Acknowledgements
Thisbookhasbeenalongtimeinthemaking.Itbeganasaseriesofconversations betweenusin2012.WewerebothlivinginParisatthetimeandourshared interestintherelationshipbetweentechnocracyandpopulismwasexploredinthe cafésandbarsthatliebetweentheInstitutd’EtudesPolitiquesandtheSaintSulpiceChurch.Theconversationevolvedintoanintellectualprojectandeventuallyabook.ThebulkoftheworkhasbeendoneoncewehadleftParis,oneofus toNewYorkandtheothertoCambridge.
Itiscustomaryinsharedwritingprojectsofthiskindtodivideuptheworkand tothinkintermsof ‘ my ’ chaptersand ‘ your ’ chapters.Thisisnotthewaywehave writtenthisbook.Thecontentswereworkedoutinlongdaysofintensive discussions,onceinCambridgeandafewtimesinNewYork.Thejobofdrafting oneoranotherchapterwasdividedup,butsubsequentrevisionshavemade itimpossibletoreallyidentifyanypartofthebookas ‘mine’ or ‘ yours ’.This experienceofthinkingandwritingtogetherhasbeenexhilarating.Our firstand principalacknowledgementistoeachotherandtooursharedwillingnesstopush thelimitsofourthinking.Wehaveaspiredabovealltoreachwhatwefeltwasthe rightargument,whereverthatmightleadus.
WewouldliketothankDominicByattatOxfordUniversityPress,whohas beenanexemplaryeditor.Hemovedquicklyatthebeginningtogiveusthe encouragementweneeded.Hethengaveusthetimetodevelopourideas,pushing gentlyandeventuallylettingusmovealongatourownpace.Thebookwouldnot havebeenpossiblehaditnotbeenforhissupportand(nearinfinite)patienceover theyears.
Theideasinthisbookhavebeenarticulatedbyusinanumberofdifferent settings.Attimeswepresentedthemtogether,atothertimesseparately.Wewould liketothankthefollowingcolleaguesandinstitutions:aconferenceattheLondon SchoolofEconomics,organizedbyLeaYpiandJonthanWhite,wherewe presentedtheearliestversionofourargument;theCentreforEuropeanStudies atSciencesPo,Paris,andtheirinvitationtopresentourideasattheCentre’ s generalseminar,wherewereceivedsternbutencouragingcommentsfromColin Hay;theDepartmentofPoliticsandInternationalStudies(POLIS)atthe UniversityofCambridge,wherethebook’smainargumentwaspresentedas partofthedepartmentalseminarseries;theHertieSchoolofGovernmentin BerlinandClausOffeandIraKatznelsonfortheirinvitationthere;theMoynihan InstituteofGlobalAffairsatSyracuseUniversityandGlynMorganforhis invitation;theExecutiveVice-RectorshipoftheUniversityofGuadalajaraand
MelissaAmezcuaYepizforherinvitation;theYaleUniversityPoliticalTheory WorkshopandGiuliaOskianforherinvitation;theRifkindCenterforthe HumanitiesandtheArtsatTheCityCollegeofNewYorkandMikhalDekel andAndreasKillenfortheirinvitation;theThomaeSmithiAcademaemeetingat Queens’ College,Cambridge;andtheEuropeanpoliticsseminarattheCentrefor EuropeanStudies,HarvardUniversity,andArtGoldhammerinparticularforhis invitation.
Weareveryfortunatetohaveagroupofgenerouscolleaguesandfriendswho acceptedtoparticipateinamanuscriptworkshoporganizedatTheCityCollegeof NewYorkinFebruary2020.Thisworkshopwasaremarkableexperienceof intellectualexchangewhichservedtoironoutagreatnumberofimperfections inthemanuscript.Itremainsfarfromperfect,buttheworkshopwascrucialin helpingusrefineandmoreclearlyarticulateourclaims.Wewouldliketothank SheriBerman,PabloBustinduyAmador,SandiptoDasgupta,NicolasGuilhot, RajanMenon,JonathanWhite,andIanZuckermanfortheirparticipationinthat workshop.Wewouldalsoliketothankagroupofscholarswhocametogetherin May2019,onceagainatCityCollege,todiscussour firstconceptualchapter, alongsidetheirownworkonrelatedthemes.TheseareCarlosdelaTorre,Lisa Disch,GiuliaOskian,MariaPaulaSaffon,andNadiaUrbinati.
Finally,aswithanybook,wehaveeachincurredalonglistofpersonaldebts. I(ChristopherBickerton)wouldliketothankPhilipCunliffe,AlexGourevitch, LeeJones,andPeterRamsayfortheirintellectualinputintotheideasdevelopedin thisbook.Iwouldalsoliketothankmybrilliantgroupofdoctoralstudents,some ofwhomhavebeentheresincethewritingonthisbookbegan.JosePiquer,Daniel Smith,andAntonJägerhavebeenagreatsourceofsupport,andithasbeena delighttoobservethedevelopmentoftheirownprojectswhichintersectin variouswayswithsomeofthethemesofthisbook.Iwouldliketothank RichardNicklforintroducingmeto TheLimeWorks byThomasBernard, whichprovedthebestantidotetowriter’sblock,andtoDanielBeer,forthe conversationstowardstheendofthewritingprocess.
Thebookitselfwas finishedduringtheCoronaviruslockdowninthespringof 2020.Finishingbooksarepainfulatthebesttimes.Thisonewas finishedthrough boutsofwritingintheearlymorning,beforeanyonewasawake.Amidstallthe worryandanxiety,myabidingmemoryofthesedaysarethelongwalkswithMati throughtheemptycityofCambridge,animatedbystoriesoftreasurehuntsand fairiesthatwouldlastforhours,andthesoundofEmaandMaticonducting scienceexperimentsinthebackgarden,astheirlaughterwasjoinedbythesounds ofthebirdsintheparkbeyond.Mygreatestdebtistomywife,Ema,anddaughter Mati,forthenever-endingjoytheybringtomylife.
