Introduction
‘Theasceticideal’ isthetermNietzscheusesin TheGenealogyofMorality¹forthe variouswaysinwhichthevalue-systemhelabels ‘slavemorality’ evolves,ramifies, andspreadsoutintothebroaderreachesofJudaeo-ChristianWesternculture. Thenatureandmanifestationsofthatidealaretheexplicittopicofthethirdand finalessayinthe Genealogy;butitsworkdependsuponthetwoessayswhich precedeit,inwhichNietzscheanalysesanddiagnosesslavemoralityitself,andin particularitsdistinctivelyChristianreligioussources.Soitmighthelptoprovide someinitialorientationforthisbook’sinvestigationoftheasceticidealifIprovide areminder(howeverbriefandselective)ofthecentralthemesofthose firsttwo essays.
Inthe Genealogy,NietzschepresentsChristianityprimarilyasaformoflife oneinwhichacertainsetofvaluesorientseverythingthebelieverthinks,says,and does;andheisinterestednotinwhetherthosevaluesaretrue(avalidrepresentationofthewaythingsare,morallyspeaking whateverthatmightmean),butin theirmeaningorsignificance(thevalueoftheevaluationoftheworldthatthey embody).ForNietzsche,thetruthofChristianityinthissenseliesinitsveneration ofthecross itsdemandthatbelieversworshipthe figureofahumiliated, flagellated,andcrucifiedhumanbeing.FortheChristian,ofcourse,this figure embodiestheircommitmenttoalifeofaltruisticself-sacrifice,inwhichtheself becomesasnothingforthesakeofthewell-beingofothers(particularlytheweak andvulnerable).Andthedivinestatusofthat figuredeclaresthatsuchselflessness istheunquestionableessenceofanythingdeservingthenameofmorality:itmakes atimelessandabsolutelyauthoritativeclaimuponusasbeingsresponsiveto ethicalandexistentialvalue.
Byplacingthisvalue-systeminitshistoricalcontext,Nietzschemeanstoputin questioneveryaspectofthisChristianself-understanding.ForwhenChristian moralityispresentedasahistoricalphenomenon,weareforcefullyremindedthat ithasatemporalpointoforigin(whichmeansthattheideaofitsceasingtoexist atsomepointbecomesthinkable),andthatitisnotonlycapableofpotentially radicaldevelopmentandalterationthereafter,butmightitselfhaveantecedents priorculturalconditionsthathelpedmakepossiblethevalue-systemwhosearrival neverthelessthreatenedradicallytodisruptthem.Noneofthesepointsis
¹Trans.C.Diethe,ed.K.Ansell-Pearson(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994).References tothe Genealogy arehereaftertoGMfollowedbyessayandsectionnumbers. TheAsceticIdeal:GenealogiesofLife-DenialinReligion,Morality,Art,Science,andPhilosophy.StephenMulhall, OxfordUniversityPress.©StephenMulhall2021.DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192896889.003.0001
intrinsicallyinimicaltoChristianity ’sofficialself-image(sinceChristianscan acknowledgethem usingnotionssuchasamomentoftransformativerevelation anditsunfoldingthroughevolvingtradition withoutcastingdoubtonthedivine authorityofwhatistherebyrevealedandunfolded).ButNietzsche’swayof exploitingtheundeniablehistoricalityofChristianmoralityallowshimtomake morespecificclaimsaboutitsbelatednessandmutability claimsdesignedto implantthesuspicionthatitsunderlyingsignificanceisverydifferentfromits overtself-understanding.
Byexaminingtheetymologyofkeyevaluativetermsthroughthelensprovided bythebroader,lingeringculturaltracesoftheancientGreekworld,Nietzsche devoteshis firstessaytoidentifyingapre-Christianvalue-systemhecalls ‘master morality’—onewhichcontrastsgoodwithbadratherthanwithevil,andwhich understandsasgoodpreciselythatwhichiscondemnedasevilbyitsmorefamiliar alternative.Mastermoralitycelebratesthosenoblesoulswhocanspontaneously andcourageouslyimposetheirwillontheworld,achievingtheirgoalsandmore generallydirectlytranslatingtheirdesiresintoeffectiveandsatisfyingaction;and itcondemnsthosewholackthegreatnessofsoulneededtoachievesuchremakingsoftheworldintheirownimage thetimid,thefeeble,theweak.Christian moralityisamirrorimageofthesevaluations:ittransposestheirpositiveand negativepoles,anditsattributionofuncannilysubstantialrealitytothelatter reflectsitsfundamentalprioritizationofthecondemnatorydimensionofmoral evaluationoveritscelebratorycounterpart.
Nietzschesuggeststhatthismirroringisnotanaccident;onthecontrary,it embodiesapowerfullynegative,andresentment-fuelled,reactionagainstmaster morality.Christianmoralityisstructuredinsuchawayastoprotectandadvance theinterestsofthosewhosuffermostfromthehitherto-unquestionedprevalence ofmastermorality theweak,nature’sslaves.Lifefortheminasocietyakinto thatportrayedinHomer’stalesisoneinwhichtheyarepushedaroundby nature’smasters,andinwhichtheirculturecelebratesthosevictimizingthem whilst ifitthinksofthematall condemningthemforbeingvictims.By invertingthesemodesofevaluation,patternsofthoughtanddeedthatadvantage theweakwouldbecelebrated,andthosedisadvantagingthem(andhencethose peoplewhonaturallyevincethem)wouldbecondemned;thelivesoftheslaves wouldbecomeworthliving,andtheirinabilitytoassertthemselveswouldbe reconceivedbyallasanachievementthatconstitutesthepinnacleofhuman flourishing.
