapproachprovidesthemoreappropriatelongerpath.
²⁰ Kantisapttolikenhistaskinmetaphysicstothatofamaritimeexplorerinsearchofanavigable channelthroughtreacherouswaters.Thefrequencywithwhichheemploysthisspecificallymaritime imageissometimesobscuredbyatendencyamonghistranslatorstorendertheterm ‘Weg’ as ‘road’ ratherthan ‘route’ evenincontextswherethedominantimageisplainlyoneofaquaticendeavour(see, forexample,thestandardtranslationsofKant’suseof ‘Weg’ at11:76).Thenauticalimagecomestothe forewhenKantdescribeshimselfaswishingtosteeracourseforpurereasonbetweenthelooming ‘cliffs’ [Klippen]offanaticism,ontheonehand,andscepticism,ontheother(B128).Thiswishseems tobeanaspectofhismoregeneraldesiretosteeracoursebetweenthetwinperilsofdogmatism,onthe onehand,andscepticism,ontheother(compare:R5645;18:287).(Forthedistinctionbetween ‘fanaticism’ [Schwärmerei]and ‘enthusiasm’ [Enthusiasmus],see2:251n.)
²¹Itakeitthat ‘annulling’ knowledgeisamatterofannullingthe claim toknow.Irender ‘Glaube’ in this contextas ‘faith’ ratherthan ‘belief ’ becausethebeliefsthatKanttakestobejeopardizedby pursuingspeculativemetaphysicsdogmatically beliefsinGod,freedom,andimmortality areones thatheterms ‘doctrinesoffaith[Glaubenslehren]’ (20:298–9).Theterm ‘Glaubenslehre’ plausibly relatestofaithratherthanbeliefingeneral,becauseitoccursinsuchphrasesas: ‘Kongregationfürdie Glaubenslehre’ (‘Congregationforthedoctrineofthefaith’).Thisisonereasontodisfavourauniform translationof ‘Glaube’ as ‘belief ’.AnotheristhatKantusestheterm ‘fides’ forthestateoneisinwhen oneattainsapractical Glaube namely, ‘rationalfaith[Vernunftglaube]’ (24:734).
²²EchoingPope’sfamousdictumthattheproperstudyofmankindisman,Kantclaimsthatpure reason ‘isinfactoccupiedwithnothingbutitself.Norcanithaveanyothervocation’ (A680/B708). The way inwhichitissooccupied,ofcourse,isthroughcritique.
mind’sabilitytoacquireaprioriknowledge,and,moregenerally,aninvestigation ofthemind’sactivepowers acritiqueof ‘theentirefacultyofpurereason ’ (20: 321),whichproceedsbymeansofanexaminationofthesourcesofcognition(A 758/B786).Butobjectively asislesswellknown itisakindof test of(what Kantseesas)themaindisciplinesoftraditionalmetaphysics.²³Viewedinthis secondway,critiqueisakindofwinnowingexerciseinwhichoneseparatesthe wheatofgoodspeculativemetaphysicsfromthechaffofbad,though,aswewill see,Kantemploysalessfamiliarmetaphortomakethesamepoint.
ThegoalofachievingaclearerviewofKant’sconceptionofcritiquedovetails withasixthand finalgoalofthebook,namely,todeepenourunderstandingof Kant’smethodologicalself-conception.Iarguethat,althoughanassortmentof influencesshapeKant’smethodology,hismostprofoundsympathiesliewith Pyrrho’smethod or,moreprecisely,withacomponentofKant’sownrather idiosyncraticconceptionofPyrrho’smethod theidea,namely,thatinquiry shouldbeprolongedanda finaljudgmentpostponed,but not indefinitely. AlthoughinKant’sviewthebestphilosophicalinquirytakesitstime,itboth aimsat,andeventuallyattains,certainty.Thiscertainty,however,doesnot concernquitethesamesubjectmatterashadbeenoriginallyinquestion.Kant’ s favouredmethod,whichhecalls ‘thescepticalmethod’,andwhichhedistinguishessharplyfromscepticism,isoneheassociatesmostcloselywiththemethod oftheantinomieswhentheyareviewed,notmerelyassnaresintowhichhuman reasonispronetofallbutasinstructiveandsalutaryinstrumentswhichcanyield insightsintothehumanpredicamentandsogenerateself-knowledgeofan especiallyprofoundkind.