I(CarloInvernizziAccetti)would firstofallliketothankmydepartment colleaguesatTheCityCollegeofNewYorkforbeingthebestthingthathappened tomesincethebeginningofmyprofessionalcareer;andinparticularRichard
Bernsteinforbeingatruefriend,aswellasagreatcolleagueandneighbour,for sharinghisloveofbookswithme,andbeingalwayswillingtoengageinany Pindaric flightoffancy,inhissimultaneouslyplayfulandseriousway;Bruce Croninforhisinfectiousgoodhumourandforbeingthebackboneofour department,withhiselasticbandsandquestionablejokes;RajanMenonfor beingamentoraswellasacolleague,hisenduringsupportandwisdom,aswell asprobingcommentsonanearlierversionofthemanuscript,whichhelpedclarify itindecisiveways;andDanDiSalvoforbeingagreatChair,aswellasagood friend,aconstantsourceofinspirationandadvice,andamodelintheartofliving. OthercolleaguesandfriendsIoweanenduringdebtofgratitudeto,forsharing theirideaswithmeandforconstantsupportandadvice,include:SheriBerman, FrançoisCarrelBilliard,LisaDisch,NicolasGuilhot,FlorenceHaegel,Lavie Margolin,Jan-WernerMüller,NadiaUrbinati,andJonathanWhite.
Amongstmypersonalfriends,IwouldliketothankPabloBustinduyAmador, JoshuaCraze,SandiptoDasgupta,LucaFalciola,ZeliaGallo,AlexGourevitch, AmanaFontanella-Khan,JamesFontanella-Khan,ClaraMattei,GiuliaOskian, FedericoPoggianti,FrancescoRonchi,TomTheuns,andFabioWolkensteinfor theinfiniteconversationswhicharethetruegroundandintellectuallifebloodof alltheideasIhavecontributedtothisbook.Iwouldalsoliketothankbothmy parents,EmanueleInvernizziandConsueloAccetti,fortheirundyingloveand guidance,whichismorethanacompassandadrive:itfeelslikeasetofwings,as DanteexplainsmuchbetterintheverseIliftedfromhimtodedicatethebookto mymother.Finally,IthankBrittanyHuckabee,thewomanIlove,forsharing virtuallyeverymomentinthewritingofthisbookwithme,forcontributing decisivelytomanyofitsideas,butalsoforthewarmthandjoyyouhavebrought tomylife,andthepromiseofmore.
ChristopherJ.Bickerton Cambridge,UK
CarloInvernizziAccetti
NewYork
Introduction
Weshallneverunderstandpoliticsuntilweknowwhatthestruggle isabout.
Schattschneider(1960:vii)
Youhaveanewdimensioninpoliticstoday...Itisnotaseasyaswhen youhasdaleft-rightscaleonwhichyoucouldplotpoliticalchoices.Itis notnecessarilyachaoticsystem,butanewpoliticallandscapeistaking shape...Wearegoingtoseeitformanyyears.
HansWallmark,centre-rightSwedishMP, quotedinHall(2019)
MakingSenseofthePresent
What’swrongwithcontemporarydemocracy?Thatsomethingisgoingonshould beevidenttoall.Manylong-establishedpartiesareinterminaldecline.Others havedisappearedaltogether.Partysystemsarebeingtransformedbeyondrecognitionasnewpoliticalactorsandpartytypesemerge.Thelinesofconflictand strugglethatstructuredpoliticalcompetitionappearincreasinglyblurred.Doubts proliferateaboutwhetherexistingdemocraticregimesareabletosustaintheir basicvalues.Citizensarebecomingincreasinglydissatis fied,notjustwithspecific politicalactorsandorganizations,butalsowiththedemocraticorderitself.
Theideathatdemocracyissomehowin ‘crisis’ hasbecomecommonplace. However,thecategoriesusedtodescribeandinterpretthiscrisishavesofar remainedprimarily negative,inthattheyfocusonwhatisfadingawayorbeing activelyundermined.Wehavebeentoldthatweliveina ‘post-democratic’ age (Crouch2003),that ‘theageofpartydemocracyhaspassed’ (Mair2013),andthat representativedemocracyisbeing ‘disfigured’ (Urbinati2014).Accordingto some,democracymayevenbe ‘dying’ (LevitskyandZiblatt2018)orclosetoits ‘end’ (Runciman2018).
Ifacrisissignalsthetransitionfromonestateofaffairstoanother,thenit necessarilymeansleavingsomethingbehind.Thisproliferationofnegativeimages isthereforeunderstandableandhighlightsanumberofimportanttendencies atworkincontemporarydemocraticregimes.Whatremainsisthechallengeof delineatingthecontoursofthenewtypeofpoliticsthatisreplacingwhatisbeing
Technopopulism:TheNewLogicofDemocraticPolitics. ChristopherJ.BickertonandCarloInvernizziAccetti, OxfordUniversityPress(2021).©ChristopherJ.BickertonandCarloInvernizziAccetti. DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198807766.003.0001
leftbehind.Thisbook’sambitionistodevelopasetof positive conceptual categoriesforunderstandingthepresentcrisisofdemocracy.Wedonotmean positiveinthesenseof ‘good’ ratherthan ‘bad’ butinthesenseofdescribingand explainingwhatdoesexistandhowitworks.
Whatweareobservingisneitherthe ‘end’ northe ‘death’ ofdemocracybut ratheratransformationinthelogicofpoliticalcompetition within existing democraticregimes.Byandlarge,democraticordershaveprovedmoreresilient thansomeofthedirestpredictionsmadeoverthepastfewyearswouldhavehad it.Thisistrueatleastintheminimalsensethatelectionsandbasicrightsremain mostlyinplace,anditseemspossibletoreplaceincumbentsbyconstitutionally guaranteedmeans.Nevertheless,thewayinwhichpoliticalactorsoperatewithin theseconstitutionalframeworks,andthesortsofoutcomesgeneratedbyour politicalsystems,havebeenprofoundlytransformed.