Nietzschethusreinterpretsslavemorality’sovertadvocacyofselflessnessas inherentlyself-interested,andsoashypocritical;altruismnotonlycomesnaturallytotheweak,butconstitutesavitalculturalweaponinthewaragainstthose naturallyequippedandinclinedtodisadvantagethem.Insofarasslavemorality asksustotakepleasureinthesystematicpunishmentofnature’smasterssimply forgivingexpressiontotheirgreatnessofsoul,itencouragesandrewardsan
essentiallysadisticaspectofourpersonality;butitalsosatis fiesourmasochistic impulses,insofarasitdemandsthatwecondemnandrepressanymanifestation, indeedorthought,ofsuchnobleimpulsesofself-expressionandself-imposition aswepossess toscourandscarifyoursoulsaswellasourlives.Andsincesuch impulsesconstituteexpressionsofwhatNietzscheseesasthebasicprincipleof life thedriveofallanimatebeingstoimposetheirwillontheworld,andto enhancethatcapacityformastery slavemoralityamountstoadenialoflife,a refusalofthevitalcoreofourownexistenceandofexistenceassuch.Inshort, Christianmorality’sendorsementofaltruismisinfactanexpressionofafundamentallyself-interested,sadomasochisticdenialoflife.Itisawhitedsepulchre, centredontheentombmentofastigmatizedhumanbody awhole-hearted affirmationofdeathagainstlife.
Inhissecondessay,Nietzschepresentsthephenomenonofpunishment,andits associatedconceptionsofguiltandresponsibility,asanexemplaryinstanceofthe wayinwhichtheformsofourcommunallifearedisruptedfromwithin,in perverselyproductiveways,bytheadventofslavemoralthinking.Buthedoesn’t dosoinaparticularlyperspicuousmanner:avarietyofdifferentaspectsand modesofthatphenomenon,andavarietyofassignmentsofsignificancetoeach aspectormode,areinvokedinhisaccount,atsomespeedandwithnoobvious singleconnectingthreadofargumentoranalysis.Soanyreaderwillhavetoelicit orimposesomekindofhermeneuticorderonthesetextualelements;andthe followingframeworkmightseemparticularlytemptingtoaphilosopher.
Noformofsociallifecanbemaintainedwithouttheimpositionofdisciplinary regimeswhichprohibitformsofbehaviourthatdamageothers,andsoimplicitly presupposeassignmentsofresponsibility.Againfollowingetymologicalclues, Nietzschetakesseriouslythefactthatthetermfor ‘guilt’ inGerman(‘Schuld’) alsomeans ‘debt’;andheaccordinglysuggestsenvisagingsocialdisciplineas generallyinvolvingaviewofthewrongdoerasindebtedtothosetowhomhe doeswrong,andthepunishmentashismeansofdischargingthatdebt.Butthe focusofsuchapracticecouldperfectlywellbenarrow:acertainkindofpublic misbehaviouroccasionsitsactivation,andundergoingacompensatoryform ofpublicsufferingisconceivedofasitsequalandoppositeoutcome awayof wipingoutthedebt,andleavingacleanslate.Suchapracticeoffersameans ofsatisfyingthecreditor’ssadisticimpulses(aswellasthedebtor’smasochistic impulses);butbecauseitisactivatedsolelybytheperformanceofaspecificact,it limitsthemoralsignificanceoftheexchangebyimputingastrictlylimitedambit ofmoralresponsibility.
Since,however,whatdifferentiatesactionfrommerebodilymovementis motiveorintention,ourinterestinwrongdoingisnaturallyextendableintothe innerlifeofourfellowmen,andsoofourselves.If,forexample,weareconcerned toprotectsocietyagainstthedamagedonebywrongfulbehaviour,wemight concludethatwecouldmoreefficientlyminimizesuchwrongdoingbyminimizing
theemergenceofthewrongfulintentionsthatengenderthem;andthisnaturally suggestsdevelopingpracticesofcriticalself-scrutiny,whicharedesignedtoextirpatewrongfulthoughtsaswellasdeeds.Onceagain,althoughsuchextensionsof disciplinarypracticeintomodesofself-disciplineextendthedomainofmoral responsibility,theycouldremainlocalized,restrictingthemselvestocombating specificwrongfulimpulsesasandwhentheyemerge,andimposingpenancesthat arepreciselyresponsivetoeachsuchmotive.Butwearesoonlikelytobestruckby thefactthatsomepeopleseemmorepronetoagreatervarietyofsuchwrongful thoughts,andtotheirpersistentrecurrence,thanothers;andthisnaturallysuggests thatsomethingabouttheircharacteristheunderlyingsourceofthosethoughts, whichnowappearassymptomaticoftherealmoralproblem thatoftheindividual’sbadcharacter,thefactthattheyareviciousratherthanvirtuouspeople.And thisextendsthedomainofourresponsibilitysothatitencompassesourselvesas such:itimplicitlyholdsusaccountableforbeingthekindofpersonweare (condemningtheeaglefordoingwhateaglesdo,andpraisingthelambfordoing whatlambsdo).
Then,however,wemightaskourselveswhysomanyindividualsrevealthemselvestohavesuchbadcharacters:whyisvicesoprevalent,soeasyforindividuals tofallinto,andwhyisvirtuesohardtoachieveandsustain?Whyisitthathuman beingsseemsoinclinedtoactviciouslyevenwhenwhatresultshasnoobvious benefitforthemandsomanyobviouscosts?Whyishumannaturesosystematicallyvulnerabletowhatonemightcalltheimpofthemorallyperverse?Thenwe mightbeinclinedtotakeseriouslytheideathathumannatureassuch(asopposed tothenaturesofspeci ficindividuals)isbad,orvicious thatbeyondanyindividualwrongfuldeeds,thoughts,andpersonalitiesthereissomethingfundamentallyawryormisdirectedabouthumanityasaspecies.Andnowwe findourselves onthethresholdoftheChristiandoctrineoforiginalsin,accordingtowhichwe mustthinkofourselvesasincomprehensiblybutundeniablyresponsiblefora sinfulnaturethatweacquiredsimplybyvirtueofbeinghuman thatis,by comingintoexistence.Littlewonderthat,inaccordancewiththecreditor –debtor modelthatinitiallygovernedthispractice,we findChristianspositingtheidea thatGodaloneiscapableofredeemingsuchanunconditionalorabsoluteformof guilt(sinceanyhumaneffortstoatoneforitwillbetaintedbythatforwhich atonementisneeded).Onlysomeoneabsolutelyorunconditionallygoodcould wipeoutsuchadebt;thatiswhyGodgavehisonlySontoredeemAdam’ssin.
OnthiswayofpresentingNietzsche’sthinking,thecomplexnexusofideasand practicesthatmakeupthephenomenonofguilt,punishment,andresponsibility appearassomethingthatmighthavenaturallydevelopedovertime itisa rationalreconstructionintheformofanenvisagedsocialevolution.Sinceeach stageinthenarrativeconstitutesanintelligibleextrapolationofthepriorstage,it bringsouttheinterconnectionsofmeaningbetweenthem;itshowsthatthe internallycomplexunityofthecurrentlydominantChristianconceptionof
responsibilityisnotdismissableasameaninglessaggregationconsequentupona successionofsheeraccidents.Andsincetheimplicitlyteleologicaloverarching narrativeisdesignedtomakeitsaudiencefeelthattheyareprobingevermore deeplyandpenetratinglyintothe fieldofhumanresponsibility,itatoncehelpsus tounderstandwhytheChristianinterpretationofthat fieldmightseemrationally compelling(byvirtueofaccommodatingorimprovinguponitslessextremeor absolutecompetitors),andalsotoseemoreclearlythepointatwhichitmight neverthelessbecriticizedasexorbitant(thedubiouslycoherentattempttocondemneaglesforbeingeagles)orevenrepellent(theself-hating,self-denying doctrineoforiginalsinfulness).
ButNietzsche’scriticalaimsinfactextendfarbeyondthatofindicting Christianaccountsofresponsibilityforgoingalittletoofar,orevenagreatdeal toofar,downtheonlyavailable(becauselogicallydetermined)conceptualroad asifitconstitutedthesingular,fullunfoldingoftheessenceofhumanmorallife thatwasimpliciteveninitssimplestinitialforms.Healsoaimstoindictnotjust theideathatthereisonlyonesuchroad,butalsotheideaofroads(oflogically unfoldingsequencesofconceptualdevelopment)assuch;andthebasisforthat indictmentisinfactdetectableeveninthequasi-evolutionarystoryIhavejust narrated inthefactthatitpositsvariousstagesorepisodesinthatevolution, andsoimplicitlyacknowledgestherelativedistinctnessandself-sufficiencyof eachstage(theirabilitytomakegoodsenseofthemselvestothoseinhabiting them).Afterall,toacknowledgethateachextrapolationfromonestageto anothercanbemadetoseemnotonlyintelligiblebutalsonaturalisnotto showthatitistrulycompulsory;onthecontrary,wecouldequallywellenvisage each(atleastanalyticallyseparable)stageasinformingandinformedbya distinct,internallycoherent,andsustainableformoflifethatrequiresnosupplementationoralteration.
If,however,anygivenstageofmyhypotheticaldevelopmentprocesscould constituteastableculturalform(whatever flawswemayseeinitsspecificshaping ofthoughtandaction),thereisnocompellingreasontoexpecttheiractual chronologicalorderingtoreflectmyconceptualorderingofthemintermsof increasinglyextensiveandinvasivemodesofguilt-attribution.Thedevelopment ofanactualculturemightequallywellmovefrommoretolessextensivemodes;it mayomitintermediarystages(logicallyspeaking)asitdoesso;oritmay finditself accumulatingovertimemorethanonewayofmakingsenseofitswaysof enforcingsocialdiscipline.AndNietzschetakesthislastpossibilityveryseriously.
Onhisaccount,preciselybecauseourcurrentpracticesofpunishmentreally didemergefromahistorycentrallyinvolvingjusttheseshifting,successive,but relativelyautonomouspatternsofself-interpretation,theyconstituteakindof palimpsest aculturalnodethathasattractedandnowembodiesmultipleand conflictingmeaningsandmodesofsignificance(andsomightconfusethenaïve culturalhistorianseekingitssingleandsingularessence,aswellassimultaneously
offeringequalamountsofgristtothemutuallyhostilehermeneuticmillsof utilitarian,Kantian,andAristotelianmoralphilosophies,amongstothers).
Themodeofunityexhibitedbycultural-historicalphenomenasuchaspunishmentisthusnotconstitutedbyeitherpurelylogicalorpurelycontingentrelations betweenitselements;itsintegrityovertimeissecuredneitherbyatimelessessence norbyasequenceofmereaccidents.Butonceitisproperlyappreciated,the hermeneuticmultiplicitythatconstitutessuchunityexplainswhyitmutatesover time(sinceitoffersmorenaturalpointsofpurchaseforsomereinterpretations ratherthanothers);anditalsoraisesthepossibilityofrecoveringcertainnonChristianmodesofinterpretationfromtheircurrentandlong-standingdominationbytheauthorityofChristianscripture,andturningtheminnewdirections.
SoitisnotanaccidentthatNietzsche’streatmentofpunishmentisalsothe locusofhismostexplicitdiscussionofhisgenealogicalmethod theonly approachhetakestobeadequatetothekindofphenomenaheaspirestograsp. Andagoodwayintothatdiscussionistoenvisagethekindofobjectionthatany well-trainedphilosopherislikelytoraiseagainstanenterprisethatseeksto determinethevalueofaphenomenonbyestablishingitshistory:thatitcommits thegeneticfallacy conflatingthequestionofavalue-system’shistoricalorigin withthatofitsintellectualvalidity.Why,afterall,shouldthefact(ifitisafact) thatslavemoralityisprecededbymastermoralityshowthattheformerembodies aself-interestedresentmentofthelatter?Andmoregenerally,whyshouldthe purelyempiricalmatterofthepreciseevolutionarypathofslave-moralityhave anybearingontheevaluativequestionofwhetheritembodiestherightexistential orientationforhumanbeings?
Asithappens,Nietzschehimselfseemstoadvanceatleastoneversionofthis objection;forhefamouslybeginssection12ofhissecondessaybydeclaringthat ‘theoriginandthepurposeofpunishment[are]twoproblemswhichare separate oroughttobe:unfortunatelypeopleusuallythrowthemtogether’.So it’sdifficulttobelievethatheisgoingabouthisbusinesscompletelyobliviousto thiskindofworry.Butthematterisn’tstraightforward:forthisdeclarationis actuallypromptedbyNietzsche’sinvocationofastanceinformedbythreemore specific,andinterrelated,assumptionsthathesuspectsmayhaveagriponhis readers:thataphenomenonsuchaspunishmenthasasinglepurposeormeaning, thatitisunchanging(henceithasthatmeaningnow),andsothatitmusthave hadthatsamemeaningwhenit firstemerged.Thecanonicalinstanceofsucha stanceisthebeliefthatanentity’stelosisdeterminedfromtheoutsetbyits functionalrole(theeyeismadetosee,thehandtograsp).ThepositionNietzsche offersasanalternativeaccordinglydoesdenythattheoriginalpurposeorsignificanceofanentityisnecessarilydeterminativeofitspresentnature;butthisisnot becauseitaffirmsanabsolutedistinctionbetweenmeaningandhistory,between theevaluativeandtheempirical.Onthecontrary,Nietzscheclaimsthat
anythinginexistence,havingsomehowcomeabout,iscontinuallyinterpreted anew,requisitionedanew,transformedandredirectedtoanewpurpose...the wholehistoryofa ‘thing’,anorgan,atraditioncantothisextentbeacontinuous chainofsigns,continuallyrevealingnewinterpretationsandadaptations,the causesofwhichneednotbeconnectedevenamongstthemselves....theformis fluid,the ‘meaning’ evenmoreso.(GM,2.12)
Thisapproachcertainlyholdsopenthepossibilitythatthekindofmeaninga phenomenonhaswhenitemergesmaybeoccludedorevenobliteratedbylater impositionsofothermeanings;butitalsoallowsforthepossibilitythatitwillbe retained,eitherinarelativelyunalteredway,orhavingbeenreshapedinmoreor lessradicalwaysbylaterlayersofinterpretation.Nietzscheenvisagesthese contestsofinterpretationasinvolving ‘moreorlessprofound,moreorless mutuallyindependentprocessesofsubjugation’;butheimmediatelyemphasizes thattherelevantphenomenoncanpushbackagainstthissubjugation hementions ‘theresistancesencounteredeverytime,theattemptedtransformationsfor thepurposesofdefenceandreaction,andtheresults...ofsuccessfulcountermeasures ’.Thisispreciselythepalimpsesticmodelweuncoveredinhisconceptionofpunishment:itpresentssuchphenomenaassitesofcontinuous hermeneuticconflict,ofpowerstruggles(thepowerofreinterpretation,andthe variousothermodesofpowerswhoseeffectsmightbeachievedby,andmightnot beachievableotherwisethanby,exercisinghermeneuticpower);anditgivesthe originalmeaningofsuchphenomenaadoublepotentialsignificance insofarasit remainsactiveovertime,andinsofarasitshapesthephenomenon’sopennessto laterreinterpretations.
ThegeneralproblemwiththechargeofageneticfallacyfromNietzsche’spoint ofviewisthatitpresupposeswhatthepalimpsesticnatureofpunishmentshows tobemistaken:thatacleardistinctioncanbedrawnbetweenwhatsuchphenomenaareandwhathashappenedtothem,betweentheiressenceandtheirhistory. Thisiswhyitassumesthatwhatevermakesslavemoralitywhatitiscanbe graspedindependentlyofthevicissitudesofitshistory,andmoregenerallyof therealmofthecultural,theempirical,thecontingent.If,however,theideaofa geneticfallacyassumesasharpdistinctionbetweentheidealandtheactual (betweenthedomainofessence,logic,andvalue,andthedomainofthefactual), Nietzsche’scontrarypositionisnotwellunderstoodassimplyinvertingthe evaluativepolesofsuchavisionofphenomena.Itisnothisviewthattheir essence,nature,oridentityshouldbesetasideinfavourof,orevenentirely dissolvedinto,thesheercontingencyofhistory forthattoowouldpresuppose theverydistinctionthatheisattemptingtoputinquestion.Hisgenealogical modelsuggestsratherthattherelationshipbetweentheidealandtheactualinthe constitutionoftheidentityofaphenomenonisinternal,inthewaythatthe
identityofafamilyisconstitutedbytheopen-endedinteractionofnaturalhistory andculture.
Aconventionalfamilytreerevealstheidentityofafamilyasestablishedbythe interplayofbiologyandsociety:undertheincesttaboo,thenaturaloffspringof onesetofparentsmarriesthenaturaloffspringofanothersuchset,withtheir offspringamountingtoaculturally-facilitatedand-legitimizedcombinationof both,whowillthenthemselveslookoutsidetheirownfamiliesforpartnerswith whomtoreiteratethisgraftingprocess.Suchgraftingdoesnotdepriveafamilyof itsdistinctidentity;itisthemeansbywhichthatidentityismaintainedthrough thevicissitudesofhumannaturalhistory.
Readingthebiologicalastheessential,andtheculturalasthehistorical,the moralofNietzsche’sentitlingofhismethodisthusthattheessenceandthe historyofaphenomenonsuchasslavemoralityareeachinformedbytheother:its constitutivestructureatagiventimemakesitcapableofacceptingandabsorbing a finiterangeofcontextualfactors,andwhicheversuchfactortakesthatopportunitywillreshapeitsessenceinsuchawayastoreshapewhichfuturecontexts willinviteitsapplicationandwhichaspectsofthosecontextsmightthenfurther reshapeitsnature,andsounendinglyon.Andthesameholdsforourconceptsof suchphenomena bothbecausetheirreferentsaregenealogicallyconstitutedand becauseconcepts findtheirprimaryexpressioninthewordsofalanguage,andso arethemselvesgenealogicallyconstituted(beingessentiallycultural-historical phenomenathemselves).
SowhenNietzschedeclaresthat ‘onlyaconceptwithoutahistorycanbe defined’ (GM,2.13),hemeanstoinvokeaspecificnotionofwhatadefinition mightbe thekindencapsulatedintheFregeanidealofa merkmal definition (intermsofnecessaryandsuf ficientconditions),thekindthatmightbeappropriateintheatemporalrealmsofthemathematical,butwhichwhenappliedto prettymuchanyotherkindofreferentsimplydistortsthephenomenaunder consideration,anddoessoinamannerwhichmeritsevaluativediagnosisand criticism.Agenealogicalperspectiveisthusnotameansofdeprivingaphenomenonoritsconceptofthatidentity,butrathertheonlyappropriatewayof disclosingthatidentitywithoutsuccumbingtothedamagingconceptionof whatidentitymustbewithwhichWesternculturehassodeeplyentangledit.
Ifthelaminated, fissiparous,andinternallyquarrelsomeunityofpunishmentis anythingtogoby,weshouldnotexpectNietzschetoarriveatasimpleorsingle evaluativejudgementaboutthevalueofthis,oranyotherelement,ofChristian morality.Afterall,ashefreelyacknowledges,thesevariousmoralphenomena havebeensubjectto subjugatedby aChristianinterpretationoftheirsignificanceforaverylongtime;andbyNietzsche’sowncriteria,thissuggeststhatthe Christianworld-viewexhibitsaveryhighdegreeofthewilltopower.Insofaras thiswill findsexpressionindeployingandenhancingthecapacitytoremakethe worldinourimage,thentheslaverevoltinmoralitycannotbutappearasoneof
themostsuccessfulexpressionsofthewilltopowerinhumanhistory.Human weaklings,lackingthephysicalandpsychologicalresourcesto fightnature’ s mastersontheirownterms,andoppressedasmuchbytheirsystemofvaluesas bytheircourageandstrength,neverthelessmanagesocompletelytorevaluethose valuesthattheysubjectthemasterstopunitivesocialcritique,totheinternalizationofthoseself-criticalvalues,andtherebyineffecttoenslavethemtothe purposesandinterestsofnature’sslaves.Thislookslikemorethanenoughto identifythesesupposedweaklingsaseaglesinlamb’sclothing.
Tobesure,thisrevoltwasled,onNietzsche’saccount,bythepriests,whoare saidtoconstituteonebranchofthearistocraticcaste thebranchwhosemembers aresuf ficientlyintelligenttoseetheusefulnessoftheslavesasameansof achievingpowerforthemselvesinandoversociety,andinparticularovertheir lessMachiavellianpeers.Unlikethesimple,andsimplypowerful,modeofmasteryexemplifiedbyanAchilles,however,thepriestssystematicallyinterpose thoughtbetweendesireandaction,andinparticular findextremelyindirect waysbymeansofwhichtosatisfytheirdesiresforpower.Inshort,theypossess acomplexinteriorlifeofjustthekindthatitisthenaturalgloryoftheHomeric masters,asNietzschesooftenpresentsthemintheirimmediatetranslationofselfaggrandizingimpulseintoeffectiveaction,tolack.
Attheveryleast,thissuggestsadeepdivisionbetweenthesetwoputative categoriesofnature’snobles;butitalsosuggeststhatthesepriestshavearather dubiousclaimtobeingnaturallynobleatall.Forelsewhereinthe Genealogy, Nietzscheassociatestherealizationofaclearboundarybetweeninnerandouter, andthebeginningofagenuinelysubstantialinnerlife,withthespecifically Christianinternalizationofself-criticism.Withinaninterpretationofguiltaccordingtowhichitispossibletocommitadulteryinone’sheart,thefocusshiftsfrom redemptionsofindebtednessforactionsinthepublicdomaintoattemptstoidentify andextirpatethemotivationalsourcesofsuchactions,andsoinvolvesturningthe sadisticimpulsesofslavemoralevaluationupononeself(withthepracticeof confessionexemplifyingitssacramentalsignificance).AsNietzscheputsit:
Allinstinctswhicharenotdischargedoutwardlyturn inwards thisiswhatIcall the internalization ofman;withittherenowevolvesinmanwhatwilllaterbe calledhis ‘soul’.Thewholeinnerworld,originallystretchedthinlyasthough betweentwolayersofskin,wasexpandedandextendeditselfandgaineddepth, breadthandheightinproportiontothedegreethattheexternaldischargeof man ’sinstinctswas obstructed... Withit,however,theworstandmostinsidious illnesswasintroduced,onefromwhichmankindhasnotyetrecovered,man’ s sicknessof man,of himself:astheresultofaforciblebreachwithhisanimalpast, asimultaneousleapandfallintonewsituationsandconditionsofexistence,a declarationofwaragainstalltheoldinstinctsonwhich,uptillthen,hisstrength, pleasureandformidablenesshadbeenbased...
[T]heprospectofananimalsoulturningagainstitself,takingapartagainst itself,wassomethingsonew,soprofound,unheard-of,puzzling,contradictory and momentous onearththatthewholecharacteroftheworldchangedinan essentialway.Sincethattime,man...arousesinterest,tension,hope...as thoughsomethingwerebeingannouncedthroughhim,werebeingprepared, asthoughmanwerenotanendbutjustapath,anepisode,abridge,agreat promise.(GM,2.16)
Thesepassageshaveanuncannydual-aspectqualitytothem,withmastermoralityoscillatingbetweenbeingamythictraceofourwhollyanimalpast(the articulationofastateofnature)andaspeci ficmodeoforganizingthecultural dimensionofanygenuinelyhumanlife,andslavemoralityoscillatingbetween beingalatersuchmodeandbeingthemythicalmeansbywhichthehuman animalentersintocultureinthe firstplace(bydividinghimselfintwo).Either way,however,thepriestswholeadtherevolutionareplainlypossessedofaninner lifeofverysignificantdepthandrichness,andsomusthavealreadybeenmarked bytheveryself-scrutinizing,life-denyingvalue-systemthatNietzsche’saccount alsotellsustheycreateinordertomarshaltheirslavearmy.ButifNietzsche finds himselfaffirmingtheparadoxicalconclusionthatslavemoralitymakespossible notonlyitsculturalhegemonybutalsoitsownexistence,thatindicatesa fundamentaltendencyonhisparttoviewthislife-denyingvalue-systemashaving alwaysalreadyleftitstracesonhumanlife asbeingwhat firstmakesgenuinely humanlifepossible,andindeedwhat firstmakeshumanbeingsandtheworldin whichtheyliveatonceinteresting,profound,momentous,andpromising.
Buttoappreciatethefullextentofthatinfluence,weneedtoexaminethewayin whichslavemoralitymutatesinto ‘theasceticideal’—aphenomenontowhich Nietzschedevoteshisthirdessayinthe Genealogy. Althoughthisessayisevenmoredigressiveandmultifariousthanitspredecessors,oneconceptthatappearstoplayadecisiveroleinfacilitatingtherelevant mutationis ‘truthfulness’ (andso ‘truth’).Thisisanotherfacetofthepivotal significancewithinthenewlyestablishedChristianformoflifeofthesacramentof confession.Itembodiestheimportanceofscrupulousself-examination,demandingthatanytraceofinnerevildetectedmustbedeclared tothepriest,andsoto God;andtheresultanthumiliationtherebyacquiresbothaninstrumentalandan intrinsicvalue(atoncehelpingtobringusclosertoGodanddeclaringourfull awarenessofourinfinitedistancefromHim).Confessiontherebyattemptsto extirpateallmanifestationsofwhatNietzscheregardsasgenuinevitalityfromour innerlife,andinsuchawayastoconfirmourownabasement;itbothexploitsand extendstheself ’sinevitableturninginonitself,butprimarilywithaneyetoits potentialforself-denigration.
TruthfulnesstherebybecomesacoreChristianvalue,understoodasessentialto establishinganappropriaterelationshiptoGodincarnate(whodescribeshimself
as ‘TheWay,theTruthandtheLife’).Wemightcallthisavisionof flourishing humanlifeastruth-seeking;onNietzsche’sgenealogicalunderstandingofsuch phenomena,oncesuchavisionisarticulatedandembodied,itbecomescapableof relativelyautonomousdevelopment bywhichImeannotonlythatitiscapable of findingnewcontextswhichinviteitsapplication,butalsothatitsnatureis capableofbeingdecisivelymodi fiedbythosecontexts.Nietzscheisparticularly interestedinfoursuchprojectionsorextensionsofthisChristianvaluationof truth:insecularmorality,mostobviously,butalsoinmodesofculturalactivity thatappeartobeessentiallyunrelatedtoethicalmatters art,science,and philosophy.
ThecontinuitybetweenJudaeo-Christianreligionandpurportedlypostreligiousorsecularethicsisevidenttoanyeyewhich likeNietzsche’ s views religionprimarilyasaformoflifeorexistentialorientation.Forifanatheist deniestheexistenceofGod,butcontinuestocleavetoavalue-systemwhich celebratesaltruisticself-sacrificeforthesakeoftheweakandvulnerable,thenshe continuestoembodythelife-denyingdriveofChristianity.Andtheissueoftruth exempli fiesthatcontinuity;regardforhonestyandtruthfulnessremaincentral virtuesinputativelypost-religiousethics,andtheydemandpotentiallysignificant sacri ficesofthedirectinterestsofthetruth-teller.
TheasceticqualitiesofWesternartduringthepre-modernperiod,whenboth patronageandsubjectmatterweredeeplyinformedbytheinfluenceofthe Church,arefairlyevident.ButaNietzscheannosewoulddetectsignificant continuitiesbetweenpre-modernandmodernartinthisrespect:thereisnot onlytherecrudescenceofexplicitlyChristiancontentinsuchworld-historical figuresasWagner,butalsothebroadercommitmenttotruthandtruthfulnessthat istobefoundinthesystemofperspectivepainting,andintheriseofthenovelasa dominantform withitsincreasing(andincreasinglyself-conscious)focusona realisticdepictionofsociallife,andinparticularonapainstakingmappingofthe interiorlifeofitsindividualprotagonistswithaviewtoenhancingourcompassionateidentificationwiththeirneedsandvulnerabilities.Andofcourse,the artistspursuingtruthandtruthfulnessinthesewayspersistentlyunderstand theirchoiceofcareerasanessentiallyself-sacrificialvocation,asifbeinganartist wasakindofsecularmartyrdom.
Modernsciencealsodevelopsaconceptionofthelifeofthescientistas requiringdedicationandself-sacrifice,eventothepointofmartyrdomforthe sakeofthetruth(Galileobeingexemplaryhere);buttheaccountitdeliversof realitybeginsbydismissingthedeliverancesofthesensesasinherentlyillusory (asinaccountsofsecondaryqualitiesaspurelysubjectivephenomena),andthen elaboratestheoriesofthetruthaboutmatteraslyingessentiallybeyondourunaided bodilygrasp,andindeedasgraspableatallonlybymeansofmathematics hence bypurereasonanditsaccesstoessentiallyunchangingrelationsbetween numbers.Modernsciencetherebyunfoldsapictureofthetruththatarticulates
itintermsofwhatNietzschewouldcallBeingratherthanBecoming asifthe truthabouttheempiricalcanonlybearticulatedintermswhichtranscendthe blooming,buzzingincarnateencounterwithotherbodies(whetherinanimateor animate).
Philosophyhas,onNietzsche’sview,beencommittedtovaluingBeingover Becomingfromitsorigin;anditsmodernincarnationsdisplayasimilarcommitment,evenifinsignificantlymodifiedterms.TakeKantasanexample:his Copernicanrevolutionisintendedtovalidateourassumptionthatwecanattain genuineknowledgeofobjectsintheempiricalrealm,butinordertodosohehas tointroduceadistinctionbetweenobjectsastheypresentthemselvestousin experienceandobjectsastheyareinthemselves,therebyinvitingustoconsider thelatterasthelocusoftruthproperlyspeaking.Butthenoumenalrealmisby definitionbeyondtherangeofpossiblehumancognition;hence,thewaythings reallyarewithobjectsandwithourselvesisplacedessentiallybeyondourunderstanding,andwithinthegraspofreasononlyinsofarasreasonaffirmsboththe fundamentalityofitsowncategories(understoodasessentiallytranscendentof theempirical)andtheirownessentialinadequacytothetranscendentalrealm. ThisishowReason’spunitivecritiqueofitselfimposesonusthehumilityneeded toacknowledgetheincomprehensibletruthoftheworld,andofourselves withinit.
Eventhisbriefinitialsketchoftheramificationsoftheasceticidealgoesbeyond themapexplicitlyoutlinedinNietzsche’sthirdessayinvariousrespects.With respecttoart,hefocuseswithundiminishedfascinationonWagnerandhis explicitlyChristianlateopera Parsifal ,whilstatthesametimeexpressingthe strangelyunnuancedbeliefthatinthisdomaintheasceticidealmeanssomany differentthingsthat ‘itistantamounttonothing!’,andvowingtoputasideartists thereafter,because ‘theirpositionintheworldand against theworldisfarfrom sufficientlyindependentfortheirchangingvaluationsassuchtomeritour attention!Downtheagestheyhavebeenthevaletsofamoralityorphilosophy orreligion’ (GM,3.5).Nodoubtthisimageofthevaletismeanttoresonatewith hisconceptionoftheslaveoriginsoftheasceticideal;butthathardlyjustifies Nietzsche’stendencytooscillateherebetweenanundulyimpoverishedand vulnerablerangeofexamples(intruth,focusingonasingleworkbyoneartist whosesubjectmatterisChristian),andatendencytocarelessgeneralization (vergingonthetautological).
