ForB,M,P,andE
Preface
Utilitarianismisoftendismissedveryquicklybythoseengagedinethicsand politicalphilosophy.Itisanunfashionableview,andithascometobe associatedwithphilosophicalandpsychologicalcrudeness.Insomequarters thisistracedprimarilytothefactthatitisaconsequentialisttheory.But utilitarianismhasabadnameevenamongstconsequentialists.Itisthought tobetheformofconsequentialismthatyouendorseifyouaresimplemindedandlackanappreciationofthepsychologicalandethicalcomplexitiesoflife.Manycontemporaryphilosophersseemtosharesomethingof Nietzsche’sview:
Justlookattheindefatigable,unavoidableEnglishutilitarians,forexample, howawkwardlyandhonorablytheywalkinBentham’sfootsteps...No newthoughts,nosignofanysubtlechangeorfoldinanoldthought,not evenarealhistoryoftheearlierthought:an impossible literatureonthe whole,unlessyouknowhowtosouritwithsomemalice.¹
Atanyrate,utilitarianismoftenfailstogetafairhearing.Theaimofthis bookistoimprovetheseriousnesswithwhichutilitarianismisconsidered, includingbythosewhorejectit.
Thebookbeginsbyidentifyingsixcommonphilosophicalobjectionsto utilitarianism.Itthenseekstodevelopaversionofutilitarianismthatis equippedtoanswerthem.Incomparisontosomeotherversionsofutilitarianism,theonedevelopedhereisbothbroaderinthetopicsitaddressesand morecomplexinitsstructure.Itrytoshowthatutilitarianismhasthe resourcestomatchandexplainthecomplexityofourethicalideas.
Oneresultisthatthebookdiscussesmanytopicsinmoralandpolitical philosophy.Utilitarianismisoftenpresented,simply,asatheoryofthe rightnessofactions.Thisbookconsidersit,inaddition,asatheoryof reasonsforaction,ofmoralrights,ofjusticeandtheimportanceofequality, oflegitimacyanddemocracy,andofvirtuousagency.Theunderlyingideais ¹Nietzsche2002/1886:119,emphasisintheoriginal.
thatwegetabettergripontheprospectsofanethicaltheoryifitis developedinsomedetail.
Myhopeisthatthebookwillbeinterestingandusefulforspecialists, graduatestudents,andadvancedundergraduatesstudyingutilitarianismin coursesonethicsandpoliticalphilosophy.Itisnotintendedtobeabalanced discussionofexistingviews,butinsteadtodevelopanewandattractive versionofutilitarianism.Nevertheless,Ihavetriedtotraceconnectionswith existingviewsinthefootnotes,andtoexplainsomedifferentwaysinwhich utilitarianideasmaybedevelopedwhereappropriate.Inthisway,Ihope thatthebookmayhelpotherstoappreciatetheuntappedresourcesofthe utilitariantradition,andpromptthemtomaketheirowncontributionstoits furtherdevelopment.
Icouldnothavewrittenthisbookwithoutresearchleave.Iamverygrateful totheUniversityofNottinghamforaperiodofleavein2013–14during whichIbeganworkonthebook,andforanotherperiodofleavein2016–17 whichenabledmetowritethe firsthalfofit.Iamalsoverygratefultothe LeverhulmeTrustforgenerouslyfundingaResearchFellowshipin2017, duringwhichI finishedacompletedraft.
Ibenefitedgreatlyfromtheopportunitytodiscussthismaterialwiththree verytalentedgroupsofstudents.Iwasfortunatetobeabletodevelopmy ideasintheclassroom,andIlearnedagreatdealfrommystudents’ excellent questionsandcomments.Iamverygratefultoallofthem.Iamalsovery gratefultocolleaguesatNottinghaminPhilosophyandinPoliticsfor encouragementanddiscussion.
Twoacademicsocietieshaveprovidedmewithintellectualkinshipand continuingeducation.Ihavelearnedanenormousamountfrompapers deliveredatmeetingsofthe BritishSocietyforEthicalTheory andofthe InternationalSocietyforUtilitarianStudies,andfromdiscussionswithmany colleaguesandfriendsatthesemeetings.
ForhelpfulcommentsorconversationsIwouldliketothankKaoru Ando,TomBaker,KristerBykvist,BruceChapman,SophieGraceChappell, RichardYetterChappell,RogerCrisp,AlexanderDietz,NirEyal,Guy Fletcher,AlexGregory,KatharineJenkins,IanKidd,JosephKisolo-Ssonko, RobLawlor,UriLeibowitz,PenelopeMackie,GregMason,BrianMcElwee, PeterNiesen,DouglasPortmore,CarolynPrice,JanoschPrinz,Peter Railton,NicholasShackel,HillelSteiner,BartStreumer,AnessWebster, SamWren-Lewis,andMichaelZimmerman.Aswillbecomeclearin Chapter5,AlexanderDietz’scommentsprovedtobeveryinfluentialon
theclaimsmadeinthisbook.Iwouldalsoliketothankaudiencesin Bloomington,Boulder,Karlsruhe,Leeds,Lille,Lucca,Manchester,Milton Keynes,Norwich,Nottingham,Oxford,Rennes,Swansea,Vienna,Warwick, andYokohamafortheircommentsandquestions.
Icouldnothopeforabettermixtureofencouragementandastute criticismthanIreceivedfrommycolleaguesZacharyHoskinsandNeil Sinclairindetailedcommentsonasubstantialportionofthe firstdraft.Iam verygratefultobothofthem.Forencouragementandinspirationovermany yearsIamextremelygratefultoBradHooker,TimMulgan,andthelate SusanHurley.Ihavelearnedagreatdealfromeachofthemandtheir writings,andeachhasbeenextremelygenerouswiththeirhelp.
IammostgratefultoPeterMomtchiloffforhavingconfidenceinthis projectfromtheverybeginning,andforhisdefthandinguidingitalong eversince.IamgratefulalsotohiscolleaguesatOxfordUniversityPressfor theirworkonthebook,andespeciallytoSusanFramptonforhercareful copy-editing.TworeadersforOxfordUniversityPressprovidedvery detailedandhelpfulcommentswhichenabledmetoavoidseveralerrors andtoimprovethe finalversionsignificantly.Iamverygratefultothemfor theircareandgenerosityinprovidingthesecomments.
Chapter3ofthisbookfeaturessomeofShellyKagan’sdiagramsofforms ofconsequentialism.TheseoriginallyappearedinShellyKagan, ‘Evaluative FocalPoints’,inB.Hooker,E.Mason,andD.Miller(eds) Morality,Rules, andConsequences:ACriticalReader.Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversity Press,Copyright©2000:134–55.IamverygratefultoEdinburghUniversity Pressforgrantingpermissiontousethem.
Finally,Iammostgratefultomyfamilyfortheirloveandpatienceduring thelongperiodinwhichthisbookconsumedmostofmyenergy.Itis dedicatedtothem.
Introduction
Inmanypartsofpubliccultureutilitarianismappearstobeinthe ascendancy.Governmentshaveusedcost–benefitanalysistomakeand evaluatepublicpoliciesforsometime.Thisisabroadlyutilitarianmethod whichusespeople’spreferencesoveroutcomestoevaluatemattersofgreat importance suchashowtoallocatehealthoreducationalresources.¹Inthe lasttenyearsorsomanygovernmentshavegonefurther,explicitlyadopting theaimofmeasuringandpromotingnationalwell-being.Inmanyother partsoflife,too,ithasbecomeverycommontoframeissuesinabroadly utilitarianway,asthoughallthatmattersultimatelyiswell-being.
However,thesebroadlypro-utilitarianattitudesareinstarkcontrastwith theattitudesofmanyphilosopherstowardsutilitarianism.Thoughthereisstill somesupportforutilitarianismwithinacademicphilosophy,manyphilosopherstaketheviewthatutilitarianismhasbeenshowntobewrongbya setofwell-knownobjections.Thisattitudeisnotuniversal,butitiswidespread.
Yettheattitudestoutilitarianismamongphilosophershaveanother intriguingfeature.Onemightthinkthat,ifitweresoeasytoseethat utilitarianismiswrong,avoidingbelievingitwouldbequitestraightforward. Butmanyphilosophicalcriticsofutilitarianismemphasizeitsattractions. PhilippaFootwrotethat ‘[i]tisremarkablehowutilitarianismtendsto haunteventhoseofuswhowillnotbelieveinit.Itisasifweforeverfeel thatitmustberight,althoughweinsistthatitiswrong.’²RichardKraut wrotethat ‘[i]tis...possibletoslipintoutilitarianismbysheerinattention. ’³ Likeaholeinthegroundorabadhabit,itisworthtakingthetroubleto avoidslippingintoutilitarianwaysofthinking.Theideathatutilitarianism exertssomeattractiveforcewhichtakesefforttoresistperhapsexplainsthe manyattemptsbyphilosopherstodiagnoseboththesourceofitsappealand thedeepwaysinwhich,supposedly,itgoeswrong.⁴
¹SeeWolff2006andOrr2007.²Foot1985:196.Footthenattemptedan ‘exorcism’ . ³Kraut2007:17.
⁴ SeeRawls1999a:19–30,Williams1973,Scheffler1994,Foot1985,andThomson1997.
Thisbooktriestoshowthatutilitarianismcanbedefendedfromsix commonphilosophicalobjections.Iattempttodothisbyelaboratinga versionofutilitarianisminsomedetail,coveringabroaderrangeoftopics thanisusual.Forexample,thebookdiscussesutilitarianviewsofreasonsfor action,rightness,moralrights,justice,equality,legitimacy,democracy, decision-making,andvirtue.Thepurposeofdiscussingallofthesetopics istoshowthatutilitarianismhassuf ficientinternalresourcestobeawellroundedethicaltheory,withaplausibleclaimtomatchuptothecomplexity ofourethicalandpoliticalideas.Thoughitisoftenpresentedasavery simpletheory,itneednotbe.
ThesixobjectionsareidentifiedanddiscussedinChapter2.Subsequent chaptersdiscusscomponentsoftheoveralltheory suchas,forexample, whatitsaysaboutreasons,moralrights,equality,andvirtue.Wereturnto theobjectionsinChapter10,oncethecomponentsofthetheoryhavebeen explained.Ithenclaimthatthisversionofutilitarianismoffersplausible responsestoallsixobjections.
Thisexercisehastwopurposes.Oneistomotivateinterestinthespecific versionofutilitarianismoutlinedinChapters3–9.Thisversionhassome novelfeatures,whichIhopecontributetoitsplausibilityandinterest.Itis, veryroughly,anindirectformofutilitarianismwithsomesimilaritiesto RuleUtilitarianism,anditisdevelopedinawaythataddressestopicsinboth moralandpoliticalphilosophy.Thetheoryisbynomeanscomplete,and Itrytohighlightthegaps.Still,Ihopethatitisdevelopedinenoughdetail forustobeabletodiscernitscharacterandtoreachsomeconclusionsabout itsplausibility.
Thesecondpurposeismoregeneralandmoreimportant.Ihopeto contributetoarenewalofphilosophicalinterestinutilitarianism.Ifthe specificversionoutlinedinthisbookisnotobviouslydefeatedbythesix commonobjectionstobediscussed,thenthoseobjectionsdonotsuf ficeto showthatutilitarianismisadeadend.Ifthisbookshowsthatitispossibleto answertheseobjections,itmayencourageotherstodevelopnew,better, versionsofutilitarianism.
Answeringtheseobjectionsisinonewayamodestaim.Idonotaimto showthat,allthingsconsidered,wehavemorereasontoacceptaversionof utilitarianismthananyotherethicalview.Thatwouldrequirecomparisonof versionsofutilitarianismwithotherviews,andthisbookismostlysilenton suchcomparisons.NordoIspendmuchtimetryingtomakeapositivecase forutilitarianism,beyondnotingtheintuitiveplausibilityofitsconstituent ideas.Insteadthemainfocusisonarticulatingaversionofutilitarianism
thatcanbedefendedfromthesixobjectionsidentified.Thebookisthus largelynon-comparativeandlargelydefensive.Inbothofthesewaysitfalls shortofofferingafullargumentinsupportofthetheoryitpresents.
Inanotherway,however,theaimisnotatallmodest.Asnotedabove,the theoryitdevelopsaddressesmanydifficulttopicsinmoralandpolitical philosophy.Toaddressanyoneofthesetopicsinvolvestakingastandon manydifficultquestions.Toaddressallofthesetopicsatoncemaybe consideredfoolhardy.
Therearetworeasonsfortryingtodevelopaversionofutilitarianismthat iscomprehensiveinthisway.Oneisthatthecommonobjectionstoutilitarianismthemselvescoverawiderangeoftopics,asweshallseeinChapter2. Toaddressalloftheobjectionsatoncerequiresdevelopingatheorythat addressesmanytopics.Thesecondreasonhastodowithabroadermethodologicalpoint.Reachingaverdictaboutaphilosophicaltheoryinvolves developingitandassessingitsmerits.Howshouldwedividetimeandeffort betweendevelopmentandassessment?Delayingassessmentcanleadto wastedeffortexploringdeadends.Ontheotherhand,ifweassessonly simpleversionsoftheorieswemayoverlooksomeoftheirpotential.This seemstometohappenwithutilitarianism.Itisoftendiscussedinitssimplest andnarrowestform,asifitwereasinglepropositionabouttherightnessof actions.Ihopetoshowthatitismorepromisingwhendevelopedmorefully.
1.1WhatIsUtilitarianism?
Asitssympathizershaveoftenpointedout,utilitarianismsuffersfromsome oftheconnotationsofitsname.⁵ Inordinaryusage, ‘utilitarian’ suggests somethingthatisplainormerelyfunctional,ascontrastedwithsomething thatis fineorbeautiful.Someoftheseconnotationsalsocarryoverto philosophicalusage.Insomecontexts,describingaviewas ‘utilitarian’ maysuggestthatitiscrudeorsimple-minded,oratleastthatitdoesnot takeaccountofallrelevantconsiderations.⁶ Utilitarianismisalsostill
⁵ J.S.Millwrote: ‘Apassingremarkisallthatneedsbegiventotheignorantblunderof supposingthatthosewhostandupforutilityasthetestofrightandwrong,usetheterminthat restrictedandmerelycolloquialsenseinwhichutilityisopposedtopleasure.Anapologyisdue tothephilosophicalopponentsofutilitarianism,foreventhemomentaryappearanceof confoundingthemwithanyonecapableofsoabsurdamisconception... ’ Mill1998/1861:54.
⁶‘ThetechnicaluseofthetermUtilitarianism...hasneverbecomeentirelydivestedof certainassociationsconnectedratherwiththeordinarymeaningoftheword “utility,” and
associatedwiththeviewsofJeremyBenthaminparticular,includinghis viewsabouthumanpsychology.Thisdoesnotalwaysredoundtoitscredit.
Thusitisimportanttodefinewhatsortofviewwehaveinmind.As Ishallunderstandit,utilitarianismisafamilyofethicalviewsunitedby acceptanceofthreedoctrines.⁷ The firstofthesedoctrinesis consequentialism.Thisistheclaimthatwecanexplainethicalphenomenasuchasthe rightnessofactions,thejusticeofinstitutions,andthevirtuesandvicesof agentsintermsofthegoodnessofoutcomes.Consequentialiststhinkthat wecanexplainrightness,justice,andvirtueintermsofthegoodnessof outcomesbecausetheythinkthatrightness,justice,andvirtueeachconsist inoneormorerelationships specifieddifferentlybydifferentconsequentialisttheories togoodoutcomes.⁸
ThesimplestandmostfamiliarformofconsequentialismisActConsequentialism.Asusuallyformulatedthisisaviewabouttherightnessof actions,accordingtowhichanactionisrightifandonlyif,andbecause,its outcomewouldbeatleastasgoodasthatofanyrelevantalternative.One wayinwhichotherformsofconsequentialismdifferisbyofferingdifferent answerstothesamequestion.Forexample,RuleConsequentialistsclaim thatwhatmakesanactionrightisthatitispermittedbythebestsetofrules. LikeActConsequentialists,theyseektoexplaintherightnessofactionsin termsofthegoodnessofoutcomes.UnlikeActConsequentialists,however, theyclaimthatwhatexplainstherightnessofanactionisanindirect relationshipbetweenitandoutcomes:theactionisrelatedtoasetofrules, whicharethemselvessaidtohavegoodoutcomes.Similarly,MotiveConsequentialistsclaimthatwhatmakesanactionrightisthatitistheaction thatwouldbeperformed,inthecircumstances,bysomeonewiththebest motives.Here,motivesareevaluatedintermsoftheiroutcomes,andthe rightnessofactionsissaidtodependontheirrelationshiptogoodmotives.
Consequentialisttheoriesmayalsodifferfromeachotherinthequestions theyaddress.ActConsequentialism,RuleConsequentialism,andMotive Consequentialismareallstandardlypresentedasrivalanswerstothe same question,ofwhatmakesactionsright.Butthisisnottheonlyquestionthat
withthesupposedpracticalapplicationsoftheUtilitariantheory,thanwiththeessentiallogicof thetheoryitself ’ Albee1902:xv.
⁷ MycharacterizationofutilitarianismbroadlyfollowsthatgiveninSen1979.
⁸ Consequentialistsuse ‘outcome’ inasomewhattechnicalway.Onthisusage,something’ s ‘outcome’ includeseverythingthatwouldhappenwerethatthingrealized.SeeChapter2 Section2.1,thisvolume.
consequentialistscantrytoanswer.Theymayalsoseektoexplainwhat reasonsagentshave,forexample,orwhatmakesaninstitutionjust,orwhat makesadecisiongoodorbad.Initsmostambitiousforms,consequentialismclaimsthatallofthesequestionscanbeansweredintermsofthe goodnessofoutcomes.⁹
Consequentialisttheoriesalsodifferfromeachotherintheirclaimsabout whatmakesoneoutcomebetterthananother.¹⁰ Utilitariantheoriesare distinguishedfromotherconsequentialisttheoriesbytheircommitmentto twodoctrinesaboutthevalueofoutcomes.The firstoftheseis welfarism. Accordingtowelfarism,allwell-beinghasnoninstrumentalvalue,and nothingelsehasnoninstrumentalvalue.¹¹Thismeansthatallwell-beingis goodindependentlyofitseffects,andnothingelseis.Thoughotherthings canbegoodorbad,theirgoodnessorbadnessdependsontheircontribution towell-being.Welfariststhusclaimthatautonomyisgoodinsofarasit promoteswell-being,andthatill-healthisbadinsofarasitinhibitswellbeing.Sincenothingelsehasnoninstrumentalvalue,thevalueofanoutcomedepends,accordingtothewelfarist,entirelyonthewell-beingit contains.
Welfarismisanimportantpartoftheutilitarian’saccountofthevalueof outcomes,butitisnotacompletetheoryofvalue.Onerespectinwhichitis incompleteisthatitdoesnottellushow,exactly,thevalueofanoutcome dependsonthewell-beingitcontains.Thethirdde finingcommitmentof utilitarianism, sum-ranking ,isananswertothisquestion.Accordingtothis claim,thevalueofanoutcomeisthesumofthegoods(andbads)existingin
⁹‘GlobalConsequentialism’ claimsthateverythingshouldbeevaluatedintermsofthe goodnessofitsoutcomes.SeeParfit1987:25,PettitandSmith2000,andDriver2014.AsIshall explaininChapter3,however,weshoulddistinguishbetweentwoissues:whatgetsevaluatedin aconsequentialistway,andhowitgetsevaluated. ‘GlobalConsequentialism’ advocatesconsequentialistevaluationofeverything,butitalsoadvocatesdirectevaluationofeverything,i.e. evaluatingeachthingintermsofitsowneffects.Itisimportanttonotethatotherformsof globalconsequentialistevaluationarepossible.
¹
⁰ Sometimesconsequentialismisdefinedsuchthatitiscommittedtoan ‘agent-neutral’ or impartialaccountofthegoodnessofoutcomes.Onthisdefinition,consequentialismisjustone kindof ‘teleology’,distinguishedfromotherkindsbyitsimpartialoragent-neutralaccountof goodness.Forexample,seeScheffler1988:1and1994:1.Onotheroccasionsconsequentialism isdefinedmorebroadly,sothataviewcanbeconsequentialistevenifitsaccountofthe goodnessofoutcomesis ‘agent-relative’ orpartial.Forexample,seePortmore2011:34–8.On thissecondusage, ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’ aresynonyms.InthisbookIunderstand consequentialisminthebroaderway,drawingnodistinctionbetween ‘consequentialism’ and ‘teleology’.Utilitarianismis,inanycase,committedtoanagent-neutralorimpartialtheoryof goodness.
¹¹Sen1979isaprominentcriticismofwelfarism.MooreandCrisp1996isadefenceofit, includingagainstSen’scriticisms.Keller2009isarecentsurveyofworkonwelfarism.
thatoutcome.AsIamdefining ‘utilitarianism’,utilitariansarecommitted bothtowelfarismandtosum-ranking.Thismeansthattheyclaimthatone outcomeisbetterthananotherjustincaseitcontainsmorewell-being.¹²
Forthepurposesofthisbook, ‘utilitarianism’ referstoafamilyofviewsall ofwhichseektoexplaintherightnessofactions,reasonsforaction,justice, virtuesandvices,orotherethicalphenomenaintermsofsomerelationship betweenthephenomenonatissueandthegoodnessofoutcomes.Since Ihavedefinedutilitarianismsuchthatitincludescommitmenttowelfarism andsum-ranking,allformsofutilitarianismalsoclaimthatoneoutcomeis betterthananotherjustincaseitcontainsmorewell-being.However, utilitariantheoriesdifferfromeachotherinimportantways.Forone thing,theydifferinthequestionstheyaddress.Second,theydifferover theexplanatoryrelationshipbetween,say,anaction’srightnessandgood outcomes.Third,theydifferoverwhatexactlywell-beingis,andsowhat exactlymakesoneoutcomebetterthananother.Onemajorthemeofthis bookisthatthesedimensionsofvariationaresufficienttoallowplausible responsestothemostcommonobjectionstoutilitarianism.Evenwhen definedintherelativelynarrowwaythatIhavedefinedit,utilitarianismis abroadtraditionofethicalthought.¹³
Notallofthetheoriesinthistraditionhaveafeaturethathassometimes seemedtobeamongutilitarianism’sdefiningtraitsandchiefattractions. Ihaveinmindthefeature,sharedbysomebutnotallutilitariantheories, thattheroleofjudgementbetweenconflictingconsiderationsisminimized, withtheresultthatethicalissuesarepicturedas,inprinciple,amenableto beingsolvedbycalculation.Thisisafeatureofsomeversionsofutilitarianism,andtosomepeopleitisattractive.Itseemstoresultifweadoptafairly straightforwardviewofthenatureofwell-being,anoptimisticviewabout theprecisionwithwhichwecanmeasurewell-beingandmakeinterpersonal comparisonsofit,andafairlystraightforwardviewofthestructureof utilitarianism.Underthesefurtherassumptionstheremaybelittleroom,
¹²Someallowotherutilitarianfunctionsfromwell-beingtogoodness,suchastheclaimthat thevalueofanoutcomeisgivenbytheaveragelevelofwell-beingitcontains.Thedifference betweentheseviewsissalientmainlywithrespecttopopulationethics:seeParfit1987:pt.4. Thisbookisnotprimarilyconcernedwithpopulationethics,andsooneoptionwouldbeto remainagnosticaboutthefunctionfromwell-beingtogoodness.However,Irestrict ‘utilitarianism’ tothosetheoriesthatacceptsum-rankinginordertobeasclearaspossibleaboutthe theoryofvalueunderdiscussion,andbecauseIbelievethatsum-rankingiscorrect.
¹³Itishardtodiscusstraditionsofthought.JamesGriffinwrites: ‘Onecannotsayanything definitiveaboutarichphilosophicaltraditioninafewpages orinabook,forthatmatter.Rich traditions,bydefinition,havetoomanyresourcesforthat’ Griffin1996:103–4.
inprinciple,fordifficultjudgementsabouttherelativeimportanceof competingconsiderations.
However,thesefurtherassumptionsarenotessentialtoutilitarianismas Ihavedefinedit,andtheyarenotadoptedbytheversionofutilitarianism thatIwillarticulateinthisbook.Accordingtothatversiontherecanbe competingconsiderations,andsometimeswehavetomakedifficultjudgementsabouttheirinteractionandrelativeimportance.Theresultisapicture accordingtowhichethicsismuchmessierthanaseriesofcalculations.
1.2WhatIstoCome
Myargumentsdependinmanyplacesonappealstointuition.Sometimes theseareintuitionsaboutspeci ficcases,inwhichrelevantfactsaboutsome agent’ssituationandoptionsarestipulated.Onotheroccasionstheyare intuitionsaboutabstractprinciples,suchasconsequentialism,welfarism,or sum-ranking.WhenIclaimthatsomefeatureenablesa ‘plausiblereply’ to oneofthesixobjectionswewillbeconsidering,thisboilsdowntotheidea thatit fitswithjudgementsaboutcasesorprinciplesthat,Itakeit,are intuitivelyplausible.
Asthismaysuggest,Iwillbeusingthemethodofphilosophicalargument knownasthesearchfor ‘ reflectiveequilibrium’.Westartwithintuitive judgementsaboutprinciplesandcases.Wethensiftthroughtheseintuitions,discardingthoseaboutwhichwearelesssure perhapsbecausewe suspectthattheyreflectbiasesorvestedinterests.Thosewhichremainwe label ‘consideredconvictions’.Wethenseekatheorythatwouldtiethese convictionstogether,showinghowthejudgementsaboutcasescanbe explainedbyplausibleprinciplesthatalsocoherewithourwiderbackgroundbeliefs.Relevantbackgroundbeliefsincludeotherphilosophical beliefs,suchasbeliefsaboutpersonalidentity,plusanyotherbeliefthatis logicallyrelatedtotheclaimsmadebyourphilosophicaltheory.¹ ⁴
Itwouldbeanenormousachievementto findanethicaltheorythat satisfiestheconditionsofreflectiveequilibrium.Attheveryleast,itwould
¹⁴ Thisdescribeswhatissometimesknownas ‘widereflectiveequilibrium’.SeeRawls1999a: 17–18and42–5,Daniels1979,andHooker2000:ch.1.Hooker2000:16doubtsthatourbeliefs aboutnon-moralmatterswillprovidemuchadditionalconstraintonourchoicebetweenmoral theories.However,itseemstomethattheymaydoso.Forexample,considerthediscussionof possiblelogicalconnectionsbetweenutilitarianismandreligiousbeliefsinNelson1991, Chappell1993,andMulgan2015:pt.3.
showhowwecan fitourethicalconvictionsintoabroadercoherentoutlook ontheworld.Ifweweretoachieveit,therewouldofcoursebefurther questionsaboutwhetherthissortofcoherencesufficesforwarrantedbelief. However,wedonothavetosettlethesefurtherquestionsinordertotreat reflectiveequilibriumasaworthwhilegoalinnormativeethics.Evenifwe weretoconcludethatitdoesnotsufficeforepistemicwarrant,knowing whichtheoryortheoriespassthetestofreflectiveequilibriumcouldnotfail toberelevanttophilosophicalethics.Inanycase,Iwillemploythemethod ofreflectiveequilibriuminconsideringtheplausibilityofrepliestothe criticismsofutilitarianism.¹⁵
Ofcourse,appealstoreflectiveequilibriumarealwaysopentoquestion. Foronething,peoplehavedifferentintuitionsaboutcases.¹⁶ Theyalsodiffer intheirjudgementsabouttheplausibilityofabstractclaims,andoverhowto tradeoffthevariouscomponentsofcoherence.Thustheyareliabletoreach differentconclusionsabouttheextenttowhichanygiventheorysatisfiesthe conditionsofreflectiveequilibrium.Forthisreason,anyappealtothe methodofreflectiveequilibriuminvolvesmattersofjudgement.
Thereasonsthatmanyphilosophersdonotthinkutilitarianismagood betprobablydonothavemuchtodowiththeplausibilityofitscentral assumptions.Eachofthethreedefiningfeaturesofutilitarianismisattractive whenconsideredasanabstractclaim.Whenweconsidereachclaiminitself, andnotwithitsimplicationsaboutcasesinmind,eachlookslikeareasonablestartingassumptionfromwhichtobuildanethicaltheory.Consequentialismistheassumptionthatgoodnessofoutcomesisbasic,inthesense thatwecanexplainotherethicalphenomenaintermsofsomerelationship togoodoutcomes.Thisis,Itakeit,aplausibleassumption;itisatleastas plausible,priortoanyworriesaboutimplicationsaboutcases,asitsmajor rivals.¹⁷ Appliedtoreasonsforaction,forexample,itclaimsthatallreasons
¹⁵ Perhapsthereareotherappropriatemethods.Itmightbepossibletoconstructanethical theoryfromaxiomsofrationalchoice,say,orbyanalysingtheuseofethicallanguage.
¹
⁶ TimMulganhasdistinguishedbetween ‘austere’ and ‘complacent’ viewsofmorality.On thecomplacentview,ourcommonbeliefsaboutmoralityaretakentobeingenerallygood order,whileontheaustereviewtheyaresuspectedofbeing ‘self-servingdelusions’ 2015:20–1. Thesedifferencesmayreflectdifferentviewsaboutwhichcommonintuitionsdeservetobe treatedas ‘consideredconvictions’.However,theymayalsoreflectdifferentpredictionsabout howmanyofourconsideredconvictionswillbepreservedinreflectiveequilibrium.Myviewis thatwedonotyetknowhowausterethecorrectmoraltheorywillbe,sincewedonotyetknow whatthecorrectmoraltheoryis.RobertAdamstakesadifferentview,claimingthat ‘[t]hereisa limittohowfarpretheoreticalopinioncanberevisedwithoutchangingthesubjectentirely’ 1999:246.
¹⁷ SeeEwing1948:103andScheffler1988:1.
foractioncanbeexplainedbysomerelationshipbetweenactionsandgood outcomes.
Welfarismisalsoaplausibleclaim.Itisveryhardtodenythatwellbeing thevalueofalifeforthesubjectwhoselifeitis is usually noninstrumentallygood.Itishardtodenythis,atleast,withrespecttolivesthat alreadyexist.Itissomewhatplausibletogofurther,andclaimthatwellbeingis always noninstrumentallygood.Incaseswherewemightdoubtthis, aswiththepleasureasadistgainsfromtorturinghisvictim,welfaristshave somewhatplausiblethingstosay.Theycansay,forexample,thatthis pleasuredoesnotreallyaddtohiswell-being,onthebestunderstanding ofwell-being;ortheycanclaimthat,thoughitisbadthatthetortureoccurs, giventhatitdoesoccuritisbetterthatthesadistgainsfromitthanthathe doesnot.Moreover,itisalsosomewhatplausibletoclaimthat only wellbeingisnoninstrumentallygood.Ofcourse,welfaristsallowthatother thingsaregoodaswell;theyjustclaimthatnothingapartfromwell-being isnoninstrumentallygood.Butthisis,again,asomewhatplausibleclaim. Itisnotobviouslyfalsetosaythatthevalueofautonomy,say,orofbeautyor knowledge,isentirelyaccountedforbyitscontributiontowell-being.¹⁸
Sum-rankingisalsoplausible.Thisistheclaimthatthevalueofan outcomeisthesumofthegoods(andbads)existinginthatoutcome. Itthusclaimsthatthevalueofanoutcomeisrelatedinasimplewayto thevalueofthethingsitcontains:thevalueoftheoutcomeisthesumofthe valuesofthethingsitcontains.Aswithconsequentialismandwelfarism,this claimisplausibleinthesensethatitisareasonableassumptiontomake whenconstructingatheory.Itcouldturnoutthatanyoralloftheseclaimsis false.Buttheyarepromisingplacestostart.Indeed,theirfacevalueplausibilityprobablyexplainsthepersistentattractivenessofutilitarianism which,aswehavenoted,ismuchremarkeduponbyitscritics.
Totheextentthatutilitarianismseemslikeabadbet,then,itisnot becauseitsdefiningassumptionsareimplausibleontheirface.Insteaditis becausethetheoriesthathavebeenconstructedfromtheseassumptionsare thoughttobeopentooneormorepowerfulobjections.Chapter2identifies sixsuchobjections.Thesearethatutilitarianismhasaninadequatetheoryof value,thatitcountenancesabhorrentactions,thatitistoodemandingof agents,thatitfailstorespecttheseparatenessofpersons,thatitcannot explainthedistinctivenessofpoliticalissuesfrommoralissues,andthatitis
¹⁸ Shaver2004claimsthatwelfarismisthemostattractivefeatureofutilitarianism.
committedtoaninadequatepsychology.Whileutilitarianismhasbeenthe targetofmanyotherobjections,thesesixobjectionshavebeenveryinfluential.Showinghowtheycanallbeansweredbyasingletheorywillbethe taskfortheremainderofthebook.
Chapter3setsouttheassumptionsIwillmakeabouttherelationships betweensomeofthebasictopicsofethicalthought:normativereasonsfor action,rightnessandwrongness,praiseworthinessandblameworthiness, andgooddeliberation.Oneimportantassumptionisthatrightnessisa functionofnormativereasons.Onthisconception,thereasonsforor againstanactiondeterminewhetheritisrightorwrong.Thispicturealso impliesthatarelevantexplanationofwhysomeactionisrightorwrongis givenbycitingthereasonsforandagainstit.Butacceptanceofthispicture raisesaquestionofwhetheritispossibletomaintainalloftheclose connectionsthataresometimespositedbetweenreasonsandrightness,on onehand,andpraiseworthinessorblameworthiness,andgoodorbad deliberation,ontheother.
Thisquestionispressingbecausereasonsandrightness,Iclaim,areboth ‘non-perspectival’:reasonsandrightnessdependontheactualconsequences ofactions,ratherthanontheconsequencesanagentexpectsorwhichit wouldbereasonableforherorforsomeoneelsetoexpect.Ontheother hand,whethersomeonedeliberatedwell,orispraiseworthyorblameworthy, certainlydependsonhowthingsseemedtoher whichistosaythatthese arecertainlyperspectivalmatters.ThustheviewIargueforinChapter3 incursasignificantcost:ofexplainingwhatconnection,ifany,thereis between(non-perspectival)reasonsandrightness,and(perspectival)good deliberationandpraiseworthiness.Itrytomeetthischallengelaterinthe book,inChapter9.
Chapter4discusseswell-being.Itbeginsbyconsideringtraditionalphilosophicaldebatesaboutthenatureofwell-being,concludingthatthecentral debate betweensubjectivistsandnon-subjectivists iscurrentlyinstalemate.Thisisadisappointingconclusion.However,Iclaimthatweknow enoughaboutwell-beingtomakereasonablejudgementsabouttheplausibilityofwelfarism.Inaddition,thechapterarguesthatwecanuseafamous ideaofPeterRailton ’sforepistemologicalpurposes.Railtonclaimsthata person ’sgoodwouldnotbesomethingshe findsalienating.¹⁹ Sometryto defendsubjectivismusingthisidea.AsIexplaininChapter4,Idonotthink
¹⁹ Railton2003b:47.
thattheseattemptswork.ButratherthantreatRailton’sideaasaninsight intothemetaphysicalnatureofwell-being,wecantreatalienationas evidenceaboutwhichthingsaresourcesofwell-being.Thechapterclaims, further,thatonewaytoenablepeopletopromotewell-beingistomakeit easierforthemtodiscoverwhichthingsareorwouldbegoodforthem.This enablesustomakeanepistemicutilitarianargumentfortheimportanceof libertyandsecurity.Wethusreachaconclusionabouthowtopromotewellbeingviaanepistemicroute,despitefailingtoresolvethecentralquestion aboutthenatureofwell-being.
Chapter5discussestwokindsofreasons.Itarguesforapluralisttheoryof reasons,accordingtowhichthereare ‘act-based’ reasons(reasonstomake outcomesbetter)and ‘pattern-based’ reasons(reasonstocontributetogood patternsofaction).Itexplainshowtheconceptofpattern-basedreasons featuresinotherethicalviews,includingRuleUtilitarianism.Italsodiscussessomeoftheissuesfacingatheoryofpattern-basedreasons,especially thedifficultyofgivingasatisfactoryaccountofthe ‘eligibility’ ofpatterns thatis,anaccountofwhichpatternsgeneratereasons,andwhichdonot.In thischapterIdepartsignificantlyfromsomeclaimsabouteligibilitythat Ihavedefendedinpreviouswork.²⁰
Chapter6discussesutilitarianattemptstoaccountformoralrights. Iclaimthatutilitariansshouldtrytoexplainmoralrights,butthatexisting attemptsareopentoseriousobjections.Ithentrytoshowthatwecan explainmoralrightsusingtheconceptofpattern-basedreasons.Thebasic ideaisthatthereexistsavaluablepracticewhichissuchthatplayingone’ s partinitamountstorespectingothers’ moralrights,andthatwehave sufficient(pattern-based)reasonstoparticipateinthispractice.Thechapter alsodiscusseswhetherrightsaretoocontingentaccordingtothispicture.
Chapter7beginsbyoutliningautilitarianaccountofjustice.Iarguethat utilitarianscanconstructaplausibletheoryofjustice,asrespectformoral rights.Sincemoralrightsincluderightsthatdependfortheirexistenceon positivelaws,justicewill,onthisview,sometimesconsistinseeingtoitthat peoplegetwhattheyarelegallyentitledto.Thisimplicationconflictswith manycurrenttheoriesofdistributivejustice,includingegalitariantheories. However,laterinthechapterIarguethatutilitarianscanexplainmany egalitarianintuitions,eventhoughtheywilltreatsomeegalitarianaimsas mattersofgoodsocialpolicyratherthanasrequirementsofjustice.
²⁰ InWoodard2008aand2017IrejectedwhatIcalledthe ‘willingnessrequirement’.As IexplaininChapter5below,Inowacceptaformofthisrequirement.