Formostofthehistoryofmoderndemocracy,politicalcompetitionwas structuredprimarilybytheleft/rightideologicaldivide.Thismeantthatcandidatesforofficecompetedwithoneanotherbyproposingalternativevisionsofthe wayinwhichsocietyoughttobegoverned,whichencapsulateddifferentvalue systemsandrivalinterestswithinit.Althoughthismodeofpoliticalcompetition hasnotentirelydisappeared,ithasbeenoverlain andtosomeextentreplaced byanewlogic,wherebycandidatesforofficecompeteprimarilyintermsofrival claimstoembodythe ‘people’ asawholeandtopossessthenecessarycompetence fortranslatingitswillintopolicy.Populismandtechnocracyhavetherefore becomethemainstructuringpolesofcontemporarydemocraticpolitics.
Therelationshipbetweenpopulismandtechnocracyisnotthesameasthat betweenleftandright.Sincethelatterarerootedinconflictingvaluesystemsand interestgroupswithinsociety,theyaresubstantivelyatoddswithoneanother.In contrast,becausetheyabstractfromsubstantiveinterestsandpolicycommitments,populismandtechnocracyarebetterunderstoodas modesofpolitical action,whichcanbecombinedwithoneanotherinmultipleandcreativeways. Manycontemporarypoliticalactorsandorganizationsturnouttodisplaythe characteristicfeaturesofboth.Thissuggeststhatthemostsalientdifferences betweenthemainprotagonistsonthecontemporarypoliticalscenedonotliein theirsubstantiveideologicalprofilesbutratherinthespecificwayinwhichthey combine bothpopulistandtechnocratictraitswithoneanother.
Twoaspectsofthisoverarchingthesisareworthhighlighting,sincetheyimply significanttransformationsinthewaycontemporarydemocraticpolitics and especiallytheroleofpopulismandtechnocracywithinit areunderstood.First, wearesuggestingthatpopulismandtechnocracyshouldnotbeseenmerelyas characteristicfeaturesofaspeci ficcategoryofactors,whichcanbeseparatedfrom andheldinoppositionto ‘mainstream’ politicians.Instead,theyhavebecome constitutiveelementsofanewpoliticalgrammar orlogic thataffectsthe behaviourof all politicalactorsincontemporarydemocraticregimes.Aswewill
seewithreferencetomanyspecificexamples,evenpoliticalactorswhoclaimto wanttostandagainstpopulismortechnocracy(orboth),ultimatelyendup assumingsomeoftheircharacteristicfeatures.Thisisbecauseofthecomplex systemofpoliticalincentivesandconstraintstheyarenowfacedwith.
Thesecondimportantpointisthat,withinthisnewpoliticallogic,populism andtechnocracydonotfunctionmerelyasoppositesofoneanother.Eventhough appealstothepopularwillandtocompetenceareoftenrhetoricallydeployed againsteachother,thereisalsoadeepaffinitybetweenthem,whichconsistsinthe factthattheyarebothunmooredfromtherepresentationofspecificvaluesand interestswithinsocietyandthereforeadvancean unmediatedconceptionofthe commongood,intheformeitherofamonolithicconceptionofthe ‘popularwill’ orthespecificconceptionofpolitical ‘truth’ technocratsclaimtohaveaccessto. Thissetsbothpopulismandtechnocracyatoddswiththetraditionalconception ofpartydemocracyasasystemof ‘regulatedrivalry’ betweencompetingsocial interestsandvaluesthatareallinprincipleequallylegitimate(Rosenblum2008).
Theconceptweproposetocapturethissetofdevelopmentsisthatof technopopulism,definedasanewlogicofpoliticalactionbasedonthecombinationof populistandtechnocratictraits.Bythiswemeanthatcontemporarypolitical actorsfaceanewsystemofincentivesandconstraintswhichpushesthemtoadopt bothpopulistandtechnocraticmodesofdiscourseandorganization,atthesame timeastheybecomeincreasinglyunmooredfromtherepresentationofparticular interestsandvalueswithinsociety.Whilethisdoesn’tnecessarilyspellthe ‘end’ of democracyassuch sinceformaldemocraticproceduresremainlargelyin place itprofoundlyalterstheir modusoperandi,aswellasthepoliticaloutcomes theyleadto.
Thisbooktracesthecontoursofthetechnopopulistlogic,butalsosetsitselfthe taskofexaminingitshistoricalorigins,likelyconsequences,andnormativeimplications.Itprovidesthe firstcomprehensivetheoryoftechnopopulismasthenew structuringlogicofcontemporarydemocraticpolitics.
CombiningPopulismandTechnocracy
Wesubstantiatetheoverarchingthesesabovewithreferencetoafewillustrative examples.Apoliticallogicasweproposetodefineit thatis,asystemofpolitical incentivesandconstraints isvisibleprincipallythroughitseffects.Forthis reason,wefocusonthediscursivepatternsandorganizationalformsadoptedby anumberofpoliticalactorsinourprimaryareaoffocus,whichisWestern Europe.Wealsodiscussthewayinwhichsomeofthemostlong-standingpolitical parties suchastheBritishLabourParty haveadaptedandchangeddiscursively andorganizationally,inlinewiththetechnopopulistpoliticallogic.However,the mainfocusisonanumberofnewpoliticalpartiesthatarecurrentlyinpowerin
France,Italy,andSpain.Theadvantageoffocusingonrelativelynewpolitical partiesisthattheydisplaythestructuralconditionsthatshapecontemporary politicalactioninapurer andthereforestarker way.
TheItalianFiveStarMovement(M5S)isacaseinpoint.Foundedin2009by thepopularItalianbloggerandcomedianBeppeGrillo,togetherwiththelesser knownmediastrategistandinternetguru,GianrobertoCasaleggio,itquickly asserteditselfasoneofthemainstaysofcontemporaryItalianpolitics.By2013 ithadalreadyobtainedthelargestshareofvotescomparedtoanyothernational party,andsince2018ithasconsistentlyparticipatedingovernmentcoalitionsasa seniorpartner firstwiththefar-right LegaNord andthenwiththecentre-left PartitoDemocratico.Fromthestart,ithasbeenevidenttocommentatorsthatthe M5Sconstitutesanovelpoliticalphenomenon,whichisdifficulttocharacterizein termsofthetraditionalleft/rightdivide.Itexplicitlychallengestherelevanceof thoseconceptualcategories,claimingtostand ‘aboveandbeyond’ theleft/right distinction.Bothitssubstantivepolicycommitmentsandsociologicalbasesof supportconstitutean ‘eclecticmix’ which ‘cutsacrosstraditionalideological divisions’ (Tronconi2015).
Thelabelthathasbeenmostoftenemployedtodescribeitisthatof ‘populism ’ , sincetheM5Sdoesindeeddisplaymanycharacteristicfeaturesofthewaythis notionisordinarilydefined fromtheantagonisticrhetoricopposing ‘thepeople’ toanevilandcorrupt ‘elite’ uptotheconcentrationofpowerwithinaleadership figureclaimingadirectrelationshipofembodimentwithordinaryvotersthat bypassesordinarybodies(Mudde2004;Müller2016;Urbinati2019).Yet,another setofdistinctivefeaturesthatisattherootoftheM5S’srecentpoliticalsuccesshas sofarreceivedlessattention,namelyitsdistinctivelytechnocraticconceptionof politics.Thisismanifestedbyitsclaimtooffermorecompetentandeffective governmentthantraditionalpoliticalparties,invirtueofthe ‘collectiveintelligence ’ itisabletoharnessthroughitsonlinedecision-makingtools.Differently fromtraditionalpoliticalparties,theM5Sisnotheldtogetherbyaspecificsetof contestablevalues,nordoesitclaimtorepresenttheinterestsofanyclearly identifiablesocialgroup.Instead,itpresentsitselfasaninstrumentforimproving thequalityofpublicpolicybyrelyingontheorganizationalpoweroftheWorld WideWebasawayofpoolingthediffusecompetenceofordinarycitizens (BordignonandCeccarini2013;BickertonandInvernizziAccetti2018).
Forthisreason,wesuggestthattheM5Sisbestunderstoodasmanifestinga particularcombinationofbothpopulistandtechnocraticfeatures,whichwe describeasamountingtoaformof ‘technopopulismfrombelow’.Inthisparticularmanifestationoftechnopopulism,ordinarycitizensarenotapprehendedas bearersofsubjectiveinterestsorvalues,butratherascarriersofaspecific competenceorexpertise,whichcanbeputintheserviceoftherestofsociety throughthemeansoftheweb.Itisprimarilyasindividual ‘experts’,capableof collectivelyformulatingbetterpolicy,thatthepeopleareopposedtoapolitical
elite,representedaseitherincompetentorintheserviceofspecialinterests.In turn,thisformula’ssuccessdemonstratesthepowerfulappealofapoliticaloffer basedonthecombinationofpopulistandtechnocraticelementsinthepresent politicallandscape.
AnothersalientexampleisEmmanuelMacron’ s LaRépubliqueEnMarche (LREM).Althoughthispoliticalmovementhasbothsoughttopresentitselfand oftenbeeninterpretedasapoliticalnemesis andindeedabulwark against populistmovementssuchastheItalianM5S,oncloserinspectionitturnsoutto displaymanyofthesamecharacteristicfeatures.LREMwasoriginallycreatedin March2016afteritsfutureleader(whohadpreviouslyservedasaMinisterin FrançoisHollande’sSocialistgovernment)launcheda ‘GreatMarch’ across France.Thiswasessentiallya ‘fact- findingmission ’,throughwhichatightly knitgroupofpolicyspecialistsandpublicopinionexpertssoughttoestablish whattheFrenchelectoratewantedmost.InMacron’sowntelling,thetwomain findingsofthisendeavourwerethatFrenchcitizensweredeeplydissatisfiedwith the ‘politicalestablishment’ andthattheyweremoreinterestedinasetof ‘consensualpolicygoals’—suchas ‘improvinglivingstandards’ and ‘preserving publicorderandsecurity’—thaninpursuinganyideologicallyconnotedpolitical projects(Macron2016).
LREMwascreatedasaself-consciousattempttorespondtothesetwospecific setsofdemands.Assuch,itspopulistandtechnocratictraitswereconstitutive featuresofLREM.ThepopulistcomponentisevidentinMacron’sclaimtorun againsttheFrench ‘politicalestablishment’,eventhough,likemanyotherpopulist leaders,heisinrealityamemberofthatsameestablishment.Wealsoseeit inthehighdegreeofpersonalizationandconcentrationofpoweraroundthe figureofMacronhimself.Asnumerouscommentatorsimmediatelypointed out,itwasnocoincidencethattheacronymforLREM’ s firstincarnationas En Marche! alsocorrespondedtotheinitialsofitsfounderandundisputedleader, EmmanuelMacron.Atthesametime,Macronhascultivatedacharacteristicallytechnocraticimageofhimselfasacompetentandeffectivecaretakerofthe commoninterest,whoiscapableof ‘achievingresults’,uninhibitedbyanyideologicalpreconceptions.
LREM’ssynthesisbetweenpopulistandtechnocratictraitsoccursinarather differentwaycomparedtotheItalianM5S.Inthelattercase,populismand technocracyarefusedtogetherbythegoalofharnessing ‘collectiveintelligence’ throughtheWorldWideWeb.InthecaseofLREM,thesynthesisoccursinthe personofMacronhimself,whoispresentedasanembodimentoftheFrench people’saspirationforpoliticalchangewhilealsoconstruedasacompetentand effective ‘doer’,possessingthenecessarydynamismandexpertisetodelivergood policies.Forthisreason,wesuggestthatLREMisbestunderstoodasmanifesting aformof ‘technopopulismfromabove’,whichrevolvesaroundtheleadership figureofMacronhimself,ratherthantheM5S’snotionofthe ‘citizen-expert’ .
Nevertheless,thesimultaneouselectoralsuccessofthesetwopoliticalforcesin ItalyandFranceclearlydemonstratesabroaderstructuraltendencyforcontemporarypoliticalactorstoadoptsomecombinationofbothpopulistandtechnocraticfeatures,attheexpenseofmoresubstantiveideologicalorientationsalong thetraditionalleft/rightaxis.
AthirdillustrativeexampleisofferedbySpain ’ s Podemos.Thisisamore complexcasethantheothertwowehaveconsideredbecause Podemos hasa markedideologicalprofi leontheleft/rightspectrum.Bothitsleadershipandthe vastmajorityofitselectorateissuefromanexplicitlyleft-leaningpolitical history.Itspatternofalliances bothwithintheEuropeanParliamentandthe Spanishnationalassembly con firmitsleft-leaningorientation.Andyet,itis impossibletounderstand Podemos’ s risetopoliticalprominencesince2014,and itstransformativeimpactupontheSpanishpartysystem,withouttakinginto accountthestrengthofitsappealongroundsotherthanitssubstantiveideologicalcommitments.
Thepartywasfoundedonwhatitsleadersdescribedasa ‘populisthypothesis’ Accordingtothishypothesis, ‘thetraditionalideologicalcategoriesof “left” and “right” havebecomehistoricallyexhausted’ andanewdimensionofpolitical confrontationoughttobecreatedbetween ‘thepeople’ or ‘democracy’ ,onone hand,and ‘elites’ or ‘lacasta’ ontheother(Errejon2014).Thisdiscursivestrategy wasredoubledbyacharacteristicallypopulistmodeoforganization,which revolvesaround ‘aleadership figurewithahighrecognitionfactor’,inPablo Iglesias’sownself-description(Iglesias2015).Atthesametime, Podemos has alsoalwayscultivatedadistinctivelytechnocraticimageofitselfasa ‘partidode profesores’ offeringcompetentandpragmaticsolutionstoSpain’spoliticalproblems(DeAzua2014).Thisdimensionhasbeenmanifestedmostclearlyinthe party’srecurrentinsistencethatitspolicyproposalsareultimatelyrootedin ‘ commonsense ’ . Podemos wentasfarasmodellingoneofitselectoralmanifesto programmesonanIkeacatalogue,themessagebeingthatthepartywasintouch withthehabitsof ‘ordinaryvoters’ whilstalsoofferingpoliciesthatwereasselfevidentastheinstructionsprovidedtoputapieceofIkeafurnituretogether.Inits othermanifestoes, Podemos emphasizeditsappealtocompetencebyaskingneutral ‘independentexperts’ tovalidatethem(BickertonandInvernizzi-Accetti2018).
Forthisreason,wesuggestthat Podemos isbestunderstoodasa ‘hybrid’ caseof technopopulism,manifestingbothaleft-leaningpoliticalidentityandaparticular combinationofpopulistandtechnocraticelements.Inaprivatecommunication, oneofthefoundersofthispoliticalmovement theformerEuropeanpolitical coordinatorandmemberoftheSpanishParliament,PabloBustinduyAmador suggestedthatboththesefeatures i.e.itspopulistandtechnocratictraits were self-consciouslyadoptedbytheparty’sleadershipbecausetheywerethoughttobe necessarytostandachanceofgainingpoliticalpowerandthereforeimplementing itssubstantivelyleft-leaningpoliticalagenda.
Preciselybecauseofitshybridity, Podemos offersapowerfulillustrationofthe concreteeffectsofwhatwehavecalledthetechnopopulistlogiconthepublic discourseandmodeofpoliticalorganizationofcontemporarycontendersfor power.Evenapartywiththeintentionofadvancinganideologicallyconnoted politicalagendafacesapowerfulsetofincentivestoadoptsomecombinationof populistandtechnocraticformsofdiscourseandmodesofpoliticalorganization. Thatispreciselywhatwemeanwhenweclaimthatpopulismandtechnocracy havebecometheconstitutiveelementsofanewpoliticallogic,whichisinpart replacingandinpartsuperimposingitselfonthetraditionalleft/rightdivide.
TheNoveltyofTechnopopulism
Anobjectionthatmightberaisedatthispointisthatthephenomenonweare claimingtouncoverisnotthatnovelorsurprising.Afterall,haven’tallcontenders forelectedofficeinthehistoryofmoderndemocracyalwaysclaimedtorepresent theinterestsofthe ‘people ’ asawholeandtopossessthenecessarycompetence fortranslatingitswillintopolicy?Ourresponseisthattheapparentubiquityof thetechnopopulistpoliticallogicinthepresentpoliticallandscapeshouldnot obscureitshistoricalspecifi city.Ifwecomparetheinstancesoftechnopopulism wehavementionedabovewiththemoretraditionalideologicalpartiesthat populatedtheWestEuropeanpoliticallandscapethroughoutmostofthetwentieth century,significantdifferencesemerge.
Tobeginwith,itisworthnotingthatnotallpoliticalpartieshavealways appealedtothe ‘people’ asagroundforpoliticallegitimacyandelectoralsupport. BothfamiliesofmainstreampoliticalpartiesthatdominatedtheWestEuropean politicallandscapeintheaftermathoftheSecondWorldWar i.e.Social Democratsonthecentre-leftandChristianDemocratsonthecentre-right construedthemselvesasthepoliticalexponentsofaspecific part ofsociety:the workingclassinthecaseofSocialDemocratsandChristiansinthecaseof ChristianDemocrats.Bothofthesepartyfamiliesdidsometimesarguethatthe particularinterestsandvaluesofthespeci ficclassorgrouptheyclaimedto representalsocorrespondedtothegeneralinterestofsocietyasawhole,butthis yieldedaverydifferentconceptionofthegeneralinterestcomparedtothenotion ofthe ‘popularwill’ implicitinpopulistclaimstorepresentthepeopleasawhole. AsMauriceDuvergernotedinhisclassicdiscussionofmodernmassparties,they offereda ‘particularinterpretationofthecommongood’,rootedinaspeci ficsetof valuesandinterests,whichinvolvesarecognitionofthelegitimacyofother competinginterpretations(Duverger1954).Incontrast,ahallmarkofpopulist discourseistheclaimto ‘exclusiverepresentation ’ ofthepopularwill,whichleaves littleornospacefortherecognitionofthelegitimacyofpoliticalopponents (Müller2016).
Somethingsimilarcanbesaidofthecurrentlypervasiveappealstocompetence orexpertiseasgroundsforpoliticallegitimacy.Duringtheearlyandmiddleparts ofthetwentiethcentury,suchappealswerefarlessprominentinpoliticaldiscoursethantheyaretoday.Thiswasbecauseofthesubstantiveideologicalconflict thatexistedbetweentraditionalmassparties.Inasituationinwhichthereis deepdisagreementoverthe ends ofpoliticalaction,itmakeslittlesenseto presentoneselfascompetentatachievingresultsordeliveringon ‘good’ public policy.Whatisatstake,andwhatisbeingdebated,ispreciselywhatconstitutes ‘good’ publicpolicyinthe fi rstplace.Thus,foralargepartofthehistoryofthe twentiethcentury,claimstocompetenceandexpertiseonlyreallyhadtraction inintra-partyorcoalitionstruggles,wherethemainsubstantivepoliticalquestions couldbeassumedtohavebeenalreadysettled.Inappealingtovotersatlarge, candidatesforofficetendedtopresentthemselvesaschampionsofparticular interestsandvaluesystems,andfarlessasideologicallyneutralpurveyorsof ‘good’ publicpolicy.
Thecurrentpoliticalsalienceofclaimstocompetenceandexpertiseispossible onlybecauseofthegradualclosure oratleastshrinking oftheideological horizon,asfundamentaldisagreementsoverthewayinwhichsocietyoughtto beranhavebeenincreasinglymarginalized.Likethepopulistappealstothe ‘people’ asawhole,technocraticclaimstocompetenceorexpertiseasgrounds forpoliticallegitimacycouldonlyreallybecomeasdominantastheyaretodayto theextentthatideologicallydrivenconflictsofinterestandvaluerecededintothe background.
Whatwecallthetechnopopulistpoliticallogicisthereforeahistoricallyspecific phenomenon.Inprinciple,theremightalwayshavebeenanincentivefordemocraticpoliticalactorstopresentthemselvesasrepresentativesofthe ‘people’ asa whole,andtoclaimtohavethenecessarycompetencefortranslatingitswillinto policy,butthehistoricalrecordindicatesthatthiswasnotthecase.Whenelectoral competitionwasstructuredprimarilyaroundideologicalconfrontation,populism andtechnocracywerefarlesssalientasmodesofpoliticalaction.Whatrequires explanationisthattodaythesemodesofactionhavebecomesoomnipresentthat ithasbecomedifficulttoimagineatimewhentheywerenotso.Thatisprecisely whatthisbooksetsouttodo.
TheSeparationofSocietyandPolitics
Theexplanationweprovidefortheriseoftechnopopulismasthemainstructuring logicofcontemporarydemocraticpoliticsfocusesonthecomplexevolutionofthe relationshipbetweensocietaldivisionsandpartisanpoliticsoverthecourseof thepastcenturyorso.Duringthe firstfewdecadesofthetwentiethcentury that is,attheheightofwhatweproposetocallthe ‘eraoftheideologicalpolitical
logic’—societyandpoliticsweretiedtooneanotherbyavarietyofpowerful instancesofmediationbetweenthem,suchasmassparties,butalsotradeunions, civicassociations,religiousorganizations,andtheinformationandopinion media.ThiswasreflectedinwhatSeymourMartinLispetandSteinRokkan havefamouslycalledthe ‘cleavagestructure’ ofmid-centuryEuropeanpolitics: politicalpartieswereeffectivelytheexpressionofunderlyingsocialgroups, definedbydifferencesofinterestandvalue(LipsetandRokkan1967).
Overthecourseoftheensuingdecades,thistightrelationshipofcorrespondencebetweensocietaldivisionsandpartisanpoliticsprogressivelybrokedown. Onereasonforthiswastheerosionofthesocialformationsandgroupsthatwere thebasisfortheestablishedsociopoliticalcleavages.Thiserosionoccurredbecause of transformationsintheeconomicstructure (whichunderminedthetraditional classdistinctionbetween ‘proletariat’ and ‘bourgeoisie’),anoverarchingprocessof secularization (whichdiminishedthesalienceofthedistinctionbetweenreligious andnon-religiouscitizens),andageneralizedprocessof cognitivemobilization (whichtendedtoproducemorehomogenousnationalcultures,acrosspreviously distinctlocalitiesandsocio-economicgroups).
Thetranslationofthiserosionofsocialgroupformationsintopoliticswasslow, uneven,andindirect.Partysystemsoriginatingintheideologicaldivisionsofthe firstfewdecadesofthetwentiethcenturyremained ‘frozen’ inplacelongafterthe societiesoverwhichtheygovernedhadchangedprofoundly(LipsetandRokkan 1967:50).Theresultofthisoverarchingprocessofseparationbetweensocietyand politicswasahollowingoutoftheexistingmechanismsofintermediationbetween them.AsRichardKatzandPeterMairfamouslyobserved,politicalparties respondedtotheirprogressivelossoffootholdinsocietybyretreatingintothe state,colludingratherthancompetingwithoneanothertosharethebenefitsof publicoffice(KatzandMair1995).Tradeunions,religiousorganizations,and othercivicassociationsretreatedintotheprivatesphere,defendingparticular interestsandvalues,butsheddingtheirbroaderorientationtowardsthecommon good(Putnam2000).Eventhoughtheseinstancesofpoliticalmediation remained,theywereincreasinglydisconnectedfromeachother,exacerbating theexistingchasmbetweensocietyandpolitics.
Thesebroadsociopoliticaltransformationshadanimportanteffectonthe incentivesandconstraintsfacedbypoliticalactors.Intheabsenceofthesocial groupsandcommunitiesdefinedbytheirdistinctiveworldviews,electoralcontendersforpublicofficewereencouragedtotonedownideologicaldistinctions andconflictsofvalue,focusinginsteadontheircapacitytogovern ‘responsibly’ . Politicalpartiesthatdonotcompetewithoneanotherforspecificsectorsofthe electorate,butrathercolludewitheachothertosharethebenefitsofpublicoffice, aremorelikelytoappearlegitimateintheeyesoftheelectorateiftheycanclaimto deliver ‘good’ policies.Bythesametoken,however,thisprocessof ‘cartelization’ openedawindowofopportunityforpoliticaloutsiderstogainelectoraladvantage
bychallengingthecollusionofmainstreampoliticalpartiesitselfthroughaclaim torepresentationofthe ‘people’ asawhole,setagainsttheself-servingpolitical elitesinoffice(KatzandMair2018).
Thegermsofthetechnopopulistlogicwerethereforepresentoncethedistinctivesocialformationscorrespondingtoideologicallypolarizedformsofpolitics hadgivenwaytosocietiescharacterizedbyhighlevelsofindividualization, atomization,andthedeclineofthoseorganizedintereststhatcouldmediatethe relationshipbetweenindividualvotersandtheexerciseofpoliticalpower.Two furtherhistoricaldevelopmentsnonethelessprovednecessarytobreaktheempty carapaceofideologicallydrivenpartisanpolitics,whichhadremained ‘frozen ’ in placesincethe1920s.The firstwasthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandthe ensuingendoftheColdWar,whichsubstantiatedtheideathat ‘ThereIsNo Alternative’ toamarket-basedeconomyandaliberal-democraticpoliticalsystem (Séville2017a,2017b).ThisalsodeprivedmanyoftheConservativeandChristian Democraticpartiesofthe raisond’être thathadeffectivelyconvertedtheminto anti-CommunistcoalitionsduringtheColdWar(Invernizzi-Accetti2019).The secondcriticaljuncturewastheGreatRecessionof2008–11.Thiseliciteda distinctivelytechnocraticresponsefromthepoliticalandeconomicestablishment, whichfedintoabroader ‘populistbacklash’ bythoseperceivedthemselvesas havingbeentakenadvantageofintheprocess(Tooze2018).Theeffectofthe GreatRecessionwastocatalysethetechnopopulistpoliticallogic,providingnew opportunitiesformobilizationforactorsandmovementsthathadnodirect connectiontothesocialworldofideologicalpoliticsthathadbeenlonggone.
Theemergenceoftechnopopulismisthustheresultofacomplexandfarreachinghistoricalprocess,whichtiestogetheranumberofdifferentsocietaland politicaldynamics.Inanutshell,ourargumentisthattechnopopulismstemsfrom anoverarchingprocessofseparationbetweensocietyandpolitics,whichhas underminedthemechanismsofintermediationbetweenthem.Thishasledtoa fargreatersalienceofunmediatedconceptionsofthecommongood suchasthe populistideaofaunifiedandmonolithic ‘popularwill’ andthetechnocraticidea thatthereisanobjectivepolitical ‘truth’.Theseareverydifferentclaimsaboutthe publicorcollectiveinterestthatprevailedwhenideologicallydrivenpolitical partiesstructuredelectoralcompetitionalongthelinesofconflictingvaluesand interestswithinsociety.
TheUnbearableLightnessofPolitics
Theconsequencesofthisdeeppoliticalreorganizationareequallywide-ranging. Inthisbook,wefocusonfourinparticular:twothataffectthenatureofelectoral competitionitselfandtwothatconcerntherelationshipbetweenthepolitical systemandsocietyatlarge.Tobeginwith,wesuggestthatpoliticiansclaimingto
standforanunmediatedconceptionofthecommongoodarelesslikelyto recognizethedemocraticlegitimacyoftheiropponents,comparedtopoliticians claimingtorepresentaparticularinterpretationofit.Ifoneclaimstohavedirect accesstotheultimategroundofpoliticallegitimacy,thenanybodywhohappens todisagreeoradvanceadifferentinterpretationofhowsocietyoughttobe governedcanonlyappeartobeeithermistakenaboutwhatthecommongood actuallyconsistsin,orintheserviceofspecial andthereforeillegitimate interests.Aspurveyorsoftheseunmediatedconceptionsofthecommongood, politicalactorswhoseappealrestsuponasynthesisofpopulismandtechnocracy arethereforemorelikelytodismisstheirpoliticalopponentsaspoliticallyignorantormalicious.
Theimplicationisthattheriseoftechnopopulismcanbeexpectedtobe accompaniedbyan increasingconflictuality withinpoliticallife.Rivalcontenders forofficeincreasinglymisrecognizeeachother’sdemocraticlegitimacyandthereforeattackeachotherpersonally,challengingoneanother’smotivations,grounds ofsupport,andmoralprobity.Politicalrivalrybecomesmoreandmorelikeall-out enmity.Thisisaphenomenonthathasalreadybeenwidelyobservedincontemporarydemocraticregimesintermsofrisinglevelsof ‘affectivepolarization’ (see,for instance:IyengarandWestwood2015;Hoboltetal.2018),increasing ‘toxicity’ of politicallanguageandstrategy(Ignatieff2017;Beckett2018),andageneralized ‘breakdownoftraditionalformsofcooperationandmutualrespect’ betweenpartisanopponents(Drutman2017).
Asecondparallelconsequenceoftheriseoftechnopopulismstemsfromthe factthatneitherpopulistnortechnocraticappealsareinprincipletiedtoany specificpolicyagenda.Unmooredfromtherepresentationofparticularinterests orvalueswithinsociety,theyarecompatiblewithallkindsofsubstantivesetsof policies.Thisismanifestednotonlybythefactthatrecentandcontemporary populistsandtechnocratshavebeenlocatedonjustaboutanypointofthe traditionalleft/rightspectrum,butalso(moreimportantly)bythefactthat technopopulistpoliticalactorsandorganizationshaveshownthemselvestobe markedlymorerapidin changing theirsubstantivepolicycommitmentscompared totraditionalideologicallydrivenpoliticians.EmmanuelMacron,forinstance, beganhispoliticalcareerasaMinisterinFrançoisHollande’sSocialistgovernment,ranhiselectoralcampaignasa ‘radicalcentrist’,buthassincebeenpursuing apoliticalagendathatmostcloselyapproximatesthatofthecentre-right.The ItalianM5Shasswungwildlyinitssubstantivepolicycommitments,astestifiedby itssuccessivecoalitionallianceswiththefar-right LegaNord andthecentre-left PartitoDemocratico.
Aspopulismandtechnocracybecomethemainstructuringpolesofcontemporarydemocraticpolitics,substantivepolicycommitmentsarelosingthecentralitytheypreviouslyhadinelectoralcompetition.Instead,whatmattersmoreis thespecific way inwhichcandidatesforofficepresentthemselvestothepublic,
stakingoutsimultaneousclaimstocompetenceandpopularappeal.Aconsequenceoftechnopopulismisthereforethatseeminglytrivialmatters,suchasthe candidates’ personalqualities,theirskillinusingthemodernmeansofmass communication,aswellastheirtrackrecordof ‘ success ’ inwhateveractivity theyengagedinbeforeenteringintopolitics,tendtoassumecentrestage,atthe expenseofsubstantiveideologicalandpolicydisputes.Thisdevelopmenthasbeen amplydocumentedinwritingonthe ‘personalization’ and ‘spectacularization’ of politics(e.g.MazzoleniandSchulz1999;McAllister2007).Thelimitpointofthis logiciswhat,followingIlvoDiamanti,wecallthe ‘politicsofdoing’;thatis,a politicsthatceasestobeabout what istobedone,andinsteadbecomesmoreand moreabout who doesit, how itisdone,andultimatelythat something isbeing done,whateverthat ‘something ’ maybe(Diamanti2010).
Takingthese firsttwoconsequencestogether,oneobtainsapictureofapolitics thatisatoncedeeplyconfrontationalbutalsoinsubstantial,confirmingawidespreadimpressionthatallthe ‘soundandfury’ ofcontemporaryelectoralcompetitionultimatelydoesn’tamounttomuchinthewayofsubstantivepolitical alternativesbeingpresentedtotheelectorate.Theideaofan ‘unbearablelightness’ ofcontemporarydemocraticpolitics fi rstadvancedbyTonyJudt(2010), paraphrasingthetitleofafamousnovelbyMilanKundera capturesthis overalleffectoftheriseoftechnopopulismonthenatureofcontemporaryelectoral competition.
Thisdescriptionalsogivesanindicationofwhatwetaketobethethirdmain consequenceoftheriseoftechnopopulism,whichconcernstheperceptionofthe politicalsystembysocietyatlarge.Itmightseemaparadoxthatpreciselyas politiciansclaimtorepresenttheinterestsofthe ‘people’ asawholeandtohave thenecessarycompetencefortranslatingitswillintopolicy,electorsappeartobe increasinglydistrustfulofthem,andmoreandmoredissatis fiedwiththeirwork. Yet,itisanotherwidelydocumentedfactthatlevelsoftrustinpoliticiansandof satisfactionwiththequalityofdemocraticrepresentationhavebeendeclining markedlyoverthepastcoupleofdecades i.e.overthesametimespanduring whichpopulismandtechnocracyhaveemergedasthemainstructuringpolesof contemporarydemocraticpolitics(e.g.FoaandMounk2016;Foaetal.2020).
Onewayofinterpretingthese findingsistosupposethatseethingdemocratic discontentisa cause oftheriseofpopulismandtechnocracyasthemain structuringpolesofcontemporarydemocraticpolitics.However,thereisalso reasontobelievethattheriseoftechnopopulismmaycontributeinfurther exacerbating thewidespreadsenseofpoliticaldissatisfaction.Thisgeneratesa feedbackloopwhereby,insteadofabettingorcontrastingthecrisisofconfidence inpoliticians,technopopulismultimatelyprovestodeepenitfurther.Thereason hastodowithanimportant thoughunderappreciated insightfromdemocratic theory,whichisanotherkeycomponentofouranalysisofthepresentcrisisof democracy.Namely,thatinstancesofpoliticalmediationbetweensocietyandthe
state suchaspoliticalparties,butalsotradeunions,religiousorganizations,and othercivicassociations,aswelltheinformationandopinionmedia playan essentialroleingivingindividualcitizensthesensethattheyarebeingadequately represented.Thedisproportionbetweenindividualinterestsandvalues,onone hand,andthoseofthecollectivityasawhole,ontheother,issuchthattheformer canonlygetasensethattheyareadequatelyrepresentedwithinthelatterifthey bandtogetherinintermediarybodiestoactpoliticallyuponit.Totheextent thatbothpopulismandtechnocracystemfromandfurtherexacerbateageneralizedcrisisoftheseintermediarybodies,theythereforefeedbackintothe widespreadsenseofdemocraticdiscontent,ofwhichtheyareatleastinpartalso anexpression.
Fromthis,weidentifya finalconsequenceoftechnopopulism.Totheextent thattechnopopulismunderminesthesenseofeffectivedemocraticrepresentation ofthecitizenryatlarge,itaffectstheultimategroundsofpoliticallegitimacyofthe state.Totheextentthatthelatterisunabletorelyonthiskindoflegitimacyto securecompliancefromitscitizens,itislikelytobecomemore ‘Hobbesian’;that is,torelyonphysicallyrepressivemeansfordoingso.Thistooisadevelopment thathasbeenwidelyobservedbyrecentpoliticalcommentators,inconnection withphenomenasuchas ‘massincarceration ’,increasinglevelsofsurveillanceand policing,andtheriseoftheso-called ‘securitystate’ (Garland2001;Wacquant 2009;NRC2014).
Whileavarietyofdifferentexplanationsforthesephenomenahavealready beenputforward,theconnectionwiththenatureandqualityofdemocratic representationisarelativelynewavenueofresearch(e.g.Ramsay2016;Gallo 2018).Theriseoftechnopopulismmayofferfurthergroundstosubstantiatethis connection,inasmuchasthegrowingdemocraticdiscontentitbothstemsfrom andfurtherexacerbatesmaybeplausiblysupposedtocontributetothestate’ s growingneedtorelyonphysicalrepressiontosecurecompliancefromitscitizens. Therelativelyuninhibited andinsomecasesopenly flaunted useofthecoerciveapparatusofthestatebytechnopopulistpoliticalactorswhosucceedin comingtopower(suchasMacron’shandlingthe ‘giletsjaunes’ protestmovement) providesfurtherevidenceforthisclaim.Theriseoftechnopopulismasthenew structuringlogicofcontemporarydemocraticpoliticscanthereforebesaidto contributeinbolsteringanewformofauthoritarianism,whichcompensatesfor itsperceiveddeficitofdemocraticlegitimacywithincreasinglyrepressivemeansof socialcontrol.
WaysOut
Afterhavingexaminedthenature,origins,andlikelyconsequencesoftheriseof technopopulism,thelastchapterofthisbooktakesastepbackanddevelopssome
