NotesonContributors
MichaelBaurmann studiedsociology,philosophyandlaw.In1997hewasappointedtoa chairforsociologyattheUniversityofDüsseldorf.Hehasbeenvisitingprofessoratthe ResearchSchoolofSocialSciencesoftheAustralianNationalUniversity,theInstituti TecnológicoAutónomoinMexicoandattheDepartmentofPoliticsattheNewYork University.CurrentlyheisscientificdirectoroftheCenterforAdvancedInternetResearch (CAIS)inBochum.Hehasbeenco-editorof Analyse&Kritik:JournalforSocialTheory for fortyyears.Hismainresearchinterestsarerationalchoicetheory,socialepistemology,and digitaldemocracy.
SvenBernecker isHumboldtProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCologneand ProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCalifornia,Irvine.Hismainareasofresearch areepistemology,metaphysics,andphilosophyofmind,andhehaspublishednumerous articlesintheseareas.Heistheauthorof ReadingEpistemology (Blackwell,2006), The MetaphysicsofMemory (Springer,2008),and Memory (OxfordUniversityPress, 2010).Heisco-editorof Knowledge (OxfordUniversityPress,2000), Companionto Epistemology (Routledge,2011), HandbookofPhilosophyofMemory (Routledge,2017), and MedicalKnowledgeinaSocialWorld,specialissueof Synthese (2019).
DavidCoady isaseniorlecturerinphilosophyattheSchoolofHumanitiesattheUniversity ofTasmania.Hehaspublishedonavarietyoftopicsinappliedepistemology,including expertise,conspiracytheory,rumour,propaganda,Wikipedia,andtheblogosphere.Hehas alsopublishedonmetaphysics,thephilosophyoflaw,scientificwhaling,policeethics,the ethicsofhorror films,andtheethicsofcricket.Heistheauthorof WhattoBelieveNow: ApplyingEpistemologytoContemporaryIssues (2012),theco-authorof TheClimateChange Debate:AnEpistemicandEthicalInquiry (2013),theeditorof ConspiracyTheories:The PhilosophicalDebate (2006),co-editorofthe BlackwellCompaniontoAppliedPhilosophy (2017),andco-editorofthe RoutledgeHandbookofAppliedEpistemology (2018).
DanielCohnitz (PhD2005,Düsseldorf)holdstheChairforTheoreticalPhilosophyat UtrechtUniversity.Hisresearchinterestsincludemetaphilosophy,socialepistemology,the philosophyoflanguage,mathematics,logic,andrelatedareasofphilosophyandcognitive science.Hismostrecentbookis AnIntroductiontothePhilosophyofLogic thathecoauthoredwithLuisEstrada-GonzálezandwhichwaspublishedbyCambridgeUniversity Pressin2019.
CatarinaDutilhNovaes isprofessorofphilosophyandUniversityResearchChairatVrije UniversiteitAmsterdam,andProfessorialFellowatArché,UniversityofStAndrews.Sheis theauthorof FormalizingMedievalLogicalTheories (Springer,2007), FormalLanguagesin Logic (CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),and TheDialogicalRootsofDeduction (CambridgeUniversityPress,2021),aswellasofnumerousjournalarticlesandbook
chapters.Sheiscurrently(2018–23)thePrincipalInvestigatoroftheERC-Consolidator project ‘TheSocialEpistemologyofArgumentation’ .
FilippoFerrari wasawardedhisPhDbyAberdeenUniversityin2014.Heiscurrentlya Stars@UNIPDpostdocattheUniversityofPaduaandthePrincipalInvestigatoroftheproject ‘LogicalAnti-Exceptionalism’.Hismainresearchinterestslieattheintersectionbetween philosophyoflanguage,philosophyoflogic,andepistemology.Hehaspublishedseveral articlesonavarietyoftopics includingthenatureandepistemologicalsignificanceof disagreement,thenatureandvalueoftruth,logicalpluralismandlogicalnormativity in journalssuchas PhilosophicalQuarterly, Synthese, Analysis, Mind, Inquiry, CanadianJournal ofPhilosophy,and AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly.Hehasrecentlyco-authoredabookon post-truthandsciencedenialismwithSebastianoMoruzzi(publishedin2020with1088press).
AmyK.Flowerree isAssistantProfessorofPhilosophyatTexasTechUniversity.Herwork isattheintersectionofepistemology,ethics,andmetaethics.Shefocusesonroleofbelief withinagency.Shehaswrittenonepistemicagency,practicalreasonsforbelief,andthe metaethicalfoundationsofepistemicnormativity.Herworkhasbeenpublishedin PhilosophicalStudies, Synthese,andseveraleditedvolumes.
AxelGelfert isaProfessorofTheoreticalPhilosophyattheTechnicalUniversityofBerlin, whereheheadstheInstituteofHistoryandPhilosophyofScience,Technology,and Literature.Muchofhisworkfocusesontheintersectionofsocialepistemologyand philosophyofscienceandtechnology.Heistheauthorof ACriticalIntroductionto Testimony (Bloomsbury,2014)and HowtoDoScienceWithModels (Springer,2016).
EmmanuelJ.Genot isanAssociateResearcherinTheoreticalPhilosophyatLund University,Sweden.Hisareasofresearchincludephilosophicallogic,game-theoretic semantics,andformalmodelsofinquiryanddiscovery.Hismostrecentpublicationis ‘TheHolmesianLogician:SherlockHolmes’ ScienceofDeductionandAnalysisandthe LogicofDiscovery’ (Synthese,2020).Heispresentlyco-investigatorinaprojectfundedby TheSwedishFoundationforHumanitiesandSocialSciencesinvestigatingpersonalized search, filterbubbles,andpolarizationinonlinesearch.
SanfordC.Goldberg isChesterD.TrippProfessorintheHumanitiesandProfessorof PhilosophyatNorthwesternUniversity.Heworksprimarilyintheareasofepistemology andphilosophyoflanguage.Hisbooksinclude CollectedEssaysinSocialEpistemology (OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming), ConversationalPressure (OxfordUniversityPress, 2020), TotheBestofOurKnowledge (OxfordUniversityPress,2018), Assertion (Oxford UniversityPress,2015), RelyingonOthers (OxfordUniversityPress,2010),and AntiIndividualism (CambridgeUniversityPress,2007).
ThomasGrundmann isProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofCologne,Germany.He haspublishednumerousarticlesonepistemology,philosophicalmethodology,andanalytic existentialphilosophy.Amonghisbooksare DiephilosophischenWahrheitstheorien (2018) and AnalytischeEinführungindieErkenntnistheorie (2017).Hiscurrentresearchaddresses issuesfromsocialepistemologysuchasepistemicauthorityandexperts,thelimitsofcritical thinking,disagreement,andpost-truth.Heistheco-editorof ExperimentalPhilosophyandIts Critics (2012).
RomyJaster isapostdoctoralresearcheratHumboldtUniversityBerlin.Herworkrevolves aroundabilities,dispositions,andfreewill,aswellasfakenews,publicdebate,andthe possibilitiesandlimitsofconstructivediscourse.ShestudiedinBielefeld,attheUniversityof NotreDame,andHumboldtUniversity,whichisalsowhereshereceivedherPhD.Herbook Agents’ Abilities waspublishedbyDeGruyterin2020.Togetherwithherco-authorDavid Lanius,shewroteabookonfakenews(inGerman),whichwaspublishedbyReclamin2019. Apartfromherresearch,sheco-heads(withDavidLanius)theGerman ‘Forumfor Streitkultur’,athinktankforthepromotionofpublicdiscourseintheGermanpublicdebate.
JenniferLackey istheWayneandElizabethJonesProfessorofPhilosophyatNorthwestern University,theDirectoroftheNorthwesternPrisonEducationProgram,andEditor-inChiefof PhilosophicalStudies and Episteme.Mostofherresearchisintheareaofsocial epistemology,withrecentprojectsincludingworkontherationalityofpunishment,credibilityandfalseconfessions,eyewitnesstestimonyandepistemicagency,epistemicreparations,andechochambersandfakenews.LackeyisthewinneroftheDr.MartinR.Lebowitz andEveLewellisLebowitzPrizeforPhilosophicalAchievementandContributionaswellas theYoungEpistemologistPrize,andshehasreceivedgrantsandfellowshipsfromthe AndrewW.MellonFoundation,theAmericanCouncilofLearnedSocieties,theNational EndowmentfortheHumanities,andtheAliceKaplanInstitutefortheHumanities.
DavidLanius ispostdoctoralresearcheratDebateLabofKarlsruheInstituteofTechnology (KIT)withfocusonstrategicindeterminacyinlawandpolitics,argumentativepatternsof populism,fakenews,publicdebate,andthepossibilitiesandlimitsofconstructivediscourse.Hestudiedphilosophy,economics,andlogicinRegensburg,Munich,Madrid,and AmsterdamandreceivedhisPhDinphilosophyfromHumboldt-UniversityBerlin.His book StrategicIndeterminacyintheLaw waspublishedbyOxfordUniversityPressin2019. Togetherwithhisco-authorRomyJaster,healsowroteabookonfakenews(inGerman), whichwaspublishedbyReclamin2019.Apartfromhisresearch,heco-heads (withRomyJaster)theGerman ‘ForumfürStreitkultur’,whichisathinktankforthe promotionofconstructivediscourseintheGermanpublicdebate.
SebastianoMoruzzi isassociateprofessorinphilosophyoflanguageattheUniversityof Bologna.HeobtainedthetitleofPhDfromtheDoctorateinPhilosophyofLanguageatthe UniversityofEasternPiedmontandthenworkedasresearchfellowattheresearchcenterof ArchéattheUniversityofStAndrews.HeisscientificdirectoroftheBolognaCogito researchgroupinphilosophy,andhehasfoundedtheresearchgroupAiònonteaching philosophyandphilosophicalpractices.Hehaspublishedseveralarticlesininternational journalsandvolumesonvagueness,relativism,alethicpluralism,epistemology,andphilosophyoflogic.HehaspublishedanItalianbookontheproblemofvaguenessandabook onpost-truthwithFilippoFerrari.Inadditiontowritingaboutphilosophy,hecollaborates withschoolstoconductexperimentalsessionsofphilosophicalpracticesforpopularizing philosophyamongchildrenandteenagers.
M.GiuliaNapolitano isaPhDstudentattheUniversityofCalifornia,Irvine,wheresheis currentlyworkingonherdissertationonthephilosophyofconspiracytheories.Beforethat, shewasaPhDstudentatCONCEPT,UniversityofCologne,andshestudiedphilosophyat
theUniversityofPaduaandatUtrechtUniversity.Herinterestsliemainlyinepistemology, philosophyoflanguage,andpoliticalphilosophy.
ErikJ.Olsson isProfessorinTheoreticalPhilosophyatLundUniversity,Sweden.Hisareas ofresearchincludeepistemology,philosophicallogic,pragmatism,and,morerecently, epistemologicalaspectsofsocialnetworksandsearchengines.Hisbooksinclude Against Coherence:Truth,Probability,andJustification (OxfordUniversityPress,2005,paperback 2008), KnowledgeandInquiry:EssaysonthePragmatismofIsaacLevi (Cambridge UniversityPress,2006)and BeliefRevisionMeetsPhilosophyofScience (Springer,2011). HeispresentlyleadingaresearchprojectfundedbyTheSwedishFoundationfor HumanitiesandSocialSciencesinvestigatingpersonalizedsearch, filterbubbles,and polarizationinGoogle.
MauraPriest isanassistantprofessorofphilosophyandbioethicistatArizonaState University.ShehasaPhDinphilosophyfromUCIrvine(2016),anMSinbioethicsfrom ColumbiaUniversity(2018),andacertificateinpediatricbioethicsfromChildren’sMercy hospital.Shehaspublishedmanyjournalarticlesandbookchaptersfocusedonthe intersectionsofethicsandepistemology,appliedethics(especiallybioethics),socialand politicalphilosophy,andsocialontology.Hercurrentresearchprojectsincludetwobooks, oneonintellectualelitesandanotherontheethicsofdating.SheistheeditorofASU’ s appliedphilosophywebpage,chairofthediversitycommittee,andsupervisesseveralMA andPhDthesis/dissertationprojects.
DuncanPritchard isUCDistinguishedProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityof California,Irvine.Hisbooksinclude EpistemicLuck (OxfordUniversityPress,2005), The NatureandValueofKnowledge (co-authored,OxfordUniversityPress,2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (OxfordUniversityPress,2012), EpistemicAngst (PrincetonUniversityPress, 2015),and Scepticism:AVeryShortIntroduction (OxfordUniversityPress,2019).
JeroendeRidder isAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyatVrijeUniversiteitAmsterdamand Professor(byspecialappointment)ofChristianPhilosophyattheUniversityofGroningen. Hisresearchfocusesonissuesinsocialepistemology,philosophyofscience,andphilosophy ofreligion.Hisworkhasbeenpublishedin TheAustralasianJournalof Philosophy, Synthese, Erkenntnis,and Episteme andfundedbyseveralgrantsfromthe NetherlandsResearchCouncil(NWO)andtheTempletonWorldCharityFoundation. Heisco-editorof Scientism:ProspectsandProblems (OxfordUniversityPress,2018), ScientificChallengestoCommonSensePhilosophy (Routledge,2020),and TheRoutledge HandbookofPoliticalEpistemology (Routledge,2021).
SarahWright isanAssociateProfessorofPhilosophyattheUniversityofGeorgia.Her researchfocusesonthenormativeaspectsofepistemology,particularlyontheepistemic virtuesasvirtuesofourpsychologicalcharacter.Shehasalsowrittenoncontextualismin epistemology,onsocialandgroupepistemology,andonenvironmentalethics.Sheis currentlyworkingonapplicationsofvirtueepistemologytoparticularreal-lifesituations, includingconcernswithepistemicinjusticeandthepoliticsofknowing.Herworkhasbeen publishedinnumerouseditedvolumesaswellasin Episteme, PhilosophicalIssues, Acta Analytica, HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly, EthicsandtheEnvironment,and Metaphilosophy
Introduction
SvenBernecker,AmyK.Flowerree,andThomasGrundmann
1.TheChallengefromFakeNews
Newsmatters.Democraciesneedindependent,fact-basednewstoprovideavoice foradiverserangeofpeople,towatchdogthepowerful,andtokeepmembersofa societyinformed.Newsisthebasisforthepublictomakeinformeddecisionsin electionsandreferendaandforpublicofficialstoactonbehalfofthepublic.By lettingthepublicmonitorgovernmentperformance,thenewsservesasamechanismfordemocraticaccountabilityandsocializescitizensintodemocraticattitudesandvalues.Whenthenewshasepistemicstanding,citizenswhopay attentiontothenewsarelikelytobeabletocastmoreinformedballots,hold publicofficialsaccountable,andbemoresupportiveofdemocraticprocessesand values(Goideletal.2017:836;Goldman1999:ch.10).
Theepistemicqualityofnewsdepends,inthe firstinstance,onitstruthvalue. Goodnewsisaccuratenews.Theaccuracyofanewsitem,whilenecessary,isnot sufficienttorenderitepistemicallyvaluable.Inordertobeepistemicallyvaluable, newsmustalsobeissuedbyamediachannel(newspaper,televisionstation, website,etc.)thatmeetstheconditionsforcontentandcoveragereliability. Contentreliabilityconsistsinamediachannel ’stendencytoproduceaccurate contents.Inotherwords,itisnotenoughthatamediachannelissuesaccurate newsonceinawhile.Inaccuratenewsmustbetheexception.Coveragereliability, ontheotherhand,referstothetendencyofamediachanneltokeepitsaudience reliablyapprisedoftherelevantfactsinacertaindomainandtoreliablyreport regardingtheobtainingthesefacts(Goldberg2010:157).
Ifwetake ‘ news ’ inabroadsense,tocoverallkindsofpublicinformation,not justorganizedreportsofnewdevelopments,itisquiteclearthatmuchofthenews surroundingustodaydoesnot,foronereasonortheother,meetthestandardsof epistemicallyvaluablenews.Ourmediaenvironmentsarepollutedbyinaccurate newsandotherformsofmis-anddisinformation.IntheUnitedStates,for instance,asignificantportionofthepubliclydisseminatedinformationinthe contextofthe2016presidentialelectionwasfalseandwaswritteneithertomake moneyortomisleadthepublic(Allcott&Gentzkow2017).IntheUnited Kingdom,apoliticalconsulting firm,CambridgeAnalytica,usedmisinformation tohelpinfluencetheoutcomeoftheBrexitreferendum(Rawlinson2020).
SvenBernecker,AmyK.Flowerree,andThomasGrundmann, Introduction In: TheEpistemologyofFakeNews. Editedby: SvenBernecker,AmyK.Flowerree,andThomasGrundmann,OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©SvenBernecker, AmyK.Flowerree,andThomasGrundmann.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198863977.003.0001
Moreover,socialmediaoutlets,suchasFacebook,haveenabledunreliablenews andconspiracytheoriestoemergeasdominantpoliticaltools.Forinstance,inthe threemonthsleadinguptothe2016U.S.elections,thetoptwentyfakenews storiesonFacebookgotmoresharesthanthetoptwentyrealnewsstories (McIntyre2018:109).
Itisanopenquestionwhetherthe floodofunreliablenewsweareencountering todayisanoldoranewphenomenon(seeDutilhNovaesanddeRidder, Chapter7inthisvolume).Evenifthephenomenonisnotentirelynew,today’ s informationtechnologymakestheproblemworse.Thereareanumberoffactors thatcontributetotheworseningofthethreatposedbyunreliablenews.First,the Internethasledtoademocratizationofnewsproduction.Anyonecanoperate theirownnewschannel.Thereisno filterinplacethatcontrolsforquality (Goldman1999:187;McIntyre2018:95).Second,intheabsenceofeffective qualitycontrol,newschannelsarenotpenalizedforincreasing,andmayeven becommerciallyincentivizedtoincrease,theiraudienceattheexpenseofthe epistemicqualityofthenewstheydisseminate(Goldman1999:182–8).Third, socialmedia(e.g.,Twitter)spreadsinaccuratenewssignificantlyfarther,faster, deeper,andmorebroadlythangenuinenews.Thereasonisthatfalsenewstends tobemorenovelandthatpeoplearemorelikelytosharenovelinformation (Vosoughietal.2018).Fourth,searchenginesandsocialmedia,duetotheir recommendationandpersonalizationalgorithms,seemtoleadto filterbubbles andechochambers(Pariser2011;Sunstein2017),whichareresponsiblefor ideologicalpolarization:Wenolongerencounterabalancedinformationdiet, butonlyseeinformationthattargetsourestablishedinterestsandreinforcesour existingworldviews.(MoreonthisissueinChapter9byLackeyandChapter10 byGenodandOlssoninthisvolume.)Fifth,thereisalackofdiversityofnewsin thedigitalage.Eventhoughthereisalargervarietyofnewspublishers,thereisless varietyofnewsbecausealargepartofthenewsacrossawiderangeofnews publisherscanbetracedbacktothesamenewsagencies,orwireservices(Welbers etal.2018).Lastbutnotleast,theinteractionandcollaborationbetweenjournalistsandpublicrelationspractitionersintheproductionofmassmedianews contenthasarguablyledtoadeclineofprofessionaljournalism(Simons& Strovsky2019).
2.TheNeedforaNewEpistemologyofFakeNews
Ifthereisaplacewithinepistemologythatshouldbedealingwiththeproblemof unreliablenewsitmightseemthatitshouldbetheepistemologyoftestimony.The epistemologyoftestimonyconcernstheepistemicstatus(justification,knowledge) ofbeliefsweformonthebasisofwhatotherstellus.Sincesomeofourtestimonial beliefsarebasedonnewsreports,itisnaturaltosupposethattheissueof
unreliablenewsfallswithinthepurviewoftheepistemologyoftestimony. However,theepistemologyoftestimonyisill-equippedtodealwiththeissueof thistypeofnews.Letusexplain.
Thecentraldebateintheepistemologyoftestimonyconcernsthenatureofthe justificationorwarrantoftestimoniallyobtainedbeliefs.Thetwodominant views reductionismandanti-reductionism differaboutthedefaultrulefor acceptingtestimony.Anti-reductionistsholdthatthenormoftruth-tellingis prevalentinsociety,suchthatbydefault,atestimonycanbepresumedtobe correctunlesstherecipienthasreasonstoquestionit(Burge1993;Coady1992; Goldberg2010).Reductionists,bycontrast,holdthattestimonyisgenerally toounreliabletobebelievedbydefault,andarguethatarecipientoftestimonymustcheckthetrustworthinessofthesourcebeforetheymaybelieveit (Fricker1995).
Itisimportanttorealizethatreductionistsandanti-reductionistsmakecertain assumptionsaboutthecommunicationsituationthatdonot(always)holdinthe digitalage.Forstarters,epistemologistsoftestimonygenerallyassumethatthe recipientoftestimonyknowsthetestifier,atleastbyname.Manyonlinenews contents,however,areanonymous.Whentherecipientdoesnotknowwhothe testifieris(letalonewhethertheyarearealpersonoranAI/chatbot),theycannot, inprinciple,vetthetestifier ’strustworthinessandcompetence(Goldberg2013). Thisconnectswiththenextpoint.Therecipientofanelectronicmessage mayknowandtrustthesenderbutmaybemistakeninthinkingthatthesender isalsotheauthor.Whenelectronicmessagesandcontentsareforwardedor re-posted,therecipientoftestimonycaneasilymixupthetrustworthinessof thesenderwiththetrustworthinessoftheauthor.(MoreonthisinChapter11 byWrightinthisvolume.)Andevenwhentherecipientisabletotellapartthe senderfromtheauthor,theymaystillbeinthedarkabouttherelevantsocial contextandthesender’scommunicativeintention.Arere-postsandre-tweets assertionsorsomeotherkindofspeechact(Peppetal.2019a;Rini2017)?Finally, onlinenewscontentsisoftennottext-basedbutintheformatofvisualimagery. Theepistemologyoftestimonytendsnottodealwiththespecialissuesconnected withtheacquisitionofinformationthroughvisualcommunication(Fallis2019; Rini2020).
Theupshotofallofthisisthattheepistemologyoftestimonyisill-equipped todealwiththeproblemofunreliablenewsor,morespecifically(aswewilldetail inSection3),itisill-equippedtodealwiththeproblemof fakenews because itfocusesonthetransferofknowledgeandinformationunderidealconditions. Thenewepistemologyoffakenews,whichthisvolumelaunches,canbecharacterizedasappliedepistemologyforknowledgecommunicationundernon-ideal conditions.
3.1AFundamentalWorry
Webelievethatitisadvisabletousetheterm ‘fakenews’ tocoverallcasesof epistemicallycorruptnews.Beforethemeaningof ‘fakenews’ willbemade transparentinthenextsection,afundamentalworryaboutthescientificuseof thistermmustbeaddressed.Anumberofscholarshavearguedthattheterm ‘fake news ’ islinguisticallydefectiveandshouldthusbeabandonedfromacademic discourse(e.g.,Chapter3byCoadyinthisvolume;Oremus2016;Sullivan2017; Talisse2018).Inparticular,JoshuaHabgood-Cootelaunchesthreeattacksagainst ‘fakenews.’ Accordingtothe objectionfromsemanticinstability (Habgood-Coote 2019:1036–47),theuseoftheterm ‘fakenews’ hassignificantlychangedduring thelastdecadeandvariesgreatlyamongspeakers,includingexperts.Until2015, thetermwastypicallyusedtorefertosatiricnewsparodiesofthekindfoundin TheOnion andonlyrarelyappliedtofalsemediareports.Thischangedwiththe 2016U.S.presidentialelection(Brown2019:145–6).Buteventhen,themeaning ofthetermcontinuedtobeunstable.Someexpertsusethetermtorefertofalseor misleadingnews(Levy2017),whereasotherstaketheauthor ’sdeceptiveintention tobetheessentialfeatureoffakenews(Rini2017).Thevariabilityofusageis thoughttoindicatethattheterm ‘fakenews’ lacksadeterminatedescriptive meaningorisaltogethernonsensical.Needlesstosay,academicdiscourseshould avoidsuchashakybasis.
Accordingtothe objectionfromredundancy (Habgood-Coote2019:1047–9), theterm ‘fakenews’ isnotnecessarytodescribethepathologiesofsocialepistemologyitismeanttoreferto.AsHabgood-Cooteputsit:
Wealreadyhaveplentyofwordsfortalkingaboutdeceit,miscommunication, bullshitting,falseassertion,falseimplicature,beingunreliable,distortingthe facts,beingbiased,propaganda,andsoon.Thesetermshaveperfectlygood meaningsinordinarylanguage.(Habgood-Coote2019:1049)
Addingtheterm ‘fakenews’ toourconceptualresourcesissuperfluous.And finally, the objectionfrompropagandisticusage (Habgood-Coote2019:1050–4)statesthat theterm ‘fakenews’ amountstonothingmorethananepistemicslurmeantto discredittheopponent.DonaldTrump’subiquitoususeofthistermisacaseinpoint. Slursandinsults,sotheargumentgoes,havenoplaceinacademicdiscourse. Whatmightbesaidinresponsetotheseobjections?Letusstartwiththe objectionfromsemanticinstability.First,whileitistruethattheterm ‘fake news ’ lacksawell-entrenchedusage,thereisaclusterofsocialphenomenathat thetermtriestocharacterize.Thechallengeisto findtherelevantunderlying phenomenon firstandthentorestricttheterm’susetothisphenomenon.Inthis
respect,thedefinitionoftheterm ‘fakenews’ hastobepartlystipulative,asitis usuallythecasewithCarnapianexplications(Peppetal.2019b:7).Afterall, expertsconverge,atleasttoacertainextent,aboutwhattherelevantphenomena defining ‘fakenews’ are(Brown2019:146).Second,theobjectionfromsemantic instabilityisunfair.Thereareothertermsforsocialphenomenasuchas ‘gender,’ ‘sexualharassment,’ or ‘propaganda ’ thatexhibitthesamesemanticinstabilityas does ‘fakenews’ butwhoseroleinacademicdiscourseisnotcalledintoquestion (Brown2019:146;Peppetal.2019b:4).
Next,considertheobjectionfromredundancy.Theobjectioncanbeinterpretedintwodistinctways.Accordingtoonereading,whatisdrivingthe objectionistheideathatatermthatisdefinableintermsofindependentterms shouldbereplacedbyits definiens.Yetifthisisso,thenwehavetoabandonnot only ‘fakenews’ butalso ‘propaganda,’‘lie,’ or ‘falseassertion’ sincetheseterms arealsodefinableintermsofmorebasicones.Habgood-Coote’spleaforholding ontothelattertermswhileabandoningtheformerappearsunreasonablypartial (Peppetal.2019b:8).Furthermore,iftheinitialtermsarereplacedwiththe definingterms,theconnectiontothetermsusedinpublicdiscourseislost.This iswhyitdoesnotseemtobeagoodideatogetridofalldefinabletermsinfavorof themorebasicones.Accordingtoanalternativereadingoftheobjectionfrom redundancy, ‘fakenews’ isnothingbutaclustertermreferringtoanumberof well-knownepistemicpathologiessuchasdeceit,miscommunication,bullshitting, falseassertion,etc.Yetitisfarfromclearthat ‘fakenews’ doesnotpickouta specificandsofarunnamedphenomenonofitsown(Brown2019:148).
Finally,letusconsidertheobjectionfrompropagandisticusage.Fortermstobe exploitableforpropagandisticpurposes,theirmeaningmustcontainanegative evaluation. ‘Fakenews’ clearlyhasanegativeevaluativemeaning.Labelingapiece ofnews ‘fakenews’ meansthatitwouldbeepistemicallybadtorelyonit. However,notalltermsthathavesuchanevaluativemeaningareabandoned fromacademicdiscourse(Brown2019:151).Aslongastermsalsohavedescriptivemeaningthatmakesthe(negative)evaluationreasonable,theyaredeemed acceptable.Consider,forexample,theterms ‘murderer,’‘fraudster,’‘liar,’ or ‘propaganda.’ Eachofthesetermsissuchthatitsdescriptivemeaninggrounds itsevaluativemeaning.Forexample,amurdererisamorallybadperson(evaluativemeaning) because theykilledsomeoneunlawfullyandwithpremeditation (descriptivemeaning).Thesekindsoftermsareperfectlyacceptableforthe academicdiscourse.Whytreat ‘fakenews ’ differently?Werecognizethatthere isaproblemwithuseof ‘fakenews’ asourtermforunreliableand/ormisleading news:Theliteralmeaningoftheexpressionhasbeentosomeextentundermined byitscynicalandinsinceredeploymentforpropagandistpurposes.Nevertheless, webelievethat ‘fakenews’ hasbecomeandwillremainthemostcommonlyused labelforthegrowingphenomenonofpubliclysharedinformationthatisunreliableand/ormisleading,andsowehavedecidedtoretainit.
Insum,eventhough ‘fakenews’ isadisputedterm,itsusecanberegulatedand tweakedinsuchawaythatepistemologistsmaykeeptalkingaboutfakenewsas otheracademicsdooutsidephilosophy(seeLazeretal.2018).
3.2ApproachestotheEpistemologyofFakeNews
Anepistemologicalinvestigationoffakenewsneedstoaddressthreekeyquestions: first,whatisfakenews;second,whatarethemechanismsthatfosterthe productionandspreadoffakenews;andthird,whichtherapiesareavailableasan antidotetofakenews?Thechaptersofthevolumeaddressthesequestionsfrom differentperspectives.Thepurposeofthefollowingremarksistosetthestage.
3.2.1WhatisFakeNews?
Beyondtheloosetalkoffakenewsasfalseormisleadingmediastories(Levy 2017),therearethreemainaccountsoffakenewsinthecurrentliterature. Accordingtothegenerallyprevailing hybridview,fakenewsisnewsthatisboth lackingtruthandtruthfulness(Jaster&Lanius2018andChapter1inthisvolume; seealsoRini2017;Gelfert2018;McIntyre2018;Mukerij2018).Newsfailstobe trueifitiseitherliterallyfalseorconveysfalseinformation.Newslackstruthfulnessifitisproducedwiththeintentiontodeceiveorwithoutanyconcernforthe truthintherelevantdomain.Intheformercase,fakenewsiscloselyrelatedto publicliesordisinformation.Inthelattercase,fakenewsistypicallystoriesthat havebeenfabricatedwiththeaimofattractingattentionintheInternetorsocial media.Here,thedeceptionoftherecipientisabyproductasopposedtothetarget. ThisisillustratedbythecaseoftheMacedonianteenagerswho,backin2016, fabricatedexcitingstories,includingoneaccordingtowhichPopeFrancesco endorsedTrumpasthenextU.S.president,andspreadthesestoriesviathe Internettoattractasmuchattentionaspossible.Thehybridviewoffakenews iswidelyapplicableandemphasizesthekeyroleoftheproducer’sbadintention, butitlackstheoreticalunity.Thereisnoclearthreadthatunitesthedisjunctive accountoftheproducer’sintentions.Whethersomeoneliesorissimplynot caringaboutthetruthwhenmakingassertionsaretwoverydifferentthings that,accordingtothehybridview,canbebothcharacteristicoffakenews.
Accordingtothe privativeview,fakenewsfailstobegenuinenewssinceits lackstherequiredpedigreeofbeingproducedbystandardjournalisticprocesses (Fallis&Mathiesen2019;Lazeretal.2018;Peppetal.2019a;Pritchard,Chapter2 inthisvolume).Fakenewsthusconsistsofstoriespublishedbythemediathat falselyappeartobegenuinenews.Thisviewcapturesanimportantaspectoffake newsasmimickingrealnews.Itis,however,lessclearwhythiscategoryshould haveanyepistemologicalsignificance.Forevenstoriesthataremistakenlytreated asnewsmightstillbeepistemicallyvaluableandreliable.
Finally,thereisthe consumer-centeredview (Grundmann2020),whichde fines fakenewsexclusivelyintermsofitssystematicdispositiontodeceiveitsconsumers.Thisviewappliesverybroadly maybetoobroadlybecauseevencasesof deceptionthroughnewsbiasorbadjournalismareincluded.Thisviewmaybe renderedevenmoreinclusiveifevenaccuratenewscanbefakenewswhenthe consumerassumestheyhavebeeninformedaboutallrelevantfacts(see Chapter13byBerneckerinthisvolume).
3.2.2WhatAretheMechanismsthatFostertheProductionandSpread ofFakeNews?
Fornow,wearegoingtotakeoursubject-mattertoincludeanythingcoveredby oneofthedifferentviews.Asthevolumeproceeds,differentauthorswillsharpen thefocusindifferentways.Butwhatexplainstheproliferationoffakenewsand whatarethecausallyrelevantfactors?Wecandistinguishthreestructuralfeatures thattendtopromotetheproliferationoffakenews:(i)featuresofcommunication technology,(ii)socialconditions,and(iii)epistemicideologies.Itisthesefactors thatrenderourepistemicecosystemnon-ideal.
Howcanfeaturesofthecommunicationtechnologyfurtherthespreadoffake news?Herearesomesuggestions:InternetplatformssuchasGoogleorYahoorank newsthroughalgorithm-drivensearchengines.Thesealgorithmsfavorengagementwithcontentoverqualityofcontentwhenrankingnews(Chapter10by Genot&Olssoninthisvolume;Lazeretal.2018).Usersofsearchenginesaremore likelytobeexposedtointerestingnewsratherthanqualityinformation.Moreover, thereistheworrythatthealgorithmsoftheInternetandsocialmediagenerate filterbubbles(Pariser2011;Sunstein2017).Thenewsconsumerinhabitsanews filterbubbleifthenewsoutletselectsfornewsthat fitswithwhattheyalreadythink abouttheworld.Thispersonalizedexposuretonewsisbasedonthenews consumer ’srecordedpastsearchbehavioronthenet.Itisstillanopenquestion whethertheInternetandsocialmediagenerate filterbubblesandiftheseeffectsare significant(seeCurtoisetal.2018:Haimetal.2017;Hannacketal.2013). However,iftheydo,thiswouldexplainwhypeoplewithfringeviewshavea hardtimeescapingtheirinsularnewsuniverses.Finally,communicationviasocial mediasuchasFacebook,Twitter,orInstagramrequiresthattheuserquickly respondsbylikingorsharingreceivednews.Fromanepistemologicalpointof view,thisgeneratesatleasttwoproblems.First,userssimplydonot findthetimeto criticallyreflectbeforetheyre-distributethenewsandthusoftendistributegarbage (Vosoughietal.2018;Chapter11byWrightinthisvolume).Second,thespeechact ofsharingisitselfambiguousbetweencallingforattentionandassertingwhatis sharedandrecipientsmayconfuseonewiththeother(Rini2017).
Socialconditionsalsocontributetotheproliferationoffakenews.Peoplewho inhabitenvironmentsthatarecharacterizedbygrouppolarization,identity-based cognition,ahighdegreeofanxiety,andafeltlossofcontrol,arelesslikelytogive
equalweighttoallavailablenews.Newsoutletsofthepolitical ‘ enemy, ’‘theelites, ’ thegovernment,officialsites,etc.willbegenerallydiscredited.Echochambersand conspiracytheorieswillselectwhatnewsisconsideredrelevant.Thiscansystematicallyinsulatenewsconsumersfromcorrectingfalsebeliefs.Forempirical studiesonthedynamicsofthesekindsofsocialsituations,seeJamiesonand Cappella(2008),UscinskiandParent(2014),andBenkleretal.(2018).Foran epistemologicalassessment,seeCassam(2019)andLynch(2019).Lackey (Chapter9inthisvolume)thinksthat,inprinciple,thereisnothingbadabout echochambers.
Epistemicideologiesofferusnormsthatregulatewhichpiecesofevidence shouldbetakenseriouslyandwhichonescanbeproperlyignored.Forexample, thejournalisticbalancenormofreportingrequiresthateverytesti fiershould receiveequalattention.Anormofintellectualtolerancemightpointinthesame direction.Thenormofacceptingonlywhatstrikesoneasplausibleprivileges one ’sowncriticalthinkingoverexpertauthority.Epistemicnormsliketheseones aretheproductofhistory.Theyregulateourselectionofnews.Someofthemmay selectforfakenewsandare,forthisreason,objectionable(seeChapter5by Ferrari&MoruzziandChapter6byGrundmann,bothinthisvolume).
3.2.3WhatTherapiesAreAvailableasanAntidotetoFakeNews?
Supposethenewsismassivelypollutedwithfakenews.Whatcanbedone topreventtheindividualconsumerfromrelyingonitwhentheyformtheir judgment?Threemeasuressuggestthemselves.First,theindividualnewsconsumercanbetrainedindistinguishingnewsfromfakenews.Thistraining willrelatetocriticalthinking,medialiteracy,orreflectiononbiases.Inthe extreme,theconsumermightcometotherationalconclusionthattheyshould ignorethemediaingeneral(seeChapter13byBerneckerinthisvolume).Second, theindividualnewsproducerordistributorcanbetaughttoexhibitmoreresponsibilitywhendisseminatingnews(seeChapter8byPriestandChapter11by Wrightbothinthisvolume).Newsproducerscantrytocommunicateunambiguouslybymakingclearwhetheramessageismeantasanassertionorasanitemof interest.Modestyintoneandlanguagecanhelptopreventtheaudiencefrom polarizingevenfurther.Newsdistributorscanself-imposetherulethattheydo notshareorre-tweetastoryunlesstheyhave finishedreadingit.Third,therecan bestructuralregulationsbythegovernmentorself-regulationsbyplatforms. Theseregulationsmayconcernthealgorithmsofplatforms(e.g.,adjustingsearch enginestoofferonlyqualityinformation),censorshipwithrespecttonews content(e.g.,deletingspecificpropagandisticmessages),orrevisingjournalistic practicesandcommunicationsettings.Allthesemeasurescanbeimplemented individuallyorincombination.Whichofthesemeasuresismosteffectiveand whichofthemispoliticallyandmorallyacceptableisanopenquestion.
Thevolumeisarrangedintothreeparts.ThechaptersinPartIareconcernedwith themeaningof ‘fakenews’ andrelatednotionssuchas ‘conspiracytheory’ aswell aswiththenoveltyofthephenomenonoffakenews.PartIIdiscussesvarious practicesthatpromoteorgeneratefakenewsorarepurportedtodoso.PartIII explorespotentialtherapiesforfakenews.
Intheirchapter, “SpeakingofFakeNews:DefinitionsandDimensions,” Romy JasterandDavidLaniusarguethatfakenewsisnewsthatlackstruthand truthfulness.Theyproposesevendimensionsthatarepartofthefakenews phenomenon,andexplorehowcompetingaccountsoffakenewsaccommodate thesesevendimensions.Theyarguethattheiraccountbestcapturestheconcept fakenews,whilealsoprecisifyingitinanilluminatingway.Itisimportantto capturethevariousdimensionsoffakenews,theyargue,inordertoengageinthe ameliorativeprojectofavoidingtheepistemicproblemoffakenews.Theproblem offakenewsinvolvesignoranceanduninformeddecision-making,distrustof informationfurtherunderminingaccesstoinformation,andinabilitytodeliberate withindemocracy.Thecorrectivestheyproposearestructural(ratherthanindividual).Tocounteractfakenews,weneedboundaryworkandparadigmrepair. Boundaryworkestablishesclearnormsofwhatisandisn’tnews.Paradigmrepair workstobuildstronginternalnormsforvettingandpromotingnews.
Incontrast,in “GoodNews,BadNews,FakeNews,” DuncanPritchardargues that,justasadecoyduckisnotaduck,fakenewsisnotnews.Morethanjust lackingtruthandtruthfulness,Pritchardmaintainsthatfakenewsdoesn’tmeet therequirementofbeingaimedatconveyingaccurateinformationoftherelevant kind.The ‘fake’ tagindicatesthatitismasqueradingasrealnewsinorderto spreadmisinformation.Sincefakenewsisnotgenuinenews,itisinsufficientto distinguishitfromagoodsourceofnewsmerelybytracingitspoorepistemic pedigree.Thispointisespeciallysignificantforcurtailingfakenews;sincefake newsisnotnews,Pritchardsuggests,underminingfakenewsisnotonparwith underminingthefreepress.Onastructurallevel,headvocatesfordemocratic institutionstomonitorand flagfakenews.Onanindividuallevel,Pritchardagrees withothercontributors,SarahWrightandMauraPriest,thatanimportant componenttoresistingfakenewsistocultivateintellectualvirtues.Heargues thatvirtuessuchasintellectualhumility,intellectualconscientiousness,andhonestyhelpindividualstospotfakenews.
Inhischapter, “TheFakeNewsaboutFakeNews,” DavidCoadyarguesthat fakenewsisnothingmorethanatermusedbythepoliticallypowerfultoquell democraticdissent.IncontrastwithPritchard ’scontentionthatfakenewsisnot news,Coadyarguesthatfakenewsisnothingmorethanalabelusedtodiscredit democraticdisagreement.OnCoady’sview,then,theonlythingthatdistinguishes fakenewsfromnewsiswhoisinconveniencedbyit.Falsereportsexist,butthey
existinrespectablenewsoutletsaswellasnon-traditionalones.Theonlyproblem withfakenews,Coadyconcludes,isthatwekeeptalkingaboutfakenews.Thisjust playsintothepowergamesthatpowerfulpeopledeployinordertomaintaintheir power.
Shiftingfromfakenewstoconspiracytheories,inherchapter, “Conspiracy TheoriesandEvidentialSelf-Insulation,” GiuliaNapolitanopresentsanovelview ofconspiracytheories.Contrarytocontemporarytreatmentofconspiracytheoriesastheories about conspiracies,Napolitanocontendsthatconspiracytheories arethecontentofaparticularkindofbelief(aconspiracybelief)thatisresistantto counterevidencebybeing self-isolating.Abeliefisself-isolatingifthebelievertakes theconspiracyitselftoneutralizetherelevantcounterevidencethatthebeliever mightnormallyencounter.UsingaBayesianframework,Napolitanocharacterizes theself-isolatingcharacterofconspiracybeliefssuchthattheagent ’scredencein theconspiracytheory,C,isP(C|E)=P(C),foranyevidenceEthattheagentmight normallyencounter.Thiscouldhappeneitherbecauseoneiscertaininthe conspiracytheory,P(C=1),orbecausetheevidenceisdisregardedasirrelevant. Napolitanoarguesthatneithercanbearationalresponse.Thus,conspiracy theoriesareirrationalbytheirnature.
InPartII,ourauthorsexplorethemechanicsoffakenews. Intheirchapter, “EnquiryandNormativeDeviance:TheRoleofFakeNewsin ScienceDenialism,” FilippoFerrariandSebastianoMoruzzitakeupthetopicof sciencedenialism.Sciencedenialism,theypointout,isnotgenerallyarationally unintelligiblepractice.Instead,theyargue,itembodiesanaberrantformof enquirytheyterm post-enquiry.Intheirchapter,theydevelopamodelthat capturestherolefakenewsplaysinbolsteringthenormativedevianceofpostenquirypractices.Theirmodelcapturesthewaysinwhichsciencedenialism mimicsenquirybymakinguseofrationalprocesses,aswellasthewayscience denialismisaberrant.Post-enquirysciencedenialismmakesuseofepistemic filtersandfakenewstodiscreditinstitutionalsourcesofevidence,andalsoto amplifypseudo-scientificexplanations.
Inmostofthechapters,ourauthorsexplorethewaypathologiescreepintoour epistemicpractices.Butinhischapter, “FacingEpistemicAuthorities:Where DemocraticIdealsandCriticalThinkingMisleadCognition,” Thomas Grundmannarguesthatevenrespectableenlightenmentprinciplescanleadus disastrouslyastray.Grundmannarguesthattwoenlightenmentideals (i)touse ourcriticalthinkingwithoutrestrictionand(ii)torespecttherationaljudgmentof anyrationalagentasepistemicallyrational oughttobequali fiedwhenwehave accesstoexperttestimony.Experts,Grundmannargues,arefarmorelikelytobe rightthanweareintheirconclusionsabouttheirdomainofexpertise.One overlookedsourceofourpost-truthmalaise,Grundmannargues,isthatenlightenmentidealshavegivenusbadepistemicstandardsthatincubateconspiracy theories.Unlikeotherauthorsofthisvolumewhoargueforthecultivationof
individualabilitiestoidentifyfakenews,Grundmanncontendsweshoulddeferto experts.Whileindividualintellectualabilitiesmayhaveotherbenefits,inthecase ofexperttestimony,weshouldviewexperttestimonyas preempting ourown judgments.
CatarinaDutilhNovaes&JeroendeRidderconsider, “IsFakeNewsOld News?” Theyexplorewhetherthephenomenonoffakenewsisactuallyanything new.Theyarguethatitislargelycontinuouswithotherformsofmisinformation andpropaganda,thoughitsdistributionandmechanismhaveshiftedinthe Internetage.Theyconsiderthreemodelsofmanipulationofinformationthat havebeenusedhistorically,andexaminehowthesemodelsimpactepistemic autonomy.InModelA,PleasingandSeducingtheAudience,epistemicautonomy islargelyintact,sinceothervoicesaren’tsilenced.InModelB,Propagandaand Censorship,epistemicautonomyisunderminedbytheeliminationofvoices.In ModelC,DisinformationbyEpistemicPollution,viewersaremanipulatedinto thinkingtheyareepistemicallyautonomous,thoughreallytheyaremanipulated. DutilhNovaesanddeRidderexaminetheuseofthesemodelsthroughouthistory andconcludecurrentfakenewscampaignsarenotnovelintheiraimortactics. It’sunclearthatthereismorefakenews,orthatournewslandscapeismore egalitarian.Propagandahasalwaysappealedtobaserinstincts,butnowaconsiderableamountofeffortgoesintogamingalgorithms.
Whilemanyauthorsfocusonthewaythatindividualvicesleadtobeing susceptibletofakenews,andindividualvirtuescanmitigatetheharm,inher chapter, “HowViceCanMotivateDistrustintheElitesandTrustinFakeNews,” MauraPriestexploreswaysinwhichexpertshavehamperedtheirowneffortsto conveyknowledge.Priestidentifiestwovicesofexperts, epistemicinsensitivity and epistemicobstruction Epistemicinsensitivity involvesafailuretorecognizetheway variousenvironmentalfeaturesimpacttheuptakeofknowledgewithinacontext. Epistemicobstruction involvespresentingmaterialinawaythatisnotdigestibleby anon-expertaudience.Bothofthesevices,Priestargues,canfeeddistrustof experts.
Echochambersareoftenlistedasamechanismforourcollectiveepistemic woes.Butinherchapter, “EchoChambers,FakeNews,andSocialEpistemology,” JenniferLackeycontendsthattheproblemisnotechochambers;theproblemis unreliable echochambers.Inordertodiagnosewhathasgonewrong,weshould notlooktosomestructuralfeature,suchasthenumberofsourcesordiversityof opinions.Instead,theproblemisaboutthecontent,aboutwhetherourinformationenvironmentisreliable.Shearguesthatourepistemicplightcallsfornonidealsocialepistemology.Theoriesoftestimony,forexample,areill-equippedto handleanepistemicenvironmentofretweetingbots.WhileLackeydoesnotgoso farastoendorseBernecker ’snotionofnewsabstinence,shedoessuggestthatwe aremuchbetteroffwithasinglereliablenewssourcethanwearewitharangeof conflictingnewsreports,someofwhichareunreliable.
Intheirchapter,EmmanuelJ.GenodandErikJ.Olssonexaminetheway algorithmscanobscurescientificdata,propagatingdiscreditedscience,evenwhen officialchannelshaverefutedit.In “TheDisseminationofFakeScience:Onthe RankingofRetractedArticlesinGoogle,” theyofferacasestudyofhowthesearch enginesGoogleandGoogleScholardisplaydiscreditedscientificdata.Theyshow thatinarangeofcases,searchenginescontinuetoshowtheretractedarticleina moreprominentplacethanitsretraction.Theyhypothesizethatthisisaresultof Google’spopularitydrivensearchalgorithms,inconjunctionwithwhattheyterm theLawofRetraction.TheLawofRetractionholdsthatretractionsarerarelyas noteworthyandsharedastheoriginalstudy,soinapopularityrankedalgorithm, retractionswillrank below theoriginalarticle.Asaresult,Googledisseminates fakeandmisleadingsciencethroughtheirrankingofsearchresults.
Finally,PartIIIexploreswaysinwhichwemightameliorateourepistemicplight.
Inherchapter, “TheVirtueofEpistemicTrustworthinessandRe-Postingon SocialMedia,” SarahWrightarguesthatweareindividuallyresponsibleforthe epistemicrisksweincurwhenwepromoteinformationonsocialmedia.She exploreshowtheepistemicallytrustworthypersonoughttobehaveonsocial media.Theepistemicallytrustworthypersonoughttoassesstherisksofpotentiallypassingonfalseinformation,sinceitisdifficulttoeffectivelyretractfalse information.Also,theepistemicallytrustworthypersonrecognizestheways othersdependonustoshareimportantinformation.Thevirtuouspersonwill balanceriskanddependencethroughvigilantlyexaminingpotentialposts,and contextualizinginformationthatmaybemisleading.
LikeWright,SanfordGoldbergfocusesonthewayindividualswithinan informationsystemarecrucialtotheepistemichealthofthewhole.Inhischapter, “FakeNewsandEpistemicRot;or,WhyWeAreAllinthisTogether,” Goldberg focusesonthewayinwhichindividualepistemicpracticesaffectmorethanjust speakerandhearer.Inaninformationnetwork,therearemanysubtleand importantwaysthatmembersaffecttheepistemicstatusofaparticularnews report.Inaddition,Goldbergsuggests,ourambientnewsenvironmentaffects whichnewsreportsweencounter.Othersplayanimportantroleinwhathecalls backgroundgardening.Muchlikegardenersinapublicgardenwhopulloutweeds andnurturehealthyplants,othersinoursocialnetworkswilldoepistemicworkto squelchbadreportsandnurturegoodones.Andweoweittoeachothertoengage inmutuallybeneficialbackgroundgardening.Continuingwiththeplantmetaphor,Goldbergalsointroducesthenotionof epistemicrot,thedecayofinformationalsystemsthroughdeviantmechanisms.Fakenewsconstitutesoneofthese mechanisms,anditisincumbentoneachofustotendourgardencarefullyto containthepathogen.
Onepotentialwaytocontainepistemicrotmightbetopracticenewsabstinence.Inhischapter, “AnEpistemicDefenseofNewsAbstinence,” SvenBernecker arguesthatwemaybepropositionallyjustifiedintemporarilyignoringnews,
eitherinadomainorfromasource.Berneckerlaysouttwoconditionsthatmust bemet:(i)weareinafakenewsenvironmentorarejustifiedinbelievingthatwe are,and(ii)itiscognitivelydifficultortimeconsumingtodiscriminategenuine fromfakenewsortoobtaingenuinenews.Inthiscase,theconsumptionofthe newsleadsustoacquirefalseorirrelevantbeliefsandpreventsusfromacquiring trueandrelevantones.Motivatedignoranceofthenewsisepistemicallyjustified whenepistemicvaluecanbesecuredbetterelsewhere.Bernecker’sposition contrastsstronglywithbothPritchard(whoarguesthatinformationistoo importantforabstinencetobetherightmove,eveniftheenvironmentisrisky) andWright(whoarguesthatothersdependonus,andwehavearoletoplayin ourinformationnetwork).
Inhischapter, “FakeNews,FalseBeliefs,andtheFallibleArtofKnowledge Maintenance,” AxelGelfertarguesthatfakenewspresentsanovelkindofsocialepistemicdysfunction,arisingfrom systemic distortionsofestablishedprocessesof creatinganddisseminatingnews-likecontent.Theresultisnotjustthatthereare falsereportsinourinformationenvironment,butalsoourenvironmentlacks coveragereliability.Whatisneeded,Gelfertcontends,isepistemicroutinesthat vindicatetrustinreliablesources.WhileGelfertdoesnotusethelanguageof gardeningorvirtue,hissuggestionsareconsonantwiththoseofGoldbergand Wright:weneedepistemicpracticesthatoperateonahabituallevelthatpromote ahealthyinformationnetwork.
Finally,in “TrustNoOne?The(Social)EpistemologicalConsequencesofBelief inConspiracyTheories,” MichaelBaurmannandDanielCohnitzarguethat conspiracytheoriesthreatentounderminedemocraticinstitutions.Theyargue thatdemocraticsocietiesrequireacomplexandopeninformation-sharingsystem. Beliefinconspiracytheoriesunderminessocialtrustininformationnetworks,and iseasilyexploitedbyactorsseekingtoundermineopensocieties.Baurmannand Cohnitzconsiderwhetherdebunkingorinfiltratingconspiracynetworkswouldbe successfulatunderminingthepotencyofconspiracytheories.Theyarguethat thesestrategiesareunlikelytobesuccessful,sinceconspiracynetworkshavevery littletrusttowardsoutsiders,andunderminingaconspiracyfromtheinside doesn’tinstilltrustinthediminishedinstitution(especiallyiftheinfiltrationis discovered!).Instead,theysuggestthatasolutionistocultivatepersonalrelationshipsoftrustwithmembersofconspiracynetworks.Theirproposalgoesfar beyondthosemadebyothersinPartIII.WhereWright,Goldberg,andGelfert focusonourdutiestootherswithinourinformationnetwork,theyaresilenton whetherweoughttoexcisetheconspiratoriallymindedfromourcommunity. BaurmannandCohnitzarguethatweoughttopositivelycultivaterelationships withconspiracythinkersinordertomaintainrelationshipsoftrust.¹
¹WethankPeterMomtchiloffforinsightfulcommentsonapreviousdraftofthischapter.
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