TargetCentredVirtue Ethics
CHRISTINESWANTON
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Acknowledgements
Iowethankstomanyorganizationsandpeoplewhohavegivenmeopportunities todiscussseveralissuesrelatedtovirtueethics.TheseincludetheAmerican PhilosophicalAssociationforasessiononpsychoanalysisorganizedbyMichael Lacewing,whichgavemeanopportunitytothinkaboutNietzsche,Bernard Williams,andobjectivityinethics,andforapaneldiscussiononvirtueepistemologywhereIspokeontherelationbetweenvirtueethicsandvirtueepistemology. IthankalsoPaulWoodruffandthephilosophydepartmentoftheUniversityof TexasatAustinwhichhostedaconferenceonphilanthropy;DarciaNarvaez, NancySnow,andJuliaAnnasandthephilosophyandpsychologydepartmentsof theUniversityofNotreDameformakingpossibleaninterdisciplinaryconference onmoralphilosophyanddevelopmentalpsychology;andMarkTimmonsandthe fifthannualArizonaWorkshopinNormativeEthicsattheUniversityofArizona atTucson.Thelattertwoconferenceshelpeddevelopmythinkingaboutdevelopmentalvirtueethicsandparticularism,respectively.Iowethankstooto HeatherBattalyfromwhomIlearnedmuchaboutvirtueepistemology.
IamparticularlyindebtedtoJonathanDancywhoseworkonpracticalreason andparticularismhasinfluencedmyown,andfromwhomIhavebenefited considerablythroughmuchprofitablediscussionandcriticalcommentsonmy workonparticularismandtheroleofthickconceptsinethics.Iamalsogratefulto GarrettCullityformuchdiscussiononsuchtopicsasthemetaphysicsofethics andtherelationbetweenvirtue,thickconcepts,andreasons.Ithankhimalsofor hisusefulcommentsonpartsofthemanuscript.
Iamalsoindebtedtotwocolleagues,JulianYoungandTimDare,forenjoyable discussionanddebateovermanyyears:theformeronHeidegger,andthelatteron virtueethics,roleethics,andtherelationbetweenthem.
Finally,IwanttothankthetworefereesforOUPfortheirthoroughand thought-provokingreports.
Iamgratefulforpermissiontoreprintormodifymaterialpreviouslypublished elsewhere:
ChristineSwanton, ‘HeideggerianEnvironmentalVirtueEthics’ Journalof AgriculturalandEnvironmentalEthics SpecialIssue ‘VirtueandEnvironment’ online2009,paper2010,146–66,repr.inPhilipCafaroandRonaldSandler(eds.), VirtueEthicsandtheEnvironment (Dordrecht:Springer,2010),145–66.
ChristineSwanton, ‘PluralisticVirtueEthics’ inLorraineBesserandMichael Slote(eds.), TheRoutledgeCompaniontoVirtueEthics (NewYork,London: Routledge,2015),209–21.
ChristineSwanton, ‘CultivatingVirtue:TwoProblemsforVirtueEthics’ in NancyE.Snow(ed.), CultivatingVirtue: PerspectivesfromPhilosophy,Theology, andPsychology (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015),111–34.
ChristineSwanton, ‘AParticularistbutCodifiableVirtueEthics’ inMark Timmons(ed.), OxfordStudiesinNormativeEthics Vol.5(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2015).
ChristineSwanton, “AVirtueEthicalTheoryofRoleEthics” inRichard Hamilton(ed.), JournalofValueEnquiry SpecialEdition(2016)50(4):687–702.
ChristineSwanton, “DevelopmentalVirtueEthics” inJuliaAnnas,Darcia Narvaez,NancySnow(eds.), DevelopingtheVirtues:IntegratingPerspectives (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2016),116–34.
ChristineSwanton, “EudaimonisticversusTargetCentredVirtueEthics,” Teoria (2018)(2):43–54.
ChristineSwanton, ‘VirtueEthics,ThickConcepts,andParadoxesofBeneficence ’ inPaulWoodruff(ed.), TheEthicsofGiving:Philosophers’ Perspectiveson Philanthropy (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2018).
ChristineSwanton, “ TheRelationbetweenVirtueEthicsandVirtue Epistemology ” inHeatherBattaly(ed.), TheRoutledgeHandbookofVirtue Epistemology (NewYork,London:Routledge,2019),508 – 21.
Introduction
TheBasicView
Virtueethicsisbynowamajorplayerinethicaltheory.Nonetheless,evennow, modernityisdominatedbytwobroadtypesofethicaltheoryopposedtovirtue ethics:utilitarianismandrights-based.Forvirtueethics,duties,rights,consequencesareimportantandaccommodated,butarenotcentral.Thetwinpoles ofrights-basedtheory,the “ethics ” ofentitlementandstandingonone’srights, andthedutyofrespectingrights,importantthoughtheyare,havebeenparticularlyinstrumentalinrenderinginvisibletherichlanguageofvirtueandvicethat wasoncesocentralinethicalthought.Onethinksnotonlyofancientand medievalphilosophybutalsothewritingsofphilosophersasapparentlyfar apartasHumeandNietzsche.Thisthinningofthelanguageofethicshasspawned arebellionmarkedbyarevivaloftheconcernsofthosephilosophers,andthe developmentofmodernvirtueethics.
Therevivalischaracterizedbytwoviews.First,thefundamentalethicalconcept islivingwell,andforlivingwelloneneedsvirtues.Second,attheheartofethics arenotthe “thin” conceptssuchasobligationbutthe “thick ” conceptssuchasjust, kind,generous,patient,courageous.