Thesearethemaingoalsofthebook.MyplanistoworkthroughtheDialectic, guidedbytheorderofitschapters.Buttherearetwoprefatorydiscussions.One concernsthenatureoftranscendentalillusionandtheroleitplaysinKant’ s diagnosisofthehumanimpulsetowardsmetaphysicaloverreach(Chapter1), theother,thenotionsofempiricalandrationalpsychologyastheyaredeveloped intheperiodfromWolfftoKant(Chapter2).
InwhatremainsoftheintroductionIbegindiggingintosomeofthethemes justmentioned,startingwithKant’sconceptionof critique and,morespecifically, withthelightshoneontheobjectivesideofcritiquebyhismetaphorofa ‘fiery test’ (A406/B433).
²³Thesubjectivesideofcritiqueisinfactratherinvolved.Forfurtherdetails,see29:782.Andfora discussionofthemeaningoftheterm ‘critique’ priortoKant,seeGiorgioTonelli, ‘“Critique” and RelatedTermsPriortoKant:AHistoricalSurvey’ , Kant-Studien,69(2)(1978),119–48.Ishouldstress thatIdonotmeantoputanygreatweightonthelabels ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ inthiscontext:it mayperhapsbebettertospeakofthe ‘faculty-directed’ and ‘discipline-directed’ sidesofcritique.These donotcometothesamethingbecause,aswewillsee,thedoctrinesbelongingtoagivendisciplineneed notuniformlyresultfromtheexerciseofasinglefaculty.
0.1The fierytestofcritique
KantdividestheDialecticintothreemainsections,eachofwhichcontainsthe critiqueofaseparatesub-disciplineofWolffian ‘special’ metaphysics(A334–5/B 391–2).Toa firstapproximationatleast, ‘rationalpsychology’ isdealtwithinthe Paralogismschapter, ‘rationalcosmology’ intheAntinomieschapter,and ‘rational theology’ inthe ‘Idealofpurereason’—thoughthesechaptersincludemuchelse besidesthesecritiquesandKant’stargetsarenotconfinedtotheviewsofthe Wolffians.Itisnosimplemattertosaywhattheseputatively ‘rational’ sciences amounttointheformsinwhichKantreceivesthem.Forexample,the ‘rational psychology’ hediscussesinthe first Critique isnotsimplythepurportedlyapriori doctrineofthesoularticulatedbythefourparalogismsofpurereason.For,aswe willseeinChapter7,Kantconceivesofrationalpsychologyasincludingacertain empiricallybasedargumentforthesoul’ssurvivalafterdeath,whichargumenthe deemslegitimatesolongasitisunderstoodtoproduceadoctrinalbeliefrather thanknowledge(28:441–2;compare28:591–2).