Thesamemightbesaidofhistreatmentofphilosophy:Nietzschefocuses primarilyonSchopenhauer,whoseextremitiesofmoralasceticismareaseasyto detectasistheChristianimportof Parsifal,andsohardlyseemtomeritthe applicationofasophisticatedhermeneuticsofsuspicion.MychoiceofKant respectsNietzsche’sownchoicebyfollowingSchopenhauer’sthinkingbackto itsfarmoresophisticatedsource,andbygivingthekindofaccountofKant thatNietzschehimselfprovidedin TheBirthofTragedy ;butthenonewonders
whyNietzschehimselfdidnotchoosetoconfrontamorechallengingopponent andexemplarinthiscontext.Hisaccountofscienceismorefocusedandpenetrating,andmyaccountfollowssomeofitscontours;butitisalsofrustratingly brief farshorterthanhisconsiderationofWagnerorofSchopenhauer.Instead, hepreferstolavishextensiveattentiononthe figurehecallstheasceticpriest.This hasthedefiniteadvantageofallowinghimtoelucidatehisinitialclaimthatthe hegemonyoftheasceticidealrevealsthathumanbeingsprefertowillnothingness thannottowill(GM,3.1);butontheotherhand,suchaclaimseemstofollow directlyfromconjoiningthethoughtthatmoralasceticismislife-denyingwiththe thoughtthatlife(bothhumanandnot)makesmanifestthewilltopower.Giving suchacentralroleinhisdiscussiontothe figureofapriestcertainlybetraysthe depthofhisconvictionthatafundamentallyreligiousphysiognomyunderliesthe maskofthescientistorartist thatwhatbeganasaspecificformofreligious moralityhasdiversi fiedandramifiedinwayswhichensurethatvariantsofthis asceticidealinnon-religiousguiseshavesubjugatedWesternEuropeanculture moregenerally;butithardlyhelpstojustifyit,andmayevenseemtohisreaders simplytobegthequestionhemeanstoraise.
Oneaimofthisbookis,accordingly,toexplorethepossibilityofsupplyinga moresustained,detailed,andwide-rangingjustificationofthatpremise anecessarilystillselectivebutperhapsmoresubstantialrevisionorextrapolationofthat lastandlongestessay,butonewhichtakestheformofthreeessayswritteninthe spiritoftheirsource(whichisofcourseinthe firstinstancethethirdessay,but sincethisinevitablyinvolvesthetwoothersthatmakeitpossible,itisnecessarily alsothe Genealogy aswhole)whilsttakingadvantageoftheenhancedrangeof culturalandthematicreferenceaffordedbymyhistoricalbelatedness.Thesethree essaysaccordinglysharethegenealogicalformandmethodofNietzsche’stext,as wellasthemorespecificstructuralfeaturesofitsindividualessays.Theyconstitute threerelativelyautonomousbutinternallyrelatedargumentativesequences,each ofwhichtakesitsbearingsfromtheoriginaryroleassignedtothepracticeof confessioninNietzche’sanalysisoftheunfoldingoftheasceticideal,byforegroundingdifferingmanifestationsofwhatonemightcallthehumancapacityto testify.The firstfocusesonbearingwitnessinreligion,morality,andart;the secondstudiesthemetaphysics,aesthetics,andethicsofselfhoodthroughthelens ofautobiographicaltestimony;andthethirdexaminestheconceptionsoftruth, perception,andembodimentthatareinherentinmodernmetaphysical,scientific, andcinematicattestationsofreality.
Despiteappearancestothecontrary,theyfollowasingle,evolvingconceptual thread(inthiscase,theconceptsofauthorityandrevelation);buttheyalsotrack morelocalthemesandexamplesacrossthedivisionsbetweentheindividualessays astheirtrajectoriesoverlap,branch,andloopback:someareexplicitly Nietzschean(truth,becoming,perspectivism),someperhapsnot(scepticism,modernism,technology).Ithaseventurnedoutthatmylastessay,likeNietzsche’s,is
alsosignifi cantlylongerthanitstwopredecessors(whichare,likeNietzsche’ s, morecloselycomparableinlength):inpart,thisisbecause,whereasmy equivalenttoNietzsche’sconcludingcitationofTertullianinhis firstessayisa discussionofoneWilliamGoldingnovel,andmyanaloguetohisstudyofthe practiceofpunishmentinessaytwoisastudyofthepracticeofautobiography, I findmyselfusingChristopherNolan’sentirebodyofcinematicworkasmy equivalentofNietzsche’spolemicinessaythreeaboutonelateWagneropera.
Ofcourse,IhopethattheinterestofsuchaprojectionofNietzsche’sprojectwill lienotonlyinitsindicatingtheseriousnesswithwhichhisclaimaboutthe pervasivenessofasceticvaluesshouldcontinuetobetakeninourcontemporary culturalcircumstances,butalsoinitsexposureoftheextenttowhichhisinitial linesofinterpretationandcriticismmayneedtoberefinedandqualifiedinorder togetagripontheirintendedtargets,andoftheresourcesthatmightaccordingly beavailableforthosetargetedtorespondtohisconcernsandcriticisms.Butthese furtheraspectsofmyprojectdependcriticallyuponappreciatingsomethingabout Nietzsche’sownrelationtothephenomenonheanalyseswhichmyinitialelaborationofhisthirdessaymakesall-but-evident thefactthatthegenealogical analysisthatheemploystocriticizetheasceticidealisitselfcaughtupinthe phenomenaitanalyses.
Bythis,Idon’tsimplymeantoregisterthatthemostlikelyresponsethathis critiquewillelicitfromitstargetistoacceptitasidentifying(nottheessential natureofslavemoralitybut)apossible,andaparticularlypainful,wayoffailingto liveuptoself-sacrificialidealstowhichgenuineadherentsofslavemoralityshould besensitive,andwhosedelineationshouldaccordinglybeanoccasionforgrateful acknowledgement.Thatwouldbeexactlythekindofself-abasing,masochistic neutralizationofhisworkthatNietzscheshouldsurelyexpect onemoreindicationoftheapparentlylimitlessextenttowhichhistargetcanturnexpressionsof lifeintofuelforthe fireoflife-denial.Mypoint,however,althoughrelated,is ratherdifferent.ItconcernsthefactthatNietzsche’sdeclaredprimaryconcernin the Genealogy istodisclosethetruthabout morepreciselythetruevalueof moralityingeneralandthewilltotruthinparticular;butthatmeansthathiswork isalate floweringofthatwilltotruth,morespecificallyamanifestationofthe pointatwhichitturnsuponitself,takingitsownmeasure atoncearadical unmaskingandafurtherexpressionofit.SothesubversivepurposeofNietzsche’ s genealogicalmethodisafurtherstepintheunfoldingofthelife-denying,sadomasochisticimpulseitaimstouproot.