Thesebasictenetsofvirtueethicsarecompatiblewithavarietyoftypesof virtueethics.Tolivewellisarelativelythinconceptwhichcanbethickenedin severaldifferentways,resultinginmanytypesofvirtueethics.ForHume,tolive wellisbasicallytoliveahumanelifeexhibitingaverybroadrangeofvirtues classi fiableasusefulandagreeabletoselfandothers:traitsthatwouldbeapproved bythosehavingarefinedandeducated ‘moralsense’.Intheeudaimonisttradition inheritedfromtheancientGreeks,livingwellisunderstoodasleadingalifewhere youyourselfare flourishing,solivingwellisgoodforyou.SincetheGreek traditionalsohasitthatvirtuesmakeonegoodasmembersofakindandin particularthathumanvirtuesmakeapersongood qua humanbeing,thevery difficultandchallengingproblemarises:howdoesoneyoketogethertwinrequirementsonvirtuewhichHursthouse¹callsPlato’srequirementonthevirtues’ : namely: ¹RosalindHursthouse, OnVirtueEthics (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress1999),167.
(a)Thevirtuesbenefittheirpossessor.
(b)Thevirtuesmaketheirpossessoragoodhumanbeing.
Anotheroptionistheviewthatlivingwellislivingalifethatismeaningfulto one.ForNietzscheameaningfullifewelllivedisoneexhibitingthe ‘lifeaffirming’ virtuesof ‘cultivatingwhatispersonal’ toone,ratherthanbeinganinstrumentfor the “commongood” (anonsenseconceptforNietzsche),theState,orscience,for example.²AttheheartofthelifewelllivedforNietzscheisalifeofvirtuous creativityexhibitingdiscipline,hardness,lackofresentment,andoriginality (makingone’sstandardsone’sown).Theideaofameaningfullifeofcreativity isnotafeatureinAristotelianvirtueethics,afeaturewhichprobablyreflectsthe basicAristoteliandistinctionbetween poesis (roughly,creativeproduction)and praxis (action):wherethelatterbutnottheformerisseenasthesubjectofethics. BycontrastphilosopherssuchasNietzsche,Heidegger,andRicoeurwhosenarrativeethicsisdescribedbyhimasthe ‘poeticsofthewill’ place poesis properly understoodattheheartofthelife “welllived” .
Itisevenmoreobviousthatthesecondmajortenetofvirtueethics,the centralityofthethickconcepts,iscompatiblewithmanytypesofvirtueethics. Eachofthetypesofvirtueethicsmentionedabove whetherAristotle’s,Hume’ s, orNietzsche’s³ hasthickconceptsattheheartoftheirethics,whetherthese conceptsareappliedtocharactertraits,actions,motives,rules,orreasons.But despitethepossibilitiesforarangeofdevelopments,contemporaryvirtueethicsis stilldominatedbyoneform:neo-Aristotelianism,aformofeudaimonisticvirtue ethics.OnanorthodoxviewandasIshallunderstandit,neo-Aristotelianismis characterizedbytwomainthesesthatarerejectedbytargetcentredvirtueethics⁴ :
(1)Eudaimonism:itisanecessaryconditionofatraitbeingavirtuethatit characteristicallybenefitsitspossessor.⁵
(2)Acriterionofrightactionaccordingtowhich ‘anactionisrightiffitis whatavirtuousagentwouldcharacteristicallydointhecircumstances’ . ⁶
²FriedrichNietzsche, HumanAllTooHuman:ABookforFreeSpirits,trans.R.J.Hollingdale(New York:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986) ‘OntheHistoryoftheMoralSensations’ , ‘Moralityofthe matureindividual’,sect.95,50–1.SeefurtherChristineSwanton, TheVirtueEthicsofHumeand Nietzsche (Chichester:Wiley-Blackwell,2015),Chapter6.
³IdefendtheviewthatHume’sandNietzsche’sethicsshouldberegardedasformsofvirtueethics inmy TheVirtueEthicsofHumeandNietzsche.
⁴ UnfortunatelyforthisunderstandingRebeccaStangl’sdevelopmentofmytargetcentredaccount ofrightactioninher NeitherHeroesnorSaints (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2020)iscalledbyher ‘NeoAristotelian.’ Forjustificationofhernomenclatureseehernote6,Chapter1.
⁵ Eudaimonismunfortunatelyhasbecomeavagueconceptwherethemeaninghasbecome stretched:seeChapter5.
⁶ OnVirtueEthics,28–9.
Giventherichnessofresourcesforitsmoderndevelopment,includingincreasinglyConfucianismandHumean “sentimentalism,” thetimeisripeforalternative structureswithinwhichvirtueethicalviewscanbeexpoundedanddefended.This bookprovidesonesuchalternativestructure;whatIcallTargetCentredVirtue Ethics.
Thenatureofthecontemporarysceneinvirtueethicsraisestwointeresting questions.First,throughwhatprocesshasvirtueethics,afteralongperiodof neglectofthevirtuesandvirtueconcepts,cometosharethestagewithothertypes ofmoraltheory?Second,whyhasneo-Aristotelianismdominatedthevirtue ethicallandscapewhenthereareotherpossibilitiesforcontemporarydevelopment?Whyisneo-Aristotelianismstillseenas the formofvirtueethics?Thesetwo questionsshouldbeseparated.Itisbynowalmostroutinelysuggestedthat Anscombe’ s ‘ModernMoralPhilosophy’⁷ heraldedtherenaissanceofvirtue ethics.Thisisafairassessment,butitdoesnotexplainthedominanceofneoAristotelianism.Anscombe’sworkshiftedthinkinginethicstowardsthetwo centraltenetsofvirtueethicsmentionedabove;namely,thecentralityofthe thickconceptsandtheideathatthefundamentalquestionofethicsiswhatitis tolivewell.Butaswehaveseen,thesetwotenetsarecompatiblewitharangeof possibilitiesforthedevelopmentofvirtueethics.TheshiftthatAnscombeinitiatedwasnotcausedandencouragedbyaloveaffairwithAristotle’sformof eudaimonismoreudaimonismassuchbutbyanattackontheideaofthe “moral” ina ‘specialsense’ andadubiousmetaphysicsassociatedwiththatidea.⁸ Ina positivedirection,and flowingfromthisattack,Anscombe’spaperisalsoaplea forthecentralityofthethickconcepts(conceptssuchasgenerous,sentimental, brutal,courageous,tasteful:indeednotjustthosethoughtofaspeculiarly “moral”).Thiswayofthinkingaboutethicswasalsopassionatelydefendedby IrisMurdochwhobelievedthatsuchconceptscarveoutanevaluativerealitythat isindefinitelycomplextothepointthatourunderstandingofitgoeswellbeyond theresourcesof “ mere ” philosophy,letalonephilosophyintheanalytictradition. ThesequeltoMurdochandAnscombeisBernardWilliams.Inlinewiththeir thoughtheattackedthe ‘moralitysystem’ dominatedbythe “thinconcepts” , notablymoralobligation,andbasedonwhatAnscombecalled ‘moral’ inaspecial (andproblematic)sense.Hedefendstheviewthat ‘morality’ shouldbereplacedby ‘ethics’;hisbeliefthatthemoralitysystemshouldbereplacedbydeploymentof thethickconceptsinourethicaltheorizing.Thisdevelopmentwasnotintendedto beneo-Aristotelian:thereisnoagent-centredappealtothevirtuousagentasthe touchstoneforethicaltruth.Forhimtheideaofnaturalgoodnessembodiedinthe
⁷‘ModernMoralPhilosophy’ repr.inRogerCrispandMichaelSlote(eds.), VirtueEthics (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1997),26–44.
⁸ TheinterpretationofAnscombe’sfamouspaper(‘ModernMoralPhilosophy’)onwhichthis disagreementrestsisdiscussedinChapter10 ‘HasVirtueEthicsSoldOut?’
virtuousagentharbouredfalsehopesfortheobjectivityofethicsthroughwhathe regardedasanoutdatedideaofthe ‘naturalgoodness’ ofexcellenthuman specimens.
UnfortunatelyforfutureoptionsinvirtueethicstheWilliamsforkforpotential developmentofaformofethicalrealisminlinewithMurdoch’sandAnscombe’ s realistunderstandingofthecentralityofthethickconceptscametosomethingof adeadendasfarasvirtueethicswasconcerned.ItfounderedonWilliams’ scepticismabouttheobjectivityofethicswhichnoappealto “thevirtuous agent” couldassuage.Thereisforhimnoperspective(suchasthatoftheperfectly virtuousagent)whichsecurestheindependentexternalviewpointrequiredfor genuineobjectivity.Thecentralityofthethickconceptsinethicsthuscomesata priceforWilliams forhimtheyareinevitablyweddedtoan “insiderperspective” ofcultureandtradition,apositionIcriticizeinChapter4.Nonetheless,Williams ’ workhashadthesalutaryeffectofrenewingattentiontothethickconcepts, thoughnotnecessarilyintheserviceofsubstantiveethicaltheory.
Virtueethicsincontemporarydress,portrayedasathirdtypeofmoraltheory opposedtoconsequentialismanddeontology,⁹ wasinitiatednotbyAnscombebut bytheinfluentialneo-AristotelianismofRosalindHursthouse’ s OnVirtueEthics. Contemporaryvirtueethicsisstilldominatedbytheneo-Aristotelianturntothe pointwheretextbooksinethicsevennowoftenregardHursthouse ’svirtueethical conceptionofrightactionasdefinitiveofvirtueethicsitself.¹⁰ Yethercriterionof rightactionwasnotintendedasde finingofvirtueethics:itwasasubstantive contributiondesignedoriginallytoallowvirtueethicstocompetein applied ethics withthedeontologicalandconsequentialistviewsthatdominatedthe field.¹¹
Howinmoredetailshouldweunderstandvirtueethicsingeneralasopposedto neo-Aristotelianism?Itisimportanttoappreciatethatvirtueethicsisafamilyof viewsopposedtootherfamiliessuchasconsequentialisttheories.Thevirtue ethicalfamilyincludesseveralgeneracomprising,forexample,Aristotelian, Confucian,Humean,Nietzschean;andseveralspeciesincludingthevirtueethics ofAristotle,Hume,Hursthouse’sneo-Aristotelianism,Zagzebski’sExemplarist formofvirtueethics,¹²myversionofTargetCentredVirtueEthics.Different versionsmaywellhaveadifferentconceptionoftargetsofvirtue,¹³different exemplars,andsoon.
⁹ SeeMarciaBaron,PhilipPettit,andMichaelSlote, ThreeMethodsofEthics (Oxford:Blackwell, 1997).
¹⁰ SeeforexampleRussellShafer-Landau, TheFundamentalsofEthics 2ndedn(Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2012).
¹¹Originallyinherinfluentialpaper ‘VirtueTheoryandAbortion’ PhilosophyandPublicAffairs 20 (1991),223–46.
¹²LindaZagzebski, ‘ExemplaristVirtueTheory’ inHeatherBattaly(ed.), VirtueandViceMoraland Epistemic (Chichester:WileyBlackwell,2010),39–55;LindaTrinkhausZagzebski, ExemplaristMoral Theory (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2017).
¹³SeeNicholasRyanSmith, ‘Right-MakersandtheTargetsofVirtue’ JournalofValueInquiry 51 (2017),311–26.
VirtueethicsasafamilyischaracterizedbytwotheseswhichIcallThick ConceptCentralismandtheCentralityofVirtuousness,speci fiedasfollows.
(A)ThickConceptCentralism(TCC)
Withinthenetworkofconceptsdenotingfeaturesthatarereasonsandrelationsof fittingness,relativelynon-evaluativefeaturessuchashelping,givingpleasure, satisfyingpreferences,benefiting(broadlyreasonsofbeneficence)needtobe furtherconceptualizedbyalargerangeofthickevaluativeconceptssuchas kind,just,callous,generous,humiliating,manipulative,fortheirreasongiving statustobeproperlyassessed.Thesamepointappliestobroadreasonsofrespect, andothergeneralclassesofreasons.Speci fically,TCCclaimsthatthegeneral conceptsofrightandoughtarenotlogicallypriortoandindependentofreason givingthickconceptsthatfavourordisfavourresponses(suchasaction).¹
(B)TheCentralityofVirtuousness(CV)
AccordingtoCV,rightnessand/orexcellenceareunderstoodthroughthevirtue/ vicenotions.TCCdoesnotentailCVforonebasicreason:thoughthethick conceptsprovideevaluativeshapetonon-evaluativerealityandthusdemarcatean evaluativereality,theydonotinthemselvesconnoteexcellenceoreven protanto rightness.Evenhonorificconcepts,suchaspatient,loyal,courageous,arenot themselvesstrictlyvirtueterms:onecanhavethecourageofathiefwherethe courageisputtobadends;anassassinmaydisplayextremepatiencewhile stalkinghishighlyvirtuoustarget;one’sloyaltymaybeblind,extreme,ormisguided;one’slovefoolishordestructive.Whatisneededtoyieldreasonsand relationsof fittingness,featureswhichmakeactionsright,andfeelingsappropriate,isthevirtuousnessoftheloyalty,patience,love,andsoforth.
TCCcombinedwithCV(henceforthTCC/CV)doesnotmakeconceptsdenoting virtuesofcharacteralonecentral;ratherwhatiscentralarethethickconceptsin generalcombinedwithnotionsofrightnessand/orexcellence.Theseconceptscanbe appliednotonlytovirtuesofcharacterbutalsotoactions,forexample:a(virtuously) generousorloyalact;thetargetsofthevirtuesatwhichvirtuousagentsaim;what
¹
⁴ ThisisaviewthatSusanHurleycallsnon-centralism: ‘Non-centralismaboutreasonsforaction rejectstheviewthatthegeneralconceptsof right and ought arelogicallypriortoandindependentof specificreasongivingconceptssuchas just and unkind ’ (‘ObjectivityandDisagreement’ inTedHonderich (ed.), MoralityandObjectivity:ATributetoJ.L.Mackie,54–97,56,citedinBernardWilliams, “Whatdoes IntuitionismImply” inBernardWilliams, MakingSenseofHumanityandOtherPhilosophicalPapers (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995),182–91,190,n.6.)Noticethatthisviewdoesnotimply thatthethickispriortothethin: ‘thespecificandthegeneralconceptsmaybeinterdependent’ (S.L.Hurley, NaturalReasons:PersonalityandPolity (NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress1989,14).
Hursthousecallsvirtuerules(thev-rules)suchas ‘Begenerous’;andtomotives. TCC/CVdoesnotentailthatvirtueethicsneedofferavirtueethicalaccountofright action,sinceitisopentovirtueethicstobescepticalofsuchanotion.¹⁵
Asstatedabove,TCC/CVcanbeseenasdefiningofthefamilyofviewslabelled virtueethics.Somebelieve,however,thatvirtueethicsbydefinitionischaracter centredassuggestedbywhatWatsoncalls “theprimacyofcharacter” thesis.For Watson... ‘anethicsofvirtueis...the...generalclaimthatactionappraisalis derivativefromtheappraisalofcharacter.’¹⁶ Thisclaimisproblematicforthe inclusionoftargetcentredvirtueethicswithinthevirtueethicsfamilyifWatson’ s thesisisunderstoodastheviewthatactionappraisaliswhollyderivablefromthe appraisalofcharacter.Thisagent-centredthesisisrejectedbythetargetcentred view,butitistruethatonthatviewweneedanunderstandingofthevirtuesto knowwhattheirtargetsare.Asstated,TCC/CVdoesnotmakeconceptsdenoting virtuesofcharacteralonecentral,buttheyarecentralnotonlyforunderstanding theirtargetsbutalsoinavarietyofotherimportantrespects.Forexample,to conformtothevirtuerules(suchas ‘Begenerous ’)weneedtoknowwhatthe demandsof,forexample,generosityasavirtueare.
Thebroadoptionswithinvirtueethicshingeonwhatcountsas “virtuousness.” Virtuousnessisahighlytheory-ladennotionanddifferentnotionsareassociated withdifferentbrandsofvirtueethics.Forexample,onmotive-centredaccountsof rightnesssuchasSlote’s¹⁷ thevirtuousnessandtherebyrightnessofanaction dependsontheadmirabilityoftheagent ’smotive;onquali fiedagentviewssuchas Hursthouse’sitdependsonitsbeinginlinewithwhatavirtuousagentwould choose;onmytargetcentredvirtueethicsthevirtuousness(andtherebyrightness) ofanactdependsonitshittingtherelevanttargetsofrelevantvirtues.Thus,for example,Hursthouse’sneo-Aristotelianvirtueethicsandmytargetcentredvirtue ethicsarespeciesofvirtueethicshavingdistinctiveanddifferentunderstandings ofvirtuousnessanditsrelationtorightness.
TurnnowtoTargetCentredVirtueEthics.Whatisdistinctiveabouttarget centredviewsisthattheysubscribenotonlytoTCCandCVbutalsotothethesis ofTargetCentredness:
(C)TargetCentredness(TC)
Whatmakesactionsright,feelingsappropriate,andtraitsofcharactervirtuesis understoodthroughthenotionofthetargetsofthevirtues.TargetCentrednessis
¹⁵ IaddressthisissuefurtherinChapter10.
¹
⁶ GaryWatson, ‘OnthePrimacyofCharacter’,reprintedinD.Statman(ed.), VirtueEthics: ACriticalReader (Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1997),56–81,58.
¹⁷ MichaelSlote, MoralsfromMotives (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001).
thedistinctivefeaturethatmakesTargetCentredVirtueEthicsopposedtoother formsofvirtueethics,notablyneo-AristotelianismasIexplorefurtherin Chapter5.
Toelaborate,accordingtoTCwhatcountsasgoodandcorrectformsof responsivenesstotheworld,whethertothings,persons,animals,situations, whetherinrelationtofeelingoraction,isdeterminedbythetargetsofthevirtues, relativetokindsofresponses,whethertheyberespect,love,creativity,promotion ofgood,andsoon.¹⁸ Forexample,thetargetofavirtueofloveistohaveexcellent lovingbondswithpeople,neithertoexcessordeficiency,intherightmanner,and soonaccordingtothenatureofthevirtueoflove,whetherromanticlove, friendship, filiallove,orparentallove;thetargetofbenevolenceistopromote thegoodofanotherinanexcellentway,fortherightreasonsandsoon;thetarget ofavirtueofcreativityistobecreativeintheproductionof,forexample,anart workwiththerightinstruments,satisfyingstandardsoforiginalityandintegrity, andsoon.Wesaymoreaboutthenatureofthetargetsofvirtue,theirrelationto rightness,andkindsofresponsebelow(Chapter5section(iii)).Ingeneral, accordingtoTC,oneactsrightly(orcorrectly)ifone hits thetargetsofthe virtues.¹⁹
ItisimportanttorealizethatforTCtherearegoodformsofresponsivenessthat donotnecessarilyissueinrightaction;forexample,well-motivatedresponses.On thetargetcentredview,oneactsinawell-motivatedwayifoneismotivatedby hittingtargetsofthevirtues;oneactsinapraiseworthywayifhittingthetarget(s) issufficientlydifficultandonemakesaworthyeffort;oneactsinthewaya virtuousagentactsif,in aiming atthetargetsofthevirtuesoneexpressesvirtue; andsoon.Fullexcellenceofactionincorporatesnotonlyrightnessbutalsothe expressionofvirtue(whichincludes finemotivation).
ItshouldbeevidentthatTargetCentredVirtueEthicsisamulti-layeredtheory. ElaborationsofTCCareformsofthickconcepttheory;elaborationsofCVare formsofvirtueethicswhichbuildonTCC,whileelaborationsofTCproduce formsoftargetcentredvirtueethicsbuiltonthegeneralfeaturesofCV.The generalfeaturesofthe firsttwolayersareelaboratedinChapter2whilemy accountoftargetcentrednessisthemaintopicofChapter5.Suf ficetosayhere thatapathforvirtueethics,cruciallyaThickConceptCentralisminspiredby Williams,willbereopened.
¹⁸ AgoodsummaryofthiscomplexrelationshipistobefoundinSmith, ‘Right-makersandthe TargetsofVirtue.’
¹
⁹ Thisconceptionofrightnesswas firstdevelopedbyChristineSwantonin ‘AVirtueEthical AccountofRightAction’ Ethics 112(2001),32–52, VirtueEthics:APluralisticView (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2003),andfurtherdevelopedinparticularly ‘AParticularistbutCodifiableVirtue Ethics’ inMarkTimmons(ed.), OxfordStudiesinNormativeEthics Vol.5(Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press,2015),38–63.
Forthisreopeninganewformofvirtueethicsisproposedinthreeparts.Part I(Metaphysics)elaboratesa ‘newmetaphysics’ forvirtueethics,thebasicfeatures ofwhichareoutlinedinChapter1,whiletheapplicationofthistothenatureof ethicaltheorizingisthetopicofChapters2and3.Orthodoxvirtueethicsinits modernguise,neo-Aristotelianism,hasavaileditselfofametaphysicsinspiredby PhilippaFoot’ s ‘naturalgoodness’.²⁰ Accordingtothisview,theevaluativestatus ofvirtuesasgoodtraitsofcharacterismodelledonabroadlyscientificandwholly naturalisticconceptionofgoodnessinplantsandanimals.Unfortunatelyithas notbeenclearjusthowthismodelistobeconceived.Criticsofthemodelhave supposedthatthisevaluativestatusisderivablefromconceptionsofnatural goodnessinthehumananimal,andthissuppositionhasledtoscepticalcritiques rangingfromBernardWilliams²¹toCoppandSobel.²²InreplyFootand Hursthousehaveclaimedthatthemodelisananalogyonly,butthatleavesus withtheproblemofascertainingjusthowtighttheconnectionbetween ‘natural goodness’ andtheevaluationofhumantraitsasvirtuesismeanttobe.Inaddition, Hursthousehasmadeitclearthattheneo-Aristotelianprojectisnottobetakenas afoundationalistone:rathertheoryjustificationiscoherentist.Thisleavesit uncertain,asPhilippBrüllmannexplores,²³justhow fixedisthe ‘fixedpoint’ of naturalgoodnessasthebasisofevaluationoftraitsasvirtues.
Insteadoftheclassicneo-Aristotelianmetaphysicsofnaturalgoodnessowedto PhilippaFoot²⁴ andlaterbyMichaelThompson,²⁵ andfurtherdevelopedina virtueethicaldirectionbyRosalindHursthouse,IproposeinChapter1a ‘ new metaphysicsforvirtueethics’.Thisisaformofresponse-dependentviewinspired byHeidegger,Hume,andMcDowell.Inthiswayvirtueethicistshaveachoice: theymayrebutorovercomethecontinuedcriticismsofcontemporaryAristotleinspiredethics,oroffernewparadigmsinspiredbyotherthinkerswhomaybe readasvirtueethiciststhemselves(e.g.Hume)orwhosemetaphysicscanbe appliedtovirtueethics.
TCCaspartoftargetcentredvirtueethicsisarguedtoberealistandnaturalist inMcDowell’ssense,thoughnon-naturalistintheorthodoxsense.² ⁶ Inbriefitis committedtoseveralbroadmeta-ethicaltheses.Theseare:
²⁰ PhilippaFoot, NaturalGoodness (Oxford:ClarendonPress,2001).Foranexcellentbook-length treatmentofFoot’sviewsseeJohnHacker-Wright, PhilippaFoot’sMoralThought (London: Bloomsbury,2013).
²¹ EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy (London:Fontana/Collins,1985).
²²D.CoppandD.Sobel, ‘MoralityandVirtue:AnAssessmentofSomeRecentWorkinVirtue Ethics’ Ethics 114(2004),514–54.
²³PhilippBrüllmann, ‘Good(as)HumanBeings’,inJuliaPeters(ed.), AristotelianEthicsin ContemporaryPerspective (NewYork:Routledge,2013),97–113.
²⁴ Seeher NaturalGoodness.
²⁵‘TheRepresentationofLife’ inR.Hursthouse,G.Lawrence,andW.Quinn(eds.), Virtuesand Reasons (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),247–96.
²⁶ SeeChapter1section(vii).
(a)Factualism
Thereareethicalfacts;theyarepartofthefabricoftheworld.
(b)Objectivism
Thefactswhichmakeethicalclaimstrueareobjectiveinthesensethattheyarefacts abouttheworldandnotthebeliefs,preferences,desires,sentimentsofthesubject. (a)and(b)togetherconstituteethicalrealism.
Cognitivism
Ethicaljudgmentsexpressbeliefs.
(c)Descriptivism
Thosebeliefspurporttorepresentordescribereality.²⁷
(d)Reasonsand/orFittingnessFundamentalism.²⁸
ReasonsFundamentalismisaviewproposedanddefendedbyT.M.Scanlon.On thisview ‘reasonsarefundamentalinthesensethattruthsaboutreasonsarenot reducibletooridentifiablewithnon-normativetruthssuchastruthsaboutthe naturalworldofphysicalobjects,causesandeffects,norcantheybeexplainedin termsofnotionsofrationalityorrationalagencythatarenotthemselvesclaims aboutreasons.’²⁹ Reasons(foractions)areunderstoodbyhimasrelationalfactsof thefollowingform:minimally ‘foranagentincircumstances cp countsinfavour ofdoing a ’³⁰ Thusreasonsfundamentalismsupposesfactualism.Noticethatas
²⁷ ThisismuchemphasizedbyJuliusKovesiinhis MoralNotions (NewYork:RoutledgeandKegan Paul,1967)whereheclaims: ‘Moralnotionsdonotevaluatetheworldofdescriptionbutdescribethe worldofevaluation’ (119).Thisisachievedparexcellencethroughthethickconcepts.
²
⁸ ExplicatedanddefendedinT.M.Scanlon, BeingRealisticAboutReasons (Oxford:Oxford UniversityPress,2014).
²⁹ BeingRealistic,2.IndefendingReasonsFundamentalismScanlonarguesagainstformsofreasons psychologismsuchasdesire-basedtheories,BernardWilliams’ internalreasonsthesis,Korsgaard’ s viewthat ‘thesourceofthenormativityofmoralclaimsmustbefoundintheagent’sownwill’ (The SourcesofNormativity,19,citedin BeingRealisticaboutReasons,16),basingreasonsinanideaof rationality,andexpressivistviews.Ishallnothereinvestigatetheserebuttals,allofwhichI find persuasive.
³
⁰ BeingRealistic,105.AlthoughIagreethatreasonsarerelationalfacts,Idonotwishtocommit myselftotheviewthatthefourplaceanalysisofScanlon(R(p, x, c, a))isthebestwaytounderstandthe reasonrelation.AnimportantobjectiontothisschemaasinterpretedbyScanlonisthatforhim c includeswhatJonathanDancycallsenablingconditions(featuresthatenableafavourertofavouran action)(EthicsWithoutPrinciples (Oxford:ClarendonPress2004)).(See BeingRealistic,31,n.21.) Thusenablersareincorporatedintothereasonrelationitself:thedenialoftheproprietyofthisis crucialtoDancy’s(anti-Rossian)particularism(seeChapter11).
ScanlonclaimsReasonsFundamentalismiscompatiblewiththeideathatthere areothernormativefundamentalisms.FollowingCullity,³¹Ibelievethatthereis alsoafundamentalismof fittingnessrelations,whererelationsof fittingnessare notreducibletoreasons.³²
Thebasicmetaphysicsofethics,developedinChapter1andfurtherelaborated inChapter3,isappliedtothe virtue ethicalparadigminChapter2.Howtarget centrednessfeaturesinTargetCentredvirtueethicsisthetopicofChapter5.By theendofthatchapterwehaveadetailedideaofthecorestructuraland metaphysicalfeaturesofavirtueethicsgroundedinthecentralityofthethick concepts,ratherthantheideathatthechoicesofavirtuousagentisdeterminative ofrightness.ForthereopeningoftheWilliams’ pathforvirtueethicsthrough TCCandCV,however,wewillneedtocombathisscepticismabouttheobjectivity ofthethickconceptsandtherebytheobjectivityofethics.Thatproblemis addressedinChapter4.
PartII(Nature)isanaccountofthesubstantivenatureofourtargetcentredvirtue ethics.Itbeginswithanaccountoftargetcentredvirtueethicsbycomparisonwith eudaimonism.TheremainingchaptersofPartIIaredevotedtoexplainingvarious featuresofmyfavouredbrandoftargetcentredvirtueethics.ItisaDevelopmental VirtueEthics(Chapter8);itisaPluralisticVirtueEthics(Chapter9)anditisavirtue ethicsthatrecognizesthatvirtueis ‘differentiated’ byanumberoffeatureswhich Icallformsormodesofethicaldifferentiation,notablyroles,one’sculturaland historicallocation,one’sstageoflife,andthenarrativeparticularitiesofone’slife. Theseneglectedfeaturesofwhatavirtueethicswhichappliestotherealworld shouldbelikeisbuiltintotargetcentrednessinChapter6.
PartIII(Application)ofthebookisconcernedwiththeoreticalissuesinthe applicationofTargetCentredVirtueEthics.Thefocusisoncentraltheoretical issuesintheapplicationofvirtueethicsgenerallyratherthanonspecificapplications,suchasvirtueethicalbusinessethics.³³Norisitacritiqueofspecificforms ofappliedethicsfromavirtueethicalpointofview:ratherourattentionison keepingourownhouseinorder.
Thecentralproblemintheapplicationofvirtueethics,muchdiscussed,and whichanimatesmuchofPartIII,istheallegedimpotenceofvirtueethicsin appliedethics.The locusclassicus forwhatmaybecalledtheactionguidingness objectiontovirtueethicsisapassagefromRobertLoudeninanarticle ‘OnSome VicesofVirtueEthics’ :
Ithasoftenbeensaidthatforvirtueethicsthecentralquestionisnot ‘What oughtIto do’ butrather ‘WhatsortofpersonoughtIto be?’ Howeverpeople
³¹GarrettCullity, Concern,RespectandCooperation (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2018).
³²SeeChapter2section(iv).
³³However,Chapter7onroleethicsdoesdiscussaspectsof,forexample,legalandbusinessethics.
havealwaysexpectedethicaltheorytotellthemsomethingaboutwhatthey oughttodo,anditseemstomethatvirtueethicsisstructurallyunabletosay muchofanythingaboutthisissue.IfI’mright,oneconsequenceofthisisthata virtuebasedethicswillbeparticularlyweakintheareasofcasuistryandapplied ethics.³⁴
Ofcrucialimportanceforovercomingthisproblemisthegroundworkprovidedin Chapters6and7ondifferentiatedvirtue.However,thereareotherproblemssuch astheallegedabsenceofrulesandsupposedlyunsatisfactoryaccountsofright action.Inshorttheallegedproblemofimpotenceisduetomanyfactorsfrequentlydeployedincritiquesofthedominantformofvirtueethics,neoAristotelianism,critiqueswhichtendtobeautomaticallygeneralizedtovirtue ethicsasawhole.Thegeneralquestionis:Aretheproblemsgenuineand,ifthey are,canTarget-VirtueEthicsdobetter?
AsecondthemerevisitsthetopicofChapter3 ‘TheConcealmentofEthics’ . Chapter12considershowethicalviewsdominatedbythewrong logos candistort theapplicationofethicsbyleadingtoparadox.Iarguethattheseparadoxescanbe solvedifthe logos ofethicsasoutlinedinChapters2and3,ratherthana logos suitabletoscience,informsethicaltheory.
Finally,theapplicationoftargetcentredvirtueethicsraisestheissuesof objectivityandepistemology.Therearetwoissues:thatofobjectivity,thetopic ofChapter4,andanepistemologysuitablefortargetcentredvirtueethics,the topicofChapter13.Chapter4isacritiqueofBernardWilliams ’ scepticismabout theobjectivityofethics,particularlyanethicsreliantonthethickconcepts,while Chapter13developsatargetcentredvirtueepistemology.
Differentchaptersofthebookcanbegroupedtogetheraccordingtothemes. ThemetaphysicsoftargetcentredvirtueethicsisthetopicofChapters1–3while Chapter4addressesWilliams’ scepticismaboutthemetaphysicsproposedfora realistconceptionofethics.Chapters5–9expoundsubstantiveaspectsofmyform oftargetcentredvirtueethics.Chapters10and11elaboratefurtheronthetarget centredaccountofrightaction,whileChapter12considerssubstantiveissuesin relationtothataccount.Chapter13developsatargetcentredvirtueethical accountofepistemology.
Thisbookisunabashedlyofferinganethicaltheory.Inthelightofpotential misunderstandingitiswelltoexplaininconclusionwhatIbelieveethicaltheoryis (orisnot)designedfor.Iwholeheartedlyrejecttheideathatitisthepurposeofan ethicaltheoryto “telluswhattodo” inourquestforanswerstospecificmoral questions.Theoriesofferframeworksormaps³⁵ onlyforthinkingaboutethical
³⁴ AmericanPhilosophicalQuarterly 21(1984),227–36,229.
³⁵ FortheideaoftheoryasamapseeDavidSchmidtz, ElementsofJustice (Cambridge:Cambridge UniversityPress,2006)discussedinmy TheVirtueEthicsofHumeandNietzsche,Chapter1.
questions.Thetaskofanethicaltheoryistodefenditsmapasofferingan adequateasopposedtoadistortedormisleadingframeworkforunderstanding theworldofethics.Theideathatanethicaltheoryandanyconceptionofright actionthatgoeswithitshouldbeseenasaframeworkormapratherthan anythinglikeadecisionprocedureissupportednotonlybythefactthatthe worldtowhichethicalthoughtappliesisextremelycomplexbutalsobythenature ofthebrain fittedtodealwiththiscomplexity.Recent findingsinneuroscience showthatthebrainbuildsandstoresmentalmaps.AccordingtoSchaferand Schiller³⁶ mentalmaps ‘mayexistatthecoreofmanyofourmost “human” capacities’ includinginferences,abstractreasoningandthe ‘dynamicsofsocial interactions’.³⁷ Forthem, ‘Mapsarenotaccurateportraitsoftheworldinallofits complexity... ’‘Mapsreduceadizzyingamountofreal-worldinformationintoa simple,easilyreadableformatthatisusefulforeffective, flexiblenavigation.’³⁸
Similarly,anethicaltheoryseenasamapshouldnotbethoughtofasoffering anaccurateportraitoftheworld.However,amapofanimportantandcomplex humancapacitylikeethicalthoughtisnotdesignedtosimplyofferamapthat describesthatthoughtasreflectedinourethicalpractices.Ithasacriticalfunction. Misguidedculturalandtheoreticalbeliefsandattitudeswillinfluencethebuilding ofthementalmapsthatenableustonavigatetheworld,andsuchinfluencesmay becriticizedas,forexample,renderinginvisiblemanyimportantethicalconcepts, ordowngradingemotionalorientationsessentialtoouropennesstoethics.Our mentalmapsmaybetoosimple,too ‘easilyreadable ’,tooemotionallyimpoverished.Therighttheoreticalframeworkisvitallyimportantsincewrongones(such asonmyviewmonisticconsequentialism)willdistortourthoughtaboutethicsin workingoutwhattodoandthereasonsforsodoing.
Toanswerethicalquestionscorrectlythereisnotonlyaneedforasatisfactory ethicalframework:weveryoftenrequireanabundanceofrelevantfactswhose discoverynecessitatesthedeploymentofresourceswellbeyondthoseavailableto anethicaltheory.Evenasufficientlycomplexandaccuratetheorywillnever,asa map,revealtheethicalworldinallofitscomplexity.Ifanethicaltheoryunderstandsthenatureofourcognitivecartography,abrainstructurewhichsuitsthe massivecomplexityoftheworld,itwillnotthinkthatthejobofsuchatheoryisto telluswhatweoughttodo.Thejobofanethicaltheorythenisnotthis;itsjobisto offertherightkindofmapfornavigatingtheethicalworld.
Asthisbookshouldamplyattest,therearemanylayersofethicalcomplexity involvedinansweringquestionsaboutwhatistobedone.Asaresultthe applicationofaframeworksuchasthetargetcentredvirtueethicsdescribedin thisbookcannothopeonitsowntoanswerethicalquestionsinareasinvolving
³⁶ MatthewSchaferandDanielaSchiller, ‘TheBrain’sSocialRoadMaps’ ScientificAmerican Feb. (2020),23–7.
³⁷ SchaferandSchiller,24.³⁸ SchaferandSchiller,26.
institutions;areassuchasroleethics,policy,culturaldiversity,legal,political,and economicinstitutions.Unfortunately,despitethis,abigdangerandtemptationin therealmofethicaltheoryisthatofadriveforsimplicityandbreadthofreach. Neitherisavailable.Our firstillustrationofthisdangercomesfromlegalethics. Onsomeviewsinlegalethicsamorallyuprightperson ’spractical(ethical) identityisnormallybuiltaroundthebasicnormsof “ordinarymorality” and thesecanconflictwithroleobligations.Onesolutiontothisproblemsuchasthat ofMarkovits³⁹ isthatalawyer’ s ‘overarchingprofessionalgroundproject’⁴⁰ isone of fidelitytoclientends,andbecauseoftheabsolutepriorityofintegritythis requiresawholeheartedself-effacementandidentificationwithone’srolerequirements.Opposingviewshaveittheotherwayround.Thefundamentalproblemis thedriveforsimplicityandbreadthofreach.TheviewIendorse(Chapters6and7) recognizesasomewhatdisunified(ornotwhollyunified)theoreticalcomplexity evenwithinethicaltheory.Neitherroleethicsnor “ordinarymorality” hashegemony;neithercoverstheentireterrain.
Asecondillustrationcomesfromculturallydifferentiatedvirtue.Ifanoversimpleethicaltheoryisassumedtocoverthegroundonewillbedauntedbythe seemingimpossibilityofansweringmetaphysicalandepistemologicalquestions concerningthenatureanddiscoveryoftheethicalfacts.Forexample,takethe exerciseofculturalsensitivityinabusinessnegotiation.Thetargetofcultural sensitivityhereisnotgivingoffence;sayingwrongthingsatthewrongtimeinthe wrongmannerandsoon.Determiningthisisnothingmysteriouseitherepistemologicallyormetaphysically.Itinvolvestheexerciseofvariousepistemic virtuessuchasindustriousnessandperseveranceininvestigatingcultural norms,andtheircompatibilitywithandintegrationwithotherdesideratain negotiationsuchasbroadvaluesofrespect,transparency,andmakingtimely progress.Forexample,determiningthetargetoftheimportantrolevirtueof efficiencyinthiscontextrequireseffortfulthoughtanddialogueconcerninghow muchtimecanbespent,howmuchprogressneedstobemade,andwhatcountsas progress.Allthisassessmentmaybedifficultbutthereisnothingmysterious. Further,manygoodenoughsolutionstovarioustensionsmaybepossible. Complexity,difficulty,andcontroversyarenomoreproblematicforarealist approachtoethicsthansimilardifficultiesinarealistapproachtoastrophysics.⁴¹
³⁹ DanielMarkovits, ‘LegalEthicsfromtheLawyer’sPointofView’ , YaleJournalofLawandthe Humanities 15(2003),209.
⁴⁰ W.BradleyWendel, ‘PersonalIntegrityandtheConflictBetweenOrdinaryandInstitutional Values’ inTimDareandW.BradleyWendel(eds.), ProfessionalEthicsandPersonalIntegrity (NewcastleUponTyne:CambridgeScholarsPublishing,2010),238–69,268.SeealsoGregory Cooper, ‘TheRoleofRolesintheNormativeEconomyofaLife’ inTimDareandChristineSwanton (eds.), PerspectivesinRoleEthics:Virtue,ReasonandObligation (NewYork:Routledge,2020),72–91. ⁴¹Ithankarefereefor TargetCentredVirtueEthics fordrawingmyattentiontotheputative problemanallegedly ‘daunting’ epistemologymightposeforarealistview,giventhelevelofcomplexity advocated.Obviously,mycompleteanswercannotbeprovidedinthisIntroduction.Fortheproblemof indeterminacyseeChapter12section(iii).