Officiallyspeaking,critiqueisthesystematicinvestigationofthemind’ scapacityforacquiringmetaphysicalknowledge andsoalsoasystematicinvestigationofthelimitsofthatknowledge(4:365,4:378–9).Itisataskinwhichthe responsiblephilosophermustengagebeforeconstructingasystemofmetaphysicalscience(B xxxv;4:371).But,unofficially,itisalsoakindoftestoftheworthof variousbranchesandsub-branchesofspeculativemetaphysics atestwhose resultsturnouttobeinterestinglyvariegated.Thispointisnotobvious,butit emergesfromaclosereadingofametaphorKantdeploysintheAntinomies chapterinthecourseofreflectingontheresultsofhisrecentlyconcluded investigationsintheParalogisms. ‘Pneumatism’,hesays,
cannotdenythatinnerdefectthroughwhichitsentireplausibility[Schein] dissolvesintomerehaze[Dunst]whenputtothe fierytestofcritique [FeuerprobederKritik].(A406/B433,Guyer–Woodtranslation Iwillshortly amendthistranslation)
Kantistellingusthattheputativescienceofpneumatismcomestonaughtwhen subjectedtoacertaintest,namely:the ‘Feuerprobe’ ofcritique. ‘Pneumatism’ ,as wewillsee,turnsout onKant’slipsatleast torefertothedogmatic,nonempiricalpartofrationalpsychology,namely,the(inambition)aprioridoctrine ofthenatureofthinkingbeingsingeneral thedoctrineofso-called ‘spirits ’.²⁴
²⁴ Spirits,moreprecisely,areforKantthinkingbeingsthatareconceivedofascapableofpossessing consciousness withoutpossessingabody(20:309).Sometimes,healsouses ‘pneumatism’ [pneumatismus]forthedoctrinethatthemindisnotmatter(A379).Butinthepresentcontext,whereheis reflectingontheresultsoftheParalogisms,thistermreferstothepurportedsciencethataimsto establish,amongotherthings,thatthesoulisaspirit.Usedinthisway, ‘pneumatism’ isequivalentto
Butwhatexactlyisa ‘Feuerprobe’?SomeofKant’smostaccomplishedtranslators havesuggestedthatitisanordealby fire;andIhaveheardthesamesuggestion madebynativeGermanspeakers.²⁵ Inthepresentcontext,however,suchan interpretationwouldbejarringlyinapt;foritwouldportrayKantasmodellinghis supposedlyenlightenedprogrammeof ‘critique’ onaparadigmofreligioussuperstition:theso-called iudiciumdei (judgmentofGod)ofmedievalEuropean Christianity.Thisisanordealinwhichapersonwhostandsaccusedofacrime forwhichtherearenoearthlywitnessesistried(inareligiousceremony)inthe eyesofGod(theuniquedivinewitnessandjudge).Inanordealspecifically ‘by fire ’ theaccused,havingvolunteeredfortheordeal,mightberequiredtocarryaredhotironbarforacertaindistance.Afterwards,theirhandwouldbebandagedand afteraspecifiedinterval(ofafewdays)examinedbyapriest.Ifthewoundwere foundtohavehealed(festered),thejudgmentofGodwouldbetakentobethatthe accusedwasinnocent(guilty).²⁶
Anordealofthiskindishardlya fittingmetaphorforcritique,which,beingan instrumentofproperlyenlightenedintellectualprogress,issupposedtoenjoy certainqualitiesofopenness,autonomy,andindependenceofreligiousauthority.²⁷ Theunwantedconnotationsofbenightednessandsuperstitionmay,of course,bemerelyaccidental manyametaphor,afterall,carriessomeunwanted baggageinitstrain.However,evenwiththatpointgivendueweight,this interpretationstillleavesthereaderwonderingwhyKant usuallysure-footed inhishandlingof figuration shouldhavefasteneduponanimagesostarklyat oddswiththespiritofenlightenedcritique.Nor,onthisinterpretation,wouldthe Feuerprobe passagereallymakesense:Kantwouldhavetobeunderstoodtobe claimingthatsomethingundergoesanordealby firewiththeresultthatit vanishesinapuffofsmoke.
Fortunately,amoresatisfactoryaccountofKant’ s ‘Feuerprobe’ metaphoris available.Anditisonethatsuggestsimportantlessonsaboutthenatureofhis criticalundertaking.Accordingtothisalternativeaccount,the ‘fierytest’ isnota religiousordealbutrathera metallurgicalassay a ‘fireassay ’ or ‘cupellationtest’ tobeprecise.Insuchaprocedure,acoinorasampleofmetal-containingoreis ‘pneumatology’ [pneumotologie],thedisciplinethatKantvariouslycharacterizesasa ‘metaphysicaldogmaticpsychology’ ,a ‘doctrineofspirits[Geisterlehre]’ (28:679),anda ‘scienceofthinkingbeingsin general’ (28:222,compare28:555).
²⁵ KempSmithsuggests ‘the fieryordealofcriticalinvestigation’,Pluhar ‘thecritique’sordealby fire ’ (A406/B433).
²⁶ Fordetails andasurprisingassessmentoftheefficacyofthepractice seePeterT.Leeson, ‘Ordeals’ , JournalofLawandEconomics,55(2012),691–714.
²⁷ Thatsaid,onemightthinkofKantaslikeningaparticular part ofcritiquetoanotherkindof ordeal,namelyatrialbycombat,forheexplicitly figuresthepartiesintheantinomiesascombatants. However,thisisnotthepartofcritiqueonwhichKantisfocusinghere.
testedforitspreciousmetalcontent.²⁸ Thetestinvolvesplacingthesampleina porouscrucible technicallya ‘cupel’—whereitisburnedinafurnaceinthe presenceofaleadcatalyst.Whenthishappensthesample’sbasemetals iron, zinc,andsoforth formoxides(aswe’dnowcallthem)thatareeitherdrivenoff infumesordrawnintotheporesofthecruciblebycapillaryaction.Attheendof theprocedure,ifoneislucky,one findsanuggetofsilverorgoldsittingatthe bottomofthecrucible.²⁹
WouldKanthavebeenfamiliarwiththisuseoftheterm ‘Feuerprobe’?Thereis reasontothinkhewould.Foronething,helecturedonminerologyintheearly 1770sandownedseveralworksonthesubject.Inoneoftheseworks,J.J.Lange’ s EinleitungzurMinerologicaMetallica,thereisanunmistakableuseof ‘Feuerprobe’ fora fireassay.³⁰ Secondly,therelatedimageofusingafurnacetorecoverthegold oftruthfromtherustanddrossoffalsehood,therebypurifyingourputative knowledgeintheprocess,occursinanotherworkKantowned,namely,Abraham Tucker’ s TheLightofNaturePursued.³¹Thirdly,Kant’sfamiliaritywith fireassays isactuallyondisplayinhis1796essay ‘Onarecentlyprominenttoneofsuperiorityinphilosophy’.There,criticizingcertainunnamed ‘philosophersoffeeling’ , hesays:
Itcannotbedemandedthatthebettermentofahumanbeing...shouldbe certifiedbyanassay-master[Münzwarden]ofhisorhermorality,tryingitin anassay-cupel[Probierkapelle];for,tobesure,theweight[Schrot]ofgood actionscanindeedbefeatherlight,butastohowmuchsterlingmetal[Mark Fein]theycontainatheart,whocanbeara publiclyvalid testimonytothis? (8:402)
HereKantisalludingtothecustomarydistinctionbetweentheweightofametal [dasSchrot]inacoinanditsinnervalue[dasKorn] thelatterbeingthecoin’ s precious-metalcontent(technicallyits ‘fineweight’)asopposeditsbase-metal ‘vehicle’.³²Heissayingthatonecannotfollowthephilosophersoffeelingin demandingcertificationofthemoralworthofanactionbya figurative
²⁸ OneofKant’snineteenth-centurytranslators,J.M.D.Meiklejohn,appearstohavebeenalertto thisinterpretation;forherenders ‘Feuerprobe’ as ‘crucible’.J.M.D.Meiklejohn, CritiqueofPure Reason:TranslatedfromtheGermanofImmanuelKant (London:HenryG.Bohm,1855)at255.
²⁹ TheprocedureisdiscussedatlengthinaclassicworkonminingbyGeorgiusAgricola, Dere metallica (Basel:Froben,1556).
³
⁰ J.J.Lange, EinleitungzurMineralogicaMetallica (Halle:J.J.Curt,1770)at184.ForKant’ s ownershipofthiswork,seeArthurWarda, ImmanuelKantsBücher (BibliographienundStudien; Berlin:MartinBreslauer,1922)at29.
³¹AbrahamTucker, TheLightofNaturePursued,7vols(1;London:R.FaulderandT.Payne, 1768–78)at xxxv and xlvi.KantownedaGermantranslationofthe firstvolumeof1771byJ.C
P.Erxleben(Tuckerpublishedunderthepseudonym, ‘EdwardSearch’).
³²SeeJ.C.Adelung, Grammatisch-kritischesWörterbuchderhochdeutschenMundart (Leipzig, 1811),1661–2.
assay-master presumablyconscienceormoralfeeling whoappliesacupellation testor fireassaytodeterminetheaction’sinnerworth.Onecannotdoso simplybecausethereisnoapplicabletestoftheinnerworthofactions.Similar imageryoccursagaininareflectiononanthropologywhereKantspeaksof subjectingcertainproductsofthemindto ‘thecupelassayofreason’ [‘der CapellenprobederVernunft’](15:407–8).Inthisinstancetheenvisagedvaluable product[Korn]isexplicitlyidentifiedas finemetal[feinMetall].And finally,Kant obliquelyinvokestheimageofa fireassayinaseparatepartofthe first Critique whenhespeaksofan ‘assaybalance[Problierwaage ]ofcritique’ (A767/B795).
Balancesofthiskindwereusedspeci ficallyforweighingtheinputsandoutputs ofmetallurgical fireassays:theywereastandardpartoftheequipmentof ‘Probierkunst’
Inthelightofthesefacts,twolinguisticpointsaboutthe ‘Feuerprobe’ passage assumeaheightenedsignificance.The firstisthattheword ‘Schein’,whichGuyer andWoodrenderas ‘plausibility ’,couldineighteenth-centuryGermanmeannot just ‘illusion’ (itsmoreusualtranslation),butalso ‘shine’—asin ‘Mondschein’ (moonshine).³³Thismakesitpossiblethatthe ‘falscheSchein’ mentionedinthe ‘Feuerprobe’ passagemaybethefalse glister or glint ofthesampletobetested (thinkoffool’sgold).Thesecondpointisthatthephrase ‘sichinDunstauflösen’ , whichGuyerandWoodrender ‘todissolveintoahaze’,hastheidiomaticmeaning of ‘togoupinsmoke’.Together,thesepointssuggestthefollowingamended translation:
Pneumatism...cannotdenythathereditary flaw[Erbfehler]onaccountofwhich allitspromisingglistergoesupinmeresmokeinthe fireassayofcritique.
(A406/B433)³⁴
Onlyasinglequestionremains:Whyshouldanoresamplebethoughttocontain an ‘hereditary flaw ’?Thisisnotobvious,buttheanswermaybethatKantishere interweavinghismetallurgicalmetaphorwithacertaingenealogicalmetaphor thathappensalsotoinvolvemetals.Thisgenealogicalmetaphoralludestothesocalled ‘mythofthemetals’ inPlato’ s Republic amyththatistobetaughttothe citizensoftherepublicaspartofa ‘noblefalsehood’.Thecitizensaretobetold thattheyare ‘earthbornbrothers’,whomustdefendtheirmotherland.Therulers amongthemaretobetoldthatthegodwhomadethemmixedsomegoldinto them,theauxiliariesthattheirmetalissilver,andthecraftsmenandfarmersthat theirmetalisbronzeoriron.Significantlyforourpurposes,eachmemberofthe
³³SeetherelevantentryinAdelung, Grammatisch-kritischesWörterbuchderhochdeutschen Mundart
³⁴ Thebroadercontextruns: ‘[IndertranscendentaleParalogismus]derVorteilistgänzlichaufder SeitedesPneumatismus,obgleichdieserdenErbfehlernichtverleugenkann,beiallemihmgünstigen ScheininderFeuerprobederKritiksichinlauterDunstaufzulösen’ (A406/B433).