Thismethodologicalperversityshouldnotbesurprisingtoanyonesensitiveto theperversityimplicitinthetriumphoftheslaverevolt,whichisthesinglemost successfulexerciseofthewilltopowerinhumanhistory,andsoamountstolife findingitsmosteffectiveexpressioninasystemofvaluesthatcondemnsthat whichpowersit.Inthisrespect,Nietzsche’sownexpressionofthewilltopower merelyreinforcesthemessageimplicitintheanalysisthatresultsfromit that
life,andsothewilltopowerassuch,issomehowinherentlyperverse,issuchasto deriveitsmostbaroque,sophisticated,andsuccessfulelaborationsofitselffrom theenergiesofitsmostintimateenemy,itsself-positedother.Butthemethodologicalexpressionofsuchperversityisnot,therefore,self-undermining asifthe onlyconclusionwecandrawfromitsunavoidableindebtednesstoitstopicand antagonististhatitsaspirationtodistanceusfromasceticismmustbeafantasy. Onthecontrary:insofarasitsucceedsintakingthefullmeasureofitssubject matterandsoofitself,itplotsitsownlimitsorconditions,andtherebyopensup thepossibilityofreconfiguringorotherwisegoingbeyondthem.
Afterall,ifthewilltotruth(andsothevariousramificationsoftheasceticideal thatitfacilitatesandconditions)reallymustbeunderstoodgenealogically,thenat anygivenpointitsvariouselementsorlayersofmeaningwillholdopenthe possibilityofreconfiguringitsinternalconstitutionandtherebyalteringitscurrentmodesofinforminganddeformingourformsoflife.Onemight,inother words,avoidtheself-subvertingdilemmaofeitherincoherentlydenyingtruthor slavishlyreinforcingtheasceticwilltotruth,andinstead findnon-asceticwaysof keepingfaithwithit,whichwillmeanreformingthatfaithinpotentiallysurprisingways waysinwhichwemightovercomeinterpretationsoftruth(notto mentionofrealityandoftheselfwhoseeksit)inwhichBeinghaspriorityover Becoming.
MyrevisionorextrapolationofNietzsche’sessayontheasceticidealisaccordinglydesignedtobeopentothepossibilityofsuchemancipatoryperversity. InseekingtosubstantiateNietzsche’sdiagnosisofourcultureasdominatedby theasceticideal,Iamalso andbytheverysametoken identifyingsitesand resourcesforthereconfigurationorovercomingofthatdominance.Forif Nietzscheisrightandtheasceticidealisatoncepervasiveandperverse,then onlyitsmostpureorelaborateexpressionscanhelpustoenvisageandimplement waysoflivingotherwise.
Acknowledgements
Incomposingthisbook,Ifoundmyselfneedingtodrawmoreextensivelythan usualonpreviouslypublishedwriting.Inpart,thisisduetothedesiretomakeits argumentsanddiscussionsrelativelyself-sufficient,andsocomprehensibleto anyonewhoreadsthisbookwithouthavinganyprioracquaintancewithmy work particularlywiththosepartsofitoriginallypublishedinrelativelyobscure locations.Inpart,itmirrorsNietzsche’stendencytoconjoinapplicationsofhis genealogicalmodeofthinkingandwritingwithrepeatedreturnstoandrevisions ofhisownearlierwriting(aconjunctionbetweenthegenealogicalandthe autobiographicalthatIattempttoaccountforinthisbook,particularlyinEssay Two).Inpart,itreflectsthefactthattheissueselaboratedhereareonesthatgo
backtomuchearlierinterestsandthoughts,sothatmypresentwaysoftreating themareinevitablyinformedbyaseriesofpriorelaborationsandprojectionsof thoseearlyintuitionswhoseexplicitacknowledgementmakesitmorelikelythat thecurrentprojectwillbeproperlygrasped.Inotherwords,thisbookhasa stronglypalimpsesticstructure;butIhopethatanyonefamiliarwithanyofthe earlierwritingsitincorporateswillalsoappreciatetheextenttowhichtheyhave beenrevisedforthepresentpurposes bycondensation,elaboration,excerption, dismemberment,andotherformsofrefinement andtheextenttowhichtheir relocationtothepresentcontext,andthesubstantialnewwritingitcontains, makessalientaspectsoftheirsignificancethatwerehithertoall-butimpossibleto detect(certainlybyme).
EssayOne
Thisessaydrawsupon:
Chapter2of TheWoundedAnimal:J.M.CoetzeeandtheDifficultyofRealityin LiteratureandPhilosophy (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2009);
‘TheWorkofSaintlyLove:TheReligiousImpulseinGaita’sWritings ’,in C.Cordner(ed.), Philosophy,EthicsandHumanity:EssaysinHonourof RaimondGaita (Oxford:Routledge,2011),21–36;
‘ANiceArrangementofEpigrams:StanleyCavellonSorenKierkegaard’,in K.Gjesdal(ed.), DebatesinNineteenthCenturyEuropeanPhilosophy:Essential ReadingsandContemporaryResponses (Oxford:Routledge,2016),248–57;
‘TheWellisNottheWorld:WilliamGolding’sSenseofRealityin Darkness Visible’,inA.FalcatoandA.Cardiello(eds.), PhilosophyintheConditionof Modernism (London:Palgrave,2018),325–54.
EssayTwo
Thisessaydrawsupon:
‘AutobiographyandBiography’,inR.Eldridge(ed.), TheOxfordHandbookof PhilosophyandLiterature (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2009),180–98;
‘Quartet:Wallace’sWittgenstein,Moran’sAmis’,in TheSelfandItsShadows: ABookofEssaysonIndividualityasNegationinPhilosophyandtheArts (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2013),283–319.
Thisessaydrawsupon:
